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TITLE History of United States Armed Forces in Korea
Part I, Chapters I - VIII

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1. The attached documents were forwarded by you for declassification review in connection with a request from Mr. Charles L. Hoag, Middlebury College.

2. The binder containing Chapters 3 and 6 of the "History of the United States Army Forces in Korea" (Inclosure 1) has been declassified.

3. The other two volumes (Inclosures 2 and 3) cannot be declassified without extensive coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other elements of the Dept of Defense and with the Department of State.

4. The Army has spent considerable time and money clearing Mr. Hoag for access to classified materials. It seems impractical to incur further substantial expenditures in an attempt to declassify documents to which he has already been authorized access. These two documents, therefore, are being returned without further action.

FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

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Director of Administrative Services

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The attached Chapter VIII (Part I) of the USAFIK History entitled "Repatriation of Japanese Civilians and Other Foreign Nationals" represents the work of at least three historians, including the undersigned. So far as I can determine, the initial research was done by 1st Lieutenant Harold C. Hinton, [illegible] Information and Historical Service, who also contributed reports from personal observation of the repatriation program. After my arrival in South Korea I collected considerable additional material from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, XXIV Corps, and the Office of Foreign Affairs, USAMGIK. I prepared the outline of topics to be treated and wrote well over half the text of this chapter. Credit for completion and clearance of the final typescript should be given to my successor, Dr. Lewis W. Bealer, to whom I assigned this task.

Harold Larson

2 November 1948

HAROLD LARSON
(formerly Chief Historian,
XXIV Corps, USAFIK)

[redacted] 27 October 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE HISTORICAL DIVISION:

SUBJECT: Review of manuscript, "Repatriation of Japanese Civilians and Other Foreign Nationals, Part I, Chapter VIII." (Historical Division Accession No. 490/1-1, Chapter VIII.)

1. a. The material covered by this review consists of a single chapter, as above stated, in the History of the Occupation of Korea; 64 pages typed double spaced on letter size sheets, with 11 additional pages of footnotes. There are no appendices. This material has no security classification.

b. Time - August 1945 to May 1948
Place - South Korea
Main Units - U. S. XXIV Corps
U. S. Military Government in Korea
Far East Command and SCAP
U. S. Navy
Japanese military and civilian refugees in Korea

c. In the absence of positive information, it is assumed that this material was prepared in Korea at Hq. XXIV Corps. Authorship and date of completion are not stated. The letter transmitting this manuscript to the Historical Division is dated 8 October 1948. Its purpose is to record facts pertaining to the subject stated in the title.

2. Comments on source materials and their use:

Sources are cited throughout the text, are frequently quoted by extract, and often elaborated in explanatory footnotes; but are not reproduced in appendices. The author has apparently investigated and evaluated source materials that were available to him in great quantity; and has produced an authentic record.

3. Comments on presentation:

a. All material presented has direct bearing on the subject. Its arrangement is primarily chronological, with discussions of various topics, such as Cholera Epidemic and Refugees from the North, in logical sequence. The narrative is well-balanced, clear and to the point.

b. The subject is accurately and adequately covered; in an objective, impersonal and unbiased manner; without undue praise or criticism.

Key problems are analyzed; solutions, means, methods and results are discussed; lessons learned are pointed out. The narrative is condensed, factual and well expressed. It is suitable for reproduction and distribution without revision.

4. This material is on a subject which is part of the overall War Department historical program. It is of value to students of foreign affairs in the Far East, to the commanders and general staff officers of corps and higher units in the Far East Command and to historians.

5. Disposition recommended.

a. Reproduce for limited distribution to:
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Command and General Staff College
Armed Forces Staff College
National War College

b. Bring to the attention of:
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U. S. Navy
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Plans and Operations Division, WDGS
Pacific Section, Historical Division
Civil Affairs Section, Historical Division
Chief of Transportation Corps, WD

6. Reviewed by:
22 October 1948

C. C. Benson
Col. Cav. (G.S.C.)

490/1-1

AG 314.7 (8 Sep 45) GB

8 OCT 1948

SUBJECT: History of the Occupation of Korea

TO: Chief, Historical Division
Special Staff
United States Army
Washington 25, D. C.

In compliance with letter, War Department, The Adjutant General's Office, Washington 25, D. C., AG 314.7 (30 Aug 45) OB-O, 8 September 1945, Subject: Historical Program for U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, forwarded herewith is Part I, Chapter VIII of the Repatriation of Japanese Civilians and other Foreign Nationals.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Part I, Chap VIII,
Repatriation of Jap
Civilians and other
Foreign Nationals

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
G-3 Historical Division

16 May 1946

1st Lt. Albert Keep,
1st Info. and Hist. Service,
APO 235

Dear friend Keep:

Your letter of 24 April reached us today via Washington, D. C., where it obviously had gone by mistake.

Please do not bother having copies made of the earlier chapters of your history. It will be sufficient to make extra copies of the subsequent ones.

As to Chapters IV and VI, we make the following comments:

On pp. 11 and 12 of Chapter VI, in reference to Colonel Prescott's visit to GHQ, to state that "confusion reigned in all departments" is severely critical of the command to which the XXIV Corps is subordinate, and therefore a most inappropriate phrase. On p. 12, the statement that on Colonel Prescott's appeal for more specific instructions, he was advised "to write his own plans for the Korean occupation" also can be regarded as critical of GHQ. It does not come within the scope of any account written by a subordinate echelon to pass judgement on the actions or policies of its higher command. On pp. 42 and 45, Chapter IV, in regard to references to "badd Press", it seems that this subject could be omitted as in the having sufficient historic importance to be included in the text. I would strongly suggest that all above references be deleted.

We have noted your letter to the Historical Division, War Dept Special Staff in re inactivation of your Section.

Capt. Putnam of the Statistical and Reports Section asked our consent to obtain from you certain information of interest to that Section. As you know, that Section has no representative in Korea. We have no objection, of course, but please clear everything you send him through this office. This applies most particularly to historical material.

With kindest regards,

W. J. MUEDDELHEIM
Colonel, Infantry
Theater Historian

1 Incl:
Chapters IV & VI

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REMARKS

Reference is made to the request of BG James K. Terry USA (Ret) of Lawrence, Kansas. I am returning an additional 2 documents which were borrowed from OCMH on 24 Nov 1971. (8 were returned to you on 7 Dec 71). These documents have been regraded UNCLASSIFIED. The remaining documents will be returned to you as soon as a determination regarding declassification of them has been made.

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PART I
(TACTICAL)

I	MISSION AND MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE	(24,000 approved)
II	KOREA PRIOR TO JAPANESE SURRENDER	(24,000 approved)
III	INTERMEZZO: AUGUST 1945	(12,000 approved)
IV	THE JAPANESE SURRENDER AND THE BEGINNING OF OCCUPATION	(20,000 approved)
V	RELEASE OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR	(20,000 approved)
VI	THE OCCUPATION OF THE PROVINCES	(30,000 approved)
VII	EVACUATION AND DEMOBILARIZATION OF JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES	(35,000 approved)
VIII	REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE CIVILIANS AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS	(Uncompleted)
IX	REPATRIATION OF KOREAN NATIONALS	(Uncompleted)
X	ADMINISTRATION OF ARMY FORCES	(Uncompleted)
XI	SERVICE OPERATIONS	(Uncompleted)

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CHAPTER I

MISSION AND MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

The first news of the Japanese offer to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration reached Okinawa on the evening of 10 August. At about 2100 an announcement brought Army listeners to their feet and within a matter of minutes the story had spread to all camps in the Ryukyus. The demonstration which followed in the service troop and naval areas was violent and colorful; for fifteen minutes the sky over the islands was ablaze with .50 caliber tracers, rockets and flares. Only by calling a condition red alert was the commander able to halt the firing. The celebration of the probable end of the war was then carried on by other means late into the night.[1]

There were in the Ryukyus area at the time of the Japanese bid for peace about 270,000 army troops -- approximately 100,000 each from Air and Ground Forces and the balance from Service Forces or of miscellaneous categories such as military government.[2] Present also on Okinawa were approximately 50,000 marines of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, some 20,000 of whom were of the 1st Marine Division. And finally, scattered throughout the

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Ryukyus, was an equally substantial naval force, both ashore and afloat.[3]

The senior army headquarters there was the Tenth Army, at the time under the command of General Joseph W. Stilwell. Major subordinate army organizations were the XXIV Corps, the 7th and 27th Infantry Divisions and Army Service Command "Iceberg" (ASCOM I).[4] The Tenth Army was assigned to the United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, with headquarters at Manila. Also under General MacArthur's command were the Sixth and Eighth Armies, and the Far Eastern Air Forces. This last was commanded by General George C. Kenney, and embraced the Fifth, Seventh, and Thirteenth Air Forces. The First Army had been allocated to the Pacific but had not yet been constituted in the area. Under General MacArthur, too, were the major army area commands in the Pacific: U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC) and U.S. Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC).

"Blacklist"

On the evening of 11 August Major General Frank D. Merrill, the recently appointed Chief of Staff

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of the Tenth Army, announced to the staff that the Army would occupy Korea in a movement to begin twenty-seven days from B-day -- the day designated by higher command for the initiation of the operation and the one upon which peace parleys would begin. With it would go the XXIV Corps composed of the 7th Division and others to be announced later. The Sixth and Eighth Armies were to occupy Japan proper, the 27th Division probably was to be employed on a separate mission as an airborne reserve. The basic plan governing these assignments was called "Blacklist". The announcement was scarcely news, since the staff had all day been feverishly studying the two copies of the plan then available at Army headquarters.[5]

The "Blacklist" plan had been formulated in accordance with directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff received by General MacArthur (CINCAFPAC) in June 1945. It covered operations of United States forces under CINCAFPAC control in occupying Japan and Korea in the event of a sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command. The plan in its latest form had been issued 8 August to senior army commanders and staff sections in the Pacific "as a guide in their planning and preparation for prompt action upon termination

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of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied." Informational copies had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander, U.S. Army Strategic Air Force.[6]

The plan visualized the "reasonable probability of active post-surrender resistance of considerable proportions within Japan proper," but it felt "some degree of cooperation may be expected from the civil population of Korea." It anticipated finding a total of 270,000 Japanese army and navy personnel in Korea, together with 35,000 members of civilian defense units. These would have to be disarmed. "Blacklist" envisioned the existing stocks and future production of foodstuffs in Korea as adequate to maintain a minimum subsistence level for the population, but its authors felt that some materials for shelter during the winter months would have to be moved in by Allied shipping. This last was based, presumably, on the expectation of future air strikes, for up to the 11th Korea had received only a few light raids by carrier-borne aircraft.[7]

"Blacklist" was further predicated upon the assumption that the occupation of Japan and Korea would take precedence over any American commitments on the mainland of Asia or on Formosa, that this

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occupation would be the first charge upon all military and naval resources in the Pacific, and that CINCAFPAC would be made responsible for carrying it out. The plan covered only what was called the "Occupation Period," during which the American forces would, by progressive occupation in three phases, seize control of the higher echelons of the enemy's government, immobilize his armed forces, and occupy selected strategic points in order to control his major industrial and political centers and avenues of sea communication. These steps would be followed by the occupation of minor areas controlling food supply and the principal overland and coastwise communications. For Korea the areas selected were: Phase I, the Seoul-Inch'on area; Phase II, the Pusan area; Phase III, the Kunsan area.[8]

Allocated for the Korean occupation, or "Baker-Forty,"[9] was the Tenth Army including the XXIV Corps of three infantry divisions. Numerically, the initial force allocated was as follows:

Per Phases I and II: minimum initial force:

48,524	ground combat
25,973	ground service
1,775	air combat
2,418	air service

The total of 78,690 would be increased by increments to 86,542.

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For Phase III: minimum initial force:

16,644 ground combat
6,791 ground service

For a total of 23,435 men and officers, or a grand total for the occupation of 109,977. These figures did not include Military Government personnel.

The initial mission of the Korea occupation force was stated as being the "disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces and establishment of control of communications." With control gained of the military and civilian population the prescribed terms of surrender would be enforced and the country prepared for post-war government under an army of occupation "as subsequently directed." There were twelve specified "tasks" outlined; they included the institution of military government, the preservation of law and order and the facilitation of peaceful commerce, the recovery of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, the suppression of "activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of Occupation Forces," the apprehending of war criminals, and the assistance to be given the U.S. Pacific Fleet. 10

Of necessity, "blacklist" as a plan was both generalized and tentative. It was essentially an

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alternate to the several major plans for assault on the Empire then in being, and a not too probable alternate at that. Even on 8 August the date of the collapse of the Japanese war effort could hardly have been predicted with certainty. "Blacklist" was, then, as its full title called it, an "outline plan" only; yet it served as a solid frame upon which future directives were built.

On the morning of the 12th the Tenth Army held a staff meeting to discuss the plan. The target date was confirmed as B plus 27, but this might be delayed if difficulties occurred in the earlier occupation of Japan proper. The Korean force would include the 7th and 40th Divisions, the latter to come from the Philippines. The third division, in the event the 27th was employed elsewhere, would be specified later. The occupation force was to move directly from Okinawa to Inch'on. A troop list (other than the type unit list furnished with "Blacklist") was reported to be enroute from GHQ by courier. The logistical responsibilities of the Tenth Army and ASCOM I toward facilitating the air movement of the 11th Airborne Division through Okinawa (in order to land in Japan on VJ Day) were discussed in detail.[11]

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In the meanwhile, events in the world outside Okinawa were moving at a fast tempo. The U.S. State Department had replied to the Japanese surrender offer that "from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms." While the United Nations waited anxiously for the Japanese reaction, news came of the steady Russian advance into Manchuria and of their entry, on 9 August, into northeastern Korea.[12] Japanese defenses crumbled before them at all points. By the 10th, Soviet forces had occupied Agochi and from the 13th to the 16th their warships shelled Chonjin, a Korean port some seventy miles southwest of the frontier.[13]

For the men on Okinawa, also, the war was still on, for the night of 12-13 saw two air raid alerts and the battleship Pennsylvania hit by a torpedo as she lay in Buckner Bay (Nakagusuku Wan) on the east coast of the island. In retaliation, the Far Eastern Air Force carried out its air strike against the Empire, planned earlier, while American and British carrier planes hammered at targets in the Tokyo area.[14]

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The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet warned his units not to relax their vigilance, for the fighting had not stopped and treachery could be expected even after a surrender was announced.[15]

On the 13th General Stilwell flew to Manila to confer with General MacArthur, soon to be appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).[15a] On the 14th Stilwell radioed his Chief of Staff that there had been no change in the basic plan. The Korea force was to move in three echelons at about two week intervals; its mission was to disarm the Japanese, release Allied prisoners of war, carry out the peace terms, and preserve order -- all as outlined in "Blacklist." It was believed that 95 percent of the population was Korean and these were to be considered "semi-friendly." General Merrill, in making this announcement, predicted confusion centering around the different political groups the Americans could expect to find in Korea, with perhaps some fighting. As a precaution, the advanced echelon would make a combat landing in the vicinity of Inch'on.[16]

Although then unknown to most of the officers on Okinawa, there had been a major change of plan for the Korea occupation. On the afternoon of 12 August

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General MacArthur had radioed the Tenth Army Commander that the third edition of the "Blacklist" plan was

> . . . amended to designate the 24th Corps as occupation force, Korea. The 24th Corps will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in Korea, functioning as a task force directly under this headquarters. Responsibilities of the 10th Army in the Ryukyus remain unchanged . . . . The 10th Army will reinforce Headquarters, 24th Corps with commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other appropriate resources as may be available to enable the 24th Corps to perform its assigned area command and military government functions.[17]

The transmission of this radio appears to have been delayed, but copies of it were at Tenth Army Headquarters by the 13th, two days before the change was announced generally to the Army Staff. Rumors of the change began to circulate and a note of uncertainty crept into the Tenth Army planning.[18]

An even greater uncertainty, however, existed at the time. By then Russian forces were threatening Harbin, in Manchuria, and had penetrated further into Korea and were still moving south. Would there be any portion of Korea left to occupy when the Americans finally got started, perhaps a month later? General Merrill added that the entire question of the American occupation of that country was being discussed on a high political level and that there was a distinct

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possibility that United States troops might not go there after all.[19]

On 15 August the President of the United States announced that the Japanese Government had accepted the Allied counterproposals on surrender terms. He added that the surrender would be accepted by General MacArthur and that arrangements were being made for the formal signing of the terms at the earliest possible moment. Allied forces were ordered to suspend offensive operations. The war was now over.

That evening General Merrill made two important announcements to the Tenth Army Staff. Today, he said, was B-Day, but the Tenth Army would not go to Korea after all. The senior command of the occupation force was to be the XXIV Corps, its staff augmented by officers and men from the Tenth Army Staff. A radio from General Stilwell, in Manila, suggested the uncertainty there over many details of the future, but made it clear that from then on the Tenth Army was out of the picture so far as Korea was concerned.[20]

The XXIV Corps

The XXIV Corps was a battlewise command. It had been activated 8 April 1944 in the Hawaiian Islands with

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Major General John H. Hodge as its commander.[21] The general had been reassigned from command of the Americal Division, at the time on Bougainville in the Northern Solomons, near the close of a daring and successful operation. He bore the reputation -- and he enhanced it considerably later -- of being a soldier's soldier. He was not a West Pointer, having been commissioned a second lieutenant in the Regular Army during the first World War. He fought as an infantry officer at St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne; and he remained thereafter essentially an infantryman, although he was one of the few Ground Force officers to graduate from the Air Corps Tactical School. He was also a graduate of the Infantry School, the Command and General Staff School, and the Army War College.[22]

General Hodge was among those who fought the Japanese to a standstill on Guadalcanal, going in as assistant division commander of the 25th Division. Following the campaign he was promoted and given command of the Americal Division, only to be selected by the Commanding General, South Pacific, a few months later, to take temporary command of the 43rd Division which had cracked up badly during its attack on Munda Airfield on New Georgia. His selection for this

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unpromising task is evidence of the confidence placed in him at the time. He was able to rebuild a shattered and demoralized group of men into a fighting division. He was able to do this to a large extent through personal example and inspiration. Then, as in later battles, he was constantly at the front -- on Bougainville he was wounded while in a forward position. For his aggressive leadership in the Solomons he won both the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Service Medal.

The new commanding general was already noted for his blunt and direct approach to problems, although his staff soon learned that he weighed every one of them with meticulous care. Memoranda and letters which went out over his name bore his direct impress, for he wrote many of them himself and few of the others got by without alteration in his bold scrawl. He was without pose or affectation; and -- as he later introduced himself to the Korean nation -- he was of the common people, born and raised on an Illinois farm. Above all, he had the capacity to inspire loyalty and unswerving obedience. Few who incurred his displeasure could soon forget his personal reprimand, or consider it unjustified.

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General Hodge's Chief of Staff was Colonel Crump Garvin, who before reporting to the Corps had commanded the 164th Infantry Regiment. Other officer personnel of the unit was drawn principally from the Central Pacific Area headquarters and organizations assigned to that area. Their diverse origins and backgrounds did not prevent them from becoming, under General Hodge's leadership, an efficient team in short order.

The first task given the Corps, together with the III Marine Amphibious Corps, was the capture of the Palau Islands. In mid-July the Corps mission was changed to the assault of Yap. A second change on 15 September -- while some of the Corps transports were actually enroute to the target -- made Leyte the objective, with the Corps comprising the 7th and 96th Divisions, operating under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army. Only by smoothly running staff work could the Corps adjust its plans to meet successfully these shifting requirements.[23]

The two divisions of the XXIV Corps landed abreast on the east coast of Leyte on 20 October, and by 5 November the 7th, after swinging in a U-shaped loop across the mountains, had reached the west side

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of the island. To the organization then came two more divisions, the 11th Airborne and the 77th, the latter veterans of Guam. General Hodge now planned and executed a triple envelopment of the strong enemy positions in the Ormoc area of Leyte. In a series of land and amphibious movements the Corps captured Ormoc on 10 December, and on the 26th the island was declared secure.

Mopping up continued until early February 1945 -- in this latter period alone the Corps killed 14,000 Japanese -- when preparations were started for the next mission on Okinawa. Again the Corps was slated to operate with the III Marine Amphibious Corps, this time under the Tenth Army. To it were assigned the 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Divisions. Troops had to be assembled from all over Leyte, reorganized, reequipped, and mounted out.

On 26 March the 77th Division seized the islands of the Kerama Retto off the southwestern coast of Okinawa, and on 1 April the 7th and 96th landed on the western coast of the island itself. A week later the Corps came up against the myriad caves and underground positions which comprised the strongly fortified concentric defense rings around Shuri. Not until the end of May was the final position broken and the

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Japanese pushed south for a death stand in mid-June. On 22 June the end came. The Corps had suffered heavy casualties in what has been called the most difficult and deadliest battle of the Pacific War, but it had accounted for 70,000 of the 100,000 enemy killed on Okinawa.

Prior to the Japanese surrender both the 77th and 96th Divisions had quit Okinawa and moved to the Philippines. Both of the remaining divisions had experienced a considerable turnover in personnel, but were by now nearly up to strength. On the 11th the 7th Division report showed 12,606 men and officers present out of an authorized 14,061, plus 813 attached troops out of an authorized 836. The bulk of the 2864 assigned absentees were in the process of readjustment and more were to follow. For a total of 770 men and officers of the division had AGR scores of 100 or over, and 4,425 scores of 85 or over.[24] There had been next to no time for training the replacements, and a considerable number of the men of the 7th Division who reached Korea were little better off than when they quitted basic training.

The Division itself was veteran, with four campaigns to its credit: Attu, Kwajalein, Leyte, and

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Okinawa. In each of it had played a distinguished part. The bulk of its officers had served in at least two of the operations and this went far toward overcoming any weakness in enlisted men. Its commander, Major General Archibald V. Arnold, was popular and its morale was high. In fact, it was hard to get a 7th Division soldier to admit that a better combat unit could exist.[25]

There had also been changes in the staff of the XXIV Corps since the end of the Ryukyus campaign, yet by and large the officers who led the Corps in combat remained to take it to Korea. Brigadier General Crump Garvin was on leave in the United States when the news came of the Corps taking over, but he was immediately recalled.[26] Colonel Kenneth C. Strother, his deputy, was on hand, as were the bulk of the general and special staff heads.[27]

Mission

Specific instructions followed shortly upon the notification of the Corps assignment. In the operations instructions issued 15 August by GHQ AFPAC, General MacArthur announced his force as the First, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Armies, the XXIV Corps, Far -

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Eastern Air Forces (FEAF), AFMIDPAC and AFWESPAC.[28] To the XXIV Corps he assigned the mission of occupying Korea in three phases, "in conjunction and as arranged with the Commander Seventh Amphibious Forces." For the first time it was definitely stated that it was only to be that portion of Korea "south of the 38° North Latitude."

The three phases of occupation were specified as follows:

Phase I: By joint overwater operations, to occupy the Seoul area of Korea and to establish control of the Japanese Central Government and the Army-Navy command of Korea for CINCAFPAC. This phase was designated "Baker-Forty," and its target date (B-day) was set at B plus 27.

Phase II: By subsequent ground and overwater operations, to occupy the Pusan area of southern Korea. This phase was designated "Baker-Forty-One," with target date (B-day) to be designated by the Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

Phase III: By subsequent ground and overwater operations, to occupy the Kunsan-Chonju area in southwestern Korea in a phase designated "Baker-Forty-Two," beginning on a target date (B-day) also to be designated by the Commanding General, XXIV Corps

General Hodge was permitted leeway in varying the order of occupation in Phases II and III if he

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found it necessary. In addition to the mission as outlined in "Blacklist," he was instructed to mount out ground and air forces for the occupation, occupy and defend sites in Korea for radar and aircraft warning installations, and establish facilities there for the air force units assigned. The Tenth Army was instructed to assist in staging out and mounting XXIV Corps troops out of the Ryukyus.[29]

Specific instructions for the occupation included these principal items: destroy hostile elements, "suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of the occupation forces," control land and coastwise transportation and signal communications, institute Military Government and insure that law and order are maintained among the civilian population.[30]

General Hodge was further ordered to facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly with a view to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population; secure intelligence; recover, relieve and repatriate Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees without delay;[31] "be prepared to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements as subsequently directed," and to "extend control over the Japanese as

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required to implement policies for post-war occupation and government when prescribed." Assistance was to be given the U.S. Pacific Fleet as needed.

AFPAC, in the instructions, ordered the Corps to move in as quickly as the situation permitted and be prepared to make, in conjunction with the Navy, "an amphibious lift of one division capacity for post-Phase I short range amphibious operations as required." This was in anticipation of possible resistance; the Corps was further instructed to watch for any "resumption of [further] hostilities, treachery or sabotage." The Corps was finally ordered to submit to GHQ a brief of the detailed coordinated plan covering the amphibious operation and subsequent action ashore.

Intelligence

Very little was known by the Corps staff officers of the land for which they were to embark in less than three weeks. Almost the sole written source of intelligence available on Okinawa (or, for that matter, in the western Pacific) was the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Korea, called JANIS 75, published in April 1945.[32] It was a capable piece of work, embracing people and government of Korea, its

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physical resources, transportation and communications, and the other topics required for strategic intelligence. But it suffered from the same superficiality that weakened other Allied writings on the closely guarded secrets of the Japanese Empire. However, using JANIS 75 as a base, the Corps G-2 undertook the several lines of investigation then open to him.

During the Ryukyus Campaign more than 700 Korean prisoners of war had been captured by American forces; they were still on Okinawa. The G-2 language teams of the Tenth Army and the Corps at once undertook an intensive schedule of interrogations, with, however, indifferent results. As the Corps Intelligence Officer later reported:

> . . . the amount of information disclosed by these POW's was meager. In all cases, the men received little education and most were of low intelligence. Very few had ever visited the area in which the initial landing was destined to take place, and all had left Korea more than a year before the interrogations were made so that it was impossible to obtain current information.[33]

Most of the results of this effort were published in two brief reports.[34]

More important were the results secured from air reconnaissance. The maps and data in JANIS 75 were palpably inadequate. A large amount of photography

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had been taken of Korea by China based aircraft in late 1944, but the negatives were in Washington. They were hastily packed and shipped by air to Okinawa. Arriving early in September, just prior to embarkation, they proved of little or no value.[35] The Tenth Army had taken steps to secure current photographic coverage shortly before it was relieved of responsibility but without results.[36] About 16 August the Corps commenced direct negotiations with the two photo reconnaissance squadrons then on Okinawa and discovered that the library of the 28th Squadron contained photographs made in sorties over Korea as late as 22 and 28 July and 6 and 18 August. The prints covered airfields in the southern part of the country plus good coverage of Pusan and its harbor. Establishing the Inch'on-Seoul area as first priority, Pusan as second, and Kunsan as third, the Corps G-2 persuaded the 28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron to fly other sorties. In spite of uncertainties of command responsibilities, general grounding of aircraft at certain times, and other handicaps, the Squadron covered the Inch'on-Seoul area on 18 August and again -- this time with excellent results in both verticals and obliques -- on the 25th. With these flights the Corps had to be satisfied,

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for AFPAC would not permit further flights to be made prior to the operation. And as it turned out they were sufficient in view of the non-tactical character of the landing. A few verticals were secured of Kunsan on the sortie of the 18th, and distribution of photographic intelligence reports and uncontrolled mosaics of the priority areas was made to all concerned prior to the departure from Okinawa.[37]

It will be recalled that "Blacklist" had estimated the Japanese strength in Korea at 270,000 army and navy with 35,000 members of civilian defense units. Based on War Department publications and the CINCAFPAC-CINCPOA Estimate of Enemy Strength,[38] the estimate for August had to be raised to 375,000 men. Included was the headquarters of the 17th Area Army, five divisions, five depot divisions, and numerous smaller units. Furthermore, it was believed that Korea had become a training center for the dangerous Special Attack Corps. Aircraft was estimated at 840 of all types, with at least 230 fighters. These estimates, of course, embraced all of Korea; no effort was made to distinguish the units then south of the 38 degree parallel. Later, when the figures and charts supplied by the Japanese delegates who went by air to Manila

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to arrange the signing of the surrender had been examined, this figure was reduced somewhat. Accurate figures secured after the landing reduced it even further, but withal the enemy troop strength in Korea was never an item which could be accepted lightly.[39]

Forces Available

At noon, Tokyo time, on 15 August the Emperor of Japan called upon his people to lay down their arms. On the 16th AFPAC radioed that negotiations with the Japanese were in progress and that hostilities were to cease. The night before enemy planes had bombed and crash dived on the little island of Iheya Shima, wounding several Americans. Other Kamikaze had attacked the warships of the Third Fleet, cruising off the Japanese mainland, and the instructions from AFPAC stated that our air reconnaissance would continue and that security measures would not be relaxed.[40] But from the 16th on Japanese military operations ceased. Within a few days all of the isolated enemy groups on Okinawa were surrendering. In the original radio orders designating the Corps as the Korea occupation force, it was mentioned that the responsibilities of the Tenth Army in the Ryukyus remained unchanged.[41] On

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the 16th the Tenth Army ordered the Corps relieved of responsibility of the ground defense of that area effective 22 August, and on that day, at 1200, ASCOM I -- subordinate to the Tenth Army -- assumed responsibility for the ground defense and internal security of the Ryukyus.[42]

On the 18th General Hodge radioed for authority to come to AFPAC headquarters for conference. This request was granted and he left by air for Manila with two of his staff officers on the 21st.[43] Four days later he returned, having been delayed by bad weather.[44]

Prior to his departure for Manila, General Hodge had been appointed Commanding General United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) with authority to "act for CINCAFPAC in reception of surrender of senior Japanese commanders and all Japanese ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude."[45] Upon his return he formally established this new overall headquarters and assumed its command on 27 August.[46]

For the Korean occupation "Blacklist" had originally assigned a force of about 110,000 men. The first troop list to arrive at Tenth Army headquarters was dated 11 August.[47] It allocated the 7th,

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27th, and 40th Divisions to the Army, together with the 137 AAA Group, 20th Armored Group, 1st Engineer Special Brigade with two engineer combat groups, XXIV Corps Artillery, and a sizeable service echelon under ASCOM TEN. In all there were to be 65,052 army combat troops, and 27,542 army service troops. Thereafter troop list revisions followed in rapid succession; by 1 September thirteen had been published.

On the 14th the 27th Division was replaced by the 96th.[48] The second troop list, dated 15 August, reflected the relief from responsibility of the Tenth Army and the assignment of the 96th Division. It listed an Army Service Command 24 (ASCOM 24) to replace ASCOM TEN.[49] Troop allocations were altered to 62,724 combat and 29,076 service. Within the Corps zone of responsibility were listed air units totalling 10,669 men, under the general command of the Far Eastern Air Forces and under the immediate control of the 308th Bomb Wing (Heavy), a specially designed mobile administrative and operational headquarters.[50]

On 1 September, shortly before the operation was launched, the major combat and service elements under the XXIV Corps were:

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7th Infantry Division
40th Infantry Division
96th Infantry Division
Tenth Army AAA (acting as Military Government Headquarters)
137th AAA Group
101st Signal Battalion
XXIV Corps Artillery
71st Medical Battalion
1140th Engineer Combat Group
ASCOM 24

The 308th Bomb Wing was to operate within the Corps area of responsibility.[51]

One of the principal considerations of the first week of planning was the state of readiness of the two divisions in the Philippines which had been assigned to the Corps. To the 40th, then on Panay, and to the 96th, on Mindoro, radios were sent through the Sixth and Eighth Armies respectively asking as to their status of preparation for movement, including the availability of required supplies, ammunition and equipment.[52] In the meanwhile, however, CINCAFPAC had ordered the commanding officers of both divisions with minimum planning staffs to report to General Hodge on Okinawa.[53] Major General James L. Bradley and party arrived on the 19th and Brigadier General Donald J. Myers on the 20th, making it possible for the Corps to receive its data at first hand.[54]

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Both of the divisions had passed to the operational control of the XXIV Corps by the terms of Operations Instructions No. 4 on 15 August, and both were assigned to the Corps effective on the same day.[55] It was thought at first that, following the general plan in "Blacklist" the 7th and 40th Divisions would move to Korea at the same time. Phase II would, in that way, follow close on the heels of of Phase I. It was not planned to have the 40th come to Okinawa; rather it was to be lifted direct from Panay to Korea.[56] The division was instructed to return to the Zone of the Interior all its enlisted personnel who wished to go of forty or more years of age and with over 85 points on their Adjusted Service Rating.[57]

A report from the Sixth Army showed the 40th Division lacking very few items of ordnance and engineer equipment, but with much that was operative but not combat serviceable. No winter clothing was available. Maintenance and supply levels were generally satisfactory.[58] Less was known about the status of the 96th, but this proved of little disadvantage since in the end it never came to Korea. Preparations for mounting the 40th Division were slowed

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by the news on 23 August that it would move to Korea in a second echelon of shipping. The story of its preparations and movement will be told in a later chapter.

Shipping

The general plan for the movement of occupation forces to Japan and Korea was covered in "Blacklist," and the overall directive was issued by the Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral R.K. Turner, on 19 August.[59] Troops were to be embarked as nearly as possible in accord with requests of the local army commanders. On Okinawa the latter would be responsible for providing loading facilities not carried by the ships. The Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force (7th Phib) was made responsible for lifting the XXIV Corps to Korea, for delivering the troops to objective beaches, for providing amphibious type ships for further amphibious operations at the target if necessary, and for planning an economical turnaround schedule for his vessels. The 7th Phib, commanded by Vice Admiral D.E. Barbey, contained two Amphibious Groups -- 9

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and 13, each containing a Transport Squadron -- and a Support Carrier Group.

In the meanwhile, on the 16th, the 7th Phib had advised the Corps of its tentative shipping assignment for the Korea lift: two transport squadrons, each with 15 assault transports (APA's) and 6 assault cargo ships (AKA's). There were to be, in addition, 60 LST's and 30 LSM's.[60] No date for the availability of this shipping had been given, and the Corps felt that if it could be secured early enough -- and if either the 40th or 96th Divisions had ample supplies on hand for mounting -- the target date of B plus 27 could be advanced one week.[61] But on the 18th, after a conference with naval officers had failed to establish a firm date for the arrival of the vessels, the Corps advised AFPAC that B plus 27 was an "extremely optimistic date."[62]

The shipping problem for "Baker-Forty" was complicated by the necessity of rounding up units assigned XXIV Corps by Operations Instructions No. 4, then on Angaur, Iwo Jima and scattered throughout the Philippines. The Corps suggested that these troops, including necessary units of the Far Eastern Air Forces, be lifted by Seventh Fleet shipping and concentrated at Okinawa by 1 September. But the difficulty of

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the Corps in planning to meet its K-day was simply a reflexion of similar difficulties throughout "blacklist," and on the 21st General MacArthur radioed that the non-availability of shipping would prevent meeting the various target dates for Phase I of the occupation, and that the XXIV Corps Commander should establish the earliest date he could move after consultation with the 7th Phib Commander and so advise GHQ. Based on such estimates from the Corps and from the Sixth and Eighth Armies, GHQ would announce the final target dates later. 63

Negotiations between General Hodge's staff and the naval staff of the 7th Phib followed and the situation began to look brighter. The 7th Phib commander requested COMPHIBSPAC to have the transport squadron and flotilla commanders assigned him report at the earliest possible moment. On 21 August he estimated that his Transport Squadron 17, then at Okinawa, would have most of its ships ready to begin loading immediately. His other Transport Squadron, number 21, would, he thought, be available for loading for Phase II where required after 10 September. He recommended that the transports of Squadron 17, plus such LST's and LSM's as could be

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collected together, lift the 7th Division and Corps units from Okinawa and land them at Inch'on on the original target date, 11 September. The 40th Division could be loaded as additional shipping became available and be landed about 30 September. If the two divisions were to be landed simultaneously, the 7th Phib Commander estimated that the 30th would, in all probability, be the earliest date he could promise.[64] In general, naval authorities did not feel a two division lift could be made initially. A study made by G-3 on the 23rd showed that under this plan the Corps artillery, anti-aircraft and armored units would have to be cut about 80 percent; the 7th Division would have to leave behind all but 35 percent of its vehicles, the 40th even more; and ASCOM 24 could take only the bare minimum of men required initially to operate the port of Inch'on.[65]

On 23 August, Admiral Barbey set 7 September as the date for the Corps headquarters and 7th Division to sail, employing twenty-one vessels, in three transport divisions.[66] Six of the ships included, however, were not at Okinawa and there was a good chance that they might not arrive in time for loading.[67] Arrangements were made to have part of

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the squadron assemble in Buckner Bay (Nakagusuku Wan) on the east coast of Okinawa, which was adjacent to Corps Headquarters and the 7th Division CP.[68] Division units were to embark at Yonabaru. Corps headquarters and headquarters units were assigned Kuba, to the north, but this was changed later to the vicinity of Naha on the west coast. Other embarkation points planned were also on the west coast: Corps artillery and armor at Naha, service units of ASCOM 24 along the Hagushi Beaches, and air forces under the 308th Bomb Wing and FEAF at Nago.[69]

Admiral Barbey's loading date of the 7th resulted from a conference at Manila. On the 23rd General Hodge radioed from GHQ that the plan was to move the 7th Division with appropriate elements of Corps and ASCOM 24 troops so as to arrive at the target on B plus 27. It was to be a one division lift; the 40th would come up later. General Hodge wanted his headquarters divided into a full operating group forward with a rear echelon left on Okinawa to handle loading and administration. He added that AFWESPAC was charged with preparing the small Corps units in the Philippines for shipment.[70]

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The 11 September target date did not last for long. Conditions in Korea were, to say the least, obscure. By 22 August the Soviet forces had occupied most of Manchuria and on the 25th Marshal Josef Stalin proclaimed its conquest. Penetration into Korea continued at the same rapid pace. Although American headquarters in Manila and on Okinawa were far from certain about Russian movements, by the 26th it looked as if the Soviet troops could scarcely avoid being in Seoul within a few days. General Hodge told his staff that he expected the Russians would have disarmed the Japanese in Korea before we could arrive.[71]

The necessity of hastening the movement to Korea was apparent. As General MacArthur's G-3 later explained to the Corps commander:

> . . . A rapid movement into Korea has the backing and direction of the President. Numerous radios have been exchanged with the War Department in which the priority of the Keijo /Seoul/ area has been greatly stressed. It is with these things in mind that the decision was made to expedite the movement even though it might disrupt previous plans and result in lighter equipment than would normally be desirable.[72]

On the 26th, therefore, General MacArthur radioed the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

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The present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy Keijo (Seoul) on 11 September. Conferences today indicate that the initial movement of lightly armed troops in assault transports and cargo vessels can take place, leaving Okinawa on the 4th and arriving Keijo on the 7th. This movement will be followed with heavier equipment as rapidly as possible. This plan is being approved and instructions are being issued to the Commanding General XXIV Corps and others to execute it generally as indicated.[73]

The XXIV Corps was so instructed. The force was to leave Okinawa on 4 September. General Hodge was to submit his final plan, at which time the Japanese Government would be told what to do about facilitating his landing at Inch'on.[74] General Hodge, after a conference with naval officers including the Commander of Amphibious Group 7, Rear Admiral I.N. Kiland, who had recently arrived on Okinawa, replied that he would move such light forces as the shipping then available could carry. Due to the "extremely poor balance of shipping," he anticipated a delay in completing the overall movement to the target. Supplementary echelons would have to be moved as shipping was secured.[75]

Admiral Kiland was instructed to use Transport Squadron 17 plus some LST's for the initial lift. Other vessels were to follow as soon as they could be secured and loaded. A meeting of ship and

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division transport quartermasters was called for conference with Corps officers on the morning of the 27th.[76]

General Hodge radioed CINCAFPAC his plan on the 28th. On that day, too, the Corps issued its Field Order 55 covering the Korean occupation.[77] Departing late on 3 September or early on the 4th, the 7th Division, less its heaviest elements and most of its transportation, was expected to land at Inch'on with the first daylight high tide on the 7th. Every effort would be made to move to Seoul the same day. The division would use 15 APA's and 1 AKA. With it on two more APA's would go the Corps troops selected for this first group, together with the advance echelon of ASCOM 24 in another APA.[78]

The 40th Division was to be picked up at Pusan as soon as shipping could be collected; it was expected in Korea about 1 October. The 96th would next be lifted from Mindoro. General Hodge felt he could meet the Japanese officials on the 7th and arrange for the surrender ceremony the following day. He desired to send a small advance party by air to arrive about the 4th, and requested approval.[79]

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The Corps commander reiterated the drastic limitations he would have to make in vehicles, equipment of other sorts, and in supplies in order to get to the target on time. He stressed that it was essential to have heavy shipping follow the advance echelon at an early date. In the current shipping "scramble," as he called it, he saw the distinct possibility of a diversion of shipping originally earmarked for the Corps which would either prevent supplies and equipment reaching the Corps in Korea or delay the move of the 40th Division, or both.[80]

To supplement what the navy could provide, General Hodge asked for six Liberty ships.[81] In the end he got them, but the exchange of radios on the subject led, through a misinterpretation, to two days of misunderstanding and confusion.[82] In the end, however, the Corps plan was approved and the AFPAC G-3 radioed General Hodge:

> Your difficulties in getting off the movement with initial inadequacies of amphibious forces are fully realized. . . . This entire problem was fully discussed with /the Commander, Seventh Amphibious Force/ prior to having /his/ the decision. He is acquainted with full details and it is certain will do everything in his power to furnish full resources of amphibious equipment. . . . Your movement is to take place after the general surrender at Tokyo.

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Information being received today indicated that the movement into Tokyo is proceeding smoothly without trouble and it is believed that the movement into Keijo will proceed in the same manner.[83]

The plans for shipping had to rest at that. Circumstances in the end, including weather, did not permit the Corps to leave on the 4th, but before dealing with the actual loading it will be well to bring the story up to date on the other aspects of preparation.

Operational Planning

The Corps Field Order, issued the 28th, specified a tentative K-day for 7 September with H-hour to be announced by the Commanding General, 7th Division.[84] The division was to land, secure and operate the port of Inch'on until relieved by ASCOM 24, push rapidly east, seizing all critical military and civilian installations in the Inch'on-Seoul Area. The area to be taken and held was a strip twenty-eight miles long and extending approximately ten miles in width on either side of the Inch'on-Seoul railway and motor road, and perhaps five miles further east of Seoul than its city wall. It was then to be prepared to extend its zone of responsibility north

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to the line of the Kaesong River and east to the junction of the Han and Pukhan Rivers.

The 40th Division was to embark at Pusan in Transport Squadron 21 shipping, move to Inchon or whatever port might later be designated, relieve the 7th Division of the area south of the Inchon-Seoul highway and the Han River, and be prepared to move south to just beyond Suwon. Later it was to extend its control along the highways and railways to the south.

The 96th Division was to move on order so as to arrive not later than D plus 30 at either Inchon, Pusan or Kunsan. Corps artillery, the units of the 20th Armored Group and the anti-aircraft artillery were instructed to be prepared to fill their normal combat functions.

To the divisions was passed the occupational mission outlined by CINCAFPAC in Operations Instructions No. 4. Strategic installations were to be seized, Japanese forces disarmed, hostile groups destroyed, law and order maintained, peaceful commerce facilitated, and Allied prisoners of war recovered. The troops were cautioned about their conduct in the eyes of "the defeated Japanese and the liberated



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Koreans." There was to be strict control over careless firing of weapons.[85]

AFPAC Operations Instructions No. 4 ordered the Far Eastern Air Forces to discontinue all air strikes against Japanese targets on CINCAFPAC order and to then "create a show of force" over critical areas of Japan and Korea. In addition, its aircraft, in conjunction with those of the navy and the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, were to provide air protection for naval forces and friendly shipping as arranged by CINCAFPAC and air support in the occupation areas as arranged with CINCPAC. Some troop carrier operations could be expected to Korea, although, as it turned out, troop carrying was confined chiefly to the initial air lift to Japan.[86]

Instructions for a "show of force" were later amended to read "surveillance flights."[87] Actually, army aircraft played a relatively small part in the move to Korea. Combat air patrols during the lift to the target and air support of the landings were to be supplied by Admiral Barbey's Escort Carrier Group. The Commanding General, 308th Bomb Wing, was required by the Corps to occupy bases in Korea and be ready to function as a combat air force plus

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furnishing air courier service and transport in of emergency supplies and air evacuation out. Aerial reconnaissance and photography, weather service, and radar and air warning operation were further missions of the air units placed under his control.[88] The part played by air units in preliminary reconnaissance, air drops, and the transport of the advance party is told elsewhere in the narrative.

Supply and Administration

In the 11 August edition of AFPAC Operations Instructions No. 4, mention was made of an Army Service Command 10, designed to serve as the logistical operating agency of the Tenth Army in Korea.[89] Steps had been taken to organize such a unit as early as 12 August. To command it General Stilwell had selected and verbally appointed Major General Gilbert X. Cheves, then Commander of Army Ports on Okinawa under ASCOM X. Meetings were held between General Cheves, Colonel William I. Sherwood -- then ASCOM's G-1 and later Corps Inspector General -- and others on the 12th and subsequently to arrange for personnel and equipment.[90]

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When the shift came to the XXIV Corps the infant service organization was adopted by General Hodge who, using as his authority the 15 August edition of Operations Instructions No. 4, renamed it ASCOM 24. For a time all planning and appointments were on a verbal basis. Then on 29 August AFPAC formally established the command.[91]

The strength of Headquarters, ASCOM 24 had been set originally at 500 men and officers.[92] This seemed to the Corps too small a figure and authority was requested for an increase. On the 30th CINCAFPAC raised his authorization for 700 men of appropriate ranks and grades.[93] On the same day General Chaves was transferred from ASCOM I to become ASCOM 24's commanding general.[94]

In his letter of instructions to General Chaves the Corps commander outlined the general duties of ASCOM 24:

> In general, ASCOM 24 is the logistic agency of the XXIV Corps and is charged with the responsibility for operating the Corps logistic facilities, establishments, and installations in Korea and for the timely submission of necessary requisitions and requests to the responsible external logistic agencies.[95]

Specifically, the Service Command was to open the

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port of Inch'on as soon as it was cleared by the assault echelon and thereafter operate it. Operation would include the unloading of ships, and the storage and issue of supplies. ASCOM 24, further, was to operate all medical installations except those assigned or attached to tactical units. It was to work in close coordination with Military Government in supervising the operation of such Korean civil facilities as railroads, communications, ports, and other public utilities, as well as arranging for the use of buildings and real estate for military purposes.[96]

All of the troops destined for the Korean occupation were in summer uniform -- in fact, the vast majority had been in cottons since they entered the Pacific Theater. In view of projected operations to the north, certain shipments of cold weather clothing were already enroute from the United States, and the Corps G-4 learned that one vessel, the Haterzitch, carrying about 125,000 units of woolen clothing, was near the Marshall Islands. The Corps requested that the entire ship be turned over for its use and that it be attached to the assault convoy without unloading at Okinawa. The fact that its cargo also included stoves and prefabricated buildings added, in the Corps'

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opinion, to its value. The request was approved and in spite of attempts to waylay some of its cargo the vessel was diverted and sent to Korea.[97]

The Corps Administrative Order was published 28 August.[98] The troops of the first echelon were to carry a 30 days supply of rations and 15 days of gas and oil. Only the most essential organizational equipment was to go in the beginning, with just enough construction materials and equipment to begin getting the airdromes, bulk petroleum installations, signal communications and the port at Inch'on into operation. Combat troops were ordered to carry three units of fire, service troops one unit, and air forces a fifteen days' supply. Re-supply was to be "automatic," as provided by AFWESPAC, until B plus 150 days. Shipments were to be moved to ports as requested by the Corps.[99]

The Administrative Order set the following levels of supply to be established in Korea as early as practicable:[100]

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Class of Supply	Operating Level	Reserve Level
Cl I, II and III (lubes and greases only)	15 D/S	15 D/S
Cl III (except lubes and greases)	10 D/S packaged and 15 D/S bulk	
Cl IIIA	15 D/S	---
Cl IV (less construction materials)	15 D/S	15 D/S
Cl V (includes that in hands of troops):		
Combat troops	5 U/F (total) (later reduced to 3 U/F)	
Service troops	1 U/F (total)	
Cl VA	15 D/S	---

The medical plan envisioned only mobile type hospitals during the early phases of the occupation. Each division was assigned two portable surgical hospitals and one field hospital, reinforced with specialist teams. ASCOM 24 was to furnish hospitalization for Corps Troops. Thirty days operational medical maintenance was set up to accompany major echelons. Fixed hospitals would be brought in as shipping permitted; evacuation policy was to be at first for 30 days, but was to expand to 60 days when facilities were available. Nurses and other female personnel were not to come in at first; they would be requested

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when facilities were ready to receive them. Full plans were made for casualties which might be received during the landing phase.[101]

Suppressive malaria treatment with atabrine was ordered, and all precautions required in malarious areas were to become effective upon landing. The problem of health and sanitation met with in Korea, and the steps planned and taken to solve these problems, will be dealt with in a later chapter.[102] Not a great deal was known of the health conditions which lay ahead, but precautions were taken against the Oriental diseases one could expect. And precautions were taken in other directions. Medical personnel were ordered to retain the weapons they had worn through the Okinawa campaign. In view of the international rules of war, however, they were to carry them only in necessary cases and to display them no more than would be required by circumstances.[103]

The naval hospital ships Refuge, Relief and Repose had been assigned to the Seventh Fleet by CINCPAC.[104] In addition, the Corps requested that the hospital ship Mercy, a naval vessel staffed with army medical personnel and designed for transferring patients from rear base hospitals to the United States be assigned to it for the operation. It was desired at

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the objective area on H-day, ready for casualties received on landing.[105] This request was granted, and the Marcy, along with the Refuge, were in Inch'on harbor when the ships carrying the assault echelon arrived. Both had moved to Korea independently of the main convoy. The other two naval hospital ships did not figure in the operation, remaining (in theory) on call.[106]

The evacuation plan specified by General MacArthur called for the sick among the liberated prisoners of war and civilian internees being sent to Manila for necessary processing before being forwarded to their final destination. Army patients were to be evacuated normally to Middle Pacific bases, with those requiring more than sixty days hospitalization continuing later to the United States. Flight personnel of FEAF would as a rule be moved by air via Okinawa to the Philippines.[107] As it turned out, not only were there no casualties on landing, but the Allied prisoners released in Korea were found to require little or no medical treatment and to be well able to move by regular transport to Manila. As a result, the Refuge left Inch'on for China a few days after the landing, and the Marcy remained there in

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the harbor as a floating hospital.

The question of the currency to be used by American forces in Korea proved a special problem. On Okinawa the troops had been given Type B Military Yen Currency. Its issue had been rigidly controlled in order to prevent inflation on the island -- a precaution quite useless since civilian markets had been obliterated by our artillery and the native possessed little more valuable than the clothes he wore. A new Type A Yen Currency had been designed for use in Korea in order to facilitate accounting and currency control between parts of the former Japanese Empire. All Type B was ordered turned in by the occupation force prior to embarkation. In the meanwhile, the old ratio of ten yen to the dollar was to be changed shortly prior to departure to fifteen yen to the dollar.

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Conversion took place on Okinawa as directed, and the 15 to 1 rate became standard throughout the former Japanese domain. At first the plan was to withdraw the local Korean currency, but instructions from Washington dated 28 August permitted its use together with the supplemental military type. Japanese bank notes, however, were to be withdrawn from

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circulation in Korea. The various currencies used in Japan and Korea were to be interchangeable at par value. Stocks of Type A notes, stored at Pearl Harbor,[110] were made available to the Corps.

The Corps moved to Korea under this currency plan, and a few Type A notes were actually issued. Then it was discovered that a sufficient supply of Bank of Chosen notes were available in Korea for military as well as civilian use. This fact, coupled with the difficulty of handling the military currency at a cashier's window and a desire to strengthen Korean notes in the eyes of the Koreans, led to a withdrawal of the Type A notes from circulation. Thenceforth, only Bank of Chosen notes, together with some small Japanese yen notes, were used by the American forces in Korea.[111]

The[therefore] hasty organization of USAFIK raised numerous questions of administration and supply channels. On 1 September General Hodge issued a detailed order making clear that with a very few exceptions all communications were to be routed through his headquarters. Military Government and units and persons in Korea, whether or not assigned or attached to the Corps, were instructed that the

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correct command and administrative channels were via USAFIK. Certain routine AAF correspondence alone was excepted; and units were permitted direct requisitioning on ASCOM 24 for routine supplies and services.[112]

In view of the shortage of shipping, a considerable responsibility devolved upon those who stayed on Okinawa to see that the men and material which were left behind by the advance echelon reached Korea as rapidly as possible. Brig. Gen. Josef. R. Sheetz was appointed Commander of the Rear Echelon, XXIV Corps, on 30 August. His instructions reminded him to keep close liaison with the transportation offices of Tenth Army and ASCOM I. They further pointed out that he could look to the Commanding General, Ryukyus Area (then the Commanding General, Tenth Army) for the supply and maintenance of his units, assistance in loading and mounting, and hospitalization facilities. He was in general to follow the echelon shipping schedule prepared by the Corps, but he was given considerable latitude in deviating therefrom in order to make the most economical use of shipping as it became available.[113]

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Contact with the Japanese

The first two weeks of radio conversation between General MacArthur and the Japanese General Headquarters made little mention of conditions in Korea, details of the surrender there, or of the Russians. A Japanese radio on the 25th reported that their commanders facing Soviet forces were having some difficulty bringing the fighting to an end, although "generally speaking the cessation of hostilities is in fair progress,"[114] A Moscow broadcast had predicted a Russian airborne movement to Hokkaido[115] and the Japanese were duly alarmed. On the 29th came the first real word of conditions in Korea:

> The condition in northern Korea has taken a sudden turn for the worst since 25 August and the lives and property of the Japanese residents are exposed to imminent danger. This deplorable situation, if left unremedied, will in all probability spread to southern Korea, forcing the local Japanese authorities into an extremely awkward position with regard to the maintenance of peace and order.
>
> Accordingly, the local Japanese authorities eagerly wait for the early arrival of the Allied forces which are to take over the maintenance of peace and order from the Japanese forces in southern Korea, and urgently desire that the Allied forces will fully take into consideration the actual conditions on the spot before proceeding with the disarmament of Japanese forces

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and the transfer of administrative organs from the Japanese hand.[116]

In this connection, General MacArthur radioed General Hodge:

> Your attention is invited to Number 65, dated August 28, from the Japanese Government. You will take such action on this matter in southern Korea as future events may justify.[117]

This confusion did not add to the ease of planning the machinery of surrender in Korea. It was known that General MacArthur's original date for the surrender of the Japanese Empire as a whole had been postponed from the 31st to 2 September due to extremely bad weather.[118] Following this ceremony the text of three documents were to be broadcast throughout all Japanese held territory: a proclamation from the Emperor, the instrument of surrender, and the Supreme Commander's General Order No. 1.[119] These documents were to lay the groundwork for the surrender of the separate armies and areas. The text of each had been sent to the principal Pacific commanders on the 19th.[120] The first commanded all Japanese to lay down their arms and carry out the provisions of the surrender and the orders issued by the Supreme Commander. The second proclaimed

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unconditional surrender; it ordered all Japanese forces to cease hostilities, give themselves up unconditionally, and carry out future Allied orders; and it instructed all Japanese officials to remain at their posts and continue to perform their non-combat duties until properly relieved. The third document, General Order Number 1, detailed the manner of effecting the first two.[121] In regard to Korea it stated:

> B. The senior Japanese commander of all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude, and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East. . . .
>
> E. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
>
> F. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrender, and all surrenders of Japanese forces shall be made only to them or their representatives.[122]

A message sent on the 21st to the Japanese had outlined action to be taken pending the actual surrender. With stated exceptions, aircraft were to remain grounded and vessels in harbor immobile;

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vessels at sea were to advertise their presence and proceed to the nearest Allied port. There was to be a general disarmament of forces -- except lightly armed civil police -- in the Tokyo Bay area which was designated the "area of initial evacuation." Ports were to remain open. In addition, the Supreme Commander announced that surveillance flights would be made over Japanese territory, that supplies would be dropped to Allied prisoners of war, and that Allied naval forces would occupy the coastal waters of Japan and start minesweeping at various locations, including Inch'on in Korea.[123]

General Hodge, planning his own surrender procedure, radioed Manila that he was assuming the Governor General of Korea was the local representative of the Imperial Japanese Government in all matters concerning the occupation of Korea south of the 38th parallel. CINCAFPAC confirmed this view, adding that the Commanding General of the 17th Area Army was the local representative in Korea of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters.[124]

On the 29th, in message Z-646, the Supreme Commander issued his first specific orders to the Japanese Government on the occupation of Korea.

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The American landing date was set for 7 September. The Japanese commanding general in southern Korea was ordered to establish radio contact with the Corps on Okinawa by 1800, Tokyo time, on the 31st on a stated kilocycle frequency. The shipping lane approach to Inch'on was ordered swept of mines and clearly marked by the 8th, and navigation lighting was to be established. All coast defense was to be rendered inoperative and all vessels immobilized. All Japanese armed forces were to be cleared from an area two miles around Inch'on except civil police and unarmed service personnel. Other provisions covered pilotage of the American convoy. Representatives of the Japanese government and the military forces in Korea were ordered to meet General Hodge at the port, and the commander of the Japanese naval forces in Korea was instructed to be present as well to meet the United States naval commander. The Japanese commander was further instructed to comply with subsequent orders received from General Hodge by radio.[125]

The Supreme Commander authorized General Hodge to add further instructions to the Japanese in Korea, reminding him though that the landing at Inch'on would be subsequent to the issuance of General Order No. 1, which detailed the actions and the conduct of the Japanese

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in Korea as elsewhere.[126] General Hodge had several additional questions as to surrender procedure for which he secured answers: (1) he should receive the surrender of armed forces in Korea as representative of CINCAFPAC, (2) the senior American naval commander present was to participate in accepting the surrender of Japanese naval forces, (3) orders and directives to civil government administrators would be given in the name of CINCAFPAC, and (4), although swords and other personal weapons were included among those to be turned over to us, the Japanese officers participating in the surrender would be told not to wear swords in order to avoid an actual tender of weapons.[127]

By now it was apparent to the Corps that communications between Tokyo and the various Japanese agencies in Korea were poor if not nonexistent. The Japanese had reported that a typhoon on the 22nd had affected their communications with some of their outlying garrisons.[128] Japanese who were in Korea at the time stated later that they received little or no word from Tokyo after 15 August.[129] In spite of the various arrangements noted above, there were many details concerning the landing at Inch'on which still

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had to be worked out with the Japanese. Information on conditions in Korea was scarce, and the little which leaked through was disturbing, to say the least. As early as the 26th the Corps had requested CINCAFPAC to make arrangements with the Japanese military commander in Korea for direct radio communications with Okinawa in clear English.[130] The Supreme Commander's message to the Japanese, it will be recalled, ordered that this be done by the 31st.[131] But it soon became doubtful if the instructions in message Z-646 had ever been transmitted from Tokyo to Korea. If this was the case, no preparations could be expected.

In the meanwhile, the Corps had been trying to establish radio contact on its own, first through the Tenth Army's rather tenuous connections with some of the Japanese island garrisons to the north, with a view to retransmission to Korea.[132] This had proved unfruitful and the Corps radio operators had been reduced to calling for Korea on all probable frequencies and with all the call signs they could think of. Finally, after two days of persistent effort, there came a hesitant, barely decipherable answer: "Keijo, here," and the contact was made.

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More time was consumed while the Japanese found an operator who could send in even passable English, and until the Corps could cautiously announce to CINCAFPAC:

> Have established communication with an alleged Keijo station with an individual who identifies himself as Yoshio Kozuki, Lieutenant General and Supreme Commander of Japanese Military Forces in Korea.[133]

The gate once opened, a flood of messages poured through in both directions. They dealt with preparations for the surrender, events in Korea, attitudes of the people there, and the like. The Japanese commander, in identifying himself, admitted he was instructed "to negotiate with you for the local armistice of the Imperial Army in Chosen in the south of 38 degrees north latitude."[134] He appeared to have received the detailed requirements contained in General MacArthur's Z-646 message, which he was attempting to carry out. "However," he radioed, "there are Communists and independence agitators among Koreans who are plotting to take advantage of this situation to disturb peace and order here."[135] General Kozuki was particularly disturbed that the 800 stevedores at Inch'on harbor were making such exorbitant demands for pay and food, "probably

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instigated by labor union (Red)," and were so strongly suspected by him of sabotage, that he feared he would not use them in aiding the American landing.[136]

Among the messages was one which dealt with Russian operations north -- and to some extent, south -- of the 38th parallel. The town of Haijo had been occupied, local officials molested, and supplies taken, all below the line.[137] But up to the date of sailing, General Hodge knew that Soviet forces had not formally moved with any force into southern Korea.

This had for several weeks been a moot point. Particularly obscure was the character of our future liaison with the Russians, wherever they were. The Corps had been seeking information on this score since the 20th.[138] To secure such information General MacArthur radioed the War Department on the 22nd.[139]

> Inasmuch as the occupation of Korea is to be on a quadri-partite basis, it is requested that this headquarters be furnished at earliest opportunity with agreements reached with Allied Powers, especially with Russia, regarding direct contact between commanders of occupational forces in continuous and overlapping areas, together with any pertinent instructions thereon pertaining to Korea. Information urgently required for incorporation in letters of instructions to CG USAFIK (CG XXIV Corps).

The possibility of a Russian movement south continued high in the minds of the American staffs.

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A radio from Tokyo received late on the 29th stated that ". . . communication from Tokyo to . . . Keijo has been severed in consequence of the entry of Soviet forces in Korea. . . ."[140] In anticipation of the worst, General MacArthur sent General Hodge these supplementary instructions:[141]

1. Consideration must be given to the possibility that the Russians may occupy the Keijo area prior to the landing of the XXIV Corps.

2. The following information is furnished:

a. The occupancy of Korea is to be a quadri-partite occupation, British, Chinese, Russian and United States. This was agreed to by the governments concerned in the Potsdam conference.

b. The directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved by the President after submission to the various countries concerned directed that the surrender of Japanese forces south of 38° North Latitude be received by United States Forces.

c. A clear definition of the areas to be occupied by the four powers has not been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

3. From the above the necessary agreements between governments has been made which would clearly authorize United States Forces to enter Keijo for the purpose of receiving the surrender, and it is desired that the landing proceed even though Russian Forces also are present.

4. In the application of the general instructions given in the paragraph next preceding, if the Russians are in possession it will be necessary to act with caution. It is suggested that prior to the landing, contact be made

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with the Russian commander and necessary arrangements be made in order to avoid untoward incident. Should events indicate that international complications will result, it is desired that the landing be delayed and that you communicate directly with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo giving a full statement of facts. Definite instructions will then be given to you.

5. Extra copies of this letter are herewith furnished. It is desired that copies be delivered to Commander, Seventh Amphibious Force and if practicable by him to Commander Seventh Fleet.

In order to arrange for the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea, to check preparations for the landing at Inch'on, and to locate billets for the troops, the Corps selected an advance reconnaissance party of twenty-nine officers and eight enlisted men to fly in ahead of the landing.[142] Brig. Gen. Charles S. Harris was given command. Permission was secured from CINCAFPAC and the party left Okinawa in eight B-25's at 0700 on 4 September.[143] In the middle of the morning the planes ran into a storm and all but two turned back. These two landed safely at Kimpo Airfield, about seven miles from Seoul, at noon. The remainder of the party tried again on the 6th and made it.[144] The activities of this party will be told in a later chapter.

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Korean Relations

Relations with the Japanese and Russians, of course, highlighted the question of relations with the Koreans. Information needed here was meager in the extreme, but Colonel Cecil W. Nist, the Corps Intelligence Officer, issued a succinct report giving some of the problems which lay ahead.[145] In it, after describing the minor part Koreans had played in the management of their country for the past thirty years, he added:

> The great deterrent to the success of an overall change in Korean government is an inherent one. Korea suffers from a tendency toward political factionalism and lack of group cooperation. On the other hand, the country enjoys unity of language, culture and tradition. Throughout the country there is an intense desire for national independence.[146]

Colonel Nist's report left no doubt about the Korean's hatred of the Japanese. "The average Korean has never profited directly from Japanese rule and despises, resents and covertly or openly resists his master." He was optimistic concerning their favorable feelings toward Americans, due to their contact with American missions and hospitals, business men, and due to the number of Koreans who had been educated in the United States. "We may

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expect," Colonel Hist concluded, "Korean cooperation if the Korean people are sold on the fact that our control is militarily essential to all concerned and that hearty cooperation on their part will result in a friendly and helpful attitude on the part of the United States."[147]

General Hodge had been given little or no practical guidance by his instructions on such thorny questions as the eventuality of Korean independence, methods of handling various political factions, or the severance of Korea from Japanese influence, economic and otherwise. If Washington [redacted] had given much constructive thought to Korean problems it had not been reflected in orders issued the Corps Commander.[148]

One or two principles were derived from the Military Government Annex of Operations Instructions No. 4.[149] Japanese governmental machinery and Japanese governmental officials would be used as much and as long as necessary, at least until our own Military Government had taken hold or until suitable Korean replacements could be secured. We would abide by the principles of international law as regards private rights and property. The Koreans were to be treated as a liberated people, in spite of

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the obvious fact that they were enemy nationals.[150] Never, apparently, did the Corps commander seriously consider applying non-fraternization restrictions to his troops.[151] And finally, based upon the declaration made at the Cairo Conference in November 1943, it was accepted that "in due course" the Koreans would be given their full independence. The span of time which might pass before this state would be achieved was, however, not even remotely predictable.

Realizing that he would require political guidance, General Hodge on 18 August asked that a State Department representative be attached to his staff. As a result, Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff was so assigned, serving as "Liaison Officer and Political Advisor." He reached Corps headquarters 3 September, immediately prior to the embarkation. Benninghoff was a Class 3 Foreign Service Officer. He was familiar with the Far East, having lived in Japan. His father had spent thirty years of his life there. Benninghoff appears to have been given the briefest of instructions in Washington and his arrival added little to the sum total of knowledge on overall policy towards Korea. He accompanied General Hodge to Korea and remained with him until relieved in the

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middle of October.[152]

A directive from CINCAFPAC on 29 August helped to clarify certain matters of policy. In the main this directive referred to Japan proper, but some of its provisions could readily be applied to operations in Korea.[153] It is given in full below:

> Since the preparation of annexes to "blacklist" and Operations Instructions Number 4, there has been a major change in the concept of conditions under which the occupation of Japan will take place. The annexes in question were prepared with a view to continuing offensive action and the possibility of the collapse of the Japanese Government. It is now contemplated that the occupation will take place without violence and the Japanese Government will continue to function. It is intended that the Japanese Government and all available public agencies will be utilized to the maximum extent to carry into effect the terms of surrender. Japanese Imperial Headquarters will continue to function until it has effected the demobilization of the armed forces, at which time it will be demobilized on order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The occupying forces will become an agency in the hands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enforce his orders and directives to the Japanese Government. The annexes in question contain many statements of intention to take over governmental and other civilian institutions, to arrest various civil and military officials, and to stop the functioning of civilian telephone, telegraph and other communications. In view of the changes that have taken place and the contemplated use of the Japanese Government and other civil agencies and the Imperial Headquarters to carry into effect the surrender terms, it is directed that none of the arrests or seizures be made

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except as they are subsequently found to be necessary to the security of our forces or as specifically directed by this headquarters. Every proposed action toward the people, their government and their property should be reviewed in the light of a desire for an effective occupation without any measures of oppression. It is desired that all commanders take steps to ensure that in the occupation of Japan the property rights of the Japanese nationals are scrupulously respected. Actions contrary to universal standards of human behavior such as looting, pillage and rape, will be severely dealt with. The behavior and conduct of our troops must be such as to instill in the minds of the Japanese people that the occupation is orderly, firm and lawful. Commanders are enjoined to ensure that the foregoing instructions are carried into effect.

The profound effect this directive had on plans for Military Government in Japan -- it was thereby supplanted by Civil Affairs -- will be treated later in this narrative.[154] So far as Korea was concerned, it strengthened the attitude toward retaining Japanese officials in their jobs and towards a scrupulous regard for private rights and property.

The day before the CINCAFPAC directive was received, General Hodge had issued a letter to all his major unit commanders concerning the indoctrination of their men in the kind of behavior expected of them in Korea.[155] After stressing the importance of uniform and neat appearance and of high standards of military courtesy, the Corps commander spoke of the need for a firm but fair attitude toward the Korean

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native. He emphasized the tendency of the American soldier to be "far too generous and easy going in dealing with natives," ending up with spoiling them and losing their respect. He made it "mandatory that we treat the Oriental women and all private property with full respect." All cases of undue coercion in trading (when trading became permitted), or of rape, were to be promptly investigated, and, where guilt was indicated, severely punished. General Hodge did not want that laxity of punishment in cases of mistreating natives which had darkened some pages of the history of previous American occupations. "The standards" which he intended to apply "are as rigid as those applying in well regulated communities in the United States."

General Hodge's letter on indoctrination ended with the following statement on our attitude toward the residents of Korea:

> The native people of our occupational area are in effect a "liberated people" and are not to be viewed and treated as Japanese. However, there are several hundred thousand Japanese residents of the area and we must watch our step on matters of security at all times. Take no chances, be wary of Oriental favors and on the alert for a double cross. Further, be careful of what you say. There are several political factions in the area both in the open and underground, each of which is "on the make" to gain its end at the expense of others.[156]

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No "pocket guides" to Korea, comparable to the handbooks issued American soldiers entering other areas of the world, were available. Work on such a booklet was commenced by Tenth Army and 10,000 copies were ready in time for distribution to the first elements of the Corps which landed. The guide described the people and the country, adding this comment under the heading of "politics":

> . . . The Koreans will welcome freedom, but not all of them may feel that our being in their homeland is the best way to gain that freedom.
>
> Now the Koreans, particularly those living in the north, are a bit on the emotional side and tend to be quick-tempered. So if there is one subject to avoid it's politics. Just say you don't know anything about it -- which is undoubtedly the truth -- and don't get into either side of an argument.[155]

One thing remained -- to get word of our ideas on Korean relations to the Korean people themselves. With this in mind two leaflets were prepared by the Corps G-2; both were written in English and Korean, while the first contained a Japanese translation.[156] The leaflets contained messages from General Hodge to the people of Korea telling of the approaching arrival of U.S. forces and appealing to them to avoid internal disorder and to apply their energies to building their country for the future.

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The second leaflet stressed that the Americans were coming to maintain order and to prepare Korea "to operate under a more democratic rule." It noted that a governmental system could not be altered overnight without great turmoil, bloodshed and the destruction of valuable property, and that the change from the Japanese regime would have to be made gradually. The message asked that the Korean people help in the following manner:

> The proclamation and orders of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be passed to you through the present Korean government. His orders are issued to help you. Violations of his orders must be punished. Obey them implicitly. Do not participate in demonstrations against the Japanese or in welcome of American forces. Go about your normal pursuits of production and trade. Keep all utilities and transportation facilities operating. Do not let hate, excitement or selfishness lead you into foolish actions. Maintain peaceful and orderly conduct at all times. It is only by doing these things that you may speed the lifting of restrictions on your country and on your daily life.[150]

A B-24 of the 380th Bomb Group, carrying two observers and 130,000 leaflets, took off from Okinawa on the morning of 1 September. The mission had unlimited visibility and was able to drop the messages with accuracy from altitudes between 1000 and 3000 feet. 35,000 were dropped at Pusan, 70,000 at Seoul,

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and the remainder at Inch'on. Crowds of civilians were observed recovering and reading the leaflets, and waving at the plane. There was no interference on the part of the Japanese. The second leaflet was dropped on the 5th, but a low ceiling hampered the operation. The same number were dropped, all in excess of 2500 feet. Secondary purposes of the flights were observation and the delivery of a special message to General Kozuki. The observers reported that while the motor roads and railway between Pusan and Seoul appeared to be in good repair, there was almost no traffic on either. Few if any factories observed appeared to be in operation. Bomb damage was negligible.[160]

The first batch of leaflets was dropped none too soon. Messages from the Japanese received on the day of the drop, 1 September, told of Korean mob violence against the police, theft of munitions, and strikes. Transport and communications, the Japanese reported, had been disrupted and delayed. The police were helpless unless backed by the army. Clearly General Kozuki was finding his position a difficult one, and was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the Americans.[161] General Hodge directed him to

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maintain order and preserve the machinery of government in Korea until relieved. To this end Hodge authorized a minimum Japanese force be retained at Inch'on.[162] He also radioed CINCAFPAC:

> In view of the situation peculiar to Korea, where revolutionary forces may acquire Japanese arms and start serious trouble, request authority to destroy or render completely inoperative any and all weapons turned over by Japanese armed forces based on my own judgment of the immediate necessity therefor. . . .[163]

This request was granted.[164]

General Hodge asked the Japanese commander for a brief report of the Korean reaction to the leaflets dropped on the 1st.[165] Kozuki replied that the American message "has caused considerably favorable results for the maintenance of peace and order. It was especially effective to shut out the illegal activities of Communistic Red elements. Message of this kind will be welcomed in the future. . . ." He also asked that we threaten punishment under martial law for violators of the public peace prior to our arrival.[166] General Kozuki requested -- and was permitted to -- publish to the Koreans some of the Corps' messages to him which authorized the Japanese to retain control until the American occupation.[167]

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As a final step, shortly before sailing, General Hodge recommended to CINCAFPAC that, in view of the unsettled conditions in Korea, a proclamation or proclamations be furnished for distribution specifically to the Korean people.[168]

Embarkation

ASCOM 24 issued its first embarkation order 29 August. By then all of the ships of Transport Squadrons 17 and 21 had either reported for duty to Commander 7th Phib or had received orders from him.[169] By the evening of the 30th one APA at Okinawa had 75 percent of her general cargo aboard, but the others had barely commenced loading.[170] On the 2nd, however, the 5 APD's and 17 of the 18 APA's were reported fully cargo loaded while the eighteenth was 90 percent ready. Most of the vehicles were aboard.[171] A fleet of LST's and LSM's was being assembled at Okinawa for the second echelon of shipping and it was expected that work on loading them would start by 7 September. Others were on their way to Okinawa or the Philippines to take care of later echelons.

On 1 September Admiral Barbey transferred his flag to the AGC (command ship) Catoctin at

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Manila and started north to lead the amphibious movement to Korea.[172] The following day the Catoctin ran into a severe typhoon and the going became slow. Weather reports indicated another typhoon ahead, and Admiral Barbey estimated he could not reach Okinawa until late on the 4th or perhaps even the 5th. He suggested that K-day be delayed forty-eight hours.[173]

Troops had commenced loading at 0600 on the 3rd. On the east coast progress was satisfactory, but on the west side of the island the typhoon had kicked up a dangerously rough sea and embarkation was halted.[174] There was no prospect of a let-up, and General Hodge, after a conference with naval officers, radioed CINCAFPAC recommending a new target date for the 9th.[175] However, conditions improved on the 4th and by that evening, in spite of a heavy swell, all the Corps troops were embarked. The vessels left their various moorings on the morning of the 5th and by mid-afternoon had formed into a convoy off the southern tip of Okinawa. In five close columns, the ships, guarded by destroyer escorts and an escort carrier, were enroute to Korea by 1545.[176]

The Convoy consisted of the following ships.[177]

Carrying 7th Division (TD's 49, 59 and 69):

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APA's: Randall, Bergen, Collingsworth, Crenshaw, Burleson, Chilton, Butte, Effingham, Hanover, Noble, Leon, Attala, Cortland, Geneva, Gilbert

AKA : Arcturus

Carrying Corps Troops:

APA's: Sarasota, Oneida

Carrying ASCOM 24 Troops:

APA: Beckham

APD: Pinkney

7th Amphibious Force Shipping:

AGC Catoctin, 1 LSD, 1 CVE, and 18 DE's

Some time before this the Japanese had been instructed by the Supreme Commander to surface all their submarines and send them to Allied ports. They had, however, been unable to communicate with several.[178] Complete blackout, therefore, was observed in the convoy on the trip north.[179] Mines, however, presented the more serious hazard. It was known that the Twentieth Air Force had mined Korean ports, probably including Inch'on, and exploratory sweeps of the harbor area were begun by the 7th Fleet minesweepers on 4 September.[180] Further, there were known to be numerous floating mines in the Yellow Sea and the principal task of the destroyer escorts lay in mine

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detection and destruction ahead of the convoy and the hospital ships. [181] Several times men on the vessels saw the tall waterspouts created as the guns of an escort found their target.

The trip was, however, generally uneventful. At about 1500 on the 7th an island was visible to starboard; it was the first of many passed in the next twenty-four hours. Morning of the 8th found the convoy threading its way along the complicated channel leading to Inch'on harbor. The weather was clear and warm. Save for one or two tiny fishing boats, no shipping was visible. The Americans crowding the decks of the transports faced their first day of the occupation of Korea.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

MISSION AND MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

1. Tenth Army Historian's journal, 10-11 Aug 45.

2. AFPAC MHD, "Report of Actual and Projected Troop Strengths," 1 Sept 45. It has not been possible to secure an accurate estimate of Ryukyus troop strength from XXIV Corps records.

3. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, "Strength and Locations, Marine Units of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific," 2 Aug and 17 Sept 45.

4. Tenth Army, Troop list, 31 July 45; Tenth Army Station List No. 10, 3 Aug 45.

5. GHQ, AFPAC, "Basic Outline Plan for 'Blacklist' Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea After Surrender or Collapse," edition 3, 8 Aug 45.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. It has not been possible to verify the number of air strikes carried out in Korea.

8. Ibid. Throughout the narrative all place names in Korea are given in the Korean spelling.

9. The operations outlined in "Blacklist" were called the "Baker Series," and that of the series covering the occupation of Korea was "Baker-Forty"; it in turn was subdivided into "Baker-Forty-One," etc.

10. Ibid. The specific missions are discussed elsewhere in the narrative.

11. Tenth Army, Conference Notes No. 72, 12 Aug 45. It should be pointed out that Tenth Army files have not been available to this author.

12. See Chapter XII ("The Russians to the North") for detailed Russian movements; Knile Minne, 10 Aug 45.

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13. Interview with Mr. Yasuma Oda, liaison officer for the Japanese Governor General of Korea, 8 Nov 45; Keijo Nippo, 11-20 Aug 45.

14. Buccaneer, 13 and 14 Aug 45. The torpedoing of the Pennsylvania was confirmed later; see Corps Courier, 25 Aug 45.

15. Conference Notes No. 72, op. cit.

15a. General MacArthur was appointed SCAP by radio, WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, NR 14068, 14 Aug 45, effective (15 Aug) upon receipt of the message.

16. Tenth Army Staff Meetings, 12 and 14 Aug 45.

17. Radio, CINCAFPAC to COMGENPOA, etc. (but not to CG XXIV Corps) 121887/X Aug 45.

18. The story of this radio is far from clear, and it appears to be tied in with General Stilwell's trip to Manila. The copy used is marked "received at GTR 130548/I"; it was found in XXIV Corps files. G-3 Journal, XXIV Corps, shows the radio received, but the date is not clear.

19. Tenth Army Staff Meetings, 12 and 14 Aug 45. The sources of General Merrill's information and the discussions referred to are not known.

20. Tenth Army Staff Meeting, 15 Aug 45.

21. Promoted to Lieutenant General effective 6 June 45 by WD SO 154, 28 June 45.

22. Biographical material on Gen. Hodge is based upon material in Corps Public Relations Office, Official Army Register, and conversations with Corps Staff officers.

23. Corps history based upon XXIV Corps Reports After Action, Leyte and Ryukyus Campaigns, and Unit Historical Report for 1944.

24. 7th Div., Strength Report for Period Ending 2400, 10 Aug 45.

25. Interview with 7th Division Historical Officer, 1 Oct 45.

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26. Radio, COMGENTEN to CINCAFPAC, 171800/I Aug 45.

27. XXIV Corps, Officers Rosters, 17 June and 30 Sept 45.

28. GHQ, AFPAC, Operation Instructions No. 4, (revised) 15 Aug 45 (hereinafter listed as O.I.4).

29. O.I.4.

30. Ibid. See Chapter VIII.

31. See Chapter V; this recovery mission was assigned an urgency "second only to military operations and to the maintenance of the forces of occupation."

32. War and Navy Departments, JANIS 75, passim.

33. Informal "Action Report" prepared by G-2 XXIV Corps, undated (in G-2 files).

34. G-2 XXIV Corps, "Summary of PW Interrogation Reports, Kyongsong - Inchi'on - Pusan (Korea)," 26 Aug 45; and "Summary of PW Interrogation Reports, Korean Political Matters," 29 Aug 45.

35. Interview with 1st Lt. Vincent A. Trump, G-2 Section, XXIV Corps.

36. Radio, CINCAFPAC to COMGENTEN, 240123/I Aug 45; Ibid.

37. Interview with Lt. Trump, op. cit.; memoranda in XXIV Corps G-2 file "Photo Requests"; G-2 "Action Report," op. cit.

38. Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz with headquarters at Pearl Harbor).

39. "Action Report," op. cit.; G-2, XXIV Corps, "Order of Battle Estimate for Korea," 21 Aug 45 (in G/S files). For a full discussion of Japanese Order of Battle in Korea see Chapter X.

40. Radio, COMGENTEN to CG XXIV Corps, 181834/I Aug 45, quoting CINCAFPAC; XXIV Corps, G-2 Periodic Report, 18 Aug 45; Buscenner, 17 Aug 45.

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41. Radio, CINCAFPAC to COMGENTEN, etc. (but not to CG XXIV Corps), 181527/Z Aug 45, op. cit.

42. Letter, CG Tenth Army to CG ASCOM I and CG XXIV Corps, 16 Aug 45, "Assignment Commander Ground Defense, Ryukyus"; radio, ASCOM I to COMGENTEN, 221201/I Aug 45.

43. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 18 Aug 45 (no DTG) and CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 191851/I Aug 45.

44. Radio, Hodge (at GHQ, AFPAC) to XXIV Corps, 241136/I Aug 45.

45. Radio, SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 191045/Z Aug 45.

46. USAFIK GO No. 1, 27 Aug 45.

47. GHQ, AFPAC, Annex No. 3 to O.I.4, 11 Aug 45. The original "blacklist" troop list showed only type units.

48. Radio, COMGENTEN to CG XXIV Corps, 142358/Z Aug 45, quoting a message from CINCAFPAC.

49. Formally established by GHQ, AFPAC GO 154, 29 Aug 45.

50. GHQ, AFPAC, Annex No. 3 to O.I.4, revised to 15 Aug 45.

51. XXIV Corps Station List, 28 Aug 45, with corrections to 1 Sept 45; see Appendix, "Order of Battle," for complete listing of occupation units.

52. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to Sixth and Eighth Armies, 181234/I and 181232/I Aug 45.

53. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG 40th and 96th Divisions, 172325/I Aug 45.

54. Radios, CG 96th and CG 40th Divs to CG XXIV Corps, 181350/I and 191736/I Aug 45.

55. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG 96th Div, 211909/I Aug 45; GHQ AFPAC Assignment Letter No. 98, 18 Aug 45; Radio, CG Sixth Army to CG 40th Div, 220445/Z Aug 45.

56. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 200736/Z Aug 45.

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57. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 241003/I Aug 45.

58. Radio, CG Sixth Army to CG XXIV Corps, 211601/I Aug 45.

59. ComphibsPac to Commanders Third, Fifth, and Seventh Fleets, 19 Aug 45 (Serial 000358), "Movement of Occupation Forces in CAMPUS Operation by Amphibious Force Shipping." See also Annex 5g to "Blacklist" for the summary of CAMPUS.

60. Radio, Com 7th Phib to CG XXIV Corps, 160110/I Aug 45.

61. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 172355/I Aug 45.

62. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC 18 Aug 45 (no DTG).

63. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG Sixth Army, etc., 2020501/I Aug 45; change 2, O.I.4, 22 Aug 45.

64. Radios, COM 7th Phib to COMPHIBSPAC, 210740/I Aug 45; and COM 7th Phib to CG XXIV Corps, 211555/I Aug 45.

65. R/S, XXIV Corps G-3 to C/S, 23 Aug 45.

66. Radio, COM 7th Phib to COMTRANSRON 17, 230401/I Aug 45.

67. Radio, COMTRANSRON 17 to COM 7th Phib, 240501/I Aug 45.

68. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to COMGEN Tenth Army, 241610/I Aug 45.

69. Letter, CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM X, 21 Aug 45, "Request for Use of Beaches."

70. Radio, Hodge (at CINC AFPAC) to XXIV Corps, 230211/Z Aug 45.

71. XXIV Corps Staff Meeting, 26 Aug 45.

72. Radio, Chamberlin to Hodge, 301351/Z Aug 45.

73. Radio, SCAP to U.S. War Dept (for JCS), 260419/Z Aug 45.

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74. Radios, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, CON 7th Phib, etc., 262004/I and 270727/Z Aug 45.

75. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 270940/I Aug 45; 240305/I Aug 45.

76. Radios, CON 7th Phib to ComPhib Group 7, 261104/Z Aug 45; COMTRANSRON 17 to COMTRANSDIV, 26 Aug 45.

77. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 281539/I Aug 45; XXIV Corps, FO 55, 28 Aug 45.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid. See also note 143.

80. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 271210/I Aug 45.

81. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 291550/I Aug 45.

82. Radios, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, [illegible]217/I Aug 45; CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 291[illegible] Aug 45; CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 301329/Z Aug 45.

83. Radio, Chamberlin to Hodge, op. cit.

84. XXIV Corps FO 55, op. cit.; see Appendix for full text of this FO.

85. Ibid.

86. O.I.&, op. cit.

87. Radio, SCAP to CG FEAF, 221351/I Aug 45.

88. XXIV Corps FO 55, op. cit.

89. O.I.&,11 Aug 45, op. cit.

90. Interview with Col. William I. Sherwood, XXIV Corps I.G., 16 Nov 45.

91. GHQ AFPAC, GO 154, 29 Aug 45.

92. O.I.&, 15 Aug 45, op. cit.

93. Radio, CINCAFPAC to COMNAVFEN, 300103/Z Aug 45.

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94. Radios CONGERTEN to CINCAFPAC, 281541/I Aug 45; CINCAFPAC to CONGERTEN, 311145/I Aug 45; GHQ AFPAC Letter Orders, 30 Aug 45.

95. Letter of Instructions, CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCON 24, 17 Aug 45.

96. Ibid.

97. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CONGERTEN, 19 Aug 45; CONGERTEN to CG AFWESPAC, 201021/I Aug 45; ASCON I to Commander Marianas, 201500/I Aug 45; Interview with Lt. Col. A. Barrow, XXIV Corps G-4, 14 Nov 45.

98. XXIV Corps, Adm Ord No. 18 to accompany FO No. 55, 28 Aug 45.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.; Report, XXIV Corps Surgeon to Surgeon General, WD, "Medical History (1 July 1945 to 30 September 1945)," 15 Oct 45.

102. See Chapter XVIII.

103. R/S, XXIV Corps G/S to Corps Surgeon, etc., 18 Aug 45.

104. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 240944/I Aug 45.

105. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to COM 7th Phib, 291600/I Aug 45.

106. Interview with Lt. Col. C. J. Derrick, MC, Corps Surgeon, 15 Nov 45; personal observation by Corps Historian.

107. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, etc., 282345/I Aug 45.

108. Derrick interview, op. cit.

109. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 27 Aug 45 (no DTG).

110. Radio, GHQ Washington to CINCAFPAC, 280736/I Aug 45; interview with Col. L.H. Graham, Finance Officer XXIV Corps; XXIV Corps Adm.O. 18, 28 Aug 45. p. 10.

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111. Interview with Col. Graham, op. cit.

112. Letter orders, GHAFIK, 1 Sept 45, "Administrative Functions. . ."

113. Letter of Instructions, CG XXIV Corps to CG XXIV Corps Rear Eshelon, 30 Aug 45; XXIV Corps GO 114, 30 Aug 45.

114. Radio, SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, etc., 251832/I Aug 45, quoting Japanese message No. 35.

115. Idem, 252034/I Aug 45, quoting Japanese message No. 40.

116. Idem, 292248/I Aug 45, quoting Japanese message No. 65.

117. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 292328/I Aug 45.

118. Radio, SCAP to various addressees, 252050/I Aug 45.

119. Radio, SCAP to Japanese Government (Z [illegible]), 210343/I Aug 45.

120. Radio, SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, etc. (Z 516), 190908/Z Aug 45.

121. Ibid. See Appendix.

122. Ibid.

123. Radio, SCAP to Japanese Government (Z 532), 210426/I Aug 45.

124. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 271130/I Aug 45; and CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 290729/Z Aug 45.

125. Radio, SCAP to Japanese Government (Z 646), 291617/Z Aug 45.

126. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 291759/Z Aug 45.

127. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 301010/I Aug 45; and CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 311043/Z Aug 45.

128. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, etc., 251840/I Aug 45, quoting Japanese message No. 37.

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129. Oda interview, op. cit. American signal officers found the Japanese wire and radio facilities in Korea intact and operable upon their arrival. There seems to have been no reason for a breakdown in communications between Seoul and Tokyo, but Japanese sources are unanimous in confirming the fact. (Interview with Col. J.E. Kelsey, Signal Officer, XXIV Corps, 17 Nov 45.

130. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 262154/I Aug 45.

131. Radio, SCAP to Japanese Government, (Z 646), op. cit.

132. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CONGREMEN, 29 Aug 45; Kelsey interview, op. cit.

133. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 011130/I Sept 45.

134. Radio, CG Japanese 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, unnumbered, 31 Aug 45.

135. Idem, 1 Sept 45.

136. Idem, no. Army-11, 3 Sept 45.

137. Idem, no. Army-16, 3 Sept 45.

138. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 301106/I Aug 45.

139. Radio, CINCAFPAC to War Dept for the JCS, 221013/Z Aug 45.

140. Radio, SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, etc., 300650/Z Aug 45, quoting message from Japanese Government.

141. Letter, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 29 Aug 45, "Occupation of Korea."

142. XXIV Corps letter orders, 3 Sept 45.

143. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 281018/I Aug 45; CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 292359/I Aug 45; interview with various members of the party, 10-13 Sept 45.

144. Ibid.

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145. G-2 XXIV Corps, "The Korean Government," 31 Aug 45.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Based upon notes of staff conferences and conversations with various officers.

149. GHQ AFPAC, Tentative Annex 8 (Military Occupation) to O.I.4, 19 Aug 45; see also Chapter VIII.

150. Based upon notes of staff conferences and conversations with various officers; see Military Government Annex to O.I.4.

151. There was one exception to this rule. For fully three weeks after its arrival in Korea the 40th Division applied the non-fraternization rule throughout its area in southeastern Korea. See Chapter IX.

152. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, [illegible]30/I Aug 45; CINCAFPAC to War Dept, 232215/I Aug 45; and Tenth Army (relaying from Washington) to CINCAFPAC, etc. Mr. Benninghoff's letter of appointment from the State Department was dated 25 Aug 45. One of the numerous misstatements made in the American press concerning the Korean occupation was that Mr. Benninghoff, having been assigned to the Corps, was "shunted off to Japan," suggesting that General Hodge was left without a political advisor in the critical opening days. See, for example, Time, 24 Sept 45, p. 10.

153. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG 6th Army, CG 8th Army CG XXIV Corps, CG FEAF, 281413/I Aug 45 (received by XXIV Corps 29 Aug).

154. Chapter VI.

155. Letter, CG XXIV Corps to all Commanders of Units, XXIV Corps, 26 Aug 45, "Indoctrination."

156. Ibid.

157. 1st Info. and Hist. Serv., Tenth Army, Korea; A Pocket Guide, p. 14.

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158. Appendix.

159. Message No. 2 (see Appendix for full text).

160. XXIV Corps G-2, "Action Report," op. cit.; Maj. C. C. MacClusky, "Report of Reconnaissance over Korea," 1 Sept 45; and 1st Lt. Robert F. Seeburger, "Report of Propaganda Mission to Korea on 1 Sept 1945," 2 Sept 45 (all in G-2 files).

161. Radios, CG Japanese 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, 1 and 2 Sept 45.

162. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG Japanese 17th Area Army, No. 7, 1 Sept 45.

163. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 011456/I Sept 45.

164. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 030537/I Sept 45.

165. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG Japanese 17th Area Army, No 10, 2 Sept 45.

166. Radio, CG Japanese 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps No Army-10, 3 Sept 45.

167. Radios, CG Japanese 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, No. 6, 2 Sept 45; and reply, No. 12, same date.

168. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv, 040910/I Sept 45.

169. ASCOM 24, Embarkation Order No. 1, 29 Aug 45, followed by others serially numbered, listing priority of loading; radio, COMFAIRWESTPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 300218/I Aug 45.

170. Radio "Leading Report," TAN XXIV Corps to COMGENTEN, 30 Aug 45.

171. Same, 2 Sept 45.

172. Radio, COM 7th Phib to COM 7th Fleet, 1 Sept 45.

173. Radio, COM 7th Phib to COM Phib Group 7 (on Okinawa), 3 Sept 45.

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174. Radio, COM TRANSRON 17 to CG XXIV Corps, 031102/I Sept 45.

175. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 031000/I Sept 45.

176. Personal observation of Historian.

177. Annex 2 to FO 55, XXIV Corps ("Embarkation Plan").

178. Radio, SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, etc. (Z-589), 272239/Z Aug 45, quoting Japanese message No. 45.

179. Personal observation of Historian.

180. 7th Fleet, Opn. Plan, 26 Aug 45; radio, COM 7th Fleet to CG XXIV Corps, 311857/I Aug 45.

181. Radio, COM 7th Fleet to CTG 70.5, 031200/I Sept 45.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

[redacted]

CHAPTER II

KOREA PRIOR TO THE JAPANESE SURRENDER

The country to which the Corps had come is an S-shaped peninsula extending southward from southern Manchuria toward Kyushu. Roughly speaking, it lies between the parallels of 33 and 43 degrees north latitude, and between the meridians of 125 and 131 degrees east longitude, its area being approximately 85,000 square miles. The peninsula is generally mountainous and particularly so near the east coast, where a chain of mountains runs the length of the country. The west coast, being more indented than the east, offers more good harbors. The climate is temperate with extremes similar to those encountered in most parts of the United States. At the time of the 1941 census, Korea had a population of about 25,000,000; Seoul, the capital, nearly 950,000; and there were nineteen other important cities, ranging in population down to a figure of 36,000.[1]

It seems likely that the Korean race had its origin in Manchuria or Mongolia;[2] it is related to both the Chinese and Japanese. The language also has points of kinship with both Chinese and Japanese, although it

is a separate language with its own distinctive alphabet; the Chinese characters are frequently employed, as is the case in Japan.[3]

Until the end of the sixteenth century, Korea had its own highly developed culture. Its craftsmen were acquainted with the use of metal type, a phonetic alphabet, the magnetic compass, firearms, and iron-clad warships. Although the land was to a considerable extent under the cultural influences of China, a high degree of originality as well as of imitative ability gave the Koreans cause to take pride in their civilization. It was from them that Japan received Buddhism, sericulture, and many forms of art. Unfortunately, this culture came to a violent end in 1592, when the armies of the Japanese warrior Hideyoshi invaded Korea and devastated a large portion of the country. At the time of their retreat, the Japanese forces took with them many of the best artisans and artists who had survived the war.[4]

Religion long occupied a peculiar position in Korean life. After the Japanese annexed the country in 1910, they recognized only three religions -- Shintoism, Buddhism, and Christianity; several religions of native

origin continued to exist, but without official sanction they did not and could not attain any great importance. Official figures in 1938 gave the total number of Koreans affiliated with some organized religion as approximately 1,200,000, distributed as follows: Shintoism 100,000, Buddhism 500,000, Christianity 500,000, and other religions 100,000. Those Koreans who adhered to Shintoism did so chiefly out of a desire to curry favor with the Japanese. From these figures it is apparent that the vast majority of the people had no formal religious affiliations at all. Some authorities state that many of them hunger for some sort of synthesis which they might find more satisfying than the established religions.[5]

Generally speaking, the Koreans are a homogeneous people and possess a unity of culture and tradition.[6] Nevertheless, they are individualistic and somewhat averse to making sacrifices for a common goal. They are more tolerant and less nationalistic than the Japanese. In their social customs they resemble other nations of the Far East with their fundamental feeling of veneration for the souls of the dead and for the sanctity of family life. Prostitution

and cremation, which the Japanese fostered, had not previously been customary among the Koreans. The position of women was for a long time one of subordination to the male head of the family, but in recent years there has been a trend toward greater freedom. After about a generation of Japanese rule the educated classes grew reasonably familiar with English and Japanese.[7]

The economy of Korea is predominantly agricultural.[8] To such an extent is farming the principal occupation that agriculture in the peninsula is described as "overcrowded."[9] Farming methods have always been primitive,[10] and the productivity of the cultivated land is low. The principal crop is rice; others of importance are other cereals, vegetables, and fruits.[11] Although irrigation is extensively practiced,[12] droughts often cause disastrous crop failures.[13] In the north dry rice predominates; in the south, where the more productive paddy system is chiefly used, a greater quantity of rice is produced. Rainfall is usually plentiful, but somewhat irregular. Floods occasionally follow an excessive amount of rainfall occurring within a short period.[14]

Relatively few farming families are wealthy enough

to own livestock,[15] and such animals as exist are of poor quality.[16] Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Korean agriculture is the poverty of the farmers.[17]

The mineral resources of the peninsula, although fairly substantial for a country of Korea's size, were never fully developed even under the Japanese.[18] The deposits of coal, which constituted the peninsula's most important mineral resource, lay in the north.[19] In spite of their existence, while Korea was under Japanese domination she imported from Japan 150,000 tons of coal per month.[20]

The Background of Korean History

Although the early history of Korea is interesting, it does not greatly concern the modern student. The peninsula has been for centuries the scene of a struggle among Far Eastern Peoples, particularly the Chinese and Japanese, for predominance. The modernization of Japan (1853-72) placed her in a more favorable position than ever before to renew the struggle.[21]

Korea's position athwart the sea lanes off the eastern coast of Asia drew her inevitably into the power

politics of the late nineteenth century. China, Japan, and Russia, being closest, felt the keenest interest in Korean affairs; it is for these reasons that an American writer has called Korea the strategic point in the Far East.[22] Since 1392 the throne of Korea had been occupied by the Yi Dynasty, and until 1832 these kings had paid tribute to both Japan and China. After that date they paid tribute only to China and acknowledged, at least when it was convenient for them to do so, the suzerainty of the Manchu emperors.[23] Korea underwent a rude introduction to modern imperialism in 1866, when a French naval expedition attempted to take revenge for a massacre of Catholic missionaries and converts. The United States almost joined in this expedition, because in the previous year Koreans had destroyed an American vessel, the General Sherman.[24] During this period the Korean government was bitterly antiforeign and did not welcome Secretary of State William H. Seward's overtures for a commercial treaty; in 1871 the United States actually sent a naval expedition against the peninsula, but little was accomplished.[25]

Japan was determined to pry Korea loose from China's grip. After several unsuccessful efforts between 1867

and 1871 to negotiate a treaty, the Japanese finally were able to extort one in 1876. Considerable military pressure was necessary to secure the consent of Yi, Hiung (Kwang Hoo), the Korean king.[26] The treaty, essentially a unilateral one in Japan's favor, denied the claims of China by recognizing Korea as an independent state, proclaimed perpetual peace and friendship between the signatories, opened three ports to Japanese commerce, and guaranteed extraterritorial rights to Japanese subjects.[27] This treaty marked the first establishment of formal relations in the modern sense between Korea and any other power. Prior to that time Korea's foreign trade had been negligible.[28] The treaty opened up the peninsula to outside influences; Japanese traders flocked to the treaty ports, and several subsequent pacts were necessary to regulate their activities.[29]

Other nations were not far behind Japan in seeking to gain a commercial foothold in Korea. In 1882 Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, an American naval officer, negotiated a treaty for the United States; it was similar to the Japanese, except that no force was applied and the terms were more liberal. This treaty also recognized the independence of Korea, much to

the annoyance of China, and provided that if either signatory became embroiled with a third power the other would use its good offices to effect a settlement; harmless though Shufeldt's intentions were, the treaty tended to draw Korea still deeper into the struggle for supremacy in the Far East.[30] An American writer has called the treaty of 1882 the "most important political action undertaken by the United States in Asia until the occupation of the Philippines in 1898."[31]

Less than a month after the American treaty, a British naval officer signed a similar agreement, which went unratified by the British government because the mercantile interests felt that it was not favorable enough.[32] In 1883 a much more advantageous treaty was negotiated, and it was ratified by both parties.[33] At the same time, a treaty was signed between Korea and Germany; both of these two pacts opened five ports to foreign trade and residence.[34] In 1884 treaties were negotiated with Italy[35] and Russia;[36] both of these followed the familiar pattern of treaties between European and Asiatic states. The Russian treaty, however, was not ratified.[37] In

the same year the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China, and Japan signed an agreement with the Korean government providing for a general foreign settlement at Inch'on.[38] In 1886 a French envoy negotiated a commercial treaty closely resembling the preceding ones.[39]

The Struggle for Korea

Korea was fast becoming a battleground for foreign interests, to which her feeble government was unable to offer effective resistance. Public opinion, however, reacted aggressively. In 1882 an anti-foreign outbreak occurred in Seoul; it was inspired by the most reactionary and nationalistic elements and was directed primarily against the Japanese. The latter's legation was destroyed, and many of their number were murdered and robbed. The episode gave both China and Japan an excuse for moving troops into the country. Finally Korea was forced to apologize to Japan and to pay an indemnity.[40] China and Japan were confronting each other squarely in the peninsula; in 1885 they signed the Convention of Tientsin, agreeing to withdraw their troops and not send them back except in an

emergency. However, the representatives of both powers continued to intrigue and compete for the dominant position. The Korean government was no longer able to maintain order; when a serious antiforeign insurrection, led by a group known as the Tong Haks broke out in 1894, the king was forced to appeal to China for help. The Chinese government responded by sending troops, an act which the Japanese chose to regard as a violation of the Convention of Tientsin. Soon a still larger body of Japanese troops appeared; brief and heated discussion ensued, with the result that the Korean king was compelled to declare war on China and to lend at least nominal support to the military campaign which the aggressive Japanese then undertook against their huge neighbor.[41]

Japan's attack on a country so far superior in size and manpower seemed foolhardy, but she quickly showed her excellence in all departments of military science. Her soldiers were well equipped, skillfully led, and fanatically patriotic; the Japanese fleet was powerful and worked in close coordination with the land forces. The Chinese armies were badly supplied, incompetently handled, and indifferent to the issues

at stake. Within seven months China was completely defeated, suffering a loss of 28,000 men in battle, without counting those who died from disease. Japan's losses were relatively light -- about 3,000. The most important battles of the war were fought in and near Korea.[42]

The terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, dictated in April 1895, included a full recognition of Korean independence from China;[43] the cession of the important Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores; and the payment of an indemnity.[44] The overwhelming Japanese victory had caused the other powers to feel alarm for the future of their own interests in Asia; encouraged by the Chinese government with substantial secret concessions in Manchuria, Russia decided to intervene, and she persuaded France and Germany to join her. Japan was compelled to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula, which Russia coveted and into which she moved in great force a little later, in 1898.[45]

However, Japan was still supreme in Korea, which was formally proclaimed to be an independent state; this toleration deceived few of the Koreans, many of whom voiced their resentment against the Japanese policy.[46] Moving too fast in their plan to dominate

the peninsula, the Japanese overplayed their hand in 1895 when they attempted a coup d'etat against the royal family. They succeeded in murdering the queen, but the terrified king, after being imprisoned for a time by his pro-Japanese cabinet, was able to escape to the Russian legation, where he was well cared for.[47]

Such solicitude was far from being disinterested; public opinion in Korea had become even more strongly anti-Japanese after this grim episode, and the Russians did not waste their opportunity. They coveted the resources and the ice-free ports of Korea.[48] The king was persuaded to grant them important commercial concessions.[49] In 1897 France and Russia tried to oust J. McLeavy Brown, the able and honest Englishman who acted as financial adviser to the King; the attempt failed because of the opposition of the British and American legations.[50] During the period from 1896 to 1898 Russia was rapidly completing her Trans-Siberian Railway, and was able to extort from the Chinese government the right to construct railroads in Manchuria and to station troops there for their protection.[51] During the same period Russia and Japan signed three agreements, each power pledging itself to

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sphere of influence.[60] This solution was unsatisfactory to Japan; the will to negotiate being lacking, hostilities soon broke out. Once again the world was amazed at the sight of Japan attacking a colossus, and the sympathies of most nations went out to her as the underdog. However, the Japanese forces soon obtained command of the waters off Korea, and by April 1904 a seaborne expedition had driven the Russians out of the peninsula.[61] Spurred by this victory, and conscious of the fact that they had the same advantage over their enemy as in 1894, the Japanese lost no time in beginning the campaign for Manchuria. By June they had isolated and invested Port Arthur; this stronghold resisted tenaciously and did not surrender until January 1905. The fanatical and often foolhardy bravery of the Japanese troops during the siege cost them 45,000 casualties. The surrender of Port Arthur was quickly followed by the occupation of the entire Liaotung Peninsula and all of southern Manchuria. The Russian Pacific fleet had already been neutralized; in May 1905 Admiral Togo all but destroyed the Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straits.[62]

Russia's only course was to sue for peace, but

left the reluctant Emperor with little choice. After halfway measures had proved inadequate Prince Hirobumi Ito, one of Japan's most prominent statesmen, arrived in the capacity of Resident General with the purpose of bringing about a protectorate. In November 1905 the Korean Emperor signed, under extreme pressure, a treaty providing for the administration of the internal affairs of his country by a Japanese administrator at each treaty port; and the conduct of foreign affairs in the future by the Japanese government in Tokyo.[65]

The Koreans received the news of the protectorate as a national disaster. The Emperor appealed secretly to the United States, through Homer B. Hulbert, an American missionary, thinking that under the terms of the treaty of 1882 President Roosevelt might feel obliged to help. However, the United States had tried in 1902 to have the treaty revised,[66] and was unwilling to intervene even had she been in a position to do so. Roosevelt was contemptuous of the Koreans and felt that since they seemed unable to fight for themselves he should not help them. Nevertheless, the Japanese were irritated at the prospect of the United States meddling in Korean affairs, and at their request the American

legation in Seoul was closed in December 1905; in any case the legation was an anomaly, since the foreign relations of the country were then conducted in Tokyo. The closing of the American legation led to a fall of American popularity in Korea, and to a corresponding increase in Japan.[67]

Japanese had already begun to infiltrate into Korean governmental positions. The most distinguished of them, beside Prince Ito, were Baron Megata, the financial adviser; and Mr. Durham White Stevens, an American in the Japanese foreign service, who was made diplomatic adviser.[68] In spite of their substantial measure of control, the Japanese were not content. Their dissatisfaction was further increased when in 1907 the Korean Emperor secretly sent a delegation to the international conference at the Hague to plead his cause. Although the delegates were not admitted, the Japanese were angered and forced the Emperor to abdicate in favor of his son, Yi, Chok (Wang). The latter, an even weaker character than his father, was compelled to sign a new treaty, empowering the Resident General to effect further administrative reforms and to give prior approval to all laws and appointments, and disbanding the Korean

army. This new blow to Korean independence, which the Japanese were pledged to respect, was greeted by popular unrest, but the presence of Japanese troops prevented any widespread disorder.[69]

The long and unhappy reign (1864-1907) of the ex-Emperor had been marked by a state of decay reminiscent of the worst days of the Byzantine Empire. He himself had always been under the influence of palace factions and scheming women, who had anything but the best interests of Korea at heart. Although kindly and tolerant, he was weak; he was not popular with his subjects, what little affection he gained deriving chiefly from his position as the nominal defender of Korea's interests against the outside world. Perhaps the most creditable feature of his reign was the emancipation of the slaves in 1894.[70] In other respects his reign was a failure; the administration was backward and corrupt to an almost incredible degree. He employed a large number of Europeans and Americans in his customs service, of whom the most distinguished was J. McLeavy Brown.[71] The Emperor's weakness cannot be ascribed to senility, for he was only fifty years old in 1901.[72] One of his ablest ministers, the unscrupulous Yi, Yong Ik,

respect the independence of Korea and to keep hands off.[52] In 1900 Russia took advantage of the chaos in China and Korea following antiforeign outbreaks in both countries to secure still more concessions.[53] By 1903 Russian domination of the Yalu valley in northern Korea had reached the proportions of a major threat to both Korea and Japan.[54] This was the period that a Japanese writer called the time "when Russians controlled Chosen."[55]

Japan had deeply resented Russia's intervention in 1895, and she feared a similar action in Korea; accordingly, she began to prepare for war with characteristic thoroughness.[56] To strengthen her position in Korea, she enlisted and trained bodies of native soldiers.[57] In 1897 she signed a treaty with the king, recognizing the independence of his realm.[58] Yi, Hiung, trying to increase his own importance and thus stave off the subjection of his country, proclaimed himself an emperor in the same year.[59]

It is probable that in January 1904 Russia proposed to Japan that they divide Korea between them; the northern half was to be "neutral" and hence under Russian domination, the southern half a Japanese

was strongly influenced by France and Russia.[73]

Prince Ito undertook a sweeping program of reform. He encouraged more scientific methods of farming and the reclaiming of waste land, and instituted a system of reforestation. He endeavored to bring order out of the chaotic pattern of mining concessions, many of which were held by foreigners.[74] His finance minister, Baron Megata, arranged a public loan, an expedient which the Emperor had never attempted in spite of the bad condition of his finances. The national debt thus acquired mounted rapidly.[75] In 1909, after the end of Ito's term of office Megata established the Bank of Chosen, and in 1910 a clearing house.[76] He also introduced the gold standard and a uniform currency, and tried to reduce the extravagant expenditures of the royal family.[77]

Prince Ito also attempted to check the immigration of undesirable Japanese; he replaced the gendarmerie, or militarized police, to a considerable extent with civil police. New roads and railroads, designed for military use, began to spread over the country.[78] The judicial system, which had been notoriously corrupt, underwent an overhauling at the hands of the Japanese; in 1907 the latter occupied the key positions. In 1909 the

Residency took over the administration and expenses of the judicial and penal systems.[79] As finally organized, the judicial system comprised three levels of courts: local courts, courts of appeal, and the supreme court; there were no juries.[80] Japanese gendarmes had first appeared in Korea during the Sino-Japanese War, when they served to guard railroads. Under the protectorate they undertook more comprehensive functions. After the treaty of 1907 all police were considered to be members of the Japanese police force in Korea; in 1909 the Korean gendarmes outnumbered the Japanese, but the opposite situation existed in the civil police.[81] The Residency General made some efforts to modernize the existing system of primary education.[82]

Although these reforms made for greater efficiency, they bore heavily on the Koreans in many cases. The actions of the Japanese were frequently characterized by the harsh methods of martial law. Coolies and other undesirable Japanese immigrants entered the peninsula in large numbers, in spite of Prince Ito's efforts. They committed ravages and dispossessed many Koreans from their property. Emigration to the Hawaiian Islands,

where many Koreans hoped to find greater prosperity, was hampered. The Residency interfered further with popular liberties by suppressing freedom of the press, giving Japanese names to the towns, and forcing the Koreans to cut off their traditional topknots and change their style of dress. On foreigners too the new regime bore heavily. Their mining concessions were restricted, and the Japanese conducted a campaign to discredit and humiliate them. Dr. Horace N. Allen, the last American minister, was compelled to leave the country because he had criticised the Japanese; J. McLeavy Brown was likewise forced out because he objected to some of Baron Kegata's financial methods.[83]

The Japanese program was not carried out without resistance. In 1907 some units of the Korean army forcibly resisted the attempt to disband them.[84] The most serious opposition to the protectorate came from the Righteous Army, a group of patriots who carried on organized warfare from the wilder regions of the country. They fought bravely, but their courage was not enough to offset the superious armament and discipline of the Japanese troops, and by 1911 they had been all but exterminated.[85] In 1907 attacks were made upon

some of the officials appointed by the Japanese, and in the same year Mr. Stevens was assassinated in the United States by a Korean. In 1909 Prince Ito himself fell victim to a Korean assassin at Harbin, in Manchuria.[86]

"Nippon and Chosen Are One Body"

In 1908 Viscount Arasuke Sone succeeded Prince Ito; two years later Count Masatake Terauchi, a more severe man, became the Resident General.[87] For several years the rulers of Japan had been growing increasingly determined to annex Korea.[88] Shortly after he arrived, Count Terauchi compelled the Emperor to sign a treaty transferring full sovereignty to the Emperor of Japan. The Korean royal family received a pension and an honorary status in the Japanese peerage.[89] The annexation was formally announced to the peoples of both countries by imperial rescripts issued by the two emperors.[90] Japanese officials stoutly defended their action as being necessary for the security of Japan.[91]

Count Terauchi became Governor General,[92] and it was around his office that the structure of the Government General was built. In relation to the Koreans, the Governor General was "virtually an absolute monarch."[93]

In relation to the government of Japan, he occupied a much less independent position; although in theory entitled to report directly to the Emperor, he was in practice compelled to report through the Minister of Colonies.[94] No decree of his could go into effect until it had been approved by the Imperial Government, except for emergency decrees, which took effect immediately but had to be reported to, and could be revoked by, the Imperial Government.[95] To be eligible for the office of Governor General, the candidate had to be a senior officer of the Imperial Army or Navy, and he was of course appointed by the Emperor.[96]

Second in authority to the Governor General was the Vice Governor General, who was invariably a Japanese civilian.[97] Under them was the Secretariat, a sort of executive committee which coordinated the activities of the two types of agencies in the Government General -- the bureaus and the affiliated offices. The bureaus were five in number: General Affairs; Home Affairs; Finance; Justice; and Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry.[98] Of the affiliated offices, the most interesting was the Central Council, which Count Terauchi established ostensibly as a representative advisory body. The Governor

General presided over the Council, but its vice president and all members were Koreans; the latter numbered seventy-one in 1911, and they all held honorary official rank.[99] They were almost entirely Japanese puppets; they decided no matters of importance, and were far from being representative of the Korean people.[100]

Korea was divided into thirteen provinces, each of which had a provincial governor with an administrative staff. The next lower level of government was subdivided into three classes: municipal prefectures (12 in number), rural counties (218 in number), and insular districts (2 in number).[101] Under these were the villages and the other forms of local government at its simplest. Even the village headmen, an institution typical of the Far East, were appointed by Japanese officials.[102]

This organization of the central and provincial governments remained substantially unchanged until 1919, except that in 1914 a uniform system of municipalities was introduced,[103] and in 1917 the villages were reorganized.[104] The laws which regulated the machinery of government came from three principal

sources -- special Japanese laws enacted for Korea, Japanese laws declared to be applicable to the peninsula, and decrees of the Government General.[105] During the period of the protectorate, Korean law was theoretically in force. After the annexation, Korean law was frequently applied in cases where both parties were Korean and where Japanese law was not applicable. However, Japanese criminal law was universally enforced.[106]

Count Terauchi was no liberal; his rule has been described as one of bayonets.[107] He introduced into Korea the Japanese concept of "dangerous thoughts," with all that it implied for the liberties of the people.[108] Eight months before his coming to Korea a program of literary censorship, from which Japanese writers were exempt, had been enacted.[109] The policies of Count Terauchi (1910-1916) and his successor, Count Yoshimichi Hasegawa (1916-1919), were similar, and their terms may be described as a unit.[110]

Prominent Koreans, such as the members of the Central Council, were encouraged by the offer of rewards and favors to serve the Japanese. The gendarmerie came back once more; the Korean and Japanese police wore different uniforms, and of course all

offices in the police force were occupied by Japanese.[111] The Government General promulgated retroactive decrees, which have been regarded in Anglo-Saxon countries as instruments of tyranny.

After the annexation had been consummated, all treaties of the Korean Emperor with foreign powers were abrogated, although the treaty rights were respected for a period of ten years, and foreign nationals were deprived of extraterritorial rights and made subject to Japanese law. In 1916 the Government General forbade foreigners to acquire further mining rights.[112] Nevertheless, the Japanese sought to convince foreigners of the purity of their intentions with respect to Korea.

During this period the country revealed all the worst features of a police state. The police were empowered to enter any house without a warrant, burn any book which was considered subversive, and exercise summary jurisdiction at will. The sanitary police had been introduced on the Japanese model in 1910;[113] if a Korean failed to satisfy them of the cleanliness of his house, he could be flogged. Persons arrested were held incommunicado without any information as to the charges against them and without the assistance of

counsel. To extract confessions and punish those whom they considered guilty, the police resorted to flogging even of old persons, women, children, and the sick. If a prisoner was granted trial, he was presumed to be guilty unless he could prove his innocence. The most glaring example of the methods of the police occurred in 1911-12; 149 persons, all of them Christians and respectable citizens, were arrested on charges of conspiring to assassinate Count Terauchi. They were tortured by the police, one man, Chi, Sam Chu, undergoing almost daily torture for two to three months. Their trial was a mockery, and the court refused to credit their story of the treatment they had suffered. Only an aroused public opinion throughout many parts of the world caused the termination of the case with some semblance of justice.[114]

Korean Resistance

The Koreans did not submit passively to harsh rule. Their desire for independence was augmented, and their hopes seemed to have some chance of realization,

when President Woodrow Wilson announced his belief in self-determination and in "making the world safe for democracy."[115] They tried to send a delegation to the peace conference at Versailles, but the one man who reached France was not admitted to the discussions. Early in March 1919 the funeral of the old Emperor who had abdicated in 1907 took place. The ceremony was the occasion for widespread demonstrations of grief and for peaceful meetings in all the large towns of Korea. A group of prominent Koreans had the courage to set up a government in Seoul and to elect Rhee, Sung Man, who was then in the United States, the first president. Thirty-three of these men, fifteen of them Christians, signed a declaration of independence, a dignified statement of the oppression under which the Korean people were laboring.[116] Copies of the declaration were read in public, and one was even forwarded to the Governor General. The signers were immediately arrested. On 10 March a newspaper called The Independence News appeared; its editor was arrested, but the paper continued to be published in spite of the strenuous efforts of the police to stamp it out. Two prominent Koreans

apparently not otherwise connected with the movement, Viscount Min, Yun Sik and Viscount Yi, Yong Chik were imprisoned for publicly petitioning for a redress of grievances.

By this time peaceful demonstrations were going on in nearly every community in the land. After a brief interval of stunned surprise, the Government General responded by instituting emergency government, and Count Hasegawa made a statement that the principle of self-determination did not apply to Korea.[117] Japanese coolies joined the police in attacking the unresisting demonstrators. The liberal use of swords and fire hooks caused many casualties among the unresisting crowds; many Koreans were killed simply for being spectators. Many persons were arrested, and their fate was very similar to that of the alleged conspirators of 1911. Political activity on the part of Koreans was declared to be illegal, and Shinto worship was encouraged.[118] Many missionaries were imprisoned, and the authorities acted as if the movement were directed by them and their converts. In many cases Christians were crowded into their churches, which were then set afire. In Pyongyang

the measures taken against Christians were particularly severe; the Japanese killed even their dogs. According to Japanese sources, 553 Koreans were killed, 1,409 wounded, and 19,054 imprisoned in connection with the movement; even these figures show that it was a truly national uprising. Korean sources give much higher figures on the number of persons killed.[119]

In Seoul the leaders of the new government drew up a progressive and democratic constitution during the brief period preceding their arrest.[120] In Tokyo a group of foreigners presented to some prominent Japanese a formal statement of what they considered to be the valid grievances of the Korean people. These were, in brief: the desire for independence, the rigor of the military administration, the attempt to rob the Koreans of their national identity, the exclusion of Koreans from positions of influence, discrimination in government and business, the lack of personal liberty, the absence of religious freedom, the practical prohibition of Koreans from traveling and studying abroad, the expropriation of the crown lands, the introduction of prostitution and morphine, the forced emigration of Koreans to Manchuria, and the

fact that many of the physical improvements introduced by the Japanese benefited them more than the Koreans.[121]

The suppression of the independence movement did not put an end to all political agitation. Labor movements began to be organized, and in 1925 the Korean Communist party was formed. A growing resistance movement, conducted from across the Manchurian border, sprang up, and popular feeling for independence remained strong.[122]

Opinion throughout the world was shocked at the methods employed in putting down the independence movement, insofar as the news was publicized. Even in Japan indignation ran high; Premier Hara, who later led Japan into participating in the Washington Disarmament Conference, made an apologetic statement and recalled Count Hasegawa.[123] He then appointed Viscount Makoto Saito, a naval officer and something of a liberal, who embarked upon an avowed policy of reform.[124] At the same time, civilians were declared eligible to hold the office of Governor-General, but no civilian was ever appointed to the post.[125]

Viscount Saito's principal professed objectives were the fostering of friendly feeling between Koreans

and Japanese, decentralization in the government, greater personal liberty, and the improvement of education and social services.[126] He reorganized the Government General, increasing the number of bureaus to seven (Home Affairs, Finance, Industry, Judicial, Education, Police, and Agriculture and Forestry) and adding to the number of affiliated offices.[127] The powers of the provincial governors were widened. In 1920 local advisory bodies were set up; although elective, they were not truly self-governing. Municipal councils were established; in spite of the small proportion of the Japanese residents to the total population, the number of Japanese elected exceeded the Koreans. In the villages the reverse was true. Elective school councils were set up, Koreans outnumbering Japanese about three to one, according to official statistics. These bodies all began to function in 1921.[128]

The gendarmerie was reduced in size; thereafter its functions consisted largely of watching foreigners. Flogging was abolished in theory, although in fact there was little change in the methods of the police. Korean and Japanese police were put into identical uniforms.[129] Viscount Saito did away with the rule

that Korean judges could sit only in cases where both parties were Koreans,[130] although this reform meant little since Korean judges were relatively few in number.[131] The Koreans enjoyed more personal liberty than before, they were permitted to study their native language and history, which had perviously been banned, although the textbooks were written by Japanese who colored them to suit their own ends.[132] Viscount Saito appointed more Koreans to his Central Council, and gave some aid to agriculture and industry.[133] The regulations on the teaching of religious subjects in private schools were liberalized.[134]

These reforms were superficial and merely mitigated, without removing, the basic grievances which had brought on the movement of 1919. The Japanese retained their throttling grip on the government and economy. There was little reform in administrative procedure, and decentralization only in the forms of power rather than in the reality. The Korean press still labored under severe restrictions. The total number of police actually increased, many former gendarmes being converted into civil police. Although popular dissatisfaction decreased, there was no real reconciliation. A sinister

feature of Viscount Saito's term of office was a substantial increase in the area of poppy cultivation.[135]

This contrast between apparent efficiency and exploitation in reality has caused some confusion among historians and is typical of the problem confronting any one who tries to study and evaluate the Japanese administration in Korea. Some writers (Brown, Ladd, Ireland) feel that the Japanese were justified in annexing the peninsula and that on the whole their rule was a success. Brown gives four reasons for his belief: the old regime was hopelessly bad;[136] Russia would have taken Korea if Japan had not; Russian rule would have been a disaster for Korea and for the Far East;[137] the Japanese introduced a more efficient administration and effected many physical improvements.[138] Other writers (McKenzie, Grajdanzev) dissent strongly. Grajdanzev shows with abundant factual evidence, much of it taken from Japanese sources, how the Japanese exploited Korea for their own benefit,[139] and deplores "the uncritical and enthusiastic attitude on the part of those writers on colonial problems who see in each newly constructed factory further proof of increased welfare for the natives."[140]

Viscount Saito's program of reform occupied the major portion of his first term as Governor General (1919-1927). The civil service in Korea was organized along the lines of its Japanese counterpart, and Japanese officials received extra pay for "colonial service."[141] After the disastrous earthquake of 1923 in Japan, government expenditures were cut and there was a 25 percent reduction in the number of officials in Korea.[142] For a few months in 1927 General Yanushige Ugaki served as acting Governor General; in December General Hanzo Yamanashi succeeded to the office.[143] General Yamanashi, a militarist, appears to have accomplished little during his term, beyond indulging in corruption to such an extent that he is said to have been imprisoned after his return to Japan.[144]

Viscount Saito returned for a second term as Governor General (1929-31).[145] Shortly after his assumption of office widespread demonstrations of Korean students broke out; they were caused by an insult offered to a Korean girl by a Japanese boy, and were severely suppressed.[146]

The Minami Regime

The next Governor General was General Kazushige Ugaki;[147] he had been the leader of the more moderate military party in Japan, and appears to have been a fairly capable although not very forceful man.[148] He accelerated the exploitation of Korea by Japanese capitalists.[149] In 1936 he was succeeded by General Jiro Minami, who had been Minister of War at the time of the invasion of Manchuria (1931);[150] he was a militarist of the most extreme type, and his arrival was awaited by the Koreans with great apprehension.[151] He did not fail to live up to their expectations; he enacted a new and more severe criminal code, placing heavy penalties on all kinds of political agitation.[152] He inaugurated a more determined program for the assimilation of the Korean people, or as the Japanese put it making "Nippon and Chosen . . . one body."[153] He made an end of all teaching of the Korean language and Korean history, even in the mission schools.[154] He forced Koreans to adopt Japanese family names,[155] and made their use in business transactions compulsory; this step was very unpopular, especially in the rural districts.[156] In 1936 a Korean won the Marathon at the Olympic

Games in Berlin and set a new record;[157] two Korean language newspapers printed a photograph of him, after obliterating the Japanese flag which had appeared in the original print. The newspapers were suppressed for this outrage to the Japanese national feeling. One daily Korean language newspaper (Ma Il Sin Bo)[158] was allowed to continue; it remained the sole non-technical daily paper in Korean.[159]

General Minami took still more positive and active measures than these. Although only 14 percent of the Korean people understood Japanese (1939),[160] he required that public business be conducted in that language. He arrested and imprisoned Korean intellectuals and civic leaders without cause; this persecution was particularly determined in 1937 and 1938.[161] Of the three basic obligations of Japanese subjects (compulsory education through the grammar school level, payment of taxes, and military service),[162] only the second had previously been enforced in Korea.

General Minami partially remedied this oversight shortly after the outbreak of the China Incident; recruiting officers were instructed to enlist able-

bodied young men for six months of military training, by force if necessary. If a man refused to perform his duties, his family was imprisoned. The men trained under this system were sent to the front in Manchuria and China. After the outbreak of war with the United States, Koreans were made subject to full military training and conscription. In this way from 300,000 to 400,000 were called out and sent into the field. In 1943 even advanced students were declared eligible for conscription, and several thousand were inducted.[163]

Minami also drafted Koreans to work without pay in factories and on projects useful to the war effort. Many of them were employed in building shrines, at which all Koreans were required to worship. Minami began a system of rationing and conducted drives to collect jewels, scrap metal, and firearms. In many cases these articles were taken by force. A shortage of utensils resulted, and most families were forced to use earthenware. Offerings of money, supposedly voluntary but actually forced loans, were exacted on a large scale.[164] Land leases were further restricted, and movement of Korean miners from one job to another

was hampered.[165]

During the period (1931-42) after Viscount Saito's departure, little progress was made even in the administrative reforms which he had promised. In 1933 a "general election" was held for the Provincial Councils, which were thereby supposed to become self-governing, but these councils actually remained under the control of the provincial governors.[166] General Minami more than undid what progress Viscount Saito had made toward reconciling the Koreans.[167]

His term came to an end in 1942.[168] His successors were less harsh, but they kept his oppressive measures in force and strove to make Korea perform her full share in the war effort.[169] General Kuniaki Koiso (1942-44) sent conscripted laborers abroad; he was not a very efficient administrator. During his term Koreans were declared eligible to sit in the Japanese Diet.[170] General Nobuyuki Abe (1944-45) appointed six Koreans to the Diet, but they never took their seats;[171] he too was not an efficient administrator,[172] and his efforts were rewarded with a slowdown campaign on the part of many Korean factory workers.[173]

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Degree of Japanese Domination

During the period of Japanese domination, virtually all the important governmental positions were held by members of the ruling race; in 1940, twelve of the thirteen provincial governors were Japanese.[174] The principal occupation of the Japanese population in Korea was government service,[175] and their lives were an adventurous search for lucrative employment.[176] Their number increased nearly fourfold in the thirty-year period following the annexation, due to immigration[177] rather than to a natural growth; by 1945 it had reached a figure of approximately 650,000.[178] In 1922 inter-marriage between Japanese and Koreans was legalized;[179] nevertheless "the Japanese, living among the Koreans, constitute a distinct group of people with their own customs and conditions of life."[180] Relatively few of this dominant racial minority were farmers;[181] in 1938, 71 percent were living in cities.[182] As a result of the control his country exercised over the government and economy, "the average Japanese in Korea is many times wealthier than a Korean."[183]

In the courts, as well as in administrative positions, racial discrimination was in evidence.

Although Korean judges were eligible to judge all types of cases, they were few in number (in 1940, none in the supreme court, 4 out of 35 in the courts of appeal). "Thus the Koreans are judged in Japanese Courts by Japanese judges according to Japanese laws." The procedure was carried on in the Japanese language, with which only a small fraction of the Korean population were familiar.[184] As a result, Koreans tended to turn to the courts only as a last resort, and the ratio of civil suits to criminal cases was very low.[185] In the latter, the number of convictions was very high, usually amounting to 95 percent of the total number of cases.[186] The penalties for petty offenses were more severe than in Japan.[187] The power of the judiciary was enhanced over a period of years; their salaries were raised, and they in effect held their positions during good behavior.[188]

After Viscount Saito's time, the police were required to have a warrant before making an arrest, except in cases where an offender was caught redhanded.[189] Nevertheless, such guarantees remained a mockery, and the police carried on as they had before the "reforms" of 1919.[190] Viscount Saito retained a censorship

section as part of the Police Bureau.[191] The principal function of this section, and the main purpose of much of the police force's activity, was the suppression of "dangerous thoughts." Persons suspected of harboring disloyal ideas were imprisoned in large numbers. Under General Minami, approximately 10,000 intellectuals and socialists were jailed for a year or longer. Many were never brought to trial; a large number were beaten and maimed.[192] Some did not survive.

The results of the domination of the government by the Japanese were reflected in the financial and economic fields. The Bank of Chosen was always under strict Japanese control; after World War I it became "the spearhead of Japanese penetration in Manchuria, the Russian Far East and China."[193] After about 1929, however, progressive retrenchment was forced on the bank, and its activities were curtailed.[194] From 1911 to 1920, under the bank's control, the currency was virtually identical with that of Japan.[195] During the 1930's Koreans were charged interest rates exceeding by 25 percent those paid by their Japanese competitors.[196] After 1910 the national debt increased steadily to roughly thirty times the original figure.[197]

An examination of the budgets for the period from 1936 to 1938 reveals that loans constituted a substantial and increasing portion (from 10 percent to 20 percent) of the public revenue; the greatest source of revenue, however (about 50 percent), was the "Government Undertakings and Properties," in other words the government monopolies.[198] The Government General directly controlled the production and distribution of ginseng, tobacco, salt, and narcotics.[199] The Japanese were not very efficient in preventing the abuse of the last product;[200] they even fostered its use.[201]

Under the Korean monarchy, tax gatherers had been corrupt and had pocketed a large share of the state's revenue. The Japanese remedied this situation and introduced a more efficient and progressively heavier system of income taxes, inheritance taxes, sales taxes, and the like. Taxation was further increased after the beginning of the China Incident to meet the demands of the new type of peace.[202] For ten years after the annexation, the tariff rates granted to foreign powers under the old treaties were allowed to remain, although the treaties themselves had been

declared abrogated. By 1923 almost all duties on goods passing between Japan and Korea were abolished, so that the two countries were in effect an economic unit.[203]

On the provincial level, revenue came chiefly from taxes, subsidies from the Government General, and returns from Imperial donations. The expenditures went largely into public works, hospitals and other sanitary facilities, charity and relief, and education.[204] In the municipalities and villages, revenue came from taxes and fees. Expenditures were made for local improvements -- waterworks, sewers, hospitals, social works, and repairs and construction of roads and buildings.[205]

The best modern writer on Korea states that "The fundamental fact of Korean economy is the extremely low value of production,"[206] and that "far more extensive industrialization would seem to be the only solution for this extreme poverty."[207] Until the Manchuria Incident, the authorities restricted the establishment of industries in Korea, presumably with the purpose of preventing competition with the industries of Japan proper; even the Japanese entrepreneure had difficulty in securing permits to found

corporations.[208] Nevertheless,

> A rapid development of Korean industry did occur after 1931, but it would be a mistake to think that this development meant a fundamental change for the Koreans. The huge new plants built or planned were Japanese enterprises in which Koreans could only hope to be employed as workers.[209]

This meant a reversal of the previous policy, and revealed the growing importance of Korea in the Japanese war economy.[210] "In 1929, the food industry occupied first place in Korea with textiles as a poor second."[211] After that time many new corporations were founded under Japanese ownership,[212] and by 1944 the chemical industry had attained the first place.[213] The statistics of this period indicate a rapid rise in the total value of production, but this apparent rise was due partly to an increase in prices.[214] One concern, the Japan Nitrogen Corporation, made a net profit of more than 30 percent in 1936.[215] Before 1933 the authorities did not permit any factories in Korea to manufacture explosives, but after that date this policy was reversed and a few plants began production.[216]

The Japanese exploited Korea's coal resources, which are located chiefly in the northern portion and are not large, but a substantial portion of which

are anthracite deposits.[217] After a period of slow development, "All data point to the rapid growth of mining in Korea after the Mukden incident [1931]."[218] Working conditions among Korean miners were bad.[219] Gold mining was an important industry in the eyes of the Japanese.[220] The Government General made efforts to develop the industry with indifferent success,[221] although with respect to the number of persons employed it occupied first place among the mining industries.[222] Korea has fairly sizeable deposits of iron ore, more than 500,000 tons having been mined in 1929.[223] 100,000 tons of iron ore were produced in southern Korea in 1944.[224] There was almost no petroleum industry under the Japanese.[225] Japan made good use of Korean deposits of graphite, molybdenum, and zinc in her war effort.[226] The total value of mineral production in 1937 was ¥ 150,000,000;[227] a standard of comparison is provided by the sum spent by the Government General on railroads, which was approximately equal for the same year.[228]

After 1931 water power underwent a rapid development under official supervision, but in 1937 the total capacity of the stations was less than one-tenth of

that of the stations in Japan.[229] "Thus, while in Japan nine-tenths of the homes are supplied with electricity, in Korea, in spite of all its development, only one-eighth of the population enjoys its benefits."[230] The situation was much the same with respect to gas; during World War II, one out of every two Japanese families in Seoul used gas, whereas only one out of every 103 Korean families did so; in other cities the ratio was even more unfavorable to the Koreans.[231]

Shortly after annexing Korea, the Japanese had begun an ambitious program of road construction, too ambitious indeed for the slender economy of the country; these roads were planned with a view to future military requirements. To build them the Japanese made use of forced labor.[232] In spite of these efforts the road network remained somewhat primitive; it was unevenly distributed, the area most liberally provided with highways being the sparsely populated northern region near the Russian border.[233]

Although the ratio of miles of rail to population was lower in Korea than in Japan, Korea was better developed in this respect than in most others; ". . . the Japanese considered railway construction in Korea

more important than the expansion of industry."[234] From 1936 to 1938 the outlay on railroads accounted for about half of the total expenditure of the Government General.[235] "The explanation is that military rather than economic considerations governed the construction of Korean railways."[236] During the same period rail fares were more than three times as high in Korea as in Japan.[237]

In all fields of industry, the Japanese share was several times as great as the Korean, with respect both to capital and profits.[238] In most cases Japanese employees received wages which were twice as high as those of their Korean competitors, since their productivity was by no means twice as great, it was uneconomical for firms to hire many Japanese workers, and those who were hired were employed for other than economic reasons.[239] In spite of the efforts at labor organization, "trade unions do not exist in Korea and attempts to form them have been suppressed with . . . energy." After Japan's entry into a state of total war, workers were encouraged to increase their efforts and to prove their loyalty to the program of "spiritual mobilization."[240]

Although the Japanese conducted a program of reforestation, they also cut down existing stands of trees at an increased pace, so that the net result seems to have been deforestation.[241] They developed the fishing industry, but their methods were somewhat wasteful. During World War II 54 percent of the manufactured by-products were used for purposes other than food, many of them being put to military uses. Three Japanese purchasing firms dominated the market for raw fish.[242]

In summing up the accomplishments of the Japanese in exploiting the resources of Korea, one writer gives it as his considered opinion that "Japanese domination has impeded the development of the country."[243] In line with this opinion, he states that the food industry has had only a slow growth, because "it is a consumers' goods industry, while the efforts of the Government and of the large concerns were concentrated on preparation for war."[244]

Ownership of Farm Lands

In a predominantly agricultural economy such as

Korea's, the matter of the ownership and exploitation of land had, of course, the greatest importance. This fact the Japanese were not slow to grasp; under the protectorate a Japanese named Nagamori, with the backing of the Resident General, almost succeeded in acquiring a concession which would have given him virtual control of from one-fifth to one-third of all land in the country. The scheme was dropped because of the hostility of public opinion, but it left a very bad impression on the Koreans. In spite of the failure of the scheme, other Japanese speculators were able to buy hundreds of thousands of acres of land at very low prices.[245]

After the annexation, native farms were expropriated in large numbers.[246] In 1918 a land survey was completed; it rendered uncertain the titles of many farmers, and greatly facilitated the acquisition of more land by the Japanese landlords.[247] From 1918 to 1938 the proportion of absentee landlords in the population increased;[248] concurrently the percentage of the Korean population engaged in agriculture fell from 85.6 percent in 1921 to 73.6 percent in 1938.[249] In 1938 tenants of all kinds and agricultural laborers

formed 81.9 percent of the total farming population.[250] It has been estimated that in 1944 2.7 percent of the agricultural population, namely the landlords, owned 63.9 percent of the cultivated land in Korea.[251]

The landlord system which then existed has been thus described by a competent authority:

> . . . most of the landlords are absentee owners; they have their agents on the place who . . . compel tenants to bring them presents, and to work for them; who order harvesting at a time convenient to themselves, increase rent to their own advantage, and burden the tenant in other ways. As a result of all this tenants are left with only a small portion of their crop.[252]

As for the farms themselves, the size of the individual plot of ground was if anything even smaller than in Japan, in spite of the greater density of population in the latter country, and the "poorest farmers form a larger part of the total than in Japan."[253]

All these facts pointed to a definite and conscious process, which has been aptly characterized as follows:

> It is clear . . . that a rapid process of dispossession is taking place among Korean farmers which turns them first into owner-tenants, then into tenants, and finally into proletarians, squatters, beggars and vagabonds. . . . the assertion that "over half of the Korean land has passed into Japanese control" is not a "gross exaggeration," when the total land area of Korea is considered. It would also seem that such

> assertions are not far from the truth even with respect to the cultivated land. . . . tens of thousands of farmers were dispossessed and. . . other tens of thousands of the younger generation could not acquire land in spite of the increase of the cultivated areas.[254]

In the decade following 1920, the number of disputes between landlords, predominantly Japanese, and tenants, chiefly Korean, began to increase. To remedy this situation the Government General established in 1928 a Temporary Committee for the Investigation of Tenancy. In February 1933 a Decree on Tenancy Arbitration was put into effect, its main purpose being to stabilize the already existing relationships. The law had no significant effect on the position of the tenant class.[255]

Japanese corporations registered in Korea were classed by the Government General as being of Korean ownership. In spite of this piece of juggling, the area of land classified officially as being Japanese in ownership increased in the period from 1921 to 1927 by 43 percent. Shortly after that time, the Government General ceased to publish statistics on Japanese holdings in Korea; nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the process of expropriating

the farmer continued at an increased pace.[256]

Grajdanzev gives the following answer to the question of why the Government General made no serious effort to improve the lot of the Korean farmer:

> The Japanese cannot change the situation for two reasons. First, they cannot very well undermine the medieval land relations in Korea while the same system still prevails in Japan itself. . . . Secondly, this system coincides with Japanese needs. . . . The tenancy system, together with the taxation system, is an important instrument for pumping rice out of Korea.[257]

The same writer states that "there was room for expansion of the cultivated area in Korea if the Government had concentrated its attention on the development of the country and not on preparation for wars of aggression."[258]

Japanese sources point with pride to the growth of Korea's foreign trade after her annexation. In terms of yen, the value of both imports and exports increased by about 2500 percent. The principal item of export was rice; the chief commodities imported were millet, textiles, fertilizer, and machinery; 84 percent of the export and 85 percent of the import trade were carried on with Japan.[259] One writer has summed up the situation succinctly: "the Japanese monopoly of Korean trade is virtually complete."[260] The Japanese spent large sums in developing port facilities,

with considerable success; Pusan, the most important port and the nearest to Japan, could berth ships displacing as much as 7000 tons.[261] Ferries plied between Pusan and Shimonoseki, but they were subject to the hazards of stormy seas; navigation in Korean waters is dangerous.[262]

Education

In the field of education, Japanese and Korean students were educated separately for the most part;[263] Japanese teachers and students were heavily favored over their Korean counterparts.[264] Ordinarily Korean children received four years of schooling, and the Japanese six. Although of course the Koreans were in a tremendous numerical majority, there were fewer schools for their children than for those of the Japanese.[265] The sums expended on schools amounted to about one-fifth of those spent on justice and prisons;[266] the Government General spent two and one-half times as much money on the education of a Japanese child, in a year, as it did for a

Korean child.[267] Although some institutions for secondary and higher education were founded,[268] they benefited the Koreans relatively little, since 95 percent of their students did not go beyond the primary schools.[269] Teaching at all schools was carried on in Japanese, and the curriculum emphasized "morals," in other words the dutiful obedience of the subject to the will of the Emperor and the officials.[270] No effort was made to cause the Koreans any feeling of pride in their nationality, history, or language; in this regard, McKenzie quotes the following syllogism which a Japanese teacher is supposed to have propounded to his class: "Savages are healthy; Koreans are healthy; therefore Koreans are savages."[271]

Korean students found it difficult to obtain passports when they wished to study and travel abroad, although in some cases the missionaries were able to secure passports for them.[272] In the instances where Koreans went to Japan to study, a Japanese educator admits that they were often treated so badly that they became very anti-Japanese and race conscious, and would speak only Korean.[273] The mission schools were

required to teach the Japanese language;[274] the missionaries constantly wanted freedom from government interference in education and in many other fields. The Japanese disliked the teaching of religion even in the mission schools.[275]

The dominant position of the Japanese minority in every important phase of Korean life -- in government, finance, industry, agriculture, trade, and education -- is what the authors of the Cairo Declaration (December 1943) had in mind when they spoke of "the enslavement of the people of Korea."[276]

Koreans Abroad

For many years,[277] Koreans emigrated to Manchuria in large numbers. Much of this movement was voluntary, the emigrants wishing to escape from Japanese rule and hoping to find greater freedom and prosperity.[278] After the beginning of World War II the movement took on a largely compulsory character, since the Japanese then controlled Manchuria and felt the need for an increased supply of labor there.[279] In 1938 the number of Koreans in

Manchuria was believed to exceed one million;[280] their chief occupation was farming.[281] Some of them were undesirables; after a time the Chinese came to prevent their presence and mistreated them.[282]

There was also some migration of Koreans to Siberia, where many of them worked on collective farms and took an active part in political and social life. The Koreans in China fell into two main classes, those who had come in the wake of the Japanese armies as traders or camp followers, and those who had gone to join the Chinese forces.[283] The number of Koreans in Siberia was estimated to be 200,000 in 1938, and of those in China 50,000. A total of about 7,000 made their way to Hawaii and America.[284]

The most significant movement of all was the migration of Koreans to Japan.[285] It was stated in 1944 that "there are now more Koreans in Japan than Japanese in Korea."[286] The extent of this movement, which was not publicized by the Japanese, is difficult to determine; figures range from more than one million[287] to five million.[288] A more probable figure is 3,800,000.[289] The migration was relatively a recent phenomenon; the Japanese considered it a

measure in the total war effort. In spite of the contribution which the Koreans thus made, they were on the whole badly treated by the Japanese population. The Koreans performed agricultural labor, worked in mines,[290] and did other unskilled labor. 120,000 of them[291] worked as coal miners in Kyushu and Hokkaido.

In 1944 it was said that "At least 10 percent of the Korean population is now earning its bread abroad."[292] In general their lot was not happy; they "hold no official positions, enjoy no subsidies or grants, and very often would be more happy if Japanese 'protection' overlooked them."[293]

Like many other conquered countries, Korea had a government in exile, which claimed to be the oldest institution of that type in the world. It was organized in Shanghai after the suppression of the independence movement of 1919.[294] In 1920 Rhee, Sung Man was elected its first president;[295] as a young man, he had come under Western influences, became a Christian, and had taken a leading part in an independence movement in 1894.[296] His liberal sympathies brought down on his head the wrath of the Korean king, and he had to leave the country in 1895. From then until 1909

he studied at Yale and Princeton Universities in the United States and became acquainted with Woodrow Wilson, who was then President of Princeton. A brief stay in Korea from 1909 to 1911 convinced him that his ideals were incompatible with Japanese methods, and he returned to America.[297]

Dr. Rhee's two closest associates were Kim, Kyu Sik and Kim, Koo.[298] The Provisional Government was informally recognized by Chiang Kai Shek, who lent financial support.[299] Its chief demand was for the complete independence of Korea.[300] It made use of communistic as well as nationalistic elements,[301] but Dr. Rhee rejected several overtures from Lenin and gained a large measure of unpopularity with both the Korean communists[302] and Russia.[303] After the beginning of the China Incident the Provisional Government retreated to Chungking, where it set up headquarters; from there it kept a force in the field against the Japanese.[304] While he himself led an exile government, General Charles De Gaulle extended de facto recognition to the Provisional Government;[305] none of the other powers did so. While it was in exile the Provisional Government was a sort of Mecca

for patriotic Koreans; nevertheless, its importance set in motion a process of slow dissolution, some of the members going to Nanking, some to Manchuria, some to the United States, and a few to Russia.[306] In spite of its practical weakness and with no formal standing in international diplomacy, the Provisional Government continued to enjoy in the minds of many Koreans the status of the rightful government of their country.[307] Dr. Rhee was widely known as the "Sun Yat Sen of Korea."[308] Nevertheless, as the men who had been connected with the independence movement of 1919 died one by one, some persons in Korea came to feel that the Provisional Government had lost contact with reality and had ceased to be truly representative of the people.[309]

The Provisional Government was the best known and most important of the organizations formed by Koreans abroad; of such persons in general, "One may say that before 1942 the Koreans in exile showed a marked inclination to divide and subdivede into small factions and to disagree perpetually among themselves. However, this is inevitable under

conditions of exile and harsh oppression at home."[310] The full extent of the Korean tendency toward disunity will appear later in these pages. A number of revolutionary groups were formed during the period when Japan ruled Korea;[311] in about 1936 nine of them formed the Korean National Revolutionary Party, and a call went out for Koreans to go to China and receive military training.[312]

The military activities of exiled Koreans were not confined to organizing resistance; they also joined existing forces. Some Koreans served as officers in the Red Army.[313] A sizeable contingent of Koreans, perhaps a full division, fought with the Chinese Communists.[314] One guerrilla leader, General Kim, Il Sawng, fought against the Japanese in Manchuria during World War II and is said to have been decorated by Marshal Josef Stalin.[315]

Rhee, Sung Man founded a political organization about the year 1910; it was called the Society of Like-Minded People, and had its headquarters in Honolulu. It was led by men from southern Korea, and its goal was independence. At about the same time, Mr. Ahn, Chang Ho founded a nonpolitical society

(its Korean name was Heung Sa Tan) with headquarters in Los Angeles; its purpose was to train young Koreans for positions of leadership, and it had members in the Hawaiian Islands, Manchuria, China, and Korea itself, as well as in the United States. Its leaders came chiefly from northern Korea. Mr. Ahn died in a Korean prison in 1938.[316]

Under the terms of the treaty of annexation in 1910, the Korean royal family were granted titles and monetary grants.[317] They remained for a time in Seoul in even greater idleness than before.[318] The old emperor Yi, Hiung, who had abdicated in 1907, died in 1919, and his funeral was the occasion for the beginning of the independence movement of that year, already described. His son Yi, Chok, who had been the last of the Yi emperors, died in 1926. Thereupon his brother, Yi, Kun, who had been educated in Japan and had married a Japanese princess, became head of the family. Although a Japanese source states that the royal couple made frequent visits to Korea,[320] Prince Yi was said to be living in Japan in 1945 with no desire to return to Korea.[321] At the same time a small royalist party was working in his native land

on his behalf,[322] and the Empress Dowager who had been Yi, Yiung's last wife, was living in the royal palace in Seoul.[323]

The Activities of Foreigners in Korea

The first European to reach Korea, a Catholic missionary, came in 1594, but it was not until late in the eighteenth century that a Christian church began to exist in the peninsula. In 1845 a Frenchman was appointed Bishop of Korea. During the nineteenth century the Christian missionaries and converts were subject to frequent fierce persecutions, which ceased only late in the century during the reign of Yi, Hiung.[324]

Although a few Protestant missionaries came to Korea during the middle of the nineteenth century, it was not until 1884 that Protestant influence made itself felt. In that year Dr. Horace N. Allen, an American Presbyterian medical missionary, arrived; he gained the confidence of the king and later became the American minister.[325] In 1885 Dr. Horace G.

Underwood, another well-known Presbyterian missionary, came to Korea.[326]

From a hospital founded by Dr. Allen grew Severance Hospital, one of the most famous institutions in the far east, which was supported at first from a fund donated by an American business man.[327] In 1886 an American woman founded Ewha School for Girls.[328] Schools founded and run by missionaries came to play an important part in the Korean educational system; in 1939 one quarter of all high school students and more than one half of all college students in Korea studied at such schools.[329]

Nor were spiritual activities neglected. In 1898 a Catholic cathedral was consecrated at Seoul.[330] At about the same time other religious organizations arrived, including the Anglican Church,[331] the Russian Orthodox Church,[332] and the Y.M.C.A.[333] Conversions proceeded at an encouraging rate, due to the emotional nature of the Korean people and the lack of any entrenched native priesthood.[334] From 1920 to 1940 the number of converts kept pace with the increase in population; at the end of that period the total number of Christians numbered at least 500,000,[335]

including about 200,000 Catholics.[336]

At first the missionaries welcomed the Japanese, hoping that a more enlightened administration would follow. Prince Ito proved himself sympathetic toward Christianity and kept the respect of the missionaries.[337] Under his successors, they found themselves the object of increasing official suspicion and persecution.[338] In general, the policy of the missionaries was to endure such grievances patiently, hoping for redress and feeling that it would be unwise to antagonize the Government General openly.[339] This course laid them open to the charge of acquiescing too easily in the Japanese rule, and of preaching its acceptance to the Koreans.[340] The officials seem to have suspected the missionaries of political designs and "dangerous thoughts,"[341] and their dislike of religious teaching even in church schools led to a continual conflict on the question of private education.[342] After General Minami began to require all Koreans to perform the Shinto ceremonies, the Catholic Church gave permission for its members to participate, since it chose to regard the ceremony as a purely political one,[343] and was forced to replace the European

bishops with Japanese or Koreans.[344] On the other hand, the Protestant missionaries refused to consider the ceremonies as purely political in nature, and all of them seem to have left Korea before the outbreak of World War II.[345]

As portrayed in official statistics, the history of the foreign population in Korea was complex. From 1910 to 1930 the total number of foreigners in Korea, including Chinese and excluding Japanese, increased at an accelerating pace. From 1930 to 1937 the trend was reversed and the total figure fell to roughly 43,000 -- a drop of 25,000.[346] The apparent exodus of foreigners took place in every province except two; these two, the northern provinces nearest the Manchurian and Siberian borders, gained in number of foreigners from 1929 to 1937.[347] Again according to official statistics, the most important occupations among foreigners were commerce, agriculture, and industry, accounting respectively for 38, 23, and 17 percent of the foreign families in 1937.[348] In the latter year approximately 1000 Europeans and Americans were living in Korea.[349] During World War II there were twenty Axis nationals, other than Japanese, in

the peninsula south of 38 degrees north latitude; they were all Germans.[350] They seem to have expected that the Japanese, their nominal allies, would hand over to them confiscated holdings and property of Allied nationals, but they were sadly disappointed. The Japanese allowed them no privileges, and required even Germans who had lived in Korea for many years to have special passes whenever they traveled.[351]

In addition to various foreign consulates in other cities (for example, a Russian consulate at Inch'on),[352] there were American, British, Russian, Belgian, Chinese, and French consulates in Seoul.[353] During World War II three consuls remained in the capital -- the French, a career officer although at the time a Vichy appointee; the Chinese, likewise a career diplomat, owning nominal allegiance to the puppet regime in Nanking;[354] and the Russian, Mr. Poliansky.[355]

The Japanese severely limited the commercial activities of other foreigners in Korea. In addition to the law of 1916 prohibiting their acquisition of further mining concessions,[356] they promulgated in

1937 an ordinance tightly restricting the acquisition and holding of land by foreigners.[357] From 1896 to 1900, Russian interests acquired mining concessions along the Tumen River, and timber concessions along the Yalu River, and Russian instructors were engaged for the Korean army,[358] but after the Russian defeat in 1905 such activity seems to have come to an end.[359] An American corporation, the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company, secured a concession to mine gold in 1896, and it became a center of American influence in North Korea. In 1937 it discovered new deposits, and prospects seemed excellent, but in the following year strong official pressure forced the corporation to sell out to the Nippon Mining Company, a subsidized concern; nevertheless, the comparatively uneconomical methods of the Japanese corporation compelled it to go out of business in 1944. This episode is an illustration, not necessarily typical, of the fate of foreign corporations in Korea.[360]

It has been said that "The Korean Government-General is the biggest entrepreneur on the peninsula;"[361] in the field of private enterprise Japanese corporations were dominant. Many such powerful concerns,

including the celebrated house of Mitsubishi, moved into Korea, especially after 1930.[362] Some general remarks have already been made on the dominant position which such Japanese corporations, together with the Government General itself, occupied in the economic life of the peninsula.[363] In 1938 four private corporations controlled approximately 22 percent of the total mileage of railway tracks in Korea.[364] One writer has summed up the situation as follows:

> . . . perhaps as much as one quarter of the cultivated area and more than half of the total area of Korea is in Japanese hands; railways, telegraphs, telephones, shipping companies, electric power stations, coal mines, most of the gold mines, and almost all large industrial enterprises are Japanese-owned.[365]

It is with such facts as these in mind that the same writer has said that "the moment of Japan's final defeat will be the most momentous in Korean history."[366]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. JANIS 75, Korea, Chapter II "Military Geography"; Government General of Tyosen /Chosen/, Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen: 1937-38 (Keizyo /Seoul/, 1938), pp. 9-11. (Hereinafter referred to as Annual Report); Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York, 1944, pp. 8-22.

2. Annual Report, p. 16.

3. Ibid., p. 23. JANIS 75, Chapter X "People and Government," p. 1.

4. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 23-25. For a further account of the Japanese invasion see Arthur Judson Brown, The Mastery of the Far East; the Story of Korea's Transformation and Japan's Rise to Supremacy in the Orient (New York, 1919), pp. 112-115. See also The Korea Times, 5 September 1945 /In historical file/; Annual Report, p. 1; F.A. McKenzie, Korea's Fight for Freedom (London, 1920), p. 18.

5. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 273-275.

6. XXIV Corps G-2, "The Korean Government," 31 August 1945.

7. JANIS 75, Chapter X, pp. 4-7.

8. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 84.

9. Ibid., pp. 85.

10. Ibid., pp. 87-89.

11. Ibid., p. 90.

12. Ibid., pp. 95-99.

13. Ibid., p. 90.

14. Ibid., pp. 18-22.

15. Ibid., p. 104.

16. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 September 1945.

17. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 89.

18. Ibid., pp. 131-184.

19. Ibid., p. 132.

20. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Foreign Affairs Section, 8 December 1945, "Measure to Induce Korean Miners to Continue Work in Japan," /In files of Displaced Persons Office, Foreign Affairs Section, Secretariat, Military Government/.

21. Brown, op. cit., pp. 20-43; Dr. Horace N. Allen, Korea: Fact and Fancy (Seoul, 1904), pp. 145-268; William Elliot Griffis, Corea: the Hermit Nation (London, 1882).

22. Brown, op. cit., p. v. A good account of Korea's part in the international struggle can be found in Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: a Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century (New York, 1922), pp. 446-487.

23. Ibid., p. 429; Brown, op. cit., pp. 109-110. There is some doubt as to whether Korea ever paid formal tribute to Japan; the Japanese tended to construe gifts as tribute.

24. Dennett, op. cit., pp. 417-420, 434-437.

25. Ibid., pp. 434-453.

26. Ibid., pp. 446-447. The name in parenthesis indicates the name of the king's era, as in Japan "Showa" is the name for the era of Emperor Hirohito.

27. Treaties, Regulations, etc. between Corea and Other Powers, 1876-1889 (Shanghai, 1891), pp. 1-6 (hereinafter referred to as Corean Treaties.)

28. Ibid., p. 11; Angus Hamilton, Korea (London, 1904), pp. 10-11.

29. Korean Treaties, p. 27, pp. 36-38, 62-63, 82-104, 120-125, 126-131, 375-379.

30. Ibid., pp. 41-50; Dennett, op. cit., pp. 450-465.

31. Ibid., p. 480.

32. Korean Treaties, pp. 53-61; Dennett, op. cit., p. 521.

33. Korean Treaties, pp. 132-142.

34. Ibid., pp. 172-186.

35. Ibid., pp. 215-228.

36. Ibid., pp. 263-276.

37. Dennett, op. cit., 480-481.

38. Korean Treaties, pp. 308-314.

39. Ibid., pp. 319-330.

40. Ibid., pp. 315-318; Brown op. cit., p. 120.

41. On the Tong Hak see ibid., pp. 60-63. For an excellent account of this entire period see Dennett, op. cit., pp. 486-487, 495-506.

42. For a general account of the war see Brown, op. cit., pp. 121-125. On the contrast between China and Japan see Dennett, op. cit., pp. 347-348, 425-427. On the Japanese fleet see Edward Mead Earl ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1943), pp. 466-470.

43. Annual Report, p. 2.

44. Brown, op. cit., pp. 125, 129; Hamilton, op. cit., p 10.

45. Brown, op. cit., pp. 129-131, 148.

46. Ibid., p. 125.

47. Ibid., 137-142.

48. Ibid., 132-134.

49. Ibid., pp. 142-144.

50. Allen, op. cit., pp. 186, 196, 201; Brown, op. cit., pp. 36, 134-136; McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

51. Brown, op. cit., pp. 127-129.

52. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 29.

53. Brown, op. cit., pp. 58-59, 131-132, 142-144; Allen, op. cit., pp. 211-213.

54. Brown, op. cit., pp. 144-147.

55. Sakau Moriya, Development of Chosen and Necessity of Spiritual Enlightenment (Government General of Chosen, 1924), pp. 19-20.

56. For an interesting description of some of the military preparations on both sides see Hamilton, op. cit., pp. xvii-xli. For a brilliant analysis of Japan's military machine see Brown, op. cit., pp. 254-272.

57. Ibid., p. 137.

58. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 122.

59. Allen, op. cit., p. 201.

60. Homer B. Hulbert, The History of Korea (Seoul, 1905), pp. 350-351; George Trumbull Ladd, In Korea with Marquis Ito. (London, 1908), p. 241.

61. Allen, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

62. The events leading up to the war, and those of the war itself, are described in Brown, op. cit., pp. 148-177.

63. Ibid., pp. 178-194.

64. Edgar Snow, People on Our Side (Armed Services Edition), p. 244.

65. Brown, op. cit., pp. 195-197; McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 87-97. For an estimate of Prince Ito see Ibid., p. 104 and Brown, op. cit., pp. 354-357.

66. Ibid., pp. 197-201.

67. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 99-103. See also Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 33.

68. Annual Report, pp. 3-4.

69. Brown, op. cit., pp. 201-204; McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 122-126.

70. Cynn, Hugh Heung-Wo, The Rebirth of Korea; the Reawakening of the People, Its Causes, and the Outlook (New York, 1920), pp. 126-128.

71. Allen, op. cit., p. 266.

72. Ibid., p. 219.

73. Except where otherwise cited, the foregoing description of the Emperor Yi and his reign is taken from Annual Report, pp. 1-3; Moriya, op. cit., pp. 2-3; Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 59-73; Brown, op. cit., pp. 20-43.

74. Ladd, op. cit., pp. 302-314; Joseph H. Longford, The Story of Korea (London, 1911), pp. 354-365.

75. Annual Report, p. 67-68.

76. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

77. Ladd, op. cit., pp. 315-324; Bank of Chosen, Report on Currency Adjustment in Korea (Keijo 1909).

78. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 104-107; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 341-351; Brown, op. cit., pp. 354-357.

79. Alleyne Ireland, The New Korea (New York, 1926), pp. 137-143.

80. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 250

81. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 154-158; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 344-348.

82. Annual Report, p. 83.

83. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 83-103, 108-120; Ladd, op. cit., 353-363; Brown, op. cit., pp. 66-68.

84. Annual Report, p. 177.

85. Ibid., p. 177; Brown, op. cit., pp. 349-351; McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 132-170; Grajdanzev, op. cit., 43-45.

86. Annual Report, pp. 4-8; McKenzie, op. cit., p. 172; Brown, op. cit., p. 351.

87. Ibid., pp. 352-353. For a description of Terauchi see ibid., pp. 297-303 and McKenzie, op. cit., p. 174. To avoid confusion, throughout this narrative each Japanese nobleman is referred to by the highest title he held during his life, regardless of what his rank was at the time under discussion. For the ranks in the Japanese peerage see Y. Takenobu, The Japan Yearbook: Complete Cyclopaedia of General Information and Statistics on Japan and Japanese Territories for the Year 1926 (Tokyo, 1926), p. 61

88. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 39-42.

89. Annual Report, pp. 5-6, 222.

90. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

91. Brown, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

92. Annual Report, p. 230.

93. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 238.

94. Ibid., p. 238.

95. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

96. Annual Report, p. 36.

97. Ibid., p. 230

98. Ireland, op. cit., p. 77, pp. 85-86.

99. Annual Report, pp. 46-48; Ireland, op. cit., pp. 87-88; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 14, 24 September 1945, pp. 3-4.

100. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 243-245

101. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

102. Ibid., p. 115.

103. Ibid., p. 126.

104. Ibid., p. 128.

105. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 250. Ireland gives several more sources (op. cit., pp. 141-143), but these three are the most important.

106. Ibid., pp. 141-143.

107. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 98, 17 December 1945, p. 3.

108. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, mining engineers, 27 September 1945.

109. HUSAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, GO 8, 18 September 1945. See also Memorandum, 17 September 1945, "Explanation of Laws enumerated in General Order #5, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA, 18 September 1945," [In historical file.]

110. Except where otherwise cited, the following account of the period from 1910 to 1919 is taken from McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 176-203.

111. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

112. The New York World-Telegram, The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1945 (New York, 1945), p. 335.

113. Ireland, op. cit., p. 213.

114. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 218-238; Brown, op. cit., p. 344. Figures on the total number of those arrested vary; the one used is that given by McKenzie.

115. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 54-55. The following account of the independence movement of 1919 is taken from the following sources, except where otherwise cited: McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 239-308; Cynn, op. cit., pp. 15-79; J. O. P. Bland, China, Japan, and Korea (New York, 1921), pp. 192-195; Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia (Boston, 1945), pp. 71-72; and interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945. The accounts are in almost complete agreement.

116. For the text of the declaration see Cynn, op. cit., pp. 19-23 or McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 247-250.

117. Ibid., p. 262.

118. HUSAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, GO 5.

119. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

120. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 303-308.

121. Cynn, op. cit., pp. 120-125.

122. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 64-67.

123. Cynn, op. cit., pp. 166-169; McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 313-314

124. For an estimate of viscount Saito see Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters (The Infantry Journal, 1943), pp. 102-103.

125. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 59.

126. Annual Report, p. 9.

127. Ibid., chart opposite p. 44; Ireland, op. cit., pp. 96-102.

128. Ibid., pp. 108-119.

129. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

130. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 141-143.

131. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 231.

132. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

133. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 77-82.

134. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

135. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 59-63.

136. Brown, op. cit., p. 371.

137. Ibid., p. 153, 373.

138. Ibid., p. 374.

139. Grajdanzev, op. cit., passim.

140. Ibid., p. 171.

141. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

142. Ibid., pp. 103-104; Annual Report, p. 38.

143. Ibid., p. 230.

144. Interview with Mr. Lew, Hyungki, editor of The Korea Times, 29 September 1945. Confirmed in an interview with Dr. Lee, Nyo Mook, editor of The Korea Times, 30 September 1945.

145. Annual Report, p. 230.

146. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 65. These demonstrations have been described as protests against an edict forbidding the teaching of the Korean language (XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 56, 5 November 1945, p. 3), but Grajdanzev believes that at a later date the Korean language was still taught (Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 268). It is the writer's opinion that the teaching of the Korean language was prohibited during General Minami's term (1936-42) (see below).

147. Annual Report, p. 230.

148. Lory, op. cit., p. 90, 133.

149. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945. See also Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 69.

150. Lory, op. cit., p. 108, 132. See also CMG, USAFPAC, I & H Sec, Heptalk, 28 November 1945, p. 75.

151. Interview with Dr. Han, Kyung Durk, editor of The Korea Times, 28 September 1945.

152. KUSAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, G0 5.

153. Annual Report, pp. 116-118.

154. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945. The fact that the teaching of the Korean language was forbidden is confirmed in an interview with Mr. Chang, Louis Pal, principal of the parochial grammar school at Seoul Cathedral, on 28 September 1945. At any rate, from 1936 to 1940 much less money was spent by the Government General on "encouragement of Korean language" than on "Japanese shrines" (Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 217).

155. Interview with Mr. Chang, 28 September 1945.

156. Interview with Dr. Han, 28 September 1945.

157. The World Almanac, 1944, p. 798; Annual Report, p. 179.

158. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, missionary priest, 17 September 1945.

159. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 272; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 9, 19 September 1945, p. 3.

160. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

161. Interview with Dr. Har, 28 September 1945; HUSAPIK, Office of the Asst. C. of S. G-2, Language and Documents Section, Translation No. 60, 27 September 1945, /In XXIV Corps G-2 files/.

162. Interview with Mr. Chang, 28 September 1945.

163. Interview with Dr. Har, 28 September 1945.

164. Ibid. See also Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 69-70, 219-220.

165. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

166. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 246-248.

167. Interview with Dr. Har, 28 September 1945.

168. The date is taken from some records in the Government General Building, which were translated for the writer by an interpreter, and is of doubtful accuracy.

169. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945.

170. Interview with Dr. Har, 28 September 1945. General Koiso succeeded Tojo as Premier of Japan (GHQ USAFPAC I & E Sec, Maptalk, 28 November 1945, p. 75).

171. Ibid. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 September 1945.

172. Interview with Dr. Mar, 28 September 1945. On General Abe see /XXIV Corps G-2 Section/, Biographies undated /In historical file/. He had been premier of Japan.

173. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945.

174. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 60.

175. Ibid., p. 79.

176. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

177. Ibid., p. 76.

178. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Foreign Affairs Section, Report, 19 October 1945 /In files of Displaced Persons Office, Foreign Affairs Section, Secretariat/.

179. Annual Report, p. 197.

180. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

181. Ibid., p. 79.

182. Ibid., p. 80.

183. Ibid., p. 199.

184. Ibid., p. 251.

185. Ibid., p. 252.

186. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

187. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 256.

188. Ireland, op. cit., p. 151.

189. Ibid., p. 147.

190. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945.

191. Annual Report, chart opposite to p. 44.

192. Interview with Dr. Har, 28 September 1945.

193. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 201.

194. Ibid., p. 202.

195. Annual Report, pp. 75-77.

196. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 207.

197. Ibid., p. 225.

198. Annual Report, pp. 52-53.

199. Ibid., pp. 61-66.

200. Brown, op. cit., pp. 390-392.

201. Gunn, op. cit., p. 125; Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 38; 213, Footnote.

202. Annual Report, pp. 50-59.

203. Ibid., p. 59.

204. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 121-125.

205. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

206. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 84.

207. Ibid., pp. 85.

208. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

209. Ibid., p. 69.

210. Ibid., p. 69.

211. Ibid., p. 150.

212. Ibid., pp. 152-153.

213. Ibid., p. 159.

214. Ibid., p. 154.

215. Ibid., p. 161.

216. Ibid., p. 163.

217. Ibid., pp. 131-133.

218. Ibid., p. 139.

219. Ibid., p. 147.

220. Annual Report, p. 139.

221. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

222. MG press conference, 17 November 1945 /In historian's journal/.

223. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 140-142.

224. MG press conference, 17 November 1945.

225. Ibid. Also Annual Report, p. 139.

226. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 144-146.

227. Annual Report, pp. 139-140.

228. Ibid., p. 53. For information on less important mining industries in Korea see Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 144-146.

229. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

230. Ibid., p. 139.

231. Ibid., pp. 170-171.

232. Ibid., p. 51.

233. Ibid., pp. 191-192.

234. Ibid., p. 186.

235. Annual Report, pp. 52-53.

236. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 186.

237. Ibid., p. 187.

238. Ibid., pp. 171-177.

239. Ibid., pp. 178-179.

240. Ibid., p. 182.

241. Ibid., pp. 51-52, 123-127.

242. Ibid., pp. 127-130.

243. Ibid., p. 78.

244. Ibid., p. 167.

245. Ibid., p. 41.

246. Ibid., p. 51.

247. Ibid., p. 54.

248. Ibid., p. 108.

249. Ibid., p. 78.

250. Ibid., pp. 109-110.

251. Ibid., pp. 111-112.

252. Ibid., p. 114.

253. Ibid., pp. 112-113. WD MID, Terrain Handbook: Korea (1945), p. 131 states that the average Korean farm is slightly larger than the Japanese farm.

254. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 110.

255. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

256. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

257. Ibid., p. 117.

258. Ibid., p. 95.

259. Annual Report, pp. 77-82.

260. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 228.

261. Ibid., pp. 194-197.

262. Ibid., p. 191.

263. Annual Report, p. 84.

264. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 267.

265. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 197-198.

266. Annual Report, p. 53.

267. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 267.

268. Annual Report, pp. 87-91.

269. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 268.

270. Ibid., p. 269.

271. McKenzie, op. cit., p. 198.

272. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

273. Moriya, op. cit., p. 27.

274. Annual Report, p. 92.

275. Brown, op. cit., pp. 586-588, 590-597.

276. The text of the Cairo Declaration is given in CH4 USAFPAC, I & E Sec, Maptalk, 12 September 1945, p. 304.

277. Annual Report, pp. 16-22.

278. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

279. Interview with Dr. Har, 29 September 1945.

280. Annual Report, p. 16.

281. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

282. Annual Report, pp. 16-17.

283. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 82, 278.

284. Annual Report, pp. 21-22.

285. The Annual Report does not mention this movement.

286. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 76.

287. Ibid., p. 81.

288. Pan, Hyun Sik, chairman of the Relief Society for Korean Refugees Abroad, report to the MG Civil Administrator, 30 September 1945 /In files of displaced Persons office, Foreign Affairs Section, Secretariat, Military Government/.

289. Interview with 1st Lt. W. J. Gane, Displaced Persons Office, Foreign Affairs Section, 15 October 1945.

290. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 81.

291. /Foreign Affairs Section, Displaced Persons Office/, Memorandum, "Measures to induce Korean Miners to continue work in Japan," 17 November 1945 /In files of Displaced Persons Office, Foreign Affairs Section, Secretariat, Military Government/.

292. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 81.

293. Ibid., p. 83.

294. Ibid., p. 67.

295. 7th Infantry Division, 7th CIC Detachment, "A Study of the Present Political Situation," 4 October 1945, p. 3 [In historical file].

296. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 70-76, p. 303 gives an outline of Rhee's career until 1919.

297. "Present Political Situation," p. 3.

298. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

299. Interview with Maj. G. B. Enders, Foreign Affairs Section, 12 December 1945.

300. Bland, op. cit., pp. 200-201.

301. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945.

302. "Present Political Situation," p. 3.

303. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 45, 25 October 1945, Incl. No. 2.

304. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 67, XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 44, 24 October 1945, p. 3.

305. Interview with Maj. Enders, 12 December 1945.

306. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945.

307. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 75, 24 November 1945, p. 3.

308. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 September 1945, p. 4.

309. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 7, 30 October 1945, p. 5.

310. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 279.

311. Records of several of them can be found in the files of the Research Subsection, Office of Public Opinion, Public Information Section, Secretariat of Military Government.

312. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 67.

313. Ibid., p. 82.

314. Interview with Dr. Har, 29 September 1945, See also XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 15, 23 September 1945., p. 3.

315. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 14, 18 December 1945, p. 5.

316. Interview with Dr. Har, 29 September 1945; interview with Dr. Lee, 30 September 1945.

317. Annual Report, p. 6, 222.

318. Brown, op. cit., p. 207, 367.

319. See above, p. 22.

320. Annual Report, p. 49.

321. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 6, 16 September, 1945, p. 3.

322. Ibid.

323. Historian's Journal, 23 September 1945.

324. Brown, op. cit., pp. 487-499.

325. Ibid., pp. 500-523; McKenzie, op. cit., p. 204, 207.

326. Allen, op. cit., p. 171. On the political activities of missionaries in Korea during the nineteenth century see Dennett, op. cit., pp. 568-572.

327. Brown, op. cit., pp. 551-552.

328. Allen, op. cit., p. 173.

329. Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. 265-266.

330. Allen, op. cit., p. 204.

331. Ibid., p. 182, 184.

332. Ibid., p. 207.

333. Ibid., p. 222.

334. Brown, op. cit., pp. 516-519. See also statement of Rev. P. J. Byrne, Catholic missionary, as quoted in Pacific Stars and Stripes, 25 December 1945.

335. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 275.

336. This figure was quoted in an interview with Mr. Chang, 28 September 1945; also in a sermon delivered by Rev. James Carey, then XXIV Corps Chaplain, 30 September 1945.

337. McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

338. Ibid., pp. 211-217. Also see above, pp. 21-23.

339. Brown, op. cit., p. 582.

340. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 275.

341. McKenzie, op. cit., p. 283, pp. 287-289.

342. Brown, op. cit., pp. 586-588, 590-597.

343. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 September 1945.

344. Interview with Rev. Han, Petrus, 28 September 1945.

345. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

346. Annual Report, p. 13.

347. For the comparative figures see Annual Report, 1928-29, p. 5 and Annual Report, 1937-38, p. 13. The exodus of Protestant missionaries (see above, p. 50) would account for at least several hundred foreigners (Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 275.)

348. Annual Report, 1937-38, p. 18.

349. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

350. /USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Foreign Affairs Section/, Report, "Axis Nationals in Korea, South of 38 Degrees North Parallel /Sic/, 1945," /Undated, in historical file/.

351. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

352. Interview with Lt. Col. G. J. Hufford, Ex C, 1st Engr Spec Brig, 4 December 1945.

353. Office of the A. C. of Air Staff, Intelligence, USAAF, "Kyongsong or Seoul (Keijo), 1/10,000, 1945," /Map/.

354. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report. No. 14, 24 September 1945, p. 5.

355. Interview with Mr. Yasuma Oda, member of the Government General, 5 November 1945.

356. See above, p. 20.

357. Annual Report, p. 42.

358. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 29.

359. See above, p. 11.

360. Interview with Messrs. Wellhaven and Arick, 27 September 1945.

361. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 213.

362. Ibid., pp. 161-163.

363. See above, pp. 32-41.

364. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 190.

365. Ibid., p. 284.

366. Ibid., p. 285.

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CHAPTER III

[redacted]: AUGUST 1945

The moment of Japan's final defeat arrived in August 1945. Perhaps as early as June, important individuals in the court and government had come to the conclusion that peace must be made as soon as possible, and Russia's declaration of war on 8 August and the almost simultaneous dropping of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to all hesitation. Japan offered to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration provided the Emperor be retained. The Allies in turn agreed to this proviso, with the understanding that the Emperor obey the orders of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and on 14 August the Imperial Government decided to end the war on this basis.[1]

The Emperor's Proclamation of Surrender

At 0800, Tokyo time, on 15 August President Harry Truman announced that the Emperor had accepted the counterproposal of the Allied Powers, that offensive operations would be suspended, and that General Douglas MacArthur would accept the formal surrender of Japan on behalf of the Allies.[2] At noon on the same day, Tokyo

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time, the Emperor of Japan broadcast to the people of his empire his decision to accept the terms imposed by the victorious nations; the immediate results of this historic proclamation were the cessation of hostilities and the initiation of negotiations for the signing of a formal instrument of surrender.[3]

In Korea the people had been warned on the previous day by means of posters and radio broadcasts that an announcement of great importance would be made at noon on 15 August. Naturally interest ran high and there were many conjectures as to what was in store.[4] The preliminary announcement originated with the Domei News Agency; the Government General seems not to have known what was forthcoming. Apparently most Koreans and Japanese expected a statement on the Russian entry into the war, no previous official pronouncement on which had then been made public,[5] although the semiofficial newspaper Keijo Nippo had been reporting the progress of the Russian forces in northern Korea ever since 10 August.[6]

The news that Japan had decided to give up the struggle astounded the Koreans.[7] To them and the Japanese, the event seemed doubly memorable in that it was the first time that they had heard the Emperor's voice.[8] Some of the Japanese described the reaction of their people as follows:

> With tears in my eyes I heard by radio the voice of the Emperor telling of Japan's unconditional surrender. This is too unbearable for us; . . . Koreans treat us as if we were foreigners.[9]

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At noon, Aug. 15, His Majesty Himself broadcasted [sic] proclaiming the Suspension of the War. Hearing this, both Japanese and Koreans felt an extreme shock, and were struck with wonder. However, Japanese gradually came to themselves, and determined to obey absolutely to [sic] His Proclamation, depending upon the instructions to be given by the government.[10]

Although the Japanese loyally determined to obey the Emperor's command, many refused to consider the defeat as a final one.

> We have suffered a national disgrace. Our enemy, the American Army, used the inhuman atomic bomb. I shall get revenge by a great and superior bomb. I will get revenge in the next war.[11]

> The Japanese have no way to relieve the shame of losing the war except by rising again. I deeply believe that the gods will help us. 1948 will probably be the year.[12]

The Koreans, however, were troubled by no such sadness. For them, as The Korea Times said, the Japanese surrender

> . . . meant the end of the war. It meant that the heavy burdens, which weighed so cruelly upon Koreans, were relieved. It meant new freedom of [sic] the downtrodden 26 millions. People came out in crowds into streets in thousands and thousands.[13]

The Koreans' First Taste of Freedom

Although the news of the surrender came as a surprise, the Japanese had been unable to conceal from the Koreans or from their own people the fact that the war had been going against them. A Japanese police official admitted:

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We depended on Okinawa as our last single fort, but in Okinawa Campaign, we could not also recover our fate [sic]. Hereupon, belief for victory of general public in Korea has radically shaken.[14]

Implying that the Koreans had hoped for a Japanese victory, the same writer stated:

> Yet, both Japanese and Korean [sic] held some strong tendency to rely upon some miraculous good lucks. They hoped that the Japanese Forces would smash the Allied Forces as soon as the latter land in Japan, and they co-operated well in the prosecution of the war.[15]

Nevertheless, he confessed that

> The more the war situation became unfavourable, the more Korean influence enhanced, and Japanese began to feel great uneasiness and worried in vain, having terror against Korea. Rumours intending to entrange [estrange] Japanese from Korean rapidly spread, for which Japanese struggled in hopeless uneasiness. . . . The principle of trimming they [the Koreans] entertained appeared to be clearer in reverse ratio to the unfavourable situations of the war.[16]

The Korea Times was much more explicit.

> Welcome, Heroes of Liberation! Ever since the outbreak of the war in the Far East, we, Koreans, have thought of you as our liberating forces, and prayed for your speedy victory. We lamented over the fact that, disarmed and fettered, we were unable to march side by side with you in arms; and we found our consolation in the thought that our brethren over-seas did their proper share to advance our common cause. In the dark days of the war, when the reports of your casualties streamed in, we felt, from afar, the pangs of loss with you. With anxiety we watched your progress from Guadalcanar [sic] to the Marshall Islands; with enthusiasm we applauded your successes in Saipan and Okinawa and many another strategic point.[17]

Nor did the activities of Korean stop at wishing for Japan's defeat. They evaded conscription and even committed acts of sabotage. The prospect of the defeat of their oppressors had given new

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life to the underground organizations, apparently led chiefly by communists and socialists. Some Koreans contemplated staging an armed uprising to coincide with the landing of Allied troops,[18] although many thought that Korea would not be invaded because her people were not enemies of the Allies.[19] American bombs fell on the peninsula during July and spurred the more determined Koreans to further action. Seditious writings were widely circulated, and on 24 July at a public meeting in Seoul "a bomb intentionally laid down was bursted up."[20]

On hearing of the surrender all Koreans felt that the independence of their country was thenceforth a fact. The translation of the Cairo Declaration which they had seen, and which presumably came from Japanese sources, phrased the expression "in due course" as "very soon" or as "in a few days." Even educated Koreans accepted the translation at its face value, and the resulting exuberance hardly corresponded with the realities of the situation.[21]

This understandable illusion was heightened by certain actions of the Japanese themselves. Earlier in the year the Government General had attempted to bribe two prominent Koreans of nationalist sympathies, Lyuh, Woon Hyung and Ahn, Chai Hong, and to persuade them to form a pro-Japanese party. At about the same time as the surrender, probably on 16 August, Mr. Endo, the Vice Governor General, tried again to form such a party. After his first choice, Song, Chin Woo, had refused to be a party to his plan, he turned to Lyuh once more.[22] One reason for his so doing was that Lyuh,

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a man of somewhat radical views, was popular with the Korean students, who the authorities feared might cause trouble.[25] Lyuh agreed to form an association to aid in the maintenance of peace and order, on five conditions: (1) food for a three month period was to be guaranteed; (2) political prisoners would be released; (3) freedom of press and speech were to be granted; (4) students would be mobilized to help in maintaining order; (5) the Japanese would not interfere with Lyuh's activities. When the Vice Governor agreed to these terms, Lyuh formed the Korean Committee for the Preparation of the Re-establishment of the State (also known as the Korean Reconstruction Commission). The followers whom Lyuh gathered around him had definite communistic leanings.[24] The name of the organization was changed several times subsequently, and finally became the People's Republic of Korea. The Government General subsidized this organization heavily (perhaps to the extent of ¥ 20,000,000) and gave it the authority to hold public meetings, use public buildings and office facilities, and drop propaganda leaflets throughout the country from Japanese airplanes. The Governor General informed the Committee that the Americans would not occupy Korea,[25] but that the occupation would be solely Russian.[26]

Lyuh was given control of the press and radio, and he announced to the people that his organization would be responsible for the maintenance of order and indeed for all the principal functions of government.[27] He then set about organizing three groups of Korean youths, some of whom had just been discharged from the

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Japanese army and others of whom were students, to act as a special police force. In many places the regular police turned over their authority to these young men.[28]

Shortly after 15 August the police had made many 'precautionary' arrests, concentrating on Koreans who had been abroad and were therefore considered especially dangerous. One of Lyuh's first steps was to release all political prisoners.[29] The total number of prisoners released in the Seoul area, including some criminals who escaped, is reported to have been as high as 10,000.[30] Prisoners were also released in other parts of Korea; for example, a missionary priest who had served more than three years of a five-year sentence for alleged espionage was released from prison in southern Korea together with many other political prisoners.[31]

Seizures of Japanese Property

The Japanese had in effect turned over the government to Lyuh and his followers. A police report described his regime and its results as follows:

> . . . some influential Koreans, rising up, since Aug. 16, schemed a plan to maintain the peace and order positively by themselves in view to establish solid foundation of New Korea.
>
> In this connection, communicating with the parties in many points they established an organization which is to co-operate actively for maintenance of peace and order. Some of the subordinates in this concern however, being instigated by those who have dangerous thought,

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acted improperly. The Japanese police treated these political movements lightly with good understanding. The general public, on the contrary, mistook it as the Japanese police had already lost their power. Rejoicing at the national freedom, they are in great excitement, they demonstrated in the streets, they committed acts of violence in succession, in order to satisfy their past resentment. Thus . . . the peace and order was disturbed extremely [illegible] all over Korea.[52]

To be more specific, on 16 August many Shinto shrines were burned, and a considerable number of policemen were beaten.[53] Local officials who had been responsible for recruiting Koreans for the army also came in for their share of popular resentment. A Korean source states that only pro-Japanese Koreans, and no Japanese, were attacked, but this is doubtful.[54] The student organizations did their best to maintain order with indifferent success. Faithful to its word, the Government General permitted the Koreans, led by Lyuh and his followers, to take over firms, factories, railways, and street car lines.[55] In many cases Koreans moved into Japanese residences, and some were found still installed when the American occupation forces entered the country.[56] Apparently such seizures of Japanese property were not universal, for conditions during this period in Ch'ungch'ong Namdo, a province south of Seoul, were quiet, except that some confusion resulted from the cessation of most governmental activities.[57] Nevertheless, many Japanese became alarmed for the safety of their lives and property and urged the Government General to undertake the restoration of order.[58]

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The Russian Scare

The progress of the Russian forces in their invasion of northern Korea was partially known through newspaper reports.[39] Alarmed at the possible effect of the invasion on conditions farther south, Mr. Yamada of the Government General had gone to the headquarters of the 17th Area Army (Chosen Army District) on 13 August to discuss the possibility of proclaiming martial law.[40] Such a step was quite in order, since "the Governor General has the right to demand the use of troops when he considers it necessary"[41] and "in certain cases they [the provincial councils] may directly request local commanders of Japanese Army detachments to use their troops against the Korean population."[42] Nevertheless, in this case martial law was not declared.[43]

The Russian advance caused great alarm among the Koreans; many of them fled into the hills from the towns in the extreme north.[44] On 15 August a pirate radio station operating on the wave length of JODK, the Seoul station, and believed by at least some of its hearers to have been operating from Russian-occupied Korea, announced that a provisional government would be set up immediately in Seoul and that the three chief members of the government would arrive at the capital on the following day by train. On 16 August crowds of Koreans went to the Seoul railroad station expecting to see these three men, but they were driven away by the police, and the expected officials did not materialize.[45]

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Rumors were current that the Russian forces would enter Seoul on 16 August, and that the Americans would arrive on the following day.[46] The two forces were expected to occupy Seoul jointly. The extent of the Russian advance was of course enormously exaggerated in these rumors, for Soviet troops did not reach Songdo, forty miles north of Seoul and slightly south of the 38th parallel, until 25 August.[47] The confusion regarding the whereabouts of the Red troops was reflected in American military planning and newspapers. It was reported that the Russians had occupied Jinsen (Inch'on); this error probably resulted from a confusion of names between Jinsen and Gensan (Wonsan), farther north and on the east coast.[48] General MacArthur considered it quite possible that the Russians might occupy Seoul before the arrival of the Americans,[49] and even as late as September a widely read American magazine reported that Russian marines had occupied Seoul; this extraordinary statement probably resulted from a confusion between Keijo (the Japanese name for Seoul) and Heijo (the Japanese name for Pyongyang, the second largest city of Korea, situated farther north) or Kaijo (Kaesong).[50] As a matter of fact, no Russian units ever entered Seoul.[51]

During the few days immediately following the Emperor's proclamation of surrender, handbills and posters appeared. One of these, a small leaflet believed to have come from communist or possibly Russian sources, ran as follows:

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Congratulations on the Independence of Chosen!
The Dawn of Democracy in the East

President — Kim, Koo
Premier — Rhee, Syng Man
Foreign Minister — Lyuh, Woon Hyung
War Minister — Kim, Il Sung
Chief of Staff — Heung, Wan

Then followed a song about the beauties of Korea, which has no particular significance.[52]

The activities of the members of the Russian consulate in Seoul during this period were somewhat mysterious. The consul, Mr. Alexander Sergeievitch Poliansky, had not been interned after the Russian declaration of war.[53] It is highly probable that he and his staff carried on communistic activities,[54] and his exact relationship with the Korean communists later became one of the XXIV Corps' Essential Elements of Information.[55] It has also been stated, on rather dubious authority, that the members of the Soviet consulate maintained an efficient spy system in Seoul, encouraged disturbances during the period following the surrender, and printed handbills to be distributed through the city.[56]

On 16 August communists were active in passing out leaflets which announced that Russian troops would soon arrive.[57] However, when no such forces appeared it was rumored that the Provisional Government at Chungking would return to Korea with American troops.[58] On 22 August some inkling of the division of Korea into an American and a Russian zone of occupation reached the people, and the possibility of a Russian occupation of Seoul, or even of all Korea, vanished.[59]

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The Japanese Retain Control

Meanwhile the Japanese authorities, alarmed at the lapse of the former rigid standards of order and fearful for the lives and property of their nationals, determined to reassert their police power.[60] On 17 August the reaction began. The Korean police had almost given up their functions, and it was necessary for the authorities to recall many (Dr. Lee says three thousand) Japanese who had formerly been policemen and had subsequently been drafted into the army. Many of the men thus called upon to undertake the restoration of order wore mixed police and army uniforms.[61] A Japanese source admits that the army cooperated with the police force in showing a "solemn attitude" toward obstreperous Koreans.[62] A Korean journalist describes the process of restoring order as follows:

> The Japanese took the peaceful demonstrations conducted by the Koreans as an insult to them and took back the policing power from the Koreans. The Japanese then stationed their troops everywhere and brought about a reign of terror. They forbade all popular meetings and shut up all political clubs. . . .
>
> Up to the 15th the police force alone could maintain order, but now a large number of soldiers with machine guns were posted everywhere. Some Korean students and even women were stabbed with bayonets by the Japanese soldiers.[63]

The control thus established and maintained by the Japanese obviously involved a break with Lyuh and his followers. Since Lyuh's peace-preserving organizations appear to have been supplied with arms by the authorities,[64] and since the end of his sway was

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urgently desired by the Japanese military commanders,[65] a delicate problem of face-saving for all concerned presented itself. A happy solution was found in changing the name of the Committee to the Public Safety Committee, while the reality of power of course returned to the Japanese.[66] Lyuh's temporary downfall was further signalized when some of his more radical subordinates gave him a severe beating which incapacitated him for several days.[67]

Having taken vigorous repressive action, the Japanese then tried to pacify public opinion and to counteract the unsettling effects of the past few days. On 19 August Keijo Nippo, which appears to have been relatively silent since the proclamation of surrender, printed the following announcement originating at the headquarters of the 17th Area Army:

> To the People in Korea:
>
> As the Japanese Government and the Korean Government General have been striving for the people's welfare, the people should maintain their respectable calling and not act rashly. If there is any one who disturbs the public feeling and peace, the Japanese troops cannot help but take strong measures. Giving a forewarning, the Japanese troops call public attention to these facts.

The same edition announced that the authorities had begun distributing to the public the articles which had been stored for 'war-disaster victims.'[68] On 20 August Keijo Nippo printed an address of Major General Nagaya, of the 17th Area Army headquarters:

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To you 26,000,000 in Korea, I am going to talk seriously. The Imperial Edict about the cessation of hostilities was published. It is the most important time when the conditions in Asia require the cooperation of each nation and state. To my regret, there is so much rashness in the actions of the Far East that, as we gaze steadily at the circumstances, the nations will have their capabilities called into question. These facts surely concern only the imprudent people. The Korean Area Troops published a notice admonishing you 26,000,000 people in Korea. My dear wise people of Korea! I thank you for adhering to the things I have said and acting calmly and engaging honestly in your respectable businesses.

But to my regret, some of you are disturbing the social order by the furtherance of your own party's ambitions and by your own individual interests, and others are taking advantage of this great Asiatic tragedy by disrupting public peace and order and acting like bandits by monopolizing rations and destroying the organs of communications. It has been published even in the Troops' declaration the other day that the Korean Area Troops, which are still maintaining themselves soberly, cannot but help to use their military power anywhere and at any time, if you do not perceive your misdeeds and correct your actions.

You, the Korean [illegible], should strive to advise those who may act arrogantly and behave like bandits and make them cease their misdeeds. The welfare of Asia depends on the endeavour of each nation and cannot be attained in a month or a year.

The concrete negotiations on the cessation of hostilities has not yet begun. After the treaty has been concluded, we will start to put forth our efforts to manage everything in a proper way and at the proper time.

The Japanese Army has several hundred thousand Korean soldiers in His Imperial Majesty the Emperor('s) service and they are our friends. We are keeping a historical tie with the several million Koreans in Japan. The disruption of the communications, etc., in Korea will cause great pain and loss to the Koreans themselves.

It is most certain that freedom will not come to a nation that dares to do such misdeeds. We, the Korean Area Troops, stand in the presence of today's circumstances fair and square. And we love the Koreans more deeply and widely

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than do any other troops in the world. Our feelings today still remain unchanged from the past. I hope that both the Japanese and the Korean leaders deeply consider these facts and soberly do their best to deal with the situation.

The same edition also carried a similar exhortation by the Vice Governor General, Mr. Ryusaku Endo:

All officials and people in Korea! Our Governor General told you the way that you should act after His Imperial Majesty the Emperor's announcement of the Edict on the cessation of hostilities. However, I am going to tell you about the preparations for this extraordinary day in amplification of what he has to say. The state of the cessation of hostilities is the situation whereby Japan ceases her war with America, Britain, Russia and China; this is brought to us suddenly. All the people have been equally astonished. This was due to the fact that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor could not bear to have his innocent people suffer any longer from the disastrous war. His humble subjects are filled with trepidation.

By the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration it is to be assumed that hostilities will cease. Every man makes convenient conjectures about the terms and creates rumors. Even among the educated classes some believe these rumors and are distrubed, but on careful consideration of Korea in the future, we find that the vesting of the sovereign power will be decided after the conference between Japan and the Allied countries. The industrial installations and equipment under government supervision will be handled systematically and within the limits agreed upon by both parties will be turned over to the proper authorities by the possessor.

By that, the Japanese sovereign power in Korea still majestically exists and the Korean Government General bears all the sovereign responsibilities and will always consider the welfare of Korea and manage all administrative institutions to keep the public peace and stabilize the popular feelings. All officials and people in Korea, remember this and do not be disturbed by rumors. Continue in your respective business calmly.

In a sense only hostilities have ceased. The matters about Korea will be decided only after the treaty has been signed and legislative steps have been taken. It has not been decided as yet who will bear the responsibility for

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the sovereignty of Korea. The Korean Government General still retains its sovereign responsibility for all institutions. All government and municipal officials must do their best for the welfare of the Korean people to the very end. It will not permit you to give up your business nor will it permit you, the government and municipal officials and the public engaging in other businesses to engage half-heartedly in your work. I think that this is only a temporary state of affairs. You people have lost presence of mind by reason of the great shock resulting from the extraordinary turn of events. But as losing the presence of mind alone casts dark shadow on the future of Korea, it is important that you must take care lest you should act like this hereafter. If we will consider all things prudently, we should not find cause for the least bit of trouble to arise between the Japanese and the Koreans. Both the Japanese and the Koreans must be prudent lest others should take advantage of your rashness. If there are some who purposely disturb the public peace the Government General, of course, must take strong action. I hope that you will not put a stain on the national dignity of the Korean people who have a promising future.

Several days later, Keijo Nippo printed an even more detailed description of the means by which the Japanese were endeavoring to maintain control:

> The Imperial Edict on the Cessation of Hostilities was published, but the Japanese Sovereign Power in Korea still exists. Therefore, without a doubt the Japanese judicial powers will exist in Korea until the details of the conference between Japan and the Allied countries are concluded. Trials of both civil and criminal cases, mediation, registration, census registration, and non-prosecution affairs are being carried out by all law courts as before. Due to the cessation of hostilities, up to a certain degree the general public as well as companies and industries, perhaps, will have some necessary liquidating transactions and reorganizing of businesses to be arranged. As there may be hearings on cases to be settled -- procedures for liquidation and other affairs of companies coming under the jurisdiction of the law courts and juridical persons -- the courts are making sufficient efforts for their expedient disposition.

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In regards to registrations and hearings the temporary farm-control acts and other control acts were never repealed at the time the Imperial Edict of the cessation of hostilities was published. Hostilities have ceased, but the past economic conditions will still prevail with only some mitigation. The inflation of currency will increase after the war, and so the control acts are necessary even after the war. However, suitable control acts for post-war are also necessary. Since the rapid changing of the control acts is undesirable at the present, we have decided to employ with mitigation only the necessary control acts among the existing ones as the new conditions warrant. So the juridical courts are doing their best for the suitable disposition of matters such as hearings, registrations, etc., coming under the jurisdiction of the control acts under the present conditions. So on the other hand the people have to tell their affairs to the court frankly.

It is of course unnecessary that the companies and endowed institutions dissolve in a hurry at the present, but it is desirable that the liquidation procedure concerning the dissolving companies and endowed institutions will be simply settled. However, the existing control acts cannot be flatly ignored and it is necessary that they be employed with some suitable mitigations. The court will strive to make wise interpretation of the control acts dealing with the special exemptions in settlement of accounts by reason of the acts governing the fair distribution of capital for enterprises.

Concerning the notification of general meetings of the shareholders, their cancellations and other matters, a plan for the simplification of the management of the companies and endowed institutions will be thought out. To make practical application of the temporary control acts of the companies, etc., in Korea and other acts is necessary and convenient.[69]

Thus the Japanese admitted that the ultimate fate of Korea would be decided by the Allies, but declared that meanwhile they themselves would exercise sovereign power. This attitude was a grave blow to the Koreans' hopes for immediate independence, which they thought had been promised to them by the United States, Great Britain, and China at the Cairo Conference.[70] The Japanese point

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of view was clear; what would be that of the victorious powers? The answer to this question did not reach the Koreans until two weeks later.

From the time that the Japanese reasserted their control of Korea until the arrival of the American forces, governmental organizations and individuals struggled to liquidate their assets and salvage what they could from the wreck of their empire.

> Just before Japan's surrender, Japanese in Korea are reported to have distributed large sums in "bonuses" to Koreans in their employ, apparently with the dual motive of creating belated good-will towards themselves and embarrassing the Americans by inflation.[71]

Officials in the Bureau of Justice in the Government General embezzled funds and destroyed documents, including a part of the fingerprint files. The officials of the two prisons in Seoul destroyed records, distributed prison funds, and sold goods belonging to the prisons.[72] The director of the Health Section of the Police Bureau was later found to have embezzled more than ¥ 200,000 of public funds.[73]

The army also participated in such activities. On 21 August the headquarters of the 17th Area Army authorized the delivery of army weapons, from which identifying marks were to be erased, to "trustworthy" civilians.[74] Two days later the army warehouse at Seoul wrote to the warehouse at Chinju, directing that all records and accounts prior to July be burned; the records for August were to be altered, all funds to be disposed of, and the records of such funds to be burned.[75] A letter from the National Defense

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Mechanization Association in Tokyo to its branch in Seoul, written on 21 August, directed that the name of the association be changed, all equipment buried, and all records burned.[76] Since these three letters were intercepted by American censors later, it is uncertain to what extent these measures were carried out, but Allied prisoners of war in Seoul later reported that as early as 15 and 16 August they had seen many bonfires which they believed to be caused by Japanese burning papers.[77] On 1 September a spokesman of the 17th Area Army admitted that "It is true that the Army burned the secret documents. However, it has finished making the list of the things to be delivered to the Allied armies and has completed proper preparations."[78] These proper preparations in some instances included hiding large stocks of arms and ammunition.[79]

The police force was kept strong; although many civilian police resigned, they were replaced by auxiliary members of the Kempei Tai.[80] Other Japanese composed underground activities. One large terrorist organization, whose aims seem to have been stirring up trouble among the Koreans and creating friction between them and the occupation forces, had among its leaders Major Ohuta Kawai, the leader of the Kempei Tai in Seoul; and the man who had assassinated Premier Hamaguchi of Japan for leading Japan into the London disarmament conference.[81] This gang had at its disposal funds, arms, and opium.

Either in order to simplify their demobilization problem or to build up an underground the Japanese army authorities began to discharge Japanese and Korean soldiers who had homes or families

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in the country.[82] The total number of men thus discharged throughout Korea approximated 15,000 Koreans and 5,000 Japanese.[83] In addition to these, others deserted in considerable numbers. Some of them, as has been indicated, found their way into the police and others into youth organizations. At the time that American troops arrived about 70 percent of the police force was Japanese.[84] Dr. Lee, an editor of The Korea Times, describes the discharge of troops thus:

> At the same time [about 17 August] the Japanese partly disarmed and disbanded their soldiers and dispersed them among the populace with definite sinister ends. The roaming bands already became a menace to the Korean people and will be an infinite source of troubles and treacherous plots. This reckless and deceitful policy pursued by the Japanese authorities intensified the hostile feelings between the Koreans and Japanese; and the situation grew worse.[85]

The already serious food situation in Korea also grew worse during this period.

> Ever since the annexation of Korea she has been Japan's granary. During the war the rice ration in towns was only one half of the necessary amount for mere existence, while the farmers were deprived of every grain of rice and gradefully allowed to starve. The reason for the shortage of food in Korea could be readily understood. Japan took away the rice from Korea for the use of her army and people and imported the Manchurian millet amounting to only less than one tenth of what she had taken away from Korea. On top of it the utter failure of wheat crops in Korea makes the food problem [a] more acute one.[86]

About 1 September the Governor General ordered that each provincial governor ship five million sacks of rice to Japan immediately, although this action would have almost exhausted the available stocks.[87] Nevertheless, because of the almost complete absence of

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shipping between Korea and Japan at this time it seems very unlikely that much rice was so delivered.[88] On 19 August the plan for distributing extra food to the public had not gone beyond the discussion stage, although the people were assured that sufficient food was on hand to feed them.[89] On 22 August the Government General admitted that the food available for distribution would not amount to an increase, but would only be sufficient to maintain the existing level of rations. The unfortunate situation in regard to food was ascribed principally to transportation difficulties.[90]

Dr Lee states that:

> Since August 15th the waste of food, clothes, and oil by the Japanese soldiers is very alarming, indeed. They sacked army warehouses and moved the contents away in army trucks. Some articles were sold; some were set on fire; and some were thrown in the rivers. And heaven only knows how many sacks of the Korean rice were sunk into the Pacific and the Korean Channel during and after the war. According to the official reports there is barely enough food for the month of September.[91]

A spokesman of the 17th Area Army issued an unconvincing denial, speaking of the "kind acts" which the Japanese army had performed for the Koreans:

> Various rumors were current recently. Some of them were coarse. For example, the Army is hauling sugar and corn by trucks and dumping them into the River Hankang [Han Gang] because it hates to deliver them to the American Army; the Army sold its clothing to the merchants and this clothing is being sold in the black market; and the Army delivered wilfully hand grenades to some people. . . .
>
> In making a counter-statement in regards to rations, it is certain that corn cannot be thrown away meaninglessly. The rumor about hand grenades is extraordinary.[92]

In the light of events, however, these rumors do not seem so extraordinary.

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The economy of Korea had deteriorated sadly during World War II. For instance, in Kyongsang Namdo Province only 860 tons of fish were produced during July 1945, whereas 8,510 tons had been produced during July 1944. After the surrender the collapse of the fishing industry became still more complete.[93] Prices had soared; the price of rice became roughly one hundred times what it had been before the war; parallel with the rather inefficient rationing system had existed a flourishing black market, run chiefly by Japanese.[94]

After the surrender the economy slumped still further. Until 17 August there was a run on the banks;[95] however, on that day it was announced that Japanese who wished to return to Japan could make deposits in Korean banks and later draw the amount from branch banks in Japan.[96] At the same time the Government General issued an ordinance to regulate deposits and withdrawals, and the trend reversed itself.[97] Before long deposits greatly exceeded withdrawals. One interpretation of this trend is that the Japanese issued large quantities of bank notes to encourage deposits and to prevent runs on the banks.[98] A Japanese source admits that a tremendous increase in the amount of money in circulation occurred from 15 August to 1 September; the Bank of Chosen arranged on 19 August for the Chosen Book Printing Company and the Chosen Seihan Company to print seven billion yen in thousand-yen notes, and five hundred million yen in hundred-yen notes. After a time the printing was stopped due to a shortage of paper, and it is not certain that the full amount

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was issued.[99] A Korean source states that the money in circulation increased by about three billion yen during the week after the surrender, until it reached a figure of eight billion yen.[100] In spite of this abundance of money, the Japanese government later asked for and received General MacArthur's permission to fly bank notes to Korea, although apparently they never actually did so.[101] Economic problems were further complicated by the fact that most Koreans stopped work when the surrender was announced. In southern Korea the stoppage of work was particularly pronounced in the coal mines.[102]

Although the Japanese had proclaimed that they still exercised sovereignty in Korea, they experienced difficulty in doing so. The Vice Governor General on 25 August announced that "I am glad that all you Korean officials are engaging in your business very calmly now,"[103] but his optimism seems to have been somewhat unwarranted. Japanese officials and police fled from the town of Yonan, near Songdo, soon after 15 August.[104] In Ch'ungch'ong Namdo Province, the government almost collapsed after the surrender and a new governor had to be appointed; fortunately no serious disorder occurred.[105] Japanese officials in Songdo appear to have fled or been expelled.[106] In spite of the appointment of five hundred Japanese soldiers as police in the vicinity of Ch'unch'on, the officials were unable to maintain order properly.[107]

Almost immediately after the surrender many Japanese decided to return to Japan. On 17 August an official explained how they

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could transfer money to Japan by means of the banking system.[106] On 20 August it was announced that "A consultation in regards to the Japanese evacuation is going on at the Korean Area Troop Hdqs [17th Area Army], and the reports on it will be published shortly. The Japanese should not be anxious about the future and should behave calmly."[109] Such a report was forthcoming within twenty-four hours:

> Do not be confused by rumors. We are using every means to maintain the railroads and the communications and are arranging for those who desire evacuation to Japan. The plans for transportation will be published consecutively by the authorities. Let us keep cool, and exhibit our true characteristics. The Army wishes the Japanese to stay and serve the New Order in Korea.[110]

However, not many Japanese were anxious to serve the New Order in Korea. Many of them "are uneasy and are anxious to go back to Japan, and so they are hurriedly dumping their furnitures [sic]."[111] In Pusan, the port nearest to Japan, many Japanese began to sell their property to Koreans preparatory to moving out.[112] In order to check the flow of currency out of Korea, it was decided that only one thousand yen of Korean currency per person would be exchangeable at the banks in Japan.[113] By the time that the American troops arrived, Japanese were leaving for their native land at the rate of 4000 to 6000 a day from Pusan; in this movement two ships were employed.[114] They were the Keon Maru and the Toko Maru; late in August the Japanese government asked General MacArthur for permission to let these ships ply between Pusan and two ports in Japan (Senzaki and Hakata), in order to repatriate Koreans and Japanese. The ships

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were to be unarmed and were to bear white crosses on the deck and hull.[115] The Supreme Commander granted permission for this movement.[116] As will be brought out later, much of the movement to Japan was carried out in small, privately owned ships.[117] The Japanese authorities anticipated that the return of these Koreans, most of whom had suffered great hardships, might have an inflammatory effect on public opinion; accordingly, an official spokesman exhorted the public as follows:

> Still further, the Korean laborers sent to Japan are coming home to Korea. Most of them are thankful for the Army's kind acts in their journey to Korea. A very few of them, on the contrary, relate that they were treated cruelly. But you must not be led astray by such over-emotional, meaningless words. These meaningless rumors are often used for strategic purposes. Please rely on the Japanese Army.[118]

In spite of official vigilance, conditions in Korea were troubled and the authorities had many worries during this period. General Yoshio Kozuki, Commanding General of the 17th Area Army, reported to General Hodge that

> . . . there are communists and independence agitators among Koreans who are plotting to take advantage of this situation to disturb peace and order here. Police is in the state where it can only exercise its power when backed by the army. Therefore it is an undeniable fact that the peace is being solely maintained by the army . . . in Jinsen district.[119]

> . . . since August 15 means of transportation and communications have been disrupted and delayed. Part of the munitions of war have been stolen, violence against police force. . . . Up to the date of August 15 Japanese army forces had been under preparations for military operations. However since that we have undergone changes for keeping law and order therefore at present all is quiet outwardly here.[120]

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Meanwhile Russian troops had in several instances crossed the 38th parallel and forced Japanese officials to give up their functions even in some areas south of the line.[121] Plainly the position of the Japanese was growing constantly more difficult. On 25 August Kaijo Nippo published what was probably the first official announcement of the forthcoming division of Korea into two zones of occupation:

> The Potsdam Declaration mentions the following about Japanese territories:
>
> The items of the Cairo Declaration will be enforced and
>
> 1. Manchuria, Formosa and the Pesko Islands are to be returned to China.
>
> 2. Korea will be a free and independent country.
>
> The history of Japanese rule which lasted 36 years in Korea and 51 years in Formosa has ended, Formosa will be governed by the military government of Chiang Kai Shek. Korea will be taken over by AMERICA and RUSSIA and governed by the military governments of these two countries until an independent government can be established.[122]

The fact that the Japanese knew of the division of Korea at this time, presumably through the Domei News Agency, and the fact that General Kozuki admitted to General Hodge by radio that he had "received instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters to negotiate with you for the local armistice of the Imperial Army in Chosen . . . south of the 38 degrees north latitude,"[123] cast some doubt on the contention made later that communication between Korea and Japan was very poor during this period, that radio contact with Okinawa gave the Government General the first definite

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[redacted] word that the Americans were coming, and that it was not until 6 September that an official message from Tokyo confirming the news reached the Government General.[124] In any event, the government's position was weak; consequently it must have been considerably relieved when the first leaflet drops from American airplanes on 1 September conveyed to the Koreans General Hodge's desire that they remain calm and abstain from violence.[125] General Komaki's reaction was one of gratitude:

> The reaction of the Koreans to the messages dropped has caused considerably favourable results for the maintenance of peace and order. It was especially effective to shut out the illegal activities of communistic red elements. Message of this kind will be welcomed in the future, we deem it a favour if you would notify . . . . the general public by dropping leaflets to the effect the responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order rest with the Japanese commander till the American occupation of Korea is completed and also that those who are guilty of either plunder, violence, rioting or destruction are punished in accordance with the martial law.[126]

The second leaflet, dropped some days later, urged the Koreans to refrain from demonstrations and to behave themselves in an orderly manner.[127] Komaki wished to broadcast the text of the second leaflet and post copies throughout the country,[128] although General Hodge felt that the drops themselves were sufficient.[129] Thus in effect the United States Army backed up the Japanese in the latter's efforts to maintain order.

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The Forming of Political Associations

A number of Korean political organizations were in existence at the end of World War II, in spite of the strenuous efforts of the Japanese to suppress such activity. Of these the most important was the Provisional Government in exile, which had been founded at Shanghai in 1919, and which despite a checkered career was still functioning in Chungking.[130] Although it had many sympathizers in Korea, it does not seem to have played any considerable part in the events which followed the surrender. There were at least six nationalist parties, with a following in Korea but probably with their actual organizations outside the country; of these at least one was affiliated with the Provisional Government.[131]

The communist party in Korea had been formed in 1925; its efforts and those of other organizations to form labor unions had been sternly repressed.[132] Its existence had inevitably been underground, and it furnished many leaders for the movement of resistance to the Japanese.[133] Although not certain, it seems likely that the communist party in Korea was supplied with funds from Russia.[134] It was reorganized after 15 August, and many of its members lent support to Lyuh's Committee.[135]

On 17 August Ahn, Chai Hong, a prominent nationalist leader who was at the time associated with Lyuh, broadcast a description of the aims of the Korean Committee for the Preparation of the

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Re-establishment of the State. His statements alarmed the Japanese, and similar claims in behalf of the same organization were later to trouble the American forces of occupation. The Government General had considered the functions of the Committee to be "to cooperate with the Government General to maintain public peace," and apparently nothing more, in spite of the wide powers which the authorities had granted to Lyuh. Hence the Japanese felt that Lyuh had "strayed from the original mission of that committee" when

> . . . . after looking into its activities and hearing its published opinions, we found what its political ambitions were and even found out its preparatory activity to grasp independent sovereign power. These are terrible mistakes. We point out from his [Ahn's] broadcast the following: the assurance of life and property, the formation of a regular army, the management of rations, and even the controlling of the small transportation organizations; to our astonishment he said that it would get the sovereign power shortly. . . .
>
> The authorities feel that these problems will be ironed out at the conference between the representatives of Japan and the representatives of the four Powers. A single party cannot delve into such problems. . . .
>
> After this, the authorities will soberly control the activities of the parties and individuals so that they will not go astray and will give appropriate names to the new parties.[136]

In other words, Lyuh's Committee pretended to be not a party but a government. Thereupon the Japanese took away its power and changed its name.[137] General Hodge later described the pretensions of the Korean People's Republic, the lineal descendant of Lyuh's Committee, in these words:

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Before the arrival of my forces in Korea there was set up here an organization known as the . . . Korean People's Republic. The name connoted, and its actions indicated, that this organization was set up to be a government rather than as a political party and its leaders spread the word to Korean people that it was their new government. . . . This group has in its followers many patriotic Koreans who for years struggled unceasingly against the Japanese domination and whose aims are above reproach. However, as the organization was set up and operated it misled many Korean people to believe that it was governing Korea.[138]

Following the line laid down by the Government General, the Committee had at first maintained that only Russian forces would occupy Korea. However, when the Japanese themselves admitted the reverse and American planes appeared to drop leaflets to the Koreans, the Committee was forced to change its tune and to confess that American forces would occupy at least a part of the peninsula. Many of the more doctrinaire communists, who had at first strongly supported both, then grew lukewarm, and a split appeared between the radical and more moderate members.[139]

Although "soberly controlled" by the authorities, political parties sprang up like mushrooms. Most of them had no great importance. Those which were formed between 15 August and the landing of American troops numbered more than twenty, and their platforms ran the gamut from right to left. A detailed list of their names and programs would be more confusing than enlightening. However, some of the events of the period which indicate the increased tempo of political activity of the Koreans deserve mention.

Several small parties went into action on 16 August, posting placards, announcing the dawn of a new era, and hoping to take over

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control. Communists were active in passing out posters and handbills which announced that Soviet forces would soon arrive. In spite of the seizure of some Japanese property, there was no serious violence during this period. Even after the reassertion of Japanese control, parties continued to form, and some of them proclaimed that Korea had become independent at the time of the surrender. Communists continued to be active in and around Seoul, and there were rumors that two thousand armed communist terrorists had entered the city. Apparently the Peace Preservation groups, formed by Lyuh from students and discharged soldiers, were not very successful in maintaining order, except insofar as they received the support of Japanese police and troops. 140

The soldiers who were being discharged from the army, and were presumably at a loose end, constituted both a political plum and a hazard. The 17th Area Army published a statement in regard to them:

> Alarming posters are posted everywhere in Seoul. Some are published under the name of the Russian Commander. The statements made are brainless ones which will greatly offend the Russian Army, if they hear of these posters. Those who printed these posters are striving hard to gather men of the same mind, and call out, 'To the Discharged Korean Soldiers!' These are the strategies executed by a radical group and a low party. Every unit advised the discharged soldiers carefully just before disbanding, and we repeat the advice here out of kindness.
>
> The reason why the Army discharged the Korean soldiers was that it desired to allow the soldiers to return home and devote themselves to the establishing of a New Order in Korea. In respect to the present

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conditions, there is nothing more meaningless and harmful than a blind act. The units often repeated the above mentioned advice. If a soldier is entrapped by the honeyed words of this dangerous party and led astray, he will worry not only himself, but also his parents and brothers and sisters. Go home quickly; take up an honest calling and guard your native land with your neighbors, or you will lose your place of peaceful livelihood and starve and be forever unable to emerge into the light of a peaceful world.[141]

In spite of all that the authorities could say or do, disorder persisted, although apparently it never attained the stage of mob violence or organized insurrection. Many individuals were robbed of their money in public places, much of it doubtless being notes recently printed.[142] In spite of the strengthening of the police force, crimes of intimidation, theft, and homicide became more common and caused the authorities much alarm.[143]

During this period of confusion, most of the students seem to have been on the side of law and order. Many of them joined Peace Preservation units which were affiliated with Lyuh's Committee.[144] The general activities of these young men brought an official commendation:

> The Korean students in Seoul are devoting themselves to the controlling and policing of traffic confusions and in the management of the block self-government groups. Acting in unison with this, the Japanese students of the University [Keijo Imperial University] and the Colleges in Seoul are arising in their young passion, with strict rules and strong system to cooperate in the maintenance of public peace. They call out to the Japanese students in all the schools in Seoul, "Let us go forward together with the Korean students in the maintenance of public peace and in the establishment of the new order." They held the All Students meeting at the hall of the Seoul Dental College at 1330, 28 August. The students of the University, the Colleges and the fourth year class students

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of the Middle School [6,7] attended the meeting. Some of them made speeches about their heavy duties during the crisis of the country. After that, they organized the student band and broke up at 1430.[145]

The Korean political parties were legion; many of them had similar names and similar aims, but few of them seem to have felt that the aspirations of all Koreans might be attained by united rather than by disjointed effort. When American troops arrived they found the Japanese still in control, but "With the removal of Japanese troops from Seoul, the capital, the political pot immediately came to a boil."[146]

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. The Field Artillery Journal, Oct. 1945, pp. 583-584.

2. The Buccaneer, Tenth Army newspaper, in an extra published on 15 Aug. 1945 [notes are in historical journal]. For a complete list of the Allied Powers and United Nations see GHQ SCAP, "Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government," 31 Oct. 1945 [in files of Displaced Persons Office, Foreign Affairs Section].

3. The Korea Times, 5 Sept. 1945 [in historical files].

4. Ibid.

5. Interview with Mr. Yasuma Oda, member of the Government General, 5 Nov. 1945.

6. Keijo Nippo, 10-14 Aug. 1945 [in historical file, in translation].

7. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 Sept. 1945.

8. The Korea Times, 5 Sept. 1945.

9. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 7, 17 Sept. 1945, p.3.

10. Peace Preservation Section, Government General, "General Situation Concerning Peace and Order Before and After the Conclusion of the War," [undated], p.6 [in historical file]. Punctuation and spelling have been altered slightly to make the meaning clear.

11. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 37, 17 Oct. 1945, p. 2.

12. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 46, 26 Oct. 1945, p. 3.

13. The Korea Times, 5 Sept. 1945.

14. "General Situation," cited above, p. 1.

15. Ibid., p. 1.

16. Ibid., p. 2.

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17. The Korea Times, 5 Sept. 1945.

18. "General Situation," cited above, pp. 2-4.

19. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

20. "General Situation," cited above, pp. 3-4. The fact that American bombs fell on Korea was confirmed, though on the basis of hearsay only, in an interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

21. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Advance, 151031/I Sept. 45.

22. Speech by Dr. Lee, Hyo Nook, editor of The Korea Times, 10 September 1945 [in Historical file]. See also Defense Section, Government General, "State of Public Peace and Order in Keijo," [undated, in files of Police Bureau, Military Government].

23. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

24. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

25. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

26. Ibid.

27. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

28. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

29. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 Sept. 1945.

30. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

31. Interview with Rev. P. Dawson, 30 Sept. 1945. See also XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sept. 1945, p. 6.

32. "General Situation," cited, p. 7.

33. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 Sept. 1945.

34. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

35. Ibid.

36. Interview with Capt. C. J. McEneney, Area and Facilities Allocations Office, XXIV Corps G-1 Section, 6 Dec. 1945.

37. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sept. 1945, p. 6.

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38. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

39. See above, p. 2.

40. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

41. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York, 1944), p. 259.

42. Ibid., p. 246

43. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

44. Ibid.

45. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 Sept. 1945. Confirmed in an interview with Dr. Lee, 30 Sept. 1945.

46. Interview with Dr. Bae, Kyung Doek, editor of The Korea Times, 28 Sept. 1945.

47. 32d Inf Regt S-2 Periodic Report No. 8, 15 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 3.

48. Corps Courier, XXIV Corps Newspaper, 27 Aug. 1945.

49. GHCAFPAC, letter to CG XXIV Corps, "Occupation of Korea," 29 Aug. 1945.

50. Time, 10 September 1945.

51. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

52. A copy of this leaflet was shown to the writer during an interview with Rev. J O'Brien, 17 Sept. 1945, and was translated for him by a young Korean. On Rhee, Sung Man; Kim, Koo; and Kim, Il Sung see Chapter II. Lyuh, Woon Hyung has been mentioned in this chapter (see above, pp. 5-8). The fact that of these leaders Kim, Koo and Rhee, Sung Man, at least, were not communists does not necessarily disprove the communistic authorship of the leaflet, since subsequently Korean communists made use of prominent non-communists on their tickets as figureheads (see XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 7, 17 Sept. 1945, p.3).

53. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

54. GHQ SCAP, Government Section, "Report of Liaison Trip to Korea of Brig. Gen. William E. Crist," [undated], part IV [in Central Files, General Affairs Section, Secretariat, Military Government].

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55. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 86, 5 Dec. 1945, pp. 3-4.

56. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 81, 30 Nov. 1945, p. 2. The authority for these statements was the former leader of the Japanese Kempei Tai in Seoul.

57. "State of Public Peace" cited above.

58. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 Sept. 1945.

59. Interview with Dr. Har, 28 Sept. 1945.

60. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945. See also "State of Public Peace and Order in Keijo."

61. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

62. "General Situation" cited above, p. 7.

63. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

64. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

65. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

66. Ibid.

67. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

68. Keijo Nippo, 19 Aug. 1945.

69. Keijo Nippo, 24 Aug. 1945.

70. See above, p. 5.

71. GHQ SCAP, "Liaison Trip," Part XII.

72. Ibid., Part II.

73. Interview with Capt. L. K. Howard, Bureau of Public Health and Welfare, 27 Dec. 1945.

74. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 83, 12 Nov. 1945, p. 2.

75. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 33, 13 Oct. 1945, p. 2.

76. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 58, 7 Nov. 1945, p. 3.

77. Interview with Lt. Col. M. A. DePietro, 10 Sept. 1945.

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78. Keijo Nippo, 1 Sept. 1945.

79. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 72, 21 Nov. 1945, p. 4.

80. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 81, 30 Nov. 1945, p. 2.

81. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report Nos. 24-46, 4 Oct. - 26 Oct. 1945, passim.

82. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

83. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

84. GHQ SCAP, "Liaison Trip" Part III.

85. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

86. Ibid.

87. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 15 Sept. 1945, p. 5.

88. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 6, 16 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

89. Keijo Nippo, 20 Aug. 1945.

90. Keijo Nippo, 22 Aug. 1945.

91. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

92. Keijo Nippo, 1 Sept. 1945.

93. GHQ SCAP, "Liaison Trip," Part VII.

94. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 Sept. 1945.

95. Keijo Nippo, 24 Aug. 1945.

96. Keijo Nippo, 19 Aug. 1945.

97. Keijo Nippo, 24 Aug. 1945.

98. Radio Benninghoff [State Department] to CINCAFPAC Adv, 121502 Sept 45.

99. Director of Bank of Chosen, letter to Director of Finance Bureau, Military Government, 27 Sept. 1945 [in files of Finance Bureau, Military Government].

100. Speech by Dr. Lee, 10 Sept. 1945.

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101. Radio SCAP to CINCAFPAC Adv, 020920/I Sept 45.

102. Military Government Press Conference, 15 Sept. 1945 [in historical journal 7. See also radio Benninghoff to CINCAFPAC Adv, 121502 Sept 45.

103. Keijo Nippo, 26 Aug. 1945.

104. 32d Inf Regt S-2 Periodic Report No. 8, 15 Sept. 1945, Incl. NO. 1.

105. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sept. 1945, p. 6.

106. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 7, 17 Sept. 1945, p. 6.

107. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 7, 17 Sept. 1945, p. 5.

108. Keijo Nippo, 19 Aug. 1945.

109. Keijo Nippo, 20 Aug. 1945.

110. Keijo Nippo, 21 Aug. 1945.

111. Ibid.

112. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 7, 17 Sept. 1945, p. 5.

113. Keijo Nippo, 22 Aug. 1945.

114. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 6. See also XXIV Corps Staff Conference, 12 Sept. 1945.

115. Radio Japanese Imperial Government to SCAP, 280307/I Aug 45.

116. Radio SCAP to War Department, 271651/I Aug 45.

117. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 6.

118. Keijo Nippo, 1 Sept. 1945.

119. Radio No. 2, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

120. Radio No. 7, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

121. Radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 051655/I Sept 45.

122. Keijo Nippo, 25 Aug. 1945.

123. Radio No. 1, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

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124. Interview with Mr. Oda, 5 Nov. 1945.

125. See Chapter I.

126. Radio No. 10, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

127. See Chapter I.

128. Radio No. 14, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

129. Radio No. 14, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army.

130. See Chapter II.

131. In this description of political parties, except where otherwise cited, all statements are based on records in the files of the Research Subsection, Office of Public Opinion, Public Information Section, Secretariat of Military Government, where the registrations of the political parties were deposited. This information at best is fragmentary.

132. See Chapter II.

133. Interview with Rev. J. O'Brien, 17 Sept. 1945.

134. Interview with Dr. Har, 29 Sept. 1945. Interview with Dr. Lee, 30 Sept. 1945.

135. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 10, 20 Nov. 1945, p. 4.

136. Keijo Nippo, 20 Aug., 1945.

137. See above, p. 13. See also GHQ SCAP, "Liaison Trip," Part IV.

138. Hq USAFIK, 12 Dec. 1945, "Statement from the Commanding General USAFIK" [in historical journal].

139. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

140. "State of Public Peace" cited above.

141. Keijo Nippo, 31 Aug. 1945.

142. Keijo Nippo, 26 Aug. 1945.

143. Keijo Nippo, 2 Sept. 1945.

144. See above, pp. 6-7.

145. Keijo Nippo, 29 Aug. 1945.

146. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 5.

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6. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Reports Nos.:
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7. Peace Preservation Section, Government General, General Situation Concerning Peace and Order Before and After the Conclusion of the War.

8. Keijo Nippo, 10-14, 19-22, 24-26, 29, 31 Aug., 1-2 Sept. 1945

9. Radios:
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   CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps Nos. 1, 2, 7, 10, 14
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10. Speech by Dr. Lee, Kyo Mook, editor of The Korea Times, 10 Sept. 1945.

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15. Letters from:
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Director of Bank of Chosen to Director of Finance Bureau, MG, 27 Sept. 1945.

16. Time, Sept. 10, 1945

17. GHQ SCAP, Government Section, Report of Liaison Trip to Korea of Brig. Gen. William K. Drist

18. MG Press Conference, 15 Sept. 1945.

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21. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 10, 20 Nov. 1945.

22. HQ USAFIK, 12 Dec. 1945, Statement from the Commanding General USAFIK

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CHECK ON SOURCES OF CHAPTER III: "INTERMEZZO". AUG. 45"

1., 21., 41., 42., 98., 115—121., 125—129. Not available in our files.

2. GHQ SCAP, "Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government", 31 Oct. 1945 in Displaced Persons Office files, Foreign Affairs Section.

18., 20., 32., 62., 4. Footnotes should read: "General Situation, cited above ....."

22., 37., 60., 140., Footnotes should read: "State of Public Peace", cited above ..... Available in MS files

60. Check on date of beginning of reaction.
p. 14. 1st para. should read:"..... and engaging in your respectable businesses honestly.

71., 72., 84., 95., 99., 102., 131., 137., Not available in our files.

86., Para. should read: "... the food problem more acute ...."

105. Para. should read: "... are engaging in your business very calmly now."

122. Para. should read: "The history of sovereign Japanese rule ..."

71., 84., 95. Footnote should read: "GHQ SCAP 'Liaison Trip', cited above..."

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF USAFIK HISTORY CHAPTER VI

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1.	16 Jan 1947	Hist Section	AG	1. Chapter VI, "The Occupation of the Provinces", is hereby sent for dispatch. 2. As of 4 Jan 1947, this chapter has been read by the following and approved; LA. Gen. Hodge CG XXIV Corps Col. Coolidge (former G-3 XXIV Corps) Col. Booth C/S USAMGIK Col. Hist (former G-2 XXIV Corps) Col. Hartshorn DC/S XXIV Corps JOHN T. PARKER Major GSC Chief, Historical Section.

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CHAPTER IV

THE JAPANESE SURRENDER
AND THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION

The planning for the occupation of southern Korea has been treated in a previous chapter. One episode of the preparation, however, remains to be described -- the advance reconnaissance party which flew to Korea to complete arrangements for the landing of the American forces and for the surrender of the Japanese.

The Advance Reconnaissance Party

The party which General Hodge selected consisted of twenty-nine officers and eight enlisted men; the senior officer was General Harris, Deputy for Military Government on the Corps staff. Colonel Strother was the other principal officer. The major units represented, in addition to XXIV Corps Headquarters, were the 308th Bomb Wing, the 7th Division, and the 101st Signal Battalion. The eight enlisted men belonged to the last-named unit and were included to

improve the imperfect communications between General Hodge and General Kuzuki.[1]

The advance party left Okinawa on the morning of 4 September in eight B-25's. They soon encountered bad weather, and all but two of the planes turned back. These two, carrying eight officers from XXIV Corps[2] as well as ten others, succeeded in reaching Kimpo Airfield, near Seoul, at 1200.[3] General Hodge had already made arrangements by radio for the reception, quartering, and safety of the advance party.[4] Now, realizing that the party was split and that arrangements might be impeded, he radioed to the senior officer of the group in Korea, Colonel Benjamin B. Talley, asking for information on the weather conditions encountered during the trip.[5] Colonel Talley replied early in the afternoon of 4 September, briefly describing his arrival and stating that the situation was "normal" and that he was awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the party; he made use of the existing Japanese radio facilities in sending his message. He received no further instructions from General Hodge.[6]

The first two planes were met at the airfield by a delegation of Japanese officers headed by Major General Toshimaro Sugai, Sub-Chief of Staff of the 17th Area Army. The welcome was reasonably cordial; the party ate dinner at the field and drove into Seoul, where they were quartered at the Chosen Hotel. Colonel Talley felt that under the circumstances he did not have the authority to conduct negotiations with the Japanese; he kept the officers in their rooms

and made only tentative arrangements with General Sugai. He arranged for pilots for the incoming convoy bearing the XXIV Corps and for interpreters for the Corps staff, the 7th Division, ASCOM 24, and Corps Troops. The Japanese made use of the local press and radio to advertise for qualified interpreters, with some success.[7]

General Hodge radioed General Kozuki that the rest of the advance party would make another attempt to reach Seoul on 5 September, and in the same message he advised Kozuki of the one-day delay in the landing schedule.[8] However, the remaining planes did not arrive at Kimpo Field until the afternoon of 6 September. They were met in much the same way as before and the party was taken to Seoul. General Harris and Colonel Strother then began to make definitive arrangements with General Sugai.[9]

The overall mission of the advance party was to see that General Hodge's demands on the Japanese authorities were being complied with, to set up an advance command post, to make preliminary plans for the surrender, and to arrange for the landing and subsequent billeting of the American forces. Under Colonel Strother's overall direction the members of the party satisfied themselves that General Hodge's directions were being satisfactorily carried out. They made arrangements to use the port of Inch'on, the railroads in the vicinity, and the local electrical system. They also completed negotiations for interpreters, pilots for the incoming convoy, and laborers as needed.[10]

The members of the advance party found themselves in a strange position. They were the first American soldiers to reach Korea, and their lives depended on nothing more than the word of a heretofore cruel and treacherous foe who had only just laid down his arms. However, the Japanese were bent on carrying out the demands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the Americans were never in any real danger. During the four-day period from the arrival of the first two planes until the landing of the XXIV Corps at Inchon on 8 September, an uneasy quiet reigned over Seoul and the surrounding area. The Japanese police and soldiers kept a strict guard, and no widespread demonstrations by the Koreans took place. This situation was in accord with General Hodge's request that acts of enthusiasm be kept to a minimum. The only significant exception was a demonstration by a group of uniformed Koreans, apparently former members of the Japanese army and in approximately company strength, with a band in front of the Chosen Hotel. It was entirely orderly. During the first few nights scattered shots were heard, but no serious violence occurred.

The members of the party met and talked with, among others, the Russian consul in Seoul and members of his staff, as well as certain of the Allied prisoners of war who had been held in nearby

camps.

By the very nature of their mission the members of the party dealt largely with the Japanese military and scarcely at all with the Koreans. On this account they appeared to some Koreans to be consorting in a friendly vein with Japanese officers and to have shut themselves up in their hotel away from Korean contacts. There were also stories of fraternization with Japanese officers and of rudeness to a group of American-educated Koreans who called upon the advance party at the Chosen Hotel.[12] Nevertheless, the mission was accomplished; the preparations were complete and all was in readiness for the landing of the XXIV Corps.

American Landing and the Occupation of Inch'on

At 0830 on 8 September a guide ship carrying pilots met the convoy off Inch'on.[13] The assistance of such a ship had been one of the requirements[14] imposed by the Supreme Commander upon the Japanese. The movement of the convoy into the harbor proceeded without untoward incident, and at about 1330 units of the 7th Division began to debark in LCVP's and other landing craft.[15] The weather was clear and warm; the dock space was ample; and by 1730 the 17th and 32d Infantry Regiments had completed unloading and begun the occupation of Inch'on. They met with no resistance.[16] A number of armed Japanese officers and soldiers were in evidence; the principal intersections in that part of the city near the docks were guarded by black-coated police, some mounted and all of them armed with rifle and fixed bayonet. Their presence effectively prevented any large scale demonstrations by the Koreans; on the one occasion

that day prior to the landing that such a demonstration was attempted, the crowd was forcibly dispersed by the police, who took literally General Hodge's injunctions against parades. Two Koreans were killed and several wounded.[17]

At the dock were a considerable number of Korean interpreters, as well as pier laborers and other workmen, all wearing armbands printed in Japanese and English. There were also a group of Japanese officers, still wearing their swords, and some army trucks with drivers which were placed at the disposal of the Americans.[18] Meanwhile, final arrangements were being made by General Garvin with local representatives of the Japanese armed forces for the signing on the following day of the formal surrender of southern Korea at the Government General building in Seoul.[19] The time for this ceremony was set for 1600.[20] These preliminary discussions took place in the city hall at Inch'on about 1600 on 8 September.[21]

Unloading of men and equipment continued during the night and the following day. By the end of the afternoon of 9 September all major echelons of the 7th Division were ashore, and the Inch'on area was then turned over to the 17th Infantry. The movements of the American troops proceeded without resistance from Japanese or Koreans and on the whole went ahead smoothly.[22] On 9 September the same personnel who had been at the pier on the previous day to help the Americans — the laborers, the trucks and drivers, and the Japanese officers — were there again; the officers this time had left behind their swords.[25] By the end of the day the occupation of Inch'on was complete, and the situation there thoroughly under control.

Occupation of Seoul by the 7th Division

The completion of the first phase of the occupation, or "Baker-Forty," called for the occupation of the Seoul area. On the morning of 9 September the 32d and 184th Infantry moved by rail to Seoul, some twenty-five miles distant, and began the occupation of the capital. Concurrently there began a process of relieving, disarming, and evacuating Japanese troops. On the same day the 7th Division opened its command post in Seoul,[25] as did the Division Artillery and the two infantry regiments.[26] The entry of the troops into the city was made in silence. There was no triumphant parade, no cheering throngs, for Japanese police lined the principal streets and the Koreans present dared not raise a voice of welcome. The regiments soon split up and dispersed to guard various critical installations. During the day American planes roared over the city at frequent intervals, providing striking demonstrations of power that could hardly have failed to impress both Japanese and Koreans.[27]

During the night of 9-10 September the 32d and 184th Infantry, with help from the 7th Division MP Platoon, instituted a system of motor patrols through the city to enforce the curfew, the hour for which had been set at 2000, and to maintain order. Routine guard posts had already been established; there were no serious disturbances. On 10 September American units established control of the two airfields

in the Seoul area -- Kimpo Field and Seoul Field. On the same morning General Hodge assumed command ashore of all American troops in southern Korea, and the Corps Headquarters opened in the Hanto Hotel, one of the two principal hotels in Seoul, located about one mile south of the Government General building.[28] The other, the Chosen Hotel, had already been set aside as quarters for XXIV Corps officers of field grade and above. Company grade Corps officers were to live at the Hanto.[29]

Meanwhile, the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in southern Korea had been signed as planned, and Japanese troops in the Inch'on and Seoul areas were being disarmed and relieved.[30]

By this time the occupation was well under way, and no immediate trouble was anticipated. Accordingly, at noon on 11 September ASCOM 24 assumed responsibility for the operation of the port of Inch'on and of the railroads of southern Korea, which had been running previously under the supervision of tactical troops. In Seoul, elements of the 7th Division increased the number of their guard posts as a precautionary measure, but no trouble occurred. Up to this time the occupation forces had suffered no casualties.[31]

7th Division Headquarters was located in the large building in southwestern Seoul which had served as the headquarters for the Japanese army in Korea; it was at a considerable distance from the XXIV Corps Headquarters. The command posts of the other major units of the 7th Division remained in Seoul.[32] The area of responsibility of the 32d Infantry comprised that part of the city west of the

north-south railroad tracks; the remainder was assigned to the 184th Infantry.[33] As elements of the 32d and 184th moved out to occupy points farther afield, and as Inch'on came under the control of AKSON 24, the 17th Infantry moved its command post from Inch'on to Seoul, in the vicinity of 7th Division Headquarters. This shift took place on 14 September.[34]

The Formal Surrender of Southern Korea[35]

The formal surrender of the Japanese armed forces in Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude took place as scheduled on 9 September at the Government General building in Seoul.

Before coming to Korea General Hodge had been careful to ascertain the exact status of the Governor General, Nobuyuki Abe, a retired general who had once been premier of Japan, and his relation to the Commanding General of the 17th Area Army. General MacArthur informed the Corps Commander that to the best of his knowledge the Governor General represented the Imperial Japanese Government, whereas General Komuki represented the Imperial General Staff.[36] General Hodge later directed the same query to Komuki and at the same time ordered that the Governor General be prepared to take part in the surrender ceremony.[37] Komuki replied that Abe was a civil official independent of himself and having a higher precedence at the Imperial court. Governor Abe was duly informed that he was to participate in the surrender.[38]

As the American delegation, led by General Hodge and Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid, the Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, drove up the main street of the city to the ceremony, thousands of Koreans cheered with wild enthusiasm. With difficulty the Japanese mounted police kept back the crowds.

The surrender was signed in a large and elaborately decorated room formerly used as a throne room on the occasions when the Emperor of Japan visited Korea. The ceremony began at 1608; numerous reporters, photographers, and spectators -- American, Japanese, and Korean -- were present. The Japanese delegation entered the room first; it was composed of Governor General Abe; General Kozuki, commanding the 17th Area Army, the highest echelon of command in Korea, and also the army air forces in the peninsula; Vice Admiral Gisaburo Yamaguchi, commanding all Japanese naval forces in Korea; and some minor officials. They represented only those forces south of 38 degrees north latitude, since northern Korea was, it will be recalled, under Russian occupation. They were all in uniform, but none carried a sword or wore decorations. Abe led the way and took the center chair on one side of the long table in the center of the room, with the two commanders beside him. No one rose as the Japanese came in.

Then the American party entered; every one present rose and stood at attention. Admiral Kincaid led the way, as the senior officer, but General Hodge took the center seat opposite the Japanese since he was the principal signatory and the representative of

General MacArthur. In addition to the two principals, the American delegation included General Arnold and several other senior officers, who seated themselves on both sides of General Hodge and Admiral Kincaid.

General Hodge conducted the proceedings; his remarks were translated for the three Japanese signers by two Japanese in civilian clothes who stood behind Governor Abe. General Hodge introduced himself and Admiral Kincaid, announced that he was there to accept the surrender of all Japanese armed forces south of 38 degree north latitude, and asked the Japanese to sign the surrender document. An officer of General Hodge's staff then handed three copies of the document to the Japanese, two in the English language and one in Japanese. The three representatives of Japan signed all copies without bothering to read the text. Then the documents were handed to General Hodge, who signed all three copies, and to Admiral Kincaid, who did likewise on behalf of the United States Navy. The signing required ten minutes in all. General Hodge announced that the surrender which had just been signed consituted another step toward the demilitarization of Japan and the achievement of peace throughout the world. He and Admiral Kincaid left the room, and the Japanese followed them. Governor Abe was ill at ease and too sick to give any interviews.

General Hodge then officiated at a ceremony in front of the building, at which the Japanese flag was lowered and the American raised. The 7th Division was represented by a composite infantry

battalion made up of a company from each of the three regiments of the division, and the division band played the national anthem as the Stars and Stripes were raised. After the ceremony two of the three companies loaded into trucks and left. The third formed into column of platoons and marched off down the avenue leading from the Government General building. At this point the crowd of Koreans, many of whom had been looking over the wall while the flag was being raised, were almost beside themselves with enthusiasm.

General Hodge then held a press conference, which will be described later. After the conference he returned to the command ship Catoctin[39] at Inch'on.

The Completion of "Baker-Forty"

The occupation of the area immediately surrounding Inch'on and Seoul, which took place at approximately the same time as the surrender ceremony, constituted the first step in Phase I of the occupation, or "Baker-Forty."[40] The completion of Phase I called for an expansion[41] of the zone occupied by the 7th Division to a line labeled "B-B," which enclosed an area roughly circular and about fifty miles in diameter, the northern edge of which ran generally along the 38th parallel.[42] Later, after the landing of the 40th Division, the 7th was to be prepared to relinquish control over the area south of the highway from Inch'on to Seoul and south of the Han Gang River.[43]

The movement of the 7th Division into Kyonggi Do Province began on 12 September, after Seoul had been occupied and it seemed likely that there would be no trouble in that region. On that day one company of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved north to Kaesong (Songdo), near the 38th parallel, by truck.[44] The principal mission of the company was to establish contact with the Russian forces.[45] On the next day the rest of the battalion displaced to Kaesong from Seoul by rail;[46] the movement was completed on the same evening, and the battalion then established eleven guard posts in the town.[47] The contact which this battalion had with the Russian forces will be described in another chapter. On 15 September it established wire communication with regimental headquarters and with the Russians.[48]

On 15 September a company of the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, departed by rail for Pusan, in southeastern Korea and well beyond the "O-2" line,[49] together with a reconnaissance party from the XXIV Corps. On the same day elements of the 7th Division conducted a reconnaissance as far as Suwon and Inch'on, which lay about forty miles to the southeast of Seoul.[50]

The mission of the Pusan party was to make a study of port facilities.[51] It set up headquarters in a hotel and began to accomplish its mission with full cooperation from the local Japanese authorities.[52] The party discovered that the port facilities at Pusan were good, and that a considerable movement of Japanese and Korean repatriates was already taking place.[53] Although a mine-free route to the docks existed, there was no mine-free anchorage.[53a] Plans were made to sweep the mines and arrangements completed for the billeting of the 40th Division after its landing.[54] On

20 September service elements of ASCOM 24 arrived in Pusan to assist in the preparations for the reception of the 40th Division.[55] On the 22d the first echelon of the 40th Division commenced unloading at Inch'on and began to prepare for the move to Pusan.[56] The first elements of the division reached the city the next day.[57]

On 16 September the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, extended its zone to include the town of Yonan, about twenty miles west of Kaesong.[58] Three days later a company of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, occupied the important town of Ch'unch'on, fifty miles northeast of Seoul.[59] The remainder of the battalion moved there on 22 September.[60] On the 23d Suwon and Inch'on were occupied by elements of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry.[61] These movements in effect completed the expansion of the 7th Division zone to the "O-2" line; thereafter other minor displacements took place, but the principal towns within the line had been occupied.[62]

On 12 September the rear echelon of the Corps passed a radio from GINGAFPAC which had been sent on 11 September, directing that, in view of the progress of occupation operations and the necessity for an eventual reduction of occupation forces in the Pacific to six hundred thousand men, minimum use be made of heavy equipment and that as many units with such equipment as possible be deleted from troop lists.[63] Accordingly, General Hodge stopped the movement of antiaircraft, armored, and Corps Artillery units whose personnel were not needed to perform the functions of military police and radioed General MacArthur for permission to turn in to depots on Okinawa the

weapons, prime movers, and fire control instruments of units to be used as MP's.[64] AFPAC gave permission, and on 15 September those units still on Okinawa were so instructed.[65] Among the units of Corps Troops temporarily converted into military police units were the 305th AAA Gun Battalion,[66] the 145th FA Battalion, the 568th AAA AW Battalion, the 779th AAA AW Battalion,[67] and the 713th Tank Battalion. Although the 7th Division brought its divisional artillery pieces, all the XXIV Corps Artillery units left their weapons behind. Among the units deleted from the troop list were the 196th and 225th FA Battalions, and the 287th FA Observation Battalion. Most of the heavy equipment of the 20th Armored Group was left behind.[68]

Taking Over the Government

One of the principal missions of the XXIV Corps was to

> Be prepared to assist in the establishment of a separate post-war government and Army of occupation in KOREA and to transfer responsibilities to these agencies when established and as subsequently directed.[69]

That part of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude over which the United States forces were to exercise control comprised about 38,000 square miles, or 44 percent of the total area of the country. Within this area lived about 15,000,000 Koreans, or 62 percent of the total population. The American zone included six of Korea's thirteen provinces in their entirety, the major part

of two more, and a small portion of another. Of the twenty principal cities, twelve lay within the American zone; the toal population of these cities, of which Seoul was of course the largest, was nearly two million.[70]

While the XXIV Corps was on Okinawa, Military Government had been "established as an integral part" of the Corps. As will be told in detail later, it was charged with "the operation of civilian activities in Korea."[71] While planning for the occupation was in progress, AFPAC authorized the maximum necessary use of the existing Japanese governmental machinery in Korea and even of the Japanese officials themselves, in order to achieve the greatest possible efficiency.[72] This news first reached the Koreans at a press conference held by General Garvin at Inch'on on 8 September, which was attended by a few Korean journalists as well as by American correspondents. According to the account given by one of the latter, General Garvin said that Abe's position would be analogous to that of the Emperor in Japan, meaning apparently that he would be merely a figurehead. One of the Koreans interrupted in dismay with the remark that the nucleus of a Korean government already existed in Chungking. General Garvin replied that he did not care to discuss politics.[73]

General Hodge showed in the press conference which he held shortly after the surrender ceremony on 9 September that he intended to follow out this policy. He stated that Governor Abe and other Japanese officials would be retained in office temporarily in order

to facilitate administration and the orderly taking over of the government. However, he added that they would be replaced as soon as possible, first with Americans and then with Koreans. He emphasized his determination that no unnecessary restrictions be imposed on the people, and said that although all questions of a political nature were decided on a higher level than his Korea would be granted independence at some time the future. 74

The announcement that Abe and some other Japanese officials would be temporarily retained caused bewilderment and disappointment among the Koreans. One American correspondent felt that the people were disappointed not only in the retention of Japanese officials but in the continued authority of the hated police, who had been responsible for much of what violence had occurred. In one case the police took advantage of their authority to effect a Korean coal merchant from his shop, ostensibly with permission from the Americans but actually on their own initiative. To some of the people the policies of the occupation forces seemed to have the effect of aligning the Japanese and Americans against the Koreans.

On 10 September a large group of Korean journalists gave a dinner at the Bright Moon Restaurant in Seoul for American correspondents and Public Relations personnel. After the dinner Dr. Lee,

Myo Mook, an editor of The Korea Times, delivered a speech in excellent English, welcoming the Americans, describing the Japanese exploitation of Korea, and outlining what he considered the best method of eliminating Japanese influence from the country. His recommendation was: "Oust the Japanese from Korea -- send them out completely stripped." He stated that the principal problems facing the occupation forces were the maintenance of law and order, the food and fuel problem, the question of Japanese property, the state of inflation, the Koreans in Japan, and the activities of communist sympathizers. General Hodge received a copy of this speech.[76]

The dissatisfaction of the Koreans with the retention of Japanese officials was powerful enough to make it appear advisable to reverse the previous policy, even at the risk of a considerable loss of administrative efficiency. Thus, after CINCAFPAC radioed on 11 September that General Hodge should "As rapidly as possible consistent with safety of operations . . . replace all Japanese in governmental positions,"[77] General Hodge replied that he "had already reached [the] same conclusion and had drafted request for authority to act." The drawbacks which General Hodge believed would result from such an important reversal of policy were:

> . . . great difficulty operating with any sweeping removal of Japanese unless willing to accept chaos. All utilities, communications, etc., are Japanese operated and government controlled. My Military Government setup is entirely inadequate to cope with [the] situation.[78]

The new policy was swiftly implemented. On 12 September Governor Abe was relieved, together with the head of the Police Bureau. By the same order General Arnold, who commanded the 7th Division, was appointed Military Governor of Korea south of the 38th parallel.[79] Unless otherwise directed, all officials were required to remain at their posts.[80] However, the removal of Japanese continued. On 14 September Vice Governor Ando was relieved, together with the remaining Japanese bureau heads.[81] Two days later five Korean advisors to the former Governor General were removed.[82]

These steps had the desired effect. Mr. Benninghoff believed that "[the] removal of Jap Governor General has apparently stopped much Korean criticism of our policy. Although further Jap dismissals will be made, any wholesale removal would probably cause a collapse of government functions."[83] In another radio he predicted that "it is our expectation that even those not removed will desert to such an extent that government functions will be seriously affected. The Mil[itary] Gov[ernmen]t will appoint Koreans as rapidly as competent personnel can be found but a period of confusion seems assured."[84]

A further decision made by General Hodge, with Mr. Benninghoff's concurrence, was to change the title of the government from "Government General," which was felt to connote a "colonial status," to "Military Government," with appropriate changes in the titles of the key personnel.[85]

During this period General Harris remained Deputy for Military Government and was responsible for much of the administration of the newly formed Military Government.[86] On 28 September he was relieved,[87] and General Sheets was appointed Deputy to the Military Governor.

On the same day orders were issued appointing General Harris Military Governor of Kyongsang Namdo Province in southeastern Korea, with its capital at Pusan.[88]

The assumption of American military authority over southern Korea was announced to the people by means of three proclamations. Their preparation had presented difficulties. At first General MacArthur contemplated using the proclamations prepared for Japan. However, Colonel Brainard E. Prescott, who later became Civil Administrator in the Military Government, USAFIK, succeeded in persuading the staff officers of AFPAC in Manila that conditions in Korea demanded proclamations different from those to be used in Japan.[89] On 5 September AFPAC directed that no proclamations prepared for Japan be used in Korea and stated that it would furnish special proclamations for the XXIV Corps.[90] On the following day General Hodge requested that the text of this special proclamation be sent to him by radio for quick distribution.[91] The final arrangement was that three proclamations were printed in Tokyo for Korea, and an officer of USAFIK flew from Okinawa to pick them up.[92] On 7 September AFPAC sent General Hodge an information copy of the text by radio.[93]

The proclamations announced a military occupation of southern Korea by American forces in accordance with the terms of the surrender signed on 2 September, and stated that the purpose of the occupation was to maintain law and order and enforce the terms of the surrender. The ultimate goal was the independence of Korea

"in due course." English was proclaimed to be the official language, and certain restrictions were imposed upon the Koreans, with particular reference to property and currency.[94]

One of the obstacles to establishing a stable occupation government was the desire of the Koreans for immediate independence. This wish was augmented by the belief that the Cairo Declaration had promised them almost immediate self-government. The translations of the Declaration which reached the Koreans had been prepared by official Japanese sources. As a result, General Hodge informed the Supreme Commander that

> One of greatest difficulties here in maintenance of order is the idea planted firmly in the mind of all Koreans that Korea is now . . . . a free and independent nation. . . . In talking to educated Koreans I discovered that translations of the Cairo Statement to Koreans have been "in a few days" or "very soon" rather than "in due course" in reference to the time of Korean independence. This is said to apply specifically to Proclamation Number One. Request that any future translations be carefully checked.[95]

The early days of the occupation saw General MacArthur's proclamations posted in prominent places in Seoul and read by large crowds.[96] Later, as American troops moved into the surrounding areas, the proclamations were posted in the smaller communities. The reaction of the Koreans in these outlying areas to the proclamations was generally favorable.[97]

Prior to the American landing, propaganda leaflets had been dropped over various parts of southern Korea. After the landing further leaflets prepared by Military Government personnel were

distributed, announcing the basic purposes of the occupation -- the maintenance of law and order, the enforcement of the terms of surrender, and the improvement of conditions in Korea -- and urging the people to obey the ordinances of Military Government.[98]

Requisitioning Real Estate for the American Forces

Closely related to the establishment of Military Government was the matter of requisitioning property for the use of American troops. It is a matter of common knowledge that the conduct of military forces in an occupation, as well as their actions during actual combat, are regulated by international treaties and by the rules of war. Among the matters so regulated is the acquisition of property for the use of an occupying force.[99] The occupying troops may requisition and use without compensation the public real property of the occupied state; this use does not convey title to the property. The user is bound not to damage the property and to return it at the close of the occupation. It is considered illegal to requisition any institutions which are of a charitable, artistic, religious, or educational nature, even though public property; such institutions, together with the property of municipalities, are treated substantially as private property.[100] Private property, including corporate property, must be respected, it may not be confiscated or pillaged.[101] However, under the authority of the commander of the occupying forces property

that is necessary to those forces may be requisitioned without regard to the wishes of the owner, provided that fair compensation is given either in the form of payment or rental.[102] Among those matters to which civil affairs officers are enjoined to give their attention are:

> Custody and administration of all property and enterprises owned wholly or in part by an enemy government w . . . custody and administration of private property susceptible of direct military use . . . such as transportation and communication facilities, arms, ammunition and other implements of war.[103]

The XXIV Corps Administrative Order provided for a requisitioning procedure which substantially satisfied the requirements outlined above. Only the Commanding General was to make requisitions from the Korean government (i.e., the Government General). He was to be the final authority for the allocation of all facilities and real estate, and all requisitions were required to clear through him. The principal subordinate echelons of the Corps were each assigned an area of responsibility; within each zone the commander was to decide what property was to be requisitioned, subject to the restrictions already described. The Commanding General of ASCOM 24 was responsible for the Inch'on area, the Commanding General of the 308th Bomb Wing for the FEAF area around Kimpo Field,[104] the Commanding General of the 40th Division for the Pusan area, the Commanding General of the 6th Division (which finally replaced the 96th) for the Kunsan area,[105] and the Commanding General of the XXIV Corps for the Seoul area. The guiding principle was to be to requisition

existing facilities where possible rather than construct new ones. At first only operational facilities, as distinct from recreational or other nonessential facilities, were to be requisitioned. The priority of installations for which suitable locations were to be sought was, in descending order: tactical installations, base development projects, hospital installations, headquarters and offices, housing and billeting, and storage. Only in an emergency were requisitions to be submitted for existing hospitals, schools, or universities.[106]

Since Seoul and Inch'on were the only large towns occupied in the initial phase of the occupation, it is only in those two areas that the requisitioning of property need be discussed here. ASCOM 24 selected the sites at Inch'on with the help and advice of Lt. Col. G.J. Rafford of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The preliminary selections were made on Okinawa on the basis of aerial photos, which unfortunately were of small scale. Later, shortly before the embarkation, photos of a larger scale became available. It was then evident that many bad selections had been made the first time, and changes were made accordingly. In addition to quarters for troops and office space, the principal property actually requisitioned was used for the handling and storage of supplies and other government property. As had been directed, ASCOM 24 supervised the establishment of these logistical installations.[107]

In the Seoul area the process of requisitioning real estate was somewhat more complicated. There were fairly large bodies of troops to be housed, XXIV Corps Headquarters had to be set up as well as the headquarters of numerous smaller units, and buildings had to be provided for Military Government. Many of the most important buildings in Seoul were government property and were accordingly taken over without ceremony, except that in some cases a requisition was submitted for record purposes only. In addition to the obvious example of the office buildings of the Government General, one such publicly owned building was the Chosen Hotel. It was in this hotel that the members of the advance party had been quartered. General Kemki seems to have expected as early as 15 August that he might have to house American officers in the hotel and to have so instructed the manager. The expenses of running the hotel and feeding the Americans in it were borne by the Japanese army until 10 September, when the hotel was formally requisitioned. In accordance with international law, no rent was paid for the use of such public property, nor was any paid for provincial property. However, in the case of municipal property[108] rent had to be paid, since it enjoyed a quasi-private status.

Those officersof the 308th Bomb Wing who accompanied the advance party had made a reconnaissance for billet sites in the Seoul area[109] and had selected the Imperial University. The university, which was government property, was to be used only temporarily until the 308th Bomb Wing should complete its permanent installations at Kimpo

Field. This requisition was handled by the 508th Bomb Wing, under Corps supervision.

Most schools in Korea were government property. Although it had been directed that they be requisitioned only in an emergency, it was found that many of them had so little fuel for the winter and so few teachers that it would be impossible for them to remain open.[110] Shortly after his arrival in Seoul General Hodge decided to close temporarily all schools above the primary level.[111] This action made a considerable number of schools temporarily available for American use, including some on the primary level whose continued operation was not feasible. The Bureau of Education of Military Government submitted a list of twenty-four available schools -- sixteen primary, six secondary, one private school, and one college.[112] Of these thirteen were actually used; ten were turned back to Military Government after being requisitioned.[113] The college was never requisitioned. No rent was paid at that time for schools which were not municipal property; the question of rent in all cases was reserved for later settlement.

Rent had to be paid eventually for the use of private property.[114] If the occupants were particularly needy or were by reason of their employment essential to the Korean economy, the property was either left alone or the occupants were given aid by Military Government.[115] In many cases it was found that Koreans had illegally moved into Japanese-owned property, either evicting the owners or finding it unoccupied. A check was made to determine the facts in all such instances and appropriate action was taken.

The agency which handled requisitions for the XXIV Corps was the Area and Facilities Allocations Office, headed by Lt. Col. C. J. Lundblad, under the Corps G-1 Section, with Captain D. J. McInaney as his assistant; Captain McInaney became head of the office about 1 November. The work on the whole went smoothly without serious friction between any of the agencies involved. During the first weeks of the occupation Captain McInaney handled some of the requisitions for Military Government; the remainder were handled by the Property Custodian of Military Government, with whom all requisitioned property was eventually registered and who assessed all private property for which rental had to be paid.

During the first week after the landing there was a rush to secure property for quarters and other purposes. In many cases requisitions were made informally and records were not drawn up until later. The troops in nearly all cases found the property in a filthy condition and in serious need of repairs. The buildings were cleaned and repaired as much as possible by the occupying units, with help from units of the 1140th Engineer Combat Group, and in most cases a substantial increase in the value of the property was effected. However, the contents of the buildings in some cases suffered severely from handling by American troops. Almost all property taken over by the Americans was Japanese-owned; it was considered unwise to requisition Korean property, and in any case Japanese owned nearly all the desirable installations in Seoul. Few individual residences were taken over, the emphasis being on property of the government and of Japanese firms.

In addition to those buildings already mentioned, the property requisitioned included the following: the Chosen Building (commonly, though incorrectly, known as the Hanto Hotel)[117]; the Mitsui Building[118]; the Mitsubishi Building[119]; and the former Belgian consulate[120] which had become the property of the Imperial Japanese Navy. These are only a few examples; by 6 December seventy-seven requisitions had passed through the Area and Facilities Allocations Office.[121]

The general steps followed in requisitioning property were the following: in the first place, the provisions of the XXIV Corps Administrative Order were borne in mind and followed out; the requirements of the troops were considered; possible sites were reconnoitred; a list was drawn up of the owner and all tenants; in the case of commercial property, clearance was secured from the Accounts Section of Military Government[122] after about the middle of October;[123] in the case of public property, clearance on almost all requisitions was secured with the Military Government agency most directly concerned; the owner was notified when the requisition had been cleared; and finally the owner's signature to the requisition was secured.[124]

These buildings which were requisitioned were used only for military purposes; among the uses to which they were put were billets, headquarters, offices, recreational facilities for troops, storage, and service and maintenance installations.[125]

Since nearly all important installations in Korea were owned and run by Japanese, it is not surprising that many of them should have suffered at the hands of excited Koreans, and of American soldiers accustomed to picking up trophies from the field of battle. Although General Hodge had forbidden souveniring, American troops often found the temptation too great, especially when they saw Koreans committing ravages which only worsened the prospects for their own future.

These factors, together with a lack of coordination between XXIV Corps Headquarters and the nascent Bureau of Education of Military Government, resulted in damage to several educational institutions, particularly to the library and scientific school and library of Seoul Imperial University, the only university in the country. Most of the damage to such buildings seems to have been caused by Koreans and by small bodies of American soldiers not under the supervision of their commanders. The haste with which billets had to be found for large numbers of troops also contributed to the damage. General Hodge tried to stop the looting, but most of the damage was done in the first few days while communications were uncertain and the general situation in a state of flux.

Port Operations at Inch'on

Logistics occupied an important place in the planning for the occupation. The Corps Field Order established as the first mission of the 7th Division the securing and operating of the port of Inch'on and the nearby island of Wolmi Do, with all their existing facilities, installations, and utilities, until the division should be relieved of the responsibility.[129] ASCOM 24 was to be prepared to relieve on order the 7th Division of responsibility for operating Inch'on, to establish an ASCOM area at Inch'on and Wolmi Do and assume responsibility for it; and to operate all logistical facilities for the XXIV Corps when so ordered.[130] In brief, the logistical plan was this: at first the system of automatic supply would be used, and supplies were to be moved to Inch'on, and later to other ports, as requested by the Corps Commander. The picture was complicated by the fact that initial resupply came from diverted shipping, and was consequently not fully suited to the Corps's needs.[131] An even worse situation had been anticipated at first; in the middle of August it had been supposed that there would be no resupply at all for the first thirty days of the occupation.[132]

The importance of port operations was emphasized in the Corps Administrative Order by the assignment of the first priority for engineer work in the early phases of the occupation to the furnishing, rehabilitating, and developing of unloading facilities.[133] The unit assigned to supervise engineer operations was the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which had seen action on the Western Front; an advance party of three officers from the Brigade made a reconnaissance of the port facilities at Inch'on on 8 September. They were met by Lt. Col. D.D. Givens, the Brigade Commander, who had accompanied the advance air party and had gone to Inch'on on 7 September to make a preliminary inspection.

The mission of the 1st Engineer Brigade, which was assigned to ASCOM 24, was to unload the assault shipping of the 7th Division during the first days of the occupation. For this purpose the Brigade attached the 1122d Engineer Combat Group to the Division for the assault phase; this unit, together with the 365d Port Battalion, which was the only other unit under the Brigade at that time, unloaded the assault shipping of the 7th Division beginning on 8 September.[134]

On 9 September the Commanding General, ASCOM 24, arrived in Korea by air.[135] At noon on 11 September ASCOM 24 assumed responsibility for the Inch'on area,[136] at this time the shore party units, which had been working under the 7th Division in unloading the assault shipping, reverted to ASCOM control and continued operations under the direction of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.[137] On 12 September

the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, ASCOM 24, less the advance party, came ashore at Inch'on.[138] On the same day the Headquarters of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade came ashore, moved into the former Russian consulate,[139] and began to function on land.

At about the same time other engineer units, such as the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, landed and began work under the supervision of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.[140] For the 40th Division, which began unloading on 22 September,[141] and the 6th Division, which did the same on 17 October,[142] the Brigade furnished lighterage and cranes with operators, but the divisions had to furnish their own labor for stevedoring.[143] On 18 September the 112th Engineer Combat Group was released from port duty prior to moving to Pusan;[144] this movement, which was conducted partly overwater, began the next day.[145] The Group was replaced at Inch'on by the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.[146]

One of the chief difficulties encountered in port operations at Inch'on was the great tidal range, amounting to roughly thirty feet. Relatively speaking, little use was made of Japanese army labor; one truck company was employed,[147] and only for a short time. A more extensive use was made of Korean labor; for example, on 15 September Military Government at Inch'on furnished 1000 laborers,[148] on the following day 1900,[149] and on 19 September 2472.[150]

On 16 September the Headquarters, ASCOM 24, and many of the principal subordinate units began to move to the area around a former Japanese arsenal,[151] not far from Inch'on on the road to Seoul. This area was christened ASCOM City.

The types of ships unloaded at Inch'on during the first few weeks of the occupation included LSM's, LST's AKA's, APA's, Victory ships, and tankers.[152] The rate of unloading was slowed from time to time by bad weather,[153] but in general continued satisfactorily. A statistical table of unloadings is included as an appendix.

The Language Problem

A powerful barrier to the maintenance of close relationships between Americans and Koreans was the problem of language. One of the very few Korean grammars written in English describes the Korean language as follows:

> As the Koreans have been under Chinese cultural and political influence for thousands of years it is natural that . . . they should have adopted the Chinese mode of writing. They write the words of their own language with Chinese characters, and these characters have thus as a rule two pronunciations, i.e. the Chinese name for the character and the word of Korean origin which has a similar sense. The Korean language lacks words for more abstract ideas. . . . Of what the language earlier possessed much may have been lost during the passing of centuries. The Chinese influence has in many ways remodelled the Korean language, and looking now in a Korean dictionary, one finds that about ninety per cent of the work material is properly speaking Chinese. But nevertheless the grammatical construction and the most used words in everyday speech are of quite different origin and testify that the Korean and the Chinese are two different types of language.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> . . . it seems most probable that the Tibetan way of writing was the model for the Korean alphabet, invented,

> according to tradition, by king Sechong (. . . 1419-1451). This alphabet, called . . . 'Hunmun,' is well suited for rendering the sounds of the language. It is not a syllabary like the Japanese kana but a system of signs where each consonant and each vowel has its own symbol. . . . The Korean alphabet is very well suited to its purpose and quite easy to write and read.[154]

Although the language is substantially the same throughout the peninsula, there are small variations in northern Korea[155] and on the island of Cheju Do (Quelpart).[156] The language can claim a considerable collection of songs and a translation of the Bible.[157] Korean is the language of the people; when the Japanese ruled the peninsula they gave Japanese names to the towns, forced the Koreans to adopt Japanese family names, and made Japanese the official language. In spite of these measures, only 14 percent of the Korean people, chiefly city dwellers, understood Japanese in 1939.[158]

> No figures are available on the knowledge of English in Korea. The teaching of English in missionary schools in Korea and to a lesser extent in high schools, and the study of English by Korean university students in Japan and other foreign countries has given it widespread currency among Korean intellectuals.[159]

This fact was to prove fortunate for Military Government. Although supposedly Japanese officials had been encouraged to study Korean, the importance of this fact was rendered almost negligible by the status of Japanese as the only official language; according to statistics published by the Government General, only some five thousand Japanese officials had become proficient in Korean as of 1938. It is plain that intercourse between Japanese and Koreans was carried on largely in Japanese.[160]

There were few Korean-speaking personnel in the American forces; therefore, when AFPAC made a search in August for Korean translators and interpreters,[161] it was able to find only six paroled Korean prisoners of war, who were accordingly attached to the XXIV Corps.[162] Although the Corps had a reasonably adequate supply of Japanese translators and interpreters, in its relations with Koreans it had to depend almost exclusively upon natives for the vital work of interpreting. In the important press conferences held by Military Government, a Korean acted as interpreter.[163] General Hodge's first public address was translated by a Korean.[164]

The problems of interpreting are difficult at best. Not only a conversational knowledge of both languages but a good military or otherwise technical vocabulary is necessary. These simple facts were to plague the Americans throughout the occupation. For example, although the Corps's Japanese interpreters were linguistically competent, some at least did not have sufficient poise to interpret properly for high-ranking officers. At the surrender of Cheju Do

> Green's [the senior American officer] remarks were translated into Japanese by an interpreter, a Nisei who looked very embarrassed and stumbled badly over the job.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> We got most of the information we wanted, most of it correctly in all probability, but it was hard and slow going. Everything had to be translated, often through two intermediaries. Questions and answers were frequently misunderstood; at times a matter had to be dropped out of sheer fatigue. And the Japanese, who were permitted to ask questions toward the last, appear to have been equally obscure on certain of the answers that painfully sifted through to them.[165]

This description brings out the salient difficulties imposed by barriers of language -- the mechanical linguistic problem, the difficulty of achieving a meeting of minds, and the frequent impossibility of being certain whether there has been a meeting of minds or not. On all levels the occupation forces were constantly confronted with problems of language.

Language from time to time had important political effects on the occupation of Korea. The effect on the Koreans of the translation of the expression "in due course" has already been discussed. When General Arnold issued a strong statement to the Korean press on 10 October, the unfavorable reaction on the part of the Koreans was due largely to the fact that some of the expressions used, such as "amateur editorship," sounded far worse in Korean than in English. 166

In December it was announced that a trusteeship for Korea was being contemplated; the reaction of the Koreans was strongly unfavorable. To some extent the reaction was due to the fact that the word "trusteeship," when translated into Korean, was the same word as that which had been applied to the status of the country under the Japanese. The poverty of the Korean language in abstract words, already noted, thus had an effect on practical politics. General Hodge summed up the problem forcefully:

> I fully understand what the word "Trusteeship" means to Koreans. In the meaning that you apply to that word, it is even more abhorrent to me as a responsible representative of my nation than it can be to you. The diplomats of the great Powers do not use the word in the same meaning as do Koreans, because they did not experience

forty years of Japanese domination. If they did understand your thoughts of the term "Trusteeship" they would use another term to express the assistance and advice they are willing to give Korea. I can assure you that I need no demonstrations of any kind to make me do all in my power to remove all reference to "Trusteeship" from future discussions of Korea.[167]

In the XXIV Corps Field Order it had been stated that "the limited number of qualified language personnel available makes it imperative that greatest care be exercised in the assignment of tasks. . . . Wherever practicable and consistent with military security, language detachments will be augmented by English-speaking enemy nationals. G-2s will be responsible for the determination of priorities in the assignment of language personnel." The initial order of priority was the securing of intelligence information by interrogation and translation, the processing of documents, and the lending of assistance to other agencies which might need language personnel.[168] In order to integrate the activities of the three language teams at the Corps's disposal a Language and Documents Section was set up under the G-2. This section handled assignments in both Japanese and Korean.[169]

The men of the section were put to use on Okinawa. They interrogated Korean prisoners of war, more than seven hundred of whom had been captured during the campaign. They translated into Korean the leaflets which were dropped over southern Korea before the landing, and while en route to Korea they turned out a Japanese translation of the surrender document signed in Seoul on 9 September.

Two officers of the section accompanied the advance air party and acted as interpreters when so required.[170]

The arrangements made for Korean interpreters to meet the Corps at Inch'on were fairly successful, and a considerable number turned up. Although not fluent in English, they were for the most part satisfactory.[171] Most of this original group of interpreters found their way to Military Government; hence it was necessary for the Corps to look for more. The second search yielded only a lean harvest, but some Koreans were hired as interpreters, translators, and civil censors.[172] These men were paid twenty yen a day; in spite of the low pay many educated English-speaking Koreans volunteered their services in order to improve their knowledge of English.[173]

At first Military Government secured many of its interpreters through Mr. Yasuma Oda of the Government General.[174] The Americans liked Koreans who could speak English, and Koreans who did not tended to feel at a disadvantage in applying for employment. It was found necessary for an official of Military Government to state publicly that inability to speak English should not deter any able Korean from offering his services.[175] In October it was discovered that the Korean public rated their distrust of interpreters used by Military Government among the five most important problems of the period; apparently the basis of this suspicion was a feeling that the interpreters were not politically honest and were trying to influence policy, as well as a belief that they were not linguistically competent.[176] One political organization believed that

the idea of trusteeship for Korea came

> From the interpreters of the US Army and Military Government who are of the opinion that in Korea we have no leader who is capable of leading us, and therefore our independence should be delayed. . . . It is not unreasonable, therefore, that US authorities should think of a trust system for Korea. Now let us sweep away those traitors at the outset.[177]

Colonel Glenn Newman of Military Government later described a Korean poster as follows:

> An American soldier, blindfolded, is shaking hands with a Korean who holds a Japanese flag and a bundle of 100 yen notes. Between the two is an interpreter labeled as "Bribed by Traitors and Pro-Japs."[178]

Many Military Government officials came to rely heavily on interpreters for the conduct of business far beyond that of mere translation. It can readily be understood how an interpreter could in time come to know his principal's job almost as well as the principal and, if granted enterprise, act on his own in answering questions and reaching decisions while interpreting, or even independently while his principal was absent. It was a common enough experience to hear one's interpreter and a Korean conversing at a greater length than demanded by the translation at hand. This led in some cases to suspicion of interpreters, but always there remained the answer that the rendition of an American thought into Korean terms was more than a mere exchange of words.

In November General Arnold defended the integrity of the interpreters at a press conference,[179] but nevertheless General

Sheets issued an order that

> Every possible precaution will be taken by all Military Government personnel to insure that the above types of individuals [dishonest and untrustworthy interpreters] are not employed in any capacity in the Military Government of Korea. Each Military Government Department Head -- National and Provincial -- will make an immediate investigation of all his interpreters and relieve any interpreter in his department upon receipt of reliable information that he may be classed under one of the categories . . . above.[180]

Each Korean town had at least two names -- the Korean name and a Japanese. The Corps decided to use the Korean names for official purposes.[181] A standard system for latinizing Japanese words, known as *romaji*, had long been in use, but no such system had ever been adopted for the Korean language. There resulted a great many informal systems, if they can be called such, and much confusion.[182] Dr. Rhee, Sung Man was called variously Rhee Syngman, Syngman Rhee, Sung Man Rhee, Lee Sung Man, and Sung Man Lee. In this case some of the confusion arose from the fact that "the Korean language has treated the sounds l and r as one."[183] Some Koreans, though not all, wrote their names with the family name first, in the same manner as the Chinese; this practice was adopted by the occupation forces as standard, and thus one source of confusion was eliminated.[184]

Once the Corps Headquarters had been set up in Korea, the Language and Documents Section attached one of its teams to the 7th Division, most of whose language personnel had not arrived.

However, the pressure of work at Corps Headquarters soon made it necessary to recall this team and to expand the administrative personnel of the section. The Japanese translation was done chiefly by Nisei.[185] As time went on the section was required to translate fewer Japanese and more Korean documents -- a logical trend, since Japanese officials and troops were in the process of being removed from the country. The main task came to be that of translating the daily Korean newspapers.[186]

The "Problems"

In spite of the fact that the occupation had proceeded without resistance, General Hodge realized that the situation was dangerous. The problems which his forces faced were numerous and serious. One of them was the division of Korea into two zones of occupation. Korea was an economic unit and the results of splitting it into two parts could hardly fail to be unfortunate from both the political and economic points of view.[187] Many of the more conservative Koreans suspected that Russia was reviving her historic designs on the ports of Korea.[188]

General Hodge had no information as to the probable length of the occupation, in other words the time when Korea would be granted her independence in accordance with the Cairo Declaration. This uncertainty irritated him, and was even more disturbing to the Koreans themselves.[189]

The actions of the Russian forces to the north were in many respects most alarming. In some cases they had crossed the boundary, although no clashes had occured. They were reported to be pillaging and otherwise terrorizing Japanese and Koreans alike. Although liaison had been established with the Russian consul in Seoul and by the 7th Division with the forces along the boundary, nothing approaching a program of cooperation had been worked out or seemed likely to be worked out.[190]

Both the inevitable progress of events and Japanese trickery had combined to leave the Korean economy in an alarming state of inflation, rendered still more serious by shortages in the American zone of both foodstuffs and coal.[191]

The presence of nearly two hundred thousand Japanese troops in southern Korea and Cheju Do constituted a serious problem. Their disarmament and evacuation to Japan were mandatory. In addition, there were hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians in the country, who were to say the least unpopular with the Koreans. Koreans abroad were in distress and were clamoring to return home. The demographic problems of the occupation were enormous.[192]

The effect of Japanese domination had been to make the Koreans hate their masters bitterly and long for independence, and yet to render them largely incapable of intelligent political action. They wanted immediate independence, which they mistakenly believed had been promised to them at Cairo; they wanted to seize the property of the Japanese in Korea and expel them immediately; but beyond this they

did not really know what they wanted, and they split up into numerous small and squabbling political parties.[193]

General Hodge did not have sufficient tactical troops at his disposal to place detachments in all communities throughout southern Korea, but the people seemed to expect just such an occupation. There was a woeful lack of personnel trained in such essential types of work as military government and military police.[194]

At the beginning of the occupation General Hodge was plagued with a host of correspondents, many of whom came merely to get a good story and hence painted everything they saw in the most lurid colors possible. Some of them stayed only long enough to misbehave, consort with Korean radicals, and file dispatches denouncing General Hodge's policies as reactionary and inimical to the Koreans. Most of these men left as soon as the situation settled and there were no longer any opportunities for sensational stories. In general they gave General Hodge a "bad press" and conveyed to the people of the United States the impression that the occupation of Korea was being completely mishandled.[195]

One story, which was widely printed in American newspapers and magazines and seems to have caused considerable excitement, alleged that General Hodge had described Koreans and Japanese as "the same breed of cats." The actual statement was that the Koreans considered their countrymen who had cooperated with the Japanese as being in the same class with their oppressors. This remark was picked up second hand and twisted, whether intentionally or not, into an outright

falsehood. For this unfortunate episode Mr. Gordon Walker of The Christian Science Monitor seems to have been chiefly responsible. His activities continued to be a source of trouble, and he was the only correspondent in Korea who maintained an unreasonable attitude after the first few days of the occupation, when most of his sensation-seeking colleagues had moved on to greener fields.[196]

During the first few days of the occupation the Koreans welcomed the Americans with tremendous enthusiasm. Except for the advance reconnaissance party, the first glimpse that the Koreans had of their liberators was at Inch'on on 8 September. In those parts of the town which were not too heavily guarded by Japanese police, the inhabitants swarmed happily around any American who appeared. Conversation being impossible for most of them, they enthusiastically waved Korean, Chinese, and American flags in order to demonstrate their feelings.[197] Some of the better educated citizens handed out leaflets dated 7 September and reading in part as follows:

To the Soldiers of the United States of America.

Dear Sirs: We Koreans have been suffering of the oppression of the Japanese iron rule over the country. Now you and other allied armies broke down the Imperialistic Militarism of Japan and freed us from the bondage of the enslavement. We every Korean does not know how we could express our appreciation and thanks to you. We are almost weeping with heartfelt joy and excess of admiration but we regret that we are not yet free to express our thanks to you to the fullest extent.[198]

The welcome accorded to the Americans in Seoul was very similar. On 9 September huge crowds gathered to welcome the troops in those

parts of the city which were not under police guard. Although extremely enthusiastic, the crowds created no disorder.[199] The first large parade took place on 12 September; it was quite orderly and fully under the control of American and Korean police.[200] The Korean love of parades culminated in a huge ceremony officially welcoming the Americans to Korea which took place on 20 October and outdid all previous demonstrations in size and importance.[201]

Although parades were gratifying to the Koreans' long suppressed desire for political activity, they neither pleased nor impressed General Hodge. Brig. Gen. Laurence E. Schick, the Provost Marshal General, urged that parading be curtailed, but the Corps Commander was at first loath to stop this Korean form of self-expression. Later he decided to require permits for groups which wished to hold demonstrations and to provide them with military police. He hoped that in time the demonstrations would die down, for the problem of controlling demonstrations was complicated by the scarcity of military police.[202] On 12 September and later the General emphasized in a speech to Korean political leaders his desire that they keep parades to a minimum and go back to work; but the demonstrations continued nevertheless.[203]

Although the Koreans were not particularly interested in working at that time, they showed great concern for other matters. They were disturbed over the arbitrary division of their country into two zones of occupation. They feared that the result would be communism in the north, democracy in the south, and a clash when

the occupation forces departed. Many of them would have preferred that the entire country be occupied by one force, whether Russian or American.[204]

The effervescence of political activity and the temptation to take revenge on the hated Japanese produced a number of cases of violence, committed by individuals and small groups rather than by mobs. For example, several hundred street car workers in Seoul went on strike and furnished fertile soil for labor agitators. Groups of Koreans tried, on some occasions with success, to take over Japanese property, such as the Domei News Agency, a local mine, a police station, and a firm which manufactured medical supplies.[205]

General Hodge was fully aware of all these problems, and he himself labeled Korea "a powderkeg." He recommended to General MacArthur measure calculated to improve the situation — such as the establishment of an advisory council with diplomatic and political functions — but many of the problems were impossible of solution by General MacArthur or even by the State Department.[206] In general, the XXIV Corps had to do benevolently what more than half a million Japanese had done tyrannically; uncertain though the situation was, it was safe to predict that the occupation of Korea would not be easy.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER XV

1. Hq XXIV Corps, Letter Order, 3 Sept. 1945.

2. Interview with Lt. Col. M. A. DePietro, 10 Sept. 1945.

3. Radio CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, 042115 Sept 45.

4. Radio No. 5, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army, 1 Sept. 1945;
Radio No. 5, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, 1 Sept. 1945;
Radio No. 10, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army, 2 Sept. 1945;
Radio No. 8, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

5. Radio No. 19, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army, 4 Sept. 1945.

6. Radio Col. Talley to CG XXIV Corps, 041520 Sept 45.

7. Interview with Lt. Col. C. L. Harrison, 13 Sept. 1945.

8. Radio No. 20, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army.

9. Interview with Lt. Col. M. A. DePietro, 10 Sept. 1945.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Interview with 2d Lt. P. L. Gerdine, 10 Sept. 1945. See also investigations by XXIV Corps IG See, "Misconduct of Brig. Gen. Harris" and "Party held at Chosen Hotel, 4 Sept" listed in IG Section History, 9 Jan. 1946; radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 251414/I March 46.

13. Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945.

14. Radio SCAP to Japanese Imperial GHQ, 300458/I Aug 45. Whether or not the actual radio on the subject ever reached the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo is uncertain, but in any case General Kozuki certainly learned of the requirements somehow (either through the members of the advance party or through a message from General Hodge dropped by plane, perhaps both), for he later described to General Hodge the difficulty he encountered in finding pilots. Radio CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, reply to radio No. 2, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army, 1 September 1945. General Kozuki later said

that the guide ship would be sent; this was before weather conditions delayed the entire timetable by about twenty-four hours. See radio No. 12, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps, 5 Sept. 1945, and radio No. 21, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps. The subject of liaison between the Japanese and American forces is more fully treated in Chapter X.

15. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No.3, 8 Sept. 1945. For details of the landing plan see 7th Div, Annex 11 (with appendices) to FO 45, 1 Sept. 45.

16. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No.3, 1 Sept. 1945. See also "Unit History, MP Platoon, 7th Infantry Division, 5 January 1946; "Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945.

17. Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945. Different sources give different figures on the number of Koreans wounded.

18. Ibid.

19. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 9 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

20. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 5, 8 Sept. 1945.

21. Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945.

22. XXIV Corps G-3 OperationsReport No. 6, 9 Sept. 1945.

23. Historian's journal, 9 Sept. 1945.

24. XXIV Corps, FO 55, 28 Aug. 1945, par. 2a.

25. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 9 Sept. 1945.

26. Historian's journal, 11 Sept. 1945.

27. Historian's journal, 9 Sept. 1945.

28. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 7, 10 Sept. 1945. See also "Unit History, MP Platoon, 7th Infantry Division, 5 January 1946."

29. Historian's journal, 9 Sept. 1945.

30. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 9 Sept. 1945.

31. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 8, 11 Sept. 1945.

32. Historian's journal, 11 Sept. 1945.

53. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 5, 12 Sept. 1945, attached overlay.

54. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 11, 14 Sept. 1945.

55. The account of the surrender ceremony has been consolidated from the dispatches of nine correspondents who were present. A brief factual account, containing no contradictory statements, may be found in XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 9 Sept. 1945. See also "Plans and Protocol to Effect the Acceptance of Surrender of the Japanese Ground, Sea, Air, and Auxiliary Forces in Korea South of 38° N. Latitude" in XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Policies and Operations No. 2".

56. Radio GINCAFPAC TO CG XXIV Corps, 290729/I Aug 45.

57. Radio No. 11, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army.

58. Radio No. 13, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

59. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 9 Sept. 1945.

60. XXIV Corps FO 55, par. 2b.

61. Ibid., par. 3a.

62. XXIV Corps, Annex 3 to FO 55.

63. XXIV Corps, FO 55, par. 3a.

64. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 5, 12 Sept. 1945.

65. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 9, 12 Sept. 1945.

66. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 13 Sept. 1945.

67. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 7, 14 Sept. 1945.

68. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 8, 15 Sept. 1945.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 12, 15 Sept. 1945.

72. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 16 Sept. 1945.

73. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 14, 17 Sept. 1945.

73a. Radio Capt C. C. Wood to Com Gru Div 16, 162200/I Sept 45.

54. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 18 Sept. 1945.

55. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 17, 20 Sept. 1945.

56. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 19, 22 Sept. 1945.

57. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 20, 23 Sept. 1945.

58. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 9, 16 Sept. 1945.

59. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 12, 19 Sept. 1945.

60. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 22 Sept. 1945.

61. 7th Division G-3 Operations Report No. 16, 23 Sept. 1945.

62. For these minor movements see subsequent G-3 Operations Reports of the XXIV Corps and the 7th Division.

63. Radio CG XXIV Corps Rear Echelon to CG XXIV Corps Advance, 121115/I Sept 45.

64. Radio CG XXIV Corps to GINCAFPAC, 122330/I Sept 45.

65. Radio CG XXIV Corps Rear to subordinates, 151015 Sept 45.

66. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 28, 1 Oct. 1945.

67. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 1, 2 Jan. 1946. See also "Unit History for 779th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion . . . 1 Jan. 1945 - 31 Dec. 1945;" "Battalion History, 715th Tank Battalion, Year 1945."

68. Hq XXIV Corps, Ordnance Section, "Ordnance Monthly Status Report," 30 Sept. 1945 [illegible] and other status reports, in XXIV Corps Ordnance Section files [illegible]. See also XXIV Corps, Annex 1 to FO 55; "History of the XXIV Corps Ordnance Section (1945);" "History of the G-3 Section XXIV Corps, 1945;" radio CG XXIV Corps to GINCAFPAC Adv, 110900/I Oct 45.

69. XXIV Corps FO 55, par. 2a.

70. These figures have been compiled from JANIS 75, Korea, Section VII "Cities and Towns," and Section IX "People and Government." The population figures are based on the 1941 census and are only approximate; where the 38th parallel cuts through a province, the assumption has been made that the population was evenly distributed throughout the province.

71. Hq USAFIK, 28 Aug. 1945, General Order No. 2.

72. This directive was discussed in a XXIV Corps staff meeting, 28 Aug. 1945 [reported in historian's journal].

73. Dispatch by Philip Potter, Baltimore Sun, 8 Sept. 1945.

74. This account of General Hodge's remarks at the press conference is taken from the same source as the description of the surrender ceremony [v. supra, footnote 36].

75. Dispatch by John Grover, Associated Press, 11 Sept. 1945. See also XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, pp. 2-3.

76. Speech by Dr. Lee, Nyo Hook, 10 Sept. 1945 [in historical file]. General Hodge's aide lent his copy of the speech to the writer.

77. Radio GINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 111641/I Sept 45.

78. Radio CG XXIV Corps to GINCAFPAC Adv, 120955 Sept 45.

79. Hq USAFIK, 12 Sept. 1945, General Order No. 7.

80. MG staff meeting, 12 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

81. Hq USAFIK, 14 Sept. 1945, General Order No. 8.

82. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, 26 Sept. 1945, Removal No. 1.

83. Radio CG XXIV Corps to GINCAFPAC, 131946 Sept 45.

84. Radio CG USAFIK to GINCAFPAC 140959/I Sept 45.

85. Radio CG XXIV Corps to GINCAFPAC, 141057/I Sept. 45.

86. XXIV Corps staff meeting, 12 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

87. Hq USAFIK, 26 Sept. 1945, General Order No. 11.

88. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, 28 Sept. 1945, Appointment No. 2.

89. Interview with Col. R.E. Prescott, 10 Dec. 1945.

90. Radio GINCAFPAC Adv to GINCAFPAC and others, 031529/I Sept. 45.

91. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv, 040910 Sept 45.

92. Interview with Col. R. E. Prescott, 10 Dec. 1945.

93. Radio CINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 070034/I Sept 45.

94. For the text of the proclamations see appendix.

95. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Adv, 151051/I Sept 45.

96. Historian's journal, 10 Sept. 1945.

97. 7th Division G-2 Periodic Report No. 14, 24 Sept. 1945, p. 4.

98. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report. For the text of one such leaflet, cast in the form of a proclamation by General Hodge, see appendix to this chapter.

99. Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, Articles 52-56. For text see FM 27-251, Treaties Governing Land Warfare, pp. 35-37.

100. FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, p. 81.

101. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

102. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

103. FM 27-5, Military Government and Civil Affairs, p. 19.

104. XXIV Corps, Annex Item to Adm. O. 18.

105. XXIV Corps, Change 1 to Annex Item to Adm. O. 18.

106. XXIV Corps. Annex Item to Adm. O. 18.

107. Interview with Lt. Col. G. J. Hufford, 4 Dec. 1945.

108. Interview with Capt. C. J. McMenamy, XXIV Corps G-1 Section, 6 Dec. 1945. For the requisition for the Chosen Hotel, made for record purposes only, see Requisition No. 57, 10 Sept. 1945, in the files of the Area and Facilities Allocations Office, XXIV Corps G-1 Section. All requisitions subsequently cited are in the same file.

109. Interview with 2d Lt. P. L. Gerdine, 10 Sept. 1945.

110. Interview with Capt. McMenamy, 6 Dec. 1945.

111. XXIV Corps staff meeting, 12 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

112. Memorandum, Bureau of Education, MG, to XXIV Corps G-1, 22 Sept. 1945 [in files of Area and Facilities Allocations Office].

113. Hq XXIV Corps, Area and Facilities Allocations Office, Memorandum, 7 Oct. 1945 [in files of Area and Facilities Allocations Office].

114. Interview with Capt. McMenamy, 6 Dec. 1945.

115. Memorandum, XXIV Corps G-1 to SNGO, Keiki Do Province, 2 Oct. 1945 [in files of Area and Facilities Allocations Office]. See also "Organizational History [1945], Engineer Section XXIV Corps, 31 Dec. 1945."

116. Interview with Capt. McMenamy, 6 Dec. 1945. See also XXIV Corps staff meeting, 12 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

117. Requisition No. 1, 10 Sept. 1945.

118. Requisition No. 8, 20 Sept. 1945.

119. Requisition No. 9, 1 Oct. 1945.

120. Requisition No. 62, 14 Oct. 1945.

121. At that time the latest requisition in the file was Requisition No. 77, 24 November 1945.

122. "Standing Operating Procedure for Procurement of Real Estate — Seoul and Vicinity," undated [in files of Area and Facilities Allocations Office].

123. Interview with Capt. McMenamy, 6 Dec. 1945.

124. "Procurement of Real Estate." See also interview with Maj. Earl M. Lockhard, Director of the Bureau of Education, 9 March 1946 [in historical file].

125. Interview with Capt. McMenamy, 6 Dec. 1945. Capt. McMenamy has read this section on the requisitioning of real estate and has stated that to the best of his knowledge all the facts in it are correct.

126. Interview with Lt. Cdr. A. Crofts, U.S.N.R., Foreign Affairs Section, HQ, 21 Jan. 1946. See also Lockhard interview, 9 March 1946; interview with Capt. R. A. Clayton of Military Government, 6 Oct. 1945; interview with Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, 17 April 1946; interview with Mr. William W. Rapaczy, 21 Jan. 1946.

129. XXIV Corps, FO 55, par. 3a.

130. Ibid., par. 3g.

131. XXIV Corps, Adm. O. 18, par. 3.

132. Hq Sixth Army, 17 Aug. 1945, Letter to XXIV Corps "Signal Supplies to Accompany 40th Infantry Division," 2d Ind. / XXIV Corps AG 400, classified, Binder No. 4, paper 587 /.

133. XXIV Corps, Annex Baker to Adm. O. 18, par. 5b.

134. All the foregoing information is taken from an interview with Lt. Col. G. J. Hufford, Ex. O., 1st Engr. Spec. Brig.,

135. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 10 Sept. 1945.

136. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 8, 11 Sept. 1945.

137. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 8, 12 Sept. 1945.

138. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 9, 13 Sept. 1945.

139. Interview with Lt. Col. G. J. Hufford, 4 Dec. 1945.

140. Ibid.

141. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 19, 22 Sept. 1945.

142. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 44, 17 Oct. 1945.

143. Interview with Lt. Col. G. J. Hufford, 4 Dec. 1945.

144. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 19 Sept. 1945.

145. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 17, 20 Sept. 1945. See also ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 16, 20 Sept. 1945.

146. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 19 Sept. 1945.

147. Interview with Lt. Col. G. J. Hufford, 4 Dec. 1945.

148. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 12, 16 Sept. 1945.

149. ASCON 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 17 Sept. 1945.

150. ASCOM 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 16, 20 Sept. 1945.

151. ASCOM 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 17 Sept. 1945.

152. See XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Reports Nos. 9,11,12,13, 16,17,18,20,21,22, 13-25, Sept. 1945.

153. For example, see XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 10, 13 Sept. 1945.

154. G. J. Ramstedt, A Korean Grammar (Helsinki, 1939), Introduction.

155. Ibid., p. iii.

156. Ibid., Appendix.

158. See Chapter II.

159. WD, MID, Terrain Handbook: Korea (1945), p. 121.

160. Government-General of Tyosen [Chosen], Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen: 1937-38 (Keijyo [Seoul], 1939), p. 94.

161. Radio CINCAFPAC TO ARMIDPAC, 251521/I Aug 45.

162. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

163. MD press conference, 5 Oct. 1945 [in historian's journal].

164. Historian's journal, 12 Sept. 1945.

165. XXIV Corps Historian, "The Surrender at Seishu [Cheju Do]," [eyewitness account in historical file], 28 Sept. 1945.

166. MD press conference, 11 Oct. 1945 [in historian's journal].

167. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 2 Jan. 1946, Incl. No.1.

168. XXIV Corps, Annex 4 to FO 55, par. 9.

169. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

170. Ibid.

171. Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945.

172. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

173. Historian's journal, 6 Nov. 1945.

174. MG press conference, 12 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

175. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, 24 Oct. 1945, Press Releases, Item 9 [in historian's journal].

176. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Intelligence and Information Section, Office of Research, "Weekly Report Number Five," 13 Oct. 1945 [in historical file]. See also XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 57, 6 Nov. 1945, Incl. No. 1.

177. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Secretary of Intelligence and Information, "Political Trends Report #4," 31 Oct. 1945 [in historical file].

178. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Secretary of Intelligence and Information, "Political Trends Report #7," 14 Nov. 1945 [in historical file].

179. MG press conference, 27 Nov. 1945 [in historian's journal].

180. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Memorandum, "Interpreters for Military Government," 30 Nov. 1945 [in historical file].

181. XXIV Corps, Annex 4 to FO 55, par. 6.

182. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

183. Hammekin, op. cit., p. 12.

184. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Secretary of Intelligence and Information, Memorandum, 15 Oct. 1945 [in historical file].

185. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

186. Ibid.

187. Hq USAFIK, Letter to CINCAFPAC, "Conditions in Korea," 15 Sept. 1945, par. 11 [in Top Secret binder, G/3 files].

188. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 11, 21 Sept. 1945, p. 3.

189. "Conditions in Korea," par. 16.

190. Ibid., par. 9-10.

191. Ibid., par. 8, 12. See Chapter XII.

192. "Conditions in Korea," par. 14, 18.

193. Ibid., par. 5-6.

194. Ibid., par. 2, 16.

195. Ibid., par. 18. For examples of the unfavorable dispatches written by some of the correspondents see dispatches by: John Grover, Associated Press, 11 Sept. 1945; Philip Potter, Baltimore Sun, 10 Sept. 1945; Handleman, International News Service, 9 Sept. 1945. For examples of the reaction in the United States caused by this adverse publicity see articles by William L. Shirer and Wilfrid Fleisher in The Washington Post, 16 Sept. 1945; Time, 24 Sept. 1945, pp. 9-10; and letter to editor in The New York Times, 8 Nov. 1945. See also radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Advance, 161951/I Sept 45.

196. Hq USAFIK, 29 Nov. 1945, Letter to CINCAFPAC, "Conduct of Correspondent Gordon Walker in Korea" [in General Hodge's official file, G/S office]. See also radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 241025 Nov. 45.

197. Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945.

198. Leaflet picked up on the spot by the writer.

199. Historian's journal, 9 Sept. 1945.

200. Historian's journal, 12 Sept. 1945.

201. Historian's journal, 20 Oct. 1945.

202. XXIV Corps staff meeting, 12 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

203. Historian's journal, 12 Sept. 1945.

204. Dispatch by Philip Potter, Baltimore Sun, 8 Sept. 1945.

205. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, pp. 4-5.

206. "Conditions in Korea," par. 19.



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CHAPTER V

RELEASE OF THE ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR

One of the primary objectives of the Allied occupations in the Pacific was the release from captivity of Allied prisoners of war, many of whom had been held by the Japanese since the enemy's successful offensives of 1941-42. In the instrument of surrender signed at Tokyo on 2 September 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered the Japanese Government and the Japanese General Staff "to liberate all Allied Prisoners of War and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance, and immediate transportation to places as directed."[1]

SCAP repeatedly showed concern for the speedy recovery of these persons.

> All Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody, including merchant seamen, are to be repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations. The urgency of this mission is second only to military operations and to the maintenance of the forces of occupation.[2]

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Formation, Mission, and Attachment of the Recovery Teams

After the surrender of Japan, it became the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, who was also the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, to arrange with the Japanese Government and its High Command for the recovery of Allied personnel held by the Japanese. His was the additional responsibility of providing for the accomplishment of this task units of trained men, known as liaison teams and recovery teams. The Commanding General, AFWESPAC, was responsible for providing the tactical units to which these teams were to be assigned with food, clothing, medical supplies, and other necessary equipment for the use of released prisoners of war and civilian internees, and for maintaining a final processing center near Manila for them. To the Commanding General, Special Troops, GHQ AFPAC, fell the task of training and making available to GHQ the needed liaison and recovery teams.[3]

> The primary mission of Recovered Personnel Teams is the identifying and initial processing of Allied Military Prisoners of War and Civilian internees and submitting these reports to CINCAFPAC by the fastest means available. The secondary mission is assisting the Army Force Commander in the care and evacuation of the above personnel to Manila, P.I.[4]

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It had been originally planned to attach seven liaison teams, each composed of an officer and an enlisted man from the American, British, and Dutch forces, to each corps of the occupation forces; and to make available to the occupying forces recovery teams, each composed of one British officer and one American officer, on the basis of one team for each expected five hundred prisoners and internees.[5] On this basis the XXIV Corps was far from having its quota of recovery personnel, for Allied intelligence on the total of prisoners and prison camps gave a greatly exaggerated picture of their respective numbers, at least as far as Korea was concerned. As many as 168,000 Allied prisoners were believed to be held by the Japanese.[6] During the latest stages of planning by the XXIV Corps prior to the occupation of southern Korea, it was believed that there were 2500 Allied prisoners of war in all of Korea;[7] as will be seen later, the actual total was 680. Allied intelligence confidently identified eleven or twelve prison camps in Korea and furnished fairly detailed descriptions of them;[8] there later turned out to be only three camps in all of that country.

The recovery teams operated under general instructions from AFPAC. They were required to move into the camps immediately upon the entry of tactical troops into

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the area, prepare rosters and other data concerning the prisoners, assist in their evacuation, and collect all documents pertaining to their treatment and condition. The teams were instructed to keep the local commander advised as to the progress of their work, and screen recovered personnel to prevent the return to Luzon of undesirables. The orders also stated that any existing organization among the prisoners should be retained insofar as it might facilitate their control and evacuation. Recovery personnel from Allied armies were to handle their nationals on a separate basis, but there was to be no discrimination in any respect between nationalities, services, or ranks, and every attention was to be paid to the comfort and welfare of all men recovered.

Allied authorities anticipated that the prisoners would have suffered many injuries at the hands of their captors which would be grounds for prosecution of the guilty parties as war criminals. For this reason the recovery personnel were instructed to collect and preserve carefully all reports, affidavits, and diaries which might serve as evidence in such trials. They also were charged with the responsibility of making photographs as visual evidence of conditions in the camps and as aids in locating the graves of those who had died while in confinement.

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With the release of Allied prisoners of war was connected a certain problem of security, since the lives of a large number of persons were directly affected. GHQ, AFPAC had already forbidden the revealing of information concerning escapes, evasions, or releases of Allied personnel from enemy custody except to designated military officials. One reason for this caution was a desire on the part of Allied authorities to safeguard any one who might have helped an escaping prisoner. The urgency of this matter diminished after the termination of hostilities, but a certain amount of security was still necessary; no publicity was to be released until the next of kin of the recovered prisoners had been notified. No information on names or experiences of recovered personnel was to be released in the Pacific Theater, but it appears that many of the dispatches subsequently filed by war correspondents violated this order.[10]

The activities of the recovery teams were also governed to a considerable extent by legal classifications of the status of various types of persons, some of whom might be evacuated by the teams and others of whom might not.

1. The term, "United Nations Prisoners of War" . . . includes all personnel held in Japanese custody:

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a. Who are or have been members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, the armed forces of any of the United Nations, or

b. Who as members of the armed forces of countries occupied by Japan have been captured by the Japanese while engaged in serving the cause of the United Nations and who under the rules and customs of war should be treated as prisoners of war even though not recognized as such by Japan, or

c. Who are or have been members of or serving with the merchant marine of any of the United Nations.

2. Such term does not include personnel who, although formerly held in Japanese custody as prisoners of war, have accepted release from the status in exchange for employment in or by Japan. Persons in this category, after appropriate identification will be dealt with as displaced persons.

A civilian internee is a person without military status, detained by the enemy, who is not a national of the Japanese empire as constituted on 10 July, 1937.11

. . . measures [are] to be taken to preclude removal of recovered stateless persons (such as White Russians, German Jews), Italians, Vichy French, Turks, Germans, and others whose evacuation from the zone of operations to the Luzon area would be undesirable or impracticable.12

The evacuation of Chinese nationals was not contemplated. Civilian internees were to be repatriated if they desired to be and if they were considered to be eligible under the somewhat complicated rules governing their status. Such was the course actually followed in Korea with regard to the evacuation of civilians. The gist of

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the rules governing their eligibility for repatriation was that they must be citizens of an Allied or neutral power. 15

The story of the release of Allied prisoners and internees in Korea is bound up closely with the activities of the recovery teams involved. Three teams were attached to the XXIV Corps, with the following personnel:

Liaison Team No. 9

Capt. George J. Stengel, A.U.S.
Capt. C. Hekky, A.I.F.
Lt. Blair C. Wood, U.S.N.R. (attached by the Navy Department)
1st Sgt. W. A. Kernop, A.U.S.
Sgt. P. C. Whitby, A.I.F.

Recovery Team No. 69

Capt. R. J. Reynolds, A.I.F.
2d Lt. Henry C. S. Swab, A.U.S.
S/Sgt. Frank P. Bohm, A.U.S.
Pvt. Carl R. Kirkpatrick, A.U.S.
Pvt. Henry L. Freundt, A.U.S.
Cpl. M. J. Hawker, A.I.F.

Recovery Team No. 70

Capt. R. W. Tiernan, A.I.F.
2d Lt. William R. Venner, A.U.S.
Sgt. Wallace W. Dierlan, A.U.S.
Pvt. Edward J. Yeaman, A.U.S.
Pvt. David A. Wilson, A.U.S.
Cpl. J. R. Campbell, A.I.F. 14

The American members of these teams were stationed in the Manila area as replacements at the time of the Japanese armistice offer. They were interviewed at GHQ on 12 August and when accepted were given a special course which had originally been designed to last eight weeks; because of

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the unexpected surrender of Japan the length was reduced to four days. The school was conducted by staff officers from GHQ and by Mr. Alexis Johnson of the U. S. State Department. The principal subjects of instruction were the rules on the eligibility of civilians for repatriation and the proper methods of filling out the rather lengthy forms required of each prisoner and internee.[15]

On 16 August the American personnel were placed on temporary duty with Tenth Army. Their orders stated that they were to proceed to the XXIV Corps for the accomplishment of their mission.[16] Four of the Australian personnel, who were members of the 1st Prisoner of War Contact and Enquiry Unit of the A. I. F. -- Captain Reynolds, Captain Tiernan, Corporal Campbell, and Corporal Bowker -- were attached to Tenth Army for duty with the XXIV Corps on 19 August.[17] The remaining two Australian members of the teams, Captain McKay and Sergeant Whitby, were placed on temporary duty with Tenth Army and were ordered to proceed to the XXIV Corps on 23 August.[18] All these officers and men were to return to AFPAC control upon completion of their mission in Korea.

The American personnel reached Okinawa by plane on 18 August; the first four Australians arrived on the 20th. The second group of Australians landed on 26 August. On the 27th Lieutenant Wood, the naval liaison officer,

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arrived; his mission was to investigate the fate of naval prisoners who were in Korea and of other naval personnel who had died on the way to the peninsula.[19]

On Okinawa the recovery personnel studied their orders, attended classes on Korea, and helped the Corps staff in the preparation of Annex 10 to Field Order 55. On 27 August all recovery personnel, with the exception of Captain Stengel and Lt. Wood, were attached to 7th Division Headquarters. The logical division of labor under this arrangement was for Captain Stengel and Lt. Wood to maintain liaison with the XXIV Corps and to co-ordinate the activities of the recovery teams, while the remaining personnel located, processed, released, and evacuated the prisoners. This was in general the way in which the teams worked.[20]

Movement to the Camps

On 3 September all personnel and equipment of the recovery teams were loaded aboard four ships (APA 38, APA 48, APA 165, and AKA 1) anchored in Buckner Bay off Okinawa. On the same day Captain Stengel was notified that he was to accompany the advance reconnaissance party, which was due to leave for Seoul by plane on the following day. Due to bad weather, Captain Stengel and the group with

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which he was traveling were unable to reach Kimpo Field outside Seoul until 1450 on 6 September.[21]

At the field the party was met by a delegation of Japanese officers and escorted to the Chosen Hotel. At 2000 that evening Colonel Y. Noguchi, the Japanese officer in command of all prisoner of war camps in Korea, appeared at the hotel, and held a conference with Captain Stengel. Colonel Noguchi furnished a list of the camps in Korea, a roster of the prisoners, and a list of those who had died. He also stated that the prisoners had been free to roam about since the Japanese surrender, and that the Japanese guards remained only to protect them. Subsequently the prisoners expressed disagreement with this last statement. Contrary to the information disseminated by Allied intelligence agencies, there were only three prison camps in Korea. One of these was at Konan, near Hamhung (Kanko), the latter town being located near the east coast and well within the Russian zone of occupation. The other two were at Seoul itself and at Inch'on, where the first echelon of the XXIV Corps was to land. Captain Stengel made arrangements to visit the two nearby camps on the following day.[22]

One of the Essential Elements of Information in the intelligence plan of the XXIV Corps was: Will the Japanese abide by the terms of surrender respecting the treatment of Allied Prisoners of War and internees? Colonel Noguchi's

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visit implied that the answer to this question was to be in the affirmative, and indeed from then on the recovery personnel experienced no difficulties due to any refusal on the part of the Japanese military authorities to cooperate, although the Japanese were unable to meet some of the requirements originally imposed on them by the Supreme Commander.[23]

On the same evening a British officer, Lt. Col. M. Elrington of the Second Loyal Regiment, the senior Allied officer in the Seoul camp, came independently to the Chosen Hotel and had dinner with the American officers there.[24] The next day Stengel went to the Seoul camp with two other American officers, one of whom was Captain V. H. P. Boeck, the medical officer of Headquarters Company, XXIV Corps. Captain Stengel talked with Colonel Elrington and Colonel Noguchi, and had the prisoners begin to fill out the forms that were required of them. Boeck inspected the camp from the medical point of view and worked closely with Major Thomas L. O'Donnell, of the Indian Medical Service. The prisoners at the Seoul camp were predominantly British.

On the afternoon of 7 September the same American officers, accompanied by Colonel Noguchi, went to the Inch'on camp, where the prisoners were chiefly American. Here the same general procedure was followed. The senior

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Allied officer was Lt. Col. Curtis T. Beecher, and the senior medical officer was Lt. Col Jack W. Schwartz. Needless to say, the men at both camps were overjoyed to see their liberators. At the Inch'on camp the prisoners had made an American flag out of a parachute dropped by a B-29, and held retreat the same evening. The opportunity was given to all the prisoners to write home; most of them had not been able to send or receive letters for a matter of years.[25]

Everything was now ready for the evacuation of the prisoners from the southern camps by the recovery teams, which landed about noon on 8 September with the first echelon of XXIV Corps. However, there still remained the problem of how to reach the prisoners held in the Russian zone.

On 6 September Colonel Elrington had received information that all the prisoners in the northern camp had been evacuated to Vladivostok.[26] This information was entirely untrue, but as late as the 10th the prisoners at Konan, who were entirely British and Australian except for the crew of an American plane, expected to be evacuated to that city.[27] The information on this camp available to the XXIV Corps turned out to be highly inaccurate and General Hodge described the situation as "obscure."[28]

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On 14 September a radio message was received at Corps Headquarters in Seoul from the headquarters of the 25th Russian Army at Pyongyang (Heijo) to the effect that the Allied prisoners were still at Konan. Captain Stengel made arrangements to fly to Pyongyang on the following day in order to secure permission from the Russians to evacuate them. Accordingly on 15 September Stengel and some members of Recovery Team No. 70 flew to Pyongyang. The permission seems to have been taken for granted, for at about the same time another plane flew directly to Hamhung. In the latter plane were Lt. Venner, two American enlisted men, an Australian enlisted man, and Mr. Barsdell, an Australian war correspondent. At Pyongyang, Captain Stengel was received courteously by the Russians, but the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 25th Army refused him permission to proceed to Hamhung to evacuate the prisoners on the ground that the weather was too bad. There was no use in remaining at Pyongyang, and Captain Stengel returned to Seoul on 16 September.[29]

When Lt. Venner and his party landed at Hamhung on 15 September they found themselves in a strange situation. They were prepared to process the prisoners, but the Russian authorities had not given permission for their evacuation. However, the party was well received. They were allowed

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the use of a truck and were permitted to stay at the camp. By noon on the 16th Venner had completed the usual forms, and the prisoners were ready to be moved.

On 17 September Venner returned to Hamhung and tried to obtain permission to fly to Pyongyang. Permission was not forthcoming, and he returned to the camp on the same day. By the day following the prisoners, to say nothing of Venner, were beginning to grow uneasy at the delay. Some of them wanted to leave immediately on foot and try to hitch-hike to Seoul. Finally, in the afternoon Venner was able to secure a ride on a Russian transport to Pyongyang. He left the other members of his party at Wonan.

In Pyongyang Venner was well treated by the Russians, several parties being given in his honor. He stayed with a Russian colonel. However, he was not allowed to send out any messages. During this time Captain Stengel and another party of Americans returned to Pyongyang from Seoul, but neither Stengel nor Venner was informed by the Russians of the other's presence in the city. On 20 September the colonel with whom Venner was staying told him that on the following day he himself would fly to Seoul; Venner agreed to go with him and on the 21st they took off in an open-cockpit Yak trainer. It was not until Venner's arrival at Seoul on the 21st that he learned that Captain Stengel had

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been in Pyongyang in the meantime.[30]

On the 17th Captain Stengel arranged for a party to leave by train on the following day for Pyongyang to negotiate for the evacuation of the prisoners from Konan by rail, and on 18 September the Russians at last gave permission. The party was to consist of Captain Stengel; Captain Tiernan; Captain Joseph H. Minden, MC, of the 7th Division; Captain Elias Bacha, AC, a Russian-speaking interpreter; and nine Russian prisoners who had been released from the camp at Seoul and were being returned to the Russian forces.[31] This party left Pyongyang on the morning of 18 September, carrying seven hundred rations for the use of the evacuees on the return trip. The party arrived at Pyongyang on the afternoon of 18 September, and that evening attended a party given in their honor by Colonel General Chistiakov, the Commanding General of the 25th Army.

On the morning of 19 September, Captain Stengel was informed that the Russian authorities had arranged for a special train to take the recovery personnel to Hamhung, and he held a conference with General Chistiakov and his staff to discuss plans for the evacuation of the prisoners. Three Russian officers were designated to accompany Captain Stengel's party to Hamhung and then to Inch'on, where the prisoners were to be placed aboard a hospital ship. An

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interpreter from the Russian consulate in Pyongyang and some enlisted Russian guards also accompanied the party on the train.

The train left Pyongyang on the afternoon of 10 September, and after a rather hazardous trip arrived at Hamhung on the following morning. A group of Russian officers met the train, and after having lunch with Colonel Shestyakov, the chief of staff of the Russian corps stationed in that area, Captain Stengel arranged with the latter that the prisoners should depart by train on the following day. Captain Stengel also arranged to send a message to the XXIV Corps headquarters informing General Hodge of the situation, and he made contact with Captain George Finloch, the senior officer at the camp, who agreed to have the prisoners ready to move out at 1300 on the following day.

On 21 September the American officers signed the following document with the three Russian officers who were accompanying them and who represented General Chistiakov:

> A Commission consisting of the representatives of the Commander of Soviet Troops in Korea, Major Satchkov P. A., Semilov, V. D., and Captain Bakaldin G. I. on the one side and representatives of the Commander of the United States Army Forces in Korea, Captain Stengel G. J., Captain Bacha E., Captain Minden J. H., and Captain Tierman R. H. on the other side, arranged the following deed concerning the reception and transfer of former prisoners of war, officers and men, of Allied Armies freed

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by units of the Red Army from Japanese captivity in the City of Wonko--in number 864 (three hundred and fifty-four) persons according to the attached lists.

At the reception and transfer of the former Allied Prisoners of War by the above-mentioned sides, neither side has any reservations and makes no demands on the other.

This act consists of two copies in the Russian and English languages. Both copies have equal power.

On BEHALF of the COMMANDER of U.S. FORCES in KOREA	On BEHALF of the COMMANDER of SOVIET FORCES in KOREA
Captain George J. Stengel	Major P. A. Satchkov
Captain Elias Basha	Captain K. D. Samilov
Captain Joseph H. Minden	Captain G. I. Bakaldin
Captain Roderick H. Tierman	

Condition of the Camps and Prisoners

The best available description of the physical facilities at the Inch'on prison camp is the following report made by one of the recovery officers:

Report of Inspection made at Jinsen Prisoner of War Camp, Korea, on the tenth day of September, 1945.

On the afternoon of the 10th of September, 1945 an inspection was made of the JINSEN Prison Camp and the following conditions were observed.

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by units of the Red Army from Japanese captivity in the City of Fusko--in number 254 (three hundred and fifty-four) persons according to the attached lists.

At the reception and transfer of the former Allied Prisoners of War by the above-mentioned sides, neither side has any reservations and makes no demands on the other.

This act consists of two copies in the Russian and English languages. Both copies have equal power.

On BEHALF of the COMMANDER of U.S. FORCES in KOREA	On BEHALF of the COMMANDER of SOVIET FORCES in KOREA
Captain George J. Stengel	Major P. A. Satchkov
Captain Elias Bacha	Captain K. D. Semilov
Captain Joseph H. Minden	Captain G. I. Bakaldin
Captain Roderick H. Tiernan	

Condition of the Camps and Prisoners

The best available description of the physical facilities at the Inch'on prison camp is the following report made by one of the recovery officers:

Report of Inspection made at Jinsen Prisoner of War Camp, Korea, on the Tenth Day of September, 1945.

On the afternoon of the 10th of September, 1945 an inspection was made of the JINSEN Prison Camp and the following conditions were observed.

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The entire camp was surrounded by a wooden fence 10 ft. high with crossed bamboo stakes on top. There was one entrance to the camp, approximately 10 ft. wide, with a bamboo gate. At the time of the inspection the prisoners had been released approximately 96 hours, and the camp seemed to be untouched since their departure.

The prisoners were quartered in wooden barracks, the aisle in the center being the bare ground. On each side of the center aisle a platform was built up with a wooden floor approximately 8 inches off the ground. It was on this floor that the prisoners slept and lived. There were no beds, and they slept on straw mats approx. one half inch thick. The living quarters consisted of about 2500 square feet of flooring for 50 prisoners. The men did not seem to be cramped for space. The buildings had large windows, and all would open. All glass was intact. The inside of the buildings was very dirty, with everything thrown about, but this seemed to be due to the prisoners themselves in their last days in camp. The buildings were littered with empty ration cans, empty bottles, papers, and books. It was of the type dropped by planes in the past few weeks.

The latrines were very dirty and unsanitary. The urinal was a trench along the wall with very poor drainage. The wash racks were next to the urinal trench, but there were no basins there at the time of the inspection. The toilets were just holes in the flooring with hardly any hole in the ground. The odor in the latrines was very bad. The latrine was located about 20 feet from the barracks.

The kitchen was very poor, and consisted of nothing more than large dirty boilers built in concrete. The inside of these boilers was rusty and dirty. There was no floor and no protection against insects and flies. All parts of this building were filthy.

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The hospital building was very small and there were no beds or cots. The patients would be on straw mats on the floor, the same as in the barracks. There were a few instruments around, all very dirty, and the only medical supplies seemed to be those dropped by plane.

There was a large vegetable garden in the camp but it is understood that the prisoners got very little of the vegetables. The gardens were very neat and full of growing vegetables. The camp also had a pig pen, chicken coop, and rabbit pen.

All heating arrangements were very poor and consisted of brick ovens that would not nearly heat the buildings.

There was a combination library and canteen in the area and articles lying around including tooth powder, matches, and tea. The books consisted of old American novels, which were spread all around the room.

William R. Venner
2d Lt Inf
Recovery Team #70

Captain Bocek's investigation of the medical conditions at the Inch'on camp on 7 September confirmed Lt. Venner's statements on the housing, hospital, and latrines. He had the following to say about the physical condition of the prisoners at the time of their release:

> On the whole the general health was fair but a true picture of the health of the P.O.W.'s cannot be ascertained at this time due to the fact that since the surrender, all of them have put on 15-25 pounds in weight due to increased rations, the Red Cross packages and drops from B-29's. I would say that about 75-90% suffered from malnutrition, avitaminosis, chronic amebic dysentery or allied dis-

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cases to some degree. They all suffered from the effects of overcrowding, poor ventilation, and poor diet. Similar outbreaks of dysentery occurred at periodic intervals causing some deaths . . . [and] a few cases of diphtheria with a few deaths, also some deaths from malnutrition and tuberculosis.35

On 12 September Captain McKay, Captain Reynolds, and Lt. Venner inspected the Seoul camp, from which the prisoners had already been evacuated. The camp had a total area of one and one-half acres, and was entirely surrounded, except for a double main gate, by a fence made of six-foot pickets closely spaced and surmounted with three-foot sharpened bamboo sticks.

The principal building in the camp was a brick warehouse with four floors. The first floor was used for stores -- food, coal, and the like. The second and third floors were the Allied officers' quarters, each floor being divided into four rooms. The entire floor space on each floor was 8,000 square feet; thus there was an average of about 170 square feet of floor space for each officer. The rooms used for living quarters were all twelve feet in height. The fourth floor, which was similar to the second and third floors already described, was for other ranks; each enlisted man had an average of roughly 135 square feet of floor space. The prisoners all slept on mats in the oriental fashion, with five blankets during the winter

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months and two during the warmer seasons. All rooms had windows, fully glassed and with shutters, and there was a heating unit in each room. Before the Japanese surrender the prisoners seem to have been allowed to use only a part of the living space, and living conditions were crowded. After the surrender, however, they were permitted to use the entire building. The group of officers who inspected the camp on 12 September considered the ventilation sufficient, but Captain Boeck, who it will be remembered had already inspected the camp on 7 September, pronounced both the heating and ventilation inadequate from the medical point of view and further pointed out that the prisoners had had no means of protecting themselves from mosquitoes.

The kitchen had a floor space of 480 square feet, and contained one water point and one baker's oven. Most of the cooking had been done in ten ten-gallon copper boilers, which were in a filthy and greasy condition. The amount of food which the prisoners had received from this kitchen had never been sufficient to maintain full health. They had done their own cooking under the direction of Japanese cooks. The water in the camp was fit for drinking.

There was a bath house for the prisoners' use. It had an area of 1500 square feet, and was divided into two

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sections by means of a wooden partition. One section was for officers, the other for enlisted men. Each section contained four tubs, set in concrete, and there were running water and facilities for heating it. However, the prisoners were only allowed to bathe twice a week and then were permitted only one bucket of hot water, which they poured over themselves. The tubs were of typical Japanese design; the bather was not supposed to step into them, but to dip water out of them. There were six inches of ice on the floor when the prisoners bathed in the winter months.

The prisoners' latrine was located thirty feet from the entrance to the warehouse in which they slept; it consisted of a trough urinal and eleven cubicles, each containing an oriental crouch-type convenience without any arrangements for flushing. The fecal matter had been cleaned out only once or twice a month, and when Captain Roesk inspected the latrine he found that there was a terrible odor and a great swarm of flies. The prisoners themselves had set aside one cubicle for men afflicted with diarrhoea, and in view of the absence of screens had tried with little success to make the latrine flyproof.

A small one-story building, with room for twenty patients, served as the prisoners' hospital. There were no beds, but mats were provided for the use of the sick.

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The story of the medical treatment which the prisoners had received during their imprisonment will be described more fully later; for the present it is sufficient to say that the prisoners had been treated by medical officers from among their own number, with supervision from Japanese medical personnel. The hospital was not sufficiently clean; it contained six rooms, including two wards and a dispensary. On 7 September there were eleven patients in the hospital -- one beriberi case, one ulcer, one tuberculosis, two bronchial asthma, one malaria, one bronchitis, one prostatic hypertrophy, and three amebic dysentery.

There was a canteen for the use of the prisoners, with an area of 300 square feet. No information on it is available, and it seems very unlikely that the prisoners ever derived from it any substantial benefit.

For refractory prisoners there was a punishment cell, with a floor space of eighty square feet, seven feet high and without windows or furniture. Some of the boards in the wall were slightly separated to permit ventilation, but the room was dark. The door opened into a guard room.

The outdoor installations included a small and neglected vegetable garden, an exercising ground one hundred yards square, and some livestock pens with a few

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small pigs.

Captain Boeck summarized the physical condition of the prisoners at the Seoul camp at the time of their release as follows:

> On the whole the general health was fair, but all put on from 15-25 pounds in weight since the surrender (3 weeks time) and after B-29's dropped food, and Red Cross packages were given out, etc. I would say about 75-90% suffered from malnutrition, avitaminosis, chronic amebic dysentery or allied diseases to some degree. They all suffered from the effects of overcrowding, poor ventilation, and poor diet that was inadequate for normal needs and far below the needs of a man doing hard work. There were no severe epidemics of any kind, but there was an occasional mild outbreak of dysentery which would cause deaths. There was quite a number of deaths from dysentery, a few from diphtheria, some from malnutrition, etc., several cases of tuberculosis and T. B. meningitis. It is indeed a miracle that any survived.35

The situation at the Konan camp was different in many respects. It was situated in the more highly industrialized northern part of Korea, and the prisoners' principal occupation had been working in a carbide factory. It would be accurate to describe this camp as a work camp rather than as merely a prison camp. The prisoners lived in three barracks. Of these two were fairly long, and were divided into four rooms each. Forty men lived in each of the rooms, which were fifty feet by twenty-five. In the third barracks, which was considerably smaller than the other two, only twenty-nine men were quartered. The

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prisoners slept on wooden platforms, with blankets which varied in number from four to six per man, according to the season, but which were inadequate for the cold winters of northern Korea. There were concrete stoves in each room which were kept burning from 21 November to 21 March of each year.

The factory in which they worked was dangerous and dirty; the work was strenuous, and the food which the prisoners received, being small in quantity and lacking variety, was insufficient for persons doing hard physical labor.

The facilities for bathing were fairly good, but in general medical conditions were bad; the latrines were filthy, hospital facilities were poor, and the medical care which the prisoners received had been very poor indeed. In spite of these facts, the general physical condition of the prisoners when they were evacuated was surprisingly good. One hundred and five cases of malaria were under treatment at the time, but there were only four bitter cases, of whom only one, a man who had a lung ailment, was in a serious condition.

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The Types of Prisoners

The types of prisoners at the Inch'on camp were as follows:

American: 112 officers, 26 enlisted men. Total 138.
British: 9 officers, 17 enlisted men. Total 26.
Australian: 0 officers, 4 enlisted men. Total 4.

Grand total 168.

Most of the Americans had been captured on Bataan and Corregidor. The senior officer among the prisoners was Lt. Col. Curtis T. Beecher; the senior medical officer was Lt. Col. Jack W. Schwartz; the Japanese commander of the camp was Major Okuda (later Lt. Col. Okazaki); and the senior Japanese medical officer was Lt. Yamaguchi (or Miyaguchi). The British prisoners, who had probably been captured in the Malaya campaign, were already at the camp when the Americans arrived.

The following is the breakdown of the prisoners at the Seoul camp:

American: 2 officers, 0 enlisted men. Total 2
British: 91 officers, 2 warrant officers, 48 enlisted men. Total 141.
Australian: 6 officers (including one Red Cross representative), 9 enlisted men. Total 15.

Grand total: 158 (exclusive of the 9 Russian prisoners).

Most of the British and Australians had been captured in Malaya. One Australian officer, Captain H. S. Goldard,

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had been aide to General Gordon-Bennett, the Australian commander at Singapore.[38] The senior Allied officer was Lt. Col. M. Elrington, British Army; the senior medical officer was Major Thomas L. O'Donnell, Indian Medical Service; the commandant of the camp was Captain Goto; and the Japanese medical officer was Captain Uchida.

At Konan there were the following prisoners:

American: None. (Some American Air Corps personnel who had been shot down by Russian forces and temporarily interned at Konan are not listed as prisoners of war because they actually were not such.)
British: 4 officers, 3 warrant officers, 295 enlisted men. Total 302.
Australian: 1 officer, 1 warrant officer, 50 enlisted men. Total 52.

Grand total: 254.

Most of the prisoners at Konan had been captured during the Malaya campaign. The senior Allied officer was Captain George Kinloch, British Army; the senior Allied medical officer was Captain Harry V. Morris, Indian Medical Service; the camp commandant was Captain Otake; the prisoners' medical treatment was supervised principally by Dr. Watanabe, a civilian doctor, and by Sergeant Yoshimura.

The breakdown of all Allied prisoners of war recovered from prisoner of war camps in Korea was:

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American: 114 officers, 26 enlisted men. Total 140.
British: 104 officers, 5 warrant officers, 360 enlisted men. Total 469.
Australian: 7 officers, 1 warrant officer, 63 enlisted men. Total 71.

Grand total: 680.

These figures do not include civilian internees or the nine Russian prisoners.

Evacuation of the Prisoners[39]

The problem of evacuating the prisoners from the Inch'on prison camp was a relatively simple one. They had been processed, it will be recalled, on 7 September, and about noon on 8 September the first echelon of the XXIV Corps began landing at Inch'on. The commander of the Seventh Amphibious Force had by then made available at Inch'on three ships whose primary task was the evacuation of recovered personnel: the hospital ships Refuge and Mercy and the APA Noble (APA 218).[40] All the prisoners from the Inch'on camp were embarked aboard the Refuge by 1830 on 8 September, on orders of Colonel Sinclair, the Corps G-1.[41] At 1400 that afternoon the first litter case was loaded aboard the hospital ship; he had suffered a broken leg from one of the drops made by B-29's during the preceding month. On board the prisoners received such medical treatment as they required, including delousing.

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On the evening of the 8th arrangements were made to evacuate the prisoners from the Seoul camp to Inch'on by rail on the following day. The prisoners and their baggage were moved to the railroad station in Seoul by means of two commandeered Japanese trucks, and were loaded aboard the Refuge by 1800 on 9 September.

On 10 September all the prisoners of war so far released except, of course, the Russians who seem to have been cared for by the authorities at the Russian consulate prior to their departure for Pyongyang, were transferred to the APA Noble.[42] Hospital beds were at a premium during the early days of the occupation of Korea, and in any case the general health of the evacuees was not serious enough to justify sending them all the way to Manila in a hospital ship. The Noble sailed for Manila at noon on 11 September; she was expected to arrive at her destination on the 17th.[43]

The matter of evacuating the prisoners from the camp at Konan was, of course, a much more difficult matter, both because of the greater distance involved and because of complications with the Russians. On 21 September, shortly before the signing of the transfer document quoted above, Captain Stengel had begun loading and transporting the prisoners and their baggage to the railroad station at Hamhung. The Russians loaned trucks for the movement and

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furnished a band to play for the departing evacuees; they also provided a train with eight coaches, decorated with banners. The occasion seems to have been rather a festive one, ending only when, at 1730, the train left Hamhung, carrying with it the three Russian officers and five guards who had joined Stengel in Pyongyang. The train arrived at the Seoul station at noon on the 22d, and very shortly the party moved on to Inch'on, reaching there at 1515. By 1730 that evening all the evacuees were loaded aboard the hospital ship Mercy. A party was given aboard ship that night by the ship's captain in honor of the Russians. The latter were treated to a hot shower and to a shave and haircut in the ship's barbershop where they seemed fascinated by the electric clippers and the tilting barber's chair. On 23 September all the recovery personnel came back to Seoul where the three Russian officers lived and messed at the Hanto Hotel until they returned to Pyongyang on the 24th.[44]

The problem of evacuating the prisoners was not ended, however. General Hodge was reluctant to let the Mercy go, unless he could have the use of the Refuge instead, since hospital beds were scarce, and yet it was important to evacuate the prisoners as soon as possible.[45] For about twenty-four hours (23-24 September) no answer was forthcoming from Seventh Fleet on the matter, and the possibility

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of evacuating the prisoners in C-47's was discussed.[46] However, on the 24th the problem was solved by the decision on the part of Seventh Fleet to send the British CVL Colossus to Inch'on to take the prisoners from the Mercy and transport them to Manila.[47] The transfer was accomplished without difficulty, and on 27 September the Colossus left Inch'on for Manila with the 354 evacuees from the Konan camp aboard.[48]

Japanese Treatment of Prisoners[49]

All the Allied prisoners appear to have entered the peninsula through Pusan, the principal port of southern Korea, reaching their camps thereafter by rail. During this trip and while in the camps, they were closely guarded by Korean and Japanese guards, who in addition to preventing them from escaping were under orders to prevent excessive noise and all attempts to communicate with Koreans. Apparently over ten prisoners died during the various trips that were made from Pusan to the camps. Once installed in the camps, the prisoners were as a rule subjected to some sort of military training; this was carried out under the Allied officers but was required to be conducted in the Japanese language. The confusion that naturally resulted brought ill-treatment. The prisoners were required to salute all

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Japanese soldiers of any rank. The Japanese considered them as enemies and they were treated as such. However, the Japanese need not be blamed too severely for such minor abuses as face-slapping. As Colonel Elrington said afterwards, "The fault lies with the system rather than the individual." Soldiers in the Japanese Army normally fared little better at the hands of their superiors than did many of the prisoners of war whom they captured. "Japan can easily feed twelve soldiers on the daily food cost of one American private. . . . A slap or blow of the sabre is regarded as an acceptable disciplinary measure [in the Japanese army]."[50]

Colonel Noguchi, in his capacity as superintendent of all prisoner of war camps in Korea, had contacts with all the prisoners. Colonel Elrington described him as follows:

> This officer is a regular soldier of the Samurai tradition. In my three years experience of him I have found him strict, just, cautious in observing the regulations, and kindly on occasions. I am satisfied that he discharged his duties conscientiously and to the best of his ability. The main criticism I have of his administration was his apparent ignorance of a great deal that went on in the camp [the Seoul camp in this case], which should have been brought to his notice. He is a firm believer in the divinity of the Emperor and the tradition of the sword.

Of great interest and value in estimating Colonel Noguchi's character and in comprehending the Japanese

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military mentality is the following talk which he delivered to the prisoners under his jurisdiction:

Instruction given by Colonel Y. Noguchi, Superintendent of the Chosen War Prisoners' Camp.

Sept. 1942

(It is requested that you should preserve these papers after having read through).

I am Colonel Y. Noguchi, Superintendent of the Chosen War Prisoners' Camp. Receiving you here, I should like to give necessary instructions to you all.

I hope you will reconsider how this Greater East Asia war happened. Nippon's desire for peaceful settlement arising from the conciliatory spirit, rejected by America and Britain in order to attain their ambitious demand to control East Asia. Finally they overwhelmed Nippon, the important defenser [sic] of Asia, to the extent that they dared to resort to violence of economic disruption. Promoting Chinese internal confusion and increasing military preparation on all sides of Nippon Empire to challenge us, thus the very existence of our nation being in danger we stood up resolutely with a unity of will strong as iron under the name of Tenno (Emperor) for the emancipation of the nations and elimination of evil sources in East Asia. The rise or fall of our Empire that has the glorious history and the progress or decline depend upon the present war. Firm and unshakable is our national resolve, that we should crush our enemy, the U.S.A. and the Britain.

Heaven is always on the side of Justice. Within ten days after the War Declaration, our Navy and Naval Air Forces annihilated both the American Pacific Fleet and the British Far Eastern Fleet; within a few months, American and British long established Army, Navy, and Air bases were crushed by our Army and Army Air Forces; and now, tide turning in our favor, all parts of regions linked with Burma, Java, and

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Wake Island have already been occupied by us, and the inhabitants there are rejoicing in co-operation with us for the construction of the New Asia. And now these above facts have induced the Indian rebellion and Australia come to a crisis of capture. Afterward our belligerents sent their air crafts and fleets for the rescue, but every time they were sunk to the bottom or destroyed and repulsed, thus the total damages come up to 2801 vessels and 4500 aircrafts.

I think these war results do not signify the inferior power of our enemy but rather owe to our absolute indomitable power -- that is to say the power protected by Kami (Heaven). Wherever Nippon Army and Navy advance, Tenyu Shinjo (Special Providential Help) always follows; you should recognize the fact and consider the reasons. Nippon Army and Navy are under the Imperial command of Tenno (Emperor) who is the personification of Kami (God), so that the Imperial troops are to be called the troops of God. Now you have become war prisoners because of struggling against the Kami-no-Gun (God's Army), and now you are convinced of fearfulness to the marrow and became aware of unsavory results. What do you think of this?

However you have lost fighting strength now, you once fought fiercely against us. Judging from this fact some of you will hold hostile feeling against us in your hearts that can never be permissible. Accordingly, we will punish you if you act against our regulations, for instance the non-fulfillment of regulations, disobedience, resistance and escape (even an attempt to do so) are understood as manifestation of hostility. I kindly request you that you must be cautious not spoiling yourselves by punishment.

But on the other hand, with Nippon warrior's forgiveness I express respect to your faithfulness to your country and fulfillment of your duty, and feel pitiful for your capitulation after exhaustion. You should reflect on yourselves. According to the extent of your malice feeling we also put certain limit to your freedom you enjoy or severity and lenity on your treatment.

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Parole is of use as a proof of wiping away your hostility. I am regretful to say those refused to swear will be treated as persons of enemy character, will be placed under restraint regarding maintenance of honour, protection of your persons, and must endure pain in compensation of hostility.

The details of concrete outline of style of daily life are defined in "The regulation regarding to daily life"; you should put them into practice strictly after reading over them.

Prejudice against labour and grumbling over food, clothing and housing are strictly prohibited, because the change in your daily life and custom are inevitable under present war situation.

Closing my instructions, I advise you all to find interest and anxiety in your forthcoming daily life by acting according to Imperial military discipline.51

Twenty-seven prisoners of war died in Korea. Of these twenty-four were British, two were American, and one was Australian. The chief cause of death was disease of one sort or another, brought on by exposure and by malnutrition. The two Americans, both officers, died at the Inch'on camp during the year 1945. 2d Lt. W. M. King died from amebic dysentery on 15 May 1945. The Japanese medical personnel at the camp refused to allow him the necessary medicine, and one of them, Private Sasaki, in the presence of another prisoner said "Let him die." After Lt. King's death, Lt. Yamaguchi, the medical officer, forced Colonel Beecher by threats of violence to sign a false statement of the cause of Lt. King's death. Captain G. C. Brundrett died on 4 July

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1945 from generalized anasarca. Although medicine and Red Cross plasma were available, Lt. Yamaguchi refused to allow them to be used. In the case of the British personnel who died at the Seoul camp, the negligence of the Japanese medical personnel seems to have precluded any hope of recovery for the dying men. Two of the men who died at Konan, Sapper Whitaker and Corporal Hayter, could have been saved, in the opinion of the British medical officer, if sulfa drugs, which were available at the Seoul and Inch'on camps, had been procured. Another prisoner at Konan, Private Knowles, died after a four-month illness in the civil hospital. He was almost starved, and was not permitted to receive his Red Cross parcel, nor were his friends allowed to visit him.

The Inch'on Camp

The great majority of the prisoners who were released from the prison camp at Inch'on had arrived there on 27 April 1945, and had been captured on Bataan and Corregidor. In the camp the prisoners were subject to strict discipline. Work for the officers was voluntary; at first they were allowed to work only on a garden project. Later they were encouraged to make wrappers for cartons of match boxes and to help the enlisted men in their work. The enlisted men

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were required, and officers were encouraged, to sew buttonholes and buttons on Japanese uniforms, and each man was required to turn out a reasonable quota of work. The men were required to perform routine maintenance details, such as hauling wood, but the Japanese authorities in charge of the work were usually reasonable in granting requests for a reduction in work when such a reduction was necessary. The prisoners were made to work at a number of factories in the Inch'on area, and at the harbor itself. This work resulted in a number of injuries. A worker's ration, according to Japanese standards, of 256 grams of steamed rice was provided for each prisoner.

Although perhaps not so serious as might have been expected, the general health of the prisoners at the time that most of them arrived at the Inch'on camp was bad, malnutrition and dysentery being the most serious ailments. The medical facilities in the camp were inadequate; bandages were almost non-existent, and Lt. Yamaguchi, the medical officer, practically denied the prisoners the use of any medicine whatever. He and his assistant, Private Sasaki, were a constant source of trouble. On one occasion, when Colonel Schwartz had managed to improvise a stethoscope, he was forbidden to use it. Laboratory facilities did not exist at the camp, and a request for a microscope for use in

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examinations was ignored. Dental and optical supplies were denied the prisoners, although not far from the camp there was an optical shop with machinery for grinding lenses. Lt. Yamaguchi was transferred away from the camp on 5 July 1945, and was succeeded by Sergeant Sumi, a great improvement; he treated the prisoners with relative consideration and courtesy.

The prisoners' diet was inadequate; one Red Cross package was distributed to every two men once in every two-week period, but even with the addition of these packages each man had a daily average intake of only 1800 calories, well below the amount required by a man of American size and proportions. At the time of the arrival of the prisoners at the camp, the average weight of each man was 115 pounds, but they were in worse condition at that time than at any time subsequently and gained weight later.

The prisoners had sufficient blankets and clothing, and they had sufficient facilities for washing their clothes. However, there was no means of controlling insects, the most annoying being flies and mosquitoes.

The prisoners had insufficient opportunities for recreation, judged by American standards. After many requests for books and games, the Japanese furnished on 1 July 1945 a supply of books and magazines, and a small and inadequate supply of games.

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After the surrender on 15 August, the Japanese increased the supply of Red Cross packages and showed a new friendliness toward the prisoners. The Red Cross parcels, combined with what the B-29's dropped, improved the health of the prisoners and caused them to gain considerably in weight. 52

Punishment was inflicted at all camps for failure to salute, for failure to work properly, and for any attempt to communicate with civilians. Three prisoners at the Inch'on camp were each given ten days in the guardhouse for making purchases from civilians. One British officer was sentenced thirty days solitary confinement for leaving his place of work without permission. Two other prisoners were severely punished for an attempt to escape; the exact nature of the punishment is uncertain, but it is known that at least one of the offenders did not survive. At least two of the Japanese officers at the Inch'on camp are known to have beaten the prisoners on several occasions. These were Major Okuda, who at one time was in command at the camp; and Lt. Yamaguchi, the medical officer.

The Seoul Camp

The prisoners at the Seoul camp, it will be remembered, were chiefly British. They arrived at the camp on 25 September 1942 via Pusan from Singapore, where they had been

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captured and held since the conclusion of the Malaya campaign. The number in that shipment was 500, of whom about half were later sent to the Inch'on camp, some later continuing on to Konan. Apparently some 1000 prisoners arrived at Pusan on this occasion, but what happened to the balance will probably always be a mystery. Presumably a great many prisoner of war camps were consolidated or moved during the course of the war, and many prisoners were transferred to Manchuria and Japan proper. For the arrivals, the sea voyage from Singapore had been a hardship and had left them in bad shape. It had lasted more than five weeks, during which the thousand men had been shut up in the hold of a 3000-ton cargo ship; much dysentery, diphtheria, and beriberi resulting from the unsanitary conditions.

There seem to have been relatively few disciplinary difficulties at the Seoul camp; there were only two courts martial. Although the prisoners were required to observe the usual routine of the Japanese soldier, the Japanese recognized the authority of the Allied officers over their own men. On the whole only a reasonable amount of work was required of the prisoners, although a request for permission to observe Sunday was denied and the prisoners were often forced to work on that day. The men worked on the bridge over the Han Gang near Seoul, at a factory, at a warehouse, and at a few other places. Accidents during the work caused

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two of the ten deaths which occurred among the prisoners at this camp. The prisoners did their best to prevent their work from helping the Japanese war effort materially, and were even able to effect a certain amount of minor sabotage.

The medical treatment of the prisoners left much to be desired. Captain Uchida, the medical officer, almost always made the wrong diagnosis of the prisoners' maladies, apparently through ignorance rather than through malice, and treated the sick according to his own mistaken notions as to the nature of their ailments. His medical orderly, T. Ushihara, who also acted as an interpreter and was an American citizen, repeatedly struck the sick men and refused to allow them to be treated properly.

The hospital facilities were completely inadequate; the building had no floor, and the temperature in winter inside the wards was often below the freezing point. Major O'Donnell kept many of the sick secretly in their quarters and cared for them there, since he knew that their treatment in the hospital would be entirely unsatisfactory. Medical supplies were very scarce, and the prisoners were not even allowed the full use of supplies sent by the Red Cross and by the Y.M.C.A. During the last year each prisoner usually received one Red Cross parcel per month. It was only by refusing to sign the death certificate of a diphtheria fatality that Major O'Donnell was able to secure sufficient

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serum for the treatment of subsequent cases of diphtheria. His own words sum up very well the general conditions under which the prisoners received medical treatment.

> The only time I can truly state that I got any reasonable cooperation from the Jap MD. was when a man was obviously dying. This came always when it was too late. It was important to him to keep his death rate down. Any intervening stage of illness was treated by being ignored.

Although Colonel Noguchi was fair in his punishments, which were of minor importance and severity, many of his subordinates in the Seoul camp were brutal to the prisoners. Besides Captain Ushida and Ushihara, other Japanese in the camp who struck or otherwise mistreated the prisoners were Captain Terada, the camp adjutant; Superior Private Suhitoo, who was extremely hostile toward all the prisoners; and Corporal Takema. All Japanese guards were considered to represent the Emperor and consequently were allowed to administer face-slappings and other summary correction. The offenses for which prisoners were confined in the guardhouse were, among other things, saying that the Japanese would be defeated, smoking in bed, dealing with civilians, and insulting the guards. The prisoners at the Seoul camp kept a careful record of all mistreatment that they suffered; their statements were later turned over to the XXIV Corps G-2 and later to the Judge Advocate General's Department.

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There were two American officers in the camp at Seoul. They were both Air Corps officers who had been shot down during a mission over Korea. One of them, Lt. W. L. McDaniel, stated that several times during his imprisonment he was subjected to mock executions. He would be blindfolded and led out into a courtyard. Then several shots would be fired over his head, to the accompaniment of loud roars of laughter from the guards.[54]

The Konan Camp

The 354 British and Australian prisoners in the northern camp at Konan had all been captured about the time of the surrender of Singapore on 16 February 1942. Many of them were members of the Australian 8th Division, which had fought throughout the Malaya campaign.[55] The men were imprisoned for six months at Singapore and then brought to Korea, probably in the same ship that carried the prisoners who were released from the Seoul camp. The prisoners at Konan had not gone there directly from Pusan; they had been in four camps at various times; Changi at Singapore; the Inch'on camp, where they had worked on the docks; the Seoul camp; and finally the camp at Konan.[56]

The principal activity on the part of the prisoners at Konan consisted of working in a carbide factory located

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about 500 yards from the camp. In general, the work was performed by the enlisted men; the officers appear to have acted as supervisors unless they elected otherwise.[57] The work was dirty and dangerous, and required an exertion and stamina for which the prison diet was by no means adequate. The work involved breaking stone, loading it into furnaces, stoking furnaces, building shelters, and other heavy labor. In May 1944 the following work schedule was inaugurated; the men worked twenty-four hours a day in three eight-hour reliefs, for thirteen days. On the fourteenth day the men were divided into two shifts, each of which worked for twelve hours. Then they had the fifteenth day free. The entire cycle was repeated, commencing with the sixteenth day, and the same schedule was followed up until the time of the Japanese surrender.

Discipline at the Konan camp was relatively lax, since it was a work camp and the men were absent at all hours. However, there was the usual face-slapping.[58] The medical treatment which the prisoners at Konan received was no better than that given to the prisoners at the other camps. Doctor Watanabe and Sergeant Yoshimura often ordered men out to work who had a fever of 104 degrees or more, although by means of dealing with the medical orderlies Captain Morris could usually save the men from actually having to perform

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labor while in such a condition. Captain Morris's protests at the unsound and cruel methods employed by the Japanese medical personnel finally brought about his complete ejection from the hospital. Captain Otake, the camp commandant, refused to permit him to write to the Red Cross to request the necessary medicines, and would not write a letter himself. From November 1944 until the prisoners were released each man was issued one half of a Red Cross parcel every other week. All these parcels came from the American Red Cross,[59] and many others were appropriated by the Japanese guards. On one occasion, a Red Cross representative visited the camp. Before his arrival the camp was cleaned up and the prisoners were instructed how to answer his questions.[60] The camp was in a low area, and this fact complicated the health situation by leading to numerous cases of malaria among the prisoners. After 15 August, as was the case in the other camps, the health of the men improved due to the food dropped by the B-29's.

In addition to the ill-treatment of prisoners by the medical personnel, there were other instances of harshness on the part of the camp authorities. Prisoners were confined in the guardhouse for such offenses as the possession of a camera, selling a watch to a guard, and dealing with civilians. There were two attempts to escape,

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both of which failed. The offenders were of course punished, but the nature of the punishment is not known. At one time in 1944 Captain Otake, the camp commander, who seems to have been responsible for most of the active ill-treatment that the prisoners received, called Captain Kinloch in and told him that if the Japanese won the war all the prisoners would be sent home, but that in the event of an Allied invasion of Korea the prisoners would be killed before they could be freed. Captain Kinloch was ordered to pass this information on.[61]

Warrant Officer W. J. Woodward, A.I.F., at one time wrote a letter to a Korean who worked in the factory. He was accused of being a spy and was kept for nine days in a punishment cell which measured four feet by six by four and had no windows. For four days he was repeatedly beaten, kicked, and punched in the face. For two more days he was forced to sit upright and not allowed to sleep. The Japanese responsible for this brutality was Sergeant Nieda.

During their captivity the only news that the prisoners received of the outside world, with a few exceptions, came from friendly Koreans in the factory, and even this originated with Japanese sources. On a few occasions, however, the Japanese themselves passed on what was supposed to be news. The prisoners were informed promptly and with considerable glee of President Roosevelt's death. Every few months the

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Japanese would announce that the major portion of the American fleet had been sunk. On 15 August the prisoners heard of the surrender through some of the Koreans; on the same day the Japanese stopped taking them to work in the factory, although they did not inform them officially of the surrender until 18 August.

When the Russians occupied the area they disarmed the guards and turned their weapons over to the prisoners. On 28 August the prisoners set up their own system of security. The Russians allowed them to move about freely in Konan and Hamhung and even brought them some livestock, locally procured. In general, however, the Russians left them to their own devices, and far from evacuating them to Vladivostok as was commonly believed at first, they seem to have neither helped nor annoyed the prisoners to any great extent. The latter at that time had plenty of clothing as the result of the B-29 drops, and the Koreans in the area brought them a good deal of food.[62]

An interesting aspect of the experiences of the prisoners at all the camps was their relations with various Koreans -- guards, factory workers, and outsiders -- in view of the widespread stories in the United States that Korean guards were often more brutal than Japanese. It is possible that some Korean guards participated in brutal acts toward

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the prisoners in Korea; Captain Stengel reported that the prisoners released from Konan said "they disliked the Japanese guards but had contempt for the Korean guards." Presumably the type of Korean that the Japanese would select to guard prisoners of war was not a high one. Five such guards wrote an interesting paper which was included in Stengel's report. They claimed they had tried on many occasions to help the prisoners but were caught and punished by the Japanese, who are supposed to have told them, "You guards need to be guarded more than the PW for your attitude."

Something has been said on the actions of the Korean factory workers at Konan already. At the Seoul camp, where newspapers were denied the prisoners, a Korean boy of about eighteen brought the prisoners a Japanese language newspaper nearly every day for a period of nearly a year. He was very clever at evading the guards. Since some of the prisoners could read Japanese, these smuggled newspapers were a boon indeed.[63]

The prisoners at the Konan camp received assistance at various times from a Mr. Lee, Luke, a Korean who spoke fluent English and Japanese and who seems to have been an enterprising man of good will. Mr. Lee set out for Seoul on hearing that the Americans had landed, taking with him three

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letters written by prisoners at the Konan camp and a sketch showing the exact location of the camp. He successfully eluded the guards which the Russians had already placed along the boundary, and on 13 September arrived in Seoul.[64]

At various times there were court martial proceedings against prisoners. The total convicted was twelve; of these two came from the Seoul camp. The offenders were confined in the Seoul city prison (Seidaimon Prison), where they served their sentences. On 12 September Captain Stengel visited the prison, took photographs of the cells in which the men had been confined, obtained the records of the court martial proceedings against them, and forwarded the data to GHQ AFPAC.[65]

Among the prisoners released from the camp at Inchi'on were six American naval officers. They were the survivors of a group of sixty-five naval officers who had been taken prisoner by the Japanese in the Philippine Islands. The entire group had been placed aboard the prison ship Oriosa, which sailed from Manila on 13 December 1944, destination uncertain. The ship was sunk on the following day, with the loss of some lives among the prisoners. On 27 December they embarked on another ship and on 30 December arrived at Takao, Formosa. Aboard the ship were also a considerable number of

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Army prisoners. On 9 January, while the ship lay at anchor in Takao harbor, it was bombed and severely damaged by American aircraft. A total of 264 prisoners, of whom seventeen were naval officers of the group already described, were killed. On 13 January the survivors were put aboard another ship and reached Moji, in Kyushu, on 30 January. There the group was split, some of the prisoners going to Fukuoka and thence to Pusan. In Pusan the group was split again, some of the men being sent to the Inch'on camp, the others remaining at Pusan, whence they were probably evacuated some time later to Mukden. The six naval officers who were found by the recovery teams at Inch'on on 7 September 1945 represented the only naval prisoners in Korea at that time.[66]

Air Drops

Several references have already been made to the dropping of food and other supplies to the prison camps from B-29's. This episode constituted a preparatory step to the actual release of the prisoners. Drops were made into all three Korean camps, commencing shortly after the surrender. In those made over the Seoul and Inch'on camps, the B-29's came in at a low altitude. Many of the parachutes to which the supplies were attached failed to open. As a result,

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from 30 to 50 percent of the supplies were unusable, and the fast-falling packages did a certain amount of damage. At Seoul they killed a Korean woman. At Inch'on they crashed through the roof of the prisoners' hospital, broke the leg of one of the prisoners, killed one Korean, and injured eight Japanese. In spite of these serious mishaps, the prisoners benefited greatly in body and mind from the flights and from the supplies that were salvaged. The morale effect of the planes was tremendous.[67]

The story of the drops made over the camp at Konan is more involved. When the first drops were made, at about the same time as the drops over the Seoul and Inch'on camps, Russian troops were in the area. Some of the packages hit a building occupied by Red Army troops and narrowly missed a colonel, as the Russians later explained. This occurrence brought an order from the local Russian commander that any planes that might come over in the future to drop supplies should be intercepted and made to land before delivering their cargo, in order to avoid any more accidents.

On 29 August a B-29 from the Twentieth Air Force flew from Saipan to drop more supplies to the prisoners at Konan. It carried a crew of thirteen. When the plane was over the camp and presumably about to drop its supplies, it was met by four Yak fighters, which signaled to the B-29 that the latter should land on the field at Hamhung. However, the

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field was too small for such a large plane, and the B-29 turned out to sea with the idea of returning to its base. This action may have seemed to the Russian fighters to be a false move or, recalling experiences in Europe with German planes using Allied markings, they may have suspected that they might now be dealing with a Japanese plane similarly disguised. At all events, they followed the B-29 out to sea and opened fire. The Super-fort held its fire and soon had an engine shot out. Six of the crew bailed out; they fell into the sea; before long they were picked up by Korean fishermen and well treated. The other seven men stayed in the plane and brought it down in a crash landing on the field at Hamhung. The Russians then found out the truth and treated the men kindly. They brought back the six who had fallen into the sea, and all thirteen of the crew were allowed to live at the camp with the Allied prisoners. The airmen then delivered personally the welcome supplies which they had originally intended to drop by parachute.[68]

The crew of the B-29 consisted of four first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, one flight officer, four staff sergeants, and two corporals. These men were flown to Seoul on 14 September in a C-46, and on 15 September they were evacuated to Okinawa by air.[69] Two more B-29's made drops over the Konan camp on 10 September without incident. By that time the need of drops at the other camps had ceased,

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but General Hodge requested that they be continued at the Konan camp until 20 September. However, none further seem to have been made.[70]

Arrest of War Criminals

With the evacuation of the Allied prisoners effected, there yet remained a number of tasks to be performed. One was the arrest and indictment of the Japanese officials whose activities in connection with the prisoner of war camps made them susceptible of being classed as war criminals. The trial of these persons, even though their actions were committed in Korea, was handled directly by AFPAC in Tokyo and hence does not fall within the scope of this history.[71]

The XXIV Corps field order stated that "enemy persons definitely identified with or apprehended in the commission of a crime or misdemeanor will be arrested and confined."[72] Accordingly, on or about 9 October 1945 eight members of the Japanese army were arrested for acts committed against the Allied prisoners. The most prominent of these were Colonel Noguchi, the officer in charge of all prisoner of war camps in Korea; Lt. Col. Okazaki, the latest commander of the camp at Inch'on; Captain Goto, who had been in charge of the camp at Seoul; Captain Terada, who had acted as adjutant at the Seoul camp; Lt. Moritomi, the paymaster; and Corporal

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Ushihara, the notorious interpreter of the Seoul camp.[73] On or about 12 October seven more Japanese military personnel of lesser notoriety were arrested, bringing the total of those in custody to fifteen.[74] All these men were held in the stockade maintained by ASCOM 24, in the vicinity of Inch'on. They were shipped to Japan on 14 May 1946.[75] After investigation and clearance by C.I.C., other guards at the prisoner of war camps against whom no evidence of guilt was found were eligible to be processed and evacuated to Japan with other Japanese military personnel.[76]

Civilian Internees

Another task was the release of civilian internees and the repatriation of those who so desired and who were found eligible. The processing of civilian internees was carried on concurrently with the evacuation of the prisoners of war and was accomplished largely by Captain Stengel.

Subject to checking and clearance by C.I.C., the following categories of civilians were considered eligible for repatriation, and might be embarked for the Philippine Islands or directly for the United States:

1. Citizens of the United States not of the Japanese race. There is a record of only one such person; he was a mining engineer named Hoebeck Evans, who had lived in Korea

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for many years and did not desire repatriation.[77]

2. Alien wives and minor children of United States citizens, if admissible under the immigration laws of the United States and if proceeding to the United States with or in order to join their husband or father. There were no such persons on record in Korea.

3. Minor children, if they were United States citizens, and were the children of Caucasian wives of Japanese subjects. There were no persons of this category.

4. Nationals of friendly governments which had made agreements with the United States to provide for repatriation. It was under the terms of this provision that all repatriation from Korea was carried out. Great Britain, the British dominions, the Netherlands, and the Dutch Empire had made agreements with the United States, and their nationals were eligible for repatriation. If repatriation was considered necessary for the health and/or safety of the individual, citizens of the following states might be repatriated: France, Switzerland, Sweden, the Irish Free State, Cuba, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium. It was not planned to repatriate stateless persons or Chinese nationals;[78] if such persons desired to go to the United States, they were forced to wait for the opening of United States consular offices in the vicinity and apply for admission under the usual quotas. By early October 1945 Denmark and

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New Zealand had made agreements with the United States; thereafter it was permissible for their nationals to be repatriated by way of the Philippine Islands or the United States regardless of the state of their health.[79]

The following civilians, all falling under the last category listed above, were found interned:

1. A group of fourteen Irish Catholic missionaries, including one nun.[80] Of these ten were released by Captain Stengel on 7 September. Two others came to him of their own accord, and were evacuated from Korea on 5 October.[81] Of the other two Captain Stnegel made no mention in his report, but they had been interned with the rest.[82] Of the ten actually released by Captain Stengel, only one desired repatriation, and he was put aboard the Mercy on 22 September.[83] Although Captain Stengel listed the Irish missionaries as British subjects[84] and their passports had originally been given them by the British government, it is uncertain whether they were evacuated as British subjects under the terms of the agreement between the British government and the United States or as Irish citizens whose health was in danger. More probably the latter alternative was the deciding one, because they were all given physical examinations by the medical officer of Headquarters Company, XXIV Corps, and their physical condition rather than their

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desire seems to have governed the decision to repatriate them.[85] Two more of the Irish priests were evacuated to Manila later, by their own desire, one on 24 October,[86] and the other on 1 November.[87] Thus the total of Irish missionaries repatriated was five. They had all worked at Mokpo before World War II, and the probable reason for their internment was that Mokpo was a strategically located port and the Japanese did not trust the priests. Thus all were interned at Ch'unch'on, farther north.[88]

2. A group of three French Canadian and one Dutch Catholic missionaries, who had been interned at Kongju (or Koshu). They were released, with some cooperation from the Japanese police, and given a medical examination on 11 September. None of them desired repatriation; their health was far from good but not bad enough to make repatriation imperative.[89]

3. A group of four French and one Swiss Catholic missionaries, who had been interned in their houses at Taegu.[90] Their physical condition made repatriation advisable,[91] and accordingly they left on 27 October for Manila.[92]

Thus the total of civilians repatriated at that time was ten; five Irish, four French, and one Swiss, all Catholic missionaries. The Corps administrative order had

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required that all recovered civilian internees who were American citizens, or who were to travel on American vessels or aircraft, be given smallpox, typhoid-paratyphoid, and cholera immunizations,[93] but none of the recovered civilians was actually so immunized in Korea, due to a shortage of vaccine.[94]

Records and Burials

An important part of the recovery teams' mission was the collection and forwarding to GHQ of documentary evidence and photographs relating to the camps. On 10 September, apparently the first day on which courier service was available, the reports of recovery and rosters of prisoners released from the Seoul and Inch'on camps, together with letters written by some of the prisoners, were sent to Tokyo and Manila in the custody of officers of the recovery teams. On the same day photographs were made of the camp at Inch'on; on 11 September Captain Stengel had photographs taken of the graves of prisoners of war (twenty-seven in all) at Seoul and Inch'on. On 12 September he obtained photographs of the cells in Seidaimon Prison in Seoul, where twelve prisoners of war had been confined, and secured the records of their courts martial. On 13 September these records were forwarded to Manila.

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On 21 September, after Lt. Venner had returned from his trip to Konan, a roster of the prisoners in the northern camp was sent to CINCAFPAC Advance.[95]

Another task was the collection and reinterring of deceased prisoners. Since it was known before the occupation that a large proportion of the prisoners would be British and Australian,[96] need was seen for a War Graves Detachment from the Australian Imperial Forces. As early as 25 August the XXIV Corps requested that such a detachment report at Okinawa as soon as possible.[97] However, the detachment did not join the XXIV Corps until 31 October, in Korea rather than on Okinawa. It consisted of one officer (a captain) and two enlisted men.[98] It had been assigned by the A.I.F. to cover the entire peninsula of Korea and, together with other detachments, the area from 40 to 45 degrees north latitude, and from 120 degrees west longitude to 130 degrees east longitude.[99]

The plan for the disposal of the remains of deceased Allied prisoners was simple. In brief, it was to establish one cemetery in the sector assigned to each major command, where the remains of all Allied personnel who had died in prison camps would be brought. These remains were to be disinterred before the withdrawal of the occupation forces and given a permanent burial elsewhere.[100]

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At the time the Australians arrived an American unit, the 3065d Graves Registration Company, attached to ASCOM 24, was already at work. It had collected the remains of twenty-seven Allied prisoners who had died in Korea. Of these twenty-five were British and Australian, and two were American; twenty-three had been cremated. Since Captain Stengel's work had revealed that a total of twenty-seven prisoners had died in Korea, it follows that there were none left unaccounted for. After their arrival the Australian detachment handled the remains of British and Australian prisoners.[101] The work of consolidating the remains into one cemetery went smoothly, since the Japanese had concentrated all the dead in the Seoul and Inch'on areas. It was decided to establish the consolidated cemetery near the 7th Division Headquarters in Seoul, and it was here that the two Americans were buried.[102] Captain S. C. Griffin, the commanding officer of the Australian detachment, took charge of the others; he stored the twenty-three cremated remains, and on 5 November began work on a small cemetery near the American Military cemetery for the two bodies of British and Australian dead.[103]

The necessary liaison between the Australian detachment and the American forces was established on 1 November, when Captain Griffin made contact with Captain C. C. Fraze, of

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the XXIV Corps Quartermaster Section, and made arrangements to set up headquarters in that section's office. Thereafter cooperation appears to have been excellent.[104]

Captain Griffin had reason to believe that in the vicinity of Mukden, within his zone of responsibility, were the bodies of at least three soldiers of the British Commonwealth. The recovery of these bodies was a difficult problem, since Russian forces were in control of the area north of the 38th parallel.[105] It proved impossible for Captain Griffin to arrange for a trip to Mukden;[106] at that time southern Manchuria was becoming a theater of conflict in which Russians, Chinese communists, and troops of the Chinese Central Government were involved.[107] He was able to verify the fact that there were no remains at Pusan, although several prisoners had died there.[108] On 28 November orders were issued by the XXIV Corps for the Australian detachment to leave for Yokohama by water.[109] They took with them the ashes and remains of all the British and Australian dead.[110]

An interesting, if perhaps not very important, detail which remained to be settled after the release of the prisoners was the matter of a sum which had been deposited for them in the Shokusan (Commercial) Bank in Seoul. The sum was deposited in installments at approximately monthly

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intervals by Lt. Moritomi, the paymaster for the prisoners of war. The first deposit was made during 1943; on 16 August 1945 Lt. Moritomi withdrew the entire amount, which then was Y 189,000, but on 27 August he redeposited the sum of Y 197,000.[111] When questioned, Colonel Elrington stated that the prisoners had never been allowed to use the money. After Lt. Moritomi withdrew the money, he tried to turn it over to Colonel Elrington, who refused to accept responsibility for it due to the fluctuating value of the yen. The sum was then kept in a strongbox at the Seoul prisoner camp until it was redeposited in the bank.[112] The money thereafter remained in the bank for some while after the arrival of American forces; army officials were unable to decide on its eventual disposition. In all probability the existence of this sum is explained by General George C. Marshall's statement that "Funds were made available, to the maximum extent permitted by the Japanese Government, for prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan proper, China, Manchuria, and the Netherlands East Indies."[113]

On 26 September AFPAC requested that all recovery personnel who were no longer needed in their present assignment be returned immediately.[114] Accordingly, orders were issued and on 3 October all the Australian recovery

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personnel and all the American recovery personnel except for three men (Captain Stengel, Sergeant Kernop, and Sergeant Bohn) left for Manila.[115]

Captain Stengel and the two sergeants remained behind in order to complete their mission. On 29 October AFPAC radioed that all recovery personnel should be returned to Manila immediately for a new mission.[116] However, the arrival of the Australian war graves personnel in Korea was expected shortly, and it was desirable for Captain Stengel to remain long enough to pass on to these men his knowledge of the deaths and graves of the Allied prisoners of war; General Hodge so informed AFPAC on 30 October;[118] already orders had been issued for the departure of Captain Stengel and the two sergeants,[119] and they left for Manila by 1 November without, however, meeting or talking with the Australian personnel who had arrived the previous evening.[120]

The departure of the recovery personnel left no one with the Corps or with Military Government competently informed on the situation of civilian internees and kindred matters. While present, Captain Stengel had kept in communication with G-1 of the Corps. Hardly a week after he had left the Foreign Affairs Section of Military Government was making plans to evacuate the four French and one Swiss missionaries who had left Korea on 27 October.[121]

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Par. 7 of the instrument of surrender signed on 2 Sept. 1945, as quoted in the instrument signed at Seoul on 9 Sept. 1945 /See appendix to Chapter IV/.

2. GHQ USAFPAC, Annex 12 to Operations Instructions No. 4, 15 Aug. 1945. See also XXIV Corps, Annex 10 to FO No. 55, 28 Aug. 1945, par. 1a.

3. Annex 12 to Operations Instructions No. 4.

4. Report made by Capt. Stengel, commanding officer of PW Liaison Team No. 9, entitled "Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in Korea," undated /in historical file/. The pages of this document are not numbered consecutively; hence exact citations from it are impossible.

5. Annex 12 to Operations Instructions No. 4.

6. GHQ USAFPAC, "Standing Operating Procedure for Processing Recovered Personnel," 14 Aug. 1945. This document constituted Appendix to Annex 10, XXIV Corps FO No. 55. A much lower figure (36,000) was given in Annex 12 to Operations Instructions No. 4.

7. XXIV Corps staff conference, 28 Aug. 1945 /in historian's journal/.

8. Appendix 2 to Annex 12 to Operations Instructions No. 4; AFPAC, MIS-X Section, PW Camp Report, 20 Aug. 1945; XXIV Corps, Appendix 2 to Annex 10 to FO No. 55. The Japanese delegation at Manila named the three camps in Korea and gave the correct grand total of prisoners (680). They also listed the factories at which the prisoners were working; however, they gave incorrect totals for the number of prisoners at the individual camps. (See GHQ SCAP, "Documents Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces by the Japanese Mission to Negotiate Surrender Manila, 19 August 1945," part I, p. 75 and part II, p. 11.)

9. XXIV Corps, Appendix 3 to Annex 10 to FO No. 55.

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10. Ibid., and GHQ AFPAC, Circular No. 23, 15 July 1945. Also XXIV Corps, Annex 4 to FO No. 55.

11. XXIV Corps, Appendix 1 to Annex 10 to FO No. 55.

12. XXIV Corps, Appendix 3 to Annex 10 to FO No. 55.

13. GHQ USAFPAC, Circular No. 20, 9 July 1945.

14. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

15. Interview with Capt. Stengel, 28 Sept 1945. The American personnel were assigned to the Recovered Personnel Section, HQ Special Troops, AFPAC, by HQ 29th Replacement Depot, Special Orders No. 43, 12 Aug. 1945 [in Capt. Stengel's personal file]. It appears that in August an American party flew from Chungking to Seoul in order to contact the Allied prisoners there. They were unsuccessful, but were well treated by the Japanese. (See memorandum by Lt. Col. Furey, XXIV Corps G-2 Section, undated, in XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Intelligence.")

16. GHQ AFPAC Letter Order dated 16 Aug. 1945 [in Capt. Stengel's personal file].

17. GHQ SOWESPAC Letter Order dated 19 Aug. 1945 [in Capt. Stengel's personal file].

18. GHQ SOWESPAC Letter Order dated 23 Aug. 1945 [in Capt. Stengel's personal file].

19. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners." The dates of arrival on Okinawa of the Australian personnel are taken from an interview with Capt. Tiernan, 28 Sept. 1945, rather than from Capt. Stengel's report.

20. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

21. Ibid. See also HQ XXIV Corps, Letter Order dated 3 Sept. 1945, for the order sending the advance reconnaissance party to Korea.

22. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners." The Japanese name of Konan is used instead of the Korean name of Honam (or Hungnam) in this narrative, in opposition to the usual practice. The town is located at (1058-1919) on the American map, Scale 1:250,000. It does not appear on most American maps of smaller scale.

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23. XXIV Corps, Annex 4 to FO No. 55.

24. Interview with Lt. Col. C. L. Harrison, of the XXIV Corps G-2 Section, 13 Sept. 1945.

25. Interview with Capt. V. H. F. Boeck, MC, 12 Sept. 1945; "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

26. Ibid. See also XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sept. 1945, p. 7.

27. Letter from Capt. Kinloch to Lt. Col. Elrington, 10 Sept. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-2 files].

28. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG XXIV Corps Rear, 8 Sept 45.

29. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

30. Interview with 2d Lt. Venner, 24 Sept. 1945. See also HQ USAPIK, Travel Orders, 27 Sept. 1945, par. 2, confirming the verbal orders given to Lt. Venner for his mission to Konan.

31. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 7, 10 Sept. 1945, p.2, and radio CG USAPIK to CG 25th Russian Army 181059/I Sept 45, on the Russian prisoners. For the order sending the party to Konan, see HQ XXIV Corps, Letter Order 19 Sept. 1945.

32. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners." The title of the act has been omitted in this text.

33. HQ XXIV Corps, Office of the Surgeon, Memorandum by Capt. Boeck to the Corps Surgeon, XXIV Corps, 9 Sept. 1945 [in historical file].

34. Report made by members of the 9th PW Liaison Team, and 69th and 70th Recovery Teams, entitled "Report of Inspection of KYONGSONG PW Camp Korea," 14 Sept. 1945 [copy in historical file]. See also the reports in "Recovery of Allied Prisoners" of Lt. Col. Elrington and Maj. O'Donnell, the senior line and medical officers respectively among the prisoners; the two latter reports give somewhat different figures on floor space and the like, the figures in general being less than the figures given in the text.

35. Capt. Boeck's Memorandum to the Corps Surgeon, 9 Sept. 1945.

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36. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners;" interview with Lt. Venner, 24 Sept. 1945.

37. Except where otherwise indicated, the material in this section is taken from "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

38. Dispatch filed on 14 Sept. 1945 by Mr. Barsdell, an Australian war correspondent.

39. Throughout this section, all information except where otherwise indicated is taken from "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

40. XXIV Corps, Annex 10 to Field Order No. 55, par. 2; radio TFGAP 504, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Division, 7 Sept. 1945.

41. Message from Col. Sinclair (XXIV Corps G-1) to Capt. Stengel, 8 Sept. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-1 files].

42. Radio Commander 7th Phib to the Refuge 091502 Sept 45. Delousing of the evacuees was required by radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps 261651/I Aug 45.

43. Radio TFGAP 516, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 10 Sept. 1945.

44. Interview with Lt. Venner, 24 Sept. 1945; historian's journal, 23 Sept. 1945; report by Capt. Elias Bacha, Russian interpreter, on the trip to Hamhung, 18-22 Sept. 1945 [XXIV Corps G-2 files].

45. Radio CG USAFIK to CTF 71, 231800 Sept 45.

46. XXIV Corps staff conferences on 23 Sept. and 24 Sept. 1945 [in historian's journal].

47. Radio Com Seventh Fleet to Com 7th Phib, 232256/I Sept. 45.

48. Radio TFGAP 608, CG USAFIK to CG AFWESPAC, 29 Sept. 1945.

49. Except where otherwise indicated, all information and quotations relating to the experiences of prisoners of war have been taken from "Recovery of Allied Prisoners," which contains several documents written by various prisoners and one written by five Korean guards who had been in charge of them.

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50. Millis Lory, Japan's Military Masters (The Infantry Journal, 1943), p. 42, p. 45.

51. The text of Col. Noguchi's talk which is given here is an exact copy of an original copy which was distributed among the prisoners by the Japanese authorities, except that the spelling and punctuation of the original have been altered in places in order to make the meaning intelligible.

52. Capt. Boesk's report to the Corps Surgeon, 9 Sept. 1945.

53. Interview with Lt. Col. Harrison, 13 Sept. 1945.

54. Ibid.

55. Dispatch filed by Mr. Baredell, Australian War correspondent, on 14 Sept. 1945. On the presence of the 8th Australian Division in Malaya, see How the Jap Army Fights (The Infantry Journal, 1942), p. 88, p. 113.

56. Interview with Lt. Venner, 24 Sept. 1945.

57. All information on work at the Konan camp is taken from ibid., and from a report by Lt. R. Mills, AIF, dated 25 Sept. 1945 and entitled "Report on Konan PW Camp" [in historical file].

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Interview with Lt. Venner, 24 Sept. 1945.

61. Ibid. Lt. Venner, it will be remembered, spent a few days in the Konan camp with the prisoners (15-18 Sept.) and is an excellent source of information on the state of the camp, also on the prisoners' experiences, since he had a good opportunity to observe and to talk to the prisoners.

62. Ibid. See a personal letter from one of the prisoners at Konan, Ron Muil (Headt) dated 10 Sept. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-2 files], for the date when the prisoners assumed control of the camp.

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63. Interview with Lt. Col. Harrison, 13 Sept. 1945. One PW said, "the Korean guards were more fiendish than the Japanese." (Affidavit by Pvt. Breese, 15 Sept. 1945, in SCAP JAG files).

64. Capt. Kinloch wrote a passport for Mr. Lee, describing him as he has been described in the text. This passport, together with the sketch, found its way into the files of the G-2 Section, XXIV Corps, where there was attached to it a note giving the information on Mr. Lee's journey.

65. Interview with Lt. Col. C. L. Harrison, 13 Sept. 1945. See HQ USAFIK, G-2 Section, Translation No. 76, 1 Oct. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-2 files], for the prisoners' records. See also "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

66. Report by Lt. Blair Wood, the Navy liaison officer who worked with Capt. Stengel, to the Navy Department entitled "(Naval) Prisoner of War Casualties" and dated 9 Sept. 1945 [in historical file].

67. Capt. Boeck's report to the Corps Surgeon dated 9 Sept. 1945; "Recovery of Allied Prisoners;" interview with Capt. Boeck on 12 Sept. 1945; HQ USAFIK, G-2 Section, Translation No. 92, 30 Oct. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-2 files].

68. HQ USAFIK, Office of the Asst. C. of S. G-2, Interview with 1st Lt. Joseph W. Queen, 14 Sept. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-2 files]. See also the dispatches filed by the following war correspondents on 14 Sept. 1945:

Mr. Barsdell (Australian war correspondent)
Mr. Crumpler (United Press)
Mr. O'Malley (Associated Press)
Mr. Veysey (Chicago Tribune
Mr. Johnston (New York Times)

69. Dispatch by Mr. Crumpler, United Press, dated 14 Sept. 1945; radio TPGAP 532, CG XXIV Corps to CG CINCAFPAC Adv, 14 Sept. 1945.

70. Ibid.; letter from Capt. Kinloch to Lt. Col. Elrington, 10 Sept. 1945.

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71. Statement by 1st Lt. R. F. Seeburger, of XXIV Corps G-2 Section, 7 Nov. 1945. Confirmed on the same date by Maj. Gillen, XXIV Corps G-2 Operations. The arrest of war criminals was required by GHQ AFPAC, Annex 8 (tentative) to Operations Instructions No. 4, 19 August 1945.

72. XXIV Corps, Appendix 3 to Annex 4 to FO No. 55.

73. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 30, 10 Oct. 1945, p. 4. Yamaguchi (Mizuguchi) was arrested in Japan.

74. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 33, 13 Oct. 1945, p. 3.

75. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 7, 30 Oct. 1945, p. 2; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 228, 15 May 1946, p. 1.

76. Radio CG USAFIK to subordinate commands, 210923/I Oct 45.

77. Memorandum, without title, dated 11 Aug. 1945 and found in the files of the G-1 Section, XXIV Corps. All facts not otherwise cited are taken from this document throughout this passage. See also Medical Detachment, HQ and HQ Co, XXIV Corps, 12 Sept. 1945, "Physical Condition of Civil Internees" [in historical file].

78. XXIV Corps, Appendix 3 to Annex 10 to FO No. 55.

79. Radio CINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 7 Oct. 1945 251021/I.

80. Interview with Rev. O. MacPolin on 10 Nov. 1945.

81. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

82. Interview with Rev. O. MacPolin on 10 Nov. 1945.

83. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners."

84. Ibid.

85. Interview with Rev. O. MacPolin, 10 Nov. 1945.

86. Letter from Capt. Stengel to XXIV Corps G-1 dated 6 Oct. 1945; radio CG USAFIK to CG AFWESPAC, 241538/I Oct 45.

87. Radio CG USAFIK to CG AFWESPAC 020927/I Nov 45.

88. Interview with Rev. O. MacPolin, 10 Nov. 1945.

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89. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners;" Medical Detachment, Hq and Hq Co, XXIV Corps, 12 Sept. 1945, "Physical Condition of Civil Internees."

90. Interview with Rev. O. MacPolin, 10 Nov. 1945.

91. Medical Detachment, Hq and Hq Co, XXIV Corps, 24 Oct. 1945, "Physical Condition of Civil Internees."

92. Radio TPGAP 758, CG USAFIK to CG AFWESPAC, 26 Oct. 1945.

93. XXIV Corps, Adm. O. No. 18, 28 Aug. 1945, Annex Charlie.

94. Interview with Capt. Boeck, 20 Nov. 1945.

95. The foregoing information on the collection of documents is taken from several passages in "Recovery of Allied Prisoners." The writer has not had access to the legal evidence collected against the alleged war criminals, and the statements made in the text must be evaluated with this fact in mind.

96. XXIV Corps, Appendix 2 to Annex 10 to FO 55.

97. Radio TPGAP 85, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 25 Aug. 1945.

98. Interview with Capt. C. C. Fraze, XXIV Corps QM Section, 2 Nov. 1945.

99. Hq Aust. War Graves Gp (North Pacific), 10 Oct. 1945, "Allotment of Areas," [in the detachment's files].

100. Radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 081402/Y Oct. 45.

101. Interview with Capt. S. C. Griffin, A.I.F., 13 Nov. 1945.

102. Interview with Capt. Fraze, 2 Nov. 1945. On the establishment of a central cemetery see also XXIV Corps, Adm. O. 18, 28 Aug. 1945, par 6b.

103. Report by Capt. Griffin, "Aust War Graves Det. (Korea), 4 Nov. 45," [in the detachment's files].

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 080943/I Nov 45.

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107. Corps Courier, 28 Nov. 1945.

108. Aust War Graves Det (Korea), Report, 18 Nov. 1945 [in the detachment's files].

109. HQ XXIV Corps, 28 Nov. 1945, Movement Directive [in XXIV Corps G-3 files]. See also radio CG USAFIK to SCAP, 080943/I Nov 45.

110. Interview with Capt. Griffin, 28 Nov 1945.

111. XXIV Corps, A. C. of S. G-2, 4 Oct. 1945, report by G-2 liaison officer entitled "Bank Account at Shokusan Bank" [in XXIV Corps G-2 files].

112. Memorandum Capt. Stengel to XXIV Corps G-1, 6 Oct. 1945 [in XXIV Corps G-1 files].

113. GHQ AFPAC, I & E Sec, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War, p. 86.

114. Radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 26 Sept. 1945 (no date-time group).

115. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 031108/I Oct 45; XXIV Corps, Letter Order dated 28 Sept. 1945. Also XXIV Corps, Letter Order dated 29 Sept. 1945.

116. Radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 291623/I Oct 45.

117. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Adv, 301015/I Oct 45.

118. Interview with Capt. Fraze, 2 Nov. 1945.

119. HQ XXIV Corps, Travel Orders, 30 Oct. 1945.

120. Interview with Capt. S. G. Griffin, 13 Nov. 1945.

121. "Recovery of Allied Prisoners"; historian's journal, 9 Nov. 1945.

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

TFIHS 000.4

SUBJECT: SHIPMENT OF USAFIK HISTORY CHAPTER VI

THRU: Commander-in-Chief, Far East

TO: Historical Division, War Department, Special Staff, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Herewith are the original and duplicate copies of Chapter VI, "The Occupation of the Provinces", of the official USAFIK history.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

[redacted]

Note:
This chapter has been read by:

Col Coolidge (former G-3 XXIV Corps)
Col Booth C/S USAMGIK
Col Nist (former G-2 XXIV Corps)
Col Hartshorn DC/S XXIV Corps

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Down grading classification authorized per verbal order Colonel Cecil W. Nist, 2 July 1946.

Robert I. Nelson
ROBERT I. NELSON
2nd Lt Inf

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER VI

Part I

THE OCCUPATION OF THE PROVINCES

At the time the 40th Division arrived in Korea the 7th Division was occupying the Seoul area, the Kaesong and Ch'unch'on areas north of Seoul, and the Suwon area to the south.[1] This chapter will trace the movement of the American Forces into the remainder of Korea south of the 38th parallel, the governmental activities of the tactical troops in the early months of occupation, and finally, the withdrawal of one of the three divisions that had participated in the operation.

The 40th Division

When the announcement of the Japanese capitulation reached Panay on 15 August, the 40th Division was preparing for its part in operation "Olympic",[2] tentatively scheduled for early November.[3] The Division was to effect a landing on five islands of the Koshiki Retto group several days in advance of the main assault against Kyushu, thereby affording security for the main effort.[4]

The 40th Division was originally a California - Utah - Nevada

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National Guard outfit. It had been inducted into Federal Service in March 1941, and one New York State National Guard Regiment had replaced an organic regiment. Its first war-time assignment was the defense of Southern California as a part of the Third Army Corps. In August 1942, under the command of Major General Rapp Brush, the Division embarked for overseas duty, its assignment being the ground defense of the outer islands of the Hawaiian group. It embarked for Guadalcanal in December 1943 where it staged for its first combat operation. The Division's first battle star was earned at Cape Gloucester, New Britain, in April of the next year when it landed to continue an offensive initiated by the First Marine Division. In January 1945 it went ashore at Lingayen Gulf in the counterinvasion of the Philippines as part of the XIV Corps and saw bitter fighting in the Zambales Mountains. In the fighting for the Central Philippines, elements of the Division participated in the struggles for Panay, Negros, Mindanao, and in the mopping up operations on Leyte. In 258 days of combat the Division accounted for 12,000 Japanese killed or captured at a cost of 590 of its own men.[5]

In June the Division was withdrawn from combat to begin a period of refresher training in preparation for its November mission. Actual amphibious problems were conducted, although a lack of shipping limited landings to one combat team at a time.[6] During this period Brigadier General Donald J. Myers succeeded General Brush as Division Commander.[7] High point men and officers were released and replacements were received to bring the Division up to strength.[8] The announcement of surrender brought an abrupt end to the period of training and preparation.[9]

On 17 August General Myers received a radio from CINCAFPAC [redacted]

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that he, accompanied by a minimum planning staff, report to the Commanding General, XXIV Corps, on Okinawa.[10] This was the first indication that the Division received of its new assignment to the Corps for the occupation of Korea. On 22 August it was officially notified that it had been assigned to the XXIV Corps, effective 15 August.[11]

The activities of General Myers's planning party on Okinawa have already been described.[12] On 24 August the party returned to Panay, followed a few days later by a liaison officer with XXIV Corps Field Order 35.[13]

Meanwhile, efforts were begun on Panay to effect the surrender of the remnants of the Japanese force which was holding out in the mountains of this island. Liaison planes dropped pamphlets informing the Japanese of their Emperor's decision to surrender.[14] General Myers was able to report on 3 September:

> In response to pamphlets we dropped on Japanese forces in this area, negotiations were initiated and 1,350 Japanese surrendered on 2 September, 400 are expected to surrender on 4 September. This accounts for all Japanese forces in this area except for a few stragglers.[15]

The end of August and the beginning of September found the 40th Division engaged in preparing for the Korean occupation. A program of instruction was begun to orient the officers and men in their new duties as occupation troops.[16] Based on what little information was available, lectures were given on the geography, climate, and culture of Korea and of the Far East. Instruction was given in military courtesy, correct personal appearance, discipline, and relationship with and methods of handling natives; General Myers termed it "reeducation for the soldier".[17] In each regiment personnel were selected to form military government teams. Instructed by the Division's Judge



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Advocate General, these teams were given all available information of the political, social, and economic structure of Korea.[18] Each team was composed of 5 officers and 15 enlisted men,[19] selected, as far as possible, on the basis of military and civilian experience. These teams were charged with advising unit commanders in matters of military government which was to be a command responsibility.[20]

The Division Field Order 20, based on XXIV Corps Field Order 55, was published on 5 September. The Division's mission was to reinforce the 7th Division in the Seoul area and to push to the "O-2" line on Corps's command.

Efforts were made to equip the Division in the most complete manner possible. After-combat requisitions were submitted to replace missing and worthless equipment.[21] General Myers reported:

> We will leave with 90 to 100 percent of required equipment and supplies of all classes. In some cases this will exceed our T/E.[22]

However, General Myers's estimate did not include wet-cold clothing which was not needed in the Philippines where the Division was staging but which would have been welcomed on arrival in Korea.[23]

The Division released all enlisted men with 85 or more points as of 15 May prior to moving to the target.[24] The replacements received by the Division brought its enlisted strength at the time of mounting to 12,688 and its officer strength to 777.[25]

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The Lift From Pusan

Transport Squadron 21 of Amphibious Group 13 (AGPHIBGRP 13) was assigned the task of lifting the 40th Division and attached units to Korea.[26] The following shipping was reported available for the lift:[27] 10 APA's, 4 AKA's, 20 LST's, 56 LSM's and 1 LSD.

By 10 September the events that had taken place in the Seoul area made it evident that no organized resistance was to be expected and that there was no necessity for the 40th Division to arrive en masse. COMPHIBGRP 13 was instructed that:

> Every effort must be made to get echelons to Jinsen [Inchon] earliest. Harbor facilities [are] congested therefore preferable echelons be small in size... Echelons should be split into slow and fast convoys. Consider you have enough escorts for this purpose. Token escort is all that is necessary. The essential thing is to get equipment to Jinsen quickly and... [not] wait for assembly of large convoys.[28]

The first ship to leave Pusan for Korea was the LST Garter Hall which departed on 7 September with the advance parties of the various units of the Division and an advance party from the attached 552d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.[29]

The process of loading and packing equipment began during the first week in September as shipping became available. To speed up the arrival of shipping, COMPHIBGRP 13 directed that ships should proceed to Pusan individually or "in any other numbers that will expedite arrival".[30] On the beaches at Iloilo the 40th Division engineers provided lighting equipment for night operation and cranes for the heavy equipment.[31] By 12 September the

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tractor group of Regimental Combat Team 160 (RCT 160), which was to be the
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slow convoy of the first echelon, was loaded and ready to leave.

Loading at Iloilo continued as shipping arrived, though it was slowed
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at times by high winds and rough seas. General Myers reported:

> Loading has progressed rapidly and smoothly despite the fact that it is necessary to continue the discharge of liberty ships and FS boats simultaneously with the back-loading of APA's and AKA's. Liberties and FS boats are discharging cargo which must accompany the 40th Division.
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> 55

Convoys departed from Iloilo as follows:

Departed Panay, PI	Arrived Insh'on	Organization	O's & WO's	EM	Vehicles	Deadwt. Tons	Shipping Used
15 Sept	22 Sept	Elms 160 & Elms 552 HB & SR	27	565	unk	2700	6 LST's 5 LSM's
15 Sept	22 Sept	Elms 160 Elms 185	274	4582	550	5954	5 APA's 1 AKA
17 Sept	unk	Elms 185 Elms 108	52	2184	459	2186	1 APD 5 LST's 5 LSM's
ASCOM 24 G-3 Operations Summary Number 25 dated 28 September 1945							
18 Sept	unk	Elms 185 Elms 552 HB & SR	28	564	249	3193	1 APD 2 AKA's 1 LSD
ASCOM 24 G-3 Operations Summary Number 25 dated 26 September 1945							
19 Sept	unk	Elms 108	111	1827	740	5176	7 LST's 6 LSM's
XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Summary Number 27 dated 30 September 1945							
22 Sept	30 Sept	Elms 185 Elms 108	235	4405	506	5567	4 APA's 1 AKA 1 APD

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By 22 September the mission of staging the 40th Division had been completed except for the departure of 2 LST's which would contain replacement equipment.[36]

The Pusan Area

Phase II of "Baker-Forty" called for the occupation of the Pusan area of Southern Korea by "subsequent ground and over water operations" after the Seoul area had been secured.[37]

Pusan, the second largest city in the American Zone, was the leading seaport of Korea, being situated only 120 miles from Japan.[39] It was the southern terminus of the Pusan-Mukden railroad, and, as such, was the gateway for all rail transportation between Japan and the continent. From the information available at the time it was known that Pusan possessed extensive rail yards and repair shops, communications facilities, and a number of factories of various types.[41] Although there were known to be no mineral deposits in the area, Pusan was reported to be the most important fishing port in the Southeast and to have the largest fish market in Korea.[42] It was reported to have modern paved streets, streetcars, and to be the terminus of an all-weather highway from Seoul.[43] Militarily, the city was classified as a "principal fortified area".[44] About 25 miles to the west of Pusan was the naval base at Chinhae, the largest one in Korea,[45] a fact that enhanced the importance of the area.

General Hodge reported on 12 September that communications to Pusan had

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been checked and that he had talked to the Chief of Police. Conditions there were reported to be quiet. The city's population had risen from 250,000 to 400,000 during the war. Japanese were leaving for Japan at the rate of 4000 to 6000 a day, and Koreans were returning at the same rate. Although General Hodge wanted to supervise movements through the port, especially the movement of soldiers, he felt that the amount of police work required there would be beyond the capacity of a single regiment.[46]


Even before the Corps reached Inch'on GINGAFFAC had informed General Hodge that Pusan should be occupied as soon as the situation would permit.[47] On 13 September he was again reminded of the necessity for the early occupation of the area, and it was suggested that the 40th Division be moved directly there unless the situation in Seoul dictated otherwise.[48]


General Hodge was well aware of the necessity for early full control; a lack of shipping had simply denied him the necessary force to effect and consolidate an occupation of the entire zone overnight. He wrote GINGAFFAC on 13 September:

> There is urgent necessity for expanding throughout the provinces of South Korea as rapidly as possible with adequate military government and troops to maintain order. However, when American troops, no matter how small in number, enter a town the population expects them to take over full control of the police and the maintenance of order, and it is a signal for Koreans to begin action against Japanese nationals.[49]

General Hodge's State Department advisor, Mr. Benninghoff, affirmed the opinion that Korea should be occupied with the minimum possible delay.[50]

In order to get first-hand information on conditions in Pusan, much of which would be of use to the 40th Division, the Corps decided that a





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reconnaissance party should be sent in advance of a major troop unit. Although the party was composed of over 300 Army and Navy personnel, it was not to be considered an occupation force; it was simply what its name implied.

Lieutenant Colonel O. J. Miller, XXIV Corps Artillery S-3, was placed in command of the party which included representatives from Corps Headquarters, ASCOM 24, 308th Bomb Wing, Military Government, the 40th Division's advance party, the Navy, the press, and a rifle company from the 184th Infantry which was to be used for guard purposes. This diverse group was charged with securing information on transportation facilities, including airports in and around Pusan, condition of harbor facilities, and communications equipment. Other information desired included the attitude of the Japanese and Koreans, political and economic conditions in the area, status of disarmament, availability of foodstuffs, fuel, and medical supplies, and the rate of flow of refugees through the port in both directions.[51] The party was instructed to take whatever vehicles seemed necessary and a ten day supply of rations. Reports were to be made twice daily to Corps Headquarters either by radio or by telephone.[52] Arrangements were made through the Japanese Liaison Detachment at Seoul for the local commander to provide the party with transportation, interpreters, and laborers to unload the train. Commanders of the local army, naval, and air forces were to be available to furnish any information that might be desired, and heads of the provincial and municipal governments were to have persons familiar with utilities, harbors, water supply, and railroads available on call. The Japanese were to continue their control measures, and the reconnaissance party

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would assume no responsibility for installations in the city.[53]

The XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Party departed by rail from Seoul at 1900, 15 September,[54] arriving in Pusan at 0920 the next morning.[55] The train went through a part of Korea that had not yet been visited by occupation forces. Throughout the night at the stations en route, cheering crowds greeted the party, presented baskets of fruit, and local officials made speeches of welcome.[56] In Pusan, however, the welcome took on a more subdued tone because "huge numbers [of] armed Japanese have the people completely intimidated".[57] Colonel Miller reported that the trip down was "entirely satisfactory"[58]; the Koreans were reported to be "curious but quiet".[59] Conferences with the Japanese were begun on arrival,[60] and the command post was set up in the Railway Hotel.

During the next few days the reconnaissance party proceeded to gather information and to arrange for the reception of the 40th Division.[61] In order to release billeting space and to minimize the chance for an incident, all Japanese troops not actually needed in Pusan were withdrawn to assembly areas outside the city.[62] The air representative located an airfield with a paved strip which could accommodate medium bombers.[63] Surveys were made of the docks, harbor, rail, and other facilities, and it was determined that it would be feasible to move in the Division directly by water.[64]

On 17 September Colonel Miller recommended that his party remain in Pusan.[65] This recommendation was approved, and the party did not return until 25 September, after being relieved by elements of the 40th Division.[66]

On 19 September service elements of ASCOM 24 departed by rail for Pusan arriving the next morning.[67] In preparation for the Division's

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arrival, Japanese soldiers were instructed by the reconnaissance detachment to clean warehouses and dock and port areas.[68] By the estimated date of arrival of the first echelon, 22 September, preparations had been completed for the reception of a waterborne landing at Pusan.

In addition to the reconnaissance just described, a road reconnaissance was undertaken by a platoon of the 7th Division's reconnaissance troop,[69] accompanied by an engineer road reconnaissance section and a signal reconnaissance section.[70] This party left Seoul at 0800, 20 September and arrived at Pusan at 1500, 25 September. The route generally paralleled the double tracked railroad, taking the party through Suwon, Chonghwa, Taejon, Yongdong, Kumch'on, Waegwan, Taegu, and to Pusan.[71] Several detours were necessary because of landslides and floods, and the party warned that many points along the way were 'subject to flash floods and erosion'. In general, it was reported that the 360 mile route averaged 15 feet in width, that it was well graded with gradual curves except in the mountain areas, but that the road was 'quite rough' due to lack of maintenance.[72] It was considered 'impossible to move more than portions of the 40th Division overland from Jinsen'.[73]

Pusan or Inch'on ?

While the 40th Division was en route and while these two reconnaissance parties were carrying out their missions, the question of where the Division would be landed came up for much discussion and change. At first, General

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Hodge expected to move the 40th through Jinsen and overland if the situation would permit.[74] It was later planned to move directly to Pusan by water to save travel on the overtaxed rail system.[75] The use of the highway, if it could be correctly termed that, was impracticable, and it was "extremely doubtful that the 40th can be supported logistically when located at Pusan by rail from Inch'on".[76]

Information was requested as to whether minesweeping in Pusan harbor had reached a stage where the Navy could move in safely.[77] No authoritative information seemed to be available on this, and CINCAFPAC suggested that a landing be made at Chinhae, a port reported by the Japanese Naval Ministry to be minefree.[78] USAAFAF, however, reported that its planes had dropped a total of 68 mines in the approaches to Chinhae during the month of July.[79] Chinhae had only a small anchorage, and the lack of transportation overland made its use impractical.[80]


Captain O. C. Wood, USN, who had accompanied the XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Party to Pusan, was informed that it was rapidly approaching a requirement that a landing be made in the area and was directed to investigate the feasibility of landing at Pusan or Chinhae with reasonable safety.[81] Captain Wood replied that he felt sure that a landing could be made at Pusan by ships the size of LST's or smaller although there was no mine-free anchorage at the port.[82]

Plans went ahead to land the Division at Pusan. It was estimated that a direct landing would save ten days, and Admiral Low, representing the Commander Seventh Fleet, agreed that the entire Division could be moved in directly by water.[83] General Myers was notified accordingly and informed

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Area Assignments as of 21 September 45



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that ASCOM 24 would have a shore party to meet the first ships.[84]

Then uncertainty began to creep into the planning. On the 18th of September, COMNAVFE/EMPHIB reported that his complete information indicated that the entrances to Pusan were still mined and stated that the 40th Division would be transported to Inch'on until further information indicated that the entrances were clear.[85] On 20 September the Corps G-3 Operations Report told of the preparations that were being made for the reception of the Division in Pusan,[86] and in the staff conference the next day, the day before the estimated arrival of the first echelon, three possibilities were reported:[87] (1) the AKA's and other vessels might go straight to Pusan; (2) the landing would be made at Inch'on, and the troops would be transferred to LST's and LSM's and proceed in them to Pusan; (3) the troops would disembark at Inch'on and go by rail to Pusan.

The 40th Division Occupies Southeastern Korea

On the evening of 21 September Brigadier General Robert Shoe, the Assistant Division Commander who was in command of the first echelon, was informed that about 1500 officers and men with necessary housekeeping equipment would be moved promptly overland to Pusan and that all LST's and LSM's should remain loaded for an early water movement.[88]

Also on that day XXIV Corps Field Order 56 was published which made the decision to change the original reenforcing mission of the Division to the execution of Phase II a matter of record. Specifically, the 40th

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Division was ordered to:

1. Occupy as rapidly as practicable the provinces of KYONGSANG PUKTO and KYONGSANG NAMDO, and exercise control over all islands adjacent thereto.

2. Establish post-war governments within assigned zone of responsibility.

3. Supervise disarmament and control of Japanese armed forces within assigned zone of responsibility.

4. Assist representatives of 7th Fleet in the disarmament of Japanese naval forces at CHINHAE [Chinhae].

5. Maintain control of Japanese civilians and Japanese Army Forces moving through the ports of PUSAN and CHINHAI for Japan in accordance with directive to be issued by this Hq.

6. Move repatriated Koreans from PUSAN to native provinces.

7. Secure critical sections of the SEOUL-PUSAN railroad within assigned zone of responsibility to insure continuous operations of the railroad by the Korean government.

At 1100 on the morning of 22 September, the first convoy arrived, and that afternoon RCT 160, the 2d Battalion, 185th Infantry, and advanced elements of Division Headquarters began to debark.[90] The 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry departed by rail for Pusan that evening at 2300, arriving the next afternoon.[91] On 24 September the 1st Battalion, Regimental Headquarters, and the Cannon and Anti-tank Companies arrived by rail.[92] The 2d Battalion of the 185th Infantry served as a shore battalion and unloaded the bulk cargo at Inch'on.[93] Other elements of the 160th RCT entrained for Pusan as rail transportation became available. Light organizational equipment and some vehicles came overland by rail; the first freight train left the evening of 24 September.[94] Two motor convoys departed for Pusan on 28 September, one consisting of 25 vehicles and one of 38.

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The 38 vehicle convoy left Inch'on for Taegu at 0945, 25 September. This was one of the first large convoys to go through the countryside, and the soldiers were the first Americans many of the Koreans had seen. The reception received by this group is believed to be typical of that accorded the first Americans to enter other communities. As such, and as an example of the tremendous popularity and acclaim exhibited towards the occupation forces, it is of more than passing interest.

As the convoy approached a town, the soldiers could see Koreans running from their houses, pointing and waving in the direction of the oncoming Americans. They lined the streets, sometimes three deep, shouting "manse!" and waving homemade American and Korean flags. How that each was experiencing the personal feeling of liberation, some were almost beside themselves with emotion.

At the entrances to the larger towns, archways garnished with fresh hemlock were constructed across the road. Across the top were welcoming signs of all sizes and descriptions — "Welcome American", "Thank you, Allied Force", or "American-Korea". Some were badly misspelled, but none failed to convey the feelings of the people who had erected them.

At night the group was given the best buildings a particular town had to offer. An army of Korean boys armed with brooms and mops helped the soldiers clean up and get established for the night. On several occasions the local inhabitants insisted on staging welcoming parties for the Americans who could not attend because of the 40th Division's non-fraternization policy. Gifts were made of large quantities of fresh eggs, apples, persimmons, saki, and beer.

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In many of the towns through which the convoy passed were stationed Japanese garrisons, but the Japanese did not approach or make trouble in any way.

It was a triumphal motor march for the soldiers participating, and all were impressed by the feeling of genuine welcome shown toward them. Perhaps never in Korea's history had an incoming foreign army been so received.[95]

By 2 October all elements of the combat team, except for personnel needed to handle the heavy impedimenta, had arrived in Pusan.[96] The move by rail was termed "one of the most difficult administrative operations ever accomplished by the regiment [since] loading facilities and railyard personnel were practically non-existent."[97] Difficulty was also experienced at first because troops were arriving at Pusan without adequate kitchen equipment and water containers with which to maintain themselves.[98] It was therefore directed that no troops be sent unless accompanied by a kitchen truck and other needed equipment.[99]

It would be well to pause here for a moment and consider the air plan that was to cover these and other movements. As a covering operation, General Hodge desired that show of force missions be flown over such important cities as Pusan, Chinhae, Chonju, Kwangju, and Kunsan. The 308th Bomb Wing was requested to stage these flights using one group of fighters and one group of attack or medium bombers; the missions were to be flown twice daily for one week beginning 21 September. However, all the planes of the 308th Bomb Wing had not yet arrived, and there was not enough gasoline at Kimpo Airdrome to stage the flights. The request was forwarded through

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higher Air Corps channels, and it was decided that the 20th Air Force should send about 100 B-29's over Korea on each of the last two days of September from bases in the Marianas. These planes never came although fire plans were made for the reception of the missions. It was felt that they were needed to fly over Japan. The only planes available were a few C-47's from the 308th which were used to a limited extent.[100]

The 160th Infantry Regiment was given the assignment of processing and loading all Japanese Army Forces and all civilians, both Japanese and Korean, moving through the port of Pusan and of performing the usual police duties in and around that city.[101] The details of the processing of repatriates and evacuees will be dealt with in another chapter, but the total number of persons handled by this Regiment up until 22 February, when its last report was submitted, was 1,130,972 of which 710,536 were incoming Koreans, 102,984 were evacuated Japanese soldiers, and 317,452 were evacuated Japanese civilians.[102]

Conditions in Pusan were quiet when the Regiment arrived, and arrangements had already been made for billets in Japanese army barracks.[103] On the day the first elements of the Regiment arrived in Pusan, the 3d Battalion Commander, accompanied by the Acting Chief of Staff of the Division and the Japanese Commander of the area, made a reconnaissance of the entire city to determine which installations and supply dumps would have to be occupied immediately and which could be left in Japanese hands to prevent looting by the Koreans until more of the Regiment could arrive.[104] By 26 September the guard company of the 184th Infantry and elements of the Japanese Army had been relieved of all guard posts in the Pusan area.[105]

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In addition to repatriation and evacuation the 160th Infantry in Pusan established guard posts over Japanese warehouses and military installations, including numerous anti-aircraft positions, radar stations, two airports, and the formidable Choshito Fortress.[105] Railroad yards in Pusan were put under guard to prevent looting of the cars, and the entire Metropolitan Police of the city was taken over until Military Government could train sufficient Koreans to perform the job. The Regiment was relieved of this responsibility on 11 November.[107]

During the latter part of September when the 160th Infantry was the only large troop unit in the area, several reconnaissance parties composed of its personnel and the personnel of the advance parties of the other major units of the Division moved into other parts of the Division's zone. On 24 September a party of one platoon departed by rail for Taegu to reconnoiter a bivouac area for a regiment.[108] The party returned two days later reporting that there were incidents involving bloodshed between the Chian Tai and the local police.[109] On 27 September a platoon departed for the Chinhae Naval Base by rail,[110] establishing several guard posts the next day.[111] It was reported that the base was large and well equipped with a large inventory of supplies of all types, and barracks space for 1000 men.[112] On 29 September another party left for Kyongsang Pukto;[113] it returned on 4 October reporting that facilities for housing infantry battalions were located in Ulsan, Kyongju, and Andong, that roads were in poor condition throughout the province, and that there were conflicts between the radicals and the police.[114]

Meanwhile, at Seoul, there was considerable discussion of how the other

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elements of the 40th Division were going to be moved into their zones of responsibility.

On 19 September General Hodge, in a dispatch direct to the Commander 7th Fleet, requested that minesweeping be undertaken to clear Pusan as soon as possible.[115] These services were requested in turn from the 5th Fleet,[116] whose area of responsibility included Pusan and its approaches.[117] No reply to this request had been received by 23 September, and Task Force 71, under the 7th Fleet, was ordered to dispatch the necessary vessels from Inch'on to Pusan to accomplish the sweep.[118] Pusan was finally opened to ships up to the size of LST's on 29 September, and COMPHIBGRP 13 was authorized to proceed with the movement of troops to that city.[120] Sweeping operations continued, and by the middle of October the port was open to ships drawing up to 30 feet of water and up to 500 feet in length.[121]

General Myers decided that the assignment of the Division and the nature of the occupation zone called for four combat commands instead of the usual three. As it was evident that the Division would not be called upon to perform any normal combat functions and in order to preserve the functional integrity of the units, he decided to divorce the artillery from its usual position in the regimental combat team and to combine it to form a division artillery command.[122] This unit was about one-half as strong numerically as an infantry regiment, numbering about 1500 officers and men.

Various units of the 40th Division continued to arrive at Inch'on during the period 22 to 30 September, and most units, without their heavy equipment, proceeded overland as quickly as rail facilities would permit. The lift to Inch'on was completed on 30 September except for the two LST's with replacement cargoes.[125]

General Myers arrived with the last major echelon and assumed command of the troops ashore on 2 October. The Division Command Post was moved from the Railway Hotel to the Municipal Building.[124]

Taegu, about 60 miles north of Pusan, capital of Hyongsang Pukto and second largest city in the 40th Division's zone,[125] was the next city to be occupied in force. The 2nd Battalion, 185th Infantry, which had remained at Inch'on as a shore battalion since its arrival with RCT 160, entrained and departed for Taegu the afternoon of 30 September[126] and arrived the next morning.[127] Quarters were set up in buildings formerly occupied by Japanese troops of the Taegu Division.[128] Regimental Headquarters and the 1st and 3rd Battalions arrived by rail on 2 October,[129] and by that evening all regimental units except a small rear detachment with heavy equipment had closed Taegu.[130] The organizational equipment came either by rail, by motor convoy,[131] or by water via Pusan.[132] By 8 October all units had consolidated in the regimental zone of responsibility[133] which included roughly the western half of Kyongsang Namdo.[134]

After consolidating in Taegu, the Regiment began to deploy units to cities and towns within its zone. Elements moved to Tetsuje, about 15 miles south of Taegu to survey a tungsten mine and to attempt to restore production.[135] Two days later the Regiment relieved Japanese guards on two airfields near Taegu[136] which contained about 60 planes.[137] On 7 October motor elements occupied Andong pending the arrival of the 106th Infantry, and elements occupied the following towns: Sangju, Kumch'on, Waegwan, Sin-dong, Kyongsan, and Kuksa-dong.[138] By 15 October the following additional towns

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had been occupied: Chongyong,[139] Somsan,[140] Hamch'ang, Yech'on, and Chamch'on-ni.[141] By this date the 180th Infantry had deployed forces to the important towns within its zone of responsibility, and, although later displacements were made, the entire area was under effective control. Into communities where troops were not stationed, frequent motor patrols were sent to remind the populace of the presence of American troops, and to disseminate and secure information.[142]

The 108th Infantry was the next unit to be deployed into its zone of responsibility which included the eastern half of Kyongsang Pukto and several [illegible] in the eastern part of Kyongsang Namdo.[143]

The bulk of the 108th Infantry arrived at Inch'on on 30 September where it debarked and aided in shore operations.[144] The Regimental Cannon Company was transferred to Pusan by water, leaving Inch'on on 2 October and arriving two days later.[145] On 3 October an advance party of two officers and nine enlisted men moved from Pusan to Ulsan to prepare for the arrival of the 1st Battalion.[146] On this day Regimental Headquarters, elements of the 3d Battalion, and the 1st Battalion departed Inch'on by rail for Pusan.[147] Other elements of the 3d Battalion, of Regimental Headquarters, and the Anti-Tank Company arrived Pusan by water the next day.[148] The 2d Battalion continued its shore party activities at Inch'on.[149] On 6 October the advanced party in the 1st Battalion's zone moved from Ulsan to Yongdok,[150] and the 1st Battalion entrained at Pusan for the move to Ulsan where it arrived the next morning.[151] The remainder of the Cannon Company joined the advanced party from this organization at Yongdok,[152] and an advanced party from the 3d Battalion departed Pusan en route to Andong.[153] On 8 October elements of the

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Anti-Tank Company arrived at P'ohang-Dong, and other elements of the Regiment occupied Kamp'o-Ri and Yongch'on.[154] Regimental Headquarters was opened in Kyongju on 7 October,[155] and the 3d Battalion arrived Andong on 9 October.[156] By 15 October the deployment of the 108th Infantry into its initial zone of responsibility had been completed.[157] In addition to the towns already mentioned, forces were in Ch'unyang and Yongju[158] and at other points within the zone.

The 40th Division Artillery was moving into its zone of responsibility, which included the western two-thirds of Kyongsang Namdo, at about the same time the 108th Infantry was moving into its zone. Since all its units were motorized, the artillery was able to move into its area without depending on rail transportation.

The 143d Field Artillery Battalion, less heavy equipment which had arrived with the 160th RCT, proceeded to Pusan by rail[159] and was already there by the time the other three battalions arrived at Inch'on. These battalions left Inch'on by water for Pusan on 2 October along with the heavy equipment of the Division, of ASCOM 24, and of the 143d Field Artillery.[160] Accompanied by elements of the 40th Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, this group arrived in Pusan the afternoon of 4 October, and the newly designated combat team assembled in preparation for the move to its zone.[161] The 222d Field Artillery was converted into a military police battalion and remained in Pusan under Division control.[162]

On 6 October an advance party of the combat team was sent to Chinhae to prepare for the arrival of the main group.[163] The next day, the 160th

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and the 143rd Field Artillery Battalions and the Division Artillery Headquarters moved to Chinhae, establishing quarters in the naval barracks there, and the 213th Field Artillery moved to Chinju in the western part of the zone.[164] By 9 October all communities which had been garrisoned by the Japanese had been occupied by elements of the combat team — the towns of Hwaksle-tong, Wondong, Masan, Kosong, Sanch'ongpo, and Sach'on.[165] Other towns occupied included T'ongyong, Chinyong-ni, and Sunmangjin.[166]

This completed the initial tactical deployment of the 40th Division into its original zone of responsibility. By the middle of October the Division had extended full control into all of two provinces and partial control into a third as will be shown later.

Occupation of the Northern Part of the American Zone

The Corps Field Order which was published on 21 September assigned the three western provinces of Cholla Namdo, Cholla pukto, and Ch'ungch'on Namdo to the 96th Division, the two south eastern provinces to the 40th, and the remaining area south of the 38th parallel to the 7th Division, less a small area around Inch'on which was assigned to ASCOM 24.[167] While the 40th was deploying its forces, the 7th Division was also expanding into its zone, and, pending the arrival of the thrid division, these two divisions sent forces into its area.

Two days before the first echelon of the 40th Division reached Inch'on a platoon of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, departed by motor for Sanch'ok,[168]

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a coal mining town on the east coast, some 40 miles below the 38th parallel. The party reached Samch'ok and reported back on 25 September that the mines were in operating condition and that a large supply of badly needed coal was on hand awaiting transportation. Conditions were quiet, and the main problem was the food supply which, for the 5700 miners there, was termed [169] 'an inadequate diet for twenty days'.

On 27 September the 1st Battalion was relieved of all guard responsibilities [170] in the Seoul area, and the next day advanced elements left [171] by motor convoy for Samch'ok, [172] arriving the afternoon of 29 September. On 1 October elements of this battalion occupied three towns along the east coast — Kangnung, Mukchojin-ni, [173] and Sibyon-ni. The remainder of the battalion, after being delayed [174] at Wonju by impassable roads, moved to the Samch'ok area during the first week in October and occupied Chumunjin [175] and Utchin. [176]

On 2 October the 48th Field Artillery was attached to the 32d Infantry [177] and was sent to occupy the area around Wonju. An advance party reached that town on 6 October [178] and relieved elements of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry which had occupied the town temporarily. [179] By 10 October the Battalion had completed displacement to its area; Headquarters was located at Wonju, and elements were in Hoengsong, P'yongch'ang, and Yongwol. [180]

By 12 October the 32d Infantry had established control over the important towns in its zone of responsibility which included generally the region south of the 38th parallel and north of the Seoul-Wonju railroad and almost all of Kangwon Do province. [181] In addition to the towns occupied by the 1st Battalion at Samch'ok, the 3d Battalion at Ch'unch'on maintained five

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roadblocks for the purpose of controlling traffic to and from the Russian zone and garrisons in nine inhabited localities. The 2nd Battalion at Kaesong maintained eight roadblocks and forces at five towns, including the town of Ongjin which could be reached overland only over a road which ran into Russian territory.[182]

The 17th Infantry was assigned on 24 September the territory of Kyonggi Do and Ch'ungch'ong Pukto Provinces south of the Seoul-Wonju railroad, less the city of Seoul and the area around Inch'on. The Regiment was to be prepared to send battalions to control the Suwon, Ch'ungju, and Ch'ongju areas.[183]

On 23 September companies of the 17th Infantry Regiment reached and went beyond the old "O-2" line. One company displaced to Inch'on and one to Suwon where the 1st Battalion command post was established.[184] Elements of the battalions closed on Suwon as they were relieved of guard responsibility in the Inch'on-Seoul area, and by 28 September elements had occupied Kumyangjang-ni,[185] Yoju,[186] and Ansong.[187]

On 1 October advanced elements of Regimental Headquarters displaced by truck to Ch'ongju[188] and were joined two days later by a small detachment of the Regiment which relieved all Japanese guards in the area.[189] Regimental Headquarters and the 3rd Battalion displaced to Ch'ongju on 5 October.[190]


Filling in the Void

By the end of September, because of lack of shipping, the third division of the occupation force had not arrived. So that some control

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could be established over all Korea without any further delay, the Commanding Generals of the 7th and 40th Divisions were ordered to send forces into its zone; the 40th Division was to occupy the province of Cholla Namdo, and the 7th Division the provinces of Cholla Pukto and Ch'ungch'ong Namdo.[191] These forces were instructed, in general, to maintain order, to relieve Japanese troops as they were evacuated, of guard duties over equipment,[192] supply dumps, and airfields, and to supervise local governments. The forces sent to the 96th Division's zone were not permanent occupation forces; they were not instructed to establish a post-war government. They were to maintain the status quo. They were to prove to the Korean people that American soldiers were preparing to occupy their land in force; their mere presence would be a stabilising influence. These forces would prevent conditions from getting out of hand during the interim between surrender and occupation in force.

On 7 October the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry at Ch'ongju consolidated guard posts and prepared to extend control into Ch'ungch'ong Namdo Province.[193] The Regimental zone of responsibility was changed to exclude all of Kyonggi Do in compensation for the two additional provinces which were assigned, and the 49th Field Artillery Battalion was attached.[194]

On 7 October elements of the 1st Battalion at Suwon and of the 3d Battalion at Ch'ongju occupied Ch'onan, P'yongtaek, Chech'iwon, and Taejon.[195] The next day the 2d Battalion, having been relieved of guard duties in the Seoul area by the 184th Infantry, commenced displacement, by rail, to Ch'ungju.[196] The 1st Battalion was not relieved in the Suwon area of Kyonggi Do by the 184th Infantry until the middle of October.[197] By 16 October all

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elements of the 17th Infantry had taken up positions within the zone of responsibility with the exception of two squads at P'yongtaek, and the Regiment was deployed as follows:[198] Regimental Headquarters and the 3d Battalion were in Ch'ongju, the 1st Battalion was in Onyang, and the 2d Battalion was in Ch'ungju.

Meanwhile, the 49th Field Artillery was moving into Cholla Pukto and the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry into Cholla Namdo.

Elements of the 49th Field Artillery departed on 7 October by rail for Kunsan which was reported "about to boil over".[199] By 12 October this Battalion had established headquarters at Chonju, the provincial capital, and had sent forces to Kunsan, Kanggyong, Chongup, Namwon, and I-ri.[200]

The 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry continued unloading activities at Inch'on through the first week of October, and, at the end of the period, was preparing to move to its newly assigned area in Cholla Namdo province.[201] The battalion, placed under Division control,[202] departed by rail on the morning of 8 October[203] and arrived at Kwangju, the capital of Cholla Namdo, the next morning.[204] Several guns in the eastern part of the province were made the responsibility of the 40th Division Artillery,[205] and elements of the 213th Field Artillery arrived at Yosu and Sunch'on on 8 October to take control.[206] Forces from the 108th Infantry were sent to occupy Kunju, Posong, and Mokp'o.[207]

Cheju Do, an island about 60 miles south of Korea proper, was logically the responsibility of the 96th Division as one of the islands adjacent to its mainland area. ASCOM 24, employing the 749th Field Artillery Battalion which was attached for the purpose, was made responsible for the evacuation

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of Japanese troops and civilians from the island. This Battalion arrived on the island on 22 October, and it appears that it did little other than go evacuate Japanese.[208]

Except for the liaison teams sent out from the 7th and the 40th Divisions,[209] this move completes the initial deployment into the provinces. Future movements would be to reinforce areas already occupied, at least with a token force, and to relieve certain units, rather than to extend control into new areas.

Phase III

Original planning for Phase III, the occupation of Southwestern Korea, called for the landing of the 96th Division approximately 30 days after that of the 7th Division. Several unexpected factors, however, delayed the arrival of the Division, and, in the end, caused a substitution so that the 96th never came to Korea at all.

The first diversion of shipping from the XXIV Corps came at the end of September when TRANSRON 17 was withdrawn from Corps's use to lift the 1st Marine Division to China.[210] TRANSRON 17, upon completion of the 7th Division lift, was scheduled to be reassigned from PHIBGRP 7 to PHIBGRP 13 for the purpose of lifting the 96th Division on turnaround shipping.[211] In protest to this diversion of shipping General Hodge radioed that it presented an entirely new factor in his planning and that the diversion would "greatly delay the accomplishment of Phases II and III which are contingent upon the

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arrival of the 96th Infantry Division[212]. It was estimated that the arrival of the Division would be delayed almost one month. Nevertheless, in reply to his protests, General Hodge was informed that "in view of the delicate political situation in the Tientsin area [it] is considered essential that the 1st MARDIV [Marine Division] be moved into that area... even though this entails a delay in the follow up movement of the 96th Division into Korea."[213] This change meant that the only shipping available would be the turnaround shipping of TRANSRON 13 which was lifting the 40th Division.[214]

The next major disruption in planning came at the end of September when the 96th Division was deleted from the XXIV Corps. On 20 September CINCAFPAC informed General Hodge that, in view of the planned reduction of the army which would occur before 1 July 1946, consideration was being given to the substitution of the 6th Infantry Division for the 96th.[215] Although a two-division occupation force was planned for Korea after 1 July 1946, both the 40th and the 96th Divisions would be inactivated or returned to the United States, since National Guard and Army of the United States divisions would have priority in these matters.[216] To avoid later movement and to preserve continuity of the forces in Korea, it was proposed that only one division which was scheduled for early return should be sent to Korea in the first place.[217] General Hodge's reply to the proposed substitution is a poignant summation of conditions in Korea at that time.

> Concur in proposed substitution of Sixth Division for Ninety Sixth Division...provided no delay in arrival of this Division in Korea ensues...Delay in arrival of third division

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will seriously impede orderly assumption of governmental agencies because of shortage of supervision and control forces.

The following considerations make necessary a larger occupation force in Korea in comparison with a similar sized province in Japan:

(A) All the higher governmental officials are Japanese whose early removal from office and return to Japan are essential to promote tranquillity.

(B) Virtually all higher officers and technicians of public utilities, transportation, banking, education and distribution of commodities and suchlike are in the same status as those mentioned in (A) above.

(C) Koreans loathe the Japs and will almost certainly molest scores of thousands of Jap civilians after the Japanese troops leave Korea unless United States troops are in evidence in strength.

(D) The struggles among scores of political groups for preeminence and control of the government suggest the advisability of having a strong armed force in evidence, particularly in view of presence of agitators throughout the nation.

(E) Presence of Soviet army in North Korea is known throughout South Korea. Fear of the Russians is great. Presence of United States forces in strength alone will render null considerations of the potentiality of the Russian force in South Korea.

(F) Inland communications in South Korea will not permit the movement of large bodies of troops from one area to another widely separated area should troops be needed...[218]

Instructions transferring the 6th Division to the XXIV Corps were published on 25 September, and CINCAFPAC added that the different conditions existing in Korea were understood and that the 6th Division was believed ready to move.[219]

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The Sixth Division

At the time of the cessation of hostilities on 15 August, the 6th Division was probably the most heavily engaged division in the United States Army.[220] In contact with the remnants of the Japanese 14th Area Army on Luzon, the Division had committed all three of its infantry regiments. Immediately after the surrender offer from Tokyo, it put into effect plans to receive the surrender of General Yamashita and his forces. Pamphlets containing surrender instructions were dropped, and broadcasts were made from L-5 planes. However, no overtures had been made at the time the Division was withdrawn from the line.[221]

On 16 August the 6th Division was notified of its new assignment in the occupation of Japan as part of the I Corps of the Sixth Army.[222] Its mission was to follow up the landings of the I Corps in the Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe area, and, on 25 October, to send one combat team to occupy the Tsuruga area. The rest of the Division would be prepared to conduct any operations that might be required.[223]

On 18 August the XIV Corps issued an order for the immediate relief of the Division by elements of the 32d Infantry Division. This relief was completed on 21 August, and it withdrew from the line to an assembly area on Luzon to prepare for the next assignment.[224]

During the ensuing days the Division licked its combat wounds, received new equipment and personnel, and conducted training to integrate them into the organization.[225] On 22 September the Division Field Order was published, and loading was to begin on 11 October.[226] Then, on 24 September as the planning was reaching a final stage, the Division was

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notified of its assignment of the XXIV Corps.[227]

Like the other major ground units of the XXIV Corps, the 6th Division was a battle-tested organization. A regular Army Division, it was reactivated in October 1939. In 46 months of training in the United States the Division was stationed at nine different army posts and had participated in eight maneuvers. It was sent to Oahu in July 1943 with the mission of ground defense of that island. It underwent an intensive course of jungle training, and embarked for Milne Bay, New Guinea, in January 1944 where it received more of the same. It saw its first combat at Moffin Bay in June 1944 and it saw more combat that year at Sansapor. The Division went ashore on 9 January 1945 at Lingayen Gulf in the counterinvasion of Luzon. On that island the Division saw 219 days of continuous combat, a southwest Pacific record. During the Shimbu Line campaign, the Division Commander, Major General Erwin D. Patrick, was fatally wounded by Japanese machine gun fire, and the Division Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Charles H. Hurdis, assumed command.[228] Later promoted to Major General, he commanded the Division until May 1946[229] when he was medically evacuated. During the Luzon campaign his Division accounted for over 20,000 Japanese, sustaining 853 fatalities of its own.

Planning of the 6th Division

Immediately upon assignment of the 6th Division to the XXIV Corps, several steps were taken to minimize the confusion which might result

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from so abrupt a change.

It was directed that the 96th Division send by air all orders, maps, shipping schedules, and other pertinent information to the 6th.[251] A liaison officer, Major Charles S. Bellows of the Corps G-3 Section, was sent by air to Luzon to orient the Division on the conduct of the occupation. He was to discuss such problems as military government and the urgent need for military police training of all troops. Major Bellows took with him a new-unit file from the Corps Adjutant General Section,[252] and copies of the XXIV Corps field orders which were the first copies to reach the Division.[253] Officers of the Division attended lectures by Major Bellows on conditions in Korea and on the type of mission it could be expecting to perform.[254] Major Bellows stayed for several days and returned to Korea in advance of the Division.[255]

An advance party of the 6th Division, headed by Lieutenant Colonel David D. Hulsey, had proceeded to Japan, landing in the Wakayama area the latter part of September. The party moved to Osaka where Colonel Hulsey was informed of the new assignment of the Division.[256]

Meanwhile, in event that the party in Japan could not be reached promptly, the 6th Division had sent another officer directly to Seoul by air.[257] Upon arrival, this officer learned that the group in Japan had been contacted and was on its way to Korea. He joined the party in Seoul and assisted it in fulfilling its mission.[258]

Colonel Hulsey's party in Japan was instructed to report to the Commanding General, XXIV Corps as soon as possible and to continue its mission in accordance with the new assignment of the Division.[259] The party

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was delayed at Atsugi Airdrome by bad weather,[240] but it made its way to Seoul on or about 4 October.[241] From there it made a reconnaissance of the Division's zone as far south as Kwangju for the purpose of locating housing, choosing sites for command posts, and observing conditions in the area. Two days before the first echelon of the Division arrived in Korea, the party came back to Inch'on where it established itself, awaiting the arrival of the 6th.[242]

Back on Luzon, the staff of the Division worked hurriedly to prepare a new field order based on XXIV Corps Field Order No. 56. It was published on 30 September. The Division's zone would include all of the provinces of Cholla Namdo, Cholla Pukto, and Ch'ungch'ong Namdo. It was to be prepared to establish a post-war government, supervise and control the disarmament of Japanese forces, and to control Japanese civilians and soldiers moving south for evacuation to Japan.[243]

On the whole, the 6th Division was well supplied for its mission to Korea. The I Corps was ordered to expedite the reequipping of the Division to the greatest practicable extent.[244] After combat, new vehicles were drawn where needed, and it was felt that the Division was 100 percent equipped with available ordnance, engineer, and medical supplies.[245] Only in wet-cold clothing did a serious supply problem exist. The XXIV Corps desired that the Division draw these items from AFWESPAC before leaving the Philippines.[246] The Division quartermaster company sent representatives to Manila to assist in supplying the Division, and its trucks were used to haul what clothing could be obtained. All the requirements could not be supplied in the Philippines prior to departure, and the Division arrived in Korea

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with only about 60 percent of its requirements. The entire issue of woolen clothing was not in the hands of the troops until the end of the year in what the Division G-4 felt was a very poor exhibition of distribution.[247]

In view of the small likelihood of expenditure, shipping and storage problems, and a lack of port facilities, permission was requested by and granted to the Division to reduce the ammunition mounted from three units of fire for combat troops to one unit of fire and organic loads for artillery.[248]

In regard to personnel to accompany the Division to Korea, the XXIV Corps felt that all currently eligible personnel should be released in the Philippines.[249] General Hurdis protested that the proposed action would remove over 400 of his officers and "at least 95 percent of all remaining NCO personnel", and recommended that the personnel be retained until after arrival in the target area.[250] The request to retain personnel was granted,[251] and the Division entered Korea with all enlisted men with Adjusted Service Rating Scores below 85 and with officers below 110. A total of 98 officers and 5481 enlisted men who had become eligible before the Division's assignment to the XXIV Corps were released; however, replacements brought the Division up to a strength of 15,584 assigned officers and enlisted men when it arrived in Korea.[252]

The Lift to Inch'on

FMIBORP 13 was assigned the task of lifting the 6th Division with shipping which, at the time of assignment, was carrying the

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40th Division to Korea. 253 COMPHIBGRP 13 was authorized direct communications with the Commanding General 6th Division for planning purposes, 254 and it was estimated that the first turnaround shipping would arrive Luzon about 5 October for outloading. 255

Although the movement of the 6th Division had already been delayed by the diversion of shipping to China, another delay seemed probable.

In the latter part of September twenty LST's were ordered to be made available from the shipping assigned 7th PHIBFOR for the purpose of making one lift with disarmed Japanese soldiers from Inch'on to Sasebo, Japan, prior to their return to the Philippines. 256 It was believed that this shipping would come from that assigned to lift the 6th Division. 257 In reply to a protest against the diversion of this shipping and further delay of the 6th, 258 General Hodge was informed by CINCAFPAC that the prisoners would be evacuated unless the delay would "acutely endanger your situation in Korea, a condition not now evident." 259 In order to outline the situation in Korea exactly as he saw it and to show why the delay was unadvisable, General Hodge radioed:

> Sixth Division [is] urgently needed here now. Southwest Korea is becoming a hotspot requiring early full control. Despite general belief cannot take over effective control [of] any area until enough troops are available to take full charge of collapse which occurs when Americans enter. Japs and Koreans alike stop all efforts at control in most areas as we enter. Rice harvest coming in Southern Korea also adds to urgency of widespread control. Do not...feel justified in delaying 6th Division move now to evacuate Japanese forces. Approximately 4,000 per day now going from Pusan [Pusan] is easing pressure for evacuation. COMPHIB Group 13 has already approved return of 20 LST's to Philippines direct. Port of Pusan now open to LST's and smaller craft allow shift to Pusan of 40th Div LST's not yet unloaded [unloaded] at Jinsen which will relieve an intolerable congestion in that inadequate port

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area and an impossible overload on rail facilities. Many complicated factors changing daily which are too numerous for inclusion in dispatch enter into decisions that can best be made on the ground. Urgently request that I be allowed to make decisions and handle directly with amphibious commander.[260]

In spite of this strong protest, he was informed that "utilization of returning amphibious shipping from Korea has been coordinated on a theater level"[261] and that the Japanese were to be evacuated as planned. General Hurdis was warned that the LST's allotted to his Division would probably be delayed.[262]

General Hurdis was authorized to load and move elements of the Division as shipping became available, although troops were to be loaded so that they could commence operations soon after arrival.[263] The Division was instructed to be prepared for a landing at either Kunsan or Inch'on,[264] but before the first echelon departed it was made firm that all shipping would be handled through the latter port.[265] An ASCOM 24 reconnaissance party had deemed Kunsan unsuitable for landing troops,[266] although the port was unmined and in the center of the Division sector. Mokp'o, a port in Cholla Namdo, was mined and had a narrow 14 foot channel which could be used only at certain times during the day, so it was not seriously considered.[267]

Five APA's and one AKA that had lifted the 40th Division departed from Inch'on for Luzon on 25 September,[268] and four APA's departed on 3 October.[269] A group of 10 LST's left Inch'on for Luzon via Sasebo on 11 October with an ETA in Luzon of 20 October.[270]

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Loading on Luzon began with the arrival of shipping and continued at a rapid rate. APA 30, Pierce, was completely loaded and turned around to be in the first 6th Division convoy within 12 hours of docking.[271]

The first convoy, consisting of 6 APA's with the larger part of two regiments, left on 10 October as shown in the following table of major convoys. 272

Departed Pt. L.	Arrived Inch'on	Organization	Personnel O's & EM	Vehicles	Deadwt. Tons	Shipping Used
10 Oct	16 Oct	20th & 65d Inf Regts, less Co & AT Cos.; Adv Det, Div Arty; elms Sp Troops	7001	726	5894	APA's 92 91, 90, 70, 121, 5.
16 Oct	21 Oct	99th Mal Cont Unit; Hq 6th Div Arty; elms 6th Med Bn.	884	230	447	AKA 67; APA 73.
18 Oct	24 Oct	1st & 2d Bns, 1st Inf; Hq & Hq Co, 1st Inf.	5164	476	2236	APA 131, 102, 104.
27 Oct	2 Nov	Elms 1st Inf; Div Hq troops; Arty Bns.	1148	387	1866	APA 66; AKA's 76, 96.

Despite the predictions that the arrival of the Division would be delayed 30 days by the diversion of shipping to the 1st Marine Division and despite the predictions of further delay occasioned by the evacuation of prisoners to Sasebo, the first echelon of the Division arrived on 16 October, only about two weeks beyond the original target date of D + 30. 273 There were several factors that made this possible; the tactical situation in Korea did not demand the arrival of the 6th Division as a unit or with all its impedimenta accompanying the using troops; the shipping used by the 40th was released

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quickly and loaded by the 6th with a minimum of delay. The convoy which left on 27 October cleared the last elements of the 6th Division on Luzon,[274] leaving a few attached units on Mindoro.[275] The entire lift was completed on 31 October.[276]

The 6th Division Joins the Corps

On 24 September, as has been mentioned, the Corps received notification[277] that the 40th Division would be withdrawn before 1 July 1946. In the Corps Staff Conference of 12 October Colonel Coolidge, the G-3, outlined a plan for placing the 6th Division in the two lower provinces of Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo so that it could easily be moved into the 40th Division's zone when that Division was withdrawn. The 6th and 7th Divisions would then be able to divide up all eight provinces of Southern Korea with a minimum of shuffling. The assignment that had been given to the 96th and then to the 6th Division on 21 September was accordingly changed, and the Division was ordered to occupy the provinces of Cholla Namdo and Cholla Pukto with priority in the order named, to relieve the 7th and 40th Divisions in these provinces as soon as possible, and to occupy Ch'ungch'ong Namdo only after all troops had been landed and upon Corps's order.[278]

Upon receipt of this order, General Hurdis who was accompanying the first echelon[279] revised the assignments of the 1st and 20th Infantry

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Regiments so that the 1st, whose expected time of arrival was 27 October, would occupy Ch'ungch'ong Namdo and the 20th, in the first echelon, would occupy Cholla Namdo.[280] As it turned out the 1st Infantry never occupied that province. Before it arrived in Korea, Change 5 to XXIV Corps Field Order 56 had changed the Division's assignment; the 7th assumed full responsibility for Ch'ungch'ong Namdo, and the 1st Infantry was sent elsewhere as will be shown later in the chapter.

The first convoy of the 6th Division consisting of the 20th and 63d Infantry Regiments, less their cannon and anti-tank companies, reached Inch'on on the afternoon of 16 October and began to debark before the day was over.[281]

These two regiments moved into their assigned areas as soon as possible after landing. In general most of the personnel moved in by rail, and the vehicles went overland in convoy. A passenger train left for Kwangju on the morning of 17 October with Regimental Headquarters and the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, and another train with the 1st Battalion left that afternoon for Mokp'o.[282] A 250 vehicle convoy left that same day.[283] The next morning Regimental Headquarters and the 3d Battalion, 63d Infantry left for Kunsan by rail, and motor serials of the Regiment left throughout the day.[284] By 19 October the 20th Infantry had completed displacement to the Kwangju area[285] for the 1st Battalion which was in Mokp'o area. At the same time the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry was performing shore party duties at Inch'on, the 2d Battalion was en route to I-ri, and the 3d Battalion and Regimental Headquarters were in Kunsan. The Division Command Post opened in Chonju along with the advanced Command Post of the Division

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Artillery.[286]

Troops of these two regiments and of the Division Special Troops continued to arrive in their areas during the latter part of October. Elements of the 51st and 53d Field Artillery Battalions, which were attached upon arrival to the 20th and 63d Regiments respectively, arrived and debarked on 22 October, leaving by rail and by convoy for their areas.[287] The 1st and 80th Field Artillery Battalions were attached to the Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery to form a Division Artillery command as had been done in the 40th.[288]

The process of relieving the 7th and 40th Divisions in Cholla Namdo and Cholla Pukto began as soon as the regiments could get established in their areas; it was a gradual process carried on over a period of three or four days. At 1900, 22 October the 6th accepted full responsibility for the two provinces.[289]

Elements of the 40th Division Artillery in the western part of Cholla Namdo withdrew to Hadong on 25 October,[290] and the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry in the rest of the province gradually withdrew to P'ohang-Dong in its Regimental zone, the last elements leaving Kwangju 26 October.[291] The 7th Division's 48th Field Artillery withdrew from Cholla Pukto into the southwestern part of Ch'ungch'ong Namdo.[292]

By the 25th of October the two regiments had dispersed throughout the two provinces. Regimental Headquarters of the 20th Infantry was in Kwangju, and battalions were in Mokp'o, Kwangju, and Changhung. The 63d Infantry Headquarters was in Kunsan, and battalions were in Kunsan, Chongup, and I-ri. Special troops were mostly concentrated in Chonju, the limits of which

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was the responsibility of the Commanding Officer, Special Troops.[293]

When Chella Namdo and Chella Pukto were in the hands of the 6th Division, all of South Korea - with the exception of Cheju Do, which was occupied by the 20th Infantry on 10 November[294] was occupied by American troops charged with full tactical occupational responsibilities including the establishment of a post-war government. In that sense, the movement into the provinces was complete although it would be several weeks yet before all Japanese guards had been relieved, before all Japanese Naval Bases had been taken over from the American Navy, and before all the troops assigned to Corps had arrived in the target area.[295]

Military Government by Tactical Troops

Planning for the occupation of Korea included a Military Government to function until civil authority could be restored. The end of the war, and the consequent breakdown of normal governmental functions in many parts of the country, produced chaotic conditions whose full seriousness were not and could not be appreciated by the Americans until some time after the initial landing. Of the two main types of military government, operational and territorial, the first had to be adopted during the first weeks of the occupation for two principal reasons - tactical considerations resulting from the presence of Japanese troops, and the absence of military government personnel. When these two conditions were alleviated or changed, a

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gradual transition to the territorial form could be anticipated. Unavoidably slow though the expansion of tactical troops into the outlying areas of Southern Korea was, tactical commanders were the only Americans who could take over the functions of government, and tactical channels of command and of communication were the only ones which were available to implement in the provinces the policies which were being evolved in Seoul. Accustomed to totalitarian government, the Koreans were both overjoyed and confused by its disappearance. However the government could not pass directly from the hands of the Japanese into theirs. The interregnum thus necessitated was to be filled first by the tactical troops and later by military government companies and groups.[296]

Such were the basic conditions molding the character of tactical military government. Although the conditions which the units of the XXIV Corps were called upon to face naturally differed from place to place, it may be said in general that three types of problems were prevalent in greater or less degree throughout Southern Korea - political, resulting from the efforts of newly-formed Korean political organizations to exercise governmental power and the lapse of the former government; economic, to the gradual decay of economy during the war and the resulting inflation; and the problems of public order, arising from various causes.

The steps taken by the tactical troops to meet these problems were governed by the necessarily general and flexible provisions of the military government annex (Annex 7) to Field Order 55, or rather those parts of the annex which were put into effect by subsequent written orders. The general mission of the tactical troops in their capacity as agents of military

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government was to maintain law and order and to use existing Japanese officials to the extent necessary to effect a gradual change first to an American, and later to a Korean administration.[297] The field orders issued by the 7th, 40th, and 6th Divisions of course reflected these policies faithfully.[298] They emphasized the fundamental fact that military government was, at first, to be a command responsibility, and was to be conducted through normal command channels. Military government thereby became an additional concern of the division staffs. In the case of the 40th Division, regimental military government teams were formed before the movement to Korea and were briefed from what information was available at the time. Military government planning, like all other planning for the Korean occupation, was handicapped by the brief time available and the previous orientation of all planning and information toward the invasion or occupation of Japan proper.[299]

After the initial landing on 8 September and until the arrival of military government companies and groups in late October and early November, policies evolved by Military Government in Seoul were disseminated through normal channels, insofar as the imperfect state of communications permitted, and were executed by the commanders of small units and detachments. Regimental commanders acted as representatives of Military Government within their assigned areas. Their general instructions were to create a Korean police force, or augment the existing one, to maintain order, to report the names of agitators, and to order the civil population to continue their normal peacetime pursuits. The implementing of these orders obviously involved tremendous difficulties.[300] During the first

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weeks of occupation small detachments were placed at important locations throughout Southern Korea; they were in no sense occupation in the eyes of the Koreans, to maintain liaison with Japanese forces in the vicinity and observe their actions, to maintain communication with their commanders, to report all lawless activities, and to disseminate to the Koreans all instructions from Military Government.[301]

The provinces of Southern Korea were divided among the three divisions along political boundaries in order to conform to areas of responsibility of Military Government agencies. Kyonggi Do, Kangwon Do, Ch'ungch'ong Pukto, and Ch'ungch'ong Namdo were assigned to the 7th Division; Kyongsang Namdo and Kyongsang Pukto to the 40th; and Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo to the 6th. Before the arrival of the 6th Division, the 7th Division assumed limited responsibility for Cholla Pukto and limited responsibility for Ch'ungch'ong Namdo until it was ordered to assume full responsibility, and the 40th Division assumed limited responsibility for Cholla Namdo. As the 6th and 7th Divisions relieved the 40th in parts of Kyongsang Namdo and Kyongsang Pukto, the military government policies of the relieving units were to be in conformity with the already-established policies of the Commanding General, 40th Division. Thus, the policies within a given province were the responsibility of one man although parts of the province might be occupied by troops from two or more divisions.

In addition to tactical commanders, military government personnel were appointed as provincial governors and as local representatives of Military Government. Their functions were in theory advisory, the real authority being left in the hands of the tactical commanders. This was essentially

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an operational form of military government with some territorial features added.[302]

By mid-October there were some thirty Military Government representatives, including provincial governors, stationed at various towns in the provinces. They were attached to the various major commands (the divisions or ASCOM 24).[303] Despite the fact of tactical control, much real authority remained with these men, and above all with the Military Government in Seoul. Removals and appointments of the higher civil officials could be made only by General Arnold upon recommendation by local commanders.[304] Although the necessity of using tactical channels and the slowness of communications left many tactical units and Military Government representatives largely isolated, it appears that they encountered many problems which were common to most parts of Southern Korea. One was violence committed by Koreans against Japanese and their property. Another was the prevalence of illegal shipping between Korea and Japan and the extreme difficulty of controlling it. Another problem was that of rice collection. Late in October the Korean Commodity Company, an agency of Military Government, was designated the sole collecting agency for rice which was under guard by troops. These are only a few examples; others will be apparent upon description of the conditions in the individual provinces.[305]

Tactical military government was never much in evidence on the provincial level in Kyonggi Do. The reasons for this fact are readily apparent. Since it was the province in which Seoul was situated and the province which was first occupied, the relative ease of communications and the shortness of distances made control from Military Government in Seoul reasonably easy.

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By 2 October Major William B. Myers had been appointed military governor of the province and the principal posts in the provincial government had been filled with Koreans.[306] Seoul and Inch'on were governed by provincial military government teams almost from the beginning.[307]

Nevertheless, local government in the province was supervised by tactical troops. They encountered few serious problems in maintaining order. Although in mid-September there were a few minor rice riots, conditions grew steadily more peaceful as all signs pointed to a plentiful harvest.[308] In spite of violations of the boundary by Russian troops, conditions in Songdo and in other towns near the border, except for Yonan, were generally peaceful. The 32d Infantry set up roadblocks along the boundary to control the movement of refugees who were beginning to arrive in large numbers. In Songdo informally elected Korean officials and police took over the administration.[309] American troops were successful in mediating a number of labor disputes in Seoul and in controlling unrest among farmers and workers in the Inch'on area.[310]

The mountainous province of Kangwon Do was the most inaccessable of all. In spite of reports of unrest in Ch'unch'on, the provincial capital, conditions in the town were reasonably peaceful.[311] Elements of the 7th Division reached Samch'ok, on the east coast, on 25 September, and reported serious labor problems at the local mine.[312] Early in October Lieutenant Colonel Earl L. Mullinix was appointed acting governor of the province. As has been explained, during this period a provincial governor was subordinate to the senior tactical commander in the province, who in this case was the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry.[313]

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In spite of the general uncertainty of the period, all schools were in operation when military government units arrived. 514

Ch'ungch'ong Pukto was governed by the 17th Infantry which moved its headquarters to the provincial capital, Ch'ongju, early in October. The Regimental Commander, Colonel F. T. Paehler, acted as military governor. With the end of the war, the Japanese governmental structure in the province had broken down. Many factories ceased to operate; communications and transportation nearly came to a halt. Many of the Koreans who replaced former Japanese office holders were incompetent. The courts were at a standstill. On the bright side of the picture, banks continued to function, and the police force appears to have been successful in maintaining order, although not in preventing widespread appropriation of Japanese property by Koreans.

The 17th Infantry made efforts to improve these conditions. The regimental S-2 and S-3 seem to have planned what measures were taken. They paid particular attention to the activities of political parties, to the improvement of transportation, and to the welfare of displaced persons. Fortunately, the rice crop was a good one. The firm measures of the troops who visited nearly all important communities in the province, combined with the cooperation of most Koreans, prevented the occurrence of any serious disorders. The Regimental Commander apparently did not relish the unaccustomed functions of military government, however, for he was anxious for trained military government units to assume control as soon as possible. 515

Although Ch'ungch'ong Namdo was occupied by American troops about

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the same time as Ch'ungch'ong Pukto, conditions in the former province were more turbulent. To this state of affairs the late arrival of troops was almost certainly a contributing factor. There can scarcely be said to have been any tactical military government in Ch'ungch'ong Namdo at all, on a provincial level, for the first military government company, the 27th, reached Taejon, the provincial capital, on 21 October, some ten days after the arrival of the provincial governor, Lieut. Col. William Karp. At that time the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, had had its headquarters in the province for a matter of only a few days, and little had been accomplished in the way of tactical military government.

Nevertheless, the commanders of those small American units which were located in the province before the arrival of military government faced many serious problems. Korean political organizations affiliated with the People's Republic were active, and their zeal was undoubtedly increased by the presence in the province of a large number of Japanese, including headquarters of the 17th Area Army at Taejon. Both before and after the arrival of American troops, these organizations attempted to assume governmental functions and to seize Japanese property. At Ch'onan, twelve days after the arrival of an American unit on 8 October, a group of Koreans took over the city hall and had to be ejected. In several areas the People's Committees attempted to prevent the farmers from harvesting their rice on the pretext that the Americans would feed everyone.

In spite of the small number of troops that he had to support him, Colonel Karp seems to have accomplished much in the short period between his arrival in the provincial capital and that of the first military

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government units. He set up his office and quarters in the provincial capitol. He removed the allegedly pro-Japanese governor and vice-governor, both of whom were Koreans and against whom a demonstration had been held, and he managed to get the provincial government functioning again. Previously it had been at a standstill, and Colonel Karp was forced to use Koreans who had been trained under the Japanese, for they were the only experienced personnel available. The city police chief, a Japanese, was left in office, but his entire force was made up of Koreans. A curfew was imposed at 2200, and with some difficulty the activity of the local political parties was brought within reasonable bounds. Although the rice crop was a bumper one, fuel of all kinds was scarce, and the prospects for the winter were not encouraging. Colonel Karp was able to open 235 primary schools and 10 middle schools in the province and planned to open the remainder as soon as teachers could be found. He also used the local press and radio to disseminate information to the people, and in particular to encourage the farmers to harvest their crops.[316]

The two important provinces of Kyongsang Pukto and Kyongsang Namdo were the responsibility of the 40th Division. Conditions in both provinces were somewhat unsettled. One of the early actions of the 40th Division, after it set up its headquarters in Pusan, was to impose what amounted to a program of non-fraternization on all its personnel. As a step to protect troops against diseases and against the dangers attendant with too much freedom in a strange land, the Division forbade all relations with Koreans

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except those which were absolutely essential in the line of duty. 517

While reconnaissance parties and later garrison detachments were visiting all major communities in both provinces, the 40th Division and Military Government in Seoul agreed to retain temporarily the Korean governor of Kyongsang Pukto, Kim Te U, an able man whose retention doubtless seemed likely to promote maximum efficiency in the provincial government. With the support of the 40th Division, Kim proceeded to change large numbers of gun and other local officials, removing Japanese and appointing Koreans. The resulting chaos, together with his reputation for being pro-Japanese, made Kim's retention seem undesirable, and he was removed on 11 October. 518

The 40th Division had been instructed to appoint an officer to succeed Kim as provincial governor; the officer selected was Colonel Edwin A. Henn, a Regular Army officer without training in military government but with an extensive academic background in political science. Colonel Henn arrived from the Philippine Islands early in October. In Pusan, he paused for an orientation by General Harris, who had been military governor of Kyongsang Namdo since late September. However, no one in Pusan knew much about conditions in the other provinces, and Colonel Henn reached Taegu, the provincial capital, in the middle of October with very little knowledge of what to expect. 519

The 185th Infantry had its headquarters at Taegu and was responsible for the western part of the province; the eastern portion was the responsibility of the 108th Infantry. The troops had been enthusiastically welcomed by the inhabitants upon their entry into Taegu; however, the strict

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interpretation placed by the Regimental Commander on the non-fraternization order prevented the acceptance of invitations to dinners or celebrations. In the city numerous disorders were caused by the radical groups, most of them affiliated with the People's Republic.[320]

Colonel Henn found the provincial government in an extremely confused state. Fortunately, the governmental records at Taegu had been secured intact. Kim, unaware of his removal, was unwilling to relinquish his post. Nevertheless, Colonel Henn expelled him as governor but retained him as an advisor. One of Colonel Henn's first steps was to order all political organizations in the province to register at his office, giving their names, purpose, officials, and financial status. Another was to undertake a study of the governmental structure as it had existed under the Japanese. He also forbade the distribution of political propaganda without permission from his office. Another order forbade the seizing or harming of any private property; this measure was designed to stop molestation of Japanese by Koreans.[321]

The problems confronting the provincial military governor were numerous and serious. The military government team of the 185th Infantry was almost inoperative. Only a few enlisted men were on duty, and the officers were in the process of being readjusted. Slow communications plagued the provincial government from the outset. All correspondence to and from Military Government Headquarters in Seoul had to be routed through the 40th Division in Pusan. Typewritten copies were, of course,

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made in Pusan, but this process simply occasioned another delay. The civil postal system was tried, but this proved to be no more speedy than the tactical channels. Colonel Henn experienced difficulty in finding sufficient qualified interpreters.[32]

Administrative problems constituted only a fraction of those confronting the provincial government. Some 10,000 Japanese had originally resided in the province; by the end of October roughly one-third of them had left for Pusan. The American authorities encouraged them to leave, although no pressure was put on them to do so. Koreans also played a part in making the Japanese anxious to leave. The property of departing Japanese represented another serious problem. Colonel Henn wished to make vacated houses available to Korean refugees. Pending decision on the disposition of Japanese holdings some such property was turned over to local Korean relief agencies, and the remainder was placed under guard by American troops. Rice on abandoned Japanese farms was harvested by Korean volunteers who received 20 per cent of the crop in return for their services.

An officer from the 185th Infantry was detailed to survey relief and welfare agencies, including hospitals, to determine what was needed for the coming winter. Japanese blankets were provided, and Japanese Army

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uniforms were made over into clothing for those who had none. Arrangements were made with the Korean Commodity Company whereby needy institutions could buy food at reduced rates, and funds were made available to destitute agencies.

Most factories and mines in the province were inoperative. Before the arrival of American troops, the Japanese employers had paid large bonuses to their employees, with the result that the Koreans experienced no difficulty in paying fines imposed upon them by the local courts.

Colonel Henn undertook a reorganization of the police bureau and placed two American officers in key positions. The 40th Division appointed provost courts to deal with offenses by civilians, but the disposition of the money collected by these courts as fines was, for a time at least, an unsolved problem.[323]

The 108th Infantry, in the eastern part of the province, undertook a semi-independent military government program, apparently implemented by the regimental military government team. Particular attention was paid to the inventorying of captured Japanese foodstuffs, the rejuvenation of local courts, and the collection of comprehensive and systematic information on all communities within the regimental zone. The Regiment encountered, as did most units, a number of Korean organizations whose announced function was to keep peace and administer local government. The Regiment was successful in diminishing the difficulties caused to Japanese civilians by such organizations.[324]

Available information points to the conclusion that the problems and experiences already discussed were typical of those encountered throughout

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the province. Local commanders had to and did exercise a great deal of initiative. In this way, a second lieutenant might be the actual ruler of many thousands of people. Such was the case, for example, at Ch'ongju were the anti-tank company of the 185th Infantry was located. The unit found on its arrival that the police were completely cowed by the local People's Committee, a radical organization which was trying to take over political power and Japanese property. The committee had collected a sizeable sum of money in so-called contributions which was in the committee's treasury. In spite of the committee's activities, the former mayor, a Korean, was still in office. He was allowed to remain, and the American commander confined his own activities to the sphere of civil affairs without attempting to organize a thorough-going military government. He later issued a proclamation directing that all Japanese property be left unharmed, and thereafter tried to fill all local offices with Koreans.[325]

Friction between radical organizations and police also occurred at Andong, as well as in other communities, but occupational troops were able to restore and maintain a reasonable degree of order.[326]

Although the 40th Division was the highest echelon of command in Kyongsang Namdo for matters of military government, as well as for tactical matters and administration, tactical military government scarcely existed on a provincial level. General Harris was appointed military governor of the province late in September. He brought a few military government officers with him from Seoul, and more followed.

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The provincial government at Pusan thus was from the beginning in relatively close touch with Seoul and can be considered a territorial government in at least an embryonic stage. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that most of the officers who took over the provincial government late in September and early in October remained at their positions a considerable period of time until after the military government in all provinces assumed a definitely territorial character.

It must be realized that of the three divisions the 40th was perhaps the most completely engrossed in military government. It arrived almost a month before the 5th Division and almost a month before military government teams could arrive in significant numbers. In the case of the 7th Division, the proximity to Seoul of most of its units permitted a fairly close liaison between Military Government and the troops in the field. However, from the Division Headquarters down to the platoon in some cases, the 40th was mainly concerned with what to do for the people whose land they occupied. Its units had to make spot decisions with little or no help from the authorities in Seoul; it was tactical military government in its purest form.

The Division and its subordinate units carried on the actual functions of military government at the local level. Their part in the government of the province may be explained by discussing their activities in some of the principal communities. In Pusan two problems common to most parts of Southern Korea at this time were particularly acute. These were the care of refugees and repatriates, and the activities of Korean groups whose alleged purpose was the maintenance of order. Measures were

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taken to clean the dock areas through which the refugees poured. In its original filthy condition, this area constituted a serious health hazard to the entire city. 327 The generic name which covered all self-appointed Korean bodies undertaking police functions was the Chian Tai. Although these groups existed in many communities and were not strictly political in nature, they had been formed in August at the same time as the People's Republic, were usually affiliated with it, and were composed in a large measure of the radical and turbulent elements of the population. At the time that American troops reached Pusan, the local units of Chian Tai had assumed many police functions; the Japanese police officials were too frightened or too indifferent to interfere greatly. The Chian Tai were armed, engaged in traffic control, dabbled in black market activities and smuggling, and made efforts to take over Japanese property. The activities of this organization do not seem to have resulted in much violence, in spite of the numerous complaints which the Japanese army authorities made to the XXIV Corps. The continued existence of such an organization, or at least its continued exercise of its assumed functions, was obviously incompatible with the establishment of a full-fledged military government. Accordingly, the Chian Tai in Pusan were disarmed without incident by troops of the 160th Infantry on 28 September, and ceased to exist officially. 328

The 160th Infantry, which was responsible for Pusan and the surrounding area, had to cope with numerous disorders and illegal acts. Many of these were traceable to the absence of a proper police force; they consisted of looting of Japanese property by Koreans and also of acts by

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Japanese. For example, the Japanese manager of a steamship line in Pusan was found to be keeping a detailed record of American troop movements in Pusan. The measures taken to solve these and other problems were, in brief, the appointment and support of Korean officials and the building up of an adequate police force; the story of these measures belongs with the history of the provincial government. 329

Military government problems encountered by tactical troops in Pusan were generally similar to those found elsewhere in the province, the eastern part of which was controlled by the 108th Infantry, the north central part by the 185th Infantry, and the southern and western parts by the 160th Infantry and the Division Artillery. The latter found that conditions in Masan, and important port thirty miles west of Pusan, were too complex for the qualifications of tactical commanders. Radical political organizations caused a great deal of trouble, and an immediate occupation by trained military government units was recommended on 5 October. 330

Conditions in Chinju, a sizeable city in the western part of the province, were disturbed by the activities of Korean political factions. To remedy this situation, the Division Artillery replaced a large number of police chiefs in its zone with junior American officers, enlisted and trained Korean police, and imposed a curfew. The latter was frequently violated, and violators who were apprehended were punished by a brief detention in jail. In this matter and in others a large number of arrests was necessary to convince the Koreans that the American commanders expected their orders to be obeyed. Large quantities of Japanese army equipment, such as drugs and motor vehicles, were stolen by Korean organizations

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and had to be confiscated. Labor troubles in Chinju resulted in a number of strikes. Political parties were active, and as late as the end of October one of them tried to take over political offices and refused to recognize the authority of the local American commanders, saying that they, the Koreans, were taking orders from Military Government in Seoul. The 40th Division apparently contemplated declaring martial law in this and other areas where such occurrences took place. Military Government in Chinju and in other parts of the Division Artillery zone was seriously hampered by a lack of interpreters. In some of the towns visited by motorized patrols it was frequently necessary to pick anyone from the crowd, which invariably gathered, who could speak a little English.[331]

American troops who entered Tongyong early in October found that no civil officials were in office. The town was being policed by an unarmed band of Chian Tai who had mistreated some and imprisoned all adult Japanese males in town and had seized some Japanese property. The Americans released the Japanese, evacuated the military personnel among them, and placed the civilians in protective custody. They appointed a mayor and a chief of police, neglecting to include among them a representative of the People's Republic. This omission produced riots, and the appointed officials did not assume their duties for a time.[332]

Political disturbances at Ulsan, fostered by the People's Republic, necessitated the dispatch of troops.[333] In the Miryang area, one of the principal difficulties, which undoubtedly plagued other tactical units also, was the difficulty of maintaining proper liaison with the

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provincial military government in Pusan.[334] Troops dispatched to investigate reports of disturbances at Kunhae reported that the Japanese officials were afraid to exercise their functions and that the people were in need of proper leadership.[335]

Members of the People's Committee seized control of the local government at Hadong, as at Chinju, and refused to recognize the authority of the local American commanders. This town was particularly turbulent, and the intervention of troops was necessary to establish order.[336] At Changnyong, the former mayor and the former chief of police disappeared a few days before the arrival of American troops who had to appoint substitutes.

At Namyang, a rich citizen proclaimed himself mayor, and other Koreans began to exploit returning repatriates and to conduct a brisk traffic in Japanese commodities. Troops of the 40th Division Artillery ousted the self-appointed mayor, reinstalled the former mayor, but retained the self-appointed chief of police. The process of disarming the population and maintaining order went ahead without serious difficulties, and the American commander provided quarters for a number of repatriates.[338]

Two other towns whose governments were temporarily taken over by the People's Committees were Hyopch'on and Sanch'ong.[339]

Other problems faced many of the tactical units in the province. Among them were a lack of orientation on civil affairs in general and on Korean conditions in particular, and the prevalence of illegal shipping between Korea and Japan, carrying both repatriates and contraband goods. The U.S. Navy maintained offshore patrols, but not with the frequency

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necessary to stop this practice.

Quite naturally, its experience in such matters, after a time, led the 40th Division to develop a standard operating procedure for military government and civil affairs. After about a month of occupation duties, the Division devised the following procedure as a guide for its subordinate units. A tactical unit occupying a community was to expel the former head of the local government, if he was a Japanese, but retain him as an advisor if necessary. Other Japanese were to be replaced by Koreans as soon as possible. If the head of the government was a Korean, he was to be retained until a suitable replacement could be found. If a political party had expelled the former officials and taken over the government, the officials put in by the party were to be arrested and suitable substitutes appointed. Former police officials were to be used, if they were available and suitable, and backed up if necessary by the military. All government funds were to be carefully controlled and placed to the credit of the Korean Military Government. Tactical commanders were to make every effort to alleviate suffering, to prevent the spread of disease, and to encourage production. Although a free market in commodities, including rice, was then the policy of Military Government in Seoul, black market activities were to be kept to a minimum by means of careful supervision.

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Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo, the eventual responsibility of the 6th Division, were occupied temporarily by the 7th and 40th Divisions pending the arrival of the 6th as has been shown. The latter assumed responsibility for its zone at about the same time that military

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government teams began to arrive, and consequently its military government activities will not be discussed here. Very little information is available on the tactical military government in these two provinces by the 7th and 40th Divisions. The occupation was a sketchy one, and communications were bad, as the liaison teams sent into this area to observe the activities of Japanese troops soon found out. These troops were to "supervise local governments" rather than to establish a post-war government.[342]

Apparently, there never was a tactical military governor of Cholla Pukto while the 7th Division occupied the province. A reconnaissance detachment of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade at Kunsan reported early in October that there was friction in the city between Japanese employers and Korean workers. Violence committed by Koreans was reported from Chonju. Both Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo were occupied by large numbers of Japanese troops, concentrated near the lines of communication with Pusan awaiting movement to that port for evacuation to Japan. Most of the early military government in the two provinces was performed by the liaison teams sent by the 7th and 40th Divisions to points where Japanese troops were concentrated.[343]

Violence committed by Koreans against Japanese was reported from Mokp'o early in October, and troops who reached the city in the middle of the month found a large number of small boats carrying on illegal traffic. These ships were, of course, detained. Military government functions on a provincial level seem to have been exercised by two military government officers from Seoul. At Mokp'o they appointed a

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mayor and police chief, but the Japanese provincial governor was not removed until 25 October. Conditions in Kwangju were generally quiet, although the fast-forming Korean political associations could not be supervised by troops from the 40th Division because their units were spread out to such an extent that control was impossible. 344

And so went tactical military government. Born of necessity, it continued only as long as was needed. The transition to military government by trained units took place over a considerable period of time — from late October to the middle of January — and it will be dealt with in another chapter.


The Withdrawal of the 40th Division

The 6th Division was informed on 20 October that it was to relieve elements of the 40th Division in eight areas in the northwestern part of Kyongsang Pukto by 5 November. This relief was the first of several successive moves which would gradually relieve the 40th of all occupational responsibilities in Korea and which would redistribute the territory held by the other two divisions so that each would assume its share of the eight provinces of Southern Korea. This first relief constituted the first Korean assignment for the 1st Infantry and for the Division Artillery Command. Ch'ungch'ong Namdo would not be occupied at all by the 6th; the 7th Division would assume full occupational responsibility for the province. The 1st Infantry and the Division Artillery were ordered to relieve the

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40th in the eight guns as soon as possible after arrival — the former occupying most of the area, and the latter, composed of the 1st and 80th Field Artillery Battalions, occupying one and part of a second gun in the southwestern part of the zone.[346]

Advance parties of the 1st Infantry and of the Division Artillery, which had come to Korea in the initial lift of the Division, initiated a reconnaissance of their new zone in Kyongsang Pukto on 21 October.[347]

The first echelon of the 1st Infantry, consisting of the 1st and 2d Battalions, Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and one company of the 3d Battalion, arrived at Inch'on on 24 October.[348] The 2d Battalion remained at Inch'on as a port battalion,[349] and the other elements left for Andong the next afternoon.[350] Regimental Headquarters was opened there along with the 1st Battalion Headquarters, and elements moved into the regimental zone to relieve the 40th. Pending the arrival of the 3d Battalion, the Anti-tank Company occupied Sangju, Yech'on, and Hamch'ang.[351] The relief in the regimental zone was completed on 2 November.[352]

The second echelon — the 3d Battalion less one company — arrived at Inch'on on 31 October,[353] and elements left by rail for Hamch'ang the next day.[354] Motor convoys departed from Inch'on for this town as unloading was completed. On 5 November the 3d Battalion relieved the Anti-tank Company at Sangju and at Hamch'ang, on 6 November at Mun'yong, and on 12 November at Yech'on.[355]

The 2d Battalion continued shore party activities at Inch'on during

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the first part of November. It was relieved as unloading was completed, and it left by rail and by motor convoy for Andong on 7 November. By 10 November the 1st Infantry was assembled in its zone.

Elements of the Division Artillery arrived Inch'on towards the end of October and the first part of November. On the morning of 1 October motor convoys with elements of the 1st and 80th Field Artillery Battalions and elements of Division Artillery Headquarters Battery left Inch'on for Kunch'on. Other elements of these units departed by rail for Kunch'on that evening. The command posts were set up in these towns, and the units settled down to what was to be a short occupation period in that locality.

Elements of the 108th and 185th Infantry Regiments withdrew into other parts of their zones as they were relieved by the 6th. To compensate for the large area in northern Kyongsang Pukto of which the 185th was relieved, the northwestern part of the 40th Division Artillery's zone was given to the Regiment.

The next advancement into the 40th's zone was ordered on 1 November; the 6th Division was to relieve the 40th Division Artillery in seven zones of Kyongsang Namdo, the relief to be accomplished by 10 November.


Advanced elements of the 1st Field Artillery left for Chinju on 7 November, and other elements came down the next day. Elements of this Battalion occupied Koch'ang, Hamyang, and Hadong. Division Artillery Headquarters moved to Chinju on 10 November. The 80th Field Artillery Battalion, after sending out an advance party, moved to Sach'on, a few miles south of Chinju. The 213th Field Artillery was relieved in the

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Chinju area by 10 November, and it displaced to Chinhae except for two batteries which were sent to Masan.[368]

The 1st Infantry relieved the 6th Division Artillery in the Kumch'on area.[369] Regimental Headquarters and Service Company moved to Kumch'on on 10 November, and the 2d Battalion, which had arrived in Andong five days before, arrived on 12 November.[370]


Following these two area adjustments, there was a temporary period of stability. Meanwhile, planning continued on how and when the 40th Division would be relieved.

At first it was contemplated that the 40th Division would be withdrawn and returned to the United States as an active, full-strength division. The withdrawal would be gradual; one combat team would leave the latter part of January, one in February, and the third early in March.[371] Since the Division was predominately composed of California National Guard units, it was proposed that it would be returned through a California port, and there was talk of a parade in San Francisco by the March echelon.[372] Planning reached the stage where shipping was requested to accommodate over 13,000 officers and men.[373] These plans came to naught; on 20 December it was proposed that the Division would move as a category IV unit late in February or early in March. It would move as a complete entity — that is, representatives of all integral units would return with the Division although no one would return with it who was not eligible for readjustment under the then-current criteria.[374] The XXIV Corps received final authority on 5 January for issuing clearance orders. All personnel not eligible for discharge were to be assigned to other units in Korea.

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


Note - The 6th Division assumed responsibility for Masan.

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


Note - Masan was the responsibility of the 6th Division.

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
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
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
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
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Area Assignments CONFIDENTIAL 46




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Area Assignments as of 20 Feb 46

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The transfer to the Division of high-point men from other units in Korea was authorized, [375] but this was not done as it was felt that the interests of National Guard in California would be furthered by the return with the Division of only those who had served with it. [376]

The period of stability lasted a little more than a month before further relief of the 40th was ordered. On 20 December the 6th Division assumed responsibility for three more guns in Kyongsang Namdo and for the city of Masan. [377]

Change 6 to Field Order 56, which ordered the above relief, outlined six phases that were to be followed during the early part of 1946 which, through gradual phases, would relieve the 40th Division of all occupational responsibilities on 20 February. The plan, subject to approval by CINCAFPAC, was reaffirmed by Change 1 to USAFIK Field Order 1 although one of the phases had been completed, in effect, by the time it was published (9 January 46).

The first change in area assignments took place on 10 January when the 6th Division relieved the 40th of responsibility for four guns in central Kyongsang Pukto. [378] At the same time the 7th Division began its move into Kyongsang Pukto by taking over two guns from the 6th and two from the 40th. [379] Five days later the 6th relieved the 40th of four other guns in the province, and the 7th took over six guns from the 6th. [380] These two changes brought the 7th Division into a little more of Kyongsang Pukto than the 6th had been occupying in that province since 3 November, and the moves constituted all the readjustment that the 7th would be called upon to make in compensation for the loss of the 40th.

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The other adjustments would be between the 6th and 40th Divisions.

On 20 January the remaining four guns of Kyongsang Pukto were turned over to the 6th Division.[381] On 1 February five guns of Kyongsang Namdo were added to the 6th Division's zone,[382] five days later another gun was added,[383] and after 15 February the 40th Division was responsible for only one gun, the one which contained Pusan.[384] The Division was relieved of all responsibility at 1200, 20 February 1946.[385]

The individual displacements made by units of the 6th and 7th Divisions for the relief of the 40th are of no particular importance to this story. The 6th Division Command Post moved from Chonju to Pusan on 17 February, moving into the Municipal Building which had been evacuated by the 40th.[386] Changes were made in the regimental zones of responsibility, of course. The 7th Division's zone in Kyongsang Pukto was added to the 17th Infantry's area, although no unit the size of a battalion was moved into it.[387] The 6th Division Artillery, at this time including all four battalions, assumed responsibility for the western part of Kyongsang Namdo. Three battalions were in Chinhae and one at Masan.[388] The 1st Infantry Regiment occupied the 6th Division's zone in Kyongsang Pukto and in the eastern part of Kyongsang Namdo, maintaining battalions at Taegu, Pusan, and P'ohang-dong.[389]

In January the 40th Division had started transferring low point men to other units in Korea, and this process was completed by the middle of February. Enlisted men with 45 points or with 50 months service as of 30 April were released in advance of the embarkation of the Division and were sent home as cadres. Most officers who were eligible under the 30 April criteria were also released. As the combat teams were relieved of

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territorial responsibility, they assembled to complete final paper work and to prepare essential records for shipment to the United States. The Division Artillery assembled in Chinhae, the 185th Infantry at Taegu, the 108th Infantry at the Yongil Naval Air Base near Po'hang-Dong, and the 160th Infantry in Pusan. Around the 22d of February what was left of the combat teams assembled in Pusan; a total of 33 officers and 17 enlisted men were left to take the Division home.[390] A single officer was the sole representative of at least one battalion. Almost all those who went home with the Division had been eligible for discharge some time before, but had waived their discharge rights.[391] The remnants of the 40th Division, except for General Myers and one other officer who returned by air, outloaded on the USS Marine Devil and sailed for San Francisco on 15 March.[392]

Epilogue

When the 40th Division returned to the United States, the total ground-service force in Korea numbered only 44,252[393] officers and men, 10,391 below the authorized 1 June strength of 54,643.[394] These figures do not include the strength of the 308th Bomb Wing, a 5th Air Force unit which was not assigned to USAFIK. According to semi-monthly strength reports, the Corps had reached its maximum on 31 October with a command strength of 77,643. General Hodge was alarmed at the reduction-without-replacement process and had noticed on 19 December:

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...it should be noted that this command is now... below the projected April 15 strength. The occupation of Korea is not in any degree comparable to occupation of Japan. Here it is an occupation in fact where we are actually governing eighteen million persons who to date show no great desire to be governed, a waning enthusiasm for Americans, and who may be said to offer a degree of passive resistance. Troop units are widely dispersed in order to maintain civil control and the shortage of personnel greatly hampers our functions. This wide dispersion further adds to the load on understrength service units.

It is pointed out that this command has not yet recovered from the delays imposed upon it in getting its troops to the target and that all its projected troop strengths are below reasonable requirements if widespread disorders should occur in southern Korea, not to mention the circumstance of two hundred thousand Russians of questionable attitude in northern Korea. In view of the circumstances, it is not believed that its strength should at any time be allowed to go below projected strengths, and that in case of reduced theater strength, reductions should be absorbed elsewhere than in Korea.[395]

Nevertheless, by 15 January the actual strength had dropped to 54,531, about 100 below the proposed 1 June strength, and the downward trend continued. It seems to have reached its low point during the two week period ending 15 March, this despite the fact that the 40th Division went home as a 'paper outfit'.

The combat efficiency of the XXIV Corps had declined even more steeply than its numerical total. By 6 November the combat efficiency in case of an emergency was considered to be "poor".[396] General Hodge radioed on 16 March: "...from the standpoint of combat, my force efficiency is near zero."[397] The overall combat efficiency of the XXIV Corps as a corps unit was put at 10 percent on 25 March for the following reasons:

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Absence of adequate corps artillery, anti-aircraft and other special combat units, the destruction of the tactical integrity of the entire command due to loss of qualified personnel and lack of combined training have reduced combat efficiency to a point where this command is not qualified to perform combat missions.398

An influx of replacements after the middle of March brought the Corps up to 32,119 by 15 May, but it seemed unlikely that the combat efficiency would improve much until the command could stabilize, assemble in larger groups, and undergo intensive field training.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. See Chapter IV.

2. Interview with Brigadier General Donald J. Myers, USA, Commanding General, 40th Infantry Division, 18 Mar 46. (in historical file); History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, 1 Jul 1945 to 15 Jan 1946. In XXIV Corps G-3 files. p. 2.

3. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 1.

4. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 2.

5. Brief History of the 40th Infantry Division in World War II. Located in G-2 files of 40th Inf Div.

6. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 4.

7. Ibid.

8. Conversations with various officers and enlisted men of the 40th Infantry Division.

9. Interview with Brig Gen Myers; also, History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 4.

10. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG, 40th Inf Div, 172325/I Aug 45. See Chapter I for details of this conference.

11. Radio, Hq 6th Army Adv to CG 40th Inf Div, 220445/2 Aug 45.

12. See Chapter I.

13. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 9; Interview with General Myers.

14. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 5.

15. Letter: Brig Gen Myers to Lt Gen Hodge, 3 Sep 45. Located in official file of Gen Hodge in G/S office.

16. Interview with Brig Gen Myers.

17. Interview with Brig. Gen. Myers.

18. Ibid.

19. Interivew with Col. Edwin A. Henn, FA, former Military Governor of Kyongsang Pukto Province, 13 Apr 46.

20. Annex 7 to XXIV Corps FO 55, 29 Aug 45.

21. Personal knowledge of historian.

22. Letter, Brig. Gen. Myers to Lt. Gen. Hodge, 15 Sep 45. Location cited above.

23. Personal knowledge of historian and conversations with various members of the 40th Inf Div.

24. See Chapter I.

25. Consolidated Daily Strength Report, 12 Sep 45. In 40th Inf Div AG files.

26. Radio, COMTHIB GR 13 to COMTRANSRON 21, 040210 Sep 45.

27. Ibid.

28. Radio, COM 7TH PHIB FORCE to COM PHIB GROUP 13, 101122/I Sep 45.

29. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea, p. 6

30. Radio, COMTHIB GR 13 to COMTRANSDIV 103, 110250 Sep 45.

31. Statement by 2d Lt. Ellis I. Johnson, Jr., Inf, 185th Infantry Regiment.

32. Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG USAFPAC APO 500, 151855/I Sep 45.

33. Unit History, 185th Infantry Regiment, 18 August 45 - 15 January 46, p. 4. In historical file.

34. Letter: Brig. Gen. Myers to Lt. Gen. Hodge, 15 Sep 45.

35. See Statistical Loading Chart, 40th Infantry Division. In historical file.

36. Radio COMTHIB GR 13 to COM 7TH PHIB, 222131/I Sep 45.

37. XXIV Corps FO 55, 28 Aug 45.

38. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York, 1944). p. 80

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59. Ibid. p. 194.

60. Ibid. p. 6.

61. CIC Area Study, Korea, August 1945, p. 15. In Historical file.

62. Factual Data - Fusan, Korea Area, 17 Aug 45, Hqs. Tenth Army. Report located in main file of Military Government Group 96, Kyongsang Namdo Province.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid..

65. See Chapter XI.

66. The information in this paragraph is from XXIV Corps Staff Conference, 12 Sep 45. Located in historical file.

67. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, 061449 Sep 45.

68. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, 131700/I Sep 45.

69. Letter, Gen. Hodge to CINCAFPAC, 13 Sep, "Conditions in Korea", par 16 - In AG "Top Secret file".

70. Letter, Mr. H. Merrill Benninghoff to Secretary of State, 15 Sep, "The Present Situation in Korea", in AG "Top Secret" file.

71. Letter, TPOOT 320.2, 13 Sep 45 to Commanding Officer, XXIV Corps reconnaissance Detachment. (Attention Lt. Col. G. J. Miller, O-268304, Field Artillery), "Letters of Instructions". Copy in historical file. This is the same party mentioned in Chapters IV and X.

72. Ibid.

73. Letter, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Inf Div, 13 Sep 45, "Instructions to Major General Sugai of the 17th Army Group."

74. Letter to CG XXIV Corps 26 Sep 45, "Report of XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Detachment to Fusan". Copy in historical file.

75. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 16 Sep 45.

76. Radio, Army Recon Party Fusan to CG XXIV Corps, 161600/I Sep 45. Radio, Army Recon Party Fusan to CG XXIV Corps, attention PRO, pass to press collect NY Times Johnston, dateline Fusan, Korea. Radio, Army Recon Party Fusan to CG XXIV Corps Attn PRO to GHQ AFPAC Manila pass to press via press wireless press collect Associated San Francisco, 162045/I Sep 45. Corps Staff Conference, 18 Sep 45.

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57. Johnson's radio, cited above.

58. Radio, Army Recon Party Fusan to G3 XXIV Corps, 161600/I Sep 45, cited above.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 18 Sep 45.

62. Letter ZPGOT 300.4, 19 Sep 45, to Maj. Gen. Sugai. "Directive to Commander, Japanese 17th Army Group".

63. Radio, XXIV Corps Recon Det Fusan to 308 Bomb Wing (Attn Col Dean), 161825/I Sep 45.

64. Radio, Captain G. G. Wood USN (with Army Reconnaissance Party Fusan) to COMDRUDIV 16, 162200/I Sep 45.

65. Radio, CTF 71 to G3 XXIV Corps, 170840/I Sep 45.

66. "Report of XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Detachment to Fusan", cited above.

67. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 17, 20 Sep 45.

68. Ibid.

69. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 20 Sep 45.

70. Radio, G3 XXIV Corps to G3 7th Inf Div, 171955/I Sep 45.

71. "Seoul-Fusan Reconnaissance Report", 24 Sep 45, in Japanese Liaison Detachments File G-3 files XXIV Corps.

72. Ibid.

73. Radio, G3 XXIV Corps to COMSEVENTH PHIB, 221101/I Sep 45.

74. Radio, G3 XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, 070850/ Sep 45.

75. Radio, G3 USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADVANCE, 140941 Sep 45.

76. Radio, G3 USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 151907 Sep 45.

77. Radio, G3 USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 191941 Sep 45.

78. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to G3 XXIV Corps, G3 USASTAF 142350/I Sep 45.

79. Radio, COMGENUSASTAF to CINCAFPAC ADV, 161002/I Sep 45.

80. Corps Staff Conference, 18 Sep 45; Radio, CG USAFIK to COM 7TH FLEET, 301451/I Sep 45.

81. Radio, COMONUDIV 16 to Captain G. C. Wood USN with Army Reconnaissance Party Fusan, 161333 Sep 45.

82. Radio, Captain G. C. Wood (with Army Reconnaissance Party Fusan) to COMONUDIV 16, 162200/I Sep 45.

83. Corps Staff Conference, 19 Sep 45.

84. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Inf Div, 180930 Sep 45.

85. Radio, COMSEVENTH PHIB to COM SEVENTH FLT, 181523/I Sep 45.

86. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 17, 20 Sep 45.

87. Corps Staff Conference, 21 Sep 45.

88. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Inf Div, 212115/I Sep 45.

89. XXIV Corps FO 56, 21 Sep 45.

90. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 17, 22 Sep 45.

91. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 20, 23 Sep 45.

92. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 2, 24 Sep 45.

93. Unit History, 185th Infantry Regiment.

94. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 22, 25 Sep 45.

95. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 28, 1 Oct 45. Personal observation of 2d Lt. Ellis I. Johnson, Inf, 185th Inf Regt.

96. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 10, 2 Oct 45.

97. Unit History, 160th Infantry Regiment. In historical file.

98. Radio, XXIV Corps Recon Party Fusan to CG XXIV Corps, 251229/I Sep 45.

99. Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 261537/I Sep 45.

100. Interview with Lt. Col. George Logan, XXIV Corps Air Officer, 15 Feb 46; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG USASTAF, 211050/I Sep 45; radio, 308 Bomb Wing Adv to CG 308 Bomb Wing Rear, 191820/I Sep 45; radio, 20th Airforce to CTO 943, 271445/I Sep 45; radio, CG USASTAF to COMAF 20, XXIV Corps Adv, 271601/I Sep 45.

101. 40th Inf Div F.O. No. 21, 4 Oct 45.

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102. These figures are from the "Daily File of Evacuation Reports Through the Port of Pusan". Now located in G-3 files, 6th Inf Div.

103. Unit History, 160th Inf Regt, p. 8.

104. Ibid.

105. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 23, 26 Sep 45. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report Nos. 2 and 3, 24 and 25 Sep 45.

106. Unit History, 160th Inf Regt.

107. Ibid.

108. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 2, 24 Sep 45.

109. Idem. No. 4, 26 Sep 45; Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 261600/I Sep 45.

110. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 5, 27 Sep 45.

111. Idem. No. 6, 28 Sep 45.

112. Idem. No. 8, 30 Sep 45.

113. Idem. No. 7, 29 Sep 45.

114. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 51, 4 Oct 45.

115. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to COM 7TH FLT, 190102/I Sep 45.

116. Radio, COM 7TH FLT to COM 5TH FLT, 230710/I Sep 45.

117. Radio, COM 5TH FLT to COM 7TH FLT, 260134/I Sep 45.

118. Radio, COM 7TH FLT to COM 5TH FLT, 230710/I Sep 45.

119. Radio, GTF 71 to CG XXIV Corps, 291805/I Oct 45.

120. Radio, COM 7TH PHIB FOR to COM PHIB GRP 13, 010217 Sep 45.

121. Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG USAFIK, 152050/I Oct 45.

122. Interview with Brig. Gen. Myers.

123. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 27, 30 Sep 45.

124. Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to COM TRANSRON 21, 061135/I Oct 45.

125. Grajdannev, p. 50, cited above.

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126. Unit History, 185th Inf Regt, p. 6; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 27, 30 Sep 45.

127. Unit History, 185th Inf Regt, p. 6; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No 28, 1 Oct 45.

128. Unit History, 185th Inf Regt, p. 6.

129. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 29, 2 Oct 45.

130. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 10, 2 Oct 45.

131. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 29, 2 Oct 45.

132. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 5 Oct 45.

133. Unit History, 185th Inf Regt, p. 6.

134. 40th Inf Div FO 21, 4 Oct 45; See maps in appendix.

135. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 12, 4 Oct 45; Radio CO 40th Inf Div to CO 185th Inf, 041600 Oct 45.

136. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 14, 6 Oct 45.

137. Unit History, 185th Inf Regt, p. 9.

138. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 7 Oct 45.

139. Idem. No. 19, 11 Oct 45.

140. Idem. No. 21, 13 Oct 45.

141. Idem. No. 22, 14 Oct 45.

142. Unit History, 185th Inf Regt, p. 7.

143. 40th Inf Div FO 21, 4 Oct 45.

144. Unit History, 108th Inf Regt, p. 9.

145. Ibid; 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 5 Oct 45.

146. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 5 Oct 45.

147. Ibid.

148. Idem. No. 14, 6 Oct 45.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. Idem. No. 15, 7 Oct 45.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. Idem. No. 16, 8 Oct 45.

155. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 34, 7 Oct 45.

156. Idem. No. 38, 11 Oct 45.

157. Unit History, 108th Inf Regt, p. 11.

158. Overlay of 40th Inf Div Troop Locations as of 10 Oct 45. In XXIV Corps G-3 Journal.

159. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 21, 24 Sep 45.

160. Idem. No. 29, 2 Oct 45.

161. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 5 Oct 45.

162. Unit History, 222d FA Bn, in historical file; Unit History, Headquarters, 40th Division Artillery. In historical file.

163. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 14, 6 Oct 45.

164. Idem. No. 15, 8 Oct 45.

165. Unit History, Headquarters, 40th Division Artillery.

166. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 35, 8 Oct 45.

167. XXIV Corps FO 56, 21 Sep 45.

168. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 13, 20 Sep 45.

169. Inclosure No. 1, 7th Inf Div G-3 Report No. 18, 25 Sep 45.

170. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 20, 27 Sep 45.

171. Idem. No. 21, 28 Sep 45.

172. Idem. No. 22, 29 Sep 45.

173. Idem. No. 24, 1 Oct 45.

174. Idem. No. 26, 3 Oct 45.

175. Idem. No. 28, 5 Oct 45.

176. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 33, 6 Oct 45.

177. Amendment 1 to 7th Inf Div FO 46, 2 Oct 45.

178. Radio, CG 7th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 070940/I Oct 45.

179. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 31, 8 Oct 45.

180. Idem. No. 33, 10 Oct 45.

181. 7th Inf Div FO 46, 24 Sep 45.

182. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 35, 12 Oct 45.

183. 7th Inf Div FO 46, 24 Sept 45.

184. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 16, 23 Sep 45.

185. Ibid.

186. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 18, 25 Sep 45.

187. Idem. No. 21, 28 Sep 45.

188. Idem. No. 24, 1 Oct 45.

189. Idem. No. 27, 4 Oct 45.

190. Idem. No. 28, 5 Oct 45.

191. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, CG ASCOM 24, 041115/I Oct 45.

192. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, Mil Govt, 061457/I Oct 45; Amendment 3 to 7th Inf Div FO 46, 7 Oct 45; Letter MGCOA 370, 27 Sep 45, "Duties of Small Detachments at Important Points throughout Southern Korea"; Annex No. 3 to 40th Inf Div FO 21, 4 Oct 45.

193. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 29, 6 Oct 45.

194. Amendment 3 to 7th Inf Div FO No. 46, 7 Oct 45.

195. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 30, 7 Oct 45.

196. Idem. No. 31, 8 Oct 45.

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197. Idem. No. 39, 10 Oct 45.

198. Ibid.

199. Teletype, CG 7th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 081900/I Oct 45; Corps Staff Conference, 5 Oct 45.

200. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 35, 12 Oct 45.

201. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 14, 6 Oct 45.

202. Idem. No. 17, 9 Oct 45.

203. Idem. No. 16, 8 Oct 45; ASCOM 24 G-3 Operations Report No. 35, 9 Oct 45.

204. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 17, 9 Oct 45.

205. Idem. No. 15, 7 Oct 45; Change 1 to 40th Inf Div FO 21, 4 Oct 45.

206. Ibid.

207. 40th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 21, 13 Oct 45; Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Inf Div, 091515/I Oct 45.

208. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24, CG 6th Inf Div, 161445/I Oct 45; Letter to CG ASCOM 24, CG 6th Inf Div, 15 Oct "Evacuation of Japanese from Cheju Island to Sasebo, Japan". For details of the 749th FA Bn on Cheju see Chapter XI; Unit History, 749th FA Bn, in historical file.

209. See Chapter XI.

210. Radio, CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA ADV to SCAP, 050333 Sep 45 which quotes an earlier radio.

211. Interview with Col. Joseph B. Coolidge, GSC, G-3 XXIV Corps, 15 Feb 46.

212. Radio, CINCAFPAC CINCPOA ADV to SCAP, 050333 Sep 45 which quotes parts of an earlier radio from Gen. Hodge; also radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 042240/I Sep 45.

213. Radio, CINCAFPAC CINCPOA ADV to SCAP, 050333 Sep 45.

214. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 15 Feb 46; Radio, COMSEVENTHFLT to COMFLTSGRP 13, 160613/I Sep 45.

215. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, CG 6th Army, 202139/I Sep 45.

216. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, CG 6th Army, 23214-/I Sep 45.

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217. Ibid.

218. Radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 211717 Sep 45.

219. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, CG 6th Army, 252140/I Sep 45.

220. Forward to 6th Inf Div After Action Report, 1 July to 21 August 1945; 1st Draft, History of the 6th Division in World War II, in PRO files, 6th Inf Div; Radio, 6th Inf Div Public Relations Officer to Korean Graphic, I & E Office, Hq XXIV Corps, 081140/I Feb 46.

221. 6th Inf Div, After Action Report.

222. Radio, CG I Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, 161244/I Aug 45.

223. 6th Inf Div FO 1, 22 Sep 45.

224. 6th Inf Div, After Action Report, cited above.

225. Interview with M/Sgt Caleb S. Brown, Inf, G-3 Section, 6th Inf Div, 6 May 46. In historical file.

226. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps Near Okinawa, etc, 252245/I Sep 45.

227. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, 241514/I Sep 45 which quotes CINCAFPAC radio, 251240/I Sep 45.

228. All information of the combat history of the 6th Inf Div is from notes of the History of the 6th Division in World War II, cited above, and from Radio, 6th Inf Div Public Relations Section to Korean Graphic, I & E Office, Hq XXIV Corps, also cited above.

229. Pacific Stars and Stripes, 8 May 46, p. 4.

230. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 13 May 46; interview with M/Sgt Brown, 6 May 46. Annual Staff History of XXIV Corps G-3 Section, part II, D, 10 Jan 46.

231. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 96th Inf Div, 240800/I Sep 45; Interview with Col. Coolidge, 13 May 46.

232. Letter, AG XXIV Corps to AG 6th Inf Div, 25 Sep 45. Copy in historical file.

233. Interview with Sgt. Brown, cited above.

234. Ibid.

235. Ibid; Interview with Col. Coolidge, 13 May 46.

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236. Interview with Lt. Col. David D. Hulsey, G-3, 6th Inf Div, 11 Jan 46. In historical file.

237. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG, XXIV Corps Rear Okinawa, 252245/I Sep 45.

238. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 13 May 46.

239. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG I Corps, 270938/I Sep 45.

240. Radio, Adv Party 6th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 051900/I Sep 45; radio, CO Adv Party 6th Inf Div to CG 6th Inf Div, 022145/I Oct 45.

241. Interview with Col. Hulsey, 11 Jan 46.

242. Ibid.

243. 6th Inf Div FO 1, 30 Sep 45; XXIV Corps FO 56, 21 Sep, with changes 1 and 2.

244. Radio, CG 6th Army Rear to CG I Corps, 260510/I Sep 45.

245. Interview with Lt. Col. John C. Wicher, G3C, G-4, 6th Inf Div, 6 May 46. In historical file.

246. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 6th Inf Div, 241514/I Sep 45.

247. Interview with Lt. Col. Wicher, cited above.

248. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 6th Inf Div, 131416 Oct 45, which refers to an earlier radio from CINCAFPAC; Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, 071550/I Oct 45.

249. Letter, AG, XXIV Corps to AG, 6th Inf Div, 25 Sep 45; also R/S AG to G/S, 25 Sep, on which Gen. Hodge has written, "By all means", on the proposal to have the 6th Division release all eligible personnel.

250. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 101700/I Oct 45.

251. Radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Manila, COMGEN 6th Inf Div, 061207/I Oct 45.

252. 1st Indorsement to Letter, 1st Information and Historical Service, APO 235, 15 May 46, "Request for Historical Information". In historical file.

253. Radio, HPIS to XXIV Corps, 240509/I Sep 45; radio, COM SEVENTH PHIB FOR to COMPHIBSRP 15, 240514/I Sep 45; radio, COMSEVENTH PHIB FOR to CG XXIV Corps, 241409/I Sep 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, 251646/I Sep 45.

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294. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 6th Inf Div, 261258/I Sep 45; radio COMPHIBGRP 13 to CG XXIV Corps, 260502 Sep 45.

295. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, 251646/I Sep 45.

296. Radio, CG USAFIK to COMSEVENTH PHIB FOR (OTF 71, please pass), 281824/I Sep 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to COMSEVENTH PHIB FOR, 031045/I Oct 45.

297. Radio, CG USAFIK to COMSEVENTH PHIB FOR, 281824 Sep 45.

298. Ibid.

299. Radio, SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 291003/I Sep 45.

300. Radio, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 301522/I Sep 45.

301. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK, 011321/I Oct 45; for details of the movement of Japanese soldiers from Inch'on to Sasebo, see Chapter X.

302. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 6th Inf Div, 300545/I Oct 45.

303. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 6th Inf Div, 031026 Oct 45.

304. XXIV Corps FO 56, 21 Sep 45.

305. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, 071530/I Oct 45; radio, OTF 78.29 to COMPHIBGRP 13, 081650 Oct 45.

306. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 13 May 45.

307. Ibid.; Interview with Major Richard Irvin, Jr., G-3 Section, XXIV Corps, 23 Jan 46.

308. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, 281545/I Sep 45.

309. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, no dtg.

310. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 6th Inf Div, 111505 Oct 45.

311. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CINCAFPAC, 102239/I Oct 45; Memorandum, G-4, 6th Inf Div to Historical Officer, XXIV Corps, 12 Jan 46, "Information of Movement of 6th Infantry Division from Luzon, P. I. to Inch'on, Korea". In historical file.

312. See Statistical Shipping Chart, 6th Inf Div. In historical file.

313. XXIV Corps FO 55, 28 Aug 45.

314. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div Rear Echelon to CG XXIV Corps, CINCAFPAC, AFWESPAC, 261305/I Oct 45.

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275. Ibid.

276. Radio, COMPHIBSPAC 13 to XXIV Corps, 311257/I Oct 45.

277. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, CG 6th Army, 232140/I Sep 45. Appears to have been received 24 Sep 45.

278. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, 101317/I Oct 45.

279. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, no dtg.

280. Message from CG 6th Inf Div afloat, 15 Oct 45, XXIV Corps G-3 Log Number 7021.

281. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 43, 16 Oct 45.

282. Idem. No. 44, 17 Oct 45.

283. Ibid.

284. ASCOM 24, G-3 Operations Report No. 45, 18 Oct 45.

285. 6th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 3, 19 Oct 45.

286. Ibid.

287. ASCOM 24, G-3 Operations Report No. 49, 22 Oct 45.

288. 6th Inf Div FO 2, 24 Oct 45.

289. Radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 230956 Oct 45.

290. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 52, 25 Oct 45.

291. Ibid; Idem. No. 53, 26 Oct 45.

292. 7th Inf Div, G-3 Operations Report No. 47, 24 Oct 45.

293. For details of these displacements, see XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Reports and 6th Inf Div G-3 Operations Reports.

294. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 68, 10 Nov 45.

295. See Chapter XI for details of these reliefs.

296. See Chapters I, III, IV and VI.

297. Annex 7 to XXIV Corps FO 55, 28 Aug 45; Hq XXIV Corps, "Paragraphs of Annex 7 to FO 55 to be placed into effect," 1 Sep 45.

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298. Annex 7 to 7th Inf Div FO 45, 1 Sep 45; Annex 8 to 40th Inf Div FO 20, 5 Sep 45; Annex 6 to 6th Inf Div FO 1, 30 Sep 45; see also Hq USAFIK, memorandum, TFKAG 300, "Administration Functions, Headquarters United States Army Forces in Korea", 1 Sep 45. Copy in historical file.

299. History of the 40th Infantry Division in Korea. pp 3 - 5.

300. 7th Inf Div FO 46, 24 Sep 45, par 3x; Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, "Instructions to Troops Occupying Areas in Korea South of 38°," 28 Sep 45. Copy in historical file.

301. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, memorandum, "Duties of Small Detachments at Important Points Throughout Southern Korea," 27 Sep 45 (copy in historical file); Annex 5 to 40th Inf Div FO 21, 4 Oct 45.

302. See above. Also Hq 7th Div, "Military Government Responsibilities and Procedures," 8 Oct 45 (copy in historical file); Changes 3 to 7th Inf Div FO 46, 22 Oct 45; Changes 3, 4 and 5 to XXIV Corps FO 56, 21 Oct 45.

303. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, "Personnel Assignments," 15 Oct 45 (copy in historical file); radio, CG USAFIK to subordinates, 230856/I Oct 45.

304. Radio, CG USAFIK to CG 40th Inf Div, 051536/I Oct 45.

305. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 061032/I Oct 45; radio, CG USAFIK to CG Sixth Army, 061816/I Oct 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 300840/I Oct 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 241528/I Oct 45.

306. MG Appointment Nos. 5 and 6, 2 Oct 45.

307. See Chapters VI and X.

308. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 15, 18 Sep 45; 7th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Report No. 20, 30 Sep 45.

309. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 25, 28 Sep 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 4, 14 Sep 45, p. 7.

310. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 19, 29 Sep 45, pp 2 - 3; Idem. No. 22, 2 Oct 45, p. 3.

311. Idem. No. 8, 18 Sep 45, p. 3.

312. 7th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 18, 25 Sep 45.

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513. MG Appointment No. 10, 5 Oct 45. See Chapter IV.

514. "Historical Report of Military Government in Kangwon Province," 17 Dec 45 (historical file).

515. Hq 67th MG Hq and Hq Co, "Military Government History, Initial Report," 20 Dec 45 (historical file); "History of the 55th Military Government Hq and Hq Co," 2 Sep 1945 — 15 Jan 1946 (historical file); report of 7th Div Ln Team No. 6, 4 Oct 45 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Policies and Operations No. 2").

516. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 33, 15 Oct 45, pp 3 - 4; interview with CO Co A, 17th Inf, at Ch'onan, 21 Oct 45; interview with Lt. Col. W. Kary, 22 Oct 45; interview with 1st Lt. R. M. Glenn, Co I, 17th Inf, 22 Oct 45; MG Appointment No. 10, 5 Oct 45.

517. Interviews with various persons at Taegu and Pusan, 22 - 24 Oct 45.

518. Interviews with Col. Edwin A. Henn, 23 Oct 45 and 13 Apr 46; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 26, 29 Sep 45; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 45, 18 Oct 45; radio, CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 041540 Oct 45; MG Removal No. 13, 11 Oct 45; CIC Periodic Report, 4 Oct 45 (40th Div G-2 files).

519. Interview with Col. Henn, 23 Oct 45 and 13 Apr 46; radio, MG to CG 40th Div, 061111 Oct 45; radio, CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 132055/I Oct 45; Col. Henn's formal appointment as governor seems to have been made later (MG Appointment No. 27, 3 Nov 45).

520. Interviews with Col. Henn and others, 23 Oct 45 and 13 Apr 46; radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 261600/I Sep 45; CIC Periodic Report, 5 Oct 45 (40th Div G-2 files).

521. Interviews with Col. Henn, 23 Oct 45 and 13 Apr 46; Provincial Orders 1 - 5, 19 Oct 45. (40th Div files).

522. Interviews with Col. Henn, 23 Oct 45 and 13 Apr 46.

523. Ibid.

524. 108th Inf G-2 Periodic Report No. 10, 20 Oct 45.

525. Interview with 2d Lt. Ellis I. Johnson, CO, AT Co, 185th Inf, 22 Oct 45. See also 77th CIC Periodic Report No. 27, 21 Oct 45.

526. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 31, 4 Oct 45; "Brief Outline of History of 63d Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co." (in historical file).

527. See chapters on repatriation.

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528. See Chapter III; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 23, 28 Sep 45; 84th Metropolitan CIC Unit, report, 18 Sep 45 (40th Div G-2 files); idem., 29 Sep 45; 77th CIC Periodic Report No. 1, 25 Sep 45; interview with 1st Lt. M. Schwartz, 40th CIC Det, 19 Dec 45; interview with Maj. M. Gracey, Military Chief of Police, Kyongsang Namdo, 24 Oct 45.

529. Memorandum, 1122d Engr Bn to 40th Div G-2, 30 Sep 45 (40th Div G-2 Msg Journal); 77th CIC memorandum, 5 Oct 45 (40th Div G-2 files); memorandum, Gen. Harris to CG 40th Div, 18 Oct 45 (40th Div files, location uncertain).

530. Radio, CG 40th Div Arty to CG 40th Div, 101157 Oct 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 35, 15 Oct 45; 40th Div G-2 Periodic Report No. 31, 26 Oct 45.

531. Oral report to CG 40th Div Arty to CG 40th Div, 061535 Oct 45 (40th Div G-2 Msg Journal); radio, CG 40th Div Arty to CG 40th Div, 121510 Oct 45; 40th Div Arty S-3 Operations Report, 12 Oct 45; radio, CG 40th Div Arty to CG 40th Div, 121400 Oct 45; 40th Div Arty S-2 Periodic Report No. 14, 22 Oct 45; 40th Div G-2 Periodic Report No. 32, 27 Oct 45; interview with officers of the 213th FA Bn at Chinju, 25 Oct 45.

532. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 39, 19 Oct 45, pp 2 - 3; radio, CG 40th Div Arty to CG 40th Inf Div, 101650 Oct 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 111500 Oct 45.

533. Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 221515/I Oct 45.

534. 185th Inf S-2 Periodic Report No. 19, 21 Oct 45.

535. Tp Msg, G-3 40th Div to S-3 160th Inf, 10 Oct 45 (40th Div G-2 Msg Journal); report, Co B 160th Inf to CO 160th Inf, 14 Oct 45 (40th Div files, location uncertain).

536. Radio, CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 271300/I Oct 45; interview with U. S. Army authorities at Chinhae, 25 Oct 45.

537. Radio, CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 151150 Oct 45.

538. Interview with officers of B Btry, 164th FA Bn, 25 - 26 Oct 45.

539. Radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 271300/I Oct 45; 40th Div G-2 Periodic Report No. 37, 1 Nov 45.

540. Interview with Army authorities at Chinhae, 25 Oct 45; interview with officers of B Btry, 164th FA Bn, 25 - 26 Oct 45.

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341. Hq 40th Div, Office of the MG, Kyongsang Namdo, memorandum to MG officers and CO's of army units in the field, 25 Oct 45 (40th Div files, location uncertain).

342. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, Military Government, 061457/I Oct 45.

343. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 51, 4 Oct 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 23, 3 Oct 45, p. 4; radio, CG 7th Div to CG USAFIK, 021410/I Oct 45; see Chapter XI; see Chapter X for details of these teams.

344. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 33, 13 Oct 45, p. 2; "Historical Report of the 55th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co for the Year 1945" (in historical file); "Unit History, 101st Military Government Group" in historical file; tp msg, Col. Henderson to CG 40th Div, 101620 Oct 45, (in 40th Div G-2 Msg Journal).

345. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, 202040/I Oct 45; Change 3 to XXIV Corps FO 56, 22 Oct 45.

346. 6th Inf Div FO 2, 24 Oct 45.

347. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 48, 21 Oct 45; 6th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 5, 21 Oct 45.

348. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 51, 24 Oct 45; Statistical Loading Chart - 6th Inf Div; Unit History 1st Inf Regt. In historical file.

349. Unit History, 1st Inf Regt.

350. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 52, 25 Oct 45; 6th Inf Div G-3 Operations Report No. 9, 25 Oct 45.

351. Unit History, 1st Inf Regt.

352. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 60, 2 Nov 45.

353. Unit History, 1st Inf Regt; Statistical Loading Chart - 6th Inf Div.

354. Unit History, 1st Inf Regt.

355. Ibid.

356. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 66, 8 Nov 45.

357. Unit History, 1st Inf Regt.

358. Unit Histories, 1st and 80th Field Artillery Battalions, in historical file.

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359. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 59, 1 Nov 45.

360. Ibid.

361. Unit Histories, 1st and 80th FA Bns. Unit History, Hq and Hq Bty, 6th Division Artillery.

362. Change 3 to 40th Inf Div FO 21, 25 Oct 45.

363. Change 4 to XXIV Corps FO 56, 21 Nov 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, 011517/I Nov 45; radio, CG 6th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 121142/I Nov 45.

364. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 65, 7 Nov 45; Unit History, 1st FA Bn.

365. Unit History, 1st FA Bn.

366. Unit History, Hq and Hq Bty, 6th Division Artillery.

367. Unit History, 80th FA Bn.

368. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report Nos. 67, 68, and 69, 9, 10, and 11 Nov 45.

369. 6th Inf Div Operational Memorandum No. 2, 5 Nov 45.

370. Unit History, 1st Inf Regt; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report Nos. 69, 70, and 71, 11, 12, and 13 Nov 45.

371. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Manila, 311257/I Oct 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, 121000/I Nov 45.

372. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Manila, 311257/I Oct 45; radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK, 081241/Z Dec 45; radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Manila, 141530/I Nov 45.

373. Radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Manila, 141530/I Nov 45.

374. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Manila, 201900/I Dec 45.

375. Radio, CINCAFPAC Manila to CG XXIV Corps, 030953/Z Jan 46.

376. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Manila, 201900/I Dec 45; personal knowledge of historian.

377. Change 6 to XXIV Corps Field Order No. 56, 15 Dec 45; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Inf Div, CG 40th Inf Div, 111509/I Dec 45; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 108, 20 Dec 45.

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378. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 9, 10 Jan 46.

379. Ibid.

380. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 14, 15 Jan 46.

381. Idem. No. 19, 20 Jan 46.

382. Idem. No. 31, 1 Feb 46.

383. Idem. No. 36, 6 Feb 46; Ulean Gun appears to Have been taken over by the 6th Division 10 days before Change 1 to USAFIK FO 1, 9 Jan 46 called for.

384. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 45, 15 Feb 46.

385. Idem. No. 50, 20 Feb 46; radio, CG 40th Inf Div to CG 7th Inf Div, 211700/I Feb 46.

386. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 47, 17 Feb 46; Personal knowledge of historian.

387. See overlay accompanying XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 53, 22 Feb to 1 Mar 46.

388. Ibid.

389. Ibid.

390. "Report of Troop Movements", 13 Mar 46. In G-3 Outgoing Message Journal, Mar 46, XXIV Corps G-3 Log No. 1039.

391. Information of the last days of the 40th Division in Korea is based on personal knowledge of historian, and on a conversation with Capt. William F. Hunt, Inf., and 1st Lts. John M. Bullitt, Inf., and Shickery Anton, FA, all of the XXIV Corps G-3 Section and former members of the 40th Division, 22 May 46.

392. Radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 152200/I May 46.

393. The figures for troop strength for the XXIV Corps are from SARO Strength Tabulation File, in strength section of 107th Machine Records Unit, XXIV Corps. These figures do not include the strength of the 308th Bomb Wing or of persons not actually serving in a command on a duty status, i. e. patients in the hospitals, Regular Army enlistees on re-enlistment furloughs, persons at the disposition center awaiting transportation to the United States, etc.

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394. This figure is subject to slight changes from time to time, but was the current figure on 22 May 46. AFPAC Form 63, 77 I/O. In XXIV Corps G-3 files.

395. Radio, GG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 191636/I Dec 45.

396. Radio, GG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 061702/I Nov 45, in AG "Top Secret" files.

397. Radio, GG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 161345/I Mar 46, in AG "Top Secret" files.

398. Radio, GG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 251630/I Mar 46.

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT: History of USAFIK

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	24 June 1946	1st Info & Hist Sv	CG	1. Tentative first draft of Chapter XI entitled "Demilitarization and Evacuation of Japanese Forces" is herewith submitted for your comments and criticism. ALBERT KEEN 1st Lt MI Commanding
		C/S	G-3	For comment prior to submission to C.G. C/S.
3	29 June	G-3	C/S	1. Recommended changes are indicated within draft. 2. In general, this history is well done and complete. JBC Concur
		C/S	I & H	C of S Noted JPW

Page No.....

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43 OVER 7773 [illegible]

Corrections made by Colonel Joseph B. Coolidge, XXIV Corps G-3 on Chapter XI.

Page 8.

Colonel Coolidge recommended that a new paragraph be substituted in place of the first paragraph on page 8. New page is inclosed herein.

Page 9.

and
~~although technically they were such; they~~ were to handle their own demobilization in Japan, ~~generally speaking~~.

Page 12.

October
and later ~~in September~~ they began to move civilians to Pusan,

The following reference is to be inserted in margin on side of this sentence: Correction by Colonel J. B. Coolidge, XXIV Corps G-3.

Page 14.

these messages 67
General Kozuki reported that ~~they~~ had a good effect.

Page 46.

A question mark was inserted in the margin along side of the last paragraph on this page, the reason for which is unknown.

Page 84.

405
By mid-June 1946 the process had been ~~resumed and~~ completed.

Page 90.

The following sentence was added to footnote #36: Paragraph, as it stands, was revised by Colonel J. B. Coolidge, XXIV Corps G-3.

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CHAPTER VII

DEMILITARIZATION AND EVACUATION OF JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES

The Potsdam Declaration, made public on 26 July 1945, promised that "The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."[1] The purpose of this chapter is to describe the application of this policy by the XXIV Corps to the Japanese armed forces in southern Korea.

In the words of the XXIV Corps field order, "The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers charges the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters with full responsibility for the rapid and orderly disarmament and demobilization of all Japanese armed forces under the supervision of Army and Separate Corps Commanders of the Occupation Forces." The Japanese military authorities were also required to furnish full information on the forces and installations under their control.[2]

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The Japanese Order of Battle in Korea

In accordance with this policy the Japanese delegates to the surrender discussions at Manila, which began on 19 August 1945, were required to submit information on the designations and locations of major Japanese units. That part of the data which related to Korea and Chuju Do indicated that the ground forces in that area were located as follows:

Northern Korea -- headquarters of the 17th Area Army, four infantry divisions (the 59th, 79th, 120th, and 137th), and one brigade (the 133d, believed to be an independent mixed brigade).

Southern Korea -- three infantry divisions (the 150th, 160th, and 320th), and one brigade (the 127th, believed to be an independent mixed brigade).

Chuju Do -- six infantry divisions (the 96th, 111th, 1215th, 12th, 17th, and 22d), eight independent mixed brigades (the 81st through the 88th), two independent infantry brigades (the 7th and 11th), and two independent cavalry brigades from the 23d Army.

Although this information may have been accurate at one time, it did not present a true picture of the situation at the time of the Japanese surrender. It is possible that the inaccuracy was due to the haste with which the data were probably compiled, or to the fact that the Imperial General Headquarters had been losing touch increasingly with its armies, due to difficulties of communication.

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Even before these figures reached Okinawa, the Tenth Army had prepared an estimate of the enemy situation in Korea. This estimate, which was turned over to the XXIV Corps when the latter assumed responsibility for the "Baker-Forty" operation, placed the Japanese strength in Korea at five depot divisions and five combat divisions, all under the control of the 17th Area Army (approximately equivalent to an American army).

A week later the XXIV Corps completed its own order of battle estimate of the Japanese forces. Based on admittedly incomplete information, this document nevertheless gave a more detailed picture than had the estimate prepared by the Tenth Army. Sufficient information was at hand to make it clear that Korea had been used as a training ground and recruiting area for the Japanese forces, including the Special Attack Corps. It was known that the old Korea Army had been converted into the 17th Area Army, with few significant changes in function. The administrative structure of the 17th Area Army was believed to consist of five divisional districts (Hamhm, Pyongyang, Seoul, Taegu, and Kwangju) and four fortresses (Hiko Bay, Pusan, Najin, and Yosu). A combat force of five divisions and a normal complement of service troops were expected. The air strength of the 17th Area Army was put at 840 planes. The total strength of the Japanese forces in all Korea (including naval personnel and presumably the forces on Cheju Do) was calculated to be 375,000. The estimated breakdown of this total was as follows:

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Infantry	215,000
Arty, AA, AT, AW	40,000
Engr, Shipping, Signal, etc.	60,000
Air-ground	35,000
Naval ground	25,000[5]

Still another week later, the Corps issued a second order of battle estimate locating the headquarters of the 17th Area Army in southern Korea. Under it, in the north, was the 34th Army (equivalent to an American corps), with its headquarters at Hamhung and controlling the 59th, 79th, 120th, and 137th divisions and the 135d Independent Mixed Brigade. In southern Korea were the 150th, 160th, and 320th divisions and the 127th Independent Mixed Brigade. Apparently no information on Cheju Do was available.[6]

After its landing the XXIV Corps found that the Japanese strength had been overestimated. The 17th Area Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Yoshio Kosuki,[7] controlled the forces in Korea proper and Cheju Do, but not those on Tsushima;[8] the total strength of these forces was approximately 200,000 men, of whom only some 30,000 were located north of the 38th parallel. There were no full combat divisions in the Russian zone.[9] These figures do not include Koreans, perhaps as many as 50,000 of whom were discharged from the army by the Japanese before the arrival of the American forces.[10]

In Korea south of the 38th parallel the major ground combat units of the 17th Area Army were:

120th Division
150th Division
160th Division
320th Division
12th Tank Regiment

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127th Independent Mixed Brigade (less one battalion north of the 38th parallel)
39th Independent Mixed Regiment
40th Independent Mixed Regiment[11]

The divisions were understrength; the 150th and 160th were square-type divisions.[12]

The chief service units in southern Korea were depot divisions at Seoul, Taegu, and Kwangju; there were fortresses at Pusan and Yosu. North of the 38th parallel there were depot divisions at Pyongyang and Nanam.[13]

On the island of Cheju Do the highest echelon of command was the 58th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Noburu Toyama and approximately 50,000 strong.[14] The principal combat units on the island were:

96th Division
111th Division
121st Division
108th Independent Mixed Brigade.

There were no service units of divisional size on the island.[15]

General Kosuki commanded the army air forces in Korea as well as the ground forces.[16] The highest air force echelon was the 5th Air Force, commanded by Lieutenant General T. Shimoyama, which controlled the 53d Air Division, the 1st Airborne Brigade, and the 1st, 2d, and 8th Air Brigades.[17] One estimate listed 910 army planes in Korea.[18] Another, presented by the Japanese at Manila, gave the strength as 43 army combat planes, of which only six were said to be operational,

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and about 194 training planes.[19] The actual strength of the 5th Air Force south of the 38th parallel and exclusive of Cheju Do was approximately 700 planes of all types.[20] In the same area there were 25 army air bases.

Japanese naval forces in Korea were under the command of Vice Admiral Gisaburo Yamaguchi, who had his headquarters at the Chinhae Minor Naval Station. Estimates of the number of men under his command vary; one shows 26,068 men as of 1 October 1945.[21] The Japanese delegates at Manila stated that the Chinhae Guard District was manned by approximately 16,000 officers and men.[22] Admiral Yamaguchi himself stated that the forces under his command south of the 38th parallel and including those stationed on Cheju Do numbered 13,000 officers and men and 1,200 civilian employees. He explained to the Commander of the Seventh Fleet that he also commanded a Special Base Unit at Wonsan and the Port Arthur District. At the time when American troops occupied Korea, these two bases had been surrendered to Russian forces, and Admiral Yamaguchi had lost contact with them. The other bases under his command, he said, were located at Pusan, Ongjin, Yongil, Pyongtaek, Kwangju, and Cheju. There were naval air bases at Chinhae, Yosu,[23] Kwangju, Pyongtaek, Yongil,[24] and Pusan.

Chinhae, the principal naval base in Korea, had long been considered a strategic area by the Japanese;[25] consequently, no information on it had been made public.[26] Admiral Yamaguchi informed the Americans that there were no large vessels at that base.[27] This statement was confirmed when American troops found only a few surface

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craft and small dock facilities. Nevertheless, the installations at Chinhae included a naval air base, an aviation cadet training school, a large headquarters and war room, barracks, a hospital, and large stocks of supplies, some of which were stored in an elaborate system of tunnels.[28] The total capacity of the base was considered by the Japanese to be approximately 20,000 men, although the permanent barracks space was smaller.[29]

A total of forty naval and government-owned ships in operating condition were based in southern Korea at the end of the war; twelve others were under repair or construction. None of these was a capital ship.[30] In addition, there were about 250 merchant vessels of more than 100 tons south of the 38th parallel.[31]

Although Admiral Yamaguchi communicated with General Hodge as well as with the Seventh Fleet,[32] and although he signed the general surrender document at Seoul on 9 September,[33] the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese naval forces were supervised principally by the U. S. Navy. There was a surrender ceremony of some sort at Chinhae, but few details are available.[34] The best information on the subject is the following:

> Information concerning and final surrender of the Japanese Navy in Korea south of 38° N Lat were received by Rear Admiral WRIGHT, USN, after the Japanese Navy had concentrated its forces at the CHINHAE Naval Base. The only information on the Japanese Navy received by G-2 XXIV Corps and carried in this report is the total of 7,746 naval troops evacuated from Korea to Japan [by U. S. Army forces].[35]

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No detailed records of shipment of Japanese naval personnel was made by the US Naval party at Chinhae to the XXIV Corps. The US Naval party, with General Hodge's concurrence, evacuated Japanese naval personnel through that port with shipping locally available.[36]

Japanese naval forces on Cheju Do were under the command of Commander Shoichi Hamada.[37] Thus, although their number may have been as high as 1500, it was probably no greater.[38]

Admiral Yamaguchi reported further that most of the naval air force personnel had been sent to Japan and disarmed on 3 September. The combined special landing units (suicide squadrons) in Korea were disarmed before the arrival of the Americans. The Korean sailors were released and sent home at about the same time.[39]

American Policy Toward the Japanese Forces

The XXIV Corps Field order had stated that:

> The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters is charged with the responsibility for the maintenance, supply, and administration of Japanese Armed Forces until demobilized, and for the preservation of all unit and individual records.

In Directive Number One to the Japanese government and to the Imperial General Headquarters, General MacArthur had named the Allied

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From this quotation it appears that there were originally several thousand Japanese naval troops in Korea of whose existence the XXIV Corps G-2 was not aware. The reason was that these men were evacuated by the U. S. Navy, with General Hodge's concurrence, before the XXIV Corps took charge of the Chinhae base in October. No detailed record of the number of these evacuees seems to have been transmitted to the XXIV Corps.[36]

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commanders to whom various Japanese forces were to surrender, and had imposed sweeping requirements relating to the furnishing of information and the immobilization of armaments.[40] These instructions, reflecting the decision to work through the existing Japanese governmental and military channels as far as possible, were of fundamental importance. The Japanese forces were not to be treated as prisoners of war, ~~although technically they were such; they~~ were to handle their own demobilization in Japan, ~~generally speaking.~~

At the risk of violating strict chronological order, certain basic decisions made by General Hodge relative to the handling of the Japanese troops in Korea must be described here, because they are necessary to an understanding of other aspects of the problem. During the planning phase of the operation, General Hodge was faced with many uncertainties as to what could be expected of the Japanese. Although for a time he thought it possible that the Russians might have disarmed them before the XXIV Corps's landing,[41] he radioed CINCAFPAC on 1 September as follows:

> In view of situation peculiar to Korea, where revolutionary forces may acquire Japanese arms and start serious trouble, request authority to destroy or render completely inoperative any or all weapons turned over by Japanese armed forces based on my own judgment of the immediate necessity therefor.[42]

General MacArthur replied two days later that such an action lay within General Hodge's authority and that he should use his own judgment.[43] Thus General Hodge went into Korea with great liberty of action so far as the handling of surrendered Japanese weapons was

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concerned, except that certain types were to be given intelligence examinations and others were to be issued as souvenirs. That the task was an important one no one doubted. A later directive from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee emphasized this fundamental fact by saying "Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination."[44]

One of the first problems confronting General Hodge was the relative priorities to be given to the repatriation of Japanese civilians and to the evacuation of troops. Shortly after the Japanese surrender on 15 August Japanese civilians had begun to leave for Japan and Koreans had started to return.[45] The resulting congestion at the port of Pusan had to be relieved before the movement of troops could be begun. Civilians who had not yet left their homes were required to stay where they were; General Hodge told General Komuki on 15 September that Japanese troops would move to Japan only on order, and that none would be evacuated until all refugees in the Pusan area had been repatriated.[46] General Komuki undertook to prevent his men from leaving for Japan without authorization.[47]

On the same day General Hodge wrote to General MacArthur that "Unless I can arragge early transportation of the Japanese forces to Japan I feel it will be necessary to put them in concentration camps."[48] The Japanese troops were a tremendous potential menace, and General Hodge seems to have grown increasingly concerned over

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them. Three days later he radioed CINCAFPAC that

> One great obstacle to peace and tranquillity is the mere presence of Japanese forces in Korea. Request authority as soon as I can occupy Pusan to start their movement to Japan. Propose to strip of all equipment except individual equipment less arms and maximum of ten days emergency rations and medical supplies.[49]

General MacArthur replied that Japanese military and naval personnel would be given priority over civilians and that shipping would be allocated as soon as available.[50] CINCPAC was asked to provide LST's and other "suitable amphibious shipping" for the movement of disarmed troops to Japan.[51] The request was passed to the 7th Amphibious Force.[52] On 19 September a definite reply was forthcoming from the Supreme Commander:

> . . . appreciate the necessity for prompt evacuation of Japanese forces from Korea. Authority granted to concentrate them in seaports for evacuation and to utilize to the fullest extent the existing ferry service between southern Korea and Japanese ports. Availability of additional shipping now under study and some will be allocated to you earliest practicable date. Approve your proposal to move repatriates [i.e. Japanese troops] with only personal equipment and such necessary rations and medical supplies as are necessary. Report by radio as soon as possible approximate date movement starts and approximate numbers to be shipped per day and ports of destination.[53]

General Hodge then informed Task Force 71 that he had authority to begin moving Japanese troops to the home islands, and requested the Task Force Commander to contact the Japanese commander at Chinhae with a view to beginning the evacuation of naval troops from that base.[54]

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The general policy gegarding the evacuation of Japanese troops was one of the principal ones discussed with the Japanese commanders. Another was the question of repatriating Japanese civilians.[55] The Japanese commanders repeatedly showed a paternal concern for the welfare of all Japanese civilians in Korea.[56] They said that, since the army had brought war on Japan, it should make amends to the civilians by taking them home. In addition, the military commanders wanted to retain their prestige, so far as possible, by remaining the strongest Japanese power in Korea. They begged earnestly to be allowed to handle the repatriation of Japanese civilians. For a time General Hodge considered the idea as a temporary expedient; the Japanese commanders were asked to submit a plan for such an operation. In their eagerness the latter mistook this request for an order to begin the movement, and late in ~~September~~ OCTOBER they began to move civilians to Pusan, where elements of the 40th Division put them aboard ships bound for Japan. This action on the part of the Japanese commanders disturbed the Japanese relief society, which was being ignored, and the Foreign Affairs Section of Military Government, which was disturbed because some of the repatriates were persons with technical skills whose continued presence in Korea was desirable.[57]

→ CORRECTION BY COLONEL J.B. COOLIDGE, XXIV CORPS G-3

In mid-October the Japanese commanders submitted an elaborate plan for the repatriation of civilians under their own auspices; the guiding principle was to be that "The evacuation should begin immediately after the completion of army withdrawal and be conducted as smoothly as possible in close cooperation with U. S. Army." The

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Japanese relief society was to inventory property which was left behind, and provide food and shelter when necessary. Army medical units would care for the sick.[58] This plan did not meet with General Hodge's approval. On 19 October he radioed SCAP that

> . . . Under present plans evacuation of Jap civilians from Korea can be accomplished by Military Government aided by Jap relief agencies and a few detachments of demilitarized Jap army not . . . to exceed total of 2000. Need about another 4000 Jap army for labor for a short period. Retention of greater number is not . . . required or desired.[59]

A week later occupation forces were in a position to take charge of the movement and General Kozuki was informed that ". . . the Japanese Army in Korea is relieved of all responsibility for the evacuation from Korea of Japanese civilians. . . . The evacuation of civilians and families of soldiers will be the responsibility of Military Government."[60]

Another fundamental decision is implicit in what has already been said. General Hodge definitely recognized, preserved, and used the normal command channels of the Japanese forces. The only alternative would have been to treat them as prisoners of war and put them in concentration camps. This alternative would have been very difficult, in view of the small forces at General Hodge's disposal, and would have been contrary to the policy of the Supreme Commander. The Americans maintained close liaison with the Japanese forces and transmitted to General Kozuki formal directives which he put into effect through his subordinates. Before landing at Inch'on, General Hodge had required the Japanese forces to evacuate the Seoul-Inch'on area;[61] at

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about the same time as the landing, the 17th Area Army moved its headquarters to Taejon, leaving only necessary guards and liaison personnel behind in Seoul.[62] From Taejon the 17th Area Army continued to coordinate the activities and movements of its troops in accordance with instructions issued by the XXIV Corps.[63]

A corollary to the policy of preserving the Japanese command channels was the principle that the forces in Korea would not be demobilized until they had returned to Japan. As the 6th Division field order expressed it, "Basically, all demobilization will take place in JAPAN."[64] The demobilization was to be handled by the Imperial General Headquarters, or rather by the Japanese War Department, since the Imperial General Headquarters was disbanded on 15 September.[65]

Establishment of Liaison Between the American and Japanese Forces

Liaison between the XXIV Corps and the 17th Area Army began while the former was on Okinawa. General Hodge was able to establish radio contact directly with General Kozuki, and during the XXIV Corps's last days on Okinawa and during the movement to Inch'on a stream of messages were exchanged.[66] General Hodge undertook to drop messages to the Koreans, urging them to refrain from violence; General Kozuki reported that these messages had a good effect.[67] In addition to the general

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requirements imposed by the Supreme Commander upon all Japanese forces, General Hodge transmitted some demands specifically his own.[68] To make sure that his orders were understood and were being carried out, General Hodge sent an advance party to Seoul by air. This party was successful in paving the way for the Corps's landing, and the Japanese proved to be generally cooperative.[69]

On the Japanese side, liaison was not handled solely by the military authorities. The Foreign Affairs Section of the Government General appointed Mr. Yasuma Oda, who had lived in the United States for ten years, to act as its representative in dealing with the Americans. Mr. Oda stated later that many of the Japanese were afraid that they might receive rough treatment at the Americans' hands. From his knowledge of the American character, Mr. Oda was able to reassure them. The Chosen Hotel had been vacated shortly after the surrender on 15 August, and Mr. Oda set about making it ready for American occupancy. The first Americans to use it were the members of the advance party. Great difficulty was experienced in finding automobiles in working condition which could be used by the Americans. During the war the gasoline engines in most vehicles had been replaced by carbide motors, and mechanical failures were the rule rather than the exception.[70]

When the XXIV Corps landed at Inch'on on 8 September, General Garvin held a conference with Vice Governor Endo; Lieutenant General Junjiro Ihara, chief of staff of the 17th Area Army; Lieutenant General Nakanishi, of the 5th Air Force; and Rear Admiral Kataoka,

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Admiral Yamaguchi's chief of staff.[71] The Japanese were briefed on the surrender ceremony, which was scheduled for the following day; other matters had already been satisfactorily arranged by General Toshimaro Sugai, the sub-chief of staff of the 17th Area Army, and the advance party.[72]

At about the same time, the 17th Area Army began to move its headquarters from Seoul to Taejon. Some guards were left behind, as well as a liaison detachment under General Sugai.[73]

At first General Sugai's liaison detachment, which at one time numbered more than three hundred persons, dealt with the 7th Division rather than with the XXIV Corps.[74] During this same early period, many important matters were handled by direct command liaison between General Hodge and Kozuki.[75] The first of these conferences between the generals was held on 11 September; General Sugai was also present. Two assembly areas for Japanese troops were prescribed, one on the east coast and one on the west. General Kozuki was directed to round up approximately one hundred members of the Kamikaze corps who were then at large, and the several thousand Japanese soldiers who had been discharged. The Japanese forces had a six-months supply of food, but finding billets for them during their southward movement was a problem. They were given permission by General Hodge to use school buildings temporarily.[75]

These conferences were continued during the two following days. General Kozuki was instructed to keep Japanese soldiers from sailing for Japan, to recall all discharged Japanese soldiers, to instruct all

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discharged Koreans to wear civilian clothes, and to use school buildings temporarily as his needs might require.[76] General Komuki then left for his new headquarters in Taejon, and at a staff meeting on 14 September he passed on General Hodge's orders and some of his own.[77]

After General Komuki's departure, General Sugai assumed the responsibility of maintaining liaison with the XXIV Corps. The expedient of having him deal with the 7th Division proved unsatisfactory, and he was soon told to deal with the XXIV Corps Chief of Staff, who in turn delegated much of the responsibility to the G-2 and the G-3. At first General Sugai, with some of his staff, came to the XXIV Corps Headquarters every day, and he had several interviews with General Hodge. Soon, however, he came to deal only with members of the Corps staff, with whom he had many conferences. General Sugai was cooperative and efficient. The principal members of his staff were an operations officer, a transportation officer, a supply officer, a medical officer, and a number of interpreters.[78]

The Work of the Japanese Liaison Detachment in Seoul

Some one provided General Sugai with an American typewriter, and letters from him and his staff began to pour in to the XXIV Corps. In a period of something over two months they wrote about 350 letters in English on many different subjects and transmitted instructions from General Hodge to General Komuki.[79]

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Some matters pertaining to the mission of the reconnaissance party which reached Pusan on 16 September to prepare for the 40th Division's coming were handled through liaison with the 17th Area Army; others were discussed with local Japanese officials. On 13 September General Hodge instructed General Komuki, through the Seoul Liaison Detachment, to prepare to accomodate 75 officers and 285 men in Pusan for a period of five days. The party was expected to arrive on the 16th. Interpreters and vehicles were also required. The Japanese were to arrange to transport a naval reconnaissance party of thirteen officers from Pusan to Chinhae.[80] Later Komuki was instructed to evacuate all his troops from the Pusan area, except for some specified units. All unnecessary supplies were to be left in the city.[81]

Since data on the 58th Army submitted by the Japanese revealed that a far larger number of troops were on Cheju Do than had been previously suspected, the surrender of Cheju Do was among the matters discussed before the departure of General Komuki for Taejon.[82] Places for collecting arms on the island before occupation by American troops were decided upon.[83] General Hodge notified the Supreme Commander that he would send a party to the island to accept the surrender and supervise disarmament.[84] On 17 September General Sugai submitted a list of questions relating to the proposed surrender of Cheju Do. He wanted to know the name of the officer commanding the American party, and the extent of this officer's authority. He asked the strength of the occupation force and the proposed landing place, and

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inquired whether the Americans wished the services of Japanese water pilots.[85]

Two days later a detailed directive was transmitted to General Kozuki through General Sugai. It ordered that all Japanese troops on Cheju Do except 5 percent be disarmed before the arrival of the American party, and that all arms be stored. All ammunition and explosives were to be destroyed. A pilot was to be available, as well as transportation and labor for loading surrendered armament aboard an American ship, which was to be sent later. The Japanese were to notify the XXIV Corps five days before the expected fulfillment of these requirements. The surrender party, composed of twenty-five persons, would arrive at a date to be announced later. They were to be met by the army and navy commanders and the head of the civil government, who were to be prepared to submit lists showing the location of all fixed armament on the island.[86]

General Sugai asked for and received permission for General Ihara to fly to Cheju Do with a small party, in order to make sure that General Hodge's orders were understood and complied with. This was done.[87] General Kozuki invested General Teyama, the commanding general of the 58th Army, with full power to handle the surrender and disarmament of the army troops on the island.[88] The XXIV Corps was informed of the name of the naval commander on the island, and told that all ammunition and other explosives would be destroyed or dumped at sea between 20 and 28 September. The principal airfield was described, and the statement made that a search was under way to locate sufficient vehicles to transport the surrender party.[89]

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On 21 September a fire broke out at one of the principal ports of the island while ammunition was being dumped at sea. The pier was rendered useless, a few vessels damaged, and a number of casualties suffered. The Japanese stated that the disposal of ammunition would be carried out "at any cost," but feared that it would not be complete by 28 September, the date set for the arrival of the surrender party.[90] After the arrival of the party on 28 September, surrender, disarmament, and evacuation of the troops on the island were handled through American channels for the most part. However, a report that the troops were using school buildings as barracks evoked an order to evacuate all primary schools by 15 October and to use only empty warehouses or other unoccupied buildings as temporary barracks.[91]

The collection of Japanese arms and supplies at designated places in southern Korea was another matter which was discussed with General Sugai. At first the Japanese troops were permitted to keep 25 percent of their small arms for self-protection; later this overall percentage was reduced to 10. The remaining arms were concentrated in designated locations. After some discussion as to which these places should be, Taejon, Taegu, Kwangju, and Kunsan were selected. Pusan was to serve as the final collecting place for units about to return to Japan. The Japanese were permitted to leave in place some rifles stored at an arsenal near Taejon. Horses were assembled at Taejon, Taegu, Kwangju, Kunsan, Ch'onan, Iri, and Chongup.[92]

The decision to give Japanese armed forces priority over civilians was implemented to a certain extent through liaison with General Sugai.

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At first, the Japanese stated that they had received no instructions from Tokyo and hence had formed no plan.[93] Later, in conferences held with officers of the Japanese liaison detachment at Seoul, priorities were assigned to various ports. In order of descending priority, these ports were Pusan, Mokpo, Yosu, Inch'on, Cheju (on Cheju Do), Kunsan, Chinhae, and Hokodi. Tentative plans were drawn up for rail transportation of the Japanese forces to these ports. It was decided that the movement would begin about 1 October, and that check stations would be operated at the ports to prevent the carrying of contraband.[94] A few days later General Sugai submitted a comprehensive plan for the movement. He suggested that Pusan be used for embarkation, and possibly Yosu and Mokpo as well. Moji and Hakata were to be the debarkation points, and the movement was to be complete by the end of November. Shipping normally assigned to the channel would be used. Priority would be given to naval units in the Chinhae-Pusan area and to the sick. In accordance with the policies of the XXIV Corps, no members of the Kempei Tai or guards at prisoner of war camps would be evacuated until cleared by the American forces.[95]

General Sugai also submitted several supplementary documents. One showed the ships which were available for the movement; they were six in number, and could carry a total of 13,600 persons. Taking into account the time necessary for a turnaround, General Sugai considered that a flow of 4,300 persons per day could be maintained. The Ministry of Transportation of the Imperial Government had the

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overall responsibility for ship movement.[96] General Sugai submitted a detailed schedule showing the names, locations, and size of all major army units; the number of trains required to move each unit to Pusan; and proposed dates of movement and embarkation at Pusan.[97] In another document, he envisaged the rate of evacuation as about 100,000 per month; thus the movement would be complete by the end of November. Priority among army units was to be given to troops located nearest the port or ports of embarkation, to small units, to units not supplied with winter clothing, and to air force units.[98] In response to a request from the XXIV Corps G-3, General Sugai submitted on 26 September a description of the facilities and condition of six Japanese ports which might be used for debarkation. He warned that the mines would not be swept from four of these ports -- Shimonoseki, Moji, Sasebo, and Maizuru -- until 10 October.[99]

The Seoul Liaison Detachment helped to arrange the evacuation of 20,000 Japanese troops from Inch'on in October. These troops belonged to units located in the 7th Division zone; it was easier to move them out through Inch'on than through Pusan, since the distances involved were shorter. The evacuation was under the control of ASCOM 24.[100] At the same time, more than one thousand patients from the Seoul Army Hospital were evacuated on a hospital ship, the Arimasan Maru, which had been sent from Japan. The troops were evacuated in two convoys of LST's, on 11 and 16 October.[101]

On 27 October General Hodge instructed General Komuki, through General Sugai, to keep at his headquarters in Taejon only such

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personnel as were necessary to "maintain communication with Imperial Headquarters, [the] Liaison Detachment at Keijo and with Japanese forces in Saishu-To."[102] Anticipating his movement to Japan, General Komuki later requested that he be allowed to take sixty days supplies for 300 men, in order to maintain his headquarters in Japan and demobilize his men. General Hodge passed this request to the Supreme Commander, adding that he believed that the provisioning of the 17th Area Army Headquarters in Japan was not his responsibility.[103] General MacArthur confirmed this belief,[104] and General Hodge disapproved General Komuki's request.[105] Another preparatory step was taken when the XXIV Corps G-2 screened the records of the 17th Area Army Headquarters, in order to make sure that no documents with intelligence value or dangerous to the American forces were being carried. The records which were approved consisted mainly of letters, orders, telegrams, maps, rosters, sick lists, payrolls, and property records.[106] Already General Hodge had informed General Komuki that "In view of the fact that the evacuation of Japanese troops south of 38° north latitude in Korea is near completion, the need no longer exists for the continuance of the 17th Army Headquarters in Korea." He was accordingly to evacuate his headquarters and a large part of the Seoul Liaison Detachment. The headquarters was to be turned over to the 7th Division, and water transportation was to be arranged through the 40th Division.[107] The 17th Area Army Headquarters sailed from Pusan on 22 November under General Komuki's command, together with men from other small units. The headquarters consisted of about 200

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persons.[106] The party reached Hakata on 25 November, and General Kozuki sent a message to General Hodge to thank him for his "kindness."[109]

On 21 September General Sugai expressed his concern over the fate of Japanese troops in the Russian zone:

> The Commander of Japanese Army in Korea is invested with the full responsibility regarding the surrender and the demobilization of all Japanese Army in Korea [i.e., including those troops north of the 38th parallel], together with all the consequent affairs. Great anxiety is felt, however, for the troops stationed north of 38° N.L., as communications with Soviet forces are suspended and, moreover, severest winter is fast approaching.
>
> Regarding the opening of negotiations with Soviet forces, Lieutenant General Kozuki, in his interview with you on September 12, asked for your good offices, which I hereby request again for the speedy realization of our hope.[110]

A week later General Hodge notified General Sugai that he had communicated his request to the Russian commander, and that he would inform Sugai of whatever decision might be reached.[111] There, however, the matter rested; the XXIV Corps could not help the Japanese further.[112]

A tentative plan for the Japanese forces to handle the processing and evacuation of Japanese troops and civilians was disapproved by General Hodge. The decision against this plan constituted a major determination of policy, and has been discussed above. On the day following the decision, three delegations from the Seoul Liaison Detachment came to the XXIV Corps Headquarters to plead for reconsideration; the last group was led by General Sugai himself. Nevertheless, the decision remained.[115]

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On 5 October the 17th Area Army was directed, through General Sugai, to report any military stocks of food, clothing, and medical or other supplies which might be suitable for use by the civilian population, both Korean and Japanese, and which were then or might in the future become surplus to the needs of the Japanese forces. It was pointed out that since the number of troops in Korea was being rapidly reduced by evacuation and since restrictions had been imposed on what these soldiers could carry out, surpluses were to be expected, and that on the other hand acute shortages existed among the civilian population. The Seoul Liaison Detachment accordingly reported the location of surplus supplies, which were turned over to the Materials Control Corporation of Military Government, after the latter began to function in November.[114]

Recalling Discharged Soldiers

Although the matters described above were the major ones handled through the Seoul Liaison Detachment, they by no means exhaust the list. One of the first problems that confronted the American forces after the landing was the soldiers who had been discharged from the Japanese army. At first it was believed that they numbered about 5,000 Koreans and 1,000 Japanese.[115] It had been the Corps's plan to permit the demobilization of Koreans, and provision had been made for keeping records of the process.[116] General Komuki

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was directed to recall the discharged Japanese soldiers.[117] On 15 September the Seoul Liaison Detachment listed the types of soldiers who had been discharged. In addition to the Koreans, they were men who were residents of Korea, especially policemen, railroad and communications employees, and officials; men "newly appointed to be policemen;" men with farms or businesses in Korea; and men assured of employment in some firm or other enterprise. Consideration had also been given to men with families in the peninsula. General Sugai wished to leave demobilized at least the men in the first two categories.[118] However, the decision to recall all discharged Japanese soldiers had already been made, and General Komuki so instructed his staff at Taejon.[119]

A few days later General Hodge transmitted to General Komuki, through the Seoul Liaison Detachment, a "Directive to All Japanese Ex-Servicemen," which was to be published in the newspapers and broadcast over the radio for a period of five days. The directive read as follows:

> I, Lt Gen John R Hodge, Commanding the United States Army Forces in Korea, have directed Lt Gen Y Komuki, to publish the following directive:
>
> "All Japanese Ex-Servicemen who were discharged from service after 15th August 1945, except those now employed on railways and communications are hereby ordered to rejoin Japanese army units.
>
> Furthermore, all men in the Keijo and Jinsen area and vicinity are ordered to report at the former Military Police Sub-Station located near the Ryusan station [in southwestern Seoul]; those in the vicinity of Fusan are ordered to report at the Fusan Fortress Headquarters; those in other districts are

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ordered to report to the nearest Japanese Army units. Such reporting will be accomplished immediately.

You are to dress appropriately when returning to your respective units.

Transportation expenses will be refunded by the Japanese Army.

The lives and properties of your families have been guaranteed by the United States Army insofar as it is within its power.

Y. KOZUKI
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAPANESE ARMY
COMMANDER OF THE 17 JAPANESE ARMY GROUP"

I expect the above order to be complied with immediately.[120]

The number of Japanese soldiers who had been discharged and were recalled was about 19,000.[121] General Sugai submitted reports from time to time on the number who had reported to their units.[122] However, discussion of the matter was not ended. On 1 October General Kozuki expressed a desire to discharge soldiers who had businesses or families in Korea. The men would be issued certificates, take the "necessary" money and rations with them, and travel without arms. General Kozuki also desired to make arrangements for soldiers to take their families back to Japan.[123] At about the same time General Hodge held a conference with General Ihara in which he reiterated his decision that no Japanese soldiers be discharged in Korea. However, he authorized the granting of furloughs to soldiers with families or businesses in the country. These furloughs were to be granted only in case of real need and were to last no later than 1 November; the soldiers were

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to be permitted to wear civilian clothes and to accompany their families to Japan. A roster of the dependents was to be submitted to the Commanding General of the 40th Division. Although General Hodge had no orders to compel Japanese civilians to leave Korea, he felt that conditions in the country made it highly desirable for them to do so. He directed General Komuki to urge the soldiers' families to go back to Japan.[124] General Hodge informed his subordinate commanders of the arrangement, and directed them to give the soldiers on furlough sufficient travel priority to enable them to arrive with their families at the ports of embarkation by 1 November. After that date, all Japanese soldiers away from their units, except those being used by the occupation forces on railroads and communications services, were to be arrested as deserters.[125] The Seoul Liaison Detachment was then informed of the instructions given to the American division commanders.[126]

Disorders Involving the Japanese Forces

Another problem confronting the Americans upon their landing was the control of extremist elements in the Japanese forces. General Komuki expressed concern over the fact that about 100 kamikaze personnel were at large.[127] A few days later, however, General Sugai stated that all kamikaze personnel in Seoul had been removed to Suwon and Taejon, and that they were all abiding by the terms of the surrender.[128]

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The Kempei Tai (gendarmerie, or military police) presented a similar problem. General Sugai denied rumors that members of the Kempei Tai had put on civilian clothes and were in hiding, although apparently some had been released on the same basis as Japanese soldiers.[129] From 14 to 19 September several hundred left Seoul for Suwon and Taejon.[130] Dissatisfied with the semi-independent position of the Kempei Tai, General Hodge on 22 September ordered General Kosuki to assemble them in one place and requested the Supreme Commander to direct the Imperial General Headquarters to place them under the command of the 17th Area Army.[131] General MacArthur did so, and the change became effective on 28 September.[132] Concurrently the XXIV Corps conducted an investigation into the strength and location of the Kempei Tai. Their commander, Major General Takachi, had moved his headquarters from Seoul to Taejon. He controlled subordinate units in eight principal cities south of the 38th parallel. All Kempei Tai had been disarmed and ordered to assemble at Taejon.[133] The Seoul Liaison Detachment reported on 25 September that all Kempei Tai had been assembled in Taejon promptly on receipt of General Hodge's order.[134] This report, however, was in error; only 445 had been assembled by 27 September.[135] The total number of Kempei Tai in southern Korea was slightly more than 2500; of these 1600 were present for duty; the rest were unaccounted for, had left for Japan, or were being recalled.[136] Gradually they were assembled; by 4 October, 1370 had reported at Taejon.[137] The Kempei Tai on Cheju Do were ordered to give up their duties and assemble at a central location.[138]

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The surrender of Japan gave the Koreans an opportunity to take revenge both on the Japanese military and on civilians. General Sugai was much concerned about such acts of violence, and his reports on them constitute a large fraction of his correspondence with the XXIV Corps. Koreans, according to his reports, stole army weapons and supplies, cut communications, and robbed, beat, and terrorized Japanese civilians.[139] According to Sugai, the situation was particularly serious in the Pusan area. However, reports from the 40th Division tended to minimize the seriousness of the situation there.[140] Accordingly, the XXIV Corps replied that only isolated instances of violence had occurred, and that every effort would be made to prevent recurrences.[141] At one time General Sugai made the following request:

> In view of the recent disturbed peace and order in districts farther south, the Japanese there earnestly desire that U.S. occupation forces would advance as soon as possible. We should like to request you, therefore, that you would inform us of the plan of your future occupation.[142]

He was informed that by 20 October all principal towns and areas previously guarded by Japanese troops would be occupied, and that the occupation of the American zone would be complete by about 5 November.[143]

As might have been expected, there were a number of instances of friction between American troops and Japanese civilians and soldiers, although there seem to have been no instances of violence. General Sugai reported some of these. General Hodge warned his subordinates to put a stop to the robbing of civilians by American troops: "The despoliation of Japanese or any other civilians by any persons are

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criminal acts and will be prosecuted accordingly."[144] To the Commanding General of the 7th Division he radioed, "Maj[or] Gen[eral] Sugai had reported to this headquarters that soldiers and MP's are stripping recalled Jap soldiers of money, watches, etc. Report includes list [of] 26 such incidents."[145]

Liaison Flights by Japanese Forces

On 22 September the Seoul Liaison Detachment requested permission for the 17th Area Army to use five transport and eight reconnaissance planes, for purposes of communication. They were to be unarmed, be painted white, bear green crosses, and fly a red streamer from the tail.[146] The XXIV Corps replied that the approval of General Headquarters was required. Thereupon the request was transmitted to the Central Liaison Agency in Tokyo, which forwarded it to General MacArthur. The request was granted, with the proviso that General Hodge inform General Headquarters in each case that a flight was authorized.[147] General Hodge then authorized the 17th Area Army to begin a "limited air courier-liaison-air transport service" on 27 September. A total of seven planes might be used, but only two could be in the air at any one time. Only seven specified fields could be used, and all flights had to secure prior clearance from XXIV Corps Headquarters.[148] General Chamberlin, however, soon decided that the Japanese should use only American planes.[149] Two days later a radio from SCAP

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emphasized the fact that the authorization had been only a temporary expedient, and directed that it be withdrawn.[150] The XXIV Corps passed these instructions to General Komuki and stated that it would furnish any necessary air transportation to the 17th Area Army.[151]

Intelligence Information Submitted by the Seoul Liaison Detachment

The Seoul Liaison Detachment was required from time to time to furnish intelligence information on the Japanese forces in Korea. At first this took the form chiefly of order of battle information. The figures obtained from the Japanese tallied closely with the actual results determined upon evacuation of the various units.[152] Lt. Col. O. L. Harrison, of the XXIV Corps G-2 Section worked with General Sugai and other Japanese staff officers in obtaining this information.[153] A number of detailed questions on intelligence matters were put to officers of the Seoul Liaison Detachment by staff officers of the XXIV Corps in a conference on or about 24 September.[154] Five days later a formal directive to General Komuki was prepared, asking for substantially the same information as that demanded at the conference. The directive was dropped when it was found that the information had already been submitted.[155] Much later, after the beginning of an organized intelligence program as directed in the War Department Target Folder on Korea, the Seoul Liaison Detachment submitted information on the training system of the 17th Area Army.[156]

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The Seoul Liaison Detachment also furnished frequent and regular information on the location and movement of Japanese units, including the departure of the ships carrying them back to Japan.[157] The Order of Battle officer in the Corps G-2 Section made daily visits to the detachment in order to secure such information.[158]

Investigation of the 17th Area Army's Funds

Early in October the 17th Area Army reported that it had accumulated a sum of 300,000,000 yen which it could not take back to Japan.[159] There followed a series of inquiries into the finances of the Japanese forces. General Komuki was directed to turn over all funds and credits, other than personal, to the Property Custodian of Military Government in Seoul or to the Military Governor in Pusan (General Harris). These funds were to be deposited to the credit of the Korean Central Government in an account entitled "Special Account Official Japanese Military Funds." Necessary funds could be retained, but they were to be carefully accounted for. Any which were not expended were to be turned over before the departure of the using unit for Japan. Receipts would be given for these funds.[160] However, the question was not settled so simply. SCAP informed the XXIV Corps that the funds of the 17th Area Army had amounted to 339,000,000 yen on 30 September and directed that they be recovered if possible.[161] General Komuki was accordingly ordered to account for these funds.[162] On 19 October he stated that

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the balance, about 80,000,000 yen, had been turned over to the American forces. This reply brought a logical inquiry as to how such a large amount of money had been expended in so short a period.[163] In an elaborate reply, General Sugai pointed out that the expenditures had been due to the increased strength of the 17th Area Army during the past fiscal year, the increase in prices, and expenses incident to military operations before the surrender and to demobilization.[164] After the departure of the 17th Area Army headquarters for Japan, it continued to keep account of its expenditures and of those of the Seoul Liaison Detachment.[165]

Personnel of the Seoul Liaison Detachment

The composition of the Seoul Liaison Detachment deserves some comment. At first the detachment consisted of about 100 men. On or about 20 September 280 more men were temporarily added to it. The mission of the latter was to return discharged soldiers and stragglers to their units.[166] From the beginning the detachment operated a telegraph set and thus kept in communication with the 17th Area Army headquarters; this was done with the permission of the XXIV Corps.[167] Late in October General Sugai proposed that the strength of the Seoul Liaison Detachment be kept at 150.[168] However, this number was reduced by order of the XXIV Corps to a figure of 30.[169] Prior to the order, the actual strength of the detachment had been

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about 100.[170] When General Sugai learned of the forthcoming departure of the 17th Area Army headquarters, he proposed as the strength of his detachment first 21 men,[171] and later 14.[172] This figure was approved by the XXIV Corps; the function of the reduced detachment was to be the recovery of Japanese soldiers who had not then delivered themselves up.[173] The detachment, together with a small group of stragglers,[174] sailed from Pusan on 23 December. From Pusan General Sugai sent a polite and cordial message of farewell to General Hodge.[175]

The activities of the Seoul Liaison Detachment were summed up by the XXIV Corps G-3 as follows:

> Close liaison was established with the Japanese Army to insure a smooth evacuation of the Japanese from south Korea. To this end the Japanese Army was directed to establish a liaison section in Seoul. This section was housed near the 7th Division and continued to function until the middle of December when repatriation had progressed to the point that their services were no longer necessary.[176]

Other Liaison Detachments Established by the 17th Area Army

The Seoul Liaison Detachment was by no means the only agency through which liaison between the American and Japanese forces was effected. Something has already been said of the part played by General Komuki and by General Ihara. Late in October the latter was authorized to visit the Imperial General Headquarters (or what was

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left of it) in Tokyo, and to return to Taejon upon completion of his business.[177]

The 17th Area Army established a number of other liaison detachments in southern Korea. Of these the most important was the one at Pusan, which "was primarily concerned with an accurate accounting of Japanese troop evacuations from Pusan to Japan."[178] It was established at about the time of the arrival of the reconnaissance party in Pusan (16 September); at that time it was authorized by General Hodge to maintain a strength of 150.[179] By the middle of October it consisted of only 70 men.[180] General Sugai apparently considered this number too small, for he proposed a figure of 220.[181] However, he later reduced this number. The Japanese War Department desired to establish a "Close Up Section" in Fukuoka to handle the demobilization of troops of the 17th Area Army; it was to have branches at Seoul and Pusan.[182] General Hodge concurred; these branches were to be merely a reduced version of the original liaison detachments at those two cities. The Pusan detachment was to be drawn from personnel of the Pusan Fortress garrison.[183] General Sugai wished the strength of the detachment at Pusan to be 100 officers and men,[184] and this was the approximate strength at which the detachment remained for a time.[185] Major General Kubo, the chief of the Pusan Liaison Detachment, transmitted correspondence between General Sugai and the 17th Area Army headquarters, after the departure of the latter.[186] The strength of the detachment dropped progressively, from 150 early in November[187] to 60,[188] 32,[189] and 18.[190] On 17 February 1946 the remnant of the detachment was

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evacuated, except for General Kubo and his orderly, who remained to direct labor troops of the 160th Division.[191]

For a time the 17th Area Army maintained a liaison detachment at Inch'on with ASCOM 24. Little information on it is available; its principal function seems to have been to coordinate the evacuation of 20,000 Japanese troops through the port.[192]

The 17th Area Army at various times established other liaison detachments. One of the first was located at Suwon, the first large town south of Seoul on the road to Taejon. It consisted of twenty men under the command of a colonel, and its mission was to recall discharged soldiers.[193] A few days later, after American troops had occupied the town, the detachment was directed to withdraw. It moved to Pyongtaek, farther south.[194]

On 25 September the 17th Area Army stated that it proposed to establish a liaison detachment of about twenty officers and men with each division and brigade.[195] Apparently they were attached to each division (including depot divisions) and fortress. Their principal duties were the following: to handle deserters and discharged soldiers; to answer American questions and to make investigations concerning the disposal of arms, horses, and other equipment; to handle the granting of furloughs; to administer various financial matters; to keep discipline among Japanese units left to guard installations until the arrival of American troops; to prevent stealing; to protect Japanese civilians as far as possible; to arrange with the American forces for the disposition of such civilian property as could not be taken

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to Japan; and to maintain communication with 17th Area Army headquarters. After American troops had taken over an area, the liaison detachment in that area was to gather together at a specified assembly point the remaining Japanese troops who had been acting as guards. These locations in some cases were not the same as the assembly areas fixed for the main body of each division. The liaison detachments were instructed by the 17th Area Army to take all Japanese soldiers with them when they left an area, and to coordinate transportation for withdrawing units with 17th Area Army headquarters. Among the towns at which the detachments functioned were Ch'onan, Kwangju, Taegu, Taejon, Chongup, Iri, Chooh'iwon, Pusan, Yosu, [196] Chongju, [197] Masan, Chonju, Kunsan, and Mokpo. [198] At one time General Sugai requested permission to send a liaison officer to Ch'unch'on; the request was disapproved because American troops already controlled the town. [199] All these liaison detachments were a temporary expedient; their purpose was to "aid US Army troops during the critical stages of the occupational phase." [200] By about 5 November they appear to have ceased to function, and the only Japanese liaison detachments remaining were those at Seoul and Pusan. [201]

At one time the 17th Area Army considered establishing a liaison detachment of about 50 officers and men at the 5th Air Force headquarters. It is uncertain whether such a detachment was ever established; matters pertaining to the 5th Air Force seem to have been arranged through General Sugai. [202]

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On 30 September the 17th Area Army requested permission to establish a liaison detachment in Japan to handle the quartering, feeding, discipline, transportation, and demobilization of troops returning from Korea. The detachment was to be under the command of Lieutenant General Myoji Hasegawa, a staff officer of the 17th Area Army, and was to consist of 200 officers and men. It was to maintain its headquarters at Moji, and to have branches at Hakata and Shimonoseki. The three sections would maintain communication by radio.[203] The plan was approved by General Hodge, who directed that none of the men in the detachment be drawn from the troops at Pusan who were helping with the processing of Japanese units there.[204] Fifty of the personnel of the detachment were drawn from soldiers who had already returned to Japan. The rest departed from Taejon in two groups, an advance party and a main body. In addition to personal belongings, the latter carried food and communications equipment. The main body left Taejon on 8 October. Apparently the headquarters was set up at Hakata, rather than at Moji, and the branches were located at Moji and Senzaki.[205]

Liaison Detachments Established by the American Forces

In order to make sure that the Japanese forces were obeying the instructions of General Hodge and the 17th Area Army, a number of

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American liaison detachments were sent to various places in south Korea at which large numbers of Japanese troops were located. These teams represented the occupation forces in the eyes of Japanese and Koreans alike at a time when no other Americans were present. As representatives of the XXIV Corps, the teams in effect performed military government functions, particularly in relation to the settling of disputes which occurred between Korean civilians and Japanese. The number of the teams was necessarily restricted by the shortage of available personnel.[206] At first the Corps contemplated sending liaison parties only to the 17th Area Army headquarters and to the 5th Air Force.[207] The detachment at Taejon was to be under the command of Colonel Doxey, the Corps Chemical Officer; the 308th Bomb Wing was to send detachments to Chinju, Kunsan, and Ulsan.[208]

Shortly after the initial decision to send liaison teams to observe the actions of the Japanese forces, it was decided to send teams to each of the Japanese divisions as well.[209] The party sent to the 17th Area Army headquarters consisted of two officers and a handful of men. It was under the command of Lt. Col. Miller, who had led the Corps reconnaissance detachment to Pusan.[210] It reached Taejon on 27 September[211] and set up its headquarters in the city hall. Since the Japanese were generally conscientious in fulfilling the demands made upon them, and since most of the important matters were handled through General Sugai's office in Seoul, Colonel Miller's detachment had little to do. It handled without difficulty a few cases of Japanese army trucks injuring Koreans and of Koreans demonstrating against

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the Japanese. The detachment stayed in Taejon constantly until it returned to Seoul on 14 October.[212]

Instead of three liaison teams the 308th Bomb Wing sent out two, one to the air base at Yongil and one to Kunsan. The former was never able to communicate with its own or any other headquarters and returned late in October; apparently it did not accomplish much. The party at Kunsan was able to deal successfully with a number of demonstrations by Koreans against the Japanese. The latter practically resigned all power into the hands of the Americans. The detachment was able to send reports through the 7th Division; it returned to Seoul about the middle of October.[213]

On 23 September the Commanding Generals of the 7th and 40th Divisions were directed to

> . . . dispatch liaison parties each consisting of a minimum of 2 officers and essential communication and guard personnel and transportation to the locations and Japanese hq as listed below. Ln tne will report daily by available communications through your hq compliance of Japanese army forces with orders. . . .

The teams' reports were to cover disarmament, collection and storage of arms, care of equipment, conduct of Japanese soldiers toward civilians and toward public and private property, the progress of collection of equipment, and miscellaneous matters. The 7th Division was to send teams to Ch'onan, Chooh'iwon, Iri, and Chongup. The 40th Division was to send teams to Kwangju, Yosu, Taegu, and Miryang.[214] These teams were to remain until relieved by XXIV Corps order.

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Team No. 1 from the 7th Division reached Ch'onan on 24 September.[215] The Japanese units at that town with which they had to deal were the 120th Division and the Seoul Depot Division.[216] The team at first communicated with 7th Division Headquarters through Japanese army communications channels; they were then instructed to use the civil telephone system.[217] The members of the team were well received by the civil officials and population.[218] The latter reported, and it seems likely, that the Japanese forces had destroyed some of their weapons and had sold horses and other equipment which the Koreans were eager to buy.[219] However, the discipline and conduct of the Japanese troops after the team's arrival were satisfactory.[220] The progress of disarmament and the care of equipment were in accordance with the XXIV Corps's orders,[221] although the large number of army horses in the area were in bad condition due to exposure and lack of food.[222] The state of public order was generally satisfactory, and although there were a few minor disturbances there were no instances of conflict between Japanese troops and Koreans.[223] After the two Japanese divisions had left the area and occupational troops had arrived,[224] the team returned to its parent organization, the 17th Infantry, on 10 October.[225] Tactical units, as well as liaison teams, maintained liaison with Japanese troops. Where there were American units the liaison detachments were largely unnecessary.[226]

Liaison Team No. 2 from the 7th Division arrived at Chooh'iwon on 24 September.[227] The 320th Division was then located in that area.[228] The team seems to have used the civilian telephone network in its communications with 7th Division Headquarters.[229] It reported that

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the Japanese were carrying out their instructions on disarmament and care of equipment.[230] Although the conduct of the Japanese troops toward the civil population was good, relations were strained and there seemed to be danger of violence.[231] The team made an inspection at Kongju, twenty miles southwest of Chech'iwon, and reported that disarmament and storage of equipment were progressing satisfactorily in that area.[232] On 10 October the team rejoined the 17th Infantry.[233]

Liaison Team No. 3 from the 7th Division reached Iri on 25 September.[234] It had trouble with communications from the start and seems to have made few reports.[235] However, it was able to report that the 160th Division was conducting itself well and proceeding with disarmament and storage of equipment in a satisfactory manner.[236] The team was relieved and rejoined its parent organization, the 184th Infantry, on 12 October.[237]

Liaison Team No. 4 from the 7th Division reached Chongup on 26 September.[238] The 150th Division was then quartered in the town.[239] The team had the usual difficulty with communications; later it was able to make fairly successful use of the Japanese radio network.[240] Although there were a few instances of misbehavior on the part of the Japanese, the latter's conduct was generally orderly.[241] However, on several occasions Koreans in various communities had committed acts of violence.[242] The team inspected Japanese troops at Kwangju and reported the situation there satisfactory.[243] At Chongup the Japanese carried out the prescribed disarmament and storage of equipment as ordered.[244] The date when the detachment returned to its unit is not known.

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Very little information is available on the liaison teams sent out by the 40th Division. Those which were called for by the XXIV Corps were dispatched about 30 September,[245] except that tactical troops and Liaison Team No. 4 from the 7th Division seem to have performed liaison functions at Kwangju, rather than a team from the 40th Division. As has been shown in the case of the 7th Division teams, the arrival of tactical troops made the teams unnecessary.[246] The 40th Division sent an extra team to Mokpo, consisting of one officer and twelve men,[247] to observe the Japanese units in that area.

The team sent to Yosu reported that the Japanese there were entirely disarmed, were taking good care of their equipment, and were well disciplined.[248] The team sent to Taegu stated that disarmament of the Taegu Depot Division was complete and that equipment was in good condition[249] except for the horses, and secured an inventory of all arms and equipment stored at the city.[250] The team sent to observe the activities of other elements of the Taegu Depot Division and the 5th Air Force at Miryang left Pusan on 4 October.[251] The team reported that disarmament was satisfactory and everything in order.[252]

Disarmament and Relief

of Japanese Troops on the Mainland

General Hodge's original plan, made on Okinawa, for disarming the Japanese forces in southern Korea was for all arms south of the

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38th parallel to be collected under guard by the day before the American landing.[253] However, this requirement does not seem to have been transmitted to General Komuki, although the Imperial Japanese Government was ordered to have him render inoperative all fixed artillery and immobilize all vessels.[254] At first it was planned to allow the Japanese to keep only civil and military police and a small number of unarmed soldiers in the Seoul-Inch'on area;[255] later, in view of the public unrest reported by General Komuki, the latter was "authorized and directed to retain in the Inch'on-Kyongsong area the minimum Japanese armed forces necessary to preserve order and safeguard property therein."[256]

When the XXIV Corps landed on 8 September, it found that Inch'on was still being guarded by armed Japanese military police. Japanese troops and police were on guard in Seoul, although most units were in the process of evacuating the city.[257] By the following day "Disarmament and relief of all military forces in the INCH'ON-SEOUL area . . . [was] progressing smoothly and without friction."[258] Another three days saw all known dumps, supply installations, arsenals, and ammunition plants in the Seoul-Inch'on area, including the important arsenal near Inch'on, under American guard. All but 25 percent of the Japanese troops in the area were disarmed by 10 September, and their guards were progressively relieved and escorted to the city limits.[259] The nature of the process of disarmament is made clear in the following quotations:

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The disarmament of the 75% of the Japanese troops in the Inch'on-Seoul area has progressed in a surprisingly smooth manner. In many instances, the units lined up and laid their weapons and equipment at their feet without hesitation. In no case did the Japanese soldier refuse to disarm when ordered to do so. The remaining 25% will retain small arms for their own protection even as evacuation to the south is begun; complete disarmament is being planned after our units are in control of southern areas.[260]

One of the first problems connected with disarmament was the question of Japanese officers' swords. General Hodge directed that no swords be worn at the surrender ceremony, in order to avoid an actual "tender of weapons." Swords might be retained at first as a badge of office, but were to be turned in before demobilization.[261] General MacArthur later stated that officers might keep swords which were their personal property, but must turn in any which were government issue.[262] This policy was soon reversed; swords were to be treated "as any other armament."[263]

The importance of disarming Japanese troops and preventing their weapons from falling into the hands of Korean factions can hardly be overstated. General Hodge was deeply impressed with the necessity of doing so.[264]

About ten days after the landing the percentage of small arms which the Japanese were allowed to retain for self-protection was reduced to ten. All other arms and equipment were to be assembled at Taejon, Taegu, Kwangju, and Kunsan. The rifles retained were to be turned in at Pusan before embarkation.[265] The collection of arms

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above the figure of 10 percent got under way immediately.[266] The Japanese stored, preserved, and guarded these weapons in a generally satisfactory manner.[267]

After the occupation of Seoul by the 7th Division and the beginning of the movement of Japanese forces towards the south, General Kozuki was instructed to "continue guarding railroads, utilities, supplies and jails in the areas under your control until relieved by United States forces."[268] To the obvious question of whom these installations were being guarded against, the equally obvious answer was that they were being guarded against lawless elements among the Koreans, who General Hodge feared might "acquire Japanese arms and start serious trouble."[269] The arrival of the 40th and 6th Divisions and the expansion of their units into hitherto unoccupied areas made possible "completing with minor exceptions the relief of Japanese troops in southern Korea" by about 20 October.[270] By 25 September all troops in the Pusan area were disarmed and relieved.[271] The Japanese guards in other areas were rounded up, as relieved, by liaison units established by the 17th Area Army and moved towards the south.[272]

Late in October the Japanese still had a large number of armed guards in Taejon, particularly in the vicinity of the 17th Area Army headquarters. However, Military Government units were only just arriving in the town.[273] By 1 November "All arms, pistols, swords, and weapons of any kind in the hands of Japanese troops will be completely turned in" and American forces took over the responsibility

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"for the guarding of personnel, collected property, and equipment of the 17th Japanese Army Group."[274] Accordingly the last 1450 Japanese soldiers to retain weapons, including those at Taejon, surrendered their arms.[275]

As General Hodge realized very well, there was a problem of keeping arms out of the hands of Korean civilians. Unquestionably, considerable quantities of Japanese, and even some American, weapons and ammunition found their way into the possession of Koreans. Some of these acquisitions were made with the connivance of Japanese troops, and some probably without it.[276] All civilians in Korea, Japanese and Korean alike, were ordered to turn in to the nearest police station by 25 September all firearms, ammunition, and explosives. The unlawful possession of such weapons after that time was to be punishable in the courts.[277] On that date civilians were directed to be prepared to surrender on order all swords and hara kiri knives.[278] In spite of these efforts, occupational commanders were informed early in November that "There is continuous evidence that firearms are still in the possession of many civilians in violation of Military Government Ordinances No. 3 and No. 5." Commanders were ordered to increase their vigilance, to confiscate all weapons found, and prosecute all violators.[279]

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The Surrender and Disarmament of the Garrison on Cheju Do [280]

After his early discussions with General Komuki, General Hodge informed the Supreme Commander that "I am sending by air a disarmament and inspection team to the island of . . . [Cheju Do] . . . as soon as arrangements can be completed." [281] The date for this operation was tentatively set for late September. [282]

Plans for the surrender of the island and for the disarmament of its garrison were thorough. It was finally decided that the surrender party would leave Kimpo Field on 28 September. A disarmament detachment under Colonel G. F. Powell, the Corps Ordnance Officer, was to sail from Inch'on on 26 September and arrive on the 28th. Arrangements had been made through the Seoul Liaison Detachment for the storage of arms and the destruction of ammunition, and methods for the final disposition of armament were determined. Except for a few specialists, the surrender party was to return to Seoul by air on the 28th; the disarmament detachment would return about 6 October, or whenever its mission was completed. The 308th Bomb Wing made reconnaissance flights over the island on 24 and 25 September, and an airfield west of the town of Cheju was selected as suitable for the landing. [283]

As finally constituted, the surrender party consisted of thirty-eight officers and men under the command of Colonel Roy A. Green of the 184th Infantry. It included representatives of the 7th Division, Military Government, Corps staff sections, and the 308th Bomb Wing.

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In addition there were a few interpreters, four public relations men, six correspondents, two communications men, and a navy representative (Commander A. J. Walden).

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The party assembled at Kimpo Field early on the morning of 28 September. Colonel Green warned the members against picking up souvenirs or accepting gifts in the course of the surrender. They loaded into two C-47's and took off shortly after 0700. At about 0900 the planes were over Cheju West Airport, one and one-half miles west of the city of Cheju. They circled the field, on which no American planes had yet landed, and found that in spite of a heavy rain which had fallen on the previous night a landing was possible.

Seven Japanese staff officers met the party at the field. After a brief period of confusion, four decrepit sedans were produced, and the party drove through the city to a school building on the southern limits, which had been chosen for the ceremony. Three rooms, all dirty and in bad repair, had been set aside. In the largest preliminary discussions were held with representatives of the Japanese commander. In spite of the correspondence which had passed between the XXIV Corps and the 17th Area Army, none of the Americans knew the name of the Japanese commander or whether he had complied with General Hodge's instructions pertaining to disarmament. The fact that there was a cordon of armed Japanese police around the school contributed to the general feeling of uncertainty. The Japanese staff officers informed Colonel Green, through interpreters, that the three Japanese representatives would be General Toyama; Commander Hamada; and Sempei Senda, the

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civil commissioner of the island. Then they returned to inform General Toyama, who was waiting in another room, of the American requirements: unconditional surrender, no questioning of the terms, and no decorations or weapons to be worn.

At 1045 the three Japanese signers, followed by three aides, entered the room. General Toyama had removed all his decorations except for the Rising Sun; the Americans were relieved at seeing him, for it had been feared that he would feign illness in order to escape the necessity of surrendering to a colonel. Colonel Green and Commander Walden were already seated at a table at one end of the room and did not rise. Behind them were some staff officers and an interpreter; a color guard with the colors of the 184th Infantry stood slightly to one side. The rest of the American spectators stood behind the Japanese, who stood at attention by their chairs while Colonel Green introduced himself, read General Hodge's directive appointing him to receive the surrender, and indicated the documents to be signed — three copies in English and three in Japanese. Then he told the Japanese representatives to be seated.

All six copies were passed to General Toyama, then to Commander Hamada, and finally to Senda. They took six minutes to sign. After they had done so, the documents were passed to Colonel Green, who signed with three pens. Commander Walden signed last; the Americans required only two minutes to sign all copies. The only noise during the signing was the clicking of numerous cameras. At 1059 Colonel Green said, "These proceedings are closed." He and the Japanese left the room simultaneously by different doors.

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A short recess ensued, during which ten Korean boys brought in beer and crackers for the Americans. No Japanese entered the room during this time except to bring more beer. Finally the room was cleared of spectators, and the American and Japanese staff officers formed into several groups and sat down to discuss various matters. Officers from the Corps G-2 Section asked for information as to the Japanese strength, installations, and dispositions. Military Government officers talked to the civil commissioner and the chief of police. Operations officers talked to General Toyama and his chief of staff about disarmament. Almost all ammunition and explosives had been destroyed by dumping at sea, although storms and an explosion had prevented the completion of the task. Aircraft had been rendered inoperative, and breechblocks had been removed from fixed artillery. All small arms, except for 5 percent which the Japanese had been permitted to retain for their guards, had been collected in three places. The Japanese reported the location of all dumps, mine fields, and other installations. They had four months provisions and ample medical supplies, but little tentage. They were informed that they would probably be evacuated to Japan within three months, and that their request to use school buildings for billets would be considered. The Japanese were to be responsible for guarding their own installations and equipment. The question of shipping for evacuating the troops was reserved for decision by the XXIV Corps, and General Toyama was told not to send any men to Japan without

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permission. General Toyama had then received no orders from General Kozuki to disarm the Kempei Tai on the island, but within two days he was told to disarm them and concentrate them in a central location. General Toyama was worried about possible violence by Koreans against his troops, although no trouble had yet occurred.

These discussions, conducted through interpreters, were slow and painful. About noon they ended; some officers were to stay to inspect the island. Colonel Green shook hands with General Toyama, and with his party returned to the planes for the trip back to Seoul.

Inspection by various officers from the XXIV Corps, including Colonel Harrison from the G-2 Section, disclosed further information. All small arms had been collected at Cheju City in three dumps. All artillery and tanks had been gathered in three other locations. The arms were in good condition, well consolined, and neatly arranged. More than one-half of the 600 trucks on the island were inoperative, because of a lack of spare parts and preventive maintenance. One hundred trucks and 500 laborers were available for the destruction of armament. Korean civilians were reluctant to provide information; they seemed to be afraid that their statements would find their way to the Japanese, and they seemed suspicious of the Nisei interpreters used by the Americans. What information was derived from civilian sources indicated that Japanese troops had behaved well; that about half of the 100 unarmed civil police were Korean; that some of the 860 Japanese civilians living on the island had left for Japan; and that the military hospital was in fairly good condition and was occupied largely by civilian patients.

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Although Korean children waved American and Korean flags and welcome signs were posted in Cheju city, the populace was generally passive. An elaborate naval air station on the island had been abandoned. Most of the naval personnel had belonged to suicide units; about 500 of them had already sailed to Kyushu. 285

Disarmament on this heavily fortified island, which was about the same size as Okinawa, was naturally a serious problem. The Japanese had considered the island a likely objective for an amphibious attack, and early in 1945 had begun moving troops into it from Manchuria, north Korea, and Japan. Around the perimeter there was flat land sufficient for a large number of airfields. A glance at a map is sufficient to show the extremely strategic location of the island. It was fortunate that disarmament had been effectively accomplished before the arrival of the surrender party. The evacuation of the garrison and the disposition of the armament and equipment on the island will be described later.

Movements and Activities of Japanese Troops

On 7 September the principal Japanese army units on the Korean mainland south of the 38th parallel were disposed generally as follows:

Seoul area — 17th Area Army Hq
Seoul Depot Division
120th Division
320th Division

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Iri — 160th Division

Chongup — 150th Division

Kwangju area — Kwangju Depot Division

Yosu — Yosu Fortress

Pusan area — Pusan Fortress

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Taegu area — Taegu Depot Division

Since of the above areas only Seoul was occupied by American troops in the first two weeks of the occupation, Japanese forces at first moved in large numbers only from Seoul; in other areas they remained largely stationary. On 16 September dispositions were as follows:

Ch'onan area — 120th Division
Seoul Depot Division

Choch'iwon — 320th Division

Taejon — 17th Area Army Hq

Iri — 160th Division

Chongup — 150th Division

Kwangju — Kwangju Depot Division

Yosu — Yosu Fortress

Pusan — Pusan Fortress

Taegu area — Taegu Depot Division

Only service units remained in Seoul. The headquarters of the 5th Air Force was located at Miryang, and other large air force units were at

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Taejon, Pusan, Kwangju, and Taegu. The influx of some 20,000 troops into Taejon caused a food shortage in the town, with the result that

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some units moved out into the surrounding area. Orderly movement of the Japanese troops was made difficult by the poor condition of their transportation and communications facilities. 288

During the remainder of September the major units remained in place, and it was at the above locations that they were visited by the American liaison teams whose activities have already been described. Except for the beginning of evacuation from the congested Pusan area, where there were about 17,000 troops, there was little movement during this period. 289

At first the Japanese troop movements were somewhat loosely organized. They moved in small groups and used any available transportation — foot, horses, trucks, and rail. 290 Soon General Hodge gave General Kozuki the clearout responsibility for controlling the movements of his men and reporting these movements to the XXIV Corps. 291 Since the Japanese units were required to turn in most of their organic transportation, together with other equipment, the long trip to Pusan was accomplished in nearly all cases by rail. The 17th Area Army coordinated these rail movements, which were resumed about 1 October, so as to maintain a steady flow of troops into Pusan without allowing congestion to develop in the city. Congestion of the rail lines continued to be a major problem. The movement was closely supervised by the American forces, and especially by the 40th Division. Unless the units went directly from their train to a ship — a not uncommon occurrence — they came under the control of the Pusan Fortress commander while they were in or near the city. 292

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In the course of this movement, no attempt was made to move whole divisions or other large units at one time. The soldiers traveled in groups of manageable size, and in many cases not all the personnel even of small units moved to Pusan at the same time. Thus, by 25 October, when only 14,000 troops remained to be evacuated from the mainland, bodies of troops remained in the towns where the original concentrations had been -- Chech'iwon, Taejon, Iri, Taegu, Chongup, Kwangju, Yosu, Mokpo, Pusan, and others. Some of these remaining troops were merely waiting for transportation; others were performing duties as guards or laborers.[293]

General Hodge strictly forbade the Japanese forces to harm or plunder civilians, or requisition their property, in the course of the southward movement.[294] A number of reported cases of misbehavior on the part of Japanese soldiers were investigated. Although it seems to have been a common practice for the Japanese to sell equipment to civilians at high prices, instances of violence were the exception rather than the rule, and occurred where soldiers were not under the supervision of their officers. Generally speaking, the conduct and discipline of the Japanese troops were good.[295]

Two focal points in the movement of Japanese troops deserve further attention. These are Taejon, where the 17th Area Army headquarters was located; and Pusan, where nearly all the Japanese forces embarked for the home islands. The end of September found a large concentration of combat, service, and air-ground units in Taejon. The 17th Area Army headquarters was moved into a large permanent building, which was

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nevertheless dingy and dirty. An elaborate system of guards was set up throughout the town, which continued until 1 November, even after the arrival of American tactical troops and military government units. The service units performed many useful functions for the Americans -- stringing telephone wires, construction, and so forth.[296]

On 16 September there were about 10,000 troops in the Pusan area, under Major General Ishikawa, the Pusan Fortress commander.[297] General Kosuki was authorized to allow the movement of civilians to Japan to continue but was instructed to "control travel of civilians into PUSAN to prevent overcrowding."[298] To fulfill this requirement and to maintain order in the city a battalion of the 260th Regiment, 120th Division, was sent from Ch'onan; it arrived in Pusan on 18 September.[299] To relieve the increasing congestion in the city and make way for the 40th Division, General Kosuki was ordered on the following day to evacuate all his troops from Pusan into surrounding areas, except for necessary guards, the liaison detachment, some service troops, and a disarmament unit. All supplies except the minimum necessary amount were to be left in the city.[300] By 24 September the evacuation of Pusan was complete.[301]

Japanese troops performed many useful functions for the occupation forces, and after the evacuation of most of them to Japan sizeable labor detachments were retained to dispose of ammunition and handle supplies. Early in November 300 laborers remained at Taegu, 100 at Kyongju, and 2,000 at Pusan.[302] The detail at Pusan assisted in processing outgoing troops and in keeping the dock area clean.[303] Most of these labor troops

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were evacuated about 1 December, leaving a detachment of about 500 men from the 160th Division in Pusan; this detachment continued the dangerous and difficult task of disposing of ammunition.[304]

Processing and Evacuation

The basic decisions governing the planning for the actual process of evacuating the Japanese forces have already been described. Briefly, they were to begin evacuation of unarmed Japanese troops from Pusan as soon as that port came under American control and to use Japanese shipping to the greatest possible extent. On 22 September the 40th Division began to debark at Inch'on. Within three days Pusan was occupied and the Japanese forces in that area were disarmed and relieved.

As far as is known, no Japanese army troops had then returned to Japan. To the two ships already ferrying repatriates between Pusan and Kyushu six more were authorized to be added.[305] The rate of flow was to be 4,000 disarmed soldiers per day; the Imperial Japanese Government was instructed to receive, process, and repatriate them.[306] General Hodge regulated the rate of evacuation, but he had to coordinate the reception and processing of the evacuees in Japan with the Sixth Army.[307]

Shipping was and remained one of the principal problems in the movement. Although Pusan was by far the best port for the movement, and although the two steamers originally used for repatriation made about thirty safe passages from Pusan before American forces assumed

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control of the port, naval commanders were disturbed by the fact that more than forty live American mines were in the harbor.[308] Chinhae, Mokpo, and Masan were also mined; none of these was a satisfactory alternate for Pusan, and plans were made to sweep the latter port.[309] The shipping employed in the evacuation of Japanese troops from all parts of southern Korea varied greatly. At Pusan some forty Japanese ships -- steamers and small naval vessels -- were used; the garrison on Cheju Do was evacuated in nearly 40 U. S. Navy LST's. Naval troops were evacuated from Chinhae in about thirty Japanese naval vessels and steamers. Evacuation from Inch'on was accomplished in a Japanese hospital ship and in two convoys of 10 LST's each.[310] At one time the possibility of using Liberty ships in the movement was discussed,[311] but the idea seems to have been dropped.

Since the movement was in effect an amphibious operation, cooperation with the U. S. Navy was essential. On 24 September General Hodge radioed Admiral Kinkaid as follows:

> Due to the close liaison necessary between this headquarters and U. S. Navy relative to completion of the movement into Korea of 24th Corps and movement out of Korea of Japanese army and Jap nationals, I consider it essential that a qualified navy staff officer be assigned to my staff as adviser and assistant in naval matters.[312]

Commander Marshall F. Thompson of Phib Group 13 was accordingly appointed as naval liaison officer. His duty in that capacity lasted about three weeks.[313]

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An important step preparatory to the actual process of evacuation was the arrangements made by General Hodge for the processing of Japanese soldiers and civilians alike, in order to "prevent the evacuation of loot and wealth." There was no intention of stripping them of "all personal possessions or keepsakes."[314] The Japanese authorities were informed before the beginning of the evacuation that their men would be searched for contraband. Early directives from CINCAFPAC ordered that each officer be allowed to take out a maximum of 500 yen, and each soldier 250. Receipts were to be given for all money in excess of those limits. Troops were to be allowed to carry their individual clothing and personal possessions, and units could take rations and medical supplies for ten days, records, and a small amount of light transportation.[315]

The final requirements for processing were essentially the same, except that the amount of money that each Japanese soldier could carry was reduced to 200 yen. Staging areas were to be established at Pusan, and at any other port which might be used later, at which all remaining weapons were to be turned in, excess individual and organizational funds turned in, and all loot and contraband confiscated. Rosters of troops were to be prepared, and the troops checked off against them as they embarked. Within the specified limits Bank of Chosen currency was to be exchanged for that of the Bank of Japan. Gold, silver, jewelry (other than a small amount of personal ornaments), and securities were not to be taken out. Although officers were limited as to the types of articles they might take in the same way as the soldiers, each

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officer was allowed to carry one extra piece of baggage, and general officers two pieces.[316] Originally, the only medical processing contemplated seems to have been delousing, which was performed with DDT by personnel of the Pusan garrison.[317] Although in general the processing was performed efficiently, misunderstandings occurred from time to time. Late in October rumors that Japanese troops were being stripped at Hakata of the money they had been allowed to take from Korea were denied by the Sixth Army.[318]

The processing at Pusan, where by far the largest number of Japanese troops were evacuated (about 100,000) was accomplished as follows. When the processing began, control of the troops passed from the 17th Area Army and the Pusan Fortress commander to the 160th Infantry. Control of the troops was greatly facilitated by their excellent discipline; they did as they were told and required little time to be processed. They had already been deloused and immunized (against smallpox and typhus, presumably) by medical personnel of the Pusan Fortress or their own units. The persons and baggage of all troops were physically searched on Pier No. 1 by details from the 160th Infantry, working in shifts on a twenty-four hour basis. All articles not authorized to be taken out were confiscated and stored in warehouses. After the inspection the soldiers were loaded aboard a ship, which sailed when it had a full load and when proper clearance had been secured. Soldiers with families usually traveled with them rather than with their units.[319]

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Beginning on 23 September, a transportation officer from the 40th Division held daily conferences with local Japanese military authorities, railroad representatives, representatives of the U. S. Navy, and other persons. In this way transportation was coordinated so as to maintain a reasonably smooth flow of persons into and out of the port. The planned rate of evacuation was 4000 per day, and at first this figure was to consist almost entirely of troops. On 28 September evacuation under the formal control of the 40th Division began; thereafter, weather permitting, ships sailed daily to Senzaki, Maizuru, Sasebo, and Hakata. On the first day about 3500 troops were evacuated. 320

By 5 October all Japanese army troops had been evacuated from the 40th Division's zone. Thereupon the Commanding General of the 40th Division was instructed to continue to evacuate Japanese forces from the rest of the mainland, except for 20,000 who were to be evacuated through Inch'on. 321 At about the same time some confusion occurred; the Pusan Liaison Detachment somehow received the impression that the 40th Division wished to evacuate Japanese troops from then on at the rate of 10,000 per day -- a desirable, but impossibly high, rate. There was no basis for this impression; the planned rate remained at 4,000 per day. 322 The 40th Division formed plans for the movement to Pusan, by rail, of Japanese troops from some of the principal areas of concentration -- Chongup, Chonju, Kunsan, Taejon, and a few other places. 323 After the arrival of the 6th Division it naturally assumed responsibility for the Japanese troops in its area (including such towns as Kwangju, Mokpo, Chonju, Chongup, and Iri). By 5 November the 6th

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Division zone was free of Japanese troops and their families.[324] By that time the rate of evacuation had fallen to about 200 per day; the XXIV Corps had nearly run out of Japanese troops. Its subordinates were instructed to make a survey of any remaining Japanese soldiers and civilians.[325]

The overall reduction of the number of Japanese troops on the mainland proceeded smoothly. Among the evacuees were 1,054 soldiers who crossed the 38th parallel from the Russian zone.[326] At first it was planned to keep 10,000 Japanese troops in Korea to help with repatriation and the disposal of ammunition, but this figure was found to be excessive.[327] In late October the number was reduced to 3,000, who were to compose the two liaison detachments and necessary labor detachments. All others were to be evacuated from the mainland by about 5 November.[328] The originally contemplated size of the labor details was reduced, and it was decided not to use Japanese troops for labor for which Koreans could be hired.[329] By 1 December all remaining Japanese army troops, except the Seoul and Pusan Liaison Detachments, personnel in the Pusan military hospital, and a labor detail of about 500 men were evacuated from Pusan. By about the same time the 7th Division zone was clear of Japanese troops.[330]

Although most of the Japanese forces were evacuated through Pusan, a few movements which deserve mention occurred at other ports. It was decided to move 20 LST's full of disarmed soldiers from Inch'on during October, it being believed that this operation would not seriously delay the arrival of the 6th Division.[331] The troops were to be evacuated

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by ASCOM 24 and were to be relieved of guard responsibility by troops of the 7th Division.[332] Each LST was to carry about 1,000 troops and a small American escort detachment;[333] the port of debarkation was Sasebo.

The troops were processed in much the same way as those evacuated from Pusan, except that the soldiers seem to have been inspected by their own officers. The 749th FA Battalion was attached to ASCOM 24 to handle the processing and evacuation.[334] The evacuation occurred as planned; the first convoy, consisting of ten LST's and nearly 10,000 Japanese troops, sailed from Inch'on on 11 October.[335] On 16 October a shipment of slightly more than 10,000 more troops sailed for Sasebo on another convoy of LST's.[336]

The shipments from Pusan and Inch'on, already described, accounted for all Japanese army troops on the Korean mainland south of the 38th parallel. However, there were also a considerable number of naval troops to be handled and several naval bases to be demilitarized. As has already been indicated, this process was handled primarily by the U. S. Navy, and consequently the records on the subject in the files of the XXIV Corps are somewhat scanty. The Seventh Fleet had available a Naval Base Occupation Unit to take charge of Japanese naval shore installations at Chinhae and Pusan. Although naval officers accompanied the reconnaissance party to Pusan in mid-September, the unit as a whole apparently did not leave Inch'on for the Chinhae-Pusan area until after the landing of the 40th Division.[337] The navy maintained liaison with Admiral Yamaguchi's command in much the same way as the XXIV Corps did with the 17th Area Army; Yamaguchi was required

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to furnish, and presumably did furnish, detailed information on the organization and strength of the forces under his command, bases and installations, munitions and equipment, and mines and navigational data. All his documents were required to be maintained intact pending an investigation by the U. S. Navy.[338] The Japanese naval personnel were concentrated at Chinhae, and their evacuation was begun about 5 October.[339] Two days later the command post of the 40th Division Artillery moved to Chinhae.[340] American army units had no relations with the Japanese naval units during this time; the U. S. Navy maintained a force of about fifty officers and men at the base. Disposal of naval ammunition was also begun by this detachment, with the assistance of Japanese naval personnel. Although some 100 of the latter went to Pusan before the landing of the 40th Division and demanded an immediate return to Japan, the naval troops in general caused no serious trouble. The S-3 of the 40th Division Artillery described them as "very highly disciplined." What processing of the naval troops was carried on by the U. S. Navy is not known, except that they were given medical inspections. Some civilians, chiefly the families of Japanese naval personnel, were evacuated at the same time. Troops of the 40th Division Artillery at Chinhae assisted in the processing and evacuation of naval personnel and civilians beginning on 10 October. A considerable number of the latter were sent to Pusan, rather than being evacuated directly from Chinhae. The 40th Division took over control of Chinhae by 31 October; after about 15 November all evacuees seem to have been sent from Chinhae to Pusan, and by 1 December the 7,000-odd naval personnel

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not handled by the U. S. Navy had been evacuated. In general the Japanese naval authorities were thoroughly cooperative. By 31 October all Japanese naval bases in southern Korea had been demilitarized; apparently the garrison of the isolated base at Ongjin was evacuated directly by water.[341]

The plans for evacuating the garrison from Cheju were summarized by General Hodge in a radio to the commanders concerned:

> . . . CG ASCOM 24 upon completion of evacuation of Jap military personnel through the port of Inch'on will be responsible until relieved by 6th Div for evacuation of Jap military, naval, and civilian personnel from Cheju Island. . . . CG 6th Inf Div, as soon as practicable after arrival in Korea, will occupy Cheju Island and will assume responsibility for evacuating Japanese military, naval, and civilian personnel at Cheju Island. . . . When 6th Div assumes responsibility for evacuating Jap personnel from Cheju 749th FA Bn will be relieved of attachment to ASCOM 24 and is attached to 6th Div until completion of evacuation of Jap personnel from Cheju.

Processing was to be conducted in accordance with the rules already established.[342] The evacuation was to be conducted in LST's and was to begin as soon after 20 October as possible.[343] The process was expected to be completed by about 15 November.[344]

On 22 October the 749th FA Battalion, which was still attached to ASCOM 24, and a detail from the ASCOM 24 POW Section, led by Colonel Sydney C. Fergason, arrived on Cheju Do to begin the processing.[345] On the next day two LST's, one carrying 1100 and the other 1200 troops, left the island for Sasebo.[346] The process which thus began was clearly described in a radio to General MacArthur:

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> . . . . LST's lifting troops from Okinawa are diverted on the return trip from Korea to lift Jap military, naval and civilian personnel at Saishu-To and deliver them to Sasebo Japan. Diversion adds three days to present round trip. Approximately fifty LST loads required to transfer Japs. Personnel being evacuated are processed by U. S. Army personnel through the port of Saishu town as LST's become available. Approximately one thousand persons will be moved on each LST. Estimated one month required to complete evacuation. . . . This hq had presumed authority to execute above plan, and had neglected to give proper notification.[347]

The evacuation went ahead steadily; some of the LST's made two trips, but the majority made only one. Estimates of the date of completion varied from 10 to 15 November. Actually, the last shipment sailed on the morning of the 12th. A total of about 50,000 troops, apparently including some naval troops, and a small number of civilians (representing all who were left on the island) were evacuated.[348]

After the evacuation was completed the island came under the control of the 6th Division; the 749th FA Battalion left Cheju Do in two echelons, on 26 and 29 November.[349]

To recapitulate the progress of the evacuation: about 100,000 troops were evacuated from Pusan; this movement was substantially completed by 1 December. Thereafter there remained only two liaison detachments (at Seoul and Pusan), a number of labor troops, and a small number of stragglers. By the middle of February all these had been evacuated except for 500 labor troops who remained to dispose of ammunition. The latter sailed from Pusan on 28 April 1946.[350] In addition, 20,000 troops were evacuated from Inch'on in mid-October; almost 50,000 troops were evacuated from Cheju Do by mid-November; and roughly 10,000 naval troops were cleared from Chinhae by 1 December.

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Gathering Intelligence
on the Japanese Forces in Korea

In addition to the intelligence information gathered before the occupation, much remained to be done to complete the XXIV Corps's information on the Japanese forces in Korea. Some of that material, including order of battle data and information on other matters, was provided by the Japanese themselves. Officers of the Seoul Liaison Detachment answered questions on matters of supply. According to them, there was only one arsenal in Korea south of the 38th parallel engaged in manufacturing army weapons; the 17th Area Army had used chiefly civilian facilities for road constructions and had depended on Japan for maps.[351]

By the end of September lengthy inventories of Japanese arms, equipment, and installations had been drawn up.[352] Some of the weapons were required to be saved for issue as trophies, and other types had to be given intelligence examinations by personnel of Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams.[353] The latter were some of the agents of the Supreme Commander's overall plan for gathering intelligence on all phases of the Japanese economy and war effort. This plan was outlined in SCAP General Order 9, issued on 2 October. Intelligence activities in Japan and Korea were to be coordinated by the SCAP G-2, and were to include a study of order of battle, technical information, and historical records.[354]

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Although for reasons unknown the War Department Target Folder on Korea had not yet reached the XXIV Corps, the latter began to submit the results of its activities to the SCAP G-2. Some thirty airstrips in southern Korea were reconnoitred, Japanese radar and ordnance equipment studied, and various Japanese officers interrogated.[355]

The War Department Target Folder on Korea, published on 18 August, reached the XXIV Corps Headquarters about 20 November and was soon reproduced for distribution to the Corps staff. At that time some MEIST personnel, led by Lt. Col. R. A. Dutton, were already at work under the supervision of the XXIV Corps G-2.[356] However, as one of their later reports said, ". . . the tardy arrival of MEIS to this country severely reduced the team's opportunities for conclusive observation."[357] Problems and obstacles in putting the intelligence program outlined in the War Department Target Folder into effect were numerous. By the time that the folder arrived, nearly all Japanese who might have provided further information had been evacuated; of the 158 targets listed, 40 were located north of the 38th parallel and investigation of them was therefore out of the question; there was a severe shortage of qualified available personnel. Colonel Dutton left Korea early in 1946; to succeed him Major C. J. Dougovito, a Russian interpreter, was selected. The targets were assigned to appropriate agencies, but the difficulties already suggested made the progress of the program slow. The XXIV Corps G-2 summed up his problems as follows:

> Reports are being received from time to time from the Military Government bureaus. However, the Russian Conferences; the recent arrival of an economic commission

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from the State Department; and the shortage of personnel make the rendition of these reports very slow. Furthermore, many of the reports require detailed and exhaustive study of commercial facilities and activities, and it is anticipated that at least a year will be required to acquire and assemble the complete data desired. At this time it is impossible to predict when any particular report will be completed.

CIC personnel has been so depleted [sic] that they are unable to meet normal demands for investigations. At the present time they have a total of 26 trained investigators against an authorized allotment of 126. However, data has been accumulated on some of the targets assigned to CIC and reports will be submitted at the earliest possible date, but it is anticipated that from six months to a year will be required to complete all investigations and submit the required reports. At this time it is impossible to predict when any particular report will be completed.

Information is being compiled as rapidly as possible covering targets to be reported on by the 308th Bomb Wing. Only one officer is available for this assignment, but at the present time he is in Tokyo and it is not known when he will return. Therefore it is impossible to estimate the date on which reports will be completed.

All available data on targets located north of the 38th parallel has been submitted and no additional information is expected to be obtained until such time as that barrier is removed.[358]

A request to downgrade the classification of the War Department Target Folder from Secret to Restricted was denied by the War Department on the ground that the international situation might be complicated if foreign nationals secured access to the information.[359]

In spite of the obstacles, the collection of intelligence information in Korea made slow but steady progress. Many of the targets did not pertain to strictly military matters and need not be mentioned here. Even those which did need not be discussed at length. Members

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of the KEIST, of the Corps staff, and of Corps intelligence agencies uncovered much that was interesting, but little that was unusual. Although Seoul had served as a major depot for units in Korea and Manchuria, there were no quartermaster items of unusual interest in Korea.[360]

In the field of meteorology, it was discovered that only the 5th Air Force had its own meteorological installations. The navy had none and the ground forces had been largely dependent on the facilities of the Government General.[361]

Another report stated that

> The CWS picture presented by this country has been very disappointing from the view point of positive information. Very little materiel has been found and practically all of that has been standard items. It is apparent that the Jap was not prepared to wage offensive chemical warfare from Korea and, but poorly prepared to defend himself against it.[362]

Although some explosives were manufactured in northern Korea, no plants were found in the south which produced "any kind of mine or explosive." On 1 July 1945 the procurement of raw materials for armaments and the control of arsenals had been made the responsibility of the 17th Area Army. Various types of light weapons were manufactured at Pyongyang and Inch'on. One interesting item of ordnance equipment, examined on 19 November, was an armored train which had been used to patrol coastal rail lines to provide antiaircraft and coastal defense. There was an abundance of light and medium field artillery in the country; two previously unreported types, neither of

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them of technological importance, were discovered.[363] The most powerful coast artillery was emplaced along the southern coast; two 410 mm. naval guns, in turrets, overlooked the approaches to the Pusan harbor. Other fixed coast artillery was located near Masan and Yosu.[364]

Photographic facilities of the Japanese forces in Korea appear to have been scanty. Although of course the 5th Air Force had its own photographic units, the other services apparently had their photographic work done by civilian agencies under contract.[365]

Information provided by the Seoul Liaison Detachment disclosed that the 17th Area Army had stressed in its training programs field fortifications, night infiltration, suicide attacks on tanks, anti-aircraft fire, night fighting, and "combat under severe bombardment." Each division maintained some schools, and there were a number of training camps throughout Korea; nevertheless, there were no specialist schools in the country. All candidates for advanced training had been sent to Japan.[366]

Important though this intelligence program was, further details about it would seem to be out of place in this history. The 17th Area Army provided only a part of the targets for Korea, and Korea in turn was only a part of the entire plan. The U. S. Navy made some studies of Japanese naval installations in Korea, details on which are not available and which in any case would not be pertinent to this narrative.

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Disposal of Japanese Military Equipment and Installations

The problem of disarmament ended, and that of disposal began, when arms, equipment, and installations passed from Japanese to American hands. Occupation Instructions No. 2, issued by the Supreme Commander late in September, laid down the general principles which were to govern the process of disposal. Equipment adapted only to warlike uses was to be destroyed, except for what might be used by American troops, used for intelligence and research purposes, and issued as trophies or souvenirs. Supplies suitable for civilian consumption were to be used for that purpose. Installations were to be guarded and kept intact pending further instructions. Complete and accurate records were to be kept of all materiel received and disposed of. 367

The XXIV Corps's Administrative Order 19, issued approximately one week later, was based on this directive. Enemy equipment was classified in four main categories -- arms, ammunition, explosives, equipment, and supplies; naval and auxiliary vessels; aircraft; and installations, bases, and fortifications. Materiel in the second and fourth categories was to be guarded intact whenever such materiel was found within the areas assigned to units of the Corps. In the other categories, essentially military equipment, including automatic weapons, aircraft, bombs, aircraft communications, and radar equipment

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was to be destroyed. No method of destruction was specified; scrap resulting from destruction was to be turned over to Military Government upon Corps order. Exceptions to the above, and types of equipment not to be destroyed, included items needed for intelligence and research, equipment used for operational purposes by American units, materiel suitable for civilian use, items suitable for trophies and war memorials, and weather equipment. Requests for permission to use any item of captured equipment were to be made through normal channels. Reports covering all such equipment on hand and disposed of were to be rendered weekly by all subordinate units.[368]

A basic policy was to prevent captured equipment from falling into the hands of Koreans without first being cleared by the American forces; the reason for this policy is obvious, especially in the case of weapons. With this end in view, Ordinance No. 4 of Military Government, dated 28 September, forbade the "purchase, sale, acquisition, and transfer" of both Japanese and American military property. Any such property used by the civilian population would be sold or issued by Military Government. The Materials Control Corporation was designated as the agency to receive and distribute Japanese military equipment destined for civilian consumption.[369]

The reports called for in Administrative Order 19 were submitted by the three divisions and by ASCOM 24; they classified equipment as to the service with which it was normally associated -- for example, quartermaster or ordnance. The reports were consolidated by the XXIV Corps G-4 Section and forwarded in fifty copies to CINCAFPAC. The

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Corps special staff sections assisted in the preparation of reports; although the 308th Bomb Wing had charge of the inspection of aircraft, reports on aircraft were actually prepared by the Corps staff. From time to time CINCAFPAC made minor changes in the form of the report; they were later made twice a month. At the end of the year the reports to the Corps ceased to be cumulative in that categories with a balance on hand of zero were dropped.[370]

The difficulties involved in disposing of the equipment of nearly 200,000 Japanese troops were considerable. General Hodge summed them up as follows:

> Everything must be rigidly guarded to keep Koreans from seizing, plundering and sabotaging. Rail and motor road conditions together with shortage of troops and transportation preclude early collection in one area. Ammo and explosives dumps are widely scattered in the best Jap fashion and are unsafe as well as extremely expensive to guard.[371]

By early October the process of disposing of Japanese materiel was well under way; Japanese labor was used, although in some areas where there were American troops to supervise the disposal there were no Japanese, and vice versa. General Hodge felt that the Corps had "missed some bets" by not making sufficient use of Japanese troops to dispose of their own materiel.[372] The original target date for the disposal of enemy equipment, 31 October, proved to be too early. The 40th Division informed General Hodge that 1 January 1946 was the earliest possible date on which the division could finish the task.[373]

Of the four categories of enemy materiel listed in Administrative Order 19, the first obviously included the greatest number of individual

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items. The sub-categories can be most conveniently classified under the using branches of service. The XXIV Corps Ordnance Section described the disposal of ordnance equipment and explosives in this way:

> The Ordnance problems connected with the disarmament of the Japanese army have been relatively minor, as far as the handling of equipment has been concerned. It has been one of taking into storage as so much tonnage, large quantities of armament. Certain specified items suitable as War Trophies and as souvenirs have been either issued as souvenirs to departing personnel or will be prepared for shipment to the United States as trophies. The destruction of the large tonnages of ammunition left in storage by the Japanese, has proved to be a formidable problem, both because of the quantities involved, and because of the hazardous manner in which the Japanese store their ammunition. Because of the congestion in the port of Jinsen, it has not been possible to dump any quantity of ammunition at sea through that port. Practically all ammunition, except that which could be evacuated through the port of Pusan has had to be destroyed in place. At Pusan, Japanese soldiers have been used for the purpose of handling the ammunition.[374]

A considerable amount of captured machinery was used for operational purposes. Types of naval ordnance destroyed included machine guns, bombs, small arms, and airplane engines. Army small arms, other than those used for intelligence purposes or saved for trophies or souvenirs, were heated and reduced to scrap. Heavy equipment, such as artillery, was rendered unserviceable by means of thermite grenades. In spite of the disposal program, considerable stocks of weapons and ammunition remained on hand in March 1946. The process was a long and difficult one.[375]

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The issue of Japanese weapons to American personnel as souvenirs was authorized by AFPAC Circular No. 58, dated 4 September 1945, and by subsequent instructions. In mid-October the XXIV Corps authorized the issue of souvenirs to the personnel of each of its principal subordinate units (the 6th, 7th, and 40th Divisions, ASCOM 24, and the 308th Bomb Wing) on the following basis: 1200 swords, 500 pistols, 100 field glasses, and an unlimited number of rifles. No police swords or swords having historical significance were to be issued. The actual issue of these souvenirs naturally varied somewhat among the various units, according to their location in relation to the stocks of available weapons; a large number of items were transferred from one command to another to effect an even distribution. On 15 December all unissued pistols and small arms ammunition were frozen. Some items were shipped to the United States as War memorials. 576

In the entire American zone there were 500,000 tons of Japanese ammunition. The disposal of arms and ammunition on Cheju Do was accomplished in a relatively short time. The Japanese had dumped at sea nearly all ammunition and explosives before the arrival of the surrender party. Of what was left, and of arms and other ordnance equipment, some was destroyed by U. S. Navy personnel and some by a detachment from the XXIV Corps, consisting of 100 men from the 7th Division and commanded by Colonel Powell, the Corps Ordnance Officer. The party sailed from Inch'on in two LSM's and arrived at the island on 28 September. Although American naval personnel left some naval ordnance and ammunition undemolished, Colonel Powell's detachment took over from them the responsibility for disposing of naval equipment on the island. They also destroyed

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all ordnance equipment and aircraft by demolition. The task was completed on or about 6 October.[577]

The disposal of arms and ammunition in the 40th Division zone seems to have begun at Chinhae, where Japanese troops were used to guard the ammunition and dump it at sea. The U. S. Navy had ordered, probably in late September, that all naval ammunition be destroyed. Coastal guns and fire control instruments at the base were also destroyed by demolitions. On 15 October a naval mine exploded, injuring five Japanese troops. Japanese naval munitions were generally concentrated at Chinhae for disposal. In November troops of the 40th Division took over the disposal of ammunition at Chinhae and began the sealing of the several hundred storage caves located near the base.[578]

The disposal of Japanese naval ammunition at the various naval bases, most of which were located within the 40th Division zone, was accomplished at first by coordination between American army and navy authorities. Early in October the Commander of Task Force 71 complained to General Hodge that American troops had interfered with the disposal of naval ammunition by Japanese naval troops at the Yongil and Pyongtaek bases to such an extent that the work had stopped. The 7th and 40th Divisions were then told to allow the work of transporting and dumping naval ammunition to continue unhindered.[579]

In early November troops of the 40th Division, and in particular the 115th Engineer Combat Battalion, began the destruction of ammunition and other ordnance materiel in the Pusan area. Other such equipment located in inland areas was moved to Pusan and dumped at sea.[580] On

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27 October a fire broke out in the ASCOM 24 area at Pusan; it spread to a barge containing Japanese ammunition. The resulting explosion caused considerable damage to surrounding installations.[381]

Of the Japanese labor troops employed by the American forces, the detachment of approximately 500 who disposed of ammunition were the last to leave Korea. Other Japanese soldiers had helped with the work, but only on a temporary basis. On 24 December 229 men from this detachment moved from Pusan to Kunsan to begin the work of disposing of munitions in the 6th Division zone.[382] The remainder continued to work in the 40th Division zone until the middle of February, when they moved to the 7th Division zone.[383]

About one month after its landing the 6th Division began to destroy arms and ammunition in its zone. At first only small quantities were disposed of, and in some cases these were taken from civilians and not from Japanese troops.[384] By 27 November much of a large Japanese ammunition depot at Kunsan had been dumped at sea; however, enough remained near a barracks area to cause the 53d Field Artillery Battalion to move to Masan.[385] At about the same time a serious accidental explosion occurred at Kunsan. After the arrival of the 229 Japanese soldiers in the division zone the rate of disposal seems to have accelerated. Some of them went to Chongup, where the 150th Division had concentrated. Part of the ammunition and explosives was detonated in place; the rest was moved to Pusan, Mokpo, or Samch'onpo for dumping at sea. Armament at airfields, such as the field at Sach'on, was also destroyed.[386] By the time the 6th Division took over the Yosu naval base on 28 October, most of the naval armament at the base seems to have been disposed of.[387]

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In the 7th Division zone the 707th Ordnance Company, assisted by other divisional troops, began the consolidation of surrendered Japanese ordnance equipment in the latter part of September.[388] Soon troops of the division began to destroy the ammunition and explosives by detonation; on 9 November a series of uncontrolled explosions occurred while a demolition squad from the 184th Infantry was working in a Japanese ammuntion dump at Anyang-Ni, where the largest Japanese dump was located. Three soldiers were killed and three wounded, and the fire was not extinguished until the 12th.[389] Disposal by demolition continued, however, and on 30 December one officer and five men of the 958 Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad were killed in an explosion near Yonan.[390] This incident helped to increase the determination of American commanders to use Japanese troops for this work and to rely on dumping at sea.[391] On 17 February 1946 the 280 Japanese soldiers who had been working in the 40th Division zone reached Anyang-Ni, and on the same day the others who had been working near Kimsan reached the town of Yongdang, in the southern part of the 7th Division zone.[392] Within a few days these soldiers began the work of disposing of the remaining Japanese ammunition and explosives of all types in the 7th Division zone. With only minor mishaps, they loaded ammunition on trains, consolidated it at Yongdang, and then dumped it at sea, while tactical troops of the 7th Division continued the dumping of ammunition in their zone. About 250,000 tons of ammunition were dumped off Yongdang. By late April, when the 509 Japanese labor troops were evacuated, the disposal of ammunition was substantially complete. A total of 6 officers and 45 men from the American forces had been killed while disposing of ammunition.[393]

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In addition to arms and ammunition, whose disposal was pressing from the viewpoint of security, other types of equipment remained which had potential value for the occupation forces and for the civilian economy. A search was begun in October to determine the number and types of Japanese army motor vehicles. These, including some 300 from Cheju Do, were made available to Military Government through the Materials Control Corporation.[394]

A considerable amount of engineer equipment, especially construction equipment, was used by occupation troops for operational purposes, and in particular by units assigned to ASCOM 24. Nevertheless, most engineer materiel surrendered by the Japanese still remained on hand in mid-March 1946.[395]

Some of the surrendered quartermaster equipment was used for operational purposes, but most of it was turned over to Military Government. Nearly all quartermaster equipment had been disposed of by the end of February 1946. Some Japanese army outer clothing and shoes were made available to the Korean police force.[396] At least 1500 horses, which were no longer needed by the Japanese forces, were turned over to Military Government for the use of the civilian population.[397] A small number of war dogs from Cheju Do were made available to guard installations used by ASCOM 24.[398]

The problem of disposing of chemical warfare supplies in Korea was greatly simplified by the fact that there were almost no war gases in the area. The only exceptions were a small quantity of chlorine, some chloropicrin insecticide, and tear gas. There was

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also a supply of smoke. These items, and many others, were destroyed by tactical troops. Extensive supervision by Chemical Warfare Service personnel was rendered difficult by the scattered condition of the dumps and unnecessary by the relatively harmless character of these supplies. Some warehouses containing gas masks and protective clothing were turned over to Military Government. Only a few items were used for operational purposes.[399] On Cheju Do, all chemical equipment was inspected by an officer of the Chemical Warfare Service and found to have no intelligence value. All such material which had no salvage value was destroyed.[400]

All Japanese army and navy medical stocks were eventually turned over to the Bureau of Public Health and Welfare of Military Government, and they played an important part in the public health situation.[401]

Some Japanese signal equipment was used for operational purposes, but most of it was turned over to Military Government for use in the civil communications system. The equipment came into use only slowly, due to the scattered location of the numerous small dumps.[402]

The existence of large stocks of Japanese equipment offered a tremendous temptation both to Koreans and to American troops. Souveniring by the latter ruined many items of medical equipment. At Chinhae, where there were vast quantities of equipment, Koreans carried out organized raids from time to time on the warehouses. Local regulations apparently permitted troops to choose and send home any type of equipment except communications equipment and automatic weapons. In this way many items which would have been valuable to the civilian economy were sent to the United States, lost, or damaged.[403]

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The second type of surrendered Japanese equipment as classified in Administrative Order 19, namely naval vessels, was handled by the U. S. Navy, although at one time it was planned to use some for the newly formed Korean coast guard; their disposal does not come within the province of this chapter. 404

Materiel in the third category, airplanes, had to be inspected and cleared by two intelligence teams from FEAF, which were attached to the 308th Bomb Wing, before being destroyed as required by SCAP directives. By 19 November all planes had been cleared. The combat planes were ordered to be stripped of their armament by ordnance personnel and reduced to scrap. Some of the scrap was then turned over to the Materials Control Corporation. Permission was asked for and obtained from the Supreme Commander to turn over transport planes intact to Military Government with a view to starting a civilian airline. Some trucks found at Japanese airfields were used for operational purposes. What meteorological equipment the Japanese 5th Air Force had had was turned over to Military Government. The disposal of aircraft and accessory equipment, as just described, seems to have stopped temporarily in early December 1945, although only 138 aircraft had been destroyed. By mid-June 1946 the process had been ~~resumed and~~ completed. 405 406 All naval aircraft were destroyed by the U. S. Navy.

The disposition of some of the installations in the fourth category described in Administrative Order 19 has already been described. Naval bases, including naval air fields, eventually passed to Army control, after the U. S. Navy had disarmed them and satisfied themselves that the terms of the surrender were being carried out. 407 AFPAC

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required late in September that airfields not needed by the occupation forces be released as rapidly as possible to civilians for agricultural cultivation.[408] All airfields, both army and navy, were inspected by the air intelligence teams already mentioned, and were progressively released to the XXIV Corps for such disposition as General Hodge might consider appropriate. By 24 October all fields and accessory equipment had been so released.[409] At about the same time four fields were being operated by the occupation forces, and fourteen were being used for the Corps courier service.[410] None had been released to the Koreans. FEAF reported to CINCAFPAC on 21 October that it required five airfields in Korea for its own use (two at Seoul, one at Kunsan, one at Pusan, and one on Cheju Do).[411]

Few other Japanese installations presented a serious problem of disposal. The only important arsenal in Korea south of the 38th parallel, that near Inch'on, was effectively demilitarized soon after ASCOM 24 moved into it. A member of the XXIV Corps Ordnance Section spoke in a report of

> . . . the disruption caused within the arsenal buildings by the occupying units. Machine tools and special machinery of many types were cleared from most of the buildings and were scattered throughout the area in order to make room for incoming troops.[412]

Although these measures were stronger than had been called for in the Corps field order, which envisaged seizure of factories rather than destruction, General Hodge felt that the destruction of the arsenal's machinery was a necessary step. In any event, the goal

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toward which these measures were directed -- the complete demilitarization of the Japanese forces in southern Korea -- was certainly accomplished, and the promise made at Potsdam, that Japanese soldiers would be permitted to return to their homes, was fulfilled. 413

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1. The Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, par. 9.

2. XXIV Corps, Annex 9 to FO 55, 28 Aug. 1945.

3. Radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 251555/I Aug 45.

4. Hq Tenth Army, Annex A to Tactical Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Blacklist -- Baker-Forty, 13 Aug. 1945. (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Intelligence").

5. Hq XXIV Corps, Office of the A. C. of S. G-2, OB Section, "OB Estimate for Korea," 21 Aug. 1945. The figure of 375,000 is also quoted in the XXIV Corps G-2 Section's report after action (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

6. Hq XXIV Corps, Office of the A. C. of S. G-2, OB Section, "KOREA Order of Battle," 28 Aug. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Intelligence"). The unit designations given in this document for northern Korea are repeated in GHQ SCAP, "Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces," 1 Nov. 1945, Encl. 16, "Demobilization Status, Korea" (XXIV Corps G-2 files), but the same source says that "No information on the progress of disarmament and/or demobilization of Japanese Forces in Northern Korea (North of 38° North Latitude) is yet available." Thus the statement, made below, that there were no combat units of divisional size in Korea north of the 38th parallel is not disproved.

7. Radio No. 1, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

8. Radio No. 20, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

9. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 9, 15 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 10, 20 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 68, 17 Nov. 1945, p. 1; interview with Capt. R. K. Allan, OB Officer, XXIV Corps G-2 Section, 30 Oct. 1945.

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10. Corrected copy of XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report (in XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Order of Battle -- Jap & Korean"). The figure of 15,000 is given in XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

11. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 10, 20 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 6, 16 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

12. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 1, 18 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

13. Interview with Capt. Allan, 5 Nov. 1945.

14. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 68, 17 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

15. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 10, 20 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 1.

16. Radio No. 1, CG 17th Area Army to CG XXIV Corps.

17. Chart in SCAP, "Progress of Demobilization," 1 Nov. 1945.

18. Another chart in ibid.

19. GHQ SCAP, "Documents Submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces by the Japanese Mission to Negotiate Surrender Manila, 19 August 1945," pp. 11-12 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

20. Interview with Lt. Col. O. L. Harrison, XXIV Corps G-2 Section, 13 Sept. 1945; Technical Air Intelligence Unit, reports to FEAF, (XXIV Corps Air Office files).

21. Chart in SCAP, "Progress of Demobilization," 1 Nov. 1945.

22. SCAP, "Documents Submitted to the Supreme Commander," p. 50.

23. "Announcement" by Adm. Yamaguchi to Com Seventh Fleet, 8 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Intelligence"). Some of Admiral Yamaguchi's statements seem dubious.

24. Technical Air Intelligence Unit, report to FEAF, "Report of Inspection of Korean Airfields," 31 Oct. 1945; letter, Lt. L. A. Redding to Com Gru Div 16, "Report of Inspection of Naval Air Fields," 7 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

25. Government-General of Tyosen [Chosen], Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen: 1937-38 (Keizyo [Seoul], 1938), map inside back cover.

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26. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York, 1944), p. 194.

27. "Announcement."

28. Interview with 2d Lt. E. H. Farrell, 213th FA Bn, 5 Nov. 1945. See also radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 301800/I Sept 45.

29. "Capa-city of dwelling," undated document prepared by Japanese naval personnel at Chinhae for the U. S. Navy. (Copy in historical file.)

30. "Summary of Japanese Naval and Merchant Craft in Seventh Fleet Area of Responsibility in Korea South of 38 Degrees North Latitude for the Period from 8 September to 25 October 1945" (XXIV Corps AG 319.1, unclassified, Binder No. 4).

31. [XXIV Corps G-2], "Japanese Action Analysis" (XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Order of Battle -- Jap & Korean").

32. See radio Yamaguchi to Hodge, 3 Sept. 1945.

33. See Chapter IV.

34. Interview with Lt. Farrell, 5 Nov. 1945.

35. "Japanese Action Analysis."

36. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 32, 1 Nov. 1945, p. 1; radio Com Seventh Fleet to CTF 71, 021728/I Nov 45; radio CTF 71 to Com Seventh Fleet, 221510/I Oct 45. There is some confusion as to when the Army took over the Chinhae base; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 65, 7 Nov. 1945, gives 7 Nov. as the date, and the Corps began including naval evacuees in its reports to CINCAFPAC on the following day (see "Weekly Reports" in XXIV Corps AG unclassified files, 319.1, Binder No. 4); see also interview with army authorities at Chinhae, 25 Oct. 1945. Some of the sources cited indicate that the base was taken over by by 40th Division in October, and it seems likely that at that time the 40th Division assumed some of the responsibilities, such as that of processing and evacuating naval troops, but that formal control of the base did not pass to the 40th Division until early November. General Hodge was aware that 2,000-3,000 Japanese naval troops were evacuated from Chinhae by early October (see his press conference, 8 Oct. 1945, in historical file). The fact that the U. S. Navy evacuated Japanese naval personnel from Chinhae is further confirmed by a statement, made by the Commander of Task Force 71, early in October, that if disposition of naval arms and ammunition did not proceed at a satisfactory rate evacuation of Japanese naval personnel would be slowed or stopped, and that the

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Army would evacuate the remaining Japanese naval personnel from Cheju Do. (CTF 71, "Report on State of Compliance of Japanese Naval Forces in Korea with the Terms of Surrender," 10 Oct. 1945, in XXIV Corps AG unclassified files, 319.1, Binder No. 4. See also radio CTF 71, to CTU 71.5.1, 300503/I Oct 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 19, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 1; radio CTF 71 to CTG 71.6, 101136/I Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to US Naval Det (Chinhae), 261006 Sept 45.) Paragraph, as it stands, was revised by Colonel J. B. Coolidge, XXIV Corps G-3.

57. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, letter to CG XXIV Corps, 21 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

58. This figure was reached by subtracting the figure of 48,524 given by the XXIV Corps G-2 (apparently representing the total of Japanese army troops evacuated from Cheju Do, see XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 64, 13 Nov. 1945, p. 1) from the figure of 50,100 army and navy troops reported to have been on Cheju Do as of 28 Sept. (see XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 25, 28 Sept. 1945). The figure is a questionable one.

59. "Announcement."

40. XXIV Corps, Annex 9 to FO 55, 7 Sept. 1945, par. 1, par. 3.

41. XXIV Corps staff meeting 26 Aug. 1945 (historian's journal).

42. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 011456/I Sept 45.

43. Radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 030337/Z Sept 45. See also interview with Col. B. E. Prescott, Civil Administrator, 10 Dec. 1945.

44. SWNCC 150/4/A, 21 Sept. 1945, Part III (XXIV Corps AG Top Secret files).

45. See Chapter III.

46. General Hodge summarized these general conclusions in a press conference held on 8 Oct. 1945 (notes in historical file). See also interview with Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin, XXIV Corps G/S, 29 March 1946; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 15 Sept. 1945, p. 3.

47. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 49, 16 Sept. 1945, "Summary of Instructions Given by the Commander of Japanese Army in Korea on the Occasion of Staff Conference held at Taiden on September 14." (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

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48. Hq USAFIK, letter to CINCAFPAC, "Conditions in Korea," 13 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps AG Top Secret files).

49. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Adv, 162011/I Sept 45. See also The Liaison Detachment of Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 75, 19 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

50. Radio SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 182021 Sept 45.

51. Radio SCAP to CINCPAC, 182305/I Sept 45.

52. Radio CINCPAC/POA Adv to Com 7th Phib, 191028/I Sept 45.

53. Radio SCAP to USAFIK, 191745/I Sept 45. See also radio CINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 202247/I Sept 45.

54. Radio CG USAFIK to CTF 71, 211019/I Sept 45.

55. Interview with Col. J. B. Coolidge GSC, XXIV Corps G-3, 11 Feb. 1946.

56. See, for example, The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 139, 27 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

57. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946.

58. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 233, "Plan of Evacuation of Japanese in Korea," 15 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

59. Radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 191620 Oct 45.

60. Hq USAFIK, letter to Komuki, 27 Oct. 1945, AG 370.05 (TFOCT) (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

61. Most of the statements made in this paragraph do not require citation. For the last statement see radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 271740 Aug 45.

62. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946; historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945; radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv, 071452/I Nov 45.

63. Interview with Maj. J. M. Wilson, G-2, 40th Inf Div, 24 Oct. 1945.

64. 6th Inf Div, Annex 5 to FO 1, 30 Sept. 1945. Mr. Benninghoff wrote to the Secretary of State that "Demobilization in Korea is impossible." (Letter No. 1, Benninghoff to Secretary of State, 15 Sept. 1945, in XXIV Corps AG Top Secret files). See also XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

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65. SCAP, "Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea for September-October 1945," Section 2, "Political and Social Activities in Japan," p. 1 (XXIV Corps G-4 files).

66. See Chapter I; interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946.

67. See Chapters III and IV.

68. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 271740 Aug 45; radio SCAP to Japanese Government, 300458/I Aug 45. There is some doubt as to whether this message actually reached Korea. See Chapter I.

69. See Chapter IV.

70. Interview with Mr. Oda, 30 Oct. 1945.

71. Ibid.; dispatch by Richard H. Johnston, New York Times, 8 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 5, 8 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 9 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

72. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946. See also Chapter IV.

73. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 9 Sept. 1945, p. 1; interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb.1946.

74. Ibid.

75. XXIV Corps staff meeting, 12 Sept. 1945 (in historian's journal); XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 9, 12 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 2; Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 1 to Gen. Kozuki, "Arms and Equipment," 14 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

76. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 15 Sept. 1945, p. 3; Directive No. 1 to Gen. Kozuki.

77. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 49, 16 Sept. 1945, "Summary of the Instructions Given by the Commander [etc.]."

78. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946.

79. Ibid. The classification of topics used here is that given by Col. Coolidge.

80. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army, 151640 Sept 45.

81. Hq USAFIK, Directive to Commander, Japanese 17th Army Group, TFGOT 300.4, 19 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

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82. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 11, 14 Sept. 1945; Directive No. 1 to Gen. Kozuki. The surrender of Cheju Do will be described in full later. Only that part of the operation which was handled through liaison with the Japanese forces is described here.

83. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 53, 17 Sept. 1945, "Alterations of Places for Collected Arms" (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

84. "Conditions in Korea," 13 Sept. 1945.

85. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 61, 17 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

86. Hq USAFIK, "Directive to Commander Japanese 17th Army Group," 19 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files). The 17th Area Army was sometimes called by the Americans the 17th Army Group, or simply the 17th Army. As has been pointed out already, it corresponded to an American army.

87. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 72, 20 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

88. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 89, 21 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

89. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, 21 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

90. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 148, 28 Sept. 1945, "Accident in Saishuto" (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

91. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, "Occupation of Schools on Saishu-To," 4 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

92. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 2 to Gen. Kozuki, 18 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); Hq USAFIK, TPGOT 801.1, "Summary of Policies Governing Japanese Forces in Korea," 25 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); 6th Inf Div, Annex 5 to FO 1, 30 Sept. 1945; Hq USAFIK, "Results of Conference between Lieutenant General Hodge and Lieutenant General Ihara, Chief of Staff, 17th Japanese Army," 4 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 53, "Alterations of Places for Collected Arms," 17 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); "Summary of Meeting With Staff Officers of General Sugai, 17 Sept. and 20th Sept. with General Sugai" (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 152, "Report on the Progress of Arms-Collection," 29 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Enemy Equipment and Supplies").

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93. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 8, 18 Sept. 1945, p. 2.

94. "Summary of Meeting with Staff Officers of General Sugai, 17 Sept. and 20th Sept. with General Sugai." The writer has not been able to find Hokodi on the map or to determine its Korean name.

95. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 106, 23 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

96. "Report on Ship Distribution for Chosen Channel" (undated, XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

97. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, "Plans of Railway Transportation of Returning Japanese Army (in case: use only Pusan Port)" (undated, XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

98. "A Plan for Transport of Withdrawing Troops" (undated, XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

99. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 125, 26 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

100. Hq XXIV Corps, letter to CG ASCOM 24, TPGOT 370.0, 6 Oct. 1945, "Movement of Japanese Troops from Inch'on to Sasebo, Japan" (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

101. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 122, 26 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 31, 11 Oct. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 37, 17 Oct. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 38, 11 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 43, 16 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 44, 17 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

102. Hq USAFIK, letter to Komuki, AG 370.05 (TPGOT), "Evacuation of Japanese Personnel in Korea," 27 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

103. Radio CG USAFIK to SCAP, 011603/I Nov 45.

104. Radio SCAP to CG USAFIK, 022104/I Nov 45.

105. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, "Letter No. K. L. L/No. 290," 4 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

106. S/S XXIV Corps G-2 to G-3, 19 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); Hq USAFIK, letter to CG 40th Div, AG 300 (TPGOT), "Documents Authorized to be Carried by 17th Japanese Army Group," 19 Nov. 1945, in the same file.

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107. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kozuki, AG 319.1 (TFUGT), "Evacuation of Japanese 17th Army Headquarters to Japan," 10 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"). See also radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div and CG 40th Div, 091230/I Nov 45 and radio USAF to subordinates, 091302/I Nov 45.

108. Radio CG 7th Div to CG 40th Div, 171603/I Nov 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 74, 23 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 77, 26 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

109. Radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 241630/I Nov 45.

110. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army K. L. L/No. 86, 21 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

111. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, 29 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

112. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946.

113. Ibid.

114. Hq USAFIK, memorandum to Sugai, 5 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"). The reports made by the liaison detachment were turned over to the 7th Division G-4; the original reports were destroyed early in March 1946, before the writer could see them. However, consolidated inventories made from these originals are in the files of the 7th Division G-4 and of the Materials Control Corporation.

115. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

116. XXIV Corps, Annex 9 to FO 55.

117. See above.

118. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 39, 15 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

119. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 49, 16 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

120. Hq XXIV Corps, letter to Sugai, "Instructions to Lieutenant General Kozuki of the Japanese 17th Army Group," 18 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

121. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 25, 5 March 1946, p. 1.

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122. See for example The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 195, "Number of the Recalled," 6 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

123. [Letter from Kozuki, 1 Oct. 1945], "Proposals for Those Who Desire to Return Home Within the Land of Korea (South of the 38° N. L.)" (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

124. Hq USAFIK, memorandum to Col. Prescott (MG Civil Administrator), "Results of Conference Between Lieutenant General Hodge and Lieutenant General Ihara, Chief of Staff, 17th Japanese Army" (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

125. Radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 061646/I Oct 45.

126. Hq USAFIK, memorandum to Sugai, 6 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

127. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 2.

128. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 15 Sept. 1945, p. 3.

129. Ibid.

130. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 12, 22 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

131. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 3 to Lt. Gen. Kozuki, 22 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); radio CG USAFIK to SCAP, 221607/I Sept 45.

132. Radio CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 281931/I Sept 45.

133. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 16, 26 Sept. 1945, p. 1. See also R/S XXIV Corps G-3 to G/S, "Kempei Tai," 29 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

134. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 120, "Some Information about Japanese Army," 25 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

135. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 19, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

136. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 21, 1 Oct. 1945, p. 1.

137. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 25, 5 Oct. 1945, p. 1.

138. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 26, 6 Oct. 1945, p. 3.

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139. The following letters from the Japanese Liaison Detachment at Seoul, located in XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Reports by and Correspondence with Maj Gen Sugai," are pertinent: K. L. L/No. 83 and 83a, 21 Sept. 1945; K. L. L/No. 104, 23 Sept. 1945; "Injuries Done by Koreans towards Japanese after Armistice;" "Injuries Done to Japanese in and about Keijo;" K. L. L/No. 112, 25 Sept. 1945; K. L. L/No. 117, 26 Sept. 1945; K. L. L/No. 131, 27 Sept. 1945; K. L. L/No. 190, 6 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 208, 9 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 211, 9 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 255, 19 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 257, 21 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 262, 20 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 263, 21 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 282, 27 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 288, 28 Oct. 1945. See also the following letters from the Japanese Liaison Detachment, located in XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det:" K. L. L/No. 117, 26 Sept. 1945; K. L. L/No. 116, 25 Sept. 1945; K. L. L/No. 158, 1 Oct. 1945; "Trouble in Koshu," 17 Oct. 1945; K. L. L/No. 297, 1 Nov. 1945.

140. 40th CIC Det, "Information on Public Peace and Order," 10 Oct. 1945; Hq 40th Inf Div, AG of S G-2, "Information on Public Peace and Order in Southern Korea," 13 Oct. 1945 (both in XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Reports by and Correspondence with Maj Gen Sugai").

141. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, TFGSI 300, "Reply to K. L. L/No. 158," 18 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

142. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 223, "U. S. Occupation Plan," 12 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

143. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, TFGOT 386.2, "U. S. Occupation Plan," 15 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

144. Radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 19 Sept. 1945 (no DTG). See also The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 112, 25 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Reports by and Correspondence with Maj Gen Sugai").

145. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div, 191055 Sept 45; for further reports of friction, see The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 109, 24 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"). The incidents reported in the latter document were investigated by the 7th Division and found not to have occurred, according to Col. Coolidge.

146. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 96, 22 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

147. Radio CINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 252255/I Sept 45.

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148. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kozuki, "Use of Aircraft of Japanese Forces in Korea," 26 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"). See also radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 261345/I Sept 45.

149. Radio CINCAFPAC Adv to CG USAFIK, 280531/I Sept 45.

150. Radio SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 301735/I Sept 45.

151. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kozuki, "Use of Aircraft of Japanese Forces in Korea," 2 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

152. See "The Outline of the Situation of Personal [Personnel], Horses and Automobile of Troop in Korea [South of 38° North Latitude]" (in historical file). This document is undated; the writer acquired his copy on 13 Sept. 1945. See also overlays showing Japanese installations and dispositions (in appendix). These were compiled from information submitted by General Sugai and other Japanese officers.

153. Interview with Lt. Col. C. L. Harrison, 13 Sept. 1945.

154. "Notes of Conference Between Staff of Japanese Liaison Detachment and XXIV Corps Staff Officers." For the preparation of the questions asked, see Hq USAFIK, Office of the AC of S G-2, "Intelligence Questions to be Submitted to Lt Gen KOZUKI, Commanding General, Japanese 17th Army Group," 23 Sept. 1945, and backing papers (all documents are in XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

155. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 4 to Lt. Gen. Kozuki, Commanding General, 17th Japanese Army Group, 29 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files). The authority for the statements made about this directive is Col. Coolidge.

156. The Liaison Detachment of Japanese Army, "Answers to Training Programs and Systems of Japanese Army in Korea," 14 Dec. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"). The subject of intelligence will be treated more fully later in this chapter.

157. See XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Reports, passim.

158. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

159. R/S, XXIV Corps G-2 to G/S, 6 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

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160. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kosuki, "Funds and Credits of Japanese Army in Korea," 7 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det")

161. Radio SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 111641/I Oct 45.

162. Radio CG USAFIK to Sugai, 131126 Oct 45.

163. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army, 261630/I Oct 45.

164. The full text of this reply is given in XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 8, 6 Nov. 1945, Incl. No. 3. General Sugai gives the total number of military personnel in Korea as of Aug. 1945 as 350,000. In the writer's opinion this figure, together with much of the other information in this document, was provided by the Imperial GHQ, which seems to have consistently overestimated Japanese troop strength in Korea, even if one takes into account the 50,000 Koreans discharged before the arrival of the American forces.

165. Radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 171550/I Dec 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 201630/I Dec 45.

166. 7th Div G-2 Periodic Report No. 11, 20 Sept. 1945, p. 4; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 11, 21 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

167. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 5, 15 Sept. 1945, p. 3.

168. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 272, "Organization of Liaison Detachments," 22 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

169. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kosuki, AG 370.05 (TFGOT), "Evacuation of Japanese Personnel in Korea," 27 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 55, 4 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

170. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 240, "Distribution of Remaining Units," 18 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

171. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 304, "Proposed Plan for Personnel to Remain," 12 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

172. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 306, "Job for Personnel to Remain," 15 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

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173. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kosuki, AG 510.1 (TFGOT), "Japanese Liaison Detachment in Korea," 16 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 78, 27 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

174. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 091055/I Dec 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 105, 24 Dec. 1945, p. 1.

175. Radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 241530/I Dec 45.

176. "History of the G-3 Section XXIV Corps, 1945" (in historical file).

177. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kosuki, AG 300.4 (TFGOT), "Travel of Staff Officer," 27 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

178. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

179. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, AG 300.4, "Directive to Commander, Japanese 17th Army Group," 19 Sept. 1945.

180. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 240.

181. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 272, "Organization of Liaison Detachments," 22 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

182. Untitled document in XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det."

183. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kosuki, AG 510.1 (TFGOT), "Japanese Liaison Detachment in Korea," 16 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

184. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 307, "Personnel of Fusan Lsn. Det.", 16 Nov. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

185. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 78, 27 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

186. See, for example, radio CG 40th Inf Div to CG XXIV Corps, 301735/I Dec 45.

187. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 55, 4 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

188. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 80, 29 Nov. 1945, p. 2.

189. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 88, 7 Dec. 1945, p. 1.

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190. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 107, 27 Dec. 1945, p. 1.

191. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 155, 18 Feb. 1946, p. 1.

192. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

193. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 89, 21 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

194. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 120, "Some Information about Japanese Army," 25 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 17, 27 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

195. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 106, 23 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

196. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 232, "Duties of Liaison Detachments (Teams)," 16 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

197. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

198. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 272.

199. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, 29 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

200. XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

201. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 55, 4 Nov. 1945, p. 1.

202. See Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, TFGOT 452, "Maintenance of 5th Air Corps Headquarters at MITSUYO," 4 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

203. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 161, "Establishment of Detachments," 30 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

204. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, "Liaison Detachments at Ports of Entry in Japan," 2 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

205. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 181, 4 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 27, 7 Oct. 1945, p. 1.; radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv, 171022/I Oct 45.

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206. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 18 March 1946. The XXIV Corps also sent other teams to survey military government conditions in various parts of Korea.

207. R/S, XXIV Corps G-3 to C/S, "Liaison Parties to Japanese Army And Div Hq," 20 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files,"Japanese Army Liaison Det").

208. Ibid.; R/S XXIV Corps G-3 to C/S, "Liaison Parties to Japanese Headquarters," 22 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); Hq 308th Bombardment Wing (H), letter to XXIV Corps G-3, 1 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Miscellaneous").

209. See below.

210. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 18 March 1946.

211. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 24, 27 Sept. 1945.

212. Interview with Col. Coolidge, 18 March 1946.

213. Ibid.

214. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div and CG 40th Div, 231600/I Sept 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 281900/I Sept 45; R/S XXIV Corps G-3 to C/S, "Liaison Teams with Japanese Army," 1 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Miscellaneous").

215. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 251355/I Sept 45; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 21, 24 Sept. 1945.

216. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 281900/I Sept 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 260930/I Sept 45.

217. 7th Div G-3 Operations Report No. 19, 26 Sept. 1945; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 260930/I Sept 45.

218. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 251355/I Sept 45.

219. Handwritten report, 29 Sept. 1945, in XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det;" radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 041600/I Oct 45.

220. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 260930/I Sept 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 050825/I Oct 45.

221. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 260930/I Sept 45; handwritten report, 29 Sept. 1945; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 050825/I Oct 45.

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222. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps 070920/I Oct 45.

223. Handwritten report, 29 Sept. 1945; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 041600/I Oct 45.

224. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 070920/I Oct 45; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 34, 7 Oct. 1945.

225. 7th Div G-3 Operations Report No. 32, 9 Oct. 1945.

226. See for example XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 33, 6 Oct. 1945.

227. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 21, 24 Sept. 1945.

228. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 281900/I Sept 45; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 22, 25 Sept. 1945.

229. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 261605/I Sept 45.

230. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 24, 27 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 31, 4 Oct. 1945; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 261605/I Sept 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 271625/I Sept 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 301635/I Sept 45.

231. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 261605/I Sept 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 301635/I Sept 45.

232. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 291910/I Sept 45.

233. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 32, 9 Oct. 1945.

234. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 270900/I Sept 45.

235. Ibid.

236. Ibid.; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 29, 2 Oct. 1945.

237. 7th Div G-3 Operations Report No. 33, 12 Oct. 1945.

238. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 24, 27 Sept. 1945.

239. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 29, 2 Oct. 1945.

240. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 270900/I Sept 45.

241. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 021410/I Oct 45.

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243. Radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 021410/I Oct 45.

244. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 24, 27 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 26, 29 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 29, 2 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 31, 4 Oct. 1945; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 070930/I Oct 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 071500/I Oct 45.

245. Radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 301750/I Sept 45.

246. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 33, 6 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 36, 9 Oct. 1945; radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 052245/I Oct 45.

247. Ibid; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 30, 3 Oct. 1945.

248. Radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 151145/I Oct 45.

249. Radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 072042/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 082030/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 102009/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 122026/I Oct 45.

250. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 37, 10 Oct. 1945.

251. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 31, 4 Oct. 1945.

252. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 37, 10 Oct. 1945; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 072042/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 082030/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 102009/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG USAFIK, 122026/I Oct 45.

253. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 271740 Aug 45.

254. Radio SCAP to Imperial Japanese Government, 300458/I Aug 45. The radios between General Hodge and General Kozuki make no mention of the requirement to disarm the day before the American landing.

255. Ibid.

256. Radio No. 7, CG XXIV Corps to CG 17th Area Army.

257. Historian's journal, 8 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 9 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

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258. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 6, 9 Sept. 1945.

259. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 2, 12 Sept. 1945; p. 1; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 7, 10 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 8, 11 Sept. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 1, 16 Sept. 1945, p. 2. For further details see 7th Division G-3 Operations Reports.

260. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

261. Radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 011010/I Sept 45.

262. Radio Com 5th Flt to various addressees, 091311/I Sept 45.

263. Radio SCAP to subordinates, 112303/I Sept 45.

264. Hq USAFIK, letter to CINCAFPAC, "Conditions in Korea," 24 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps AG Top Secret files).

265. "Summary of Meeting with Staff Officers of General Sugai, 17 Sept. and 20th Sept. with General Sugai."

266. The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 89, See also reports of U. S. divisional liaison teams.

267. Ibid.

268. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 1 to Kozuki, "Arms and Equipment," 14 Sept. 1945.

269. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 011456/I Sept 45.

270. Hq USAFIK, letter to Sugai, TPGGT 386/2, "U. S. Occupational Plan," 15 Oct. 1945. See also radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 041115/I Oct 45.

271. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 3, 2 Oct. 1945, p. 1; Hq XXIV Corps, report to CG by Col. Miller, "Report of XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Detachment to FUSAN," 26 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

272. See The Liaison Detachment of the Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 232.

273. Personal observation of the writer, 22 Oct. 1945.

274. Hq USAFIK, letter to Kozuki, AG 370.05, "Evacuation of Japanese Personnel in Korea," 27 Oct. 1945.

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275. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 7, 30 Oct. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 8, 6 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 59, 1 Nov. 1945.

276. See Chapter III. For numerous instances see XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Reports, passim. See also radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 041127/I Oct 45.

277. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, GO 3, 17 Sept. 1945; Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Ordinance No. 3, 29 Sept. 1945.

278. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, Ordinance No. 3, 25 Sept. 1945.

279. Hq USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor, letter to the Military Governor and all territorial commanders, AG 474 (TFIB3), "Firearms in Possession of Civilians," 6 Nov. 1945 (historical file).

280. Except where otherwise indicated, all information in this section is based on "The Surrender at Saishu [Cheju Do], 28 September 1945, Eyewitness Account by XXIV Corps Historian" (in historical file); Hq XXIV Corps, Office of the AC of S G-2, letter to CG, "Report on Surrender of Troops on SAISHU-TO, and Preliminary Survey of Disarmament Proceedings," 30 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); Hq USAFIK, Office of the AC of S G-2, report to G-2 by Col. Harrison, "Intelligence Report on SAISHU," 4 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

281. "Conditions in Korea," 13 Sept. 1945.

282. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 1, to Komuki, 14 Sept. 1945.

283. Memorandum, undated, "Surrender and Disarmament of Troops on SAISHU-TO" (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

284. Memorandum, 27 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

285. The last statement is based on letter OTU 71.1.9 to CTF 71, "Report of Demilitarization of Japanese Naval Forces, Quelpart Island [Cheju Do]," 7 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

286. Hq XXIV Corps, "Sketch Map Showing Location of Major Japanese Units in South Korea as of 7 Sept. 1945," 11 Sept. 1945 (historical file).

287. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 1, 16 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 2.

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288. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 10, 20 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

289. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 2, 25 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 4; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 3, 2 Oct. 1945, Annex 1 to Incl. No. 1; Hq XXIV Corps, report to CG by Col. Miller, "Report of XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Detachment to FUSAN," 26 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 14, 24 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

290. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 9 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

291. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 1 to Komuki, 14 Sept. 1945.

292. Personal observation of the writer; interview with Maj. Wilson, 24 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 29, 9 Oct. 1945, p. 1; interview with Brig. Gen. Garvin, 29 March 1946.

293. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 6, 23 Oct. 1945, Incl. No. 1.

294. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 1 to Komuki, 14 Sept. 1945.

295. Reports of U. S. liaison teams; Hq 308th Bomb Wing, report to CG XXIV Corps, "Investigation at SUWON," 15 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Miscellaneous Rpts"); interview with army authorities at Chinhae, 25 Oct. 1945. The general statement on the good discipline and conduct of the Japanese troops seems to be the nearly unanimous verdict of Americans who came in contact with them.

296. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 4, 9 Oct. 1945, Incl. No. 3; personal observation and inquiry by the writer, 22 Oct. 1945.

297. Hq XXIV Corps, "Report of XXIV Corps Reconnaissance Detachment," 26 Sept. 1945.

298. Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 1 to Komuki, 14 Sept. 1945.

299. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 9, 19 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

300. Hq USAFIK, Directive to Komuki, TFGOT 300.4, 19 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

301. Hq XXIV Corps, "Report of Reconnaissance Detachment," 26 Sept. 1945.

302. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 55, 4 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 8, 6 Nov. 1945, p. 1; Hq USAFIK, letter to Komuki, AG 370.05 (TFGOT), "Evacuation of Japanese Personnel in Korea," 27 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det").

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303. Personal observation by the writer, 24-25 Oct. 1945.

304. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 11, 27 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 12, 4 Dec. 1945, p. 1; interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946; also see below.

305. "Report on Ship Distribution for Chosen Channel;" XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 1, 16 Sept. 1945, p. 2.

306. Radio SCAP to Imperial Japanese Government, 252213/I Sept 45.

307. Interview with Brig. Gen. Garvin, 29 March 1946.

308. Radio Commander Destroyer Sqdn 64 to CTF 71, 171215/Z Sept 45; radio CTF 71 to Com Seventh Fleet, 191115/I Sept 45.

309. Radio CG XXIV Corps to Com 7th Phib, 221101 Sept 45; radio Com Seventh Fleet to Com Fifth Fleet, 230710/I Sept 45; radio COMGENUSASTAF to CINCAFPAC Adv, 161002/I Sept 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to COMINPAC, 271622 Sept 45; radio CG USAFIK to Com Seventh Fleet, 301451/I Sept 45; radio CTF 71 to CG XXIV Corps, 191619/I Oct 45; radio CTF 71 to ALUSNA Moscow, 302300/I Sept 45.

310. These data were compiled from a complete file of XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic and G-3 Operations Reports for the period.

311. Radio SCAP to CG USAFIK, 301928/I Sept 45; radio SCAP to CG AFWESPAC, 301931/I Sept 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv, SCAJAP, 160850 Oct 45.

312. Radio CG USAFIK to Com Seventh Fleet, 240933/I Sept 45.

313. Radio Com Seventh Fleet to CTF 76, 241624/Z Sept 45; radio Com Phib Group 13 to CG XXIV Corps, 282326/I Sept 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to Com Phib Group 13, 012000/I Oct 45; radio Com Seventh Fleet to CG XXIV Corps, 221710/I Oct 45.

314. Radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 221322/I Oct 45.

315. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 260958 Sept 45.

316. Radio CG USAFIK to CG 40th Div, 261600 Sept 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 262110/I Sept 45; radio CINCAFPAC Adv to CG USAFIK, 281721/I Sept 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 291105/I Sept 45; radio CG USAFIK to CG 40th Div, 021712 Oct 45.

317. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 011405/I Oct 45.

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318. Radio SCAP to CG USAFIK, 271121 Oct 45.

319. Hq 40th Div, Operations Memorandum No. 13, "Processing of Evacuees Both Military and Civilian Prior to Movement to Japan," 16 Oct. 1945; interview with Maj. Wilson, 24 Oct. 1945; personal observation by the writer, 24-25 Oct. 1945; 40th Div, "Evacuation" (undated); 40th Div, "Evacuation and Repatriation Through the Port of Pusan, Korea 28 Sept 45 - 15 Nov 45" (copies of all documents are in historical file).

320. The sources are the same as for the preceding note; see also XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report and XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 19, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

321. "Evacuation and Repatriation," p. 10; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 041100/I Oct 45.

322. Handwritten memorandum in XXIV Corps G-3 files, O/E duty officer to G/S, 5 Oct. 1945.

323. Radio CG 40th Div to CG 7th Div, ASCOM 24, 8 Oct. 1945 (no DTG).

324. Radio CG 6th Div to CG 40th Div, 291441/I Oct 45; radio CG 6th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 061517/I Nov 45.

325. Radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 160830/I Nov 45.

326. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 26, 12 March 1946, p. 1.

327. Radio CG USAFIK to SCAP, 161516 Oct 45.

328. Radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 270922/I Oct 45; Hq USAFIK, letter to Kosuki, "Evacuation of Japanese Personnel in Korea," 27 Oct. 1945.

329. Radio CG ASCOM 24 to CO Pusan Det, Hq ASCOM 24, 281518/I Oct 45.

330. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 271442 Nov 45; radio CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps 241245/I Dec 45.

331. Radio SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 291003/I Sept 45; radio CG USAFIK to Com Seventh Fleet and others, 021049/I Oct 45; radio CG USAFIK to Com 7th Phib, 021014/I Oct 45; radio SCAP to Imperial Japanese Government, 051757/I Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Div, 052115/I Oct 45.

332. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div, 042130/I Oct 45.

333. Radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 050945 Oct 45; radio CG Sixth Army to CG V Phib Corps, 071501 Oct 45.

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334. Hq XXIV Corps, letter to CG ASCOM 24, TPGOT 370.01, "Movement of Japanese Troops from Inch'on to Sasebo, Japan," 6 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); R/S, XXIV Corps G-3 to G/S, "Japanese PW Processing Center at Inch'on," 9 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 021531/I Oct 45.

335. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 31, 11 Oct. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 38, 11 Oct. 1945; radio CG ASCOM 24 to SCAP and others, 111255 Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Div, 111505 Oct 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report.

336. Ibid.; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 37, 17 Oct. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 38, 18 Oct. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 43, 16 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 44, 17 Oct. 1945.

337. Radio Com Seventh Fleet to CG XXIV Corps, 091234 Sept 45; radio Com Seventh Fleet to CTF 71, 121028 Sept 45; letter Com Gru Div 16 to CG XXIV Corps, "Naval Base Occupation Unit (NBOU) for Pusan-Chinkai area," 12 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

338. Letter Com Seventh Fleet to Commander Japanese Naval Forces, Korea, "Disarmament and Demobilization of Japanese Naval Forces in Korea, Requirements for," 9 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

340. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 34, 7 Oct. 1945.

341. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 9, 19 Sept. 1945, p. 1; interview with army authorities at Chinhae, 25 Oct. 1945; Hq 40th Div Arty, "Occupation History Report," 31 Dec. 1945 (historical file); CTF 71, "Report on State of Compliance of Jap Naval Forces in Korea with the Terms of Surrender," 31 Oct. 1945; radio CTF 71 to CTU 71.5.1, 300503/I Oct 45; radio Com Seventh Fleet to CTF 71, 021728/I Nov 45; radio CTF 71 to CG XXIV Corps, 211153/8 Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to SCAJAP, 151500/I Nov 45.

342. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24, CG 6th Div, 101445/I Oct 45. See also radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Div, 101517/I Oct 45.

343. Hq XXIV Corps, "Evacuation of Japanese from Cheju Island to Sasebo, Japan," 19 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

344. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv, SCAJAP, 160850 Oct 45.

345. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 30, 23 Oct. 1945; Hq 749th FA Bn, unit history for 1945 (historical file).

346. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 31, 24 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 45, 25 Oct. 1945, p. 2.

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348. Radio ASCOM 24 to Col. Ferguson, 112358/I Nov 45; radio 749th FA Bn to ASCOM 24, 121725/I Nov 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 121020/I Nov 45; The Liaison Detachment of Japanese Army, K. L. L/No. 290, 28 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 64, 13 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 68, 17 Nov. 1945, p. 1; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 70, 12 Nov. 1945.

349. Ibid; radio CG 6th Div to CG ASCOM 24, 041724/I Nov 45; radio CG ASCOM 24 to CG 6th Div, 051714/I Nov 45; radio 749th FA Bn to ASCOM 24, 111510/I Nov 45; Hq 749th FA Bn, unit history for 1945.

350. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 215, 30 April 1946.

351. "Notes of Conference Between Staff of Japanese Liaison Detachment and XXIV Corps Staff Officers;" Hq USAFIK, Office of the AC of S G-2, "Intelligence Questions to be Submitted to Lt Gen KOZUKI, Commanding General, Japanese 17th Army Group," 23 Sept. 1945; and backing papers (XXIV Corps G-3 files). See also Hq USAFIK, Directive No. 4 to Kozuki, 29 Sept. 1945 and backing papers (XXIV Corps G-3 files). This directive was never sent, since the information desired had already been furnished (see above).

352. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 15, 25 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 2, 25 Sept. 1945, Incl. No. 1; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 4, 9 Oct. 1945, Incl. No. 4.

353. Interview with Gen. Garvin, 29 March 1946.

354. GHQ SCAP, GO 9, "Japanese Military Intelligence Targets," 2 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Order of Battle -- Jap & Korean").

355. Radio CG XXIV Corps to Advon FEAF, 201430/I Sept 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 231600/I Sept 45; radio Sec 22, GHQ AFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 241251/I Sept 45; XXIV Corps G-2 Action Report; XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary No. 3, 2 Oct. 1945, Incl. No. 2; Hq XXIV Corps, report to Senior Asst. Director, Section 22, GHQ AFPAC, "Interrogation Reports," 3 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files); radio CG USAFIK to CTF 71, 261651 Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, 210800 Oct 45.

356. Interview with 1st Lt. R. F. Seeburger, XXIV Corps G-2 Section, 27 Feb. 1946. The Target Folder was reproduced on 23 Nov. 1945.

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358. The quotation is from Incl. 1 to 1st Ind., GHQ SCAP, letter to XXIV Corps G-2, "Intelligence Targets," 7 Feb. 1946 (XXIV Corps G-2 files). Other information is taken from the rest of the letter; and from interview with Lt. Seeburger, 27 Feb. 1946.

359. Ibid.; WD, WDGS, G-2, MID 906, letter to CINCAFPAC Adv, "Classification of War Department Target Folders," 24 Jan. 1946; GHQ USAFPAC, letter to CG XXIV Corps, "Classification of War Department Target Folders," 11 Feb. 1946 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

360. CM reports Nos. 1-5 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

361. Target No. 158 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

362. Hq XXIV Corps, Office of the Cml O, report to Chief Cml O AFPAC, "Japanese Chemical Warfare Intelligence," 17 Dec. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

363. "Information of Special Interest To the Office of Chief of Engineers;" ordnance report No. 6 (undated); No. 11, 10 Dec. 1945; No. 13, "Field Artillery in Korea," 10 Dec. 1945; No. 15, 12 Dec. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

364. Reports on Targets No. 9 and 107 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

365. Hq XXIV Corps, Office of the Sig O, report to Corps G-2, "Japanese Intelligence Targets in the Far East (Korea)," 1 Feb. 1946 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

366. The Liaison Detachment of Japanese Army, "Answers to Training Programs and Systems of Japanese Army in Korea," 14 Dec. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det"); Target No. 108 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

367. SCAP, Occupation Instructions No. 2, 25 Sept. 1945.

368. XXIV Corps, Adm. O. 19, 2 Oct. 1945.

369. Radio MG to CG XXIV Corps and subordinates, 12 Nov. 1945 (no DTG); radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Div, 131200/I Nov 45.

370. See the changes to Occupation Instructions No. 2, especially Change 2; reports in XXIV Corps G-4 files; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 270843/I Oct 45.

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571. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Adv, 250959 Sept 45.

572. R/S XXIV Corps AG to G-3, "Disposition of Japanese War Material," 7 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps AG Classified files, 386.3,Binder No. 1).

573. Radio CINCAFPAC Adv to subordinates, 242139/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 271605/I Oct 45.

574. "History of the XXIV Corps Ordnance Section (1945)" (historical file).

575. Ordnance reports in XXIV Corps G-4 files; conversation with XXIV Corps Ordnance Officer; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 041127/I Nov 45.

576. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div, 181100/I Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, 181145/I Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24, 181145 Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 6th Div, 181200/I Oct 45; radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 308th Bomb Wing, 181200/I Oct 45; radio CG 40th Div to CG ASCOM 24 181940/I Oct 45; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 261427/I Oct 45; Hq USAFIK, letter to Komuki, "Evacuation of Japanese Personnel in Korea," 27 Oct. 1945; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 061017/I Nov 45; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 081033/I Nov 45; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 151506/I Dec 45; radio CINCAFPAC Adv to subordinates, 270821/I Nov 45; conversations with officers of the XXIV Corps G-4 Section; miscellaneous reports in XXIV Corps AG classified files, 386.3, Binder No. 1.

577. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG XXIV Corps Disarmament Det at Cheju Do, 021950/I Oct 45; memorandum, undated, "Surrender and Disarmament of Troops on SAISHU-TO;" "The Surrender at Saishu;" Hq XXIV Corps, letter to CG, "Report on Surrender of Troops on SAISHU-TO," 30 Sept. 1945; Hq USAFIK, Office of the AC of S G-2, report to G-2, "Intelligence Report on SAISHU," 4 Oct. 1945; radio OTU 71.1.9 to CG XXIV Corps, 041958/I Oct 45; radio CTF 71 to Com Seventh Fleet, 051740/I Oct 45; letter OTU 71.1.9 to CTF 71, "Report of Demilitarization of Japanese Naval Forces, Quelpart Island," 7 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); XXIV Corps staff meeting, 17 June 1946 (historian's journal).

578. F. S. Low, USN, memorandum to Gen. Hodge, 29 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G/S files); letter CTF 71 to Capt. O. C. Wood, "Letter of Instructions," 7 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files); Hq 21st Portable Surgical Hospital, "Terminal History Report, 1 October 1945 to 18 December 1945," 18 Dec. 1945 (historical file); Targets No. 19 and 107 (XXIV Corps G-2 files); XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Reports for the period, especially No. 43, 18 Oct. 1945; No. 78, 20 Nov. 1945.

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379. Radio CTF 71 to CG XXIV Corps, 101132/I Oct 45; memorandum XXIV Corps G-3 to C/S, "Naval Disposal of Explosives and Ammunition," 12 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

380. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 67, 9 Nov. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 73, 15 Nov. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 78, 20 Nov. 1945; interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946.

381. XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 48, 28 Oct. 1945, p. 4; radio CG 40th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 281030/I Oct 45.

382. Radio CG XXIV Corps to CG 40th Div, CG 6th Div, 200950/I Dec 45; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 113, 26 Dec. 1945.

383. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 46, 16 Feb. 1946.

384. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Reports No. 76, 18 Nov. 1945; No. 104, 16 Dec. 1945; No. 105, 17 Dec. 1945.

385. "Information of Special Interest to the Office of Chief of Engineers," (XXIV Corps G-2 files); Hq XXIV Corps, memorandum G-3 to C/S, "Movement of 6th Div Bn to Masan — 40th Div Zone of Responsibility," 2 Dec 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files, "Policies and Operations No. 2"); XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 82, 1 Dec. 1945, p. 4; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 93, 5 Dec. 1945; letter CG 6th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 6 Dec. 1945 (XXIV Corps C/S files); unit history, 56th MG Co., 20 March 1946 (historical file).

386. See the following XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Reports: Nos. 114-118, 27 Dec. 1945 - 31 Dec. 1945; Nos. 4-48, 5 Jan. 1946 - 18 Feb. 1946.

387. Radio CTU 71.5.1 to CG 6th Div, 211347/I Oct 45; letter CTU 71.5.1 to CG 6th Div, "Reisui Naval Air Base -- Record of Transactions Concerning Enemy Equipment," 29 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-4 files, "Enemy Equip., 7th Div"); there is no information available on the disposal of munitions at Yosu, whence the tentative assumption that the U. S. Navy and Japanese naval troops finished the task. See also CTF 71, "Report on State of Compliance of Jap Naval Forces in Korea with the Terms of Surrender," 31 Oct. 1945.

388. 7th Div G-3 Operations Report No. 18, 25 Sept. 1945; 7th Div G-3 Operations Report No. 20, 27 Sept. 1945; 7th Div G-3 Operations Report No. 22, 29 Sept. 1945; and subsequent reports.

389. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 67, 9 Nov. 1945; XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 70, 12 Nov. 1945.

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390. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 117, 30 Dec. 1945; 707th Ord Light Maintenance Co., "Organizational Historical Report," 10 Jan. 1946 (historical file); XXIV Corps staff meeting, 31 Dec. 1945 (historian's journal); interview with Col. Coolidge, 11 Feb. 1946.

391. Ibid.; Hq USAFIK, "Disposal of Japanese Ammunition," AG 471 (TFIDO), 18 Dec. 1945; change to ibid., same title, 28 Jan. 1946.

392. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report Nos. 46-48, 16-18 Feb. 1946.

393. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report Nos. 33-37, 1, 8, 15, 22, 29 March 1946; No. 39, 5 April 1946; XXIV Corps staff meeting, 17 June 1946 (historian's journal).

394. Radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 251612/I Oct 45; radio CG USAFIK to CG 6th Div, CG ASCOM 24, MG, 050858/I Nov 45.

395. Records of surrendered engineer equipment (XXIV Corps G-4 files); radio CG USAFIK to CG 7th Div, CG 40th Div, CG 308th Bomb Wing, 171554/I Oct 45.

396. Records of surrendered quartermaster equipment, (XXIV Corps G-4 files); Hq USAFIK, Office of the FMG, letter to CG, "Captured Clothing Supplies," 22 Sept. 1945; Hq USAFIK, letter to MG, TFGOS 386.3, "Shoes for Korean Police Bureau," 26 Sept. 1945 (both letters in XXIV Corps AG files, unclassified, 386.3, Binder No. 1).

397. Radio CG USAFIK to Maj. Koontz (Chosen Food Co. at Taejon) 050913/I Oct 45; radio CG USAFIK to subordinates, 061227/I Oct 45.

398. Radio CG ASCOM 24 to CO 749th FA Bn, 021525/I Nov 45.

399. Records of surrendered chemical warfare equipment (XXIV Corps G-4 files); conversation with officers of the XXIV Corps CW Section; Target No. 112 (XXIV Corps G-2 files).

400. Hq XXIV Corps, KHIST, Gnl Sec, "Japanese Chemical Warfare Materiel, Saishu-To, Korea," 12 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-2 files, "Enemy Equipment and Supplies").

401. Records of surrendered medical supplies (XXIV Corps G-4 files); interview with Capt. P. W. Bogikes, Bureau of Public Health and Welfare, 5 Feb. 1946; interview with 1st Lt. S. H. Goldman, Bureau of Public Health and Welfare, 5 Feb. 1946. This subject will be treated more fully in the chapter on public health and welfare.

402. Records of surrendered signal equipment (XXIV Corps G-4 files); radio CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, 111702/I Dec 45.

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405. Interview with Lt. Goldman, 5 Feb. 1946; statement by 1st Lt. J. D. Comer, 213th FA Bn, 20 Feb. 1946.

404. See SCAP, Occupation Instructions No. 1, 15 Sept. 1945, par. 3x; radio Adm. F. S. Low to CG XXIV Corps, date not given but roughly 20 Oct. 1945; statement by Lt. Col. L. S. Thompson, Director of Dept. of National Defense, 10 April 1946.

405. Interview with Gen. Garvin, 29 March 1946; records of surrendered aircraft and accessories (XXIV Corps G-4 files); conversation with XXIV Corps Air Officer; radio CG FEAF to CG XXIV Corps, 101642/I Oct 45; radio CONSENTEN to CG USAFIK, 252105/I Sept 45; radio CG USAFIK to SCAP, 151608/I Nov 45; radio CG 308th Bomb Wing to CG XXIV Corps, 19 Nov. 1945 (no DTG); radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Adv, 281549/I Nov 45; SCAP, Occupation Instructions No. 2, 25 Sept. 1945, par. 5; Hq FEAF, Occupation Directive No. 1, 10 Oct. 1945; XXIV Corps staff meeting, 10 June 1946 (historian's journal). The disposal of aircraft seems to have been surrounded with considerable confusion.

406. CTF 71, "Report on State of Compliance of Jap Naval Forces in Korea with the Terms of Surrender," 31 Oct. 1945.

407. Ibid.; U.S.S. Frank E. Evans (DD 754), report, "Demilitarization of ex-Japanese Naval Air Base, Korea," 24 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps AG files, unclassified, 319.1, Binder No. 4).

408. GHQ USAFPAC, letter to subordinates, AG 686, "Release of Airfields," 25 Sept. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

409. See the teams' reports in the records of surrendered aircraft and accessories (XXIV Corps G-4 files), especially "Release of Japanese Aircraft and Air Equipment for Disposal," 24 Oct. 1945.

410. Hq XXIV Corps, letter to CINCAFPAC, "Release of Japanese Airfields," 15 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files).

411. Adv. Echelon FEAF, letter to CINCAFPAC, "Release of Japanese Airfields," 21 Oct. 1945 (XXIV Corps G-3 files). See also radio FEAF Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 011937/I Nov 45.

412. Ord. Technical Intelligence Report No. 1, "Japanese Army Arsenal, Jinsen (Inchon) Korea," 12 Dec. 1945, p. 1 (XXIV Corps Ord. Sec. files). The statement quoted is amply substantiated by verbal evidence from persons connected with ASCOM 24, but other written evidence is scarce.

413. Annex 7 to FO 55, par. 8e; interview with Gen. Hodge, 17 April 1946.

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REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE CIVILIANS AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS

The homeward movement of Japanese civilians from American-occupied Korea began practically immediately upon formal announcement of Japanese surrender, and was in full swing at the time of the American landing. These repatriates travelled on privately-owned vessels, including two ships, the KOAN MARU and the TOKUJU MARU, which the Japanese Government had obtained permission from General MacArthur to use in repatriating Japanese and Koreans across the Tsushima Straits.(1) The exact number of Japanese civilians who left Korea in this manner is difficult to determine, since the movement was not supervised by any American agency. When the American forces arrived, Japanese were returning to their native land, via Pusan, at the rate of 4,000 to 6,000 daily.(2) Indications are that approximately 160,000 Japanese civilians left Korea for Japan between 15 August 1945 and the close of the following month, when Occupation authorities took charge of the movement.(3)

The Problem

The Japanese constituted the principal foreign element in Korea. The small number of Chinese, Ryukyuans, and Formosans, to whom further reference will be made elsewhere in this chapter, were

but incidental to the major problem. Although a minority, the Japanese had been dominant in Korean life for some four decades. The key positions in government, industry, commerce, and education were occupied by them. The hatred of the native population for the Japanese ruling class, and the desire of the former to appropriate the wealth which the latter had amassed, created a serious problem for the United States forces.

Available estimates of the number of Japanese in Korea vary. From Japanese sources it appears that, as of September 1945, the number of that nationality resident in Korea totaled approximately 660,000 persons; of that figure, two-thirds, or about 435,000, was found in the American zone (south of the 38th Parallel), while the remaining 225,000 was located in the Soviet Zone.(4) At best these figures were only estimates which soon were altered by the influx of Japanese refugees from areas occupied by the Soviet Army.

Regardless of the precise number of Japanese civilians remaining in Korea, there could be no doubt that they were regarded as undesirable, both by the Koreans and by the United States forces.(5) The Koreans viewed the Japanese as oppressors holding property and positions that rightfully belonged to them. The United States Army, on the other hand, feared the powerful Japanese minority in Korea as the potential spearhead of a future economic and political penetration by a revived and militant Japan.

Japanese Civilians in Soviet-Occupied Areas

Although not of direct concern to the XXIV Corps, the fate of

Japanese civilians in the Soviet-occupied areas of North Korea and Manchuria naturally came under consideration from time to time. As in Korea, contemporary estimates of the number of Japanese in Manchuria varied greatly. The total of prospective Japanese civilian repatriates in Manchuria was somewhere between 1,300,000 and 2,000,000 in August 1945. This did not include approximately one hundred thousand South Manchurian Railway employees, who were to remain. Most of these Japanese were concentrated along the main railway line, notably in Mukden, Hsinking, and Harbin.(6)

All reports indicate that at the outset the Japanese under Soviet domination suffered from ill-treatment and, in many cases, were victims of looting, pillage, and rape by the Soviet Army.(7) As early as September 1945 the Japanese Foreign Office expressed grave concern over the fate of Japanese civilians in the Soviet zone of occupation. Its liaison officer in Seoul, Ichiji Kameyama, sought permission from SCAP to travel to Pyongyang (Heijo) to negotiate with the local Soviet authorities regarding the evacuation of Japanese nationals from North Korea and Manchuria. According to the political advisor to General Hodge, H. Merrell Benninghoff, whose assistance had been solicited in this matter, Kameyama had planned a mission to North Korea to distribute rice and money to needy Japanese. Kameyama's request was forwarded to the Soviet commander, who at length replied that he did "not see the necessity" for the proposed visit.(8) The Japanese Government also requested resumption of railway service from Hsinking, Mukden, and Shankaikwan to Pusan, in order to facilitate repatriation of Japanese nationals from North Korea and Manchuria. However, nothing came of

this proposal.(9)

The Japanese civilians together with the many Koreans in the Soviet-occupied areas of North Korea and Manchuria might be likened to a reservoir of humanity which overflowed periodically, spilling a flood of refugees into South Korea. As will be shown below, the problem thus created for the United States forces became increasingly acute by 1946.

Initial Policy and Planning

Initial policy and planning for the evacuation of Japanese civilians evidently originated in the Bureau of Planning under the Japanese Government General, which already had begun caring for displaced persons when the United States forces arrived. Operating for the relief of refugees and utilizing government funds, this Japanese organization had its main office in the Government General Building in Seoul and branches, called "inquiry offices", in that city as well as in Taejon, Taegu, and Pusan, in addition to representatives in Japan proper. These cities served as control points for the housing, feeding, and repatriation of refugees. Late in September 1945, when over-all responsibility for repatriation was assigned to Military Government, it was only natural that maximum use was made of the existing Japanese agencies in this field. Dependence upon the Japanese for assistance, thus begun, remained characteristic of this phase of the repatriation program.(10)

Under Military Government the task of repatriation fell to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Secretariat. On 9 October 1945

Major Gordon B. Enders, head of that Section, outlined its plan and policy for the handling of displaced persons. Its responsibility extended to the three broad groups: all Japanese civilians in Korea south of the 38th parallel, and all Japanese civilians residing in China, Manchuria, and Northern Korea, in the event that they were transported through territory under the jurisdiction of the XXIV Corps; all Koreans residing in Japan, China, or Manchuria who were desirous of returning to Korea; all Chinese and other nationals desirous of returning to their respective countries from Korea.

The Foreign Affairs Section was to make the necessary arrangements for transportation by rail and water of Japanese civilians leaving South Korea. It was to notify the Japanese representatives of the scheduled times of departure and the number of persons to be moved, on their part these representatives were to handle the selection and assembly of the Japanese repatriates at designated loading points. The Japanese Relief Society or other duly recognized organizations as well as Korean governmental agencies were to be held directly responsible for the care of displaced Japanese at Korean ports of embarkation. Japanese repatriates were to be subject oo existing restrictions on amounts of money, food, and baggage which might be carried out of the country. Lastly, the Foreign Affairs Section was to maintain necessary liaison with the Transportation Bureau and other interested agencies of Military Government.(11)

Meanwhile, shortly after his arrival in South Korea, General Hodge reached the conclusion that all Japanese within the American zone should be repatriated, and he so advised the Supreme Commander,

General MacArthur.[12] The American commander in Korea felt that prompt evacuation of Japanese civilians was essential to the achievement of stability.[13] On 8 October 1945, in furtherance of this policy and in order to insure orderly repatriation, Military Government promulgated its Ordinance No. 10, requiring registration of all Japanese and restricting their travel. Specifically, all persons of Japanese nationality were forbidden to travel in excess of ten kilometers from their place of residence without written permission from the Military Government through the Civil Police. All Japanese nationals were to register at the offices of their block associations, and the accumulated registrations for each week were to be filed with the Foreign Affairs Section of the Secretariat.[14] Thereafter, all movement of Japanese civilians were under American control, except for those accomplished by illegal means.

Actual control over Japanese civilians was a matter for local tactical units and Military Government personnel and consequently varied somewhat from place to place; in general, however, no special restrictions were imposed upon the Japanese, other than limitation of travel and compliance with the customary police regulations. As a matter of fact, this policy of "laissez faire" had been authorized by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, one of whose directives declared, "Civilian Japanese may be allowed to continue their normal activities consistent with the objectives of the military occupation."[15]

The Agencies Involved

The movement of Japanese civilians to the home islands involved

a number of different agencies. In Japan, SCAP, AFPAC, Sixth Army, Eighth Army, representatives of the United States Navy, and officials of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned at various times and to a greater or lesser degree. In South Korea nearly every office of a policy-making or operational nature had some part in the repatriation program. General Hodge and his Chief of Staff, General Garvin, each kept a map showing the number of Japanese left in each community in the United States zone; by means of these they followed developments closely and with great interest. Both the G-2 and G-3 Sections, XXIV Corps, maintained records of the movements of repatriates. (16)

Military Government also was involved, from the highest to the lowest level. The Military Governor and his Deputy had a hand in matters of policy. However, the main administrative burden fell upon the Foreign Affairs Section, for although the Koreans were still, technically, subjects of Japan, the Japanese nationals in Korea were viewed and treated as foreigners. The Foreign Affairs Section actually coordinated and arranged the movements of Japanese civilians. Transportation was obtained through the Bureau of Transportation and with the cooperation of the port directors of the United States Navy. Medical care and immunization of departing repatriates were supervised by the Bureau of Public Health and Welfare; and together with the Foreign Affairs Section, that bureau coordinated private relief activity among the Japanese.

Subordinate tactical units were responsible for most of the actual processing of repatriates at the ports of debarkation. This was especially true of the 40th Infantry Division, and later the 6th

at Pusan.[17] Local Military Government units supervised registration of Japanese nationals and insured compliance with current directives on such matters as transfers of property. They informed the Japanese of the prevailing restrictions and made arrangements for all necessary rail movements.

Coordination of these many scattered agencies obviously proved a task of the first magnitude, constituting a major problem in the repatriation of Japanese civilians. Maintenance of effective liaison was made still more difficult by the poor communications existing within many parts of South Korea during the early months of the occupation. Viewed in the aggregate, the evacuation of the Japanese from South Korea, and the simultaneous return of thousands of Koreans to their homeland, resulted in an army-supervised mass movement of humanity on a scale rarely exceeded.[18]

Priorities and Procedures

One of the first problems facing General Hodge was that of determining the relative priorities to govern the repatriation of the several categories of Japanese in South Korea. In response to a query on this subject, SCAP directed, on 20 September 1945, that first priority be granted to the movement of Japanese military personnel, and second to that of Japanese civilians. Further details were to be announced at an early date, it was stated. Subsequently, during the autumn of 1945, the priorities were set forth in greater detail. As of 5 November, Japanese were to be repatriated in the following order: military units; furloughed and discharged soldiers

and families of Japanese military personnel; undesirables; civilian welfare cases; other civilians, except essential employees in government and industry.(20) Persons in the last category were to be evacuated only after approval by Military Government, except for railroad and communications employees, who were to be removed only by order of the Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

In the repatriation program, the initial emphasis rested upon the movement of Japanese military personnel, which was to be accomplished prior to any organized exodus of civilians. The categories of civilians to be evacuated were largely self-explanatory, but two groups, the civilian welfare cases, and the undesirables, require some clarification. The former comprehended the destitute and the homeless, who were likely to become public charges if allowed to remain in South Korea. The latter included all Japanese Shinto priests and monks. By directive of 2 November 1945 these were to be evacuated "as soon as possible." Early in the following month similar orders were issued for the immediate removal of all Japanese geisha and prostitutes (Joro).(21) All persons in these categories were obviously undesirable.

It will be noted that the priority system took no heed of the personal desires of the repatriates, who in this instance were clearly victims of the fortunes of war. Actually, many Japanese in South Korea, and especially the younger generation, had never seen Japan and could hardly be enthusiastic over the prospect of returning to their devastated homeland. On the other hand, they had lost their dominant role in Korea and could look forward only to increasingly

difficult living conditions if they remained. Under these circumstances the Japanese showed no great reluctance in leaving. Of the 30,000 who remained in the United States zone in late December 1945, only 1,345 wished to stay. The willingness of the Japanese to go made it unnecessary for the XXIV Corps to stress its determination that they leave. For the record, at the outset no compulsion was exercized, and late in November 1945 Military Government informed its subordinates that the Japanese were not obliged to evacuate. Meanwhile, a considerable number of Japanese civilians who were regarded as essential utilized their special skills in the service of the United States Forces.(22) For the time being, the priority system afforded such Japanese an additional stay in Korea.

Once priorities had been established, procedures for the movement of the Japanese could be regularized. The necessary coordination was accomplished by the Displaced Persons Office of the Foreign Affairs Section. In general, aside from expediting the flow of repatriates, the procedures were designed to effect two main objectives: to restrict the amount of money and other property which the Japanese might carry out of Korea, and to prevent the spread of disease by the repatriates. Considerable reliance was placed upon Japanese organizations in the processing of their countrymen, a practice that was facilitated by the general subservience of the Japanese, and their ready compliance with orders.

Late in September 1945, orders were received from CINCAFPAC which limited strictly the amound of currency and other property to be carried by each individual. Japanese civilians were permitted

to have a maximum of 1,000 yen per person. Funds in excess of that amount were to be confiscated, receipted for, and entered into a special account. Civilians were not allowed to take out gold, silver, jewelry, securities, financial instruments, or other property, other than wearing apparel and personal possessions of value only to the owner. Subsequently, on 22 October 1945, it was explained that the restrictions on items taken out of the country by Japanese soldiers and civilians were "to prevent the evacuation of loot and wealth of Korea". At no time was it intended that the departing Japanese be stripped of all personal possessions or keepsakes. Therefore, each individual was to be allowed to retain "one watch, one fountain pen, and one of each of similar small objects in this class". (23)

The ruling on currency remained unchanged for Japanese nationals, but in December 1945, some relaxation was made by permitting repatriates bound for Japan to take with them passbooks issued by banks in Japan, Formosa, Korea, and Kwantung Province, North China. Meanwhile, because of indications that the Japanese would attempt to carry out more money, jewelry, and securities than authorized, frequent spot check physical examinations were ordered for both male and female repatriates. (24)

As to baggage, departing Japanese were authorized to take only what they could carry. In practice, this resulted in the loss of many of their possessions. In fact, early in November 1945 it was stated that "Japanese property left in storage by individuals

returning to Japan is presumed to be abandoned and will be impounded in the name of U. S. Military Government of Korea." In the same month commanders of all units supervising the removal of the Japanese were advised that no excess baggage was to be shipped to ports of embarkation. Much excess baggage was impounded in Pusan and used for the relief of destitute Japanese and Koreans. Indeed, by late December, since title to such property was then formally vested in Military Government and since it contained many articles badly needed by Japanese and Korean repatriates, General Hodge recommended that "no effort be made to ship this baggage to Japan either now or later."(25) Thus, it became part of the larger problem of Japanese property in South Korea, for which Military Government was the temporary custodian.

The policy of limiting baggage of Japanese repatriates to the amount each individual could carry was continued during the ensuing months. In January 1946, in view of reports from reception centers indicating that repatriates were returning with more than they could handle personally, with consequent overloading, confusion, and slow up in processing, SCAP requested that the prevailing baggage limitations be strictly enforced.(26)

It was early recognized that the emigrating Japanese might bring disease into Japan unless proper preventive measures were taken. Accordingly, by direction of SCAP, from late in September 1945, all enemy military and civilian personnel received smallpox and typhoid immunizations before embarkation, but cholera vaccine was to be given only when necessary.(27) In November a typhus control program was placed in operation. It consisted of dusting with DDT and immuniza-

tion with typhus vaccine and was directed primarily at refugees from the Soviet-occupied areas. However, at Pusan and other ports in South Korea, all Japanese repatriates were dusted and immunized prior to embarkation. (28)

The Role of the Japanese

From late August 1945 the Japanese in Korea took an active role in arranging for their repatriation to Japan. The chief difference of opinion among them was as to whether the movement of civilians should be supervised by the Japanese army or by nonmilitary agencies. At the close of the war a group of Japanese civilians formed their own private organization to facilitate their return. This was the Nipponjin Sewakai, or Japanese Relief Society.

Meanwhile, the Japanese military commanders exhibited a paternal attitude toward all Japanese civilians in Korea and asked to be allowed to handle their repatriation. For a time General Hodge considered the idea as a temporary measure, and in mid-October the Japanese army liaison detachment submitted a detailed plan for the repatriation of all Japanese from South Korea under their auspices. The guiding principle was that the evacuation "should begin immediately after the completion of army withdrawal and be conducted as smoothly as possible in cooperation with U. S. Army." War refugees and the destitute were to be removed first. Pusan was to be the principal port of embarkation for the estimated 500,000 Japanese civilians then in South Korea. Although the Japanese army was to direct the movement, some use was to be made of private Japanese organizations and doctors, who would inventory property

left behind tnd provide relief and medical care.(30)

The Japanese commander's plan gave Nipponjin Sewakai a definitely subordinate role, and was disturbing to the Foreign Affairs Section of Military Government. Nor was it satisfactory to General Hodge. On 19 October he informed SCAP that evacuation of Japanese civilians could best be accomplished by Military Government with the assistance of Japanese relief agencies. Therefore, responsibility for evacuation of Japanese civilians and of families of military personnel was delegated to Military Government. Thus, the demilitarized Japanese army was relieved of all such responsibility except for providing a limited number of service troops at Pusan and the necessary liaison detachment at Seoul.(31)

Although the Japanese army had thus been eliminated from a dominant position in the repatriation program, the United States Military Government continued to rely heavily upon the assistance of private Japanese relief and medical associations. Inevitably the end of the war had brought hardship to many Japanese civilians in Korea. As was pointed out earlier, the Government General of Chosen had established an agency for repatriation of Japanese and relief of refugees, with headquarters in Seoul and inquiry offices there and elsewhere. Late in September 1945, these offices came under the control of the Foreign Affairs Section of Military Government. Their functions were absorbed progressively by Nipponjin Sewakai, so that by the end of November the transfer of functions was complete.(32)

At first largely an organization to disseminate information regarding repatriation, Nipponjin Sewakai later maintained camps for refugees and dispensed relief.

In a single day (23 September 1945) this society fed some 20,000 Japanese refugees in Seoul.(33) On 16 October 1945 it was recognized by Military Government as the only unofficial organization authorized to deal with the Japanese repatriates. It maintained a legal staff to give advice on the disposal of Japanese property, and stored personal possession of the departing Japanese. After the issuance on 6 December 1945 of Ordinance No. 33, by which Military Government took title to all Japanese property, the society lost one of its most important functions. Subsequently, many of the parcels which the Japanese had placed in storage were sold to American military personnel.

After late October 1945, when the Bureau of Public Health and Welfare was established, the activities of the Japanese Relief Society came increasingly under the supervision of that bureau.(34) Earlier, it was supervised largely by the Displaced Persons Office of the Foreign Affairs Section. All the society's expenditures, many of which were met from subsidies made by the Government General and later by Military Government, were supervised originally by the Displaced Persons Office and subsequently by the Bureau of Public Health and Welfare.(35) At the height of its activity, in addition to the headquarters in Seoul, Nipponjin Sewakai had twelve branches in the principal cities of South Korea. It also maintained twenty-seven camps, primarily for refugees arriving from north of the 38th parallel. At these camps Japanese repatriates were housed, fed, clothed, and in some instances furnished temporary employment.

In the fall of 1945 Nipponjin Sewakai organized a Medical Relief Union. Staffed by Japanese doctors, medical students, and nurses,

this unit provided free medical care for repatriates at former Japanese hospitals in South Korea, on repatriation trains and ships. At Hakata and Senzakai, located near the railway station, it dispensed relief only to those Japanese who did not go directly from train to shipside. It supplied a daily ration of rice for such repatriates and housed them in a number of somewhat dilapidated buildings. However, most Japanese civilians had little or no time in Pusan, and some of them spent the night in the railway station in preference to going to the relief society.(36) Throughout the process, the Japanese remained passive, obedient, and generally cooperative in effecting their removal from Korea.

Transportation Aspects

Although the exodus of Japanese civilians from Manchuria and North Korea into the United States zone usually was accomplished on foot, movements within South Korea were made by rail. At Seoul, where approximately a third of the the Japanese population in South Korea was concentrated, trains loaded with repatriates began leaving for Pusan in mid-August, 1945. Operation of these trains was not interrupted when the United States occupation began.(37) However, from 23 September 1945 the Displaced Persons Office directly supervised rail travel of repatriates in the Seoul area, and effected the necessary coordination with the Bureau of Transportation and railway operating units. The procedure was similar in other areas, except that G-3 in each tactical division notified the local Military Government units of the forthcoming movements. The latter in turn informed the Japanese repatriates, who after registration had been assigned

to numbered blocks, each comprising 1,250 persons.

Through daily conferences with American and Japanese personnel concerned, the 40th Division determined the number of Japanese to be handled each day at Pusan. To allow for possible accidents and mechanical difficulties on the railway, shipment quotas were planned four days in advance and were based primarily on estimated passenger capacity of refugee ships due to arrive at Pusan. After 17 October 1945 calls for Japanese civilians to be evacuated from there were made through the Displaced Persons Office at Seoul. However, because of its poor communication with Seoul, the 6th Division was authorized to initiate rail movements to Pusan after notifying the Displaced Persons Office. At the outset, coordination between the 6th and 40th Divisions was not wholly effective, and for a while some trains reached Pusan unexpectedly.*

In the Seoul area, repatriates were informed by radio and by newspaper a day before their scheduled shipment. In this way, those whose numbers were announced could be present at the railway station. Railway tickets were sold in blocks and paid for by the Japanese Relief Society. The transaction was under strict control in order to prevent black market operations. In compliance with Military Government Ordinance No. 10 of 8 October 1945, travel certificates were required for departing Japanese. For a short time, such certificates were not issued in Seoul if the repatriates owed any taxes, but this restriction soon was removed. From late

* The 40th Division, with headquarters at Pusan, and the 6th at Mokpo, each exercised jurisdiction over roughly half of southern part of the American zone until February 1946, when the 6th took over entire responsibility.

October 1945 as much immunization as possible was done prior to loading the repatriation train, a practice designed to expedite the final processing at the port of embarkation. Outside the Seoul area, much the same procedure was employed, under the supervision of local military government units.

At Seoul each person was assigned to a specific, numbered car of the repatriation train, and upon reaching the station joined the group assembled by the Japanese leader for that particular car. This car leader passed instruction from the supervising Americans to the passengers. The order of loading was: first, baggage, then women, children, and men. Each train usually carried one hospital car and a complement of Japanese doctors and assistants.

As a rule each car held at least 75 persons, and since most of the trains consisted of boxcars, the repatriates hardly traveled in luxury. On the whole, the system was efficient; aided by the natural orderliness of the Japanese, it made possible the loading of repatriation trains in a remarkably short period, sometimes as little as 20 minutes for a 30-car train with 2,250 persons aboard. Because some Koreans had robbed and otherwise mistreated Japanese refugees, it proved necessary to assign American military police to each train to protect the passengers. Throughout the entire process, "obstacles of language, mechanical defects in material, improperly trained railroad employees, and above all, the inability of Korean civilians to comprehend the requirements of a time schedule hampered the smooth functioning of transportation."(38)

For the most part the shipping employed to deliver the repatriates to Japan was the same as that used to carry Japanese

troops; the two processes took place concurrently, with military personnel having priority over civilians. Available ships were assigned to this task by SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority, Japanese Merchant Marine)a Joint United States Fleet-SCAP agency, which controlled the Japanese merchant marine. Aside from Japanese merchant vessels, which formed the backbone of the repatriation fleet, former Japanese naval vessels also were employed, together with a small number of American Liberty ships, such as the STEPHEN WHITE and the WILLIAM D. HOWELLS.(39) In November 1945 the suggestion that small sailing ships be used to repatriate Japanese from Korea was disapproved by the United States Navy as "not desirable" because of difficulty in identification and control. Similarly, in October 1945, CINCAFPAC had refused to concur in the proposed use of United States hospital ships for transportation of Japanese repatriates.(40)

As of 6 October 1945, it was reported that twenty-one ships were operating in the shuttle service between Pusan and debarkation ports in Japan. Turnaround time of the repatriation vessels varied from two to five days. Their passenger capacity ranged from a few hundred to approximately seven thousand persons. By all ordinary commercial standards the ships were grossly overloaded, but this condition was understandable in view of the urgency of the movement and the comparatively short voyage. Especially during October and November 1945 notifications of arrivals and departures of the ships often failed to reach the Displaced Persons Office, with resultant delay and confusion. Improved liaison at the port of embarkation served to remedy this situation. Obviously, all agencies involved in

the repatriation process had to be kept informed of both rail and ship movements if they were to be able to plan their work and to avoid an undesirable congestion of repatriates at any one place. (41)

Late in October 1945, General Hodge requested the use of ten LSTs for sixty days to carry Japanese civilians to their homeland, with the object of removing them before a possible increase in Korean unrest led to violence on the part of the Koreans. The Commander of the Seventh Fleet was unwilling to accede to this request because of his understanding that the repatriation of Japanese from Korea was to be handled by Japanese shipping and the Tsushima ferry service. SCAP later confirmed this understanding, but with the qualification that LST's returning to Okinawa were to assist in the evacuation of Okinawans to Okinawa and Japanese to Japan. Actually, although some LST's were utilized for the removal of the Japanese, vessels of this type were employed largely for the return of Koreans and primarily at such ports as Mokpo, Kunsan, and Inchon, where the need existed for ships of a shallow draft. (42)

The passenger loads carried by the individual vessels varied from time to time. Early in December 1945 General Hodge notified SCAP that, because of difficulty in assembling scattered groups of Japanese in Korea, decreasing numbers of Japanese were being repatriated, with the result that partially loaded ships were being dispatched from Pusan. However, General Hodge added that partially loaded ships would continue to be sent in order to expedite the repatriation of Koreans from Japan on the return trip. Indeed, many ships later left Pusan with no passengers on the outbound voyage. In the spring of 1946 the cholera epidemic in Korea led to a reduction

in the passenger lists of the repatriation vessels. In the fall of the same year, with the advent of cooler weather and the somewhat lessened hazards arising from communicable diseases, SCAP requested that the loading of repatriation ships be resumed in accordance with the following listed capacities: (a) Liberty ships, 3,500; (b) LST's, 1,200; (c) Japanese ships, 100 percent of capacity as rated prior to 15 June 1946. A continuing problem throughout the evacuation process was that of unsatisfactory sanitary conditions aboard the repatriation vessels. The Imperial Japanese Government was warned repeatedly by SCAP to remedy such conditions and to take immediate action to effect thorough cleaning, disinfestation, and inspection of all Japanese-manned repatriation vessels prior to departure from a Japanese port and while at sea. (43)

Outstanding among the repatriation vessels was the KOAN MARU, both because of her large passenger capacity and her prominent role in the evacuation of the Japanese from South Korea. During the period from 28 September 1945 to 29 December 1946, at which time mass repatriation had ended, this ship made 33 sailings from Pusan to Japan, carrying a total of 120,763 Japanese civilians, or 17.1 percent of all passengers in this category. As the following tabulation shows, by far the greater portion of this huge passenger load was transported during the closing months of 1945:

Japanese Civilians Repatriated Aboard KOAN MARU

1945

September (two voyages only)	9,101
October	42,572
November	52,221
December	1,097
	104,991

Japanese Civilians Repatriated Aboard KOAN MARU

1946	
January	17
February	1,281
March	152
April	3,802
August	2,209
October	3,425
December	4,886
	15,772
Grand total (1945-46)	120,763

Top loads of the KOAN MARU frequently ran above 6,000 persons, especially during the peak months of October and November 1945. The largest single load was 6,904 civilians.(44)

Built in 1936 at Nagasaki, Japan, the KOAN MARU had a registered length of 415 feet, and was described by Lloyd's as a twin screw, cruiser stern steamship of 7,080 tons gross, 3,227 tons net. In peacetime she had made regular runs between Korea and Japan for her owner, the Department of Railways of the Imperial Japanese Government.(45)

Late in October 1945, when the Japanese repatriation program was in full swing, an officer of the 1st Information and Historical Service, XXIV Corps traveled aboard the KOAN MARU to and from Japan. His eyewitness account will serve to illustrate the highlights of what may be considered a typical voyage of the largest ship in the repatriation fleet.

On the morning of 25 October 1945 at Pier No. 1, in Pusan, Japanese repatriates began boarding the ship, utilizing every available space until by 1700 in the evening some 4,700 persons had embarked. "There ensued a wait, undesirable because of the limited food at the disposal of the passengers and the complete inadequacy of the sanitary

facilities of the ship for such a large crowd." Two reasons accounted for the delay. First, when the vessel began loading, there were not enough Japanese waiting in Pusan to fill her to capacity. Additional Japanese repatriates arrived in the late afternoon and early evening, and after having been processed they were placed aboard the ship at once, so that by about 2200 she was full. Nonetheless, the second cause for delay still prevented sailing. The ship's bunkers had to be replenished with coal, and by the time that operation had been completed and all the repatriates had been loaded, it was dark. Since port regulations forbade clearing the harbor except during daylight hours, the sailing had to be put off until the following morning.

Promptly at dawn, or about 0600 of 26 October 1945, the KOAN MARU left Pusan with her human cargo of 16 officers, 287 enlisted men, and 6,210 civilians. Meanwhile, the passengers had spent an uncomfortable night, although most of them did have blankets. "All, including the children, had huge bundles, since they were allowed to take only what baggage they could carry." Since the ship had no means of feeding the repatriates, they had to depend on whatever food they had brought with them. "Long lines" formed at the few latrines on the ship which the passengers were permitted to use, and when the vessel reached Senzaki, on Honshu, "the condition of the latrines was indescribably filthy." Many refugees, and especially the numerous children, made no attempt to stand in line, "but simply made use of out-of-the way corners of the deck. Fortunately, the sea was calm, or the decks would have been even more slippery."

At 1345 on 26 October 1945 the KOAN MARU dropped anchor in Senzaki harbor, "a long and rather narrow body of water bounded on

one side by the beautiful and mountainous mainland and on the other by a small island and a narrow channel separating the island from the mainland." A fairly small port situated on the west coast of Honshu, Senzaki had no dock of any size. Accordingly, the Japanese had to be landed by means of tenders. These varied in size, but averaged about forty feet in length. All were power-driven. Some, but not all, were marked with a white cross like that carried by the vessels in the repatriation fleet.

The tenders met the KOAN MARU as soon as she arrived, and the Japanese began debarking immediately. No distinction was made between men and women, or between the civilians and the few Japanese troops aboard. "It was simply a case of first come, first served. By dusk, about 1800, all Japanese had cleared the ship." Without delay the Japanese crew "began to make heroic efforts to clean up the horrible mess" which the passengers had left. "Decks and hallways were swept, furniture rearranged, and latrines flushed and swabbed out with mops and many buckets of water." After being loaded with Koreans, the vessel returned to Pusan to pick up another shipment of Japanese repatriates.(46)

Throughout 1946 the KOAN MARU continued to be employed to return Japanese civilians to their homeland. However, she was not operated as frequently as during the preceding year because of difficulty in obtaining capacity loads. Her largest lift in 1946 consisted of 3,798 persons forwarded from Pusan in April of that year.(47) All these voyages were made without noteworthy incident, but not all the repatriation vessels had the same good fortune. Adverse weather was an ever-

present possibility, and floating mines took their toll. Thus, early in October 1945 the Imperial Japanese Government reported the loss of two ships in the repatriation runs between Korea and Japan. One vessel struck a mine and the other was sunk in a typhoon.(48)

Although, as already indicated, the bulk of the Japanese repatriation program was effected by means of Japanese merchant vessels and former naval craft, some use was made in 1946 of American Liberty ships and LST's of the "Q" type (Japanese-manned). The Liberty ships in general carried loads of from 2,000 to 2,500 persons, but on occasion transported as many as 4,500 Japanese civilians. The Q-LST's normally lifted from 900 to 1200 Japanese, but when necessary they moved between 1400 and 1500 passengers on a single voyage.(49) Obviously there could be no comfort on such heavily loaded ships, but they did contribute effectively to the immediate objective of removing the Japanese as quickly as possible from Korea to Japan.

In Japan the two principal ports of entry for repatriates from Korea were Hakata, in Kyushu, and Senzaki, in Honshu, although several other ports were utilized too. The facilities at Hakata were superior since that city had an excellent compound, a good hospital, and a pier at which repatriates could be landed without the necessity of lighterage.(50) In mid-October 1945, SCAP directed the imperial Japanese Government to establish reception centers for the processing of repatriates at Maizuru, Kure, Shimonoseki, Sasebo, Senzaki, Kagoshima, Hakata, Uraga, Yokohama, Moji, and Hakodate. Sasebo was to be used for Allied ships only. Uraga was to be employed for outgoing as well as incoming repatriates. Food, quarantine facilities, and medical care were to be provided by the Japanese.(51)

Processing of Japanese at Pusan

Pusan, on the southeast coast, was the principal processing point for Japanese civilians leaving South Korea. A scant 120 miles from Japan, it normally served as a terminus of the railroad ferries between South Korea and Honshu. At the close of hostilities an influx of refugees swelled the population of the port, as Japanese sought to reach their homeland and Koreans returned from Japan, mostly via Pusan. In mid-September 1945 a XXIV Corps reconnaissance detachment reached the city and reported that it afforded such excellent port facilities, warehouses, and storage areas as to make necessary the utilization of other ports which had been suggested, notably Chinhai. Subsequently, elements of the 40th Infantry Division moved into the dock area, and by 28 September 1945 had assumed control of the processing and embarkation of the outbound Japanese at Pusan. The initial procedure, based upon experience gained in handling the surrender of Japanese troops in the Philippines, later was modified to meet new requirements in South Korea. (52)

At Pusan the Japanese repatriates either came under the temporary care of the Nipponjin Sewakai until they could be processed, or, if a ship was waiting, they were processed at once. Coordination of processing and of transportation within the Pusan area was the responsibility of the staff of the 40th Division. The actual processing was carried out by a composite battalion comprising Companies E, F, K, and L of the 160th Infantry. This battalion was divided into three eight-hour shifts and each shift into inspection teams. The remainder of the 160th Infantry was employed in guard

and police duty within the regimental area. (53)

The first problem was to relieve the temporary congestion of refugees at Pusan. Early in October 1945 the special trains for the evacuation of Japanese refugees were discontinued. At about the same time, in order to facilitate the prompt removal of enemy troops and to insure their speedy demobilization in Japan, the shipment of Japanese civilians was severely curtailed. As of 11 October, there were 11,000 repatriates in Pusan, although accomodations existed for only 6,100. One school was closed to provide space for 3,000 who arrived on that date. (54) This curtailment obtained until 18 October, when removal of non-military personnel was resumed.

Meanwhile, by mid-October 1945 the American Command had begun to look forward to the ultimate evacuation of all Japanese military forces in South Korea. Accordingly, upon completion of such action, the Commanding General, 40th Infantry Division, was ordered to continue to evacuate Japanese civilians through the port of Pusan. All available shipping at that point was to be utilized to the maximum. Lastly, Military Government was directed to maintain the necessary liaison with the Commanding General, 40th Infantry Division, in order to insure "the proper flow of evacuees" into the Pusan area. The initial arrangements for this liaison were effected at Pusan during the period 10-14 October 1945, by Captain Robert L. Beyer of the Foreign Affairs Section. Late in the same month 1st Lt. Harold L. Williamson, Jr. was designated Control Officer at Pusan and was instructed to advise the Displaced Persons Office each day of the capacity of incoming ships for the next three days; and the number of Japanese currently waiting shipment each

day at Pusan; and, finally, to submit a recommendation on the number of persons to be moved into that port each day.(55)

Processing of the Japanese repatriates took place on Pier No. 1, Pusan. As of late October 1945 the cycle was as follows: Repatriates were taken from train to pier, where the first step consisted of delousing the Japanese and their baggage with DDT. Next, immunization was given where necessary. Then, in accordance with SCAP directives, cash to the limit of 1,000 yen was exchanged for each person, regardless of age, from Korean into Japanese money. Excess amounts were seized and a receipt issued therefor. Much of the processing described thus far was performed by civilian relief workers and by details of Japanese soldiers, under the supervision of United States military personnel. Finally came a physical search of the repatriates and of their baggage. Under the circumstances it was perhaps inevitable that some "scrounging" occurred with respect to the possessions of the departing Japanese: As one officer observed, "Naturally, our men picked up a lot of stuff for themselves."(56)

At the outset, because of a lack of definite instructions as to what was or was not to be confiscated, considerable discretion rested with the individual soldier who did the searching. In fact, at first only about one in every ten Japanese civilians was searched. Thus, "the inspection of civilians, particularly women was often perfunctory. The sight of homeless men, women, and children carrying their pitifully inadequate possessions on their backs (when, that is, the adults were not burdened with children or ailing relatives) excited little enthusiasm among American troops to pick among their homely relics." But from G-2 came reports that considerable contraband, and

especially excess currency, was being smuggled out of Korea by the Japanese. As a result, the inspections were made much more thorough than before. The Japanese women and children thereafter were searched in a separate room on the pier by Korean women, who worked in three shifts of eight hours each. The men and the baggage were searched by details of United States soldiers in another area on the pier. However, Japanese evacuees, both military and civilian, were to be "permitted to retain watches, personal jewelry, and similar trinkets obviously not loot." After the completion of the processing the repatriates were loaded aboard a ship, and the homeward journey began.

Sanitation proved a major problem. Uncontrolled repatriation in August and for the greater part of September 1945 had resulted in overcrowding which clearly demonstrated the complete inadequacy of the sanitary facilities in the vicinity of Pier No. 1 at Pusan. When the processing began, swarms of flies and mosquitoes menaced the health and morale of the United States troops in that port. This situation improved when the local Japanese army command furnished a detail of soldiers who each day cleared and washed the pier and the adjacent areas and then sprayed liberal quantities of DDT in every corner. Hand in hand with this program of sanitation went the Medical Department's "insistence upon immunization of all repatriated Japanese in order to prevent the transmission to Japan of communicable and liceborn diseases endemic to Korea." Japanese doctors assisted in the immunization of the repatriates and cared for the sick and the ailing among them.

During the closing months of 1945 the departing Japanese "streamed through the gateway of Pier No. 1." One observer described the

situation:

> Silent, passive, always obedient and subservient, the Japanese soldiers and civilians massed in Pusan by the thousands, squatted in the open or under the inadequate shelter of leaky warehouses, quietly consumed their meager rations of fish, rice, soy beans, and sake, and as silently were processed and evacuated to Japan. Despite the grim tragedy of their defeat and evacuation, life continued. Some persons, exhausted by travel and without hope for the future, arrived sick in Pusan and occasionally died, while eight babies were born to open their eyes on a shattered Japan. To the American men and officers engaged in the mechanics of this operation, soldiers of whom one Japanese writer spoke as being 'very good, for the Americans are the most cultured of peoples' the homeless repatriates presented a kaleidoscopic panorama of squalor and misery, testimony of the defeat of a nation and the collapse of a conqueror's dream. (57)

Repatriation of Japanese civilians proceeded rapidly during the last quarter of the calander year 1945. For the most part it was effected through the port of Pusan. By mid-December of that year, in view of the "small number of repatriates being returned to Japan from South Korea," SCAP requested a review of the situation as a basis for future planning. In reply, General Hodge reported that as of 24 December 1945 a total of 30,430 Japanese civilians remained in South Korea, of whom only 1,345 desired to stay on in a permanent status. Meanwhile, because of difficulty in assembling scattered groups of Japanese, some partially loaded ships were dispatched from Pusan. This practice was continued in order to expedite the repatriation of Koreans from Japan on the return trip. As of 15 December 1945, or only four months after the end of hostilities, a total of 461,389 Japanese civilians had been evacuated from South Korea. (58)

Utilization of Other Korean Ports

In 1945 practically all Japanese civilian repatriates sailed

from Pusan. In order of importance, other ports of embarkation were Chinhae, Inchon, Masan, Mokpo, and Cheju. Use of Kunsan also was contemplated, but in 1945 that port received incoming Koreans only; moreover, it had very poor harbor facilities to which access could be had only by way of a treacherous channel.(59) At Chinhae, formerly an important Japanese naval base, some 6,871 Japanese civilians were evacuated during October and November 1945. They comprised the dependents of the Japanese naval personnel concentrated in that area and civilian employees of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Like the naval personnel they were assembled at Chinhae from other parts of South Korea and were repatriated with them on the same vessels. On 6 October 1945, while the base was under the control of the United States Navy, General Hodge radioed the commanding officer of Task Force 71 that Japanese civilians were embarking from Chinhae without the inspection required by SCAP. Accordingly, the Commanding General, 40th Infantry Division, was instructed to insure that the representatives of the United States Navy at Chinhae were informed of the pertinent SCAP directives on the processing of Japanese repatriates.(60)

Processing of Japanese civilians at ports other than Chinhae took place under the control of the XXIV Corps and was accomplished in accordance with SCAP directives. During 1945 little use was made of Inchon, from which only two Japanese were repatriated in October, while the r mainder — 673, all told — left on four Japanese ships in the following month. In November and December 1945, four shipments of Japanese departed from Masan; the 305 persons involved were the only repatriates ever lifted from the port. At Mokpo a

single Japanese vessel, the HAYATOMA, departed on 7 December 1945 with 256 passengers, bound for Hakata, Japan. This, the only Japanese movement by water from Mokpo, evidently resulted from a desire to utilize space made available after the HAYATOMA had delivered 292 Koreans to Mokpo early in December 1945. Evacuation of the comparatively small number of Japanese on Cheju-do was concurrent with the removal of enemy troops from that island and has been discussed in a previous chapter. Limiting factors in the use of ports other than Pusan were the presence of mines and lack of adequate harbor facilities, especially for the larger passenger ships in the repatriation fleet. At Inchon an additional factor entered into the picture, for the harbor was being employed extensively by United States Army personnel and cargo ships.(61)

In this connection it should be remembered that Pusan always had been the principal port of Korea and as such proved a convenient center for the shipment and processing of Japanese civilians, including many who lived in the vicinity of other ports and therefore had to be transported to Pusan by rail. However, during 1946, a heavy influx of Japanese refugees from Soviet-occupied areas coupled with a cholera epidemic in the spring and summer and a railway strike in the fall of that year curtailed evacuation from Pusan and necessitated extensive employment of Inchon and Chumunjin. At Inchon, the peak loads were carried in June (21,424 persons) and in October (24,093 persons), with the total number of Japanese-manned vessels including several Q-LST's and American-built Liberty ships. At Chumunjin, site of a camp for refugees from the North, speedy repatriation was essential because the

port lay within a "deficit" area of Korea, where the food supply was at a premium. Most of the 11,344 Japanese civilians shipped from Chumunjin in 1946 traveled on Q-LST's. During June of the same year, three Q-LST's lifted 4,353 Japanese repatriates at Kunsan and transported them to Japan. As a matter of fact, most of the shipping utilized at Inchon, Chumunjin, and Kunsan comprised vessels that normally would have touched at Pusan. (62)

Further Developments in 1946

At the close of 1945 virtually all Japanese troops and the majority of the Japanese civilians domiciled in South Korea had been evacuated to Japan. As of 2400 hours 5 January 1946 there were 20,345 Japanese civilians in the United States zone, according to the official census compiled by the Displaced Persons Office. Of that number by far the largest proportion -- 14,273, or 70.1 percent of the total -- remained in Seoul. The figure for that city, however, reflected an increase of 659 Japanese arising from an influx of refugees from the North and a temporary stoppage of evacuation ordered by the XXIV Corps. (63)

During 1946, although the general pattern of the Japanese repatriation program was unchanged, several important developments took place. Early in that year a repatriation conference was held in Tokyo, at which certain agreements were reached on policies to govern the repatriation of Japanese nationals in conquered territory. Late in January 1946 the Displaced Persons Office received a verbal order from General Hodge, relayed through the Military Governor,

General Lerch, to the effect that "all Japanese not absolutely essential to Military Government must be repatriated as soon as possible." Subsequently, an effort was made to hasten removal of the remaining Japanese. On 20 February 1946 the Commanding General, USAFIK, banned all "unwarranted solicitude" by United States military personnel for Japanese "refugee friends," particularly as evidenced by providing or seeking "special consideration" for individual repatriates. Some two weeks later (8 March 1946), Military Government announced that all Japanese other than those "deemed essential" were to leave Korea for Japan "as soon as possible." In Accordance with the current directives, the Foreign Affairs Section was to determine which Japanese actually were essential.(64)

In the course of the next four months the number of Japanese fell from 4,562 on 2 March to 411 on 24 June, considering only those who had formerly resided in what had became the American Zone of Occupation. The 411 comprised three categories: 117 were covered by "Temporary Permits", the largest single element being 43 employees of the Port Director's Office at Pusan; 218 were Japanese Relief Society workers and dependents not specifically covered by permits; the remaining, miscellaneous group included some applicants for permits, four officially described as "crippled Jap and family", and eleven in "poor health".(65)

The job of repatriation as initially contemplated was virtually done. Meanwhile, however, a new factor had entered, the very heavy influx of Japanese refugees from North Korea and Manchuria. This flood of human misery poured across the 38th parallel into the United

States zone and brought new difficulty for the American Command. Coupled with an outbreak of cholera in the spring and summer and a crippling railway strike in the fall, this mass movement of Japanese (and Koreans) from the North was perhaps the outstanding development in a troubled year.

SCAP Repatriation Conference

On 15 January 1946 a conference on repatriation problems and policies convened at Tokyo. In preparation for that meeting, the XXIV Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Colonel J. B. Coolidge, solicited suggestions on subjects to be included in the agenda, and in response thereto, the Corps Surgeon stressed the need of due precautions against the spread of disease by repatriates.

At the conference, whose sessions lasted for three days, the XXIV Corps representatives were Major Eric Edgerton of XXIV Corps G-3 Section, Major Gordon B. Enders, Office of ForeignAffairs, USAMGIK, Lieutenant Ian T. Patterson, 6th Infantry Division. However, the bulk of the business of Tokyo concerned Korean rather than Japanese repatriates and will therefore be treated in another chapter. Suffice to say that, as in the past, the conferees agreed that maximum utilization was to be made of available Japanese naval and merchant shipping for repatriation of Japanese nationals. The Imperial Japanese Government was to "operate, man, victual, and supply Japanese-manned shipping used for repatriation to the maximum practicable extent." No change was made in the prevailing policy of granting first priority to the movement of Japanese military and naval personnel and second priority to the movement of Japanese civilians.

Subsequently, under date of 25 February 1946, General Hodge summarized the prevailing repatriation policies, which reflected the agreements reached at Tokyo during the preceding month. However, it should be noted that, although no repatriate could carry to Japan more than 1,000 yen in currency, he could retain postal saving books issued in Japanese yen as well as insurance policies issued by Japanese agencies, bank pass books issued in Japan, and Japanese Government bonds expressed in Japanese yen.(66)

Refugees from the North

At the Tokyo conference in January 1946, some attention was given, too, to the removal of Japanese repatriates from the Soviet-occupied areas north of the 38th parallel. In the policy memorandum of 25 February 1946, General Hodge indicated that this subject was to be dealt with by SCAP, the Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Forces in the Far East, and the Commanding General, USAFIK. Such action became increasingly imperative when, during the spring and summer of 1946, a heavy flow of both Japanese and Korean refugees entered the United States zone from the North and added to the burdens of the American Command. Here, only the Japanese phase of the movement will be considered.

For various reasons -- notably shortage of food, alleged mistreatment by Russians and Koreans, and the desire to return home in the closing months of 1945 -- Japanese refugees already had begun to cross the 38th parallel on their way to Japan. On the whole, the condition of the Japanese in North Korea and in Manchuria was deplorable, and many sought to escape by whatever available means.(67)

For the most part they arrived in the United States zone by the overland route, but a number of them came by sea in small unauthorized vessels, putting in at Inchon, Pusan, and other ports. By early December 1945, Military Government had established five stations along the boundary for the processing of refugees. At the border United States tactical troops searched the refugees -- principally for weapons -- after which they were treated with DDT, fed, and furnished rail transportation to the south, for eventual repatriation to Japan via Pusan.

In one respect the Japanese refugees from the North differed materially from the bulk of their countrymen who left South Korea in the closing months of 1945. For the most part, the latter, had some possessions which they attempted to removed to Japan. The former, however, had already been largely stripped of their belongings before they reached the American zone. Accordingly, the principal task was to provide food, immunization against disease, temporary quarters, and transportation to Japan. Early in 1946 an officer of the 1st Information and Historical Service observed the processing of southbound refugees near the border, at Tongduchon. In his opinion they presented a truly heart-rending spectacle. Most pathetic of all were the children, "whose feet were bound up with rags and straw for the long cold trek." From Tongduchon at this time three trains departed each day - morning, noon, and night - carrying repatriates to Seoul. (68)

Late in December 1945 General Hodge notified SCAP that reports from several sources confirmed the belief that the Soviet forces were "encouraging, if not compelling" the Japanese in North Korea to cross the 38th parallel into the American zone. Accordingly, following the

termination of the Moscow Conference and subject to its agreements, he gave consideration to submitting a plan to the Soviet authorities whereby regularly scheduled trains would move not more than 2,500 Japanese daily from North Korea to Pusan for evacuation by ship to Japan. The same trains were to carry Koreans to the Soviet zone on the return trip. In view of the shortage of coal in South Korea, General Hodge intended to ask the Soviets "to furnish each train with sufficient coal for the entire trip". SCAP concurred in the proposed plan, for which it was able to provide the necessary shipping, but warned that the Soviets might "in addition funnel great mass of Japanese in Manchuria over presently congested railroads in southern Korea". SCAP therefore requested that General Hodge "obtain reaction of Soviet authorities to a proposal for opening negotiations for movement of displaced persons by sea" from and to ports in North Korea. This, it will be noted, contemplated that repatriation of the Japanese would be accomplished concurrently with the return of an estimated 182,000 Koreans from Japan to their homes in North Korea. (69)

Subsequently, in January 1946 at the conference of Soviet and United States representatives in Seoul, the Soviet Command requested assistance in the evacuation of 232,000 Japanese citizens from its zone. The Soviet plan contemplated the removal by water of 2,000 persons daily from each of two ports, Wonsan on the east and Chinnampo on the west coast of North Korea. Originally the movement was scheduled to begin on 15 February, but later it was postponed to the period 1 March through 15 May 1946. The required medical supplies for immunization of repatriates were to be furnished from Japanese sources. However, before the first month of negotiations had ended, General Hodge

had begun to suspect that the Soviet delegation had "only two immediate goals": to obtain rice for North Korea and to get the United States Army to evacuate their Japanese for them.

Although SCAP had pointed out the possibility of congestion of transportation facilities in South Korea, General Hodge evidently gave prime consideration at this time to the problem of food. On 1 February 1946 he informed SCAP that the Soviet delegates insisted that Korean repatriates be furnished sufficient food for the journey from the port of debarkation to their homes in North Korea. This request was considered by General Hodge as "unreasonable and not appreciative of our effort to help with a strictly Soviet problem."

SCAP, however, interposed no objection to the proposed reciprocal repatriation, and was willing to provide shipping and medical supplies, but indicated a desire that the removal of Japanese from North Korea be conducted in "the same general manner" as for China, except that United States liaison at Soviet ports was not regarded as necessary. SCAP was prepared also to have Korean repatriates inoculated for smallpox and typhus in Japan and to give them food from Japanese sources for the voyage plus one day only. Meanwhile, at the twelfth meeting of the conference between the United States and Soviet commands held at Seoul on 1 February 1946, the United States delegation refused to recommend to SCAP that food be furnished to Korean repatriates beyond the port of debarkation. However, the Soviet Command "would not agree to this last point and withdrew the question of repatriation from the joint agreement for reciprocal repatriation of Japanese and Koreans." (70)

Although the Japanese in North Korea were placed in dire straits by the outcome of the war, in February 1946 their fortunes took a temporary turn for the better. At that time -- possibly in anticipation of an agreement at Seoul for their repatriation by sea -- the Japanese in North Korea received somewhat improved treatment, including a daily ration, from the Soviet authorities. But when the United States delegation failed to agree with the Soviet representatives concerning the repatriation program, Russian policy was suddenly reversed, and "the barriers were lifted from the Japanese". For the first time since early in the preceding autumn the Japanese were allowed to leave their homes and to enter the United States zone. Interrogation of these refugees by American personnel revealed unmistakably that, except for certain Japanese technicians who were required to remain, the Russians "turned their backs" on the exodus of the Japanese civilians. Despite somewhat better living conditions, the refugees expressed relief at leaving, and attributed their hasty departure primarily to "economic hardship and insecurity". The trek to South Korea began to increase late in February 1946 but hardly gained momentum until the following month. For obvious reasons it would be difficult to establish the exact motivation underlying Soviet action in this matter, but it would appear that the XXIV Corps G-2 was not far afield in tracing Soviet behavior to a desire to get rid of "unwanted and extra mouths" that had to be fed.(71)

Early in March 1946 the number of Japanese refugees crossing the 38th parallel began to "skyrocket". During that month the weekly totals consistently exceeded 1,000 persons. Meanwhile, on 5 March General Hodge informed SCAP that he did not propose to open discussions

with the Soviets in regard to repatriating Japanese from North Korea through South Korea to Pusan. This method, he declared, "will be of no concrete benefits to this Command and will add to transportation and control problems in Southern Korea." During April and May the flow increased, with a peak total of 14,526 Japanese entering the United States zone during the week 19 to 26 May.(72) In the entire month of May, 44,011 illegal repatriates crossed the 38th Parallel, against 23,363 in April, and 5,281 in March.(73)

Most of these refugees came overland. Some, however, arrived by water, especially during April. Thus, on 26 April, the 32d Infantry reported that eight small boats carrying a total of 457 refugees from North Korea landed in the vicinity of Chumunjin, just below the 38th Parallel, and Samchok, some twenty-odd miles farther south. Practically simultaneously with this East Coast arrival, five unauthorized boats from the north with refugees arrived at Mapo on the Han River below Seoul. Two arrived on 27 April with 150 Japanese refugees, two on 29 April with 140 Japanese refugees, and one on 3 May with 41 Japanese refugees, and 13 Korean refugees." In all these cases the boats were impounded and the captains held for trial.(74)

In some instances Japanese were "brought by boat from the North and dumped on the beaches." An American Red Cross civilian relief representative, (Paul Chavchavadze), reporting on displaced persons in the Kangnung district of Kangwon province, wrote, "A little over two hundred were brought in this manner between 28 May and 2 June and were being held in Mukpo, where they did not present a serious problem." The main problem was at Chumunjin, Chavchavadze asserted. There most

of the Japanese were arriving by land from the north in large groups of around a thousand each approximately every two to three days. (75)

Late in April General Hodge protested to the Soviet Command concerning this unwelcome and unauthorized movement. On 24 May 1946 in a radiogram to SCAP he reported that the "illegal movement of Japanese refugees from North Korea traveling south across the 38th parallel" was continuing to increase. Acceleration of this movement, he said, had burdened the transportation facilities and aggravated already critical food and clothing shortages, so that it now constituted a menace to the health of the American Command as well as to the native population in South Korea. Accordingly, he was preparing another letter of protest to the Russian commander, General I. M. Chistiakov. In this letter, dated 27 May 1946, General Hodge complained of the steadily increasing number of unauthorized Japanese and Korean refugees coming into South Korea, asked that this "illegal traffic" be curtailed, and requested specifically that the Soviet Command "take additional control measures" to prevent the flow of Japanese into the American zone. Despite denials by Soviet authorities that the movement was under way, XXIV Corps G-2 received reports indicating that Russia and North Korean officials actually were "assisting Japanese refugees to reach and cross the border." (76)

The effect of General Hodge's protest, however, was at best transitory. In mid-June G-2 stated:

> There are indications that the continuous stream of Japanese refugees flowing southward from North Korea which has seriously embarrassed RR transportation in the South and has posed a crucial health problem, has finally been halted by Russian authorities. It has long been clear that

> this flow, which has averaged between 1,000 - 2,000 refugees a day for the past two months (approximately 80,000 persons), has been accomplished through the passive cooperation of Russian authorities and the active cooperation of the North Korea police.

G-2 then pointed out that the number of refugees crossing the border had dropped from 13,273 in the first week of June to 2,508 in the next, and continued:

> The Japanese Relief Society (Sewakai) in Seoul claims to have received a message from the society in Pyongyang, to the effect that all emigration of Japanese to the south was stopped on 5 June and that preparations are being made for water evacuation to Japan directly from North Korea. Significantly, the drop noted above was an abrupt one, going from 1,500 on 4 June to 198 on 11 June. It has averaged about 100 since. (77)

Subsequent adjustments made in early July added 16,355 "previously unreported" refugees. That most of these were May and June entrants is evident from an August radio message to SCAP, which gives the June total of Japanese repatriates illegally crossing the border as 33,413. In July, however, only 2,631 entered. How much this drop was the result of General Hodge's vigorous protest and how much was due to its being at the peak of the rainy season is uncertain. During the first two weeks of August, the July total was more than equalled. (78)

Effect of the Cholera Epidemic

Just as the flow of Japanese repatriates across the 38th Parallel was reaching flood proportions, a serious cholera epidemic hit South Korea and materially disorganized the then existing evacuation system even as it was being taxed to the utmost by the strain of the heavy and uncontrolled migration from the North. The epidemic had its South Korea start at Pusan with the arrival in early

May of three ships from China and Indi-China with cholera cases aboard.(79)

From Pusan, it spread over most of South Korea, especially the southern provinces. Eventually, cholera broke out in North Korea, too, thus adding a further complication. On 28 May, as a result of the cholera epidemic, SCAP directed that Pusan be closed to repatriation traffic and imposed special controls on repatriate ships entering Japan.(80)

The American command forthwith took several steps to meet the new situation. SCAP was asked to divert incoming repatriate ships (carrying Koreans) to Kunsan or Inchon, there to receive outbound Japanese and to make available a minimum daily average of 500 spaces for direct Chumunjin to Japan transport. Due to lack of docking facilities, LST's or similar ships were necessary for this purpose. Until SCAJAP vessels should be available, shipping was to be provided by the Marine Division of the Bureau of Transportation, Military Government. Two Liberty ships were diverted to Inchon to unload and take on Japanese repatriates who were already at Pusan and elsewhere. Three LST's already on the high seas with Korean repatriates were ordered into Kunsan to pick up Japanese, who would be embarked after complete processing there.

Further changes were covered in a radio directive to the commanding generals of the 6th and 7th Divisions, USAMGIK, and Korea Base Command. Repatriates from Kaesong and Uijongbu enclosures were to be moved by train to the port of Kunsan or Inchon and loaded directly on ships for Japan. Meanwhile, 6th Division and Korea Base

were to notify 7th Division "as soon as practicable" of available shipping space and were required to hold ships until they should be fully loaded. Military Government's primary responsibility was to furnish trains, and to assist 7th Division in establishing enclosures, providing food, and furnishing personnel for the operation of enclosures as well as to assist in the financial processing.(81)

A few days later (10 June) the command informed SCAP that the cholera epidemic at Pusan was under control and requested reopening of the port. Both Corps Surgeon and the Director of Public Health and Welfare, USAMGIK, concurred. To avoid, wherever possible, contact between refugees and the resident population, it was proposed that the repatriation camps at Kaesong, Uijongbu, and Seoul undertake complete processing of the Japanese repatriates, including the six-day quarantine, and move them direct to Number One Pier at Pusan, where they would be loaded on ships for Japan. "Early consideration and approval of plan will speed up release of shipping urgently needed to lift heavy refugee movement from North Korea. Japanese refugee movement has greatly increased in the past six days and has heavily overcrowded all quarantine enclosures."(82) On the same day General Hodge personally phoned General Clarkson at SCAP.(83) The request, however, was denied by SCAP.

The difficulties were enhanced by a further instruction from SCAP. To minimize danger of epidemics of cholera and other communicable diseases in Japan and Korea, this directed that precautionary measures be taken against overcrowding. Authorized capacities of various types of ships were reduced: Liberty ships to 2500, LST's to 900, and Japanese ships to 75 percent of capacity as rated prior to 15 June.

This was to be effective 15 June 1946 and until further notice. Actually, it remained in effect until 10 September.

The request was renewed on 16 July, at which time the Commanding General informed SCAP that the cholera situation in Pusan was now under control, with quarantine lifted in most areas of the city and only ten new cases reported in the previous six days. Meanwhile, the port of Inchon was jammed, with "at present a 30 day backlog in the harbor," he pointed out. Therefore, "since all ports in Korea have been declared cholera suspect, (I) request port of Pusan be reopened for repatriation to relieve the backlog of shipping at Inchon."(85) This was approved, effective 1 August 1946, and Military Government was so informed. Some important restrictions were laid down, however. Thus ships bringing Korean repatriates into Pusan (at a rate limited to a daily maximum of 4,000) could not be used to pick up outbound Japanese. Schedules were to be arranged so that the Japanese arrived at Pusan from compounds and were loaded direct from train to ship. The repatriates outlifted from Pusan and Chumunjin were all to be routed to Sasebo, in Kyushu, the quarantine port of Japan.(86)

Meanwhile, outbreak of cholera in Russian-occupied Korea compelled much closer controls on incoming refugees from the north. These were instituted on 13 July, in a directive which initiated several measures to prevent the spread of cholera in South Korea by refugees from the north. Military Government was to "Assume responsibility for operation of refugee compounds at Kaesong, Uijongbu, Chunchon, and Chumunjin for material and equipment now installed in compounds and such other compounds as are required."

The quarantine period was raised to ten days, with refugees receiving inoculations against cholera and precautions taken against other diseases. After the ten day quarantine, cholera-free refugees would be moved to destinations. Meanwhile, the Commanding General, 7th Division, was to turn over refugee compounds to Military Government, increase patrol measures along the border "to insure that refugees are assembled at compounds," and to assist Military Government at the compounds. "The transfer of responsibility to Military Government operation of compounds and processing of refugees is not intended to relieve the 7th Infantry Division of personnel requirements in handling refugees. Therefore, no personnel of 7th Infantry Division will be relieved of allied activities without full concurrence of Military Government agencies concerned."(87)

Six days later, restrictions were further tightened as a result of information showing that the North Korea epidemic was much more widespread than had been realized earlier. The principal effects on handling of repatriates lay in the increase of patrols along the 38th Parallel "to prevent movement of personnel to the North and to collect and turn over to refugee compounds for quarantine incoming personnel."(88)

The foregoing were the last of the measures taken to adjust handling of repatriates to conform with cholera precautions. These and earlier restraints, however, continued to impose heavier burdens on the evacuation machinery until return to the six-day quarantine requirement (in August) and restoration in September of the earlier capacity limits on ships carrying repatriates.(89)

Handling Refugees from the North

The cholera epidemic had accentuated the difficulties in handling the heavy flow of Japanese as well as other refugees from the North. To accommodate these refugees, several camps were set up, at Kaesong, Uijongbu, Chumunjin, and Chunchon, while already existing facilities at Seoul were materially expanded. The first three had capacities of 4,000, 5,000, and 4,000 respectively as of 30 June 1946.(90) By August capacity of the four was rated as 15,000.(91) During September, "the Kaesong and Uijongbu camps expanded facilities and increased supplies to care for 20,000 refugees."(92) The camp at Chumunjin at the beginning of June 1946 was described as consisting of "15 large army tents, with ten more tents expected shortly." Eighty to 120 Japanese were being placed to a tent.(93) An excellent job had been done in cleaning the camps and digging latrines. Several Japanese doctors and nurses, themselves DP's from the north, were being held there and were attending to the processing and the care of the sick. "The majority of the Japanese seemed in fairly good condition, although two cases of typhus had been reported during the week and were being taken care of in the local hospital. One of the main problems was to keep the Japanese from circulating in the town in large numbers; another problem was food." Army emergency food supplies were being used but stocks were getting low, while "the number of Japanese who were unable to pay for their food was increasing daily." At this time, according to Chavchavadze, the camp was expected to handle four thousand "in case of emergency", using certain warehouses for the purpose.(94)

Standard procedure for handling entering refugees was first of all to inspect them for the presence of communicable diseases. If none was found they were then dusted with DDT powder and given typhus, smallpox, cholera, and typhoid immunization.

Japanese repatriates were given a second dose of cholera vaccine prior to embarkation for Japan, "if six or more days had elapsed since the first," according to standing instructions. Since the quarantine period was six days at first, then ten, presumably this second immunization step was normally taken. Maximum use of Nippon-jin Sewakai was made in the processing.(95)

Transportation from camp to embarkation point was by rail except at Chumunjin, where LST's were used for direct routing to Japan. Outlift for the former was principally by way of Pusan except during the months of June and October, when 21,424 and 24,093, respectively, were evacuated from Inchon. Except for July and September, in which months less than three thousand all told were shipped, no other departures from Inchon were made. These represented roughly a third of all evacuations in the period June-December 1946 inclusive. The same general handling procedures were followed as those described earlier.(96)

In November, with the decrease in the number of Japanese refugees coming from north of the 38th Parallel and the advent of cold weather, travel restrictions on refugees were lifted, permitting their direct transport to Pusan. There they underwent the required six-day quarantine. As of the end of that month, a total of 5,067 was reported in refugee camps in South Korea.(97)

The maximum number of Japanese at any one time appears to have been 28,728 on 2 October 1946, when orderly evacuation had been disrupted by a railway strike. This strike compelled complete suspension of repatriation trains from 19 to 30 September and almost complete stoppage until 8 October. In lieu of trains, some 60 trucks were used to bring repatriates to Inchon. Meanwhile, during the strike a temporary refugee camp was established at Inchon on 27 September. It was closed, however, on 14 October. (98)

Continued Flow of Japanese From The North

The great flood of Japanese from the north had reached an all-time high in May 1946, declining to a relative trickle in July, when only 2,631 refugees had entered the American zone. In August, just as the cholera epidemic was brought under control (even though it still raged), there was a sudden resurgence.

Before the month of August was half over, July totals had been exceeded and refugees were entered at the rate of 1,580 a day. The volume was such that on 21 August, Military Government reported 14,651 Japanese as "now on hand in various stages of ten day quarantines." (99)

The great bulk of these refugees came by land. Some, however, came surreptitiously aboard small ships. Thus, on 22 September, two ships arrived at Inchon. These were the UNKAE MARU which sailed from a port in northwest Korea "near Ryuganpo" and the SHINSURI, a 60-foot craft out of Antung (on the Korea-Manchuria border). Presumably both parties had originated in Manchuria. Two of the UNKAE's passengers and five of those aboard the SHINSURI were dead

before the ships reached Inchon. "An examination conducted by medical officers at the Port Surgeon's Office disclosed that deaths were due to malnutrition and dehydradation. Japanese doctors aboard ship stated they had been short of water and without food for about ten days."(100)

During the four weeks ending 1 September, 27,946 Japanese entered, according to figures furnished XXIV Corps G-2. Early September witnessed an initial decline with 4,428 in the week ending 8 September. As the month wore on, however, the rate accelerated, with a spurt in the final week which all but doubled the preceding period. The two seven-day periods ending 29 September and 6 October, were among the heaviest yet recorded, with totals of 12,457 and 12,707 entering refugees, respectively.(101)

This late September rise coincided with the Communist-initiated railway strike which gripped South Korea during September and October. No direct proof exists of a connection between the two, but in view of other activities it is a reasonable assumption. One well-informed officer closely associated with repatriation problems in this period (Major J. W. Smith, G-3, XXIV Corps) is responsible for the flat assertion that the Russians had encouraged migration southward at this time "obviously to embarrass us".(102) The effect of the strike on the orderly handling of repatriation was all but paralyzing.(103)

The refugee inundation which accompanied the railway strike was the last great flow of refugees. Over the next four weeks the tide steadily ebbed, from 7,665 in the second week of October to 1,690 in that ending 3 November. In the balance of the year weekly totals

never exceeded 490, with several showing such totals as four, seven, and eleven, and one with none at all! The well had run dry and the great migration of Japanese refugees was at an end.(104)

Repatriation Of Other Nationals

Further problems in repatriation, on a far small scale, were presented by the presence in South Korea of at least 2,800 Chinese in Seoul and Inchon who desired repatriation, and a few hundred Okinawans and Formosans. It was decided to repatriate these people to their respective homelands. In the case of the Okinawans and Formosans, there was no difficulty, since they were technically Japanese subjects and hence under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander.

With the Chinese, however, the problem was somewhat more complicated. There were a number of Chinese consulates in South Korea. During the war, these had been subject to the puppet government at Nanking, but with the close of hostilities, they had transferred their allegiance to the National Government of Chiang Kai Shek. Due to widespread Korean resentment against Chinese, these consuls were placed under protective custody but were permitted to play a large part in arranging with the Foreign Affairs Section for repatriation of the Chinese and notifying the latter of their time of departure.(105)

Repatriation of the Chinese was coordinated by the Chinese consulates in South Korea and by the Chinese Affairs Office of the Foreign Affairs Section. When the former notified the latter that a group of Chinese desired repatriation, the Chinese Affairs Office

arranged for immunization and processing. Transportation was arranged, and processing was accomplished in the same way and under the same standards as those governing Japanese repatriates. Too, the same restrictions with respect to currency and contraband were applicable, except that they were allowed to carry extra baggage.

In the main these Chinese had come from Japan, where they had been taken for forced labor. As early as 15 September 1945 the Command had asked CINCAFPAC for instructions as to disposition of some 1,400 Chinese laborers "now concentrated in Kyongsang and Inchon." These had gone originally from Shantung and Hopeh provinces to Japan. Earlier in 1945 they had been sent to Korea.(106)

The Chinese Consul stated on 12 October 1945 that there were at that time 950 such refugees at Inchon, all men, who were "working for the U. S. Army on the docks unloading ships", and an additional 1,900 living in the Chinese Consulate and Chamber of Commerce grounds in Seoul. These last were without regular employment.(107) Apparently, either the totals originally reported were inaccurate or, more likely, all of these displaced persons were never formally repatriated.

The first shipment comprised an even hundred Chinese, who were outloaded at Inchon on 29 December 1945, and probably came from within that port's immediate area. Their departure occasioned no comment at the time and is in fact noted only in contemporary formal statistical reports.(108) Presumably, it was thoroughly routine.

With the second and practically simultaneous shipment, however, consequential difficulties began to be experienced. This group comprised 251 Chinese, all men except for three women and a baby.

Concerning it, Gane comments: "It was more difficult to send 251 Chinese to a port than 2,500 Japanese." (109) The subsequent report on this shipment bears Gane out in most respects, although it cannot be said that all the fault lay with the Chinese. The trials and tribulations of the shipment's escorts — and of the Chinese themselves -- make it worthwhile to give account in more than usual detail.

The movement began at 2115 hours on 28 December 1945, when the entire party began marching in a column from the Chinese consulate general to Seoul railway station, where they were to entrain for Kunsan. Trouble started when the train on which they were to depart pulled into the station. Koreans who had been waiting for one or two days in long queues outside the station "swarmed into the cars" and had to be expelled "at rifle point." While the Koreans were getting out, the Chinese "lost their discipline, broke their formation, and rushed for the entrances of the cars". The result was a brief mixup of Koreans and Chinese.

> We left momentarily the task of putting Koreans off and rushed outside where finally with the use of physical force and voice, we forced the Chinese back from the cars and restored them to formation away from the cars. After this was done we picked up some crying Korean children who had been separated from their families by the rush; happily, in a couple of minutes, various relatives of the children came up to claim them.

By midnight the train was cleared and the Chinese put aboard, but it did not depart until 0620 the following morning.

At 2300 on 29 December, the train arrived at Iri, where transfer to the Kunsan line was necessary. While arrangements were being made for this, trouble broke out near the Chinese cars.

> A Chinese hit a Korean over the head and a Korean smashed a window of the Chinese train, whereupon, the Chinese started rushing out of the cars to fight. We put all the Chinese back in the cars, closed the doors, forbade them to come out and stood guard for part of the night. The entire night was spent in the Iri station.
>
> The next morning (30 December) we had some difficulty obtaining drinking water for the Chinese, as the Koreans, incensed over the fracas of the evening before, were reluctant to open the only water faucet we found in the vicinity.

When, at length, the movement reached the dock area at Kunsan, shortly after 1400 hours on 30 December, it was discovered that two LST's had left "about two hours earlier". Difficulties then arose with the commanding officer of another LST who lacked orders to receive the repatriates as passengers. Not until the night of 3 January were written orders from the fleet commander received. Next day the Chinese were taken aboard and within two hours the LST departed with them for Taku, China.

The compilers of this report presented some "conclusions" and "recommendations" which are of interest for the further light they throw on the problem. To them the Chinese repatriates' outstanding characteristics were "excitability, individualism, and independence", with an "inclination toward intractability." The leaders appointed by the Chinese organization in Seoul, they felt, were "too free in their interpretation of orders". While agreeing that "this particular group of repatriates certainly needed guarding and guidance to keep them out of trouble", they were nevertheless quite ready to note shortcomings in the handling itself: "The train was very slow and the Chinese became very thirsty, as the train contained no water."

At Iri, "railway authorities were either lax or improperly alerted, so we missed the LST which left on 30 December." Some further lack of planning was indicated by the comment, "LST commanders will refuse to take on repatriates unless they have previously been issued orders from their superiors." The report concluded with the following recommendations:

a. In the future, if repatriates are to be on-loaded at a passenger station, steps should be taken that Koreans do not occupy the cars previously assigned for repatriation use.

b. Due to the very evident animosity between Koreans and Chinese, a minimum of contact between Chinese repatriates and Koreans should be maintained. If the Chinese must leave the train, i.e. to get water, etc., they should be accompanied by a guard.

c. Due to the intense nationalism of the Koreans, Chinese repatriates should not display the Chinese flag or at least not without displaying a Korean flag the same size.

d. All future repatriates should be advised to carry a quart of water.

e. Ideal escorts for Chinese repatriates would be persons who can speak Korean, Chinese, and English. On this trip the Chinese Chamber of Commerce observer acted as Korean interpreter for the MG guards, who conversed through him in Chinese.

f. The system of organizing the repatriates into smaller units within their group should be continued.

g. At junction points, such as Iri, where transfer to the Kunsan line is made, railway authorities should be alerted as to repatriation movements or be more closely supervised or both.

h. Liaison with the Navy should make arrangements enabling commanders of vessels to move repatriates already processed if their ship is going out empty and bound for the port to which the repatriates are destined. (110)

During the course of 1946, a number of other shipments of Chinese repatriates were made, the heaviest being on 21 April and

1 May, when 461 and 228 Chinese, respectively, were evacuated from Inchon to Taku by Japanese-manned LST's. The latter reportedly "cleared the Seoul-Inchon area of Chinese refugees." Some of these later repatriates, too, were presumably troublemakers, for, on 29 April, the Commanding General directed Korea Base Command to furnish a guard of one officer and six enlisted men on Japanese-manned SCAJAP ships with Chinese repatriates for the purpose of controlling Chinese repatriates from Inchon to China.(111)

As of 2 May, 1,207 Chinese repatriates had been evacuated. Further shipments during the year brought the total to 1,531. Most of these went through Inchon. Some, however, were evacuated by way of Japan during October. During 1947 and early 1948, other Chinese were repatriated, but handling of them was routine. As of 28 May 1948, the cumulative total stood at 1,940 for the entire period of the occupation.(112)

Another problem in repatriation was presented by a group of about one hundred Okinawans near Seoul; others were believed elsewhere in Korea, but were not initially located. CINCAFPAC decided that they should be repatriated on LST's operating between Inchon and Okinawa. The date for the movement was fixed for approximately 15 November. The Okinawans were processed in the same way as Japanese civilians, but were allowed to carry 300 pounds of extra baggage each. The actual number in this first shipment was 104. They sailed on LST 656 on 14 November.(113)

From time to time more Okinawans were discovered. On 9 March 1948 the Command requested authority to send approximately 30 Okinawan repatriates to Japan for transshipment to Okinawa. "According to the most recent census taken in Korea", these were

the last Okinawans south of the 38th Parallel, it informed SCAP. On 19 June, however, 149 Okinawans left Inchon for Hakata. A few days later 21 more departed, bringing the total to 274, at which figure the cumulative total remained thereafter.(114)

Formosans -- or, to be more precise, Formosan Chinese — were technically Japanese subjects. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, however, authorized American commanders to treat them as liberated persons, like the Koreans.(115) Originally some seventy-five turned up in Korea south of 38°. These were processed in the same manner as were the Okinawans and sent to Japan with Japanese repatriates. Forty-five left on 31 December, most of the remainder in March.(116) From time to time, however, others showed up. On 23 July 1946, the Commanding General, USAFIK, informed SCAP of the shipment of two Formosans through Inchon to Hakata, Japan, for repatriation. In replying SCAP concurred but laid down new procedure for repatriation of "Formosans and other non-Japanese" from Korea to their homelands through Japan. Prior clearance was now required in each instance. Requests were to be consolidated monthly and submitted by the 15th of each month. Full name, age, nationality, and destination of each repatriate was required.(117) The last shipment sent consisted of 12 Formosan nationals who left Korea during the week ending 2 March 1947. This brought the total to 103, at which it still stood on 28 May 1948.(118)

Illegal Shipping

Illegal shipping played a large part in the movement of Japanese and Koreans across the Tsushima Straits and Chosun Channel. The

same was true of the movement of goods. Illegal shipping may be defined as any shipping moving to or from Korea south of the 38th parallel other than American shipping and those ships authorized by General Headquarters or by SCAJAP to make the trip.

The fact that such shipping existed has been clearly established. Since no commerce by private concerns between Korea and Japan was authorized, it followed that even ships carrying normal merchandise was operating illegally. In many cases, however, illegal vessels were engaged in smuggling contraband or in carrying repatriates. The traffic was carried on in both directions.

The advisability of using small sailing ships to repatriate Japanese was considered by the United States Navy in November, and a negative decision was reached, primarily because of the "difficulty in identification and control."(119) The same characteristics which made such small ships unsuitable for a controlled repatriation movement made them ideal for smuggling. As units of the XXIV Corps moved south and occupied ports from which movements to Japan could be most conveniently conducted, they encountered many small ships engaged in such movements,(120) and reports of still more.

The purpose of most of this shipping was simple enough. The Japanese who participated wished to escape a search and probably confiscation of personal property, and thus carry all their wealth back to Japan. That many succeeded in doing so cannot be doubted, although statistical data are naturally hard to obtain. Another type of smuggling was carried on by luggers which brought property to Japanese on the official steamers after they had been searched. To prevent this, destroyers flashed their lights across Pusan harbor

periodically at night. Other ships brought Japanese from North Korea. (121)

Persons who traveled to Japan on illegal shipping paid varying, but usually high, fees. American authorities in Shimonoseki, Japan, reported that unauthorized ships were operating out of that place in considerable numbers. These ships, ranging in size from ten to twenty tons each were employed to ferry Koreans back to their homeland. They accomodated about two hundred passengers at from 75 to 150 yen a head. Apparently the fare varied according to the passenger's ability to pay, with some destitute persons carried free of charge. Harbor police, the report stated, were making no concerted effort to control movements of these ships, most of which entered at night and carried no log. During the week ending 1 November 1945, thirteen ships were said to have departed from Shimonoseki harbor, carrying an average of two hundred passengers each. Of these, 280 all told reputedly were given passage free of charge. On the return trip, most of these ships carried Japanese civilians who paid 150 to 200 yen for the voyage. (122)

There were a number of disadvantages to this type of travel. Small ships were quite vulnerable both to storms and pirates, a considerable number of whom operated in the straits. Letters written by Japanese civilians during late 1945 told of the ease with which they were able to travel secretly between Korea and Japan. At first, reports of pirates being on many of these secret ships made little difference to most. One letter examined by Civil Censorship warned, though, "When you return to Korea from Japan, avoid the secret ships because there are many pirate groups at sea. The best way to go is by official steamer." (123) Despite these hazards, however, illegal ships

operated extensively from many ports of South Korea and out of Cheju-do.[124]

Measures were taken to stop this practice, but from the very nature of the problem, they could not be completely effective. Units of Task Force 71 initiated an offshore patrol, and made some seizures of vessels and property. A number of guilty individuals were prosecuted and sentenced to prison. Warehouses at the various ports which were known to hold contraband were seized and placed under guard or closed. On 31 October 1945, G-2, 40th Division, reported the strong suspicion that Nipponjin Sewakai's Pusan branch was "the central agency responsible for the organization and coordination of this illegal traffic". CIC investigation, he declared, showed Nipponjin Sewakai in Pusan "operates openly under the guise of instructing Japanese repatriates in the policies and regulations of the United States pertinent to their shipment to Japan."[125]

The American Command, however, was loath to crack down on the Society, because its work in other respects was so helpful.[126] This illegal shipping continued as long as there were South Korea Japanese to be repatriated. When the flood of refugees from north of the 38th Parallel began in the spring of 1946, the situation changed. In the main the new traffic, however illicit it might be, was not carried on for the purpose of evading American zone regulations but rather to escape from the north, in some cases, or as a forced expulsion from there in others.

Final Phases

By late fall of 1946, the repatriation of foreign nationals

had ceased to be a major problem. On 13 December of that year, XXIV Corps G-3 informed the XXIV Corps Staff Conference that he regarded the movement as definitely over.(127) As early as 26 October, only 228 Japanese, exclusive of incoming refugees, had remained in the American zone. Within the next two months 101 of these were gone. Of the 127 still in South Korea on 28 December, 68 were rated as "essential technicians"; the balance comprised two of their dependents, fifteen persons permitted to remain for reasons of health, either their own or that of a member of the family and 42 "awaiting repatriation or approval of permits". Fifty-two of these departed within a week and 34 more by 8 March 1947, reducing the total to 41.(128)

Meanwhile, the influx of Japanese refugees from the north was well under control. On 4 October, the refugee camp at Kaesong had 13,185 Japanese refugees on hand out of the all-time high of 28,728 in all camps (as of 2 October). A week later, when the railway strike was over, there were 8,657. The total fell to 184 on 25 October, rising slightly to 204 on 1 November. These were cleared during the first week of November. Thereafter, the few new entrants were shipped out almost as soon as they entered, and General Lerch, the Military Governor, was able to inform his press conference on 12 November that incoming refugees were now being moved to Pusan and on to boats "within 60 hours".(129)

In December, when the movement had practically ceased, an agreement was reached between representatives of SCAP and Lt. Gen. K. N. Derevyanko, Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan, for repatriation direct to Japan. This agreement, signed at Tokyo on

19 December, dealt with both Japanese military and Japanese civilians in Soviet territory. But as far as the American zone in Korea was concerned, its provisions for direct repatriation to Japan were the proverbial locking of the stable door.(130)

The repatriation movement was now over. The belated agreement with the Russians had removed the likelihood of any renewed influx of refugees from among the Japanese still in Soviet-occupied areas.

During the sixteen months ending 21 December 1946, however, a grand total of 701,644 Japanese civilians had been returned to their homeland. This total did not include some thousands who had succeeded in effecting their own repatriation by illegal ships. Approximately forty percent of the legal repatriates, or 287,995, were Japanese from outside the American-occupied zone, whose repatriation was properly the responsibility of Soviet authorities in North Korea and Manchuria. Of this total, 82.24 percent had originated in North Korea, 51,564 in Manchuria, and six in China. Compared with the great exodus of Japanese repatriates, that of non-Japanese foreign nationals was quite minor. During 1945 and 1946 1,531 Chinese, 274 Okinawans, and 71 Formosans, representing only 0.27 percent of the whole outward movement, were evacuated to their respective homelands.

During 1947 and 1948 repatriation of various foreign nationals from American-occupied Korea was only an occasional and casual occurence. In the course of 1947 a total of 2,659 Japanese were evacuated, principally during the early months. The largest single shipments appear to have been 369 on the KINSHU MARU, 8 March 1947, and 253 aboard the TACHIBANA MARU on 25 January. The KINSHU MARU also carried 12 Formosans, the last of that nationality recorded as

having left. During the year, too, 409 Chinese were repatriated, making a grand total of 3,080 evacuated in 1947, less than had at times gone out in a single day in 1945 and 1946. Up and including 28 May 1948, a further 414 Japanese were repatriated. Practically speaking, the 1947 and 1948 evacuees consisted of refugees from the north, who crossed the 38th Parallel in occasional sporadic groups to the number of 511 in 1947 and 23 in the first five months in 1948. (131)

FOOTNOTES

1. See Chapter III, "Intermezzo: 1945", pp. 24-25. Repatriation of Koreans will be covered in a separate chapter.

2. XXIV Corps, G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept 45, p.6. Cf. discussion at Corps Staff Conference, 12 Sept 45. (I and H. Journal). All citations to G-2 Periodic Reports, G-2 Weekly Summaries, etc, made hereinafter are to those prepared by XXIV Corps G-2 unless otherwise indicated.

3. G-2 Periodic Report No. 72, 21 Nov 45, p.1, and No. 95, 14 Dec 45,p.2. In Mar 1946, XXIV Corps G-3 corrected the current total to include 164,740 Japanese civilians repatriated between 15 Aug to 27 Sept 45. G-3 tabulation, "Japanese Returned to Homeland."

4. United States Army Military Government in Korea, Foreign Affairs Section, Repatriation from 25 September 45 to 31 December 45. Prepared by William J. Gane, 1st Lt. A/C. (Seoul,n.d.) (Hereinafter cited as Gane). Lt. (later Capt.) Gane headed the Displaced Persons Division of the Foreign Affairs Section.

5. Ibid., p.1. Cf. G-2 Periodic Report No. 1, 9 Sept 45, p.2, on Korean objections to having the Japanese remain.

6. Gane, op.cit., pp. 10-11, Appendix C (p.36). The maximum figure of 2,000,000 was supplied by the former Japanese consulate in Manchuokuo. A much lower figure, nearly 1,300,000, was furnished by the Japanese Postwar Transaction Committee. Both appear in Gane's work.

7. Ibid., Appendix C (p.37).

8. Radios SCAP to CG XXIV Corps 1833/I, 17 Sept 45; CG USAFIK to SCAP 051552 Oct. Cf. Memo H. M. Benninghoff to Chief of Staff, USAFIK, 27 Sept 45, (G-3 files, "Japanese Army Liaison Det."); ltr CG 25th Soviet Army to CG XXIV Corps, 3 Oct 45.

9. Rad CINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 172233, 23 Sept 45.

10. Gane, op.cit., p.4. Gane, however, is none too clear as to the exact nature of the Japanese repatriation agencies.

11. Memo 9 Oct 45, by Maj Gordon B. Enders, For Aff Officer, "Plan for Handling of Displaced Persons."

12. Ltr Hqs., USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, "Conditions in Korea," 13 Sept 45 (TS) (XXIV Corps AG Top Secret files).

13. General Hodge's press conference, 8 Oct 45 (I and H. Journal).

14. MG Ord No. 10, 8 Oct 45. On 4 Oct the Military Governor urged all Japanese who had not done so to register "at the nearest Japanese relief agency", so as to be included in the repatriation program. He also warned them that individual travel to Japan was forbidden. (I. and H. Journal).

15. SWNCC 176/8, 13 Oct 45 (XXIV Corps C/S files).

16. Interview with Maj. G. B. Enders, For Aff Officer, 12 Dec 45. Cf. G-3 Operations Report and G-2 Periodic Reports, XXIV Corps for current data on repatriation.

17. On the work of the 40th Infantry Division at Pusan, see History of Evacuation and Repatriation through the Port of Pusan, Korea, 28 Sept-15 Nov 45 (Pusan, 1946) (R). This 31-page booklet, brought together by 1st Lt. John M. Bullitt, Assistant G-2, 40th Div, contains much valuable information, along with illustrative charts and sketches.

18. Cf. interview of 12 Dec 45 with Maj. G. B. Enders and Capt. P. B. Mertz of the For Aff Sect. See Memo 5 Nov 45, by the For Aff Officer, subj: "Displaced Persons" (Copy in Historical File.)

19. Rad CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, 202247/I, 20 Sept 45.

20. Memo by For Aff Officer, USAMGIK, Maj. Gordon B. Enders, subj: "Displaced Persons", 5 Nov 45.

21. Memo subj: "Orders for Evacuation of Japanese Shinto Priests", 2 Nov 45; and Memo subj: "Order for Evacuation of Japanese Geisha and Prostitutes", 5 Dec 45, both issued by the For Aff Sect, USAMGIK.

22. Rad CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, Dec 45; Hq. USAFIK, Office of the MG, Planning Sect, "Digest of Current Activities", 27 Nov 45, par. 8 (Files of For Aff Sect, Displaced Persons Office).

23. Rad CINCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK, 28 Sept 45; Rad from SG, XXIV Corps to subordinates, 22 Oct 45.

24. Rad SCAP to CG USAFIK, 1 Dec 45, and repeated by the latter to subordinates, TFGCT 1778, 2 Dec 45; rad CG USAFIK to CG 40th Div, 4 Oct 45.

25. Rad CG USAFIK to subordinates, 201106/I Oct 45, and 08155/I Nov 45; Hq. 40th Div., 26 Oct 45; Ops Memo No. 15, "Disposition of Excess Baggage and Personal Effects of Japanese Evacuees"; Rad Hq. MG to CG 6th Div., 7th Div., 40th Div., 16 Nov 45; Rad CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFTMG 549, 271045/I Dec 45.

26. Rad CG XXIV Corps to subordinates, TFGCT 45, 18 Jan 46.

27. Rad CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 271446/I Sept 45. In 1946 cholera became a serious problem. See below.

28. Memo Col. L. A. Potter, Corps Surg XXIV Corps, to the Surg Gen, ASF, Wash., D.C., subj: "Essential Technical Medical Data, 15 Dec 45, pp.2-3-5. File TFYSG 350.05. On the typhus control program see Memo 8 Nov 45 on that subject, issued by Hq USAFIK, AG 710 (TFYSG).

29. G-2 Periodic Report, No. 14, 24 Sept 45, Incl. #1. Cf. Gane, op. cit., pp 23-28.

30. Ltr Gen Sugai to Gen Hodge, K.L.L. No. 233, 15 Oct 45 (Copy in Historical File).

31. Ltr Hq USAFIK to Kozuki, 27 Oct 45, AG 370.05 (TFGCT) (XXIV Corps G-3 files). Cf. Chapter VII, "Evacuation and Demilitarization of Japanese Military Forces," pp.12-13.

32. On Nipponjin Sewakai, see Gane, op.cit., pp. 21-28.

33. 7th Inf Div, G-2 Periodic Report No. 15, 25 Sept 45, pp. 4-5

34. MG Ord No. 10, 8 Oct 45.

35. Gane, op.cit., p.24. Cf. Interview of 26 Feb 46 with Capt C. J. Glacken, Head of Gen Aff Dept., Pub Welf Branch, Bur of P/H and W (copy in Historical File).

36. Gane, op.cit., pp. 23-32; Weekly Reports, For Aff Sect to Planning Sect, MG, Sept-Nov 45; personal observation of Lt. H. L. Hinton in Pusan, 24-25 Oct 45 (copy in Historical File).

37. Cf. G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept 45, pp. 5-6.

38. Gane, op.cit., pp.33-42; G-2 Periodic Report No. 96, 15 Dec 45, p.3; 40th Inf Div, History of Evacuation and Repatriation pp. 4-7.

39. Gane, op.cit., pp.49-50; Daily Report, For Aff Sect, 5-6 and 9-10 Sept 46. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Reports provide a convenient source of shipping data for the repatriation program

40. Rad CTF 50.3 to CGF 71, 131710/I Nov 45; Rad CINCAFPAC Adv to AFWESPAC, 221207/I Oct 45.

41. Rad MG, Pusan, to Hq. USAMGIK, Seoul, 6 Oct 45 (noDTG); Gane, op.cit., pp 49-50.

42. Rad CG XXIV Corps to Com 7th Phib, 311357/I Oct 45; Com 7th Flt to CG XXIV Corps, 021202/I Nov 45; CG XXIV Corps to Com 7th Flt, TFGCT 1465, 041310/I Nov 45; SCAP to Com 7th Flt, 061432/I Nov 45.

43. Rad CG XXIV Corps to SCAJAP, TFGCT 1771, 011058 Dec 45; Rad SCAP to CG USAFIK, 081125Z Sept 46; Memo SCAP to Imperial Japanese Government, 15 Mar 46, AG 370.05 (Mar 46) CG SCAPIN-817)

44. Figures on the passengers carried by the KOAN MARU were compiled from data in the XXIV Corps G-3 files.

45. Lloyd's Register, issue of 1944-45, as reported by Roland W. Charles of Office of the Chief of Transportation, Washington, D. C., in personal letter of 6 Mar 47, to Harold Larson.

46. Eyewitness account by 1st Lt. Harold C. Hinton (Historical File). Figures on the passenger list, outbound, were furnished by the XXIV Corps G-3 Sections.

47. From shipping data compiled by XXIV Corps G-3 Section.

48. G-2 Periodic Report No. 22, 2 Oct 45, p.4. Cf. radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, 102300/I Oct 45.

49. From shipping data compiled by XXIV Corps G-3 Section.

50. Interview of 27 Mar 47 with Capt. Thomas Harrison of the Office of For Aff, MG.

51. GHQ, SCAP, Memo for the Imperial Japanese Government, "Reception Centers in Japan for Processing Repatriates," 15 Oct 45.

52. G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, 13 Sept 45, pp.5-6; telegram, Lt. Col. C. J. Miller, Reconnaissance Detachment, Pusan, to CG XXIV Corps, 16 Sept 45; Rad CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, TFGCT 670, 17 Sept 45. For further details of initial arrangements at Pusan see 40th Inf Div, Evacuation and Repatriation, for the period 28 Sept-15 Nov 45, pp. 1-7.

53. 40th Inf Div, Evacuation and Repatriation, pp. 4-5; personal observation of 1st Lt. H. C. Hinton at Pusan, 24-25 Oct 45.

54. MG press release 5 Oct 45; Rad, Mil. Gov. of Pusan to For Aff Sect, USAMGIK (R) 11 Oct 45. Cf. shipping data compiled by XXIV Corps G-3 Section.

55. Rad CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24 and CG 40th Div., TFGCT 1175, 13 Oct 45; Capt R. L. Beyer to Maj. G. B. Enders, Report on trip to Pusan, 15 Oct 45; memo Capt. R. L. Beyer to 1st Lt. H. L. Williamson, Jr., 27 Oct 45.

56. Personal observation of 1st Lt. H. C. Hinton at Pusan, 24-25 Oct 45.

57. Interview with 1st Lt. John M. Bullitt, XXIV Corps G-3 Section, former Asst. G-2, 40th Inf. Div., 27 May 46.

58. Radios: CG XXIV Corps to SCAJAP, TFGCT 1771, 011058 Dec 45; SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 120949/Z Dec 45; CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFGCT 1832, 171345/I Dec 45; CG, XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFGCT 1876, 261610/I Dec 45. On the number of Japanese remaining in South Korea, see the weekly census compiled by the Office of For Aff from mid-November 45.

59. Rad CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, SCAJAP (Tokyo) TFGCT 1209, 16 Oct 45: Report from conversations with operational officers at Kunsan, dtd 6 Jan 46, prepared by Cpls. David E. Collier and Victor C. Lee for the Chief, For Aff Sect, MG. Cf. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 106 17-18 Dec 45, pp.1-2.

60. Shipping data compiled by XXIV Corps G-3 Sect; Rad CG USAFIK to CTF 71, CG 40th Div., 061826 Oct 45.

61. Shipping data compiled by XXIV Corps G-2 Section. Cf. G-3 Operations Report No. 92, 3-4 Dec 45, No. 95, 7-8 Dec 45 on the evacuation from Cheju Do, which was completed by mid-November 45, see G-3 Operations Report No. 70, 12 Nov 45. Cf. also Chapter VII, "Evacuation and Demilitarization of Japanese Military Forces," pp. 52, 53, 59-60, 66-68.

62. XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report, 1946, passim. For the shipments from Kunsan see No. 69, 31 May-7 June 46, p.2, and No. 70, 7-14 June 46, p.1.

63. Displaced Persons Office, "Census of Japanese Civilians Remaining in South Korea," 7 Jan 46.

64. Weekly Report, Displaced Persons Office, 8 Jan, 4, 18, and 25 Feb 46; CG USAFIK to XXIV Corps and subordinates, TFGBI 202.20 Feb 46; Rad 8 Mar 46, Hq. USAMGIK, 014.33 (MGTMG), subj: "Repatriation of Japanese". Cf. Chapter VII, "Setting up a National Administration", p.65.

65. Weekly Report, Displaced Persons Office, 4 Mar 46, 27 June 46.

66. Memo XXIV Corps, G-3 to Corps Surg, G-2 and C/S, 1 Jan 46, with attached study for Tokyo repatriation conference; Annex IV to Agreements Reached at Conference on Repatriation, 15-17 Jan 46 (for policies on repatriation of Japanese nationals in conquered territory); XXIV Corps AG Memo 370.05 (TFGCT), 25 Feb 46, subj: "Repatriation".

67. Gane, op.cit., p. 10 and Appendix C, pp. 31-38.

68. Entry by 1st Lt. Albert Keep in I. and H. Journal, 6 Jan 46. Cf. G-2 Periodic Report No. 87, 6 Dec 45, p. 4.

69. Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCG203, 28 Dec 45; Rad SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 030951/I Jan 46; Rad SCAP to CG USAFIK, 020911/Z Feb 46.

70. Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCT 2003, 311935 Jan 46; Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCG 254, 26 Jan 46; Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCT 2006, 012000/I Feb 46, Rad SCAP to CG USAFIK, 020605/Z Feb 46; Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGBI 182, 012025 Feb 46.

71. G-2 Weekly Summary No. 35

72. G-2 Weekly Summary, Mar-May 46, passim.

73. Rad CG, USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCT 2460(S) 14 Aug 46. AG Rad files

74. Off. of For Aff, Weekly Report to the Military Governor, 7 May 46.

75. Ltr, Paul Chavchavadze, ARC Civ Relief Repr, to Thomas L. Metsker, Asst. Dir., ARC CIV. Relief, subj: "Displaced persons and refugees in the Kangnung Dist, Province of Kongwan Do (sic!) Seoul, 4 June 46.

76. G-2 Weekly Summary, Mar-May 46, passim; letters of General Hodge to Gen. Chistiakov, dtd 27 and 28 Apr and 28 May 46 G-2 files); G-2 Periodic Report No. 257, 19 June 1946, pp. 1, 3; G-2 Weekly Summary No. 42, 5 Jul 46, p. 6; Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFHBI 317, 28 Jun 46 Gen. Hodge had received no replies to his letter of protest to Gen. Chistiakov.

77. G-2 Weekly Summary No. 40

78. G-2 W/S Nos. 39-44, covering this period, passim; Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCT 2460(S), 14 Aug 46. AG Rad Files.

79. Rad, CG, XXIV Corps, to SCAP, TFGCT 2257, 8 May 46 (C) AG Rad Files.

80. Rad SCAP to CG USAFIK, ZX35515, 28 May 46 (U) AG Rad Files.

81. These various instructions are covered in a series of radio messages. See the following radios, all from CG XXIV Corps, dtd 31 May 46 (U) to SCAP, TFGCT 2297; to CG's 6th Div., 7th Div., USAMGIK, CO, KBC, TFGCT 2298; to CG 6th Div., TFGCT 2299; to CG's 6th., 7th Div., USAMGIK, CO KBC, TFGCT 2300; to CO KBC, TFGCT 2301. Details of the implementation of these instructions are covered in 7th Div Ops Instrs No. 3, Jun 46 (no day given) (Copy in Historical File).

82. Rad, CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFGCT 2326, 10 Jun 46 (U) AG Rad Files.

83. Rad, SCAP to CG USAFIK, ZO2835 12 Jun 46 (U) AG Rad Files.

84. CG XXIV Corps to CG's 6th Div., USAMGIK, KBC, TFGCT 2338, 18 Jun 46 (U), AG Rad Files. (Copy in Historical Files). For the lifting of the restrictions see also "Corps Staff Conference Notes," 20 Sept 46, I & H Journal.

85. CG XXIV Corps, to SCAP, TFGCT 2407, 16 Jul 46 (U) AG Rad Files.

86. CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFGCT 2419 22 Jul 46 (U) AG Rad Files; memo XXIV Corps G-3 to For Aff Sect and Bur of P/H, USAMGIK, 17 Jul 46.

87. CG XXIV Corps to CG's 7th Div., USAMGIK, TFGCT 2403, 13 Jul 46 (R). AG Rad Files.

88. CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div, CG USAMGIK, TFGCT 2414, 19 Jul 46 (R) AG Rad Files.

89. USAFPAC, Summation of United States Military Government Activities in Korea, No. 11 (Aug 46), p. 75.

90. USAMGIK, Office of Admin., Statistical Research Division "History of United States Army Military Government Activities in Korea; Period of Sept 45-Jun 46)", two volumes in three. (Manuscript copy in Historical Files., Sept 47, p. 171.

This work is to a large degree a consolidation of the contents of preceding issues of the monthly Summation of United States Army Military Government Activities in Korea, with the addition of considerable additional material. The style and method of handling Volume I follows in large measure that of the Summation. While it contains many data not otherwise readily available, its value is largely vitiated by failure to cite sources.

91. "Repatriation", prepared by G-3 XXIV Corps, Aug 46. (This is a collection of carbon copies of miscellaneous material on repatriation, all undated, but bearing pencil memorandum "Prepared by G-3, Corps, Aug 46." (In Historical Files).

92. Summation No. 12 (Sept 46), page 59.

93. A few days later (8 June) Capt. William J. Gane, Chief, Displaced Persons Division, who visited Kangnung and Chumunjin on an inspection trip, reported that 25 tents were up and 21 "to be set up today". He estimated tent capacity at 40 to 50 Japanese to a tent, with two warehouses at Mukko having a

93. further capacity of 300 and 500 persons, respectively. D/P Div to Director, Off of For Aff, subj: "Situation at Kwangnung (Sic!), Chumunjin", 8 Jun 46. (Copy in Historical Files).

94. Ltr Chavchavadze to Metsker, already cited.

95. Dept of Public Health and Welfare Directive, subj: "Transfer of Responsibility for Repatriation", 10 Jul 46.

96. Statistical Compilation, "Evacuation from Inchon — Japanese Civilians", undated. The data contained were brought together by Dr. Harold Larson during his tenure as Chief, Historical Section, G-2, XXIV Corps, and are derived from G-3 Operational Reports. (In Historical Files).

97. Summation No. 14 (Nov 46), p. 68.

98. Rad CG USAFIK to SCAP (pass to State Dept.) TFGBI 496 (S), 29 Oct 46, AG Rad Files; Summation No. 13 (Oct 46), p. 70 "Notes on Interview of Dr. Harold Larson, Historical Section, with Maj. J. W. Smith and Capt. J. O. Daulton, G-3, XXIV Corps", 9 Jan 47 (In Historical File). Maj. Smith handled repatriation problems for G-3 from May to Aug 1946, at which time Capt. Daulton took over.

99. Rad, For Aff MG to SCAP, TFGCT 2478 (U), 21 Aug 46. AG Rad Files.

100. Rad CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFGCT 2556 (U) 30 Sep 46.

101. The two heaviest weeks were these of 18 to 26 May, with 14,526, and 2 to 9 Jun with 13,273, according to contemporary statistics. Subsequent readjustments of these various totals, however, make precise comparison impossible.

102. Interview of Dr. Harold Larson, Historical Section, G-2 XXIV Corps, with Maj. J. W. Smith and Capt. J. O. Daulton, 9 Jan 47, already cited. (In Historical Files).

103. For further detail see page 48, below, under "Handling Procedure".

104. Statistical data used in this discussion are derived from G-2 Weekly Summaries for the pertinent periods. It should be borne in mind, however, that these contemporary figures were frequently readjusted, due to delayed reports, overlaps, and the like; consequently, comparisons are not feasible.

105. Gane, op.cit., pp. 83-94; Rad CINCAFPAC ADV to CG AFWESPAC, 232131/I Oct 45; Rad CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div, CG ASCOM 24,

105. 191602 Oct 45; Rad CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC 151548 Sept 45; Hq USAFIK, Office of MG, "Plan for Handling DP's," 9 Oct 45 (Copy in Historical File); repatriation figures in XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Reports. The Chinese puppet consular staff itself left Korea on the LST Q-043 on or just after 27 Nov 46. (copy in Historical Files).

106. Rad CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC TFXAG 542, 15 Sept 45, AG Rad Files.

107. Memo For Aff Sect to Office of the Civil Administrator Subj: "Refugee Report No. 2", 19 Oct 45.

108. XXIV Corps G-3 to C of S, Daily Memo subj: "Movement of Displaced Persons since 28 Sept 45", 5 Jan 46. (In Off of For Aff files). These daily memoranda continued to note this shipment individually for several weeks. No other specific reference to it has been encountered. Thus, Capt. C. S. Clarke, Assistant G-3, 6th Division, is quoted as having stated in an interview only a few days later (12 January) that the shipment of 251 Chinese (about to be discussed) which departed from Kunsan on 4 January, was "the only case to date". Cf. "Notes on Interview with Capt. C. S. Clarke, Asst. G-3, 6th Div., 12 Jan 45 (Sic!) (In Historical Files).

109. Gane, op.cit., p 83.

110. For Aff Sect, Displaced Persons Office, to Chief For Aff Sect, subj: "Report on Movement of Chinese Repatriates from Seoul to Kunsan". 6 Jan 45 (Sic!) (In Historical Files).

111. Dispatch, CG XXIV Corps to CO, KBC, TFGCT 229, 29 Apr 46. AG Rad Files. See also Displaced Persons Division "Weekly Reports" for pertinent periods; SCAP to CG USAFIK, CX 66190, AG Rad Files.

112. Radios CG, USAFIK to SCAP, TFYMG 2596, 28 Aug 46; same to same, TFYMG 2766, 3 Oct 46; same to same, TFYMG 9 Oct 46; SCAP to CG USAFIK CX 66190, 15 Oct 46. AG Rad Files. "Movement of Non-Korean Repatriates. Totals by years to 28 May" (Copy in Historical Files). This last is a rough statistical compilation brought together for Historical Section, G-2, by XXIV Corps G-3 on basis of data in files of Repatriation Section, Office of For Aff, USAMGIK.

113. Rad CINCAFPAC ADV to CG AFWESPAC, 232131/I Oct 45; Rad CTG 78.16 to CTF 78, 291045/I Oct 45; Rad CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24, 301624 Oct 45; Rad CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24, 061132/I Nov 45; Hq. USAFIK, Office of the MG, Sec of For Aff, report for week 27 Oct-03 Nov, 6 Nov 45, Part II (DP files); XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 72, 14 Nov 45.

114. Rad, CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFGCT 2110, 9 Mar 46; Rad CO KBC to CO 2d Marine Div 200901/I Jun 46. AG Rad Files; Office of For Aff "Report on Displaced Persons Movement", 11 Jul 46. See also G-2 Weekly Summary for pertinent periods. The "approximately 30" Okinawans presumably were included in a later group.

115. SWNCC 17618, 13 Oct 45, p. 51 (XXIV Corps C/S files).

116. G-2 Periodic Report No. 120 (10 Jan 46). No. 167 (5 Mar 46), No. 189 (Mar 46); XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 57 (29 Mar 46).

117. Rad, CG XXIV Corps to SCAP, TFYMG 2336 (U), 20 Jul 46; Rad, SCAP to CG, USAFIK, 063321 (U), 23 Jul 46; dispatch, CG XXIV Corps to CG USAMGIK, TFGCT 2434 (U), 28 Jul 46. AG Rad Files.

118. G-2 W/S, No. 77; "Movement of Non-Korean Repatriates. Totals by years to 28 May 48. Supplied to Historical Section through XXIV Corps, G-3" (In Historical Files).

119. Rad CTG 50.3 to CTF 71, 1317101 Nov 45.

120. G-3 Periodic Report No. 35, 15 Oct 45, p.2; No. 43, 23 Oct 45, p.3, No. 52, 1 Nov 45, p.e; Rad CG 7th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 302223/I Sept 45.

121. 40th Inf. Div., Evacuation and Repatriation; G-2 Periodic Report No. 100, 19 Dec. 45, p.3. See also manuscript "Reparation of Civilians from Korea", n 44. This manuscript, an early compilation of material pertinent to the present chapter made by an unidentified member of the then 1st Information and Historical Section, has been followed closely on the immediate topic. Footnote 44 therein cites as a partial source, "Personal observation of the writer, 24-25 Oct 45."

122. Sixth Army G-2 Periodic Report No. 45, quoted in XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report No. 70, 19 Nov 45.

123. G-2 Periodic Report No. 76, 25 Nov 45.

124. G-2 Periodic Reports, passim., especially: No. 77, 26 Nov 45; No. 101, 20 Dec 45, p.2; Rad CG ASCOM 24 to CG XXIV Corps, 051555/I Nov. 45; Rad CG XXIV Corps to CTF 51, CTG 55.2 071352/I Nov 45.

125. G-2 40th Div., Periodic Report No. 36, Incl. 1.

126. This conclusion derives from an investigation made on 19 Feb 47 by Dr. Harold Larson, Historical Section, G-2 XXIV Corps,

126. who noted as follows: "19 Feb 1947: Queried Lt. Col. R. Smith, Ex Off G-2 Corps re above. Search made but no copy found of any reply. The message was sent out from G-2. Col. Smith called Lt. H. H. Dow of CIC, who reported that although Nip. Sew was suspected, work of society was so helpful to Am. that no action taken. CIC report of 2 Mar 46 bore out feeling that the NS not subversive, tho it tried to help Japs in illegal travel for purely personal reasons, such as wanting to locate families in Korea and get them out of country." (In Historical File).

127. XXIV Corps Staff Conference Notes, 13 Dec (In Historical Journal)

128. Displaced Persons Division to Director of For Aff, Weekly Report, subj: "Census of Japanese Civilians residing in Korea south of 38°", 28 Oct 46, 30 Dec 46.

129. Press Conference held by General Lerch, 12 Nov 46 (summary in Historical Journal.) The cited statistics are from 54th MG HQ & HQ Co Weekly reports, to the Prov. Mil. Gov. Kyonggi-do., subject: "Daily Refugee Report", during the period treated.

130. "Agreement Reached Concerning Repatriation of Japanese Prisoners of War and Japanese Nationals from Territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and from Territories under the Control of the U.S.S.R. to Japan, as well as Korean Nationals from Japan to Korea North of the 38th North Latitude", Tokyo, 19 Dec 1946. (Mimeographed Copy in Historical Files).

131. Statistical data contained herein are based on XXIV Corps G-3 Operations Report No. 5 (25 Jan 47), No. 13 (8 Mar 47); "Movement of Non-Korean Repatriates. Totals by years to 28 May 1948; Supplied to Historical Section through XXIV Corps G-3" (in Historical File); Off of For Aff, USAMGIK, "Reports on Displaced Persons Movement in and out of U. S. Occupied Korea"; G-2 Weekly Summaries for pertinent periods. Weekly Report, Displaced Persons Division to Director of For Aff subj: "Census of Japanese Civilians Residing in Korea, South of 38th."

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Part II

GROUP - 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

Chapter I - Korean Politics and People: Introduction

Chapter II - Korean Politics and People: First Year (Sep 46-47)

Chapter III - Korean Politics: The Second Year (rough notes only - filed Bulky Files)

Chapter IV - American-Soviet Relations: First Year

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Part II

KOREAN POLITICS AND PEOPLE: INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

CHAPTER I

Introduction

KOREAN POLITICS AND PEOPLE - THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

Although Korean political associations were to have no immediate place in the establishment of the national administration of Korea, from the first day they became a force to reckoned with in the XXIV Corps's relations with the Korean people, and in its attempt to solve with the aid of Military Government the manifold economic and social problems ahead. More than seventy had been formed prior to the American landing, as has been described above.[1] Others were forming apace.

The first episode in this relationship occurred when the representatives of the "Provisional Korean Commission, 1945" presented themselves at Headquarters, XXIV Corps, aboard AGC Catoctin on 8 September. This organization, composed of 135 separate commissions throughout Korea, had as its stated objective the organization of a democratic form of government for the Korean people. Most of the members had lived through the Japanese occupation and disliked the Provisional Government in exile.[2] The representatives of the "Commission"

were to have been three prominent Koreans: Professor Pak, Sang Kyu; Mr. Cho, Han Yong; and Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung, head of the People's Republic.[3] Mr. Lyuh, however, was replaced by his brother, Lyuh, Woon Hong, when they came out to the Gotostin. General Hodge was advised not to see them himself, both because of the fact that they were sponsored by the Japanese, and because it was considered unwise to give even the slightest possible appearance of favoring any political group.[4] These men did talk with members of the Corps staff and gave to them from memory a list of Koreans who could be depended upon and another list of those who were said to be collaborationists. They asked about the American point of view toward the various exiled governments. They assured the staff of their full recognition of the U. S. Military Government and offered their own services in a liaison capacity between that government and the Korean people. They showed some concern over the division of Korea at the 38th parallel, about currency and inflation, about the discipline of American troops, and about the food situation. They were also most emphatic in expressing their belief that all Japanese should be evacuated from Korea.[5]

After tactically securing Seoul, General Hodge, mindful of the importance of establishing at the outset a modus vivendi with the political parties, invited their representatives to attend a meeting in the Civic Auditorium at 1430 on 12 September.[6] It had been explained through the medium of the press conferences that the representatives of each party would be expected to register before attending. There were to have been two representatives from each of the thirty-three or more political parties which were then believed to

exist. Since the task of completing the registering and name-taking at the door of the auditorium was still going on at the appointed hour, the remainder were admitted regardless.[7] It was estimated that approximately 1200 attended.[8]

General Hodge appeared at 1440 and introduced himself as a "man of the common people," born and raised on a farm. He gave a brief background of his part in the Pacific war which was followed by loud applause.[9] He explained that he was a soldier, not a diplomat, and that he did not have full knowledge of the Allied plans for Korea but that his own mission was clearly stated. Briefly, it required him to receive the Japanese surrender and to preserve law and order until readjustment was achieved. He said also that he realized the Cairo Declaration had promised the Koreans independence "in due course." This meant that Korea would get independence as soon as a stable government was formed and that could not be accomplished in a day or a week. It would take some time. There was a noticeable lack of applause after this point had been made clear. Too rapid action could only result in chaos, a complete breakdown, and "in what you do not want."[10]

The General continued, saying that he was glad the landing of the American troops had taken place without incident, that it appeared the Koreans were an orderly people and that he was grateful for the warmth of their welcome. He had, he said, just removed Governor Abe and not replaced him. Military Government would carry on the government of Korea. Meanwhile he needed the help of the leaders of the Korean people and felt confident he would get it. The people themselves must reduce parades and demonstrations to a minimum and must get back to work. They must keep property inviolate regardless of

who owned it. General MacArthur had announced that the Korean people would have freedom of speech, press, and religion. General Hodge said he hoped they would not abuse these freedoms. He, for his part, hoped he would not need to place any but the briefest and most minor temporary restrictions on them.[11]

There had not been time yet for him to acquire personally a knowledge of Korea's problems, but as soon as he knew a little more he wanted to meet all the leaders. He would announce, he said, from time to time when he would meet political groups and their leaders. Meanwhile, he believed it would save time if each party would prepare a written statement of the desires and position of the group. He also expressed the wish that those who had not had an opportunity to register at the door before the meeting would do so on the way out. He wanted to know "who you fine people are." He hoped he could count on their help in doing "our task" because what helped them also helped him. He believed Korea had a great future and enjoined them not to spoil it.[12]

Although the language difficulty beset this speech as on all such occasions, it was, on the whole, well received by the political delegates. A XXIV Corps G-2 report described its reception as follows:

> The applause and expressions on the faces of the delegates indicated pleasure and satisfaction following the announcement by the General of each one of the requirements and commitments. Their attention was gained and the entire audience hung on each remark without relaxing for a moment, which is very unusual for Koreans.[13]

After the applause at the close of his speech had died down, the General was presented with a document by an old man in the dress of a Korean patriarch. Following this, Mr. Cho, Pyung Oak spoke from the

floor, expressing gratitude to the Allied Powers. He said he was ashamed of the political situation in Korea, but felt sure that with American help his country could build up a strong government in time. He was also confident the Provisional Government in Chungking would work with General Hodge in every way.[14]

While the meeting was still in progress several parades were going on in the city. One of these filed by the Civic Auditorium at 1500. These demonstrators were mostly young men and women, but they were orderly and completely supervised by MP's and the Korean police. Many carried red banners, and the fact that the streets were littered with Red leaflets indicated that they were Communist in sympathy. Another parade was allegedly in honor of two students killed at Inch'on on 8 September.[15]

On 15 September General Arnold, at a press conference, informed the press that the Koreans, who were going to help in the government, had promised not to play politics for six months. In this way they would be able to serve Korea rather than any particular party. He explained also that the many small political parties had been urged to group themselves into organizations according to their objectives.[16]

By 15 September it was reported that a so-called Korean National Congress had been created. It had sprung from the common desires of numerous small political parties to combine for the purpose of coordinating their program and activities. At this time it was attempting to amalgamate several of the smaller parties which supported the same general program as the Democratic Party, many of whose members were successful business men and more highly educated Koreans.[17]

One of the first large parties to follow General Arnold's advice

was the Democratic Party, which on 16 September held its first open meeting in the Chun Do Kyo building. The top officers had been selected by an inner committee on 13 September. Dr. Rhee, Sung Man (president), Dr. Philip Jason (vice-president) and Mr. Kim, Koo (also vice-president) were all absent from Korea.[18] The platform approved was fairly general and conservative in nature, and notably absent therefrom was any mention of the Provisional Government in exile at Chungking, the support of which had originally been a publicly announced policy and later was prominent in their program.[19]

Their platform included the following provisions: For the people they proposed a guarantee of basic livelihood, a guarantee of equal opportunity for education and public health, a readjustment of the existing land system, a guarantee of freedom of speech, press, congregation and religious belief. They also favored the industrialization of Korea as a national economic policy, a democratic form of government, and complete independence for Korea.[20]

One of the chief speakers, Mr. Cho, Pyung Oak, a graduate of Columbia University, stressed the need for economic as well as political stability.[21] He also stressed the dangers of communism. Although there were no real disturbances, there were interruptions from the floor when Mr. Cho became critical of Russia, and one man was escorted to the door. Outside the building there was some shouting and threats, but the Korean guards, carrying wooden rifles, prevented unfriendly action.

Later the Democratic Party developed more forcefully under the leadership of Mr. Song, Chin Woo, who was later assassinated on 30 December 1945.[22] When his turn came to speak for the party over JODK on 21

December, he not only clarified its platform but called attention to the collaborationist beginnings of the People's Republic. The platform was somewhat streamlined from the original. It stressed democracy, individual rights, complete independence, state ownership of heavy industry, division of land, and free competition.[23]

On 16 September, the same day as the meeting of the Democratic Party, Mn Il Sin Bo, the only Korean language daily paper which had functioned under the Japanese, and which was now under radical influence following its emancipation from Japanese control, took off for a flight into politics by proposing a slate for a "Korean People's National Election." This slate named many well-known Koreans with a generous sprinkling of radicals. In many cases, however, the older statesmen recommended were not available and the radicals were recommended as alternates for these positions as well. For example, Dr. Rhee, Sung Man was nominated for Chief Head of Government and Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung for Vice-Head, but since Dr. Rhee was not then available, Mr. Lyuh was to act "permanently" as Head. Mr. Kim, Koo was nominated for Secretary of Internal Affairs, but since he was not available, Mr. Hu, Hun, first choice for Head of the Secretariat and a leftist leader, was also to act as Secretary of Internal Affairs.[24]

Before things had a chance to take too definite political shape, General Hodge began a program of personal interviews with the political leaders. Although he saw all of the more important men, he felt both at the time and later, when questioned about it, that the interviews were not bearing much fruit in political unity.[25] Concurrently with the beginning of this program of interviews, General Arnold appointed an

advisory council, composed of eleven carefully chosen, prominent, conservative Koreans as well as the two foremost leftist leaders. A radio which General Hodge forwarded for Mr. Benninghoff to CINCAFPAC included the following statement about this Korean Advisory Council:

> General Arnold told them that they were selected to give him advice on Korean matters on an honest nonpartisan basis having in mind only the good of the country and not personal or party gain. The eleven men accepted appointment on that basis and in secret session chose one of their members, Kim, Sung Soo by name, to act as chairman.
>
> The purpose of the council, aside from giving advice is to build up in the consciousness of the Koreans the feeling that they are beginning to participate in their government. 26

None of the political parties was particularly enthusiastic about the Advisory Council, possibly because they remembered a similar council of collaborationists under Japanese rule, or possibly because they felt that this new council would weaken their partisan organizations, which even then had governmental pretensions or ambitions.[27] Whatever the reason, the Council never exerted much of an influence on anybody and certainly did not live up to the hopes of those who created it.

One of the chief problems which was to cause concern to Military Government was the problem of political groups who assumed unauthorized governmental prerogatives.[28] The most troublesome of these was the People's Republic.

The People's Republic

Many obstructive activities emanated from the People's Republic, which was in the ambiguous position of trying to maintain itself as a

self-constituted government (as it had actually been for a few days in mid-August) while at the same time it claimed the rights of a legitimate political party.[29]

This organization in August adopted the following sweeping resolutions:

1. To establish an autonomous and independent state both politically and economically.
2. To demolish imperialism and residuary feudalistic influences in our state and to be faithful to the principles and ideals of democracy which must materialize the basic political, economic and social needs of our nation.
3. To secure a rapid elevation in the living standards of the laborers, the peasants and the masses.
4. To establish world peace through our cooperation as a member of the democratic countries of the world. [30]

These generalities were implemented by a program of twenty-seven specific administrative policies. There was nothing in their published program which would have made them public enemies had they not continued to act as though they were the government of Korea and so interfered with Military Government. These principles, moreover, were very rarely mentioned as this organization became more of a government and less of a party. Too specific a party platform might have frightened away peripheral support.

By the middle of September, the People's Republic had organized many subsidiary groups spreading throughout the provinces. Typical was one called the "Student Public Peace Body" composed of radical students, thugs, and some criminals, armed so far as possible.[31] It was believed by the more law abiding Koreans that no permanent peaceful settlement of Korea's political problems could be effected till these pseudo-political public safety organizations were disbanded.[32] Their fears appear to

have been well founded, for when the Chian Tai, one of the People's Republic's subsidiary branches in Pusan, was disbanded on 28 September, 257 rifles, 3 shotguns and 14 pistols were found.[33]

Many other instances of the assumption of governmental functions by unauthorized groups connected in some way with the People's Republic might be cited, for they were legion. The most flagrant examples occurred in the provincial governments. Consequently, any further description belongs more properly in the two subsequent chapters which deal with government in the provinces.[34]

During the third week in October a pamphlet entitled "The Traitors and the Patriots" was printed by the People's Republic and distributed in Seoul. It replied to a strong statement made by General Arnold to the press on 10 October. The pamphlet "exposed" the alleged pro-Japanese, anti-American Koreans, who were acting as advisors to the Military Government, by quoting from statements they may or may not have made against the Americans during the Japanese rule of Korea. Then again, on 20 October the People's Republic distributed "A Message to U S A Citizens," which begged the people of the United States to understand that those, like themselves, who had remained in Korea in the underground resistance during the Japanese Regime and had organized themselves after the Japanese surrender, represented the real will of the Korean people. It would be the "tragedy of the century" if Military Government should oppose the will of this government of the Korean people.[35]

One other thing which may have militated against smooth relations with the People's Republic was the statements of several members of the American Press. Mr. Robert H. Myers of the Associated Press and Mr. Gordon Walker of the Christian Science Monitor had an informal talk

with the Central People's Committee of the Korean People's Republic. These journalists acknowledged that the Democratic Party had the ear of General Arnold but added "the Military Government is not all of the U. S. A."[36] This undoubtedly created the feeling that there was more sympathy for the Republic in the nation than was being shown by the Military Government and may have encouraged them in their resistance.

That the People's Republic was a potent force cannot be doubted, for after his extensive visit to the rural area, a Military Government advisor, Dr. H. H. Underwood, who was formerly a resident of Korea, stated that the "Republic" was the strongest and most active organization throughout the south. By comparison, the Democratic Party was "poorly organized or unorganized in most places," and seemed to have nothing as attractive to offer, such as free land to the farmer and free factories to the workers.[37] Major W. F. La Hatte, of the Office of Public Opinion of Military Government, corroborated these views of Dr. Underwood after his trip through the provinces in December. He said that the strength of the "Republic" was growing, that they were organized into a government at all levels and that no other party was given a chance to coexist with them. Without Military Government intervention in their favor, no other party would be allowed to flourish.[38]

Although the People's Republic under the leadership of Mr. Lyuh stopped short of open revolt, it tended to be continuously critical and troublesome.[39] It defied Military Government's wishes by insisting that it would hold national elections on 1 March 1946, by devoting itself to self-expansion rather than union with other parties, and finally by refusing at the end of a three-day meeting on 20-23 November to drop

Kook (Republic) from its name.[40]

This last was an immediate act of defiance hard to ignore, since Military Government had specifically requested that the name be changed to avoid misunderstandings which had arisen about this group's status.[41] The leaders had assured Military Government that the name would be changed. General Arnold himself went to the meeting and delivered a brief speech stressing the need for cooperation and order during the next critical months. He said that any possible material reconstructional help from Allied sources depended in a large measure upon how the people of Korea conducted themselves. He emphasized also that Military Government was only a stop-gap, though, while it was in operation, it was the government of the Korean people, not an American or Allied government.[42]

Though the speech seemed to be well received, the subsequent events showed that the majority were not convinced, because in the resolution of gratitude which was passed by the meeting for transmission to each of the Allies, the offending word Kook was used in the signature. Furthermore, on the final day, the younger and more radical elements ran away with the meeting and shouted down those who wished to comply with the request that the name be changed.[43] In spite of this independent attitude the People's Republic did, at this same meeting, publicly resolve to cooperate fully with the U. S. occupation forces until such time as the government would be turned over to the people.[44] Giving more point to the situation was the fact that, immediately after this defiant meeting of the People's Republic, Kim, Koo returned to Korea bringing with him several other members of the self-styled Provisional Government. This meant for the People's Republic that the 'chips were

down.[44] They had no choice but to outdo their rival pseudo-government, amalgamate with it, or disappear into the oblivion of history.

Adding to the complexities of the relationship with the People's Republic at this time, was the fact that just before this three-day meeting, Mr. Lyuh, formerly its head and the very man who had carried Military Government's request to the central committee, suddenly bolted to form what was thought at first to be a more tractable middle-of-the-road party called the People's Party. With Mr. Lyuh went many of the members of the parent organization leaving Mr. Hu, Hun, Mr. Lyuh's old running mate, and Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, the Communist leader, as the leading figures connected with the Republic.

There had been at this time some advance indication of Mr. Lyuh's withdrawal from formal connection with the People's Republic on 2 November when he announced that on 15 November four lesser parties would amalgamate themselves into a People's Party which firmly disclaimed any Communist affiliation and denied connection with the Korean People's Republic except in so far as they both advocated certain reform principles in common.[45]

For the People's Party to disclaim close integration with the People's Republic was as far from the truth as their denying Communist connections. It was believed by some reliable sources that the Communists had actually created it in order to take into their membership a wider group that could be responsive to the appeal of the Communist party itself.[46] Later Mr. Lyuh himself seemed outwardly to be embarrassed by this association, but by that time it had become impossible to measure either his sincerity or political stability.

Shortly after the turn of the year, General Hodge's political adviser felt obliged to warn the State Department that the People's Party was not the moderate liberal party which it seemed to be. He explained that Communist elements in it were even stronger than ever, that Mr. Lyuh and Mr. Hu had lost control of the party to Communist elements though they would remain as nominal leaders for fear of being eliminated entirely from the political scene.[47] By the end of February it seemed clear that Mr. Lyuh was completely enmeshed with the Communists, not only because of his party, but as an individual, and that he was advising his followers on the various ways of discrediting the American Military and Military Government.[48]

The program of this new party was not startling and not very different. It included: (1) Political equality and women's rights. (2) Absolute self-government. (3) Separation of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. (4) Four or five administrative districts rather than thirteen. (5) Planned economy.[49]

The relations between the People's Republic and USAFIK became increasingly tense when General Hodge, tiring of the former's recalcitrant attitude, issued a strong statement on 12 December to the effect that USAFIK would no longer tolerate the activities of any organizations which were "governmental" in character. He reviewed a long list of broken promises and obstructionist acts. He pulled no punches.[50]

Although the Korean Democratic Party, the Republic's arch enemy, thought the statement was hardly strong enough, the reaction of the People's Republic was immediate and vigorous. The Intelligence Sub-Section of the Military Government described it from newspaper sources as follows:

The Republic deliberated furiously all night and half the next day and finally released a hard hitting rebuttal. The main points were: (1) That present confusion and mis-understandings are due to the slanderous advice of Pro Jap traitors; (2) That the change in name was promised only as an item for discussion at the National Assembly and the body voted against it; (3) That after the meeting, President Hu, Hun agreed to all the points of a letter sent to him by General Hodge except the proposal to refrain from using the word Kook (Republic); (4) That the so-called "Provisional Government" is tacitly permitted to refer to itself as such, and even hold "Cabinet Meetings"; (5) That such an attitude by Military Government may be subjectively consistent, but that objectively it confuses the public. (Seoul Shin Mun 18 December.) 51

So what happens now? The people await specific action from Military Government. Yet can Military Government go further without appearing to suppress liberal elements? The issue will be squarely met on March 1, 1946 --- if not before. On that date the Republic presumably still calling itself such, plans to hold a national election. 52

1 March came; there were parades and a ceremony commemorating Korean independence; the conservative elements and heroes of the old 1919 independence movement dominated the scene.[53] The People's Republic was not in evidence nor did they hold an election. They were still a most powerful element to be reckoned with, however. They hoped, perhaps, to gain more through waiting for the support to their power and prestige which the advent of the Russians and the beginning of the Joint Commission might bring.

The Communist Party

The history of the relationship between the other major political groups and USAFIK is less colorful perhaps than the stormy saga of the

People's Republic, but equally significant. The Korean Communist Party, which emerged from its underground activities first briefly in mid-August, then again upon the arrival of the Americans, had been one of the least known, most powerful, and best organized of all the parties. Tainted at first by the suspicion of having been subsidized, like the People's Republic, by the Japanese at the end of their regime, they, by their vigorous actions and characteristic singleness of purpose, established a place for themselves among Korean political parties.[54] In the early days, as a party, they did not cause Military Government serious trouble, though small communistic radical groups and small groups of possibly irresponsible members caused the legitimate party to be blamed for many obstructive and violent acts.[55] Also their affiliation with and support of the People's Republic brought them in the way of much criticism as public enemies. After the turn of the year, however, the true extensiveness of their activity and the extent to which they were influenced by non-Korean forces became evident and became increasingly troublesome to USAFIK.

Not until 20 September did G-2 report the name of the head of the one big regular Communist Party, the Korean Communist Party (Chosen Kong San Dang). His name was Pak, Hung Yung.[56] The numerical strength of the party was then believed to be about 5,000.[57] Later, in early January, Mr. Pak said it contained 10,000 south of the 38° and 20,000 north of the line.[58] The first signs of admittedly "Communist" activity since the beginning of the occupation began to appear in mid-October when a poster entitled "Communist News" was found in Inch'on dated 15 October, and a handbill entitled "A Manifesto" signed by the Korean

Communist Party was found in Seoul on 20 October.[59]

The Communist groups were loud in their protests against the Korean advisors to Military Government, the interpreters, and against any things which they chose to consider as signs of a continuation of a reactionary tyranny over Korea. They attacked, particularly, the Korean Democratic Party, charging them with being pro-Japanese, reactionary, and traitorous.[60]

The policy of the Korean Communist Party was often obscure, probably because of the efforts of its leaders to appeal to so many factions in the interests of unity and power. On 19 September the "Emancipation Daily News" (Hai Bang Il Bo) published the program of the party which said, in essence, that its aim was to lift up the laboring masses, to fight for the complete independence of the Korean people, and to establish a revolutionary democratic government. It said, also, that the purpose was to build a Communist society with no social strata, graft, or oppression. Support of the People's Republic and condemnation of "such reactionary parties as the Korean Democratic Party" was also part of the program according to this paper.[61]

Another statement of their aims appeared on 3 October. It included the organization of a free and independent country, a democratic settlement of the land problem, freedom of speech and assembly, the eight-hour day, compulsory education, higher standards of living for all laborers, and the franchise for all men and women.[62]

On 31 October Mr. Pak granted an interview to a representative of the "Korea Free Press." When asked about the question of cooperation with Military Government, he replied:

We must cooperate fully with the American Military Government. Cooperation is only right. Even though protests and explanations may be made in the event of a disagreement with the authorities, none must oppose or clash with Military Government. We must not forget that the U. S. came to wipe out Japanese imperialism and to guarantee Korean liberation. 63

On 1 November Mr. Pak also granted an interview to a representative of Ha Il Sin Bo which was widely publicized. In this interview he expressed himself very vigorously in favor of the occupation and denied having told American press representatives that he favored the immediate withdrawal of American and Russian occupation forces. He was fulsome in his gratitude to the United States and the other Allies for the blood they spilled in the liberation of Korea and said that, until the Korean people practiced a little self-analysis and realized that their present liberty was due to these allies and not to the Koreans in exile, little progress would be made in achieving a united, independent, and democratic Korea. 64

When Dr. Rhee, Sung Man, through the medium of his Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, attempted to draw the Communist Party into the fold, he found them reluctant. Mr. Pak felt the executive committee of this organization was dominated by reactionary and pro-Japanese members of the Korean Democratic Party and Nationalist Party. Dr. Rhee agreed to eliminate the offending members and the Communist Party joined. 65 A rift soon developed and became so pronounced by the end of November after the arrival of Kim, Koo that Pak withdrew from the Council. At this time Pak, in an interview with a representative of the Korea Free Press on 28 November, said that he believed unity was all-important but that it must be founded on the principles

of a progressive democracy. In any case there should be no violence. The government should be formed by gathering the opinions of the whole people, not by a conference of a few political leaders.[66]

Another indication that the publicly announced policy of the party was comparatively moderate may be found in an undated handbill distributed to Communist Party members in which Pak clarified the official policy. It included the following statement:

> There is a rumor current that the Korean Communist Party advocates a proletarian revolution and the establishment of a socialist state. This is a misconception. The Party stands for and always has advocated the foundation of a bourgeois democracy as a necessary step toward full freedom for all classes.[67]

Naturally the measure of a party's cooperation had to be taken by what it did rather than by what it said, and it was, in the early stages, difficult to determine to what extent the Communists were directly responsible for the highly obstructive acts of the People's Republic with which they were admittedly affiliated, and to what extent they were subject to outside non-Korean influences.

Several events involving the relationship of the Communist Party with the Americans should be considered before leaving the subject. One of these events took place when there was a meeting of the Korean Independence Promoting Central Committee held on 2 November in the Chun De Kyo, the non-sectarian religious meeting hall where the Democratic Party had held its 16 September meeting.[68] Fifty seven different political factions were present and the five major parties were each represented by their leaders. Dr. Rhee, Sung Man, who had

arrived on 16 October from the United States, was chairman and sponsor of the meeting. The hall was heavily guarded both inside and out by MP's and Korean police. Though the meeting was spirited and almost violent, and though there were occasionally shouts and calls from outside the building, Dr. Rhee's prestige was such that the police did not have to be called.[69]

The majority of the groups, and particularly Song, Chin Woo, leader of the conservative Korean Democratic Party, were chiefly concerned with drafting a resolution to President Truman, the State Department, Congress, the American people, England, China, and Russia, calling attention to the terrible blunder of the division of Korea at the 38° parallel for which they absolved the military commanders from blame but expressed their strong opposition to the blunder of the trusteeship which had been suggested by Mr. John Carter Vincent of the State Department,[70] and which will be given full treatment in a subsequent chapter on National Issues.

In the midst of this meeting, swarthy, dynamic, Mr. Pak, head of the Korean Communist Party, delivered an impassioned speech insisting that "partition" and "trusteeship" were not serious problems.[71] Although the majority finally adopted the resolution after it had been reworded slightly out of deference to its critics, the Communist Party, at a meeting the next day, decided that the resolution would create a misunderstanding and draw criticism from the Allied Nations, and that it was not a true expression of the will of the Korean people.[72] Consequently, they prepared a counter-statement which:

> . . . thanked the Allies for the gift of independence, hoping for the eradication of Japanese Imperialists, the impounding of Japanese land, the establishment of a progressive Democratic Government, and the withdrawal of the Allies once such a

government is established.[73]

This resolution was given the same distribution as Dr. Rhee's, much to the latter's annoyance, and signalized the beginning of a widening rift between the Communists and the Committee for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence.

Another occasion when the Korean Communist Party appeared to be cooperating with Military Government was at the famous 23 November meeting of the Korean People's Republic. The more solid wing of the party under the leadership of Pak refrained from plunging with their radical wing brethren into the landslide which defeated the proposal to drop Kook from the name of the organization.[74] By this restraint they clearly placed the burden of the blame for the defiance on the radical wing. The latter, however, quickly came back into the fold that very night by declaring what they were pleased to call a "developmental dissolution" and joined whole heartedly under Pak to eliminate intra-party strife at a time when the arrival of patriot Kim, Koo made unity seem vital.[75]

Feeling this strength in unity, Mr. Pak made it quite clear early in December that he would have no further truck with the Committee for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, which in his mind was too full of men who had been collaborators. He also, while protesting support of national political unity, charged the so-called Provisional Government group with failing to respond to his approaches on the issue of unity.[76] On 19 December Dr. Rhee struck back by using his regular

Wednesday night radio time on JODK to blast the Communists. Though General Hodge had invited him as a non-party man to give a series of non-partisan stabilization speeches to the Korean people, he said:

> Communists in Korea are responsible for concocted stories, cheating, organized terror . . . They invented the name so-called People's Republic to show the world we are divided among ourselves. 77

Dr. Rhee finally urged all patriots to band together to fight "those people whose work is to destroy and prevent unity." 78

The Communists gave indications of being ready to fight back since it appeared to them that Dr. Rhee had practically declared war. 79 The early press releases on the evening of 28 December, however, which told of the Moscow Conference decisions and indicated that a five-year trusteeship had been decided upon temporarily distracted the parties from a continuation of their mutual name-calling.

The question as to how closely the Korean Communist Party might be controlled from Moscow was of course of concern to the American occupation forces. The answer became increasingly clear to the command. General Hodge reported to SCAP on 2 November in part as follows:

> Communistic activities are reaching point where they may get beyond control unless positive action is taken. Am sure most radical elements are Russian instigated but cannot get positive proof. Activities are hampering efforts to establish sound Korean economic system. . . . Communist propaganda is so insidious and well handled as to have influenced materially the American press. . . . The entire activity has the smell of being agitated by a well trained group of outside experts. 80

He reported again to SCAP on the tenth that Communistic activities were well organized and effective and that they were directed

against the efforts of USAFIK to establish an effective government and a sound economy. He said also that he believed communism was backed "by both Soviet and Japanese activities in apparent effort to create chaos."[81] There was a strong belief at Corps Headquarters that members of Mr. Alexander Sergeievitch Polyansky's staff at the Soviet consulate in Seoul carried on Communist activities in Korea.[82] By December the State Department became sufficiently concerned over the possibility of the "existence of directive action inspired from without as against normal political activity" to request General Hodge through CINCAFPAC to send more information on this aspect of the Communist problem in Korea.[83] There was also a belief that Russian Communist literature was being dispensed in Korea south of the 38th parallel by Soviet agencies.[84] Pictures of Lenin and Stalin were sold at a memorial service held by radical groups in honor of the Korean martyrs of 1919,[85] but the fact that two of the greatest Communist heroes happen to be Russian merely added to the impression of connivance without proving it.

General Hodge, though perfectly convinced in his own mind since early in the occupation found it very difficult to establish a firm proof of extra-political forces pulling the lead strings of the southern Korean Communists.[86] On 30 November he summarized the situation as follows to SCAP:

> Circumstantial evidence indicating possible outside assistance includes the following. (A) Presence of Russian Consul in Seoul. (B) Russian confiscation and withdrawal from circulation for possible use in Southern Korea all Bank of Chosen money in N. Korea and which is valueless except in Southern Korea. (C) Reports that Communists have received funds from outside sources presumably Northern Korea. (D) Reports that three thundred

Communist organizers are to be sent from Kanko in Northern Korea to Southern Korea. (E) Internal events show organization and direction beyond the estimated capabilities of local Communist leaders. 87

On 3 December General Hodge sent a radio to SCAP saying that, although he still had no positive documentary proof of outside control and that proof would be difficult to obtain, he felt the evidence justified the conclusion that outside control of Communists in South Korea probably existed. 88

Communist public utterances certainly offered little help in establishing proof of sinister outside influences because, except for inspiring much of the campaign to palliate the reported atrocities north of 38°, lending generally their approval to the Russian administration, and discrediting U. S. Military Government, there was little said by the Communists which would indicate they advocated anything approaching old-fashioned party line communism of the Comintern type.

The relations of the XXIV Corps with the Communist Party and the popularity of the party itself among Koreans suffered a marked decline when their leader, Mr. Pak, wavered at first on the trusteeship question which came to a climax as a national issue on 30 December. 89 In a personal interview with General Hodge on 1 January he indicated strong opposition to trusteeship and several Communist newspapers also objected to it. Then he was silent, hesitating to make a public statement. 90 It appeared that he did not dare openly to take a definite stand on either side until he assured himself of the party line.

Instructions were issued on 3 January 1946 by the "Responsible Secretary of the Northern Korea Branch, the Korean Communist Party"

to "Responsible Secretaries of all levels and Branches of the Communist Party" relative to the Moscow Conference decisions. The instructions enjoined all Communists to support in every way those decisions.[91]

A leftist parade of 3 January was first called as an anti-trusteeship demonstration then changed a few hours before hand to a pro-Moscow decisions parade.

Coming close on the heels of this evidence of outside influence came the much disputed and publicized 8 January interview between Mr. Pak and Mr. Richard J. H. Johnston of the New York Times. The nimble journalist maneuvered the Communist leader into making a number of statements concerning his support of a plan to sovietize Korea within ten to twenty years and concerning the Communist's preference for a one-power trusteeship under Russia. The fact that these statements were introduced by explanation of what he meant by soviet and were qualified by an insistence on absolute independence for Korea was lost in the general hue and cry which arose.[92] Although supported by the Korean press, Mr. Pak made his position weaker by trying to deny what he had actually said and by requesting the expulsion of Mr. Johnston.[93] There were no grounds for expelling Mr. Johnston for what he did not tell. The statements he did make were verified even by some American eye-witnesses who disagreed with his overall interpretation of the interview. Consequently, Mr. Johnston was officially exonerated by Corps after an investigation and Mr. Pak went into hiding.[94] His enemies had placed a sum of 300,000 yen on his head.[95]

This episode, which alarmed moderate and conservative Koreans as much as it alarmed Corps, was the beginning of the end so far as effective

cooperation with the Communists was concerned. Other episodes only added to the cleavage. The refusal of the Communists to have any part in efforts at party cooperation by Colonel H. P. Goodfellow's Korean Representative Democratic Council, the sudden appearance of millions of brand new yen to replenish the dwindling party coffers when the Russian Commission came down from the north,[96] and the discovery of letters on the person of at least one American soldier from Mr. Pak to American Communists thanking them for the vociferous sympathy they were arousing in the United States[97] did little to raise the confidence of General Hodge in the honesty and sincerity of the Communists as an independent Korean political party.[98] He believed furthermore in March that there was a considerable increase of Communist strength and activity in South Korea, which he reported to SCAP.[99]

A further indication of a party unity, which extended at least beyond American occupied Korea into the northern zone, was the discovery of the apparently authentic document of instructions to all Communist leaders in South Korea, which has already been mentioned. The document was found on a Korean and emanated from Northern Korean Communist headquarters. It was dated 2 January 1946 and dealt with the party line attitude on the decisions of the Moscow Conference, but it also prescribed in detail the cheers, slogans, and speeches which were to be made in support of those decisions.[100] In addition to this was the lengthening shadow of Kim, Il Sawng, leader of the Communist Party north of 38 degrees, believed to be impersonating the former guerilla leader who had been decorated by Stalin.[101] His influence in Southern Korea had nearly eclipsed that of Mr. Pak by early spring.

General Hodge reported the growing strength of the outside influence and the lessening distrust of Russia among Koreans. He said this was evidenced by:

> the newly intensified Communist campaign in South Korea and evidences of increasing Communist followings. It is also evidenced by the recent open sell-out to the Russian trained and directed Communist by the so-called "leftist" Korean leaders, who had previously avowed they were not Communists. 102

Later still more definite and specific proof of the far reaching tie-ups of the South Korean Communist Party came to hand when a "Communist Unit Journal" was discovered at the Communist Party Headquarters. The journal covered the period from December 1945 to May 1946 and revealed the connections which existed between the leaders of the party and Mr. Lyuh, the Russian delegates on the Joint Commission, the North Korean Communists, American military personnel, and the Soviet Consulate.[102a] The relationships between the latter and the Korean Communists was further established by the talkative Soviet vice-consul, Mr. A. I. Shabshin, who admitted to a Korean friend in confidence that he was the controlling leader of all Communists in South Korea and that Mr. Pak was his henchman.[102b]

The Nationalist Party

The Nationalist Party, under the leadership of Mr. Ahn, Chai Hong, did not have a particularly colorful relationship with the national administration. They early expressed themselves as opposed to the

trusteeship.[103] The party was vociferous in its support of the anti-trusteeship resolution which emanated from Dr. Rhee's all-party 2 November meeting, already described. They also, early in November, expressed a readiness to dissolve themselves into a united party if any such party developed from the efforts of Dr. Rhee, Sung Man's Central Committee for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence.[104]

The Nationalist Party actually did accomplish something itself toward the unification of parties when, at a secret meeting on 15 November, nineteen parties resolved to unify. These parties were all unimportant groups; consequently, the move had little significance.[105]

Later, on 4 December, they made a still greater gesture at attempting to unify by joining the Korean Democratic Party and forty lesser

parties in agreeing to dissolve themselves into one big party which would support the Provisional Government.[106] Although all the parties agreed, it was referred to a committee meeting for final action. Though there was no immediate action, Mr. Lee, Kap Sung did announce, on 14 December, the creation of a New Korean Nationalist Party made up of twenty-five small parties. With this nucleus at his disposal, he attempted to complete the blend with the big parties, Mr. Ahn's Nationalist Party and Mr. Song's Korean Democratic Party, and with his united front of all conservative parties support the Provisional Government.[107]

This union, however, was never really consummated until February when Colonel H. P. Goodfellow, acting for General Hodge as a special party conciliator, managed to achieve some unity among the less radical political groups.

When, according to rumor, Kim, Koo was on the verge of returning, Mr. Ahn, Chai Hong stated, "I welcome Kim, Koo with open arms. . . . I expect a great deal from him."[108] The Nationalist Party did carry through its support of Kim, Koo, joining with the Korean Democratic Party in aligning themselves in support of the Provisional Government shortly after the majority of its members were brought to Korea as private citizens by army air transport between 25 November and 1 December.[109] They stated jointly, "Our aim is to establish the independence of Korea immediately by respecting the dignity of the Provisional Government and obeying its leaders."

The Korean Democratic Representative Council

The Korean Democratic Representative Council has been mentioned above several times in the narrative, but it deserves some additional attention, for it nearly became a great step toward creating a union of a majority of the political parties. As already indicated, most of the conservative elements had agreed to bury their differences in the interests of union. These parties were ready to pledge themselves under the leadership of Dr. Rhee, Sung Man; Kim, Koo; and Kim, Kyu Sik. This initial success was achieved by the tactful efforts of General Hodge's representative, Colonel Goodfellow.[110] Even the moderate leftist People's Party under Mr. Lyuh had been apparently lured into the fold by the colonel.[111] Only the Communists and extreme radicals shunned all relationships with the proposed Representative Council.[112]

Shortly before the first meeting of this heterogeneous group on 14 February 1946, publicity emanating from the rightist propaganda chief, Mr. Um, Hang Sup, deeply offended Mr. Lyuh. All the efforts of General Hodge and Colonel Goodfellow to repair the damage were of no avail. Consequently, at the very last minute Mr. Lyuh decided not to appear, even though he was scheduled to be a chief speaker and a chair was held for him at the speakers' table till the last moment.[113] He apparently preferred sulking like Achilles in his tent to helping in the effort to unify Korean parties, or perhaps the Communist elements in his own party and the Communist party itself were terrorizing him.[114] The People's Party, after thus showing its colors, settled back into

still closer connection with the Communist left, its leader Mr. Lyuh accepting office in the newly created Democratic People's Front, and the more conservative groups continued their own tenuous and troubled union.[115] Although the Council maintained enough cohesiveness to express itself on several minor matters like recommending a national holiday on 1 March and a return to driving on the right hand side of the road, this effort at real union with resulting strength proved almost as abortive as all previous efforts made either by Koreans or Americans.[116]

General Hodge felt, nevertheless, that he must attempt to keep up the prestige of the Council, gain the backing of the Korean people, and discredit the Communists. He said he felt "any other local action now would be fatal."[117]

The Koreans were certainly living up to what General Hodge said of them in December. "Koreans are the most politically minded people I have ever seen."[118]

He was sufficiently discouraged at that time with the Korean political situation to suggest that, unless some definite policy were announced regarding certain national issues which were keeping the Koreans in a state of turmoil, "an agreement with Russia that both the United States and Russia withdraw forces from Korea, simultaneously, and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self-purification," be arranged.[119] By the end of January, after the fracas over the Moscow decisions and trusteeship, the situation seemed so devoid of prospects for a political amalgamation that the Commanding General

informed SCAP that he would be willing to be relieved as a 'sacrificial goat' in the hope that such a removal would clear the air and afford an opportunity for a straightening out of the political situation both internally and in respect to American relations with the Russians.[120] The events of the later winter did not cause him to improve his estimate of the situation. He said in a 2 April retrospective report: 'The Korean people are the most difficult of all peoples I have ever encountered. They have only one common idea - independence. . . . [they] are stubborn, are highly contentious among themselves, can only cooperate to the extent that each individual can have his own way.'[121] He concluded this report with a statement to the effect that he believed the occupational forces were reaching the point of diminishing returns and consequently strongly recommended that 'if and when the Joint Commission succeeds in establishing a provisional government, our government approach the Russians to the end that both nations withdraw military forces as such no later than 1 January 1947, leaving behind such civilian and military advisers as are requested by and arranged with the Korean government.'[122]

Registration of Political Parties

The earlier attempts to register the Korean political parties have already been mentioned but a further effort to achieve complete official registration was made in February. The War Department G-2 had requested

a list of parties and their leaders. The US-Russian Joint Commission was soon to meet. Consequently, the Military Governor was directed on 15 February "to take immediate steps to register all political parties and other organizations."[125] This registration was to contain a declaration of purpose, names of officers, and location of headquarters. It was directed that each party would maintain "an office of record," a proper accounting system for party funds, and would make a periodic financial statement. This was to make the necessary vital statistics available at the time of the meeting with the Russians.[124]

This order was implemented by USAMGIK Ordinance 55 on 25 February. The Ordinance was entitled "Regulation of Political Parties" and did go considerably farther than mere registration.[125] There was, as might have been expected, a flurry of protest from the Korean press and the parties, particularly the Communists. The protests resulted in an amendment in the form of Ordinance 79 which eliminated the requirement for the registration of lists of individual party members.[126] By April, one hundred and thirty-four political parties, groups, and societies had registered.[127]

The Korean Leaders

According to an observation by General Hodge, Korean political leaders were unstable because their positions were based on personal relationships rather than on political beliefs and convictions. A

Korean might be a leader one day and be without a following the next.[128]

No consideration of the relationship with political groups, however, could be complete without some reference to several individuals who played a very important part in this relationship, though they claimed no party affiliations. The chief ones were the two returning patriots, Dr. Rhee, Sung Man and Mr. Kim, Koo, already mentioned many times, and Dr. Kim, Kyu Sik.

Dr. Rhee returned to Korea on 16 October after thirty-five years absence. According to his own statement and the statement of General Hodge, he came as a private citizen. His return had been approved by General Hodge in the belief that he would exercise a stabilizing influence on Korean politics and would be of value as an advisor. Dr. Rhee's return to Korea had also been approved by SCAP and the State Department.[129] In fact shortly after Dr. Rhee's arrival in Korea, an exchange of radios indicated that both the political advisor at CINCAFPAC and the Secretary of State were looking with favor upon the possibility of using Dr. Rhee and the Chungking exiles as the nucleus of an interim government.[130]

Dr. Rhee had several tremendous initial advantages over most of the other big leaders in smoothing relations between USAFIK and the Korean people; first because he had lived so long in the United States, and second because he spoke English as well as he spoke Korean. This was a firm foundation for a mutual understanding which, combined with his great popularity in Korea, might have been used to bind together the chaotic party groups and bend them to sensible cooperation. It

appeared, however, that Dr. Rhee found he had to take up many of the Koreans' popular and troublesome causes in order to preserve his popularity with them.

He was, indeed, well received and many parties began angling for his support and leadership. For example, the radical People's Republic tendered him the presidency. Even before his arrival he had - it will be recalled - appeared as Chief of State on the ticket of the government proposed by Ma Il Sin Bo on 16 September. Dr. Rhee tended to steer clear of the radical elements, trying at first not to alienate them entirely. As time went on, and particularly after the arrival of Kim, Koo, he lined up very decisively on the side of the conservatives and in favor of a recognition of the Provisional Government of which he himself had been the head many years before.

It would appear that he had not been overly discreet in utilizing the non-partisan trust which General Hodge had placed in him, for on several occasions he used the opportunities for speaking given him by the General to express very partisan views. Only four days after his arrival, he spoke at a ceremony on 20 October in front of the Government General building blasting Russia and the 38th degree division of Korea.[131] On subsequent occasions over the radio, he made speeches on government time,[132] supporting Kim, Koo and damning the Communists. In general he had lined up very definitely with the conservative elements by the beginning of December. As a private citizen he was of course entitled to take sides, but as the great non-partisan unifier which General Hodge had hoped for he was a disappointment, and his

Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence became a conservative organization. It was so much so that Lyuh, who had disclaimed with his People's Party any affiliations with the Communists and had claimed to be attempting to steer a more middle-of-the-road course, found the preponderance of conservative Korean Democrats so uncongenial that he walked out of the first meeting of the newly appointed executive committee.[153]

The second individual who became an important factor in Korean-American relations was Mr. Kim, Koo, originally head of the Provisional Government in exile who resigned in favor of Dr. Rhee after the surrender of Japan. This resignation, however, never seemed to take effect, for even though Dr. Rhee was his senior in the Provisional Government, neither he nor Kim, Koo seemed to consider their relationship as anything but that of two returning popular heroes of equal rank with substantially the same political following.[154]

Although General Hodge had approved of his return for the same reasons, on the same conditions, and in much the same manner as he had favored the return of Dr. Rhee, he was well aware that the return of such an individual was fraught with political significance both for Korea and for the whole Far East.[155] He took great pains, therefore, to assure himself that Kim, Koo would return as an individual and not as the representative of any provisional government or political party.[156]

General Hodge also indicated to CINCAFPAC that it would be "highly desirable that Kim, Kyu Sik . . . be added to Sung Man Rhee and Kim Koo for early return to Korea in advisory capacity."[157] He

specified, further, that Kim, Kyu Sik should be delayed till a few days after Kim, Koo's arrival because he was a "very active character who may seize the opportunity to achieve his personal ends during the coalition period."[138] He also took pains to keep the exact date of Kim, Koo's arrival a closely guarded secret. The General had substantial evidence that there was a price on his head and that some of the plans for welcome were a cover for plots for his assassination.[139] On 12 November General Hodge expressed himself to his staff as feeling that the occupation forces were, in fact, walking on the edge of a volcano, that political affairs in Korea simply mirrored political affairs throughout the Far East and particularly in China. He pointed out that Chiang Kai Shek was fighting communism in China and wanted a democratic Korea on his flank. For this reason the Generalissimo was backing Kim, Koo. General Hodge knew that the Korean radicals were aware of this; therefore the point at issue was whether or not the entire Far East would become Communist controlled.[140] Thus, in order to avoid international complications, it was very important to make sure that Kim, Koo came as a private citizen and to make sure that he was not harmed.

Having given assurance, Kim, Koo was cleared to come to Korea from Shanghai with several other members of the Provisional Government in exile by U. S. Army planes, but they all came as private citizens.

General Hodge's genuine concern over Kim Koo's arrival and over his status was evident from the radios he sent to the Headquarters of

the China Theater.[141] Consequently, a written pledge was obtained from Kim, Koo on 19 November before air transportation was finally authorized.[142] The pledge is of sufficient interest to merit presentation in full as follows:

House 121, Lane 668 Yu Yuen Road
Shanghai
November 19, 1945

Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer
Commanding General, U.S. Forces
China Theater
U. S. Army Headquarters
Shanghai

Dear Sir:

With reference to the matter of arranging air lift and clearance for myself and other members of the Korean provisional government (until recently located in Chungking) to enter Korea in individual capacity, I hereby undertake to assure you that I and my colleagues fully understand that we shall be allowed to enter as strictly private individuals and not in any official capacity. I further have the honor to state that on entering Korea we do not expect to function, either collectively or individually, as a government or such body exercising civil and/or political power. Our aim shall be to cooperate with the U. S. Military Government in establishing order as will benefit the Korean people.

Allow me to express my gratefulness for your kind courtesy and consideration, and my very high esteem for yourself.

Yours faithfully,

(Kim, Koo) [143]

Kim, Koo reached Seoul late on the afternoon of 23 November and held himself aloof under Korean and Military Police guard for two days, feeling his way very cautiously.[144] He granted interviews to the representatives of the American press but not to the Korean press

during this period. This angered the Koreans who regarded him as their own personal property.[145]

Shortly after his arrival, however, he began a series of conferences. He met with General Hodge, General Arnold, the Korean press and every political leader except Mr. Pak, Hung Yung of the Communist Party. During this early period the People's Republic had attempted to win his support but without success, for he considered that organization unnecessary and a traitor to the Provisional Government and unity.[146]

The Nationalist and the Democratic Party both hastened to state their support.[147] Several other minor organizations followed suit. Kim, Koo departed sufficiently from his official promise to say in one interview, "where I return, the government of Korea returns."[148]

The "Provisional Government" members even went so far as to hold two "Councils of State" at which current Korean conditions were discussed. Dr. Rhee took a prominent part in these meetings as "Representative to the United States."[149]

In order to clear up any possible misunderstanding about Kim, Koo's "Provisional Government" the Adjutant General of XXIV Corps released the following message to "all units and Military Government":

> There appears to be general misunderstanding about status of Kim Koo and "Chung-King Korean Provisional Government" group. This group is not repeat not in Korea as a Korean government. They are here in the capacity of private citizens and have no commitments or promises from the Allied Powers that they or any other group will be recognized as a government. The establishment of any all Korean government depends entirely upon developments. Inform all concerned. 150

The members of the "Provisional Government", however, strained their status as private citizens to the limit and stuck together in considering themselves as logical candidates to be a "Transitional Government." Dr. Kim, Kyu Sik, one of the strongest members of the "Provisional Government," told a representative of Military Government that the "Provisional Government" as now constituted could assume full lead as a "Transitional Government," or become part of such a government, or be relieved entirely, depending upon the wishes of the Korean people. He did not offer, however, any suggestions as to how or where the will of the Korean people could be ascertained. In this respect, therefore, the "Provisional Government" was considerably behind the People's Republic whose plans, though unauthorized, were well advanced. Also in violation of the understanding, there began to appear, during the first week of December, handbills which restated the fourteen points on which the "Provisional Government" planned to operate and listed its officers.[151]

Military Government continued its attitude of non-recognition scrupulously. When General Arnold was asked by the Korean press on 11 December whether he would act as a mediator in a union between the "Provisional Government" and the People's Republic, he said that the grouping of political parties was entirely a matter for the Korean people.[152]

During the third week in December the conservative elements in Korea announced their plans for a National Conference with nationwide representation. This conference was to take place on 10 January 1946

and was definitely committed to the support of the 'Provisional Government.' Meanwhile, further references were being made to the 'Provisional Government.' At a mass meeting on 19 December following a parade, Mr. Hong, Nyawang Hi made a speech to the assembled crowd in the presence of Major General Lerch, who was soon to relieve General Arnold as Military Governor, and Kim, Koo in which he referred to the 'Provisional Government' as 'our only one government.'[153]

The temerity of the Kim, Koo group reached its height in the excitement over the announcement of the Moscow Conference decisions. At that time Kim, Koo attempted to arouse the Koreans and to make a major issue of opposition to trusteeship even before the conditions under which there might be one were clarified.[154] General Hodge quietly but firmly gathered the reins in his hands and considerably less was heard from Kim, Koo thereafter until he and Dr. Rhee and Dr. Kim, Kyu Sik became the leading figures in Colonel Goodfellow's Korean Democratic Representative Council.[155]

Another figure who was closely associated with the Kim, Koo group and the 'Provisional Government' was General Lee, Bun Suk, head of the Kwang Bok Army, which had been the instrument of the exiled Korean Government in nationalist China. General Lee and his army had made repeated efforts to get back to Korea. General Hodge, for obvious reasons, was just as determined that they should not come except in very small contingents and as individuals. This had required considerable vigilance on his part. On 25 January he pointed out strongly to the Commanding General, China that Kim, Koo had violated his promises and General Hodge wished no more of his stamp in Korea at that time.

He explained that Kim, Koo had actually attempted a coup d' etat on 1 January, therefore, it was "of utmost importance that Kim, Koo's Provisional Government receive no additional support."[156] This firm stand on the Kwang Bok Army and its leaders may well have prevented serious trouble later.

The Information and Intelligence Section

Such relationship as existed between the Korean political leaders and USAFIK was, as has been suggested, largely on the highest military level. But equally important in the long run were the relationships on lower levels - between Military Government and the Korean press, between the former and all the many Koreans who came to seek jobs or favors or to redress wrongs, and between the ordinary Korean on the street and the American soldier. The burden of responsibility for the relationship between the Korean people and the Military Government rested largely, at first, on the shoulders of the Korean Relations and Information Section.[157] The mission of this section, as stated by its first chief, Lt. Col. Paul Hayward was: (1) To establish liaison between Koreans and Military Government Departments; (2) to screen and channel Korean personnel; (3) to collect information from and disseminate information to the Korean people.[158] Until the various other government departments began to gain momentum, this section of the Secretariat had the responsibility of soothing,

understanding, satisfying, classifying, and making use of all the Koreans who suddenly became articulate in this nation newly awakened to self-consciousness.

It was personnel from this section who on 9 September had distributed General Hodge's statement "To the People of Korea" both in English and Korean.[159] It was they who had it broadcast from the surrender room. It was they who, on 10 September, assembled the Korean newsmen and distributed to them copies of Proclamations 1, 2, and 3. It was they who obtained from the newsmen information concerning the local press and radio situation. It was they, in short, who took over the entire relationship of the Corps with the Korean people and channeled these relationships to the proper governmental agency.

Colonel Hayward, a writer in civilian life, had been stationed for some time in the Southwest Pacific Theater. He had been scheduled to serve as Public Relations Officer for General Crist, who later became Chief of Government Section, GHQ, AFPAC, but plans were changed and he was assigned to the XXIV Corps. He reached Okinawa just in time to accompany General Hodge to Korea as a liaison officer between the Corps and the Koreans. As assistants he had Major William F. La Hatte[160] and Major David B. Tuke. The former entered the Regular Army in 1940. Most of his service had been overseas in the Pacific Theater. He was assigned to Tenth Army AAA and in that way came into Military Government; he had had no civil affairs experience.[161] Major Tuke had considerable newspaper experience on the Evening Public Ledger in Philadelphia before the war. He was sent to the Pacific Theater in

1944 where he served as I&E Officer in New Guinea. Next he received training in psychological warfare and was appointed Physchological Warfare Officer of the 1st Cavalry Division. With this unit he went through the Leyte and Luzon Campaigns. August 1945 found him Commanding Officer of the Psychological Warfare Detachment, AFPAC, and under orders to go with the XXIV Corps to Korea. He landed there on 8 September.[162]

These three, with the help of five enlisted men, were pressed almost beyond endurance in their early attempt to interview Koreans. Colonel Hayward at first attempted to do most of the interviewing himself and to take most of the responsibility for the activities of the section entirely on his own shoulders. Information was not filtering through fast enough during those first few days. Shortly after General Arnold took command, he investigated the situation. Conferences with the three officers did not reassure him completely; it appeared that Colonel Hayward was ill. Consequently, he was relieved a few days later and hospitalized. Colonel Glenn Newman was called upon to take his place.[163]

Colonel Newman, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy in 1924, entered the army and elected the Coast Artillery where he remained thereafter. He was assigned to the Pacific Theater in time to take command of the 157th AAA Group of the Tenth Army on Okinawa during the last few days of that campaign. Late in August 1945 he was ordered to bring his command to Korea, but only one battalion actually came as an AAA unit. He had had no idea, however, until he was suddenly called on after his arrival, that he would take part in Military Government.

Unexpectedly, therefore, he found himself at the head of a section which originally had been thought of as merely a public relations section but which rapidly grew into a section of thirty-three officers, forty-nine enlisted men and 109 civilian employees.[164]

Some specific things which KRAI accomplished in spite of difficulties during these early days by way of helping the Corps in its relations with the Korean people are worthy of mention here. On 12 September they registered the representatives of the political parties which General Hodge addressed in the Citizens Building. They interviewed prominent Koreans for the purpose of establishing an Advisory Council. In addition, they listened to stories of political unrest, thefts and disturbances in the city's warehouses, to the story of the occupation of the Japanese Domei news agency by Koreans, to suggestions about finance by a Korean economist, to tales of hidden Japanese stores of arms, to offers of food for distribution and ships for repatriation of Koreans and Japanese, of inside information on the Communists, and to stories of outrages committed by the Russians.

By 14 September KRAI had prepared two lists of names of leading Koreans, which they submitted to General Arnold. They had also arranged for radio time on the broadcasting station JODK. In this way Military Government was able to give publicity to proclamations and official announcements.[165] By the 16th, all ten of the Korea Broadcasting Corporation's stations, south of the 38th parallel, were taken over jointly by KRAI and the Communications Bureau of Military Government. The former was to handle all programming, the latter the technical and

business side of these operations.

KRAI made arrangements to have all bureau chiefs submit all news releases to them by 1500 each day so that they might be translated into Korean and mimeographed for distribution by the time of the morning press conference which had become an institution at 1000 every morning in the Throne Room of the Military Government Building.

Concurrently with all these activities involving relations with the Koreans, KRAI was studying its own reorganization. Plans were formulated to change the name to Intelligence and Information Section. As soon as Colonel Newman formally took over from Colonel Hayward, the new organization went into operation. The I and I Section was divided into the Intelligence and Information Sub-Sections. Later these units were called, respectively, the Office of Public Opinion and the Office of Public Information. The former established civilian contact offices, to conduct field surveys of public opinion, to keep personality files, and to maintain liaison with other army agencies. The latter was charged with the dissemination of information, distribution of news stories, radio, leaflets, and speeches.[166] By the end of the first week this section had not only absorbed the chief shock of the contact with the Korean people, but it had changed leadership, solved most of its own internal difficulties, and developed plans for a new organizational structure which was to carry it through the ensuing months.[167]

The Office of Public Information was divided into six sub-sections. First was the Planning Sub-Section which was to receive, collate and forward to other sub-section chiefs suggestions for approaching Korean

people which came into the Office of Public Information from the Office of Public Opinion and other sources. This Sub-Section was to submit outlines of items to be stressed "psychologically" each week. It was to interview individuals and representatives of groups to determine their potential usefulness in the dissemination of information. It was to present suggestions for the dissemination of propaganda in a weekly plan to be presented at a meeting of the sub-section chiefs. It was to keep a weekly intensity chart to indicate where emphasis should be placed. These many functions were never completely carried out as planned, and after a few months the Sub-Section disappeared and its tasks were performed by other sub-sections.

Second, there was the Publications Sub-Section charged with the conduct of the daily press conference with the representatives of the Korean Press. It distributed mimeographed copies of the daily news releases. Translation was also its responsibility.

Third was the Radio Sub-Section which operated through the radio station JODK. From this station they disseminated news and directives. They also ran the program "Your Military Government Hour" for Koreans, and such other programs as historical sketches and a nightly English-Korean lesson to help Koreans in their effort to learn English.

Fourth was the Motion Picture Sub-Section. They saw to the utilization of motion picture theaters and film producers as means for the dissemination of information to the Koreans.

Fifth was the Production Sub-Section. It was their task to print General Orders, notices, bulletins, posters, leaflets, and Military

Government publicity of all kinds. In carrying out this assignment they made use of the Chosen Printing Company which was requisitioned by Military Government.

Sixth was the Public Address and Leaflet Dissemination Sub-Section. Their assignment was to use the city's Police Boxes for daily broadcasts of news over PA systems, to carry out regular mobile public address broadcasts, to distribute leaflets and official statements by General Hodge and General Arnold.

The Office of Public Opinion (OPO) was subdivided into three sections. First there was an office of civilian contact. It organized opinion sampling teams, using Koreans as a nucleus. These teams, made up of Koreans and American officers, traveled through all the provinces, carefully recording cross sections of public opinion in every area. The findings of the teams were gathered and published in a weekly mimeographed report called "Opinion Trends," which was distributed to the government agencies vitally concerned. These showed the fluctuations in popularity of the United States occupation forces, which during the early spring, revealed a favorable reaction from approximately fifty to sixty-five percent of the people questioned. There were also spot sampling efforts on specific issues. The work of this section developed, in fact, into one of the most unique efforts in history, an occupying army taking the pulse of the occupied nation. It also compiled questionnaires and lists of items of greatest public concern. It was essentially an intelligence collecting agency.

Second, there was a research office to maintain liaison with G-2

XXIV Corps, to keep track of a confused mass of information, confidential and otherwise, on the Korean political parties, and to compile lists of prices of food, fuel, clothing and other commodities. In short any information of an intelligence nature was to be carefully recorded and prepared for use by proper government agencies. It was, therefore, essentially an intelligence collating agency.[168]

Another subdivision of the OPO was devoted to political analysis. This office published a weekly bulletin for the information of government agencies called "Political Trends." It began as a comparatively objective unintegrated factual report on the statements and actions of various political parties and leaders, but as time went on it developed into an attempt to analyse and interpret the meaning and significance of Korean political activities.

The Information Sub-Section was slightly ahead of its sister subsection, the OPO, in becoming effective, partly because of the lack of personnel for the OPO, and partly because it took time to gather useful intelligence, whereas, there were ready to hand many things which required immediate publicity. Since, however, the work of the two parts of this section under Colonel Newman are so closely interdependent, no further attempt will be made to differentiate between the two in considering the activities of the section as a whole.

Although there was no prohibitive censorship of press or radio, the papers were carefully read and the broadcasts carefully monitored, the latter function being taken over by Military Government from G-2 XXIV Corps during the last week in September.[169]

This was done with the help of Japanese and Korean ex-government censors. Objectionable passages were discussed with the Korean Association of Editors who were asked to explain to the offenders and to endeavor to prevent recurrences.

Efforts were made to discover what questions during this early period were foremost in the minds of the Korean people. It was discovered that the problems which were bothering them most were: (1) A clarification of conditions causing the division of Korea sharply at the 38th parallel; (2) A clarification of the U. S. policy regarding the purchase, transfer or disposition of Japanese property; (3) Distrust of the interpreters employed by Military Government; (4) Currency problems, whether or not the U. S. would issue supplemental notes; (5) Inflation; (6) Distribution of land; (7) Employment of former pre-Japanese Koreans by Military Government. Later the issues of fuel and rice became critical, but these were not among the earlier, more pressing worries of the Koreans.

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By the second week in October the I and I Section had distributed in the Provinces beyond the Seoul area approximately 300,000 leaflets, most of which were Military Government Orders. 140,000 such had been dropped by plane on six outlying cities. The others had been taken to the points of distribution by train.

Plans were made for the printing of a nation-wide news sheet called the Chukan Digest. Printing was done by the production section and was begun on 16 October. The plan called for a distribution of 400,000 copies by mail. A proportionate number was sent to each provincial capital and distributed by the head man system. The sheet itself was

devoted to the distribution of important news which would not be available to the outlying areas not reached by capital papers and the radio news. It contained a continued column called "Mr. Kim and Sergeant Kay," in which Sergeant Kay told Mr. Kim the truth about the war. It also contained a cartoon strip "Doledori" (Clever Boy) which was a continued story combining humor with mild editorializing.

In spite of early difficulties in eliminating the un-Korean phraseology pointed out by Korean press correspondents, the Digest was considered to be successful enough to merit raising the number of copies from 400,000 to 800,000. Though the production section could not step up their printing immediately, they did reach this mark by mid-December.[171]

A series of posters on themes of "Back to Work," "Catch More Fish," and "Use the Labor Mediation Board" were prepared. Unfortunately, these contained a strange mingling of Chinese characters with misspellings and American colloquialisms. The members of the press were given an advance showing though not in time to influence the phraseology and spelling before release. The members of the press, in general, were not impressed by the earlier posters and their criticisms were taken into consideration in the later editions.[172] The effect on the people as a whole was difficult to measure.

Leaflets too were attempted but the officers in charge of the I and I Section were convinced that this was the least effective means of reaching the people. Leaflets dropped by plane too often did not fall into the most effective hands. Even in cases where leaflets were

distributed by other means it was discovered that the Korean people considered any leaflet suspect. They had been and were still being subjected to too many.[173]

The radio probably reached more people than any other agency for the dissemination of information to Koreans. At first JODK had to carry both the load of broadcasting to Koreans and to the U. S. Army personnel, but in mid-October the Armed Forces Radio Service was established in the Citizens Building and thereafter JODK was able to devote most of its time to Korean programs. This station broadcast many programs in Korean designed to give the Koreans information which Military Government thought would be helpful to them. Among these were: "Your Military Government Hour;" regular news broadcasts; dramatic skits called "Lessons in Democracy;" four speeches on the "Transfer of Japanese Property;" English lessons; speeches from representatives of the four leading political parties. The first of these, "Your Military Government Hour," was pure entertainment, string quartets, the 7th Division Band, Korean singers, anything in fact that the ingenuity of an American program director could devise.

Of interest in showing the sensitivity of the Korean people with whom Military Government had to deal is the fact that repeatedly the representatives of the Korean press complained that the call name JODK was objectionable to the public.[174] It was full of Japanese implications and tended to make people feel reluctant to listen. It was explained that these were international call letters and could not be changed without official permission from the International Telecommunications Union at Berne, Switzerland. Since the procedure for obtaining

authorization for a change was a long one, and since the Koreans kept on complaining, the station announcers were instructed to restrict themselves to the minimum number of references to JODK required by law.[175]

The Radio Sub-Section working with the Speakers Advisory Sub-Section in an effort to help the chief political parties in their process of development instituted a speakers' program which provided one speaker each week from the political parties. The time allotted at first was to be ten minutes, but the parties were so markedly unenthusiastic about so short a time that it was increased to fifteen minutes before the first broadcast on November 30.[176]

The names of the four leading parties were placed in a hat and were drawn with complete impartiality at a press conference before the eyes of all. The drawing determined the times assigned: Communist Party, 30 November; People's Party, 7 December; Nationalist Party, 14 December; Democratic Party, 21 December.[177]

Notably absent from these first parties invited to speak was the powerful People's Republic, but by their insistence on continuing to call themselves a government and by carrying on other troublesome activity they had disqualified themselves from government favor at that time.

The following list of six feature speakers and their topics heard over JODK during the week ending 4 December reveals the extent to which the Radio Section was attempting to cover a wide field of Korean interests:

Dr. Choi, Sang Hee:	"Typhus Control."
Dr. Rhee, Sung Man:	"The Provisional Government and Kim Koo."
Dr. Lee, Hon Koo:	"Bureau of Agriculture."
Mr. Pak, Hung Yung:	"The Communist Party."
Mr. Nam, Bong Soon:	"Forest Stand South of 38°."
Mr. Kim, Koo:	"Greetings to the Korean People." 178

The I and I Section tried to reach the Korean people also through the medium of motion pictures. A thorough investigation was made of the Korean Motion Picture Association.[179] Arrangements were made in conjunction with the Bureau of Education to film a series of shorts for educational purposes. American films showing the early struggles of the United States to become a nation and the battles of the United States Army through the Pacific were requested from America with a view to familiarizing Koreans with American problems and struggles. A more ambitious project called "Let Freedom Ring" was undertaken and by December was nearing completion. Efforts were made also to open a newsreel theater where Koreans could see local and foreign news film releases.[180]

Relations With The Korean Press

Most revealing of all contacts with the Korean people were the daily press conferences. These were attended by General Hodge at least once a week until early in October when General Arnold took over and established the custom of attending it every Tuesday morning. The interim conferences were conducted by Major Tuke. On Sundays there was

no regular conference but instead a meeting of the editors and publishers which was organized as a self-disciplining group with Mr. Chang, Do Pin as chairman, to insure a responsible press.[181]

The conferences usually lasted from twenty minutes to one hour and a half depending on the nature of the topics discussed. Attendance varied from fifteen to nearly forty. The meeting was usually opened by a distribution of mimeographed copies of the official press releases in English, Korean and - for a while - Japanese. Then the meeting would be thrown open for questions, and the current Korean issues aired.[182]

A majority of the members of the newspaper men's association belonged to the elements in Korea which they themselves called progressive and which others called radical or Communist. They had their fingers on the pulse of important sections of the urban population, and were quick to pick out points where friction was likely to develop.[183] Although their criticisms and questions were often trying to the American officers who conducted the conferences, they were usually constructive in intent.

Colonel Newman considered that bringing the recalcitrant and unruly press to heel was the first great problem.[184] He took a strong hand with them on several occasions, notably when they showed a reluctance to publish a statement of General Arnold's on 10 October to the Korean press, when they wanted to be given an opportunity to meet Kim, Koo, and when the paper Ma Il Sin Bo was closed by Military Government. The army naturally does not lose battles with civilians; consequently, the relative success of such a mission can only be judged by

the price paid for the accomplishment. In this case, though the issue was never in doubt and the mission to establish and maintain a Military Government in Korea was accomplished, the price paid by the Director of the Bureau was a marked loss of confidence, friendliness, and cooperation.[185] That this was not more complete and that it did not bring about a complete breakdown in press relations, was largely due to the extraordinary tact and patience of Major Tuke, who conducted many of the most critical conferences and served as a buffer between the press and Military Government.[186]

Initially the conferences between Military Government and the Korean press were considered important as a means not only of disseminating information through the papers to the people, but as a means of giving the newsmen some understanding of and sympathy for the actions of Military Government on vital issues. Before long, however, the conferences took on a larger significance, for not only did the Korean press often fail to sympathize with the actions of Military Government, but they as often called attention to new issues on which they considered action was necessary. On several occasions they became a major problem themselves by taking issue publicly with Military Government and claiming immunity from interference under the principle of a free press. In general, the press seemed to favor more drastic, more sweeping and more immediate measures, with less emphasis on legality than the Military Government seemed willing or ready to undertake. The several occasions, however, when relations with the Korean press itself became the burning question, deserve mention here.

The first serious conflict arose when General Arnold made his strong statement to the press of Korea on 10 October ordering that it be given prominent publicity in all papers. Following are some of the passages which bothered the Koreans:

> . . . it is to be expected that many foolish and inconsidered statements will appear in the newspapers under amateur editorship. . . . such boyishness even by old men will be allowed to evaporate as smoke in the air. . . . Self-appointed 'officials', 'police' groups, big (or little) conferences 'representing all the people,' 'The (self-styled) government of the Republic of Korea,' are entirely without any authority, power or reality. . . . If the men who are arrogating to themselves such high-sounding titles are merely play-acting on a puppet stage with entertainment of questionable amusement value they must immediately pull down the curtain on the puppet show. . . . If behind the curtain of these puppet shows there are venal men holding strings who are so foolish as to think that they can take to themselves and exercise any of the legitimate functions of the Government of Korea let them pinch themselves and awaken to the realities of the situation. . . . fraud on the people of Korea has been recently publicized in the free press, namely the calling of fictitious 'election on the first of March', 1946. . . . If the people of Korea value the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, . . . time has come for the moral leadership of the people to assert itself and prevent the abuse of these freedoms by either foolish or venal men. 187

An officer present at this meeting and the subsequent one on 11 October, when the matter was discussed further, made the following comments:

> Although it was impossible at first to gather from their expressions or comments what the Koreans thought of being blasted in this way it was all too clear on the following day after they'd had an opportunity to think it over. The effect had been devastating. They were angry and hurt. They felt that, if they were required to print it, freedom of the press in Korea was a myth. 188

Major Tuke was not present on the day of this second session, consequently, the officer in charge had sent for Colonel Newman to stem the anticipated tide of protest. When the meeting began the editor of Ma Il Sin Bo appeared to be the unofficial spokesman of the group. He contended and the others agreed that the statement appeared to be made in wrath, that it seemed to include them all whereas only a small group was guilty of irresponsible acts, and that the words employed like "amateur," "venal," "self-styled," "boyishness," and "puppet" carried particularly unfavorable connotations in Korean. The Koreans considered them insulting. Colonel Newman replied that he knew the General was angry and that he had intended to use strong language. He said also that the General was directing this blast only at the guilty but, "if the shoe fits, put it on."[189] As the conference progressed and the requests of the press for a reconsideration of the phraseology were repeated the colonel became even less sympathetic, until finally he withdrew.

Most of the papers did publish the statement. Only two failed to do so at first, and even they later complied. Ma Il Sin Bo, which objected most strenuously, ran off an early edition including the speech; then the workers' committee in the press room blocked it out leaving a blank space where the General's statement had been. The second edition was on the streets before the responsible head of the paper discovered what had been done. He immediately ordered a third edition with the statement restored. By this narrow margin Ma Il Sin Bo complied.

Hardly had the excitement over General Arnold's proclamation died down when several other crises were narrowly averted. On 25 October after a series of particularly dangerous handbills had appeared in Seoul an AFPAC directive signed by General MacArthur was released to the press. It ordered that the distribution of unauthorized handbills would be interpreted as a violation of his Proclamation No. 2 of 7 September which called for the death penalty in cases of any act against the occupying forces or any act which might disturb the peace.[190] There was a flurry of protest over this and also over the Declaration of a National Emergency published on 30 October.[191] It looked to the sensitive freedom-conscious press as though a repressive military dictatorship was just around the corner. They soon were to be diverted, however, by another issue which came closer to home.

The Ma Il Sin Bo Case

Another crisis which occurred in the relations between Military Government and the Korean Press was brought about by the closing of Ma Il Sin Bo, mentioned above. This paper had served as a mouthpiece for the Japanese during the preceding decade, but it had come under the influence of radical groups of Koreans after the announcement of the Japanese surrender. It had been causing some embarrassment to Military Government by thinly veiled criticism and by entering the lists on various controversial issues which the government was attempting to

solve with a minimum of friction. There had also been trouble on the board of directors between those chosen by the Military Government and those chosen by the other stockholders. Since the Government General of Korea enjoyed approximately one-third ownership of the paper, the Military Government inherited these stockholder rights as well as the rights inherent in its position. According to the official statement made by Colonel Newman, it was suspected that the financial soundness of the paper was open to question and that the government's investment was in danger.[192] The Office of Public Opinion had been alerted and ordered to investigate the books of Ma Il Sin Bo during the first week in November. The purpose of the investigation was to discover some flaw which could be used as a legitimate reason for controlling the paper if it seemed advisable. "It was like getting Al Capone for his income tax," said one of the officers charged with the investigation. It was discovered that the books were confused, the management obscure, and that there were a considerable number of unpaid overdue bills.[193]

On Saturday, 10 November, the ax fell. An officer of the Bureau of Mining and Industry, which was responsible for all machinery, appeared at the Ma Il Sin Bo office and said the presses were to cease; he offered no explanation.[194] On Monday the press conference was held in an atmosphere of considerable tension. All the correspondents were present, and Colonel Newman was called in to explain why this action had been taken. He said an investigation had revealed that Ma Il Sin Bo owed large bills and that its books were in such disorder that the

extent of the paper's solvency or insolvency was impossible to determine. Military Government was responsible for the financial affairs of the company; therefore, the company had been closed until its affairs could be put in order.[195]

The Koreans were not satisfied with the Colonel's reply and suggested that if the paper was being closed for purely financial reasons it might still be allowed to continue publication during the investigation. According to the Koreans, Ma Il Sin Bo was the largest and most important newspaper in Korea, employing over 600 people. It was more than a newspaper, it was a public utility and should not be stopped. Since no meeting of the minds was in sight, Colonel Newman withdrew. The next day the matter came up again at General Arnold's weekly conference with similar results.[196]

Nothing conclusive happened for the next four or five days, though the burning question of Ma Il Sin Bo came up again and again in the press conferences during those days. Meanwhile, an investigation was being carried on by the Office of Public Opinion. The purpose of the investigation according to the official report of this office was to "uncover possible outside political influences."[197]

During the period of waiting for the verdict about Ma Il Sin Bo there was considerable fear among the members of the press that Military Government would turn the paper over to Mr. Ahn, Chai Hong leader of the conservative Nationalist Party. Although General Arnold had assured them this would not be done, the reopening of the conservative paper Chosen Il Bo in the Ma Il Sin Bo building led them to wonder what was going on.[198]

Finally on 20 November, General Arnold announced that he had given permission for Ma Il Sin Bo to resume publication but that they seemed unable to straighten out their affairs and carry on. Consequently, he gathered managers of the recalcitrant paper together and had General Sheetz tell them they were to begin operations immediately under a new directorate and under a new name, Seoul Shin Mun. General Sheetz explained further that because of the paper shortage, they were to be limited to a circulation of 100,000, the same as their rival Chosen Il Bo. Although this limitation was not well received because Ma Il Sin Bo had enjoyed a circulation many times as large as Chosen Il Bo even at its peak, there was nothing to do but accept it.[199]

By 25 November Seoul Shin Mun was in publication again and this crisis was over, but it had aroused both the Korean press and Military Government. It had not been just a question of one paper because the whole press had battled for Ma Il Sin Bo as though their lives depended on it. On one occasion during the interim between closure and reopening they did actually threaten to bolt as a group from the press conferences and from any support of Military Government.[200]

The Arrival of Kim, Koo

Another crisis in the relations with the Korean press arose over the question of the arrival of Kim, Koo. The press had requested information concerning his status and concerning the time of his arrival

at their conference on 9 November. The correspondents wanted an opportunity to confer with him as they had with Dr. Rhee. The question was brought up again on the next day. Major Tuke explained that weather, priorities, and security prevented his knowing anything definite about the arrival of Kim, Koo.[201] General Arnold himself, on 13 November, informed them that Kim would come as a private citizen and that "Military Government would welcome him as a Korean patriot and because they believed he was coming with a sincere desire to help his country."[202] The time of his arrival, he said, was a different matter, which could not be determined accurately beforehand for many reasons. In the meanwhile, Korean correspondents had spent several fruitless days at Kimpo airfield, and on 12 November all the school children turned out to greet the great patriot on the strength of a rumor supposedly emanating from Military Government. General Arnold expressed regret at these inconveniences, but offered no further information.

The Commanding General was well aware of the legitimate interest of the press, but he was also aware of the interest of Kim, Koo's political adversaries and of the grave international issue involved. He was taking no chances. The denial of information, however, nearly caused a falling out between Military Government and the press at the very time when nerves were jangled over the closing of Ma Il Sin Bo.

When it was announced on the 24th that Kim, Koo, who had arrived the night before, would not attend the conference that day, the members of the Korean press unburdened themselves of all their annoyances about

the handling of the matter. Although Major Tuke had made every effort to inform them by telephone and messenger as soon as he himself learned of Kim, Koo's arrival, they continued to feel abused. They resented the fact that if Kim, Koo was a private citizen he should be guarded by MP's at his residence, they resented being searched before entering and resented the fact that they were only allowed to see the secretary after they finally were admitted.[203] Mr. Lyuh, leader of the People's Party, was particularly offended at being searched and the press took up his resentment.[204] Major Tuke patiently listened to all these grievances and finally, after the meeting had officially been adjourned, managed to arrange an interview. The gratitude of the press was as evident as their displeasure had been before.

Kim, Koo did come to the regular conference in company with General Hodge and Colonel Newman. He spoke very briefly saying he intended to talk to all the party leaders and thoroughly orient himself before developing a policy of his own. Meanwhile, he intended to cooperate with the Military Government in its task of preserving law and order.[205] The leader had come, had spoken, and the crisis was over.

The Soldier and the Korean

The problem of making social relationships between the members of the armed forces and the Korean people contribute to the success of the mission rather than detract from it were manifold. Some of the steps

taken by General Hodge to orient his men have been described in the first chapter. Others were required later.

The average American soldier tended to be friendly, particularly with children who showed friendliness toward him but this basic kindliness was often tempered by outside factors. One was the resentment at being held overseas after the war, which increased as the novelty of a new country wore off. This accentuated a feeling that the Koreans should be grateful for his staying in Korea which, as time went on, was usually not the case. Historically, no occupying army has held its popularity for long.

General Hodge, himself, realizing the extraordinarily difficult circumstances under which the occupation was being carried on, appreciated that the Americans would probably become less, rather than more, popular with the Koreans. He reported to SCAP as follows:

> It is my considered opinion that our occupational forces here are now reaching the point of diminishing returns in so far as value to Korea is concerned. Their continued presence will be interpreted as having imperialistic designs. 206

There was, furthermore, a tendency to take a scornful attitude toward the "Gook", the term which applied to all Polynesian or Oriental natives. The term became particularly current in Korea because of the inability of the soldier to distinguish readily between the Korean, Japanese, and Chinese, and the frequent need of a ready designation for any person who was not Caucasian. Its exaggerated use led the XXIV Corps newspaper to make a plea that the more specific and accurate

tern "Korean" be used. The Korea Graphic called attention to the implication of inferiority unquestionably present, an implication undoubtedly not lost upon the Koreans.[207]

There was ill feeling generated over Korean women. The American soldier, who fancied himself as something of a Lothario, freed from the restraining influences of a home society, occasionally took a predatory interest in Korean women which either flattered them into a pliable attitude or seriously insulted and alarmed them. In any case, the result was quite naturally resented by the Korean men.

The Office of Public Opinion in Military Government recorded an alarming drop in the popularity of the American soldier in late March 1946. Of the Koreans questioned in the Seoul area, the percentage who expressed a favorable attitude dropped from 62% to 51%. One of the chief reasons cited for an unfavorable attitude was that American soldiers frequently "beguile and frighten women on the streets."[208] A special effort was made by General Hodge to combat this slump. He issued on 1 April a "Message to Commanders" calling attention to the recent drop in American popularity and directing his commanders to make "renewed efforts . . . toward indoctrination and orientation on soldiers' behavior."[209]

One case in Military Government illustrates the attitude of Korean men toward the American relationship with Korean women, whether friendly or fearsome. A Korean girl working in one of the offices appeared to be enjoying the gentle teasing of a certain soldier. The Korean men in the same office resented it and consequently made her

life so miserable that the Bureau head had to intervene in her favor. This only aggravated the situation to such an extent that the Korean girl finally had to be transferred to another office.[210]

There were a number of instances of Koreans beating or trying to beat American soldiers on this account. There were also instances of Korean women being threatened for associating with American soldiers.

A mild example of this may be found in a printed warning to Korean women which received distribution in October. It was entitled "The Bomb Declaration for Womanhood." A translation of the text follows:

> We could not overlook you, womanhood, when you fool around with westerners in just showing your vanity and worldly devices, which is nothing but scandalous, while you should put all your strength on establishing the state of new Korea.
>
> From now on anyone of you who shows the following scandalous actions beware that you will be insulted right in front of public:
>
> 1. Those women who are quite animated in riding automobiles with westerners.
> 2. Those women who wink at the westerners in saying "Hello, gum" and "My home" and such short words.
> 3. Those women who chew the gum and stroll all over town.
> 4. Those women who are whispering to the westerners in the night.
> 5. Those women who go to the dance hall just because they are crazy about coffee and chocolate. [211]

General Hodge himself received a letter from a Korean who complained of the behavior of American troops. The complaint seemed well founded enough to warrant a memorandum by the General to the units of his command reiterating his earlier warnings to be careful about behavior and providing for two thirty minute training lectures on how to behave.[212] General Hodge's directive was carried out and probably

helped to improve behavior and minimize the criticism, but its implementation by junior officers left something to be desired often enough to prevent its being completely effective. An enlisted man who attended one of these lectures wrote home:

> Today we had another 'orientation' class. The officer who conducted it warned us that the following things would not - - repeat not - - be tolerated in this command; armed robbery of civilians; rape; and appearing in public in the OD uniform without a necktie. 213

On 21 November General Hodge circulated another memorandum to his command following a 15 November article in the Korea Free Press which called attention to armed robbery by American soldiers and warned Korean women to stay indoors at night. The General's comments follow:

> It should be noted that this article intimated that all U. S. soldiers are potential armed robbers and that they are the ones who are engaged in a widespread crime wave. In other words, the Koreans multiply each U. S. crime many, many times, and class all our soldiers along with the worst we have.
>
> The total value of the loot obtained in the robbery cited in paragraph 1 was undoubtedly less than a week's pay for the criminals, yet they risked 10 years of their lives in prison for a few dollars.
>
> The net result of such behavior is twofold; first it casts an unwarranted reflection upon the entire army, and second, thoughtless men become criminals, paying a stiff penalty that is all out of keeping with what they gained from the crime.
>
> To the Korean people we are representatives of the greatest nation in the world. They are looking to us for guidance and assistance in establishing a free government of their own. Each military man serving in Korea is looked upon as a personal representative from America. That man is you. If you behave in a lawless manner that is unbecoming to a soldier, then you may rest assured the reputation of the United States will suffer,

and our mission made more difficult, or even fail because of misbehavior.

It is incumbent upon every member of this force to conduct himself accordingly. 214

Countless stories were circulated both pro and con concerning the Korean people's attitude toward the American soldier. One example, taken from an intercepted letter from a Korean to a girl in Japan, illustrates the only too familiar attitudes:

> American soldiers take away our fountain pens and watches and are acting lewdly with our women. I saw some of them satisfying their desires in a vehicle near the front of the station. 215

True or not, the stories had influence; the unfavorable comments seemed always to have wider currency than the favorable ones.

Constantly American authorities struggled. The Commanding General of the 40th Division issued a directive demanding exemplary behavior from his command in their relations with the Koreans. This was reproduced and circulated by the AG of USAFIK on 17 November with the statement that it expressed the attitude of General Hodge as well. This memorandum condemned stealing, abusing shopkeepers, and "otherwise behaving in a manner which reflects discredit upon the Armed Forces of the United States." It pointed out that it was incumbent upon all commanders to properly and continually educate the personnel of their commands against misbehavior. There followed a list of points to be stressed in the orientation course which included making American soldiers conscious of their obligation to conform to the strangeness

of the Korean, to respect his property and to uphold the standard of the American soldier and the Christian gentlemen.[216]

In the daily press conference numerous instances were brought up of American soldiers holding up Korean civilians and robbing them.[217] In each case the Military Government made every effort to bring the culprits to justice, but even bringing the men to justice did not undo the impression created.

The social relationships of the Koreans with the American officer personnel at Corps headquarters were somewhat more remote. Although there were no written orders on the subject, it was made clear that Koreans were not to be invited to either of the two hotels, the Chosen and the Hanto, where XXIV Corps officers were quartered. This restriction did not apply to other nationals.[218] The attitude of Military Government officers toward associating with the Korean people was, however, quite different. Far more of the Military Government officers and men were entertained in Korean homes, and the officers at least were able to return the hospitality by inviting Koreans to their club and quarters. Fully half of the girls at Military Government officers club dances were Korean girls.[219]

On 23 February believing that some of the entertainment of American officers by Koreans was being misinterpreted and was certainly taxing the Koreans' limited food supply, General Hodge issued a directive forbidding "the acceptance by United States officers from Koreans of gifts, favors, or entertainment."[220] This directive practically eliminated entirely the opportunity for XXIV Corps officers to associate with

Koreans and left Military Government officers with only the opportunity to invite Koreans to their club or quarters.

Whatever social relationship existed or was permitted, however, there were obstacles to a complete understanding which were almost insuperable. The language problem of course was acute in this as in other things. The differences in customs and in point of view were ever present in a greater or less degree. There could not be an easy comfortable relationship, even with the best of intentions on the part of both Koreans and Americans.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Vide supra Chapter III (Intermezzo) passim.
2. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #2, 12 Sept. 1945, p.5.
3. Vide supra Chapter III (Intermezzo) p.6.
4. Interview with Gen. Hodge, 17 Apr. 1946, I & H files.
5. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #1, 9 Sept. 1945.
6. KRAI Weekly Report #1, 9 - 15 Sept. 1945.
7. I & H Journal, 12 Sept. 1945, p.1, Personal observation by Lt. Col. F. P. Todd.
8. TS ltn Gen. Hodge to Gen. MacArthur, 15 Sept. 1945.
9. I & H Journal, 12 Sept. 1945, p.1, Personal observation by Lt. Col. F. P. Todd.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #3, 15 Sept. 1945, p.4, Ibid. Col. Todd's report, based on personal observation, however, was inclined to take a less favorable view. He believed the language problem had greatly reduced the effect of the speech and that most of the appeal of the Gen.'s forthright manner, bearing, and method of speech was lost through the medium of Dr. Lee's interpretation. It became in his opinion Dr. Lee's speech.
14. Ibid.
15. I & H Journal, 12 Sept. 1945, personal observation of Lt. Col. F. P. Todd.
16. Press Conference Report, 15 Sept. 1945, I & H Journal.

17. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #4, 14 Sept. 1945, p.4. See also USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #15, p.4, para 6b(1).

18. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #5, 15 Sept. 1945, p.5.

19. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #2, 12 Sept. 1945, p.4.

20. I & H Journal, 16 Sept. 1945, personal observation of I & H officer.

21. Ibid.

22. Radio TFGBI #100, XXIV Corps G-2 to CINCAFPAC ADVON, 301440/I, 30 Dec. 1945.

23. MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends, ~~hereafter referred to as Political Trends #13.~~ #13 22 Dec. 1945, p.4.

24. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #7, 17 Sept. 1945, p.7.

25. Interview with Gen. Hodge, March 1946, I & H Journal.

26. Radio G² USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 091417/I 9 Oct. 1945.

27. Ibid.

28. Radio G3 7th Div. to G3, XXIV Corps, 191200/I, Oct. 1945. See also Radio G3 USAFIK to G3 7th Div, 161305/I, Jan. 1946 - TFGBI 155.

29. USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #8, 28 Oct. - 4 Nov. 1945, p.4.

30. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Parties File.

31. USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #4, 14 Sept. 1945, p.4.

32. Ibid.

33. USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #23, 3 Oct. 1945.

34. USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #97, p.3.)
" " " " #95, incl. 1.)
" " " " #91, p.2.) 8 - 16 Dec. 1945.
" " " " #89, p.2.)

35. USAFIK G-2, Weekly Report #7, 21 - 28 Oct. 1945.

36. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #6, 9 Nov. 1945.

37. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #11, 8 Dec. 1945.

38. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #13, 22 Dec. 1945.

39. USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #10, 11 - 18 Nov. 1945, p.3, par. 6b.

40. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #4, 31 Oct. 1945, p.1. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #7, 14 Nov. 1945. USAFIK, Military Government, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.

41. Ibid.

42. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.

43. Ibid. See also Radio TFBBI #44 CG USAFIK for Langdon to SCAP, 011435/I, Dec. 1945.

44. USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #75, 24 Nov. 1945, See also Radio TFGCG 159 CG USAFIK to SCAP 241655/I Nov. 1945.

45. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends, #5, 5 Nov. 1945, p.1.

46. USAMGIK, Bureau of Public Information, OPO, Political Trends #17, 2 Feb. 1946.

47. Radio TFGCG #245, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 221930/I Jan. 1946.

48. TS Radio, TFGCG #502, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 221141/I Feb. 1946.

49. Political Trends #7, 14 Nov. 1945.

50. Printed Statement, CG USAFIK, 12 Dec. 1945, I & H Journal. See also USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #14, 9 - 16 Dec. 1945, p.14, para. 6a.

51. Ltr. referred to is probably one sent to Mr. Hu, Hun by Col. Nist, Corps G-2, for General Hodge on 28 Nov. 1945 listing the points the Korean People's Republic should agree to.

52. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #12, 15 Dec. 1945, p.2.

53. USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #25, 24 Feb - 3 Mar. 1946.

54. Interview with Commander G. Z. Williams USNR, I & H Journal, 13 Oct. 1945.

55. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.2.

56. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, #10, 20 Sept. 1945, p.4.

57. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political parties file.

58. Press interview with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, 5 Jan. 1946, I & H Files. See also CSC 25 March 1946, I & H Journal, where Gen. Hodge stated that Communists own figures showed 20,000 but did not specify how much of Korea this figure included and was only speaking in general terms.

59. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.1. ~~Hereafter referred to as Political Trends.~~

60. Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.2.

61. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties files, translation of "Emancipation Daily News" (Hai Bang Il Bo), 19 Sept. 1945.

62. USAFIK, MG, Foreign Affairs Section, Digest of Local Political News #18, 2 Nov. 1945 translation of 3 Oct. 1945 Emancipator.

63. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties file, translation of interview of Korea Free Press representative with Mr. Pak, HungYung on 31 Oct. 1945.

64. USAFIK G-2, translations of newspapers #187, 1 Nov. 1945.

65. USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #54, 3 Nov. 1945, p.3.

66. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties files, translation of Korea Free Press interview with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung on 26 Nov. 1945.

67. USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Information, political parties file, translation of Communist leaflet written by Mr. Pak, Hung Yung.

68. Political Trends #3, 5 Nov. 1945, p.1. I & H Journal, 2 Nov. 1945, eye-witness account.

69. Ibid.

70. The Koreans had heard of Vincent's statement made at a banquet of the Foreign-Policy Association in the US. Leaflets had immediately appeared on the streets of Seoul protesting.

71. Ibid.

72. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV for Langdon, 091654/I Nov. 1945.

73. Political Trends #6, 9 Nov. 1945.

74. Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.

75. Political Trends #10, 1 December 1945.

76. Radio TFGBI #81 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 211630/I Dec. 1945.

77. Political Trends #13, 22 Dec. 1945, quotation from 19 Dec. 1945 broadcast over JODK, See also Radio TFGCG #180 CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 061644/I Dec. 1945.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Radio TFGCG #138, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 021403/I Nov. 1945.

81. Radio TFGCG #144, CG USAF IK to SCAP, 100927/I Nov. 1945.

82. Report of the state of Korea by Brig. Gen. William E. Crist, 14-24 Oct. 1945 after inspection trip to Korea. Radio TFGCG #190 CG USAFIK to SCAP 141501/I dated 14 Dec. 1945 says consul confering with local Koreans. Radio TFGBI #63 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 111613/I Dec. 1945 describes Song, Chin Woo's interview with Polyansky in which latter said the Soviet maintained no liason with Korean Communists. This is difficult to accept at face value.

83. Radio CINCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK, 030757/Z Dec. 1945.

84. Radio TFGBI #52 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 051703/I Dec. 1945.

85. Press Conference Report, 9 Nov. 1945, I & H Journal.

86. TS Radio C/S USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 131727/I Sept. 1945.

87. Radio TFGBI #40 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 011206/I dated 30 Nov 45. Radio TFGBI #46 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 040813/I, 3 Dec. 1945. Radio TFGBI #52 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 051703/I Dec. 1945.

88. Radio TFGBI #46 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 040813/I dated 3 Dec. 1945.

89. Radio TFGBI #240, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC 261325/I Mar. 1946. Contains criticism of Pak's policy by Inch'on Communist leader.

90. Radio TFGBI #157, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADVON, 251000/I Jan. 1946.

91. HUSAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #52, 21 Apr. 1946, Incl. #2.

92. Interview between Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, Leader of Korean Communist Party and Mr. Richard J. H. Johnston of NYT recorded by XXIV Corps PRO and I and E representatives present; I & H Journal. See also TFGBI #190, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 081500/I, dated 7 February 1946.

93. USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #19, p.3, 13 - 20 Jan. 1946.

94. MG Press Release 18 Feb. 1946, Incl. #1 to USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #156.

95. USAMGIK, Bureau of Public Information, GPO, Political Trends, #17, 20 Jan. 1946.

96. CSC 25 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal. See also radio TFGCG #526 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 161612 Mar. 1946.

97. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 281625/I Mar. 1946. See also CSC 29 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.

98. CSC 29 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.

99. Radio, TFGCG #526, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 161612/I Mar. 1946.

100. USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #52, dated 21 Apr. 1946, Incl. #2.

101. Radio TFGCG #305, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 251800/I Feb. 1946. See also TFGBI #142, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 191254/I Jan. 1946 and TFGBI #176, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 301658/I Jan. 1946.

102. Radio TFGCG #533, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 022313/I Apr. 1946.

102a. XXIV Corps G-2 Summary #41, 25 June 1946.

102b. Radio TFGBI #304, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 130656/I, June 1946.

103. Political Trends #3, 29 Oct. 1945, p.2.

104. Political Trends #6, 9 Nov. 1945.

105. Political Trends #8, 19 Nov. 1945, p.1.

106. Political Trends #11, 8 Dec. 1945, p.1.

107. Political Trends #12, 15 Dec. 1945, p.1.

108. Political Trends #7, 14 Nov. 1945, p.2.

109. Political Trends #10, 1 Dec. 1945, p.2.

110. Radio TFGOO #257, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 261147/I Jan. 1946. See also TFGBI #190, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 081500/I dated 7 Feb. 1946. TS Radio TFGOO #265, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 281521/I Jan. 1946.

111. TS Radio TFGOO #285, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 131655/I Feb. 1946.

112. USAMGIK, Bureau of Public Information, Political Trends #21, 17 Feb. 1946.

113. I & H Journal, 14 Feb. 1946. See also TS Radio, TFGOO #302, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 221141/I, Feb. 1946.

114. Radio TFGOO #291, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 161115/I Feb. 1946.

115. TS Radio #302, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 221140/I, 22 Feb. 1946.

116. Hq XXIV Corps Information Bulletin #39, 14 Mar. 1946; See also USAMGIK Ordinance #65, 29 Mar. 1946; USAMGIK, Declaration #2, 21 Feb. 1946.

117. TS Radio TFGOO #302, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 221141/I, 22 Feb. 1946.

118. Radio TFGOO #190, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 141501/I Dec. 1945.

119. Radio TFGOO #190, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 141501/I Dec. 1945.

120. TS Radio TFGOO #262, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 281520/I Jan. 1946.

121. Radio TFGOO #333, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 022313/I, Apr. 1946.

122. Ibid.

123. Radio WARGFWO to USAFIK, 220702/Z Jan. 1946. Also Radio TFGBI #199 to USAMGIK 151702/I Feb. 1946.

124. Radio TFGBI #199 to USAMGIK, 151702/I Feb. 1946.

125. USAMGIK Ordinance #55, 25 Feb. 1946.

126. USAMGIK Ordinance #79, 30 Apr. 1946.

127. Radio TFGBI #227, CG USAFIK for Langdon to SCAP, 191307/I dated 18 Mar. 1946. This radio covers registration of political parties.

128. TS Radio TFGOO #285, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 131655/I Feb. 1946.

129. Radio 220924/I, Washington to CINCAFPAC, Info. XXIV Corps, 24 Sept. 1945, Ref. NR WU 8725. See also radio CG USAFIK to CinCAFPAC ADV, 051114/I Oct. 1945; Radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC for Benninghoff, 281345/I Sept. 1945.

130. Radio CA 53551 CINCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK, 191133/Z Oct. 1945. See also radio Washington to CINCAFPAC, 192131/Z Oct. 1945.

131. I & H Journal, 20 Oct. 1945, eyewitness accounts.

132. Political Trends #13, 22 Dec. 1945.

133. Political Trends #11, 8 Dec. 1945, p.1.

134. Political Trends #10, 1 Dec. 1945, p.3.

135. Corps Staff Conference notes, 12 Nov. 1945; I & H Journal. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV. 051114/I Oct. 1945.

136. Radio TFGGG 143 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 081632/I Nov. 1945. See also radio TFGGG 146 CG USAFIK to CHINA, 131805/I Nov. 1945.

137. Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 051358/I Oct. 1945.

138. Radio TFGGG #121, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 231504/I 23 Oct. 1945.

139. Corps Staff Conference notes, 12 Nov. 1945. I & H Journal.

140. Ibid.

141. Radio TFGGG #146, CG USAFIK to COMGEN CHINA, dated 13 Nov. 1945. See also Radio TFGGI 22, CG USAFIK to SCAP, dated 21 Nov. 1945 and radio TFGGG #150, CG USAFIK to SCAP and CG CHINA, 171404/I Nov. 1945.

142. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Ray T. Maddocks, C/S US Forces China Theater to Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, CG USAFIK, 29 Nov. 1945. Copy in I & H files.

143. Ltr., Kim, Koo to Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, CG US Forces China Theater, 19 Nov. 1945. Copy in I & H files.

144. Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945, Press Conference Report, 24 Nov. 1945, I & H Journal.

145. Press Conference Report, 24 Nov. 1945, I & H Journal.

146. Political Trends #10, 1 Dec. 1945, pp. 1&3.

147. Political Trends #10, 1 Dec. 1945, p.2.

148. Ibid.

149. Political Trends #11, 8 Dec. 1945, p.2.

150. Message AG XXIV Corps to all units and MG 5 Dec. 1945, #AGO 14 (TFGOG).

151. Political Trends, #11, 8 Dec. 1945, p.2.

152. Press Conference Report, 11 Dec. 1945, I & H Journal.

153. Political Trends #13, 22 Dec. 1945, p.1.

154. See below chapter on "National Issues" section on trusteeship for more detailed account.

155. Radio TFGBI #124, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 091430/I dated 8 Jan. 1946.

156. Radio TFGBI #154, CG USAFIK to CG CHINA, 231505/I Jan. 1946.

157. See above "Setting up a National Administration I and I Section."

158. Korean Relations and Information Section, MG, Weekly Report #1, 9 Sept. - 15 Sept. 1945.

159. See Appendix to Chapter IV for General Hodge's statement.

160. Interview with Maj. William F. La Matte, Chief of Intelligence Sub-Section later called office of Public Opinion, 19 Dec. 1945. I & H files.

161. Ibid.

162. Interview with Maj. David B. Tuke, Chief of Information Sub-Section later called Office Of Public Information, 26 Nov. 1945. I & H files.

163. Interview with Col. Glen Newman CAC, Secretary of the Public Information Section of the Secretariat, 13. Dec. 1945. I & H files.

164. KRAI Weekly Report #1, 9 Sept. 1945 to 15 Sept. 1945. I & H files. Personnel figures as of 1 Dec. 1945.

165. KRAI Weekly Report #2, 15 - 22 Sept. 1945, I & H files.

166. Intelligence and Information Section (formerly KRAI) Weekly Report #5, 13 Oct. 1945. Hereafter I & I. I & H Files.

167. Later after consultation with press which began at 23 Oct. 1945 meeting its name was changed again to Public Information Section. See press conference report 23 Oct. 1945, I & H Journal, and MG Ordinance #52, 30 Nov. 1945.

168. I & I Weekly Report #3, 29 Sept.1945, I & H files.

169. I & I Weekly Reports #3 and #5, 29 Sept. and 13 Oct. 1945 respectively. I & H files.

170. I & I Weekly Report #6, 23 Oct. 1945. I & H files.

171. Press Conference Report, 3 Dec. 1945. I & H Journal.
" " " , 5 Dec. 1945. " "

172. Interview with Maj. David B. Tuke, Chief of Information Sub-Section, later called Office of Public Information, 26 Nov. 1945. I & H files. I & I Weekly Report #6, 23 Oct. 1945. I & H files.

173. I & I Weekly Report #10, 20 Nov. 1945, p.3.

174. Press Conference Report, 22 Oct. 1945. I & H Journal.
" " " , 18 Oct. 1945, " "

175. Ibid.

176. I & I Weekly Report #12, 4 Dec. 1945, p.1.

177. I & I Weekly Report #11, 27 Nov. 1945, p.1. I & H files.

178. I & I Weekly Report #12, 4 Dec. 1945, p.3.

179. I & I Weekly Report #13, 11 Dec. 1945, p.3.

180. I & I Weekly Report #5, 13 Oct. 1945, p.3.

181. USAFIK MG, Office of Public Information, Progress Report. I & H files.

182. Press Conference Reports. I & H Journal, passim.

183. Interview with Commander Z. N. Williams USNR, 13 Oct. 1945. I & H Journal.

184. Interview with Col. Glen Newman CMG, Secretary of the Public Information Section of the Secretariat, 13 Dec. 1945, I & H files.

185. Press Conference Report, 11 Oct. 1945. I & H Journal.

186. Press Conference Report, 24 Nov. 1945. I & H Journal.

187. Gen. Arnold's statement to press 10 Oct. 1945, verbatim. Mimeographed release in I & H Journal.

188. I & H Journal, entry for 10 Oct. 1945, eyewitness account of officer present.

189. Press Conference Report, 11 Oct. 1945. I & H Journal.

190. Press Conference Report, 25 Oct. 1945. I & H Journal. See also GHQ AFPAC Proclamation #2 to the Korean People, 7 Sept. 1945.

191. USAFIK, MG, Ordinance #19, 30 Oct. 1945.

192. Press Conference Report, 12 Nov. 1945. I & H Journal.

193. Ibid.

194. Ibid.

195. Ibid.

196. Press Conference Report, 13 Nov. 1945, p.4. I & H Journal.

197. I & I Weekly Report #10, 20 Nov. 1945, p.4.

198. Press Conference Report, 15 Nov. 1945, p.1. I & H Journal.
" " " , 16 Nov. 1945, p.1. " .

199. Signed Personal Statement by Lt. W. C. Wales of the Office of Public Opinion, MG, 25 Nov. 1945. I & H files.

200. Press Conference Report, 12 Nov. 1945, p.3. I & H Journal.

201. Press Conference Report, 10 Nov. 1945, p.2. I & H Journal.

202. Press Conference Report, 13 Nov. 1945, p.1. I & H Journal.

203. Press Conference Report, 24 Nov. 1945. I & H Journal.

204. Radio TFGBI #61, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 211630/I, 21 Dec. 1945.

205. Press Conference Report, 26 Nov. 1945, I & H Journal.

206. Radio TFGCG #333, CG, USAFIK to SCAP, 022513/I, Apr. 1946.

207. Korea Graphic, XXIV Corps I & E Section, 9 Dec. 1945.

208. USAMGIK Bureau of Public Information OPO. Public Opinion Trends #4, 25 March 1946.

209. Message CG XXIV Corps AG 250.1 (TFXAG) 1 April 1946.

210. Interview with Maj. D. L. Abshire, Bureau of Mining and Industry, 22 Apr. 1946.

211. Historical Report of MG of City of Seoul, 11 Sept. to 30 Nov. 1945, section for 24 Oct. para. 2 which quotes translation of printed warning received by the MG Korean interpreter-receptionist. MG historical files.

212. USAFIK Memo. AG 250.1 (TFXAS), 7 Dec. 1945. Subject: Behavior.

213. Excerpt from personal letter of an enlisted man of Hq XXIV Corps, 21 Dec. 1945. I & H files.

214. USAFIK Memo. AG 250.1 (TFGCG) 21 Nov. 1945. Subject: Crimes Committed by Military Personnel.

215. USAFIK G-2; CCIG-K Report, Digest of Occupational Trends in Korea, 1 Dec. - 31 Dec. 1945, dated 7 Jan. 1946, p.2.

216. USAFIK Memorandum AG 250.741 (TFXAS) 17 Nov. 1945. Subject: Conduct of Military Personnel Toward Civilians.

217. Press Conference Report, 5 Dec. 1945. I & H Journal.

218. Interview with Manager of Chosen Hotel & Hq. Commandant XXIV Corps, 16 Dec. 1945, I & H files.

219. Personal Observations of I & H officer present at MG dance 24 Dec. 1945. I & H files.

220. USAFIK Directive AG 014.13 (TFXAS), 23 Feb. 1946.

Part II

Korean Politics: The First Year

Chapter II

KOREAN POLITICS, THE FIRST YEAR

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KOREAN POLITICS AND PEOPLE, THE FIRST YEAR

The American Command sought to carry out its mission of bringing democracy to the long oppressed Korean people against a background of political maneuvering and struggle. Suffice to say at the outset that the main current of political affairs in South Korea during the twelve month period under discussion in this chapter was largely the resultant of six forces other than the basic struggle between Right and Left. These six forces were:

1. The struggle between Lyuh Woon Hyung and Pak Heun Yung for the control of the Left.

2. The anti-American campaign waged by the Communists.

3. The rivalry between Kim Koo and Rhee Syng Man for Rightist leadership.

4. The effort of the American Command to effect a coalition of the moderate Right and the moderate Left.

5. The leadership of Kim Kyu Sik and Lyuh Woon Hyung in achieving a working political coalition of moderate Rightists and Leftists.

6. Intrigue on the part of the extreme Right toward seizing governmental power and establishing a separate South Korean government.

These will be discussed in this chapter in the order named, with the exception of No. 2, which is treated in the chapter, "American-Soviet Relations, The First Year."

Initially, the Korean political scene presented nothing but confusion to the American newcomers. The almost complete lack of advance planning for the Korean occupation (1)

brought the XXIV Corps to the scene without adequate knowledge of local political affairs or the assistance of competent political advisors. Moreover, it was not until February 1945, that anything resembling a political directive arrived from Washington, D.C., to guide the American Commander.(2) To counteract this initial disadvantage General Hodge addressed a meeting of some 1200 political leaders in Seoul three days after he stepped ashore at Inchon.(3) At this meeting he requested each party to prepare a written statement of its desires and position. Soon thereafter, General Hodge commenced a program of personal interviews with the major political leaders. Although he saw all the more important men, he felt both at the time and later, when questioned about it, that the interviews caused but negligible progress in the direction of political unity.(4)

Concurrent with the beginning of this schedule of interviews, General Arnold, the Military Governor, appointed an advisory council composed of eleven carefully chosen, prominent, Koreans, mostly conservative but including Lyuh Woon Hyung, a leading Leftist, and Cho Man Sik, grouped by some with the moderate Left. The list included:(5)

Kim Seung Soo	Hankook Democratic Party
Chun Young Soon	Hankook Democratic Party
Kim Dong Won	
Lee Yong Sul	
Kim Young Moo	Hankook Democratic Party
Koo Young Suh	

Song Chin Yo	Hankook Democratic Party
Kang Syung Soon	Hankook Democratic Party
Yon Hoe Ik	
Lyuh Woon Hyung	Korean People's Party
Cho San Sik	Choson Democratic Party (did not serve because of residence in North Korea)

Political Adviser H. Merrill Benninghoff commented at the time;

> General Arnold told them that they were selected to give him advice on Korean matters on an honest non-partisan basis having in mind only the good of the country and not personal or party gain. The eleven men accepted appointment on that basis and in secret session chose one of their members, Kim Seung Soo by name, to act as chairman.
>
> The purpose of the council, aside from giving advice, is to build up in the consciousness of the Koreans the feeling that they are beginning to participate in their government.

None of the political parties was particularly enthusiastic about the Advisory Council, possibly because they remembered a similar council of collaborationists under Japanese rule, or possibly because they felt that this new council would weaken their partisan organizations, which even then had governmental pretensions or ambitions.(7) Whatever the reason, the Council never exerted much of an influence on anybody and certainly did not live up to the hopes of those who created it. Nevertheless, this was the initial step taken by the American Command in its search for some degree of political stability upon which to erect a democratic Korea.

The Right and Left in Korea

Actually, in a relatively short space of time, the political stratification of South Korea began to crystallize in outline---both in reality and in the American mind. The myriad of political parties was confusing to the uninitiated, but only a few of them, it soon developed, were of any very great significance, at least when measured in terms of their influence upon the course of the occupation.

Organization of the Right

On the Right were four major parties and a similar number of "fronts" claiming to represent all of the Right. The oldest of the four parties was the Korean Independence Party (Hankook Dok Lib Dang organized in the early 1920's in Shanghai by Kim Koo and still headed by him as the first year of occupation closed. The other three parties were the Korean Democratic Party (Hankook Minju Dang), headed by Kim Seung Soo and Won Sei Hoon; the Korean Nationalist Party (Chosun Kook Min Dang) under An Chai Hong, Paik Yong Hi and Myung Chai Sei; and the New Korean Nationalist (or Racialist) Party (Sin Han Minchok Dang) led by Kwawn Dong Chin and On Sei Chang.

These parties, in turn, constituted the political pillars for the original Right Wing front, "Provisional Government of the Republic of Great Korea" (Tai Han Rim Shi Jung Bu), the presidency and vice-presidency of which were held by Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik, respectively. In the fall of 1945 the personnel

this "government" returned to Korea as private citizens after 26 years of exile in China, where CLOSE liaison with the Nationalist Government had been maintained.

By early 1946, however, the Korean Representative Democratic Council of South Korea (Dai Han Kook Min Dai P'yo Mun Choo Oi Wawan), with Dr. Rhee Syng Man as chairman and Kim Koo as vice-chairman, was rapidly becoming the predominant Rightist "non-political front." The Council was originally created through American good offices on 14 February 1946 in an effort to achieve a working coalition between moderate Right and Left, the purpose being to make available a representative advisory body to assist General Hodge on things political. However, with the withdrawal of the Left on the day after it was formed, the Council rapidly became an exclusively Rightist group. Nevertheless, it continued to function in official capacity until the end of 1946.

Another major Rightist "front" was the National Association for the Rapid Realisation of Korean Independence (Tai Han Dok Lib Toh'ok Sawng Kook Min Hwei) organized on 8 February 1946 under the leadership of Dr. Rhee Syng Man. Ultimately, it emerged as the most powerful Rightist organization of all and gained for Dr. Rhee unchallenged leadership of the Right.

Organization of the Left

On the Left were the Korean People's Party (Chosun Inmin Dang), headed by Lyuh Woon Hyung: the Seoul Branch of the

Yenan Independence Alliance (Dok Lib Dong Maing)--later known as the Korean New Democratic Party (Chosun Sin Min Dang)---under the leadership of Pak Nam Un in South Korea and Kim Doo Bong in North Korea; and the Korean Communist Party (Chosun Kongsan Dang), controlled by Pak Heun Yung and Lee Kwan Soo.

These groups in turn, supported the Korean People's Republic (Chosun Inmin Kangwha Kook) which had been set up originally as a government under the leadership of Lyuh Woon Hyung in August 1945. Although Rhee Syng Man had been selected initially as titular president of the "Republic" and Kim Koo as Minister of Home Affairs, in absentia, they both refused the posts and were ultimately "expelled" on 10 January 1946. They regarded the "Republic" as usurping claims to governmental authority that belonged exclusively to their own Provisional Government. Lyuh Woon Hyung had been the actual leader of the ill-fated Republic in the early days of its organization, but by March 1946 he had dropped from prominence in it as the organization became politically impotent by reason of American opposition to its assertion of governmental prerogatives. In the meantime, Hu Hun emerged in Lyuh's place as the active leader.

During this period, on 15 February 1946, the Korean Democratic People's Front (Chosun Min Choo Choo Ooi Min Chok Chern Sawn) was organized and rapidly became the successor to the

"Republic" as the major Leftist front. Hu Hun, leader of the "Republic", likewise led the newly-founded Democratic Front.

In addition to these organizations, both Rightist and Leftist women's, student, and youth associations, under divers nomenclatures, abounded. In the early days of the occupation, the most significant of these were the Leftist All-Korean Farmers' Union (Chosun Nong Min Cho Hap Chong Yun Maing) under the leadership of Paik Yong Hi and Lee Ki Hoon and the All-Korean Labor Union (Chosun Lodong Cho Ha Chaun Kook P'yoong Ooi Hwei), likewise of the Left, led by Hu Gong Taik, Han Tehul, and Mbon Eun Chong. (8)

Historical Differences

However simple Korean political organization might have been, the fundamental distinctions between Rightist and Leftist in Korea were both obscure and indeterminate. And yet, every political leader was forced into one of these two camps. There seemed to be no political middle ground.

Under early Japanese oppression there was little political consciousness existent in Korea other than a common resentment against the invader. However, after 1925, the year in which the Communist Party was first officially organized in Korea, the Communists took the lead in the underground resistance movement against the Japanese overlord. Communist prestige grew among the people, and many

non-Communists--the so-called nationalists--cooperated in the common effort. Despite this cooperation, many of these nationalists never became Leftists in the true sense, but rather, became associated with the Leftist movement merely through affiliation on a personal basis. As one Korean put it, they "had Rightist stomachs and Leftist mouths." But, be that as it may, the power and authority of the Left grew under the well organized Communist leadership of the anti-Japanese underground.

And then came the 1945 day of liberation. The Communist-controlled Korean People's Republic and its constituent People's committees momentarily took over governmental authority. However, unfortunately for the Left, the people quickly showed a tendency toward disillusionment and alienation from this leftist rule, particularly so when it became quite apparent that the Communist Party wished to make Korea into a Soviet colony. Suffice to say that the Right slowly began growing in strength at the expense of the Left.

At this point, the United States Military Government entered the picture. Apparently, the Korean people considered that at least tacit recognition had been given by the Americans to a small minority of extreme Rightists headed by Rhee Syng Man and Kim Koo. By infiltration into the national police and into the national and provincial governmental bureaucra-

racy, this group for a time actually seemed to control the Korean governmental machinery. During the first year of occupation there were many accounts of police oppression directed against the Leftists, as well as stories of excesses committed against the public interest by the Rightist bureaucracy functioning under Military Government. (See account of Joint Korean-American Conference, Section two, Chapter III, "Korean Politics, The Second Year.") Inadequate American personnel, in addition to the inherent language difficulty---a difficulty enhanced by many dishonest and scheming interpreters---made proper supervision of these politically and financially ambitious officials a virtual impossibility. The problem was still further aggravated by the extreme shortage of trained governmental personnel to be found among the Koreans other than those who had been trained by and under the Japanese, and were, therefore, unpopular with the mass of Koreans. The Leftists shouted "pro-Japanese" against both the police and the governmental bureaucracy, and with telling effect in terms of diminished popular prestige for the Military Government-sponsored Korean officials.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the line between Left and Right had its origin in the recent past, particularly so in the personal associations established during the common effort against the Japanese. Later, the line was redefined by the attitude shown toward American Military Government; the Rightists manifesting a degree of

cooperation in their hope of seizing political---and hence, economic---control by means of infiltration into the police and governmental bureaucracy under Military Government, and the Leftists showing more or less hostility by reason of the apparent tendency of the American authorities to rely upon Rightist leadership in administrative affairs---not to mention, the all-out Soviet-inspired effort by the Korean Communist Party to create chaos in the American Zone.(9)

When speaking of the Right and Left, one has to eliminate the great bulk of the Korean public from consideration. A typical reaction by the farmer in the hills to political questioning was, "I do not know. I am a farmer. I am not interested in politics." (10) Only a very small minority of the people could be called politically conscious. The picture presented, then, was that of small, well organized groups of extreme Rightists and Leftists tugging in opposite directions on the great vacillating and amoebic body politic. Generally speaking, the Left had the initial advantage. This was true because of: (1) the early organization of the Leftist-dominated Korean People's Republic and of its constituent People's Committees; (2) the Communist leadership of the anti-Japanese underground; (3) active support of the Left from North Korea; and (4) the disciplined cellular organization of the Communist Party itself. These factors all worked toward a more effective national organi-

zation. Moreover, the two most prominent extreme Rightist leaders did not return to South Korea until well after the occupation had begun---Dr. Rhee Syng Man on 16 October, 1945, and Kim Koo on 22 November of the same year! Nevertheless, the fact remained that Rhee's name and that of Kim Koo were the two most revered among the Korean People. These two men seemed to occupy a position above any political group, somewhat akin to that of a national legendary hero.(11) This position went unchallenged for a number of months, and then only partially so by the growth in political stature of Lyuh Woon Hyung and Kim Kyu Sik.

Points at Issue

two criteria for classifying a Korean politico as Rightist or Leftist, thus, are established: namely, historical association with a particular group and personal allegiance to a "leader." Other factors are more easily defined and are as follows: (The terms Left and Right here mean the extreme elements of either unless otherwise modified, the Communists being considered as the extreme Left and the Rhee-Kim Koo-Hankook Democratic Party--Provisional Government alignment as the extreme Right):

Primary Distinctions

1. Motivations. The Left had its source of power and authority in the Soviet Union and its puppets controlling North Korea. The desire was to make Korea into a virtual Soviet colony, if not an integral part of the USSR. The Right, on the other hand, tended to be more nationalistically inclined with the motivating factors probably being personal, financial, andpolitical ambition as well as keeping its collective neck from the Soviet-Communist ax.

2. Method of Distributing Land. Practically all, Right and Left, professed themselves as in favor of land reform. However, they differed on the method: the Leftists, advocating confiscation of all Japanese properties and that of large Korean landlords and free distribution to tenant farmers; the Rightists, similarly calling for confiscation of Japanese properties, but favoring reimbursing Korean landlords for their seized land and selling it to the tenants. Moreover, the Left doubted the sincerity of the Right in carrying out any land reform by pointing out the large land holdings of many leaders of the Right. Some moderate Leftists and Rightists advocated nationalization of all land, with or without confiscation.

3. Nationalization of Industry. Both Right and Left favored such nationalization, at least, in their published programs. However, again the Leftists doubted the sincerity of Rightist declarations on the subject, pointing out the large business holdings and interests controlled by leaders of the Right.

4. Foreign Trade and Investment. The Rightists favored opening up Korea commercially. The Leftists were opposed, evidently fearing "capitalistic penetration."

5. Reform and Tradition. The Rightists, consciously or not, tended to support the centuries old Confucian thought as to the proper organization of family and society and resented any change in the

status quo. A conformity with tradition was sought. The Leftists, on the other hand, were reformers, advocating such things as the emancipation of women, divorce, new family relationships, progressive education, changes in marriage customs, elimination of feudalistic relationships, and the like.

6. Method of Achieving Reform. All groups claimed allegiance to "democratic" procedure. What was meant by the term was another matter. For both extreme Rightist and Leftist it probably meant elimination of the opposition: the former, by control of the police and governmental bureaucracy; the latter, by class struggle and revolution. Only the moderate Right and Left--a minute group--seemed to have any understanding of, or desire to follow, truly democratic processes of evolution.

Secondary Manifestations

1. Attitude Toward the United States. The Right was prone to consider the United States as more or less its patron saint. The extreme Left, on the other hand, became increasingly vocal on the subject of the "reactionary, capitalistic, and imperialistic" America.

2. Attitude Toward the Soviet Union. This varied all the way from outright hostility by the extreme Right to the desire on the part of the Communist Party to incorporate Korea as a part of the USSR.

3. Attitude Toward China. Obviously, the Right was closely allied with Chiang Kai Shek, and the Korean Communists, with their counterparts in North China.

4. Trusteeship. The extreme Left favored the imposition of a trusteeship, (that is, after orders to do so were received by the South Korean Communists on 3 January 1946) probably because a Communist-controlled Korea was envisioned as the result. The Rightists loudly opposed any form of trusteeship, but rather, demanded immediate independence even to the extent of setting up a separate South Korean government. Moderates of both camps hoped for a period of "friendly assistance" by the Allied Powers.

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5. Japanese Collaboration. The Leftists had held leadership in the Korean underground against the Japanese, and so were particularly sensitive and vocal on this score. The Left was continually calling "pro-Japanese" at the leaders of the Right and Korean officials of Military Government. A Korean unit had fought with the Chinese Communists in China. Kim Koo and Dr. Rhee were charged by Leftists with having deserted the country to seek their own personal safety. The importance of the Provisional Government-sponsored Korean army (Kwang Bok Army) fighting with the Chinese Nationalist forces was minimized. Moreover, the Leftists pointed to important figures in the Right wing who had collaborated with the Japanese in business and government. The Hankook Democratic Party was the worst offender on this score according to the Leftists.

The position of both moderate Left and Right was perhaps best expressed by Lyuh Woon Hyung on 13 February 1947 in a press conference with American newspapermen. (13) The following exchange took place:

Question: "What are your political views?"

Lyuh: "I am a Marxist: I believe in a socialist Korea".

Question: "How does that differ from the Communist view?"

Lyuh: "I am a nationalist and do not believe in totalitarianism".

It should be recognized that the camps of both Right and Left were rife with political bigots merely using the names of political groups for reasons of expediency in personal attempts to achieve political fortune. This, naturally, included whole coteries of followers with the same

insincere motivations, motivations constructed not upon political conviction, but merely upon personal ambition for power.

The Left Bids For Power

The story of the Left in South Korea actually falls into two chapters, that having to do with Soviet-American relations and that having to do with Korean politics. The relationship between the Left in South Korea and the Soviet-sponsored Government in North Korea is mentioned only incidentally in this chapter, as is likewise the overall anti-American strategy of the Soviet-inspired Korean Communist Party in its attempt to sabotage American efforts in South Korea. Here, we shall treat merely the political manipulations of the Left in its evaluation as a political power. These manipupations actually brought the Left into a short-lived governmental control over all of Korea in the very early days of the occupation. In South Korea, the American Command vigorously opposed this assumption of governmental prerogatives by the Left and slowly, under American pressure, it gave way. In so doing, the Left split internally into the Soviet Communist and Korean Nationalist camps. These two schools were allied in principle, but very much opposed in method and ultimate object-

ive. In North Korea, the Soviet Government recognized the Leftist claim to govern at the outset, but in so doing, strengthened the extreme Communist elements to the almost total exclusion of the more nationalistically inclined Left, or, as some have called it, the "patriotic Left."

It is impossible to appreciate the Korean political situation as of 8 September 1945, the date of the initial American landing at Inchon, without some understanding of the early history of the Korean Leftist movement, a history which until recently has been largely that of the Korean Communists

The Korean Communist Movement

The story of the Korean Left Wing begins with the Communists. Information available as to the early days of the Communist movement in Korea is meagre and confusing to say the least. Apparently the movement had its inception among members of the Korean community in the Russian city of Irkutsk, located near Lake Baikal in south central Siberia. Here, early in 1920, a group of Korean Communists assembled. On the pretext that they had a sizable following within Korea, the leaders of this Irkutsk group allegedly hoodwinked the Third International out of some 40,000 yen for purposes of organizing a Korean Communist Party, and thereupon fled to Shanghai to enjoy their plunder. There, they joined forces with Kim Chul Soo, Cho Bong Am, Chu Chung Kun and Hahn Wi Kun. (14)

Meanwhile, in Korea, then under the relatively liberal rule of Admiral Makoto Saito, a so-called Laborers' Association was formed. Actually, membership was not drawn from the laboring classes but, rather, from communistically inclined professional groups in Seoul. Membership was probably not more than 300. This was in January 1920. In November of that same year, the All Korean Young Men's Union, likewise inspired by communist doctrines, was organized by Lee Yung and Chung Paik. The organization soon boasted a membership of 30,000, included in which was one Pak Heun Yung, one day destined to become the leader of the Korean Communist Party. The nucleus of this nation-wide Union was the Seoul Chung Nyun Hwei, or the Seoul Young Men's Association, the only section to survive later police oppression.(15)

In the meantime, the Shanghai group which had originally received official encouragement from the Comintern, began infiltrating into Korea proper in the attempt to build up the popular following which it had previously assured the Comintern was already in existence. Likewise, the disgruntled group which was left in the lurch at Irkutsk when the Shanghai-bound clique absconded with the Comintern funds also began migrating to Korea. The local Korean Communist movement was soon split into rival camps, one supporting the Shanghai and the other, the Irkutsk faction. This was the source of much of the early disunity within the Korean Communist movement,(16) which later was reflected in personal

squabbles among the leaders.

By 1924, following a new wave of Japanese oppression, Pak Heun Yung and Hong Cheung Sik formed the Shin Se Sang Yun Koo Hwei (Institute for Investigating New Ideas). By this time the original Laborers' and Young Men's Associations had pretty well disintegrated as a result of action on the part of the Japanese gendArmerie. There were then two chief opponents in Communist circles; Pak's new Institute, and the Seoul Young Men's Association, this last being the only portion of the original all-Korean Association remaining more or less intact. (Later, however, it died a lingering death under the leadership of Lee Yung and Chung Paik.) Soon thereafter, Pak's new institute changed its name to Hwa Yo Hwei, or the "Tuesday Meeting" communist group, but still remained under Pak's leadership.(17)

By reason of the malodorous act of the Shanghai group in turning to their own private use part of the money donated to it by the Comintern, this faction ultimately fell into official disgrace. By 1924, most of its major leaders ---at least Kim Chul Soo, Chu Chung Kun, and Hahn Wi Kun--- had migrated to Korea and fallen in with the Pak's "Tuesday" group. Pak's leadership was forced on them because of the popular following he had gathered in Korea. At about the same time, probably November 1924, a group of Korean Communists from Japan, known as the Puk Pung Hwei (North Wind

Association) under the leadership of Kim Yak Soo and Ma Myung, arrived in Korea. They also joined with Pak's group.(18)

On 17 April 1925 the Korean Communist Party was first officially organized. Leadership was divided between Kim Chai Bong who headed the main body of the organization and Pak Heun Yung who took over the all-important organizational section of the Party, and, in addition, direction of the Young Men's Communist Association, a Korean counterpart of the Soviet Komsomol. Apparently sometime before this took place, Pak had received official recognition from Moscow through Betchinsky, then head of the Far Eastern Division of the Comintern.(19) Kim Tan Ya, a rather shadowy figure, was allegedly dispatched to Moscow to represent the party in the Comintern and supposedly, was still there as late as 1 January 1947, acting as the real power behind the Korean Communist Party.(20) Soon thereafter, another faction of Korean Communists is said to have petitioned Betchinsky demanding a change in leadership. The petition, however, was denied. Possibly in contradiction to this, but not necessarily so, is the rumor reported by Eugene V. Prostov, political advisor to the American delegation on the Joint Soviet-American Commission, that "in the early 1920's Lenin decided against lending support to the Korean Communists and instead aided Korean nationalists." During the early

stages of Stalin's rule, according to the same source, Russia abided by a secret agreement with Japan and abstained from encouraging Communists in Korea.(21) This support of nationalist groups would be well in line with later established Comintern policy. In the program of the Comintern, for example, is found this statement of principle:

> The principal task in such countries [those with "feudal mediaval relations and Asiatic mode of production relationships"] is, on the one hand, to fight against feudalism and pro-capitalistic forms of exploitation and to develop systematically the peasant agrarian revolution; on the other hand, to fight against foreign imperialism and for national independence." (22)

In any event, at this point in the movement, 1925, the Japanese police stepped into the picture and put a quietus on activities by arresting many of the Communist leaders and effectively breaking up the organization. A later attempt to reorganize the party met the same fate. Pak was imprisoned a short time, but finally regained his freedom and fled to the Soviet Union. Apparently he remained there from 1927 until 1930, at the end of which time he returned to Shanghai, only to be rejailed by the Japanese for Communist activity. Ultimately, he was escorted back to Korea under guard and finally released. This time he retired from active participation in politics and concealed his identity until 1945 under the guise of a common laborer and an assumed name, working the while in the Communist under-

ground.[23]

During the twenty years intervening between the abortive 1925 effort to organize a Communist Party in Korea and the liberation of Korea, only one Communist group of significance crept into prominence on the Korean scene. This was known as the "Marx-Lenin", or more simply the "ML" Communist party. Organized in 1935 by Toh'ei Ik Han and Kun Chun Yun, this group was but short lived. The leaders were arrested, and the organization broken up by the Japanese police.[24]

On the evening of that August liberation day in 1945, two political groups were meeting in Seoul. One was assisting Lyuh Woon Hyung in establishing his Preparatory Committee (refer next section) and the other was discussing the revival of the Korean Communist Party. The first group consisted of Lyuh himself, Chung Paik, Hong Nam Pyo, An Ki Sung, Hong Cherng Sik and Hong Tuk Yu. The last two named were former members of Pak's Tuesday communist group. The second group consisted of Toh'ei Ik Han, a former member of the Marx-Lenin group; and Ha Pil Won, Kim Kwang Soo (brother of Kim Chul Soo) and Lee Yung, all one-time members of the Seoul Young Men's Association. When the groups became known to each other, a merger was quickly effected, and two days later, on 17 August, all but Lyuh and Hong Tuk Yu joined to form the Chang An Pa, or Seoul Communist Party.[25] This group is considered to have been at the time of its

inception a nationalist faction willing to compromise with the right wing for the promotion of Korean independence.[26]

However, likewise on 17 August, Pak showed up in Seoul, having been most recently employed as a bricklayer in Kwangju, Cholla-namdo. With him he carried a list of members of the old 1925 Communist Party and of the underground, plans for reorganizing the Party, and most important of all, the latest instructions from Moscow. Suffice to say that within a short time, by 28 August to be exact, the bulk of the local communists fell in with his leadership and organized the Chai Kun Pa, or the Rehabilitation Communist Party. This was a much more radical and pro-Soviet organization than its momentary rival, the Chang An Pa.[27] By November 1945 the last of the dissenting members of the rival group had been forced to join with Pak's forces, but the source for future friction within the party remained, as was made obvious by efforts continued throughout the first year of occupation by Kim Chul Soo[28] and Cho Bong Am,[29] former leaders of the old Shanghai faction, to challenge Pak's leadership of the Party. Pak's control was so severely shaken at one time that he was forced to repair to Pyongyang in North Korea for new instructions.[30]

Korean People's Republic

As World War II ended, the Japanese authorities in

Korea were hard pressed to maintain law and order and to protect the safety of their own persons. Moreover, they wished to find a government acceptable to the Russians who they believed, would occupy Korea.(31) The aid of Korean leaders was enlisted with the hope that some impromptu Korean government could be set up. Sometime shortly before the cease fire order was given ending hostilities in the Pacific, the Japanese Governor General Abe asked Song Chin Oc, later the leader of the extreme Right Wing Hankook Democratic Party, to form such a government. Song refused, and the same request was put to Kim Chun Yun, early leader of the moderate "ML" Communist group and later associated with Song Chin Oc on the staff of the Dong-A Ilbo (Oriental Daily News) and in the ill-fated effort to achieve political coalition between Right and Left by means of the Preparatory Committee for the National Congress (Kook Min Jun Chei Tak Whei Jun Bi Whei) in August, 1945. Again a refusal was encountered. Finally, on the evening of 14 August, the Governor General requested Lyuh Woon Hyung to see him.

Lyuh's politics were a bit uncertain even as the first year of occupation ended, although he was definitely of the Leftist camp. He is known to have visited the Soviet Union in 1921-22 in the company of Kim Kyu Sik.(32) It is also known that at one time he actually held a membership card in a Korean

Communist group in Shanghai. Since that time, he continued to maintain a close working alliance with the extreme Leftist group in South Korea and seemed to have been very much persona grata in North Korea on several visits to Pyongyang during the first year of occupation.

In any event, Lyuh was informed by Abe that the Japanese were going to surrender the following day, and was requested to form an organization to aid in the maintenance of law and order. Supposedly the Japanese placed a considerable sum of money at Lyuh's disposal. Lyuh accepted the offer under five conditions: (1) that food for the coming three months would be guaranteed; (2) that political prisoners would be released; (3) that freedom of the press and speech would be guaranteed; (4) that there would be no mobilization of the students for the maintenance of peace; and (5) that there would be no interference from the Japanese. G-2 commented at the time that "apparently, Lyuh, with these conditions, had the best intentions of sidetracking the Japanese." The Japanese, under the circumstances, had little choice except to agree to the conditions.(33)

That same day, 14 August, Lyuh and his younger brother, Lyuh Woon Hong, former manager of the Korea branch of the Singer Sewing Machine Company, drew up a tentative organization which included Song Chin Oo and other leaders who were far from the extreme Left. However, the next

day, the 15th, Lyuh the elder was called before Endo, the Vice-Governor, and told that the Americans would occupy merely the Pusan and Mokpo areas. Thereupon, Lyuh revised his organization so as to include only Communists and Communist sympathizers, men whom he regarded as acceptable to the Russians.(34) However, An Chai Hong, considered to be a moderate Rightist in political conviction, was invited to participate in the organizational hierarchy.

This organization, first called the Preparatory Committee for Korean Rehabilitation (Chosun Keun Kook Chun Bi Wi Won Hwei), quickly assumed governmental functions not envisioned by the Japanese offer. In mid-August, this group adopted the following sweeping resolutions as to its objectives:(35)

1. To establish an autonomous and independent state both politically and economically.

2. To demolish imperialism and residuary feudalistic influences in our state and to be faithful to the principles and ideals of democracy which must materialize the basic political, economic, and social needs of our nation.

3. To secure the rapid elevation in the living standards of the laborers, the peasants, and the masses.

4. To establish world peace through our cooperation as a member of the democratic countries of the world.

Meanwhile, the Japanese learned that Southern Korea would be occupied by the United States and not by the Soviet Union. As the days went by without the arrival of American forces, the heads of the Japanese Government-General overcame

the shock received from the news of the unconditional surrender and realized that Lyuh had no intention of following their dictates. They were also under pressure from the Japanese military to disown Lyuh's Preparatory Committee. To reduce the power remaining in the Committee, the Japanese Government General took the peculiarly Japanese method of changing its name to the Public Safety Committee. (Chian Dai). Meanwhile, the Japanese military endeavored to prevent Lyuh's committee from exercising even police powers. The Japanese added some three thousand soldiers to the regular police force, transforming them to a civil status overnight, and attempted to discredit the Chian Dai.(36)

Lyuh was not, however, to be suppressed. The Japanese had created a Frankensteinian monster which they were unable to control. When the American occupation was announced, Lyuh grasped the American privilege of free political endeavor, and on 6 September, two days before the American landing at Inchon, did in effect constitute his group not only as a political party but as a government, the "Korean People's Republic". The presidency and vice-presidency were offered to Dr. Rhee Syng Man and Kim Koo, respectively, but neither would have any part of it. Later, on 10 January 1946, both were "expelled" from the offices which they never had accepted. Lyuh, Hu Hun, and Lee Kang Kook were the predominant figures throughout, although Lyuh ceased active participation in the

Republic in November 1945 when he commenced organizing his People's Party. As to the nature of the Republic, Lt. Bertsch commented,(37) "The People's Republic, on its lower levels of organization, grew in part spontaneously, in part under Japanese direction, in part under frankly Communist control, and in part under conservative auspices. It must not be forgotten that in many places the new groups moved into a virtual governmental vacuum. Previously-existing social or revolutionary committees, or Farmers' organizations, moved in full into the functions of local government, and became units of the People's Republic." Lt. Bertsch went on to point out that this was all done according to the "transmission belt" principle of Communist operation involving the "infiltration by trained communist agents into larger groups, whose members do not agree with all the party principles, but who can be induced to go along on a lesser program of common objectives, to be extended when and as possible."(38) The People's Republic remained, in theory, non-partisan and set itself up as the de facto government, a fact which was soon to bring it into sharp conflict with American Military Government.

The first episode in contact which the American Command had with this erstwhile government, the Korean People's Republiv, occurred when its representatives (calling themselves the "Provisional Korean Commission, 1945) presented themselves at XXIV Corps Headquarters aboard the AGC CATOCTIN

on 8 September 1945. It was learned by the Americans that the organization was composed of 135 separate committees throughout Korea and had, as its objective, the organization of a democratic form of government for the Korean people. The representatives were to have been Pak Sang Kyu, Cho Han Yong, and Lyuh Woon Hyung. Lyuh, however, was replaced by his younger brother, Lyuh Woon Hong, when the delegation boarded the CATOCTIN.

General Hodge was advised not to see these men himself, both because of the fact that they were allegedly supported by the Japanese, and because it was considered unwise to give even the slightest possible appearance of favoring any political group.(39) These men did talk with members of the Corps staff, however, and gave from memory a list of Koreans who could be depended upon and another list of those who were said to be collaborationists. They asked about the American point of view toward the various exiled governments, assured the staff of their full recognition of the United States Military Government, and offered their own services in a liaison capacity between that government and the Korean people. They showed some concern over the division of Korea at the 38th parallel, about currency and inflation, about the discipline of American troops, and about the food situation, and were also most emphatic in expressing their belief that all Japanese should be evacuated from Korea.(40)

By the middle of September 1945, the People's Republic had organized many subsidiary groups throughout the provinces. Typical was one called the "Student Public Peace Body" composed of radical students, thugs, and criminals, armed so far as possible.(41) It was believed by the more law abiding Koreans that no permanent peaceful settlement of Korea's political problems could be effected until these pseudo-political public safety organizations were disbanded.(42) Their fears appear to have been well founded, for when one of the Republic's subsidiary branches in Pusan, was disbanded on 28 September, some 257 rifles, 14 pistols, and 3 shotguns were found.(43) Many other instances of the assumption of governmental functions by unauthorized groups connected in some way with the People's Republic could be cited, the most flagrant examples of which occurred in the provincial governments.(44)

The American Command replied to this challenge of the People's Republic through the medium of the press. On 10 October 1945, General Arnold issued the following statement:

> TO THE PRESS OF KOREA:
>
> What I say and hand you today must be given a prominent place in the front page of every newspaper. This is a request with the force of an order.
>
> The liberation of Korea from the heel of Japan is of course an occasion for celebrations, for demonstrations and speechmaking. Freedom of speech and freedom of press having been given to the Koreans, it is to be expected that many foolish and inconsidered statements will appear in the newspapers under

amateur editorship. So long as peace and order are not endangered, and so long as disorder is not fostered and no attempt is made to interfere with the orderly administration of the government, such boyishness even by old men will be allowed to evaporate as smoke in the air.

There is only one Government in Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude. It is the government created in accordance with the proclamations of General MacArthur, the General Orders of Lieutenant General Hodge and the Civil Administration orders of the Military Governor. It is an organization made up of carefully selected Koreans working under the Military Governor and his officers. It has exclusive control and authority in every phase of government. Self-appointed "officials", "police" groups, big (or little) conferences "representing all the people", "the (self-styled) government of the Republic of Korea", are entirely without any authority, power or reality.

If the men who are arrogating to themselves such high-sounding titles are merely play-acting on a puppet stage with entertainment of questionable amusement value, they must immediately pull down the curtain on the puppet show. If some peace preservation groups have sincerely but childishly acted (without violating laws) to aid law and order, they will now disband and return to proper work to aid Korea feed and clothe and house itself during the coming winter. There is honest work for fair wages for which they are needed. The manpower of Korea will have to provide for the basic comforts of the people this winter.

If behind the curtain of these puppet shows there are venal men holding the strings who are so foolish as to think that they can take to themselves and exercise any of the legitimate functions of the Government of Korea, let them pinch themselves and awaken to the realities of the situation. Let us have no more of this.

A fraud on the people of Korea has been recently publicized in the free press, namely the calling of fictitious election on the first of March, 1946, at which it is promised "all men and women over the age of eighteen, except for traitors, will have the right to vote." Nothing is more sacred to a free

people than the right to vote and to elect their own representatives in Government. This right is too sacred to be made the toy of self-appointed statesmen who attempt to lead the people with false hopes. The right to vote can only be exercised in the manner and at the times prescribed by the Government for elections. For any man or group to call an election as proposed is the most serious interference with Military Government, an act of open opposition to Military Government and the lawful authority of the Government of Korea under Military Government.

"If the people of Korea value the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the freedom from many restrictions under which they have long suffered, which freedoms have come to them in recent days, the time has come for the moral leadership of the people to assert itself and prevent the abuse of these freedoms by either foolish or venal men."

"The Korean people should prevent any possible threat to the peace and order of their country on the part of irresponsible persons; by so doing they would make it unnecessary for the Government to intervene and exert the power and authority which it possesses."

By way of an answer, the People's Republic published during the third week in October and distributed in Seoul a pamphlet entitled "The Traitors and the Patriots." The pamphlet "exposed" the alleged pro-Japanese, anti-American Koreans, who were acting as advisors to the Military Government by quoting from statements they may or may not have made against the Americans during the Japanese rule of Korea. Then again, on 20 October 1945, the People's Republic distributed "A Message to U.S.A. Citizens", which begged the people of the United States to understand that those, like themselves, who had remained in Korea in the underground resistance during the

Japanese regime and had organized themselves after the Japanese surrender, represented the real will of the Korean people. It would be the "tragedy of the century" if Military Government should oppose the will of this government of the Korean people, wrote the spokesmen for the Republic.(45)

One other event which may have militated against smooth relations with the People's Republic was a statement made by two members of the American press. This occurred in an informal talk between Mr. Robert H. Myers of the Associated Press, Mr. Gordon Walker of the Christian Science Monitor, and the Central People's Committee of the Korean People's Republic. These journalists acknowledged that the conservative Hankook Democratic Party had the ear of General Arnold, but added, "The Military Government is not all of the U.S.A."(46) This undoubtedly created the feeling that there was more sympathy for the Republic among Americans than was being shown by the Military Government and may have encouraged the Republic in its resistance.

That the People's Republic was a potent force at the time cannot be doubted. After an extensive visit to the rural areas, a Military Advisor and a former resident of Korea, Dr. H. H. Underwood, stated that the Republic was the strongest and most active organization throughout the South. By comparison, the Hankook Democratic Party was "poorly organized or

unorganized in most places", and seemed to have nothing as attractive to offer as free land to the farmer and management of their own factories to the workers.(47) An observer from Military Government corroborated the views of Dr. Underwood after a trip through the provinces in December 1945. He reported that the strength of the Republic was growing, that it was organized into a government at all levels, and that no other party was given an opportunity to coexist with it. Without Military Government intervention, it was clear that no other parties would be allowed to flourish.(48)

Although the People's Republic under the leadership of Lyuh stopped short of open revolt, it continuously tended to be critical and troublesome. It defied Military Government's wishes by insisting that it would hold national elections on 1 March 1946, by devoting itself to self-expression rather than union with other political groups, and finally, by refusing at the end of a three-day meeting on 20-23 November 1945 to drop the word "Kook" (republic or government) from its name.(49) This last was an immediate act of defiance difficult to ignore, since Military Government had specifically requested that the name be changed to avoid misunderstandings which had arisen about the Republic's status.(50) The leaders had assured Military Government that the name would be so changed. General Arnold himself went to the meeting and delivered a

brief speech stressing the need for cooperation and order during the following critical months. He pointed out that any possible material aid from Allied sources depended in a large measure upon how the people of Korea conducted themselves. He emphasized also that Military Government was only a stop-gap, although while it was in operation, it was the government of the Korean people not an American or Allied government.(51)

Even though the speech was apparently well received, subsequent events showed that the majority was not convinced. In the resolution of gratitude which was passed by the meeting for transmission to each of the Allies, the offending word "Kook" was used. Furthermore, on the final day, younger and more radical elements ran away with the meeting and shouted down those who wished to comply with the request that the name be changed.(52) In spite of this independent attitude, the Republic did, at this same meeting, publicly resolve to cooperate fully with the American Command until such time as the government would be turned over to the people.(53) Giving more point to the situation was the fact that, immediately after this defiant meeting of the People's Republic, Kim Koo returned to Korea bringing with him several members of the self-styled Provisional Government. This meant for the Republic that the "chips were down." It had no choice but to outdo its rival pseudo-government, amalgamate with it, or disap-

pear into the oblivion of history.

Adding to the complexities of the situation at the time was the fact that just prior to the three-day meeting, Lyuh Woon Hyung, the acting head of the People's Republic and the very man who had carried Military Government's request for a change of name to the central committee, suddenly bolted to form on 12 November 1945 what was thought at first to be a more tractable middle-of-the-road party called the Korean People's Party. With Lyuh went many of the members of the parent organization, leaving Hu Hun, Lyuh's old running mate, and Pak Heun Yung, the Communist Party leader, as the leading figures connected with the Republic. This was the third blow which presaged the final oblivion of the "Republic". The first two had been the refusal on the part of the American Command to recognize the Republic as a government and General Arnold's press attack on the Republic on 10 October. The fourth blow was a hard-hitting statement issued by General Hodge on 12 December specifically denouncing the "Republic" and reviewing a long list of broken promises and obstructionist acts. It appears below: (54)

> It is after careful thought and deliberation that I make this announcement to the Korean People. This announcement is necessary to prevent continued misunderstandings and delays in Korea's progress toward stability and independence. In making it, I assure each and every one of you that I do so in the interest of a complete and lasting Korean freedom and independence which I desire as ardently as any native born Korean. With full understanding by all the Korean population we can reach that goal.

When my forces came to Korea I found local misunderstandings of our mission and our status. These resulted in some unforeseen difficulties that have hampered our efforts to work for Korea. My knowledge of Korea and of its history and its people was such that I felt sure all difficulties came about entirely through misunderstandings. Therefore, I was tolerant and patient with mistakes and have believed in the honesty and good faith of the mass of the Korean people in their expressed desires for freedom and independence. My patience has paid dividends, because I found that most of the misunderstandings were honest mistakes and have now been cleared up.

Before the arrival of my forces in Korea there was set up here an organization known as the Chosen In Min Kong Whá Kook (Korean People's Republic). The name connoted, and its actions indicated, that this organization was set up to be a government rather than a political party and its leaders spread the word to the Korean people that it was their new government. This has caused many misunderstandings among the people, and has hampered my efforts to assist Korea toward its independence. This group has in its followers many patriotic Koreans who for years struggled unceasingly against the Japanese domination and whose aims are above reproach. However, as the organization was set up and operated it misled many Korean people to believe that it was governing Korea. Assumption of any functions of government by this group without the Allied Powers authority was an error on the part of the party leaders, apparently due to their not understanding all the existing conditions. However, because of misunderstandings arising from the name and actions of the Korean People's Republic, some groups operating under its banner have defied and opposed both openly and secretly the efforts of the Military Government of Korea, have caused serious delays in establishing economic stability of your country and actually delayed progress toward Korean independence which we all so greatly desire. It is hard to believe that all these groups are bona fide members of the Korean People's Republic.

In talks with the leaders of the Korean People's Republic, they indicated an understanding of the situation, admitted the error made and promised that if I would allow their delegates to assemble in convention at Seoul on November 20 they would make clear

to all Korean people by a reorganization that they were a political party only, that they would further clear up all misunderstandings for their followers, and they would insure that all future actions of the bona fide members would help the Military Government of Korea in establishment of economic stability and preparation for Korean independence. I authorized and gave police protection to the convention in full confidence that the leaders intended to carry out fully their promise and would act faithfully to do all in their power to remove further misunderstandings and would work unselfishly for the good of Korea. In the same belief that full cooperation and understanding was to be established, General Arnold attended the opening session.

At the end of the convention I was greatly surprised and disappointed to find that although they agreed in words to cooperate with and aid the Military Government of Korea, the leaders and representatives had in some ways used the convention to aggrandize themselves further as a Korean government, had intimated that the Military Government is aiding and abetting their organization in its attempted activities as a government, and had left considerable confusion in the minds of Koreans everywhere. In other words they failed to keep their promise to me that the situation would be completely clarified.

Because of this failure after my long patience I feel it necessary to the public understanding to announce that, regardless of what it calls itself, the Korean People's Republic is not in any sense a "government", and is not authorized to act in any capacity as such. The only functioning government in Southern Korea is the Military Government of Korea which was established by order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enforce the terms of surrender, to replace the deposed Japanese Government for the purpose of helping to establish a sound Korean economy and to stabilize and prepare Korea for its independence when a sovereign and unified government of the people, by the people, and for the people can be established.

The Americans and the Military Government of Korea are not in the business of quarreling with or suppressing political parties or beliefs. We believe implicitly in freedom of political beliefs and

have no desire and no intention or aim to suppress or in any way hamper legitimate political activities of any party. However, we must make clear statements of fact to avoid all misunderstandings which may further mislead the Korean people. I am deeply interested in the unity and in the future of Korea, and I and my officers and men are working hard in the effort to build up your nation so that we may turn it over to you in good shape and on a firm foundation.

Therefore, in order to eliminate further misunderstandings and cloaked disorders, I have today directed my occupation forces and the Military Government of Korea that the activities of any political organization in any attempted operations as a government are to be treated as unlawful activities, and that necessary steps will be taken at once to insure that no political organization operates in any way as a government in any portion of the American occupied area without specific authority of the Allied Powers. This directive is not in any manner intended to interfere with lawful activities of any group organized as and/or acting solely as a political party, nor is it intended to denounce any Korean patriots who have been misled by false promises.

Although the Korean Democratic Party, the Republic's arch enemy, thought the statement hardly strong enough, the reaction of the People's Republic was immediate and vigorous. An American political observer described it as follows: (55)

The Republic deliberated furiously all night and half the next day and finally released a hard hitting rebuttal. The main points were: (1) That present confusion and misunderstandings are due to the slanderous advice of pro-Japanese traitors; (2) that the change in name was promised only as an item for discussion at the National Assembly and the body voted against it; (3) that after the meeting, President Hu Hun agreed to all the points of a letter (56) sent to him by General Hodge except the proposal to refrain from using the word "Kook"; (4) that the so-called "Provisional Government" is tacitly permitted to refer to itself as such, and even to hold "cab-

inet meetings"; (5) that such an attitude by military Government may be subjectively consistent, but that objectively it confuses the public.

However, the influence and prestige of the Republic was already waning. The defection of Lyuh and the more moderate Leftists made it impossible for the Republic to maintain its popular appeal. Leadership of the Left shifted temporarily to Lyuh and his People's Party and to a new Left Wing catch-all, the Democratic People's Front.

Pak versus Lyuh

On 12 November 1945 the leftist People's Party was launched by Lyuh Woon Hyung, a party which, it was hoped, would include within its membership most of the members of the People's Committees which were acting as local governmental units under the "Republic." It has been pointed out as a possibility that the People's Party was "designed to provide the intermediate transmission wheel by which the whole machinery of the People's Republic would be controlled, since it was believed that most members of the committees could be induced to join the People's Party, and would thereby be led into a minimum program of Communist collaboration."(57) Whether or not this was the conscious reason for the organization of the "Republic" and the People's Party is open to question. However, that the Communists attempted to turn these organizations to their own ends is difficult to refute in the light of

more recent events. In January 1946, General Hodge radioed the following analysis of the situation to the State Department: (58)

> In its reference to Korean People's Party, State Department apparently still feels that it represents liberal although not necessarily Communistic elements. Such is not now the case, as Communist elements are even stronger than as described in my TFCCG 159 of 24 November. It is admitted by personal henchmen of Lyuh Woon Hyung that he and Hu Hun have lost control of the party to Communist elements. They nevertheless remain as nominal leaders and, probably for fear of being eliminated entirely from the political scene, have not openly broken with the actual manipulators of party power. It seems to us that at present the Communists, probably with Soviet connivance, are using the popular and supposedly 'Liberal' People's Party as a 'front' behind which they can carry on their activities, which include terrorism as a political instrument. It would not suit their interests to dispense with Lyuh, while he, being an opportunist without backing except within the party, is unwilling to step down on his own initiative.

American opposition to the governmental prerogatives exercised by the "Republic", and the defection of the moderate Left slowly forced it out of the picture, thereby making room for a new Leftist overall organization known as the "Democratic People's Front". This organization, born officially on 15 February 1946, operated more or less as a coordinated propaganda machine for all Leftist groups---labor unions, farmers groups, women's and youth associations, political parties, and other diverse groupings within the Leftist camp. The two mainstays, however, were the People's and Communist Parties. Battle was soon joined between these two groups for control, the Soviet-

controlled Communists on the one hand led by Pak and the more nationalistically-inclined Leftists on the other, led by Lyuh. Temporarily, at least, the Pak faction won out. On 9 May 1946, for instance, Lyuh Woon Heng bolted the party of his elder brother, declaring that the Communists so effectively controlled the People's Party that its reform was no longer possible.(59) Lyuh Woon Hyung, himself, remained as nominal leader of his party, but for the time being was unable to free himself of the web of Communist control.

In the meantime, old wounds were being reopened within the ranks of the extreme Left. On 17 July 1946 one American political observer reported that it was reasonably certain that control of the Korean Communist Party in South Korea had passed from Pak's hands. The rank and file was expressing resentment toward Pak's highhanded and arbitrary assumption of leadership and the practice of considering himself the sole source of party policy, not the least of which was his refusal to call a party congress. In voicing this refusal he explained that the members were not yet well enough disciplined and that the principle of "democratic centralism" must be observed. At that time it was thought that the threatened shift in Party leadership had not yet received Kremlin approval. Nevertheless, indications were that the executive committee and central committee of the Party were following a triumvirate composed of Lee Kang Kee, Heng Nam Pyo, and Lee

Choo Ha, and that final leadership would probably be vested in Kim Chul Soo, a man regarded as "an intellectual and a gentleman."(60) The break became so serious that Pak Heun Yung departed for points North where he knew the issue ultimately would be resolved. General Hodge reported soon after Pak's return to Seoul as follows:

> Political situation in Korea is not encouraging. We have been working for several weeks in an effort at conciliation between Leftists and Rightists with some indication of results. However, Pak Heun Yung, upon return from North of 38 about 23 July, apparently brought definite orders and in addition definite information from the Soviets including threats of reprisals against all who do not follow the Comintern line. One reliable informant says that Pak passed the information locally that the Russians will occupy South Korea peaceably or otherwise in the not too distant future and that all traitors will be eliminated. At any rate, there has been a great scurrying to cover of the Communist-controlled rats who were nibbling at the bait of unification and talking sensibly for the moment. I received what I consider reliabl e information this morning that the Communists and their Communist-controlled satellites are going to consolidate as the Korean Labor Party, which will eliminate the name Communist and may by this subterfuge attract many Leftists who have been becoming wary of Russian Communist leadership. This will give an outlet for Leftists who do not like the name Communist and may become in influence more powerful than current coalition People's Front. This step has already been taken in North Korea. (61)

It further came to light that Pak had cautioned Lyuh Woon Hyung not to "play the American game", and had predicted that the Coalition Committee (the American-inspired effort to achieve a working political agreement between moderate Right and Left to replace the Representative Democratic Council)

would be another fiasco and that all Rightists opposition in Korea would be eliminated in short order if Southern Korea Leftists stood firmly by their compatriots in the North. Pak's attitude toward the coalition effort before going to Pyongyang was not unfriendly, even though non-committal. However, after his return it became clear that a resolute and positive opposition to the coalition effort on his part was the result of instructions received in Pyongyang. Lyuh informed General Hodge that he had told Pak that he (Lyuh) was too far committed to Dr. Kim Kyu Sik and the coalition effort to slacken or discontinue his efforts to effect political unity in the South and, further, that he would stay with the project until some conclusion was reached.

General Hodge in an 9 August 1946 radio speculated, "Some deep fear or mortal enmity of Pak must HAVE come to the surface in this encounter as Lyuh hinted to us that it was essential to the success of the American program that Pak be dealt with drastically at this juncture, perhaps jailed by some juggling at the counterfeit trial due July 29." General Hodge went on to say:

> We asked why he himself (Lyuh) did not expose Communist intentions to sabotage unity. His answer was that large labor, farmer, and youth elements in Southern Korea divide their allegiance between him and Pak and that if an open break between him and Pak came now it would harm the unity movement. He suggested that if Pak could be made to lose face at this moment Lyuh might be able to win a considerable portion of these elements over to his, and therefore, our side

> Our view is that Lyuh either lacks moral courage or is too far secretly committed to the Communists to have a showdown with Pak and is looking to us to extricate him from his position. We made it plain to Lyuh that we have no intention of abusing the counterfeit trial for political persecution and that he must fight his own battles, but that we would continue to give the unity movement and its leading spirits all support possible... (62)

Pak quickly regained control over the party Councils by reading Lee Chung Yoon out of the Party and indefinitely suspending Kim Chul Soo, Soo Chung Suk, Kang Chin, Kim Kun, and Moon Kap Song for "trying to cooperate with the reactionary Right Wing". All were members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, (63) and had on 5 August issued an anti-Pak statement to the local press.

Probably because he found himself unable to straddle the ever-widening gap between the two divergent political groups even within his own People's Party, Lyuh tendered his resignation from leadership of the People's Party on 13 August 1946 and retired to the country. This act threw the People's Party into an uproar and forced a decision on the Communist call for a merger of the three principal Left Wing parties along North Korean lines. A few days later, the matter was resolved in the high councils of the People's Party by a 48 to 31 vote in favor of the merger, with 53 not voting. (64) It was later suspected that the outcome of this balloting had been affected no little by the payment of over two million yen to those voting in favor of the merger. Obviously, the money came from Communist Party coffers. (65)

However, by mid-September 1946, Lyuh had withdrawn his resignation as chairman of the People's Party, and with the exodus of the more vocal Communist members he had regained control of his party.(66) In fact on 15 September, Lyuh announced that he would make a new start as chairman of the People's Party and warned the Communists to keep their hands off. He also declared that he still favored the merger of the three Left Wing parties but only on terms of the People's Party.(67)

Meanwhile, on 3 September 1946, the Communist-inspired merger of the Communist Party and the Communist elements of the People's Party and the New Democratic Party (a less important Left Wing group headed by Paik Nam Un springing up in the interim) had been effected. The Newly-found South Korean Labor Party (Nam Chosun Lodong Dang) resulting from the merger immediately fell under complete control of the Communist Party members of the Pak faction. Through the medium of this new Leftist front organization, the Pak group apparently thought it would be able to consolidate more effectively political control of the Left.(68)

However, learning of this pending move by the Communist elements and moving rapidly to sabotage the effort and win the day, Lyuh Woon Hyung and two others,

Paik Nam Un (leader of the New Democratic Party) and Kang Chin (anti-Pak Communist), led in the creation of the Socialist Labor Party (Saway Lodong Dang) heralded as a party to include all the Left.(69)

Thus it was that the first year of occupation ended with Lyuh and Pak squared off against each other for Leftist control. Apparently Pak was officially sanctioned by Soviet-controlled North Korean leaders, but strangely enough, Lyuh likewise seemed to bask in the good graces of the Soviet Puppets to the North. Lyuh's great popular prestige may have been the explanation for this apparent contradiction.

The Right Moves for Consolidation

The story of the Right begins on 1 March 1919, when a declaration of independence, signed by a number of Korean patriots, was read before a student gathering in Pagoda Park in central Seoul. The mass passive resistance movement which followed was ruthlessly suppressed by the Japanese, and many of the revolutionary leaders fled the country. On 10 April of that same year a group of these revolutionists met in Shanghai and established the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Great Korea", more simply known as the "Provisional Government."

The Korean Provisional Government from Chungking

The object of this so-called Provisional Government was--and is -- complete independence for Korea and the establishment of itself as the Korean Government. The group was headed by Dr. Rhee Syng Man, Lee Chai Hwal, Lee Si Yung, Kim Kyu Sik and An Chang Ho. Dr. Rhee was proclaimed Premier, and the headquarters was established in Shanghai. Later, following the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the Provisional Government moved to Nanking and finally to Chungking.

In 1921, Dr. Rhee and An Chang Ho attended the Washington Conference at Washington, D.C. and propounded Korean independence. Their efforts failed and dissent soon arose within the Provisional Government. One faction, centering around Kim Koo and Lee Tong Yerng, favored revolution. The other, centering around An Chang Ho, pleaded for more moderate methods of gaining independence. During this period the Kim Koo faction carried out assassination plots against prominent Japanese, and Kim Koo himself gained considerable personal prestige therefrom. In 1935, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government and soon thereafter, ascended to leadership. Rhee, in the meantime, had stepped down from the presidency to become the unofficial representative of the Provisional Government to the United States. This rivalry between Kim Koo and Rhee first manifested in Shanghai in the 1930's carried over into the American occupation of Korea over a decade later.

During the war, the Provisional Government had received *de facto* recognition from the De Gaulle government and tacit recognition from Chiang Kai Shek. Several military academies had been established in China by the Provisional Government, and more than a thousand officers had been trained and had fought with the Chinese Nationalist Army. Estimates of the total strength of this Korean force in Nationalist China run as high as 200,000.(70) In 1940, this force was reorganized by the Provisional Government in Chungking as the *Kwang Bok* (Shine Again) Army, apparently with the support and blessing of Chiang Kai Shek.(71)

That the Provisional Government enjoyed tremendous prestige among the Korean people was undoubted. Moreover, it was assured of a certain degree of active political support from within Korea. Existent in Korea during the war was the Hankook Democratic Party. Although the membership was probably not greatly in excess of 1000, it consisted for the most part of well-educated business men and community elders. Its popular following during the war years was unknown. The organization was purely an informal one and was prohibited from holding meetings for the purpose of obtaining popular support. Soon after the end of the war, but before the American landing, leaders of the Hankook Democratic Party formed the *Kook Min Tai Whei Jun Bi Whei* (Preparatory Committee for the Korean National Congress). This was to have been

a preliminary move leading to the formation of a National Congress in which, it was hoped, all political groups would be represented. Song Chin Oo, leader of the Hankook Democrats, Kim Chun Yun, an early leader of the moderate "ML" Communist group, and Sul Yi Sik, a Seoul newspaper man, led the movement. All had been associated on the Oriental Daily Times (Dong-A Ilbo) and were commonly referred to as the "Dong-A Ilbo Group". On 13 September, five days after the American landing, this committee met and laid plans for andelection, from which the framework and leadership were to evolve for a National Congress. The organization was to extend down to every municipality, province, county and myun, in competition with the organization of the People's Republic. The first representative meeting of the Congress was to have been held in Seoul on 10 January 1946. However, later political events caused the indefinite postponement of the meeting. The importance of this group stemmed largely from its pledge to support Kim Koo's Provisional Government and from its work in laying the political groundwork for the return of the Provisional Government leaders.(72)

At an early date after the American forces landed, the Hankook Democratic Party made the following request of the American Command relative to the Provisional Government:(73)

> That they (the Hankook Democrats) be permitted to invite the Korean Provisional Government, now in Chungking, to come to Korea and that the United States occupation forces authorize and facilitate such a move.
>
> That the United States occupation forces take the Korean Provisional Government officials into their confidence and utilize their services as much as possible.

Before Kim Koo and Dr. Rhee, as well as the other Provisional Government leaders, were allowed to return to American-occupied Korea, the American Command obtained pledges from them that they were entering as private citizens.(74) Wrote Kim Koo in part:(75)

> "I hereby undertake to assure you that I and my colleagues fully understand that we shall be allowed to enter as strictly private individuals and not in any official capacity. I further have the honor to state that on entering Korea we do not expect to function, either collectively or individually, as a government or such body exercising civil and/or political power. Our aim shall be to cooperate with the United States Military Government in establishing order as will benefit the Korean People".

On 16 October 1945 Dr. Rhee landed in Korea from the United States, soon to be followed on 22 November by Kim Koo and fourteen other Provisional Government leaders from China. Others followed before the year's end. As of 11 February 1946, the officials of the Provisional Government were as follows:(76)

President	Kim Koo	
Vice-President	Kim Kyu Sik	
Secretaries of State	Lee Si Yung	Kim Won Bong
	Hwang Hak Soo	Cho Sung Hwan
	Chang Kun Sang	Sawng Choo Sik
	Kim Boong Choon	Kim Sung Sook
	Lyoo Rim	Cho Kyawn Han
		Cho So Ang

Chief of Home Affairs	Shin Ik Hi
Chief of Foreign Affairs	Cho So Ang
Chief of Military Affairs	Kim Won Bong
Chief of Law and Justice	Toh'ei Dong O
Chief of Finances	Cho Wan Ku
Chief of Culture	Kim Sang Dawk
Chief of Publicity	Uem Hang Sup
Chief of Staff	Lyoo Dong Wal

Despite assurances to the contrary, Kim Koo announced at an early press conference, "When I return, the Government of Korea returns."(77) The Provisional Government members even went so far as to hold two "Councils of State" (Hong Chin In presiding) at which current Korean conditions were discussed. Dr. Rhee took a prominent part in these meetings as "Representative to the United States".(78) By December the Provisional Government had announced that it had established a branch office in Chungking, with which it maintained contact by wireless.(78A)

In order to clear up any possible misunderstandings about Kim Koo's Provisional Government, XXIV Corps transmitted the following message to all members of the Command:(79)

> There appears to be general misunderstanding about status of Kim Koo and "Chungking Korean Provisional Government" group. This group is not repeat not in Korea as a Korean government. They are here in the capacity of private citizens and have no commitments or promises from the Allied Powers that they or any other group will be recognized as a government. The establishment of any all-Korean government depends entirely upon developments.

The members of the Provisional Government, however, strained their status as private citizens to the limit and continued to consider themselves as logical candidates for a Korean transitional government. Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, one of the strongest members of the Provisional Government once

commented that the "Provisional Government as now constituted could assume full lead as a transitional government", or become part of such a government, or be relieved entirely, depending upon the wishes of the Korean people. He did not offer, however, any suggestions as to how or where the will of the Korean people could be ascertained. In this respect, therefore, the Provisional Government was considerably behind the People's Republic whose plans, though unauthorized, were well advanced.

Voicing a less tolerant attitude than that expressed by Kim Kyu Sik, Kim Koo commented that he "would brook no interference with his government" once it was established. If opposition arose from the Leftist People's Republic he would deal with them "just as Chiang Kai Shek is suppressing the Yenan government". As to the use of force, he thought it would not be necessary because "our Communists are not organized".(80) Also in violation of the understanding that the officials of the Provisional Government would return as private citizens, there began to appear, during the first week of December 1945, handbills which restated the fourteen points on which the Provisional Government planned to operate.(80A) Military Government scrupulously continued its attitude of non-recognition. When General Arnold was asked by the Korean press on 11 December 1945 whether he would act as a mediator in a union between the Provisional Government and

the People's Republic, he said that the grouping of political parties was entirely a matter for the Korean people. (81)

Another figure who was closely associated with the Kim Koo group and the Provisional Government was General Lee Bum Suk, head of the Kwang Bok Army which had been the instrument of the exiled Korean government in Nationalist China. General Lee and his army made repeated efforts to get back into Korea during the early months of the occupation. General Hodge, for obvious reasons, was just as determined that they should not come except in very small contingents and as individuals. On 23 January 1946, General Hodge pointed out to the Commanding General in China that Kim Koo had violated his promises and he wished no more of his stamp in Korea at that time. He explained that Kim Koo had actually attempted a coup d'etat on 1 January and, therefore, that it was "of utmost importance that Kim Koo's Provisional Government receive no additional support". (82)

Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence

In the meantime, on 23 October 1945, one week after his advent into the Korean scene, Dr. Rhee met with representatives from fifty political and cultural groups to discuss methods of effecting unification of the disintegrated body politic. Out of the meeting came the "Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence" (Dok Lib Chok'ok Sueng Choong Hoe Hyueb Eui Hoey) headed by Rhee. The purpose of this Central Council was to unify all existing political

groups in the movement for independence. As the Communist Party was the only major political group which had not joined the Central Council, Dr. Rhee met with Pak Heun Yung, Communist Party Chief, on 31 October 1945 in an attempt to secure Communist Party support. Pak agreed to participate on the condition that the pro-Japanese elements in the Central Council be eliminated, a proposal which was agreeable to Rhee. Ostensibly, therefore, a loose unification of the major parties was consummated.(83) With all principal factions at least nominally in the fold, the Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence met on 2 November 1945 and unanimously adopted several resolutions which were to be presented to the Allied Powers. The three most pertinent were:

(1) Immediate independence of Korea.

(2) Abolition of the 38 degree boundary line.

(3) Opposition to the proposed Allied trusteeship of Korea.

Following approval of the resolutions, Pak Heun Yung expressed the opinion that the "partition" and "trusteeship" issues were not serious problems. After a prolonged and vehement discussion, a commission was appointed to reexamine the resolutions. Seoul newspapers reported on the following day (3 November) that all political parties represented on the Central Council had approved the resolutions. However, two days later the Communist Party publicly denounced them on the premise that they contained statements which would

lead to misunderstandings and drew criticism from the Allied Nations. On the ground that the resolutions had been finally adopted by a majority vote and therefore constituted the will of the people, the Hankook Democratic and Nationalist Parties refused to accede to the Communist stand. The net result was that the Communist Party withdrew from the Central Council. In retrospect, it might be added that Communist Party reasoning on this score might not have been without outside influence.(84)

On 7 November 1945, Dr. Rhee specifically aligned himself with the Provisional Government which was due to arrive shortly from China. A week later, he decried the presence of "radical elements" which were against "unification" and "independence." It was an indirect bid for the latent nationalist left, but failed. When Kim Koo and his entourage arrived late in November, it soon became apparent that both Kim Koo and Rhee sided with the Right Wing and considered the mere existence of the People's Republic as tantamount to usurping the rightful claims of the Provisional Government.(85)

Likewise late in November, Rhee's Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence appointed an executive Committee. Noting that five of the seven committee members were representatives of the Hankook Democratic Party, Lyuh Woon Hyung, head of the People's Party and formerly

active leader of the People's Republic, completed the defaction of the Left by refusing to participate in the executive committee sessions. A second committee, minus the self-excluded Lyuh, was formed, but this did little to mitigate dissension within the Central Council. Leftist newspapers implied that Dr. Rhee was attempting to set himself up as the head of a transitional government through the Central Council to the exclusion of the People's Republic as well as the recently arrived Provisional Government.(87)

By this time Rhee was lashing out in a series of tirades against the Korean Communists and the People's Republic. These were broadcast to the Korean people during time allotted to him as a news commentator. On 21 December 1945 he said, "I declare to the world that Korea does not wish to have the Communist Party under the present circumstances...They / the Communists / have robbed the people of their property by the use of arms and placed the nation into chaos under the beautiful name of 'Republic' [Korean People's Republic]". On 26 December he said, "We have spared no effort in unifying all the political parties in the recently organized Central Council for quickening independence. But for the few extreme Communists given to making difficulties whenever union is near, it would have proved successful long ago. Waiting for them to come around has delayed it...It is unthinkable that persons who call themselves Koreans should

destroy the national cause in this critical day...If we are betrayed into trusteeship, into slavery, not only the betrayers but also we fighters for independence will be slaves." (87)

To some extent, perhaps this apparent change of Rhee's policy from that of attempting to secure Leftist cooperation to one of condemning it can be explained by a plan which came to light in mid-December 1945. On the 13th of that month the first meeting of the Great Korean Economic Contributor's Association (Taihan Kyun Chai Hokuk Hwai) came into being. The association's self-avowed aims were: (a) to lend support to the Provisional Government, financially and otherwise; and (b) to make it widely known that the wealthy men of Korea were patriotic. The immediate objective was to raise from its membership 20 million yen to be placed at the disposal of the Provisional Government. This project was originally proposed by the members of the Association and later officially approved by Rhee. (88) Although Rhee was specifically named as the intermediary, later he publicly denied any connection with the plan. Actually evidence indicated that Rhee received a good share of the money. (89) No doubt there were strings attached to the receipt of the money by Rhee.

Coincident with this activity on the part of Rhee, the Provisional Government denied that he was speaking for it, saying, "At present, when cooperation with the Left Wing forces is necessary, we are sorry to have heard Dr.

Rhee make a statement to the contrary. If we do not recognize the Left Wing, we will not be able to achieve unification. We have no connection with the Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence." (90) The rivalry between Kim Koo and Dr. Rhee was already causing disharmony within the ranks of the Right. On 30 December 1945, Rightist leadership was further whittled down by the assassination of Song Chin Oo, leader of the extreme Rightist Hankook Democratic Party. Although originally believed to be the victim of a Communist plot, it later developed that there was a strong possibility that Song's untimely demise was actually engineered by Kim Koo out of fear of Song's increasing moderate influence in Provisional Government circles. (91)

The Emergency National Congress

Until the announcement of the Moscow Decision, Dr. Rhee was the principal figure on the Right. However, Kim Koo's violent and dramatic denouncement of the trusteeship principle in late December 1945 momentarily secured the limelight for him. By thus taking advantage of the excitement aroused by the Moscow Declaration on the subject of trusteeship, the Provisional Government called an "Anti-Trusteeship National Mass Campaign" meeting of its followers on 29 December, at which time it was resolved: (92)

1. To demand of the Allied Powers the immediate recognition of the Korean Provisional Government headed by Kim Koo

2. To request the Korean officials working at the Military Government of the United States and the USSR to resign.

3. To dissolve the political parties as soon as possible.

4. To carry out a national strike.

5. To expand the campaign for liberation to minor races in the Far East.

6. To hold national mass meeting against trusteeship.

7. To prohibit all publications which will not cooperate with this campaign.

8. To prohibit radio broadcasting for amusement.

On the evening of 31 December orders were issued from Kim Koo's headquarters to the effect that henceforth the employees of Military Government would take orders from the Provisional Government. Military Government employees went on a temporary strike and a huge parade of Kim Koo's followers wound through the streets of Seoul waving anti-trusteeship banners and shouting "manseii". However, the attempted coup d'etat fizzled. The next day, before the public had been really notified as to what was taking place, General Hodge called in Kim Koo for a private conference, the upshot of which was that Kim Koo offered to commit suicide then and there in a face saving gesture. The General than had to dissuade him from that course of action. A spokesman for Kim Koo broadcast that same evening calling upon the people to cease their demonstrations and strikes. Although the Provisional Government

still declared itself as being unalterably opposed to any kind of trusteeship and further, that the people would rise again if that or anything similar were thrust upon them. (93) Nevertheless, Kim Koo had suffered a serious loss of face in the episode.

On 7 January representatives from the four major political parties---Hankook Democratic, Nationalist, People's, and Communist Parties---jointly issued the following statement on the subject of trusteeship. (94)

> We absolutely support the decision made regarding the Korean problem by the Three-Power Council in Moscow which determined the independence of Korea and promised assistance in the development of Korean democracy, but we wish to have our government in accordance with the spirit of independence.

Before two days had elapsed both the Democratic and Nationalist Parties (the Right Wing faction at the meeting) issued what amounted to disclaimers, thus saddling the two Left Wing Parties with the resolution. By this adroit maneuver, the Provisional Government had seemingly placed the Left in a position which at best reflected a passive reaction to the idea of trusteeship, if not a downright acceptance.

Within a week, on 13 January 1946, Cho So Ang, Chief of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, flatly stated that if trusteeship were established through the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Provisional Government would not join in. Rather, Cho indicated, it would establish a new

government through its own strength by calling a national conference and drawing up a constitution within one year. Obviously, this was in sharp conflict with the Communist-inspired pro-trusteeship stand taken by the Left.(95) With this final crystallization of Left and Right Wing attitudes toward trusteeship during late December and early January, political unity became impossible.

Aware of its failure to achieve political unity, the Right attempted to find a solution to its own internal unity problems. Political fortunes, it was apparently believed, would be decided at the forthcoming sessions of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, and the group with the greatest cohesion and popular following would be in the best strategic position in the formation of an interim government under the Commission. On 17 January 1946, Cho So Ang announced that the Provisional Government would call an urgent political meeting for the establishment of a transitional government, citing as the reason that all previous attempts of the Provisional Government toward unification of parties had failed because of disagreements between Right and Left, with the implication that the fault lay with the Left. On 20 January, the "Preparatory Committee for the Emergency National Congress" met. Dr. Rhee's Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence quickly joined the movement.(96) Some twenty political, cultural, and religious groups

had been invited to participate in this preliminary meeting, among which were included all major political parties, both Right and Left. The Leftists, however, failed to respond. Moreover, on 23 January, Kim Kyu Sik, Kim Won Bong, and three other Provisional Government Leaders led their following, out of the National Congress and out of the Provisional Government on the ground that it did not represent true unification. (97)

Nevertheless, despite these defections, the Emergency National Congress (Bisang Kook Main Hoey) got under way in Seoul on 1 February 1946. The Preparatory Committee had invited some 200 representatives from all major political parties and divers other groups (including the Left) as well as five representatives from each of the 13 Korean provinces. Suffice to say that the Left was conspicuously absent when the Congress met. The highlight of the first session was the almost unanimous election, 102 to 2, of Dr. Rhee as president and Kim Koo as vice-president. Hong Chin and Choi Dong O were named chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. (98) G-2 commented at the time that there were ample indications that the Emergency National National Congress intended to assume the functions of the Provisional Government. (99) The Rightists apparently realized that they needed more support from the Left if the Congress were to succeed, and

a delegation was dispatched forthwith to negotiate with the Left, but without success.(100)

National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence

Meanwhile, on 8 February 1946, the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (hereafter called the NSRRKI) was formed through a merger of Dr. Rhee's "Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence of Korea" and An-Chai Hong's "Central Committee of the Society for General Mobilization against Trusteeship." Provincial representatives were selected and a propaganda section established. Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo were placed in the number one and number two spots.(101) By this time it was apparent that Dr. Rhee was fast gaining control of the Right at the expense of Kim Koo - Provisional Government faction. Actually, the function of the NSRRKI was to provide the provincial organization and propaganda agency for the Emergency National Congress. The reasons for this merger were probably: (a) to overtake the early lead enjoyed by the Left in organizing the provinces; and (b) to present a united Rightist front to the Joint Commission.(102) First concrete evidence that the NSRRKI was progressing with its organization came in an announcement that 24 February would see the beginning of a lecture series which would explain the objectives of the Society

to the public. Provincial and county units were being formed, and propaganda groups were being dispatched to preach the cause.(103)

To coordinate activities and overall policy, representatives from all branches of the HSBRKI met in Seoul on 10 and 11 April 1946. Speaking in behalf of Dr. Rhee and Kim Kyu Sik, neither of whom were present, Kim Koo proposed a slate of central committeemen which was adopted by the convention. However, there were some representatives who resented what they felt was Kim Koo's highhanded designation of office-holders. To one such disgruntled person, according to Corps G-2, Kim privately explained that there had been rivalry between the two original groups within the organization. He added that each group had presented a list of persons desired in office, and he had ironed out the differences between the two lists so as to prevent dissension.(104) The fact that Kim Koo spoke in the name of Dr. Rhee did not quell rumors of differences between the two leaders, rumors which had been given additional force by earlier statements of Dr. Rhee to the effect that he had not yet abandoned his Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Independence.(105)

Nevertheless, Dr. Rhee was installed as president and Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik as vice-president at this April meeting. Conclusion of the organizational details was left to a committee

composed of two representatives from each province with Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo as co-chairman and Kim Kyu Sik as the vice-chairman.(106) Following the conference, it appeared that the complex manoeuvering for power within the NSRRKI had resulted, at least temporarily, in the Kim Koo faction gaining control.

With the adjournment of the Joint Commission, the NSRRKI found new sustenance. The American explanation for the breakdown of the Commission, plus the announcement of the Chiekazaw counterfeit scandal which clearly implicated the Communist Party, had weakened the position of the Left and had, in many minds, enhanced the moral position of the Right. The Society's newly found organizational talent manifested itself with greater fervor, and the provincial branches were exhorted to take up the cause of national independence.(107) The Society grew rapidly and was the first Rightist movement which enjoyed a successful organizational drive in the provinces. It was even reported that an underground membership drive had been initiated in North Korea.(108)

On 10 May 1946, following the Joint-Commission's adjournment, Right Wing groups held a hurried meeting under the auspices of the NSRRKI and resolved to stage a mass anti-trusteeship rally on 12 May. Held on schedule, the mass meeting was hailed as a huge success. Officially

termed an anti-trusteeship rally, the session developed into a demonstration denouncing Communists and the Soviet Union. After the meeting, participants staged an unauthorized parade and demonstrated before the Soviet Consulate and Communist Party Headquarters. Later, Right Wing extremists attacked three Leftist newspaper offices in Seoul, an episode which led to the jailing of On Hah Young, chairman of the meeting, and three others.(109) This reaction of the Right might have been predicted, for the Soviet stand at the Commission sessions made it all too clear that Rhee, Kim Koo, Kim Kyu Sik, and the major Rightist parties had made themselves unacceptable to the Russians for participation in the formation of any interim government--this, by reason of their anti-Moscow Decision (anti-trusteeship) stand.

Dr. Rhee's tour of the provinces, which had been interrupted by the adjournment of the Joint Commission, was resumed late in May 1946 and appeared to be directed primarily toward strengthening of the National Society.(110) Other Rightist leaders were making more frequent appearances in the provinces, and as a consequence, organization of the NSRRKI continued at a rapid pace. Corps G-2 observed that the Right was finally overtaking their opponents' early lead in the field of political organization.(111) This was not taking place, however, without the assistance

of the Korean police. There was abundant evidence that high police officials were closely allied with Rhee and Kim Koo and causing Leftist groups to be harrassed severely throughout South Korea. In May 1946, for instance, it was evident to American observers traveling throughout South Korea that an order apparently had been issued down through Korean police channels to arrest all Leftist leaders, this without the knowledge of American police supervisors. As a result, scores of Leftist leaders were placed in confinement for varying periods of time.(112) Doubt as to where lay the real allegiance of the police continued a source of worry to the American Command.(113)

Dr. Rhee returned from his triumphal speaking tour of the provinces in early June 1946, with the knowledge that his personal popularity was greater than at any other time since his return to Korea. On his tour he had seen at first hand the organizational success of the NSRUKI and had spoken occasionally under the auspices of local aids and units, thereby establishing a more direct relationship. In many communities the local NSRUKI branches had become the successors to the People's Committees, whose popularity and strength had diminished.(114) With this knowledge, Dr. Rhee attended the 10-11 June 1946 Convention of the NSRUKI, the purpose of which was to further coordinate

activities, formulate policy, and to elect a new chairman. It was obvious to all present that the popular backing was Rhee's. However, not all top level personnel were adherents to the personal cause of Rhee. Nevertheless, with the behind-the-scenes maneuverings of the Rhee inner circle, a unanimous election of Rhee to the NSRUKI presidency was managed. In fact, it was so well managed that it gave the appearance that Rhee had been forced to accept. By making it appear so, Rhee was able to condition his acceptance. Declared Rhee at the meeting, "I retain full authority of chairmanship and you obey my directives. I do not like to be a doll. I will do my best to attain complete independence on the basis of your unification and through your organization. One more condition; let us keep away from the formation of any new political faction within our block. Your movement will be purely a national government." He added that he was in "complete accord with Kim Koo, and Kim Kyu Sik. You do not need to feel uneasy in regard to our unification." Kim Koo replied, "I, with you, the representatives of the nation, acknowledge Dr. Rhee's full authority as a leader of the Society, and here let us take a solemn oath to be faithful to the Society and to our leader, Dr. Rhee. Your organization is in the vein of the nation. Directives, information, and decisions will be issued from central headquarters and you will execute them through your organizations."

Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik retained their vice-chairmanships. Messages to the Allies and to the Joint Commission were approved. It was decided that a national movement to reopen the Joint Commission would be inaugurated. If the movement failed, NSRMKI would work independently for the establishment of a government. In addition, the Society indicated its intention to enter the economic field by fostering cooperatives. (115)

In essence, Rhee had succeeded in a minor coup d'etat. Until the June Convention, the influence of Kim Koo and his Independence Party associates had been predominant in the NSRMKI thanks to their packing of the Central Committee at the April Convention. A Military Government political analyst pointed out at the time. (116)

> As the man with the most prestige, a prestige that had somehow surmounted political bungling, and the man who had strengthened his personal hold in the provinces during his speaking tour, Dr. Rhee's power within the Society increased. It was apparent that the bulk of the Right had agreed---tacitly, by force of circumstance, or otherwise---that, if there were to be a separate government [in South Korea] or increased participation of Koreans in Military Government, Rhee would be the leading light.
>
> Dr. Rhee's speech at Chongup [re a separate South Korean Government] whether it was misquoted or not was a certain evidence that the Right was seriously considering a separate government.
>
> Rhee's ascendancy within the NSRMKI culminated at the 10-11 June meeting where he accepted the chairmanship on further stringent conditions. He obviously knew his own power, particularly in the

provinces, and so did the assembled repres entatives. But it was not without significance that he was motivated to remark, 'I am in complete accord with Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik. You do not need to feel uneasy in regard to our unification.' At the time it was presumed that Military Government among others, was not particularly satisfied with Dr. Rhee. With a representative of Military Government as a mediator, Kim Kyu Sik and Lyuh Woon Hyung were negotiating for a more representative unification of Korean political factions. Dr. Rhee was worried.

A joint meeting of the Emergency National Congress, the Representative Democratic Council (refer next section) and the NSHRKI on 6 June 1946 seemed to presage a unification of all the Right--at least, on paper. Rightist leaders undoubtedly realized that competition between parties and loose coalitions did not lead to collective, unified strength. Because of its wide popular basis, the NSHRKI offered the best medium for eventual Rightist unity. (117)

Dr. Rhee's CHQ

However, Dr. Rhee was still striving for more complete control. He realized that the way in which he had managed control of the NSHRKI at the June convention had alienated some of the organization's top personnel. Therefore, he did not have all the support necessary to the degree of authority he had demanded and had outwardly received. Moreover, he was worried about Dr. Kim's coalition effort which, because he (Rhee) was an anathema to the Left, constituted

a more basic unification effort than anything he was capable of managing. The June convention had authorized him to set up a central headquarters for the NSRRKI. Therefore, in a desperate bid for personal power and as a reminder to Dr. Kim's group that Rhee Syng Man still existed and should not be neglected, the latter announced on 29 June 1946 the formation of his "Central Headquarters for the Korean National Society for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence" (118) or, more simply, the GHQ for Korean National Unification (Min Chok T'ong Il Toh'ong Bon Boo).

The actual position of the "GHQ" was not clear at the time, though it was apparently a superstructure imposed on the NSRRKI. Dr. Rhee proclaimed it to be a "non-political body for the national unity" and ordered all parties to join in and obey its command. By the end of the first week of its existence, it was clear that the entire Left Wing had rejected the organization as "reactionary." The fact that Dr. Rhee himself was chairman, Kim Koo, the vice-chairman, and Kim Kyu Sik conspicuously absent, evoked comment. The most prominent of the Right Wing leaders, other than Rhee himself and Kim Koo, were absent from the "GHQ", as were also almost the entire Hankook Democratic Party. (119) For these reasons, Rhee's "GHQ" never became a group of very great importance and slowly faded out of the picture. The NSRRKI remained the main political weapon of the Right, having far surpassed its parent, the Provisional Government, in organization, power and prestige.

That Rhee had, in fact, won control of the Right was demonstrated in August 1946. At that time Lee Si Yung, chairman of the NSRRKI, suddenly expressed his intention to resign from all public positions. Reliable information disclosed that Lee had made this move after quarreling with Shin Ik Hi, vice-chairman of the Society. Shin had presented a petition to the Kyonggi-do Provincial Court requesting the arrest of Kim Won Bong, Chang Kun Sang, and other Leftist leaders who had allegedly accused the NSRRKI of being a terrorist organization. Although the petition had been submitted in the name of the National Society, it did not have the approval of Lee Si Yung, the chairman. This incident and subsequent quarrel with Shin allegedly caused Lee's proferred resignation. The split in leadership of the NSRRKI brought the intervention of Dr. Rhee, who reasserted his authority by requesting all officers of the Society to resign en masse. Confronted with the weight of Rhee's prestige, the oriental psychology inherent in the face-saving measure for the revered elder, and the maneuverings of Rhee's henchmen in the Hankook Democratic Party and Democratic People's Party (led by Lee Chong Yung, owner of the extreme Rightist Dai Dong Press), the Central Standing Committee had no other choice than to comply with Dr. Rhee's

request. Some thirty members of the NSRRKI staff promptly tendered their resignations as a testimonial to Rhee's power.

The next move was to call a national convention of the NSRRKI to elect a new Central Standing Executive Committee. Invitations were issued by President Rhee. On 7 September 1946, approximately 1400 representatives (based on two per province, one for each 군, 읍읍 and 면) assembled in Seoul. With the Rhee group espousing the necessity for unity in the face of internal crisis, a situation which could be handled best by Dr. Rhee, the convention entrusted the nominations for the new Central Standing Executive Committee to Dr. Rhee. His nominations met with immediate opposition on the grounds that: (a) the nominees were primarily political party adherents, a situation contrary to the alleged non-political status of the NSRRKI; (b) some of the nominees were notorious pro-Japanese collaborators with whom no Korean patriot would or could work; and (c) most of the elders went unmentioned. The upshot was that Dr. Rhee agreed to reconsider. The new list, presented on 9 September, became official despite objections identical to those voiced against the original list. The governing body was now strictly a Rhee group.(120)

Dr. Rhee then went ahead with plans to secure Dr.

Kim Kyu Sik for the chairmanship of the NSRRKI, and Kim Seung Soo (head of the Hankook Democratic Party) and Cho So Ang (a leading figure in the Independence Party) as vice-chairmen. (121) As one political analyst pointed out:

> The strategy was grand but transparent. If the negotiations were successful, the leading neutral in South Korea and the man in favor with American policy makers (Dr. Kim Kyu Sik), the leader of the best knit Rightist Party in South Korea (Kim Seung Soo) and a dominant figure in the Kim Koo camp (Cho So Ang) ---all would be answerable to Rhee and the Rhee inner circle. Undoubtedly, the next step would have been to clear up the confused relationships between the Headquarters for the National Unification and the NSRRKI by a formal amalgamation of the two into a super Rhee organization, an organization which, by its very weight, could appreciably influence, if not dominate, any organs entrusted with governmental power by Military Government.

However, none of the three participants in the play refused to act in the assigned roles. Dr. Kim established his position through an emphatic statement to the press refusing in advance any official position. He referred to "ambitions and conspiracies" within the NSRRKI and the "obscure relations" between NSRRKI and Rhee's "GHQ" in his refusal. Kim Seung Soo did not accept on the ground that his duties as head of the Hankook Democratic Party consumed all his time. The statements of Kim Seung Soo and Dr. Kim led Cho So Ang, the third candidate for office in the hierarchy, to the belief that it would not be politic for him to assume an official position in the NSRRKI until

"certain obscurities" had been eliminated. The master plan had failed. By the end of September 1946, the new Central Standing Executive Committee was subject to four changes in personnel. Dr. Rhee commented, "I am having a difficult time in finding persons agreeable to all."(122)

The structure of the Right was analyzed as of September 1946 as follows:(123)

> Individuals in the Headquarters for National Unification (Rhee's GHQ) are representatives of political parties; individuals within the NSRRKI represent themselves and are non-partisan in keeping with the independent character of the NSRRKI. However, Rhee is the dominant individual in both organizations. His relations with both organizations are largely determined by those who surround him...The avowed purpose of the Headquarters of National Unification is to unify political parties at top levels. As a popular movement, supported in spirit and reality by political parties, the NSRRKI is the logical popular basis upon which the Headquarters for National Unification may build for the goal of one, large, all-inclusive, Rightist party. That this is the idea of some people has been clearly demonstrated by recent history.

In this organizational structure of the Right, it was apparent that Rhee was the stabilizing core, a figure with whom the American Command necessarily had to reckon. As of September 1946, the position of Rhee was analyzed thus:(124)

> Dr. Rhee is the most influencial, popular individual in South Korea. As an individual, he

> will retain his influence and popularity---if for no other reason than the ingnorance of Korea's little people, people whose oriental background has prepared them to adopt the mythological halo that, partly by design and partly by the accidents of history, has come to surround the name and figure of Dr. Rhee Syng Man. In an individual sense, therefore, he may be representative of the base (i.e. political base). It may be doubted, however, that his methods, his personal ambitions, and, perhaps, his ideals are representative of the desires of the base. It is extremely doubtful that his inner circle is representative of the base in any sense.

From the foregoing discussion it becomes apparent why, concidental with these political machinations by Rhee to gain control of the Right, the American Command actively entered the Korean political arena in search of a genuinely representative political group on which to base a democratic Korean administration. The first of these attempts was the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea.

The Korean Representative Democratic Council of South Korea

By the end of January 1946, General Hodge was taking steps to create an all-Korean advisory commission to assist him in the formulation of political policy. This culminated in the opening of the Korean Representative Democratic Council on 14 February. In General Hodge's own words, spoken at the opening session: (125)

> It is hoped that the Council will represent their fellow Koreans in advising me on questions of greatest national importance affecting both

the present and future of the nation.....
The establishment of such a group in a council gives one tangible proof of the ability of Koreans to cooperate in a move toward their national goal of independence...Together let us strive for that great objective foremost in all minds--a united, free, truly democratic and independent Korean nation.

Formation

Members were selected carefully so as to assure a truly representative group. The tactful efforts of Colonel Preston Goodfellow, General Hodge's representative, resulted initially in bringing into the fold all but the Communists and extreme radicals.(126) Luring Lyuh Woon Hyung and his People's Party into cooperation was a tortuous process. To detach the People's Party from its uneasy alliance with the Communists, and bring it into working cooperation with the other parties, was the obvious strategy. The People's Party could not be written off as unimportant. Losing ground and uncertain of its leadership, it still commanded a great, loose following, disproportionate to the numbers of its active members. A Military Government political analyst pointed out at the time that "without its [People's Party] participation, a Korean popular governmental agency, as of this date, would be stillborn."(127) When Lyuh was approached, he attached three conditions to his party's entrance into the Council, namely; (a) that the Council must be advisory and not governmental; (b)

that it must take no decision by simple majority vote; and (3) that it must not take up political matters. The first two conditions reflected the belief of Lyuh that four members would be too small a minority to represent his party fairly if the Council were to constitute an actual government. The third condition was mutually understood to be impossible; it would be left to fate and be forgotten.(128)

Twenty-eight representatives were finally appointed and tentatively agreed to serve. Among these were twenty Rightists, four Leftists and four classified as neutral. This list included two women. The original thought had been to include four members of the Communist Party and four from the Chosun Democratic Party of North Korea.(129) This would have included four representatives of all of the major parties then existent. However, the Communists could not be enticed. Pak Houn Yang, the Communist Party leader, repeatedly countered various proposals with, "What will the Russians think of this?"(130) The plan to include North Korean political leaders was apparently deemed impracticable. Therefore, the final list of members consisted of the following:(131)

The Right

Rhee Syng Man	NSRMKI, Provisional Government
Kim Koo	NSRMKI, Provisional Government
Kim Kyu Sik	NSRMKI, Provisional Government
Kim Bong Chin	Provisional Government

Cho Wan Koo	Provisional Government
Kim Chum Yeun	Provisional Government
Kim Chang Suk	Provisional Government
Cho So Ang	Provisional Government
Kim Lyuh Sik	NSRRKI
Whang Hyun Sook (Mrs)	NSRRKI, Patriotic Women's Association
Kim Sun (Mrs)	NSRRKI, Patriotic Women's Association
Pak Nam Koon	Hankook Democratic Party
Paik Kwan Soo	Hankook Democratic Party
Won Sei Koon	Hankook Democratic Party
Kim Do Yeun	Hankook Democratic Party
Kim Pup In	Hankook Democratic Party
An Chai Hong	Nationalist Party
Khoo Yi Sik	Nationalist Party
Pak Yong Hi	Nationalist Party
Ham Dai Yung	Nationalist Party

The Left

Toh'ei Ik Han	Korean People's Republic, Korean Communist Party
Paik Sang Kyu	Korean People's Party
Lyuh Woon Hyung	Korean People's Party
Hwang Chin Nam	Korean People's Party

Neutral

Oh Se Chang	Original signer of 1919 Declaration of Independence
Kwan Dong Chin	Original signer of 1919 Declaration of Independence
Chung In Po	Classical scholar
Chang Myun	A Tchwun Do Kyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) leader

Of these, only Lyuh Woon Hyung and Toh'ei Ik Han failed to take their seats on the morning of 14 February 1946 when the Democratic Council opened its sessions in the Throne Room of the Capitol Building. It seems that the evening before, Uom Heng Sup, Chief of Propaganda for the Provisional Government and chairman of the Committee for Propaganda and Intelligence in the Emergency National

Assembly, had stated publicly, "As soon as a sovereign interim government is formed, the Korean Provisional Government will be dissolved." This statement was reportedly broadcast and appeared in some newspapers dated 14 February.(132) This clearly violated one of Lyuh's conditions for sitting on the Council. Uem went on to announce that Lyuh had asked to be admitted to the congress. This bare-faced lie was duly trumpeted by the reactionary Dai Dong Ilbo (Great Eastern Daily News). General Hodge moved quickly to salvage his program. His statement denouncing the falsehood was broadcast from the Seoul radio station at frequent intervals. But the harm had been done, and Lyuh, now wary and cautious, did not attend the Council. However, two of his delegates attended in his absence, thus holding the door of cooperation open.(133) At least one observer claims that he actually saw Lyuh at the capitol on the morning of the 14 February, but that he was dissuaded at the last moment from taking his seat on the Council by his associates.(134)

Kim Kyu Sik, vice-chairman of the Council, provided the final impetus for the Leftist evacuation of the Council chambers. During the opening session, he read a statement that the membership of the Council had been

chosen by the chairman, Rhee Syng Man, and the other vice-chairman, Kim Koo. Apparently, this provided the Left with final proof that what had been meant to be a non-partisan assembly was in fact a Rightist Council. Lyuh's delegates, Pak Sang Kyu and Hwang Chin Nam, refused to speak. After the session ended, their departure from the Council was announced by the People's Party.(135) The defection of the Left was then complete, and the Representative Democratic Council became representative only of the Right. One political analyst described the situation as follows:(136)

> To the entomologist, the situation presented some interesting contrasts. The Right regarded the 'Provisional Government' as the egg, the Emergency National Congress as the larvae, the Korean Representative Democratic Council as the pupa, and the future government, presumably, as the butterfly. Just how all the beginning phases could exist concurrently, would pose an interesting problem.

Activities

Although the Council maintained enough cohesiveness to express itself on several minor matters (such as recommending a national holiday on 1 March and a return to driving on the right-hand side of the road),(137) this effort to achieve a real union on which a Korean administration might ultimately be based was an abortive one.

General Hodge felt, nevertheless, that he must attempt to keep up the prestige of the Council, gain the backing of the Korean people, and discredit the Communists. He commented at the time that he felt "any other local action would be fatal".(138) Some Koreans heralded the Democratic Council as the first step in the unification of North and South Korea. In the North they saw the North Korean Interim People's Committee established as the central political organ under Soviet tutelage. Heading this group were Kim Il Sawng of the Communist Party as president, Kim Moo Bong of the Korean Independence Alliance as vice-president, and Kang Myung Hwang of the Chosun Democratic Party as secretary. The extreme right Wing Oriental Daily News (Dong-A Ilbo), therefore, concluded that there must have been some understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union in the concidental establishment of these two groups.(139) Actually, both powers were merely jockeying for position in anticipation of the opening of the Joint Commission.

In the meantime, the Representative Democratic Council came under constant attack from the Left. Wing. The Council and the Leftist Democratic People's Front continued to snipe

at each other through the local press. The adoption of the following two regulations by the Council did nothing to alleviate the bitterness:(140)

> The Democratic Council will consist of members of the Emergency National Assembly's Supreme Political Council.
>
> The duties of this council [Democratic Council] are to establish a Democratic Provisional Government, solve urgent political problems, negotiate with foreign nations, and take necessary measures to alleviate other urgent internal problems.

The Leftist-inspired onslaught continued with a personal attack on Dr. Rhee. This had its origin in Korean Independence, a weekly newspaper, published in Los Angeles, California. A 23 January 1946 story in the publication claimed that Dr. Rhee had accepted bribes from an American business man amounting to one million dollars for certain mining concessions in Korea. According to alleged news from Chungking, it was further announced that the Chinese Nationalist Government had cancelled the "Sino-Korean secret pact." The contents of this pact supposedly had to do with offering control of Korean diplomatic affairs to China. The Leftists insisted that Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo were promised three million dollars in exchange for terminating this pact. To these charges, Dr. Rhee answered, "No one who knows us will doubt our integrity, on the contrary, everyone will suspect those people who say such things. Those who make

such foolish statements will be severely punished in the future."(141) The significance of the last phrase did not go unnoticed.

On 18 March 1946, Dr. Rhee, chairman of the Council, submitted his resignation, ostensibly because of poor health. The Council deliberated and announced on 20 March that it would not be accepted. Instead, the Council offered Dr. Rhee a leave of absence. In the meantime, Kim Kyu Sik became acting chairman. There was much speculation as to the true explanation for Rhee's proferred resignation, some believing that he had broken with Kim Koo, and others, that he had put himself in a position where, without prejudicing the Council's interests, he could work outside it in an effort to attract a greater following for its policies.(142) At a joint press conference on 20 March 1946, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik stated frankly,"The Democratic Council is not an advisory body for the Military Government; it is an organ of the people of Korea. The objective of this Council is to aid the Joint Commission in establishing a Provisional Government as provided in the Moscow Communique."(143) Suffice to say that the Joint Commission never reached the point of calling in any

Korean groups for aid. It was apparent by this time, that the Democratic Council had gone far afield from its initial purpose, that of providing a representative group to advise General Hodge.

Other than providing the original inspiration for its organization, the American Command maintained only vague connection with the Democratic Council, even though the Council remained, in theory at least, the official advisory body to the Commanding General until the end of 1946. Certain financial backing was provided, however. Immediately after its inception, for instance, Military Government paid each member of the Council a salary check of 3,000 yen (for one month). The members were insulted, and the checks were promptly returned. By June, an American political advisor had induced Kim Seung Soo, head of the Hankook Democratic Party to contribute one million yen to support the Council. Other individuals contributed smaller sums. By September 1946, the Council submitted a monthly budget to Military Government, a budget which called for a monthly expenditure of 800,000 yen. Military Government made available at that time 2,400,000 yen to cover three months' expenditures. These were the only official funds ever used, although Military Government did provide a motor pool for the

Council. In addition, the Council received some two million yen of the famous twenty million yen fund collected by wealthy Koreans (refer page 57), the funds which Rhee had denied ever existed. It is reported that some ten million yen of the fund went to Rhee personally.(144)

It should be added that in the interim Rhee himself had revived the rumors that he had entered into commercial relations with foreign interests. At a 27 May 1946 press conference he was quoted as saying, "Some of my friends in America have organized a trading firm to cultivate our resources. Mr. Goodfellow is one of the members of the firm, and Mr. Oliver, another member, is on the way here." According to the Communist Choesun Inmin Po (Korean People's Times) of 28 May, Rhee had commented, "I organized the United States Korean Economy Company with Mr. Oliver, Colonel Goodfellow, and other friends...When our government is established, I will give this company monopoly rights."(145) That Rhee did in fact say something along this vein could hardly be denied, even though he later branded the whole story as false.(146) Dr. Oliver's arrival in Korea in the spring of 1946 did not strengthen the denial.

In mid-July 1946, the selection of the Rightist delegates to the Coalition Committee was referred to a joint session of the Democratic Council and the Emergency National Congress (refer page 109). The last important act taken by the Democratic Council was to approve the proposed United States loan to Korea of twenty-five million dollars. Dr. Rhee stated at the time, that the loan was nothing but friendly assistance on the part of the United States. Communist opposition, however, was loud. Corps G-2 commented: (147)

> It should be remembered the loan will aid Military Government in building the shattered economy of South Korea, and, in turn, would be presumed to raise the prestige of Military Government. However, this is contrary to the policy of obstruction pursued by the Communist Party. Then too, the Communist aim is to have Korea look to Russia for help, not to the United States. Opposition to the American loan, therefore, is merely a basic part of their overall strategy.

On the other hand, the Democratic People's Front criticized the Democratic Council for accepting the loan as if it were acting as a Korean government, claiming that it had no right to do so. The Communists frankly branded the loan as a manifestation of American "imperialism." However, Won Sei Hoon, a member of the Democratic Council, struck a telling blow when he accused the Leftists of inconsistency in that they had not similarly criticized the Farmer's Bank in North Korea,

established through the aid of the Soviet Union. He further defended the act of the Democratic Council by stating, "It is not unreasonable that the Democratic Council, which was established with the general approval of the Korean people, consented to accept the proposals of General Hodge in order to solve the present economic problems in Korea."(148) By August 1946, however, the American Command had long since lost faith in both Rhee and the Democratic Council and had turned elsewhere for political assistance in establishing a democratic Korean administration. This change of policy was a significant one.

American Political Policy Changes

The change in policy implied in the following documents is self-explanatory. In essence it was a slow drift away from the Kim Koo-Rhee Syng Man-Provisional Government alignment. On 15 January 1946, the following statement made by Corps G-2 was concurred in by General Hodge.(149)

> It is believed the time has arrived for the reconsideration of special considerations granted the members of the Provisional Government, in particular the authority for certain members to carry arms and special police protection for the group. This recommendation is based on the following considerations:
>
> a. When the members of the Provisional Government first arrived, they came to what was for them a strange land and uncertain

reception. That period of uncertainty has passed. They have been here long enough now to be thoroughly oriented and should receive no more consideration than is due resident patriots who have spent their whole lives in jeopardy.

b. The present regal air which surrounds the members of the Provisional Government is enhanced in no small measure by the show of armed force with which they have been provided. It creates the impression that they have at least tactical support of the United States authorities. As a matter of fact, there is the general impression that such is the case and comments to that effect have appeared in the public press.

c. It would not be surprising therefore if the Russians might not conclude that we are embracing the Provisional Government. At least there are grounds for suspicion that we might treat the Provisional Government out at the proper time for recognition as the interim government. Since it is believed we have no such idea, it would be well to dispell any basis for suspicion prior to negotiations for the establishment of an interim government.

d. It is believed the Provisional Government will have to be broken up prior to the establishment of any interim government. The present time is as good as any to start robbing it of prestige.

e. Revoking authority to carry arms and removal of special police protection would place these individuals on the same plane as other prominent politicians. As a matter of fact, the element of personal danger is not as great for members of the Provisional Government as for some of the other politicians.

f. The present arrangement makes for more freedom of action for the members of the Provisional Government than is enjoyed by any of the other political leaders.

General Lerch added to this by commenting, "Deflation of Korean Provisional Government should be carried out firmly and progressively."(150)

With General Hodge's concurrence, the following directive was issued to General Lerch:(151)

1. You will initiate the necessary action to carry out the recommendations contained in Item #1 of this memorandum (quoted above).

2. The following information is for your guidance in possible future action against the "Provisional Government."

a. It is noted that the "Provisional Government" has announced in the public press that it will not cooperate with any government set up by the Joint United States-Soviet Commission, and further, it proposes to call a National Congress for the purpose of establishing its own Interim government.

b. This government believes that it is time the "Provisional Government" group is broken up. Individuals concerned should cease all affiliation with that organization and should align themselves with one of the established political parties.

c. This headquarters has no intention of permitting the situation to be further complicated by allowing the "Provisional Government" group to call a National Congress or to set up its own Interim Government.

d. It is believed that Dr. Rhee Syng Man and Mr. Kim Koo are necessary individuals in the establishment of any interim government. In the dissolution of the "Provisional Government", it will be necessary to accomplish it in such a way that these two men will be saved for future use.

e. As stated above, the subject matter of this paragraph is advisory in nature. Instructions for the breaking up of the "Provisional Government" group will be furnished at a later date.

Up until this time no political directive in the true sense of the word had been received by XXIV Corps. The initial policy directive received from the Joint Chief of Staff in Washington, dated 29 January 1946, had to do largely with the impending meeting of the Joint Soviet-American Commission. It did however, include the following significant paragraph relative to domestic South Korean political policy.(152)

> With a view to facilitating the creation and smooth functioning of a provisional Korean Government, the United States commander in Korea should, without delay, encourage the various Korean political factions to reach fundamental agreements on the political, economic, and social policies to be applied by the new government, including essential democratic reforms.

This presaged the formation of the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea described in the preceding section. More specific advice was received in early March 1946 from Washington.(153)

> While it is realized that it may be difficult, it is felt that every effort should be made to find leaders in our zone who are neither associated with the Kim Koo group nor the Soviet dominated groups and who will put forth

a firm progressive program for Korea. Such a group should be encouraged to elaborate in detail a progressive program which will stress the four freedoms and basic land and final reforms which would appeal to the vast majority of Koreans, with the effect of winning over to such progressive program people who now believe that the Communist program offers the best hope for them. We should be prepared to give our full backing to such a group as a counterpart to the Soviet-backed Communist groups. Because of their background as exiles, and the fact that they are apparently being supported by the Kuomintang, and the State Department's unsatisfactory experience with Rhee in dealings with him over a period of years, we should not show any favoritism to the Kim Koo and Rhee Syng Man groups. If it should prove impossible to find such a group of progressive leaders, it might be necessary to make a strong effort to force Kim Koo group to adopt and put into effect a progressive program along the lines outlined above.

The American Command was quick to point out (154)
certain fallacies in this line of reasoning.

Analysis of Korean political situation must be with realization that programs [of] all political parties will be quite socialistic and definitely left from United States point of view. Generally speaking, Korean political thought is divided on only one basic issue and that is Communism. Party leadership within groups is a matter of personal following rather than support of party platforms. It is, in other words, a struggle for individual power. These are facts which must be accepted in working out the solution of an interim government.

Korean political parties [are] now aligned [in] two camps. All Right, Center, and Left [of] Center parties are united behind the Representative Democratic Council of Southern Korea under leadership [of] Rhee Syng Man. Extreme left and Communists [are] united [in]

Democratic People's Front under Pak Hoon Yung and Lyuh Woon Hyung.....Democratic Representative Council contains all well known conservative and moderate leaders. Membership of any working council must contain Rhee Syng Man, Kim Koo, and Kim Kyu Sik. It is realized that these men are old, arrogant and intolerant. However, their intolerance is principally of communism. In this, these leaders will have support of great majority of people of Southern Korea. These three leaders are best known of all leaders to Korean people, and we cannot afford to have them in camp of opposition. Saving feature is fact that they are ultra-nationalistic and in spite of personal ambitions will still work for Korea as a whole. I am thoroughly convinced that Korea should have younger leadership, and I have tried and will continue to try to develop younger men who have moderate point of view. Am now screening several apparently able younger men for use in connection with Representative Council.

By early summer it was indicated publicly that American policy had undergone a change. United (155) Press reported on 6 June 1946:

> The American Military Government may scrap its policy of supporting Korean Rightist groups and set up a political advisory council composed of middle-of-the-road politicians, observers predicted today.
>
> Since the occupation of Korea began, the United States has favoured Dr. Rhee Syng Man, chairman of the Representative Democratic Council, Kim Koo, and other Rightist leaders of "Democratic" or "Reactionary" elements, depending upon who discusses them.
>
> Indications are today, however, that the Americans will scrap Rhee's Council in favor of one centering around Lyuh Woon Hong, a Socialist and brother of Leftist Leader Lyuh Woon Hyung.

Some Americans here, however, are pessimistic that the American Command in Korea, under Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, will abandon the Rhee group. It is generally admitted that the United States made a mistake in supporting the Rightists so wholeheartedly and it may be difficult to persuade Korean moderates and Leftists that the United States is experiencing a change of heart.

In July 1946 the first real political directive for Korea arrived from Washington. (156) Significant paragraphs are quoted below:

4. As a further measure to win popular support for United States policies and thus strengthen the United States position in future negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Commander of United States Forces in Korea shall take steps to institute a broad program of constructive economic and educational reforms for Southern Koreans looking toward the creation of conditions favorable to the development of a strong and lasting democratic system in Korea.

Appendix B

9. In particular, the holding of elections to choose an advisory legislative body should enable us to create a Korean leadership in the South which is more truly representative of all Korean political opinion than is the leadership of the present Representative Democratic Council of Southern Korea, which includes no Leftists of any kind. Such a new leadership should prove to be not only stronger but also more acceptable to the Soviet Union than the present Council and, therefore, a factor strengthening rather than weakening the possibility of agreement with the Soviet Union.

10. An agreement not only between the Soviet and United States authorities but also between the various factions in Southern Korea would also be greatly facilitated if certain personalities who have been the storm centers of recent political controversy in Korea were to retire temporarily

from the political scene. There is reason to interpret the collapse of negotiations in the Joint Commission as the result of a clash between United States insistence upon respect for the principle of freedom of speech and Soviet determination to prevent certain avowedly anti-Soviet Korean leaders from participation in a Provisional Korean Government. These leaders constitute a group of older emigre Koreans who have returned to Korea since the capitulation of Japan. They are not thought to be completely representative of Korean political opinion, nor are they felt to be essential to the establishment of Korean democracy or the attainment of United States objectives in Korea. On the other hand, their presence on the political scene greatly increases the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, it can be concluded that the attainment of the United States objectives in Korea is on the whole hampered rather than aided by their participation in Korean politics.

It will be noted that three actions were indicated in the preceding documents: (1) a gradual swing away from reliance upon the Rhee-Kim Koo group; (2) establishment of a middle-of-the-road group; and (3) the formation of an interim legislative body. The first of these has already been dealt with. The second is discussed in the succeeding three sections, each of which describes a certain phase of the effort to establish a group of moderates to assist the American Command in its difficult task of founding a democratic Korean administration. The last phase was the formation of the Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea. This is treated in the

Chapter, "Korean Politics, the Second Year".

The Social Democratic Party

By early spring 1946, American political observers were convinced that Lyuh Woon Hyung, leader of the Leftist Korean People's Party, was being forced to adhere to the Communist Party line even though he himself, was not a party member. The inner circles of his own People's Party gave every appearance of being controlled effectively by the Communist Party, and Lyuh was powerless to act by himself if he wished to maintain leadership of the party organization. Lyuh's powerful potential leadership as a political moderate was therefore lost. Although he had never been openly antagonistic to the American regime, neither had he been overly cooperative. At one point he had voluntarily absented himself from the Representative Democratic Council. Nevertheless, it was becoming apparent to American political advisors that if any sort of political coalition of the moderate Right, Center, and moderate Left were to be achieved, Lyuh Woon Hyung must perforce assume a position of leadership. Both Kim Koo and Dr. Rhee had obviously incurred the wrath of too great a portion of the moderate Right and Center as well as the Left, and therefore had excluded themselves.

Moreover, there was considerable doubt existing in the American minds by this time as to just how democratically inclined Kim and Rhee would be if intrusted with authority.

The initial strategy pursued was that of trying to convince Lyuh of the wisdom and necessity of withdrawing from his alliance with the Communist Party. A number of conversations were held at the Chosun Hotel by Colonel Preston Goodfellow, 2nd Lieutenant Leonard M. Bertsch, Lyuh Woon Hyung, and Lyuh Woon Hong (the younger brother).(157) As of 12 April 1946, upon the basis of these conversations, the attitude of Lyuh the elder appeared to be crystallized against the proposal. Lyuh did state, however, that he did not approve of the Moscow Decision without qualification or reservation, and that he did not favor the domination of Korea by any party or by any power, including specifically the Soviet Union. Upon being told that the viewpoint which he expressed concerning trusteeship would bar him from the government if the Communist viewpoint prevailed, Lyuh stated that he was tired of politics anyway and would welcome retirement.(158)

It became increasingly apparent that Lyuh was not going to make the initial break himself, even though he was reported to be "unhappy" over the situation (i.e. the Communist domination of the People's Party).

Therefore, Colonel Goodfellow and Lt. Bertsch agreed to try to blast Lyuh out of the People's Party by getting his personal friends and advisors to initiate the exodus. Through April 1946, Lt. Bertsch met with Lyuh's friends trying to persuade them to leave the People's Party and set up a new political group free from Communist domination. At one point they were on the verge of actually making the break, only to be forced back into the line by the ill-advised comments of another American official. (159)

Late in April, General Hodge, Colonel Goodfellow, and Lt. Bertsch met and decided to persuade all the leaders they could to desert the People's Party and to support them in forming a new political group. The result was that Lyuh Woon Hong, the younger Lyuh brother, and a handful of "second stringers" left the People's Party. On the evening of 8 May 1946, the day on which the Joint Commission finally broke up, Lyuh Woon Hong announced his desertion from the People's Party. Said Lyuh the younger; in words written by Lt. Bertsch: (160)

> Last November, the People's Party was created, its platform supported by the great mass of the Korean people. We have endeavored to build our new country upon the foundation of this platform. Unfortunately, the People's Party from the beginning was disturbed and misled by the actions of the Communists group, so that the party could not maintain its integrity...

...I have concluded that it is impossible to work for the aims of the People's Party while remaining in it; we have decided to separate ourselves from the People's Party.

This course does not mean that we are going over to the Right. We remain Leftists. We shall be the party of the patriotic Left."

****

The mass of the Korean people oppose trusteeship, but because of the propoganda of the Communists they have not expressed themselves clearly to the world.

The new party of the "patriotic Left", the Social Democratic Party (Sahway Min Choo Dang) made its official debut on 3 August 1946. Corps G-2 commented at the time that the party policies were much like those of other Korean political parties but with pronounced emphasis on opposition to interference by any foreign countries which might desire strategic bases, harbors, or economic privileges in Korea. (161) This platform was adopted upon the advice of Lt. Bertsch and was aimed directly at the "disloyal Left." During the following week, Lyuh Woon Hong accused the Left Wing of insincerity in their attempts to wreck the Left Wing-Right Wing coalition effort.

It was hoped that the Social Democratic Party would be the magnet which would draw the loyal Left out of the Communist-dominated People's Party. When it did not do so, suspicion grew in the minds of

American political observers that the Communists were blackmailing Lyuh in order to assure the use of his prestige for their own purposes. The following report was submitted to Konoye Fodge in early August on the subject: (162)

1. On the basis of hearsay information, it appears to be true that Lyuh maintained highly secret relations with a number of very highly-placed Japanese officials throughout the War. It appears to be the fact that he made between eight and fourteen trips to Japan, on various political missions, between 1939 and 1945. Lyuh himself has admitted to me that he had private interviews with Tojo, Koiso, and with others. Inadvertently, he once stated that when he was last arrested, in the summer of 1945, he protested to the Japanese police that they had no right to arrest him because he had been promised safe-conduct by the Premier personally. This last arrest apparently occured in Pusan, when Lyuh stepped of the boat from Shimonoseki.

2. Lyuh's attitude of fear of the Communists is believed to be inspired in part by the knowledge that the Communists hold certain information, probably documentary, about these activities.

3. Again emphasizing that this particular information is merely hearsay, I have been informed by some individuals close to him that he was the go-between in negotiations carried on between the Russians and Japanese, and these negotiations were aimed at effectuating a final and permanent agreement to keep Russia out of the war.

4. It is believed that in the summer of 1945 Lyuh carried an offer from the Japanese, granting the Russians economic and territorial concessions and agreeing to grant Korea a limited measure of autonomy.

5. If this is true, it is readily conceivable

> that Lyuh is most anxious that it not be made known to the People generally, since successful results of his efforts would have been designed to perpetuating Japanese Sovereignty over Korea."

The result of these speculations was the dispatch of an American officer to Japan to make an investigation of the matter. Official Japanese archives were searched and several persons, formerly high officials in the Japanese government, interrogated. The upshot was that the investigation revealed nothing. No evidence was uncovered revealing Lyuh to be any other than a patriotic Korean leader.(163)

Even though Lyuh Woon Hyung remained temporarily in the People's Party, there was little doubt but that the withdrawal of his younger brother was in part responsible for the tendered resignation of the elder Lyuh from chairmanship of the party on 13 August 1946. Lyuh Woon Hyung had been seriously embarrassed politically by the activity of his younger brother. Faint rumblings of the trouble within the People's Party were disclosed when on 13 August 1946 the Right Wing paper, Dong-A Ilbo (Oriental Daily News), reported that Chang Kun Sang, vice-chairman of the party, had presented a twofold program to Lyuh Woon Hyung...first, that the People's party must cooperate with Military Government; and second, that the

unification movement of the Right and Left must be continued. As Corps G-2 pointed out, these two points were anathema to the Communist Party and could scarcely promote the merger of the People's Party and the Communist Party, a merger which was currently being demanded by the latter. Lyuh Woon Hyung's resignation threw the People's Party into a furor and further accentuated its split into two factions, one favoring unconditional merger with the Communist Party, the other favoring a moderate course and retention of the party name.

On 16 August 1946, at the meeting of the so-called "Expansion Committee of the People's Party", the two factions became deadlocked over the merger issue. It was reported by the Right Wing paper, Chosun Ilbo (Korean Daily News), on 18 August that Chang Kun Sang made use of the stalemate to read Lyuh Woon Hyung's resignation and press the Committee for a decision. As a testimonial to Communist strength within the inner circles of the People's Party, the Committee decided 48 to 31 (with 53 not voting), in favor of unification with the Communist Party--this, in spite of Lyuh's threatened resignation. Thereupon, the moderates opposing unification stomped out of the meeting. Later, the presiding officer, Chang Kun Sang, also withdrew. Lyuh temporarily retired to the country.(164)

The minority continued to maintain that they were the People's Party and that the others were communists who simply had voted themselves out of it.(165) In mid-September, the Central Executive Committee of the People's Party met, Lyuh Woon Hyung presiding. On 23 September it was announced that Lyuh would withdraw his pending resignation. The resignations of the staff members were accepted, although actually all but two remained in office. The important post of Chief of the Propaganda Bureau went to Chang Kun Sang, an advocate of cooperation with Military Government and apparently still the vice-chairman of the People's Party. These moves indicated a strengthening of Lyuh's control over the People's Party and a cleaning from it of Communist elements.(166)

Although the Social Democratic Party of the younger Lyuh had at its peak a membership of only 5,000 members and never gained prominence as a political party, nevertheless, it served a very valuable function by driving a schism between Pak Heun Yung and Lyuh Woon Hyung and freeing the People's Party of Communist domination. These moves made possible the leadership of the elder Lyuh in the formation of the Coalition Committee discussed in the following Section. Failure of the Social Democratic Party to survive as a

significant party was largely due to the lack of strong leadership and adequate financial backing. Actually, the only funds made available to the party were those collected by Colonel Goodfellow from interested Koreans to the amount of 100,000 yen.

The Coalition Committee

By late spring 1946, it had become apparent that the Representative Democratic Council had outlived its usefulness on at least three counts. First, the entire Council was very much persona non grata with the Russians. Second, it was representative only of the Right and, therefore, did not provide the political unity which seemed to be a prerequisite for the reconvening of the Joint Commission and/or the establishment of an all-Korean administration in South Korea. Third, the American Command wished to get away from Rhee's leadership whose motives by this time were suspected by the Americans and loudly denounced by the Russians. A more moderate group and a more representative one was sought so as to give greater prestige to the American efforts in South Korea, strengthen the American position internationally, and eventually to give assistance in setting up a Korean administration.

Lyuh Woon Hyung and Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, moderate

Leftist and Rightist, were the obvious candidates for the leading roles in the new coalition movement. So it was that General Hodge authorized Lt. Bertsch in late Spring 1946 to proceed with sponsoring conversations between these two leaders toward the establishment of the Coalition Committee. These conversations took place at Lt. Bertsch's residence, and under his guidance. The idea, however, was to present superficially a picture of spontaneity on the part of the more moderate Koreanleaders. After the initial meetings had taken place and some area of agreement had been reached, it was suggested that each should invite one more representative. Thereupon, on 14 June, Lyuh brought Hu Hun, leader of the Democratic People's Front, and Dr. Kim invited Won Sei Hun, a member of the Representative Democratic Council and of the Hankook Democratic Party. (167)

The Extreme Right Balks

Meanwhile, the breakdown of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, officially announced 8 May 1946, had blasted the hopes of the Koreans for an early functioning of their own government. This gave rise to considerable sentiment favoring the establishment of a separate South Korean government. (168) This sentiment was exploited by Dr. Rhee Syng Man and the ex-

treme Rightists. By way of opposing this Rightist-inspired idea, Lyuh Woon Hyung in 11 June statement condemned the separate government plan for South Korea. He turned down in advance a "cabinet position" in any such government and urged instead a united organization of the Right and the Left Wings irrespective of the Representative Democratic Council (Right) and the Democratic People's Front (Left) in order to promote the reopening of the Joint Commission. (169)

The results of the 14 June meeting of the embryonic Coalition Committee were made known the next day (15 June) by Won Sei Koon. (170)

Our views coincided on the following three points:

1. The political system of the future Korean government must be that of a bourgeois democracy. The future Korean democratic government must maintain friendly relations with all foreign countries, especially the United States and Russia.

2. We must not attack some of the political leaders of the Right and Left...True patriots will cooperate with one another.

3. It is a most essential matter in the unification of Korea to permit freedom of speech, press, and assembly in North Korea.

This release marked, for the moment, a high point in the movement to form a coalition of moderate Right and Left Wing elements. Uem Hong Sup, propaganda

spokesman for Kim Koo's Independence Party, issued a statement disapproving of the "bourgeois" form of government. This was promptly answered on 20 June by Han Sang Hoon, spokesman for the Representative Democratic Council, who announced that Won's statement had been misunderstood and that he had not meant a "Communist State" by the term "bourgeois democracy." Han also added that Kim and Won had been participating in these "informal conversations" in a strictly unofficial capacity.(171)

Meanwhile, the Left Wing added its objections to Won's claim. Hu Hun held a press conference on 20 June and declared that both Lyuh and he had urged that unification must begin with support of the Moscow Decision. He branded Won's assertion that agreement had been reached as Won's personal opinion. Pak Heun Yung, leader of the Communist Party, added his dissent on 21 June, "... this conference was nothing but an exchange of opinions...As long as the Right Wing parties do not change their attitude concerning the trusteeship problem or reject the pro-Japanese and national traitors, it will be difficult to accomplish unification." The issue of trusteeship, then, was the expressed---if not the actual---obstacle to formation of the coalition group. A XXIV Corps G-2 observer analyzed the situation as follows:(172)

It seemed that, the movement for a separate South Korean government had, in part at least, prompted the Leftists to engage in coalition talks with Rightists. Yet, they were unwilling to budge an inch from their adopted platforms. Pak Heun Yung was emerging as a powerful restraining force on Left Wing moderates. Similarly, among extreme Rightists, Dr. Kim Kyu Sik's flirtations with Lyuh Woon Hyung were not looked upon with excessive favor.

This was the time at which Dr. Rhee launched his General Headquarters for Korean National Unification. Dr. Rhee proclaimed it a "non-political body for national unity" and ordered all parties to join in and obey its commands. Had Dr. Rhee's move succeeded, there is little doubt but that it would have eliminated the possibility of agreement between moderates of the Right and Left. Obviously, Dr. Rhee hoped, by this move, to wreck the unification effort, an effort which was seriously undermining his own prestige. At least one factor in bringing Dr. Rhee's house of cards toppling down was a 30 June statement by General Hodge heartily endorsing the coalition efforts of Dr. Kim and Lyuh and completely ignoring Dr. Rhee's "GHQ". General Hodge declared:(173)

> I have been following with keen interest the reports of the progress being made by Dr. Kim Kyu Sik and Mr. Lyuh Woon Hyung in their current efforts to achieve a greater degree of cooperation and unity among the major political parties of Southern Korea.
>
> While I believe that genuine unity and sincere cooperation should not be imposed from outside, but

can best be achieved through the efforts of the Korean people themselves, working within the framework of the four freedoms, I need hardly state that the American Command fully endorses and supports in every way possible, the efforts of Dr. Kim and Mr. Lyuh.

I have long been aware of the fact that the Korean people have become increasingly weary of political bickering and partisan recriminations. All my sources of information lead me to believe that the overwhelming majority of the Korean people sincerely desire that a basis for cooperation among their leaders be found. I am confident that Dr. Kim and Mr. Lyuh will succeed in replacing the antagonism between the parties with that harmony which the people of Southern Korea desire, need, and deserve from all their political leaders.

All parties and groups approved of the General's statement. Dr. Rhee himself belatedly indorsed the efforts at unification being made by Dr. Kim and Lyuh.(174)

The Coalition Committee Meets

Early in July 1946 it was agreed that the Coalition Committee should broaden discussion. To do so, it was felt that additional members would be necessary. Won Sei Hoon, one of the two Rightist members, proposed that full membership of the Committee should be composed of five Rightists and three Leftists. Lt. Bertsch, the American liaison officer, insisted, along with the Leftists, on parity. The result was that it was determined to enlarge the membership so as to include five Rightists and five Leftists.(175) The Rightists, on their part, referred the matter to a joint meeting of the Emergency National Congress and

the Representative Democratic Council. On 23 July 1946 it was announced that this group had jointly appointed a five-man delegation consisting of Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, Won Sei Hoon, Toh'ei Dong O, An Chai Hong, and Kim Boong Choon---all members of the Representative Democratic Council.(176) The Leftists requested the Democratic People's Front to name the official delegation of the Left. The Front agreed to designate "officially, unofficial delegates." This group consisted of Lyuh Woon Hyung, Hu Hun, Kim Won Bong, Chaung No Sik, and Lee Kang Kook---all members of the Democratic People's Front. Lee Kang Kook was the only known Communist in the group.(177)

On 22 July 1946, the delegates held their first formal preparatory meeting, in the residence of Lt. Bertsch. It was presided over by Dr. Kim. Because of the official nature of the group, it was determined to request the use of the Duk Soo Palace, the headquarters of the American Delegation to the Joint Soviet-American Commission, for future sessions. Meetings were to be held twice weekly. It was further decided that Dr. Kim and Lyuh would act as chairman during alternating weeks. Dr. Kim made a long statement during the meeting saying in part, "We are here tonight because of the pleading of Lt. Bertsch who has acted as the agent of General Hodge and General Arnold. It is sad

that it has had to be a foreigner who had to lead us to cooperation. Heretofore we have been passive; we now become active."(178) Dr. Kim later pointed out that without American help they would never have been sitting around the same table.(179) Thereupon, the question was discussed as to the presence of Lt. Bertsch at subsequent meetings. An Chai Hong commented that some means should be found to assure His presence. Lyuh stated that Lt. Bertsch should continue to act as a neutral to help bring both sides together, and that his presence should be validated by formal invitation of the committee. A letter was composed requesting General Hodge to designate Lt. Bertsch as the American liaison officer to the committee. It was also decided to invite the Soviet command in North Korea to send an observer.(180)

The second official meeting of the Coalition Committee was held on 25 July at the Duk Soo Palace with Lt. Bertsch present as the official American liaison officer. Only Hu Hun was absent. Fourteen regulations under which the Committee would operate were unanimously approved. These were:(181)

1. The purpose of this Right and Left Coalition Committee is to attain complete national independence by accelerating formation of a democratic provisional government.

2. This committee has been created by the designation of five representatives from each side, bringing the total number of Left and Right representatives to ten.

3. It is understood by all parties concerned that decisions of the committee cannot become effective unless consent has been obtained from the respective organizations.

4. No reports, statements, or communiques should be made without the consent of the majority.

5. Minority reports or statements in the event of dissension shall likewise be released through the Committee.

6. All members of the committee agree that they will issue no separate reports or statements or communiques either individually or collectively through the designating organizations other than as outlined in these by-laws of this committee.

7. The committee shall operate under the weekly alternative chairmanship of leaders chosen from the Left and Right.

8. The chairmen of this committee shall have the power to call special meetings or cancel regular meetings by their joint action.

9. Regular sessions of the committee shall be held from 2 p.m. to 5p.m. on each Monday and Friday.

10. No meeting shall be considered official unless attended by at least three representatives from each side. Likewise, no decision shall be considered binding unless approved of by at least three representatives from each side.

11. All items suggested for discussion by either delegation or by any member shall be included in the joint agenda.

12. A press sub-committee shall be created by the chairman and shall be charged with the duty of issuing statements to the press.

13. Two secretaries shall be appointed from each side and they shall be charged with the duty of keeping minutes of all committee meetings. Unless approved and signed by the chairman, minutes of committee meetings shall not be recognized as official.

14. The committee shall designate any other subcommittee as may appear desirable.

Communist Sabotage

Meanwhile, the Communist-inspired Left was doing its best to sabotage the entire coalition effort. When the Committee was formed Pak Heun Yung was noncommittal about it. Apparently puzzled by what his strategy should be, he visited North Korea to learn the party line on the subject. On the night of 22 July 1946 he returned and took a strong stand against the unity movement. In so doing, he first took vigorous action to reassert his position in the Communist Party against opposition which had become bolder during his five weeks absence. He exercised his prerogative as one of the Presidium of the Democratic People's Front and called together the hierarchy of the Front in a special session. Defying his critics within the Communist Party he announced that his right to remain as Executive Secretary of the party had been specifically confirmed at Pyongyang and that any members would be running the risk of incurring severe disapproval in questioning his authority. He further informed his colleagues had received top secret information that the Russians intended to occupy Southern Korea within a maximum of three years and that the occupation would be by negotiation if

possible, but would take place in any event. He reminded his audience that it would not be well to incur the disapproval of the Soviet authorities during the interim. He specifically demanded that the Left withdraw from the unity meeting with the Right, and moved for absolute prohibition of any collaboration in a legislative body.(182) Pak was supported by Lee Choo Han and Hong Nam Pyo of his own party, and by Hur Hun, who was nominally representing the defunct People's Republic. The opposition to Pak was led by Lyuh Woon Hyung and joined in by Kim Won Bong. Pak Nam Un straddled the fence during the debate. Commented an American political observer on the failure of Pak to gain acceptance for his proposals.(183)

> When the Democratic People's Front was organized five months ago it was specifically agreed that all parties would follow the Front. The purpose of this was to bind the alliance in such a way that the other parties could not escape Communist domination. At the moment, at least, this device was against the Communists, for while there is no doubt that Pak is able to reestablish his control of the Communist Party proper, he is at the moment not able to control a majority in the presidium.

Defeated in his first proposal, Pak advanced a "compromise." He would go along with the unity movement if the following five conditions were accepted.(184)

(1) Full and unqualified support of the Moscow Decision.

(2) Immediate release of all political prisoners.

(3) Enactment of a Land Reformation Law similar to the one in North Korea.

(4) Expulsion of "reactionaries" from public life.

(5) The functions of government should be transferred at once from the hands of Military Government to the People's Committees.

These impossible demands were temporarily defeated in the Presidium of the Democratic People's Front, but Pak continued his effort to wreck the coalition movement. A few days later he called a meeting of the five chairmen of the Democratic People's Front Lt. Bertsch reported at this juncture as follows: (185)

> There is a breach of faith in the fact that these five conditions were stated to the newspapers by Pak and his representatives in violation of the agreement that there would be no unilateral releases. Pak's answer to this is that he is not a member of the Unity Committee and is not bound by its agreements.
>
> The attitude of Lyuh Woon Hyung is sound. He has sent out a call to his district leaders to meet with him over the weekend, to plan the fight against the Left Wing. He has also given word to the newspapers friendly to him that he expects to denounce the Pak proposals. He does not know how many of the Unity Committee will continue to meet, but he gives definite assurance that he will continue to work with the Committee and to attend meetings with them irrespective of any action of the governing body of the Front.

Handicapped by the "unauthorized" announcement of the Left Wing's five demands, the Rightist delegation of the Committee attended the third scheduled session of the Coalition Committee on 29 July 1946 only to find the Leftist delegation absent and a messenger waiting in its stead

carrying a letter from the Left, the gist of which was:

> We are waiting for your answer to our five-point proposal. At the same time, we are anxious to receive your counter proposals, and we will be grateful if you will give us a chance to study them. In order to give us enough time for study, we think it desirable to postpone our session until a later date. Further, Mr. Lyuh's condition has taken a turn for the worse, and temporarily he needs medical treatment and rest.

Lyuh had already informed Dr. Kim by private note of his illness and inability to attend. "I have completely lost my appetite", wrote Lyuh. (136) The delegation of the Right held a short caucus and reached the decision to release their eight-point counter proposal as follows: (137)

> 1. To make all possible efforts to bring about the formation of a democratic provisional government embracing both Northern and Southern Korea.
>
> 2. To issue a joint communique urging the United States - Soviet Joint Commission to reconvene.
>
> 3. In accordance with the decision of the Moscow Three-Power Conference, discussions concerning the so-called trusteeship question be initiated following the establishment of a provisional government between the said government and the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission with the basic aim of making Korea an independent nation.
>
> 4. To convene a people's representative assembly to facilitate elections six months after the formation of a provisional government.
>
> 5. To establish a national government within three months after opening of the people's representative assembly.

6. To safeguard future general elections, freedom of organization, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of travel and communication, freedom of suffrage, etc., be upheld throughout the country.

7. Laws and by-laws concerning political, economic and social problems be promulgated by the People's representative assembly.

8. Special legal machinery be set up after the formation of a provisional government to deal with collaborators and traitors.

This proposal was sent to the Left and also given out to the local press. As was expected, the Democratic People's Front condemned the eight proposals as being "reactionary" and "insincere." No further meetings of the Coalition Committee were held after the 29 July session until late in August. During the interim, it will be remembered, the split in the People's Party occurred (see page 102) over the issue of merging with the Communist Party, the result being a smaller but more nationalistically-inclined People's Party, thereby relieving Lyuh, in part at least, of Communist dictates. The Rightists were quick to take advantage of the situation. On 21 August 1946, the representative Democratic Council met and a long discussion of the temporarily defunct Coalition Committee ensued. The result was a public statement reading in part: (133)

> We will not give up this work. We will unite everybody except the extreme unpatriotic elements who have been inspired by external influences. Even among the Leftist leaders there are patriotic Koreans who would join us in uniting all the people.

The only answer from the Left was a comment by the Democratic People's Front on 23 August that the unification movement could not be carried on because of suppression and persecution.(189)

Success

In the meantime, on 22 August, Lyuh visited Dr. Kim for the purpose of discussing unification. On 26 August, representatives of both wings met. The Rightist delegation remained unchanged: Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, Won Sei Hoon, An Chai Hong, Toh'oe Dong O, and Kim Boong Choon. Only Lyuh Woon Hyung and Chaung No Sik were present from the original Leftist delegation. They were joined by Chang Kun Sang (vice-chairman of Lyuh's People's Party), and ten Communists who had revolted against Pak's leadership. The open rebellion in the Leftist camp between the moderate and extremist members had provided the opportunity for the Right Wing to effect political cooperation with the moderate Leftists.(190) On 26 August, General Hodge addressed a letter to Lyuh and Dr. Kim urging them to continue the unification effort. The meetings of the Coalition Committee did, in fact, continue, and under the guidance of Lt. Bertsch it proceeded to enlarge upon the area of

agreement. As of 1 September 1946, a United Press dispatch from Seoul said:

> Well informed persons in constant touch with Korea expressed the opinion that unification of Korea political parties in the southern occupied zone might be accomplished in the near future and thus facilitate proceeding with the American idea of elections to a consultative assembly.
>
> It is believed that a unification might result in both extreme Communists and extreme Rightists in Southern Korea being left out.
>
> These sources said a large middle group which so far has refused to espouse either Communist or Rightist ideas appeared agreeable to a plan for unification of the parties.
>
> Development of a greater degree of autonomy in Southern Korea was said to be part of an American plan to present Koreans in the North with a study in contrasts which is expected to result in Northern Koreans forcing the Soviet into a more tractable position as regards resuming negotiations with the United States for unification of all Korea.

Coincident with this activity, and following General Lerch's warning on 21 August that SCAP Proclamation No. 2 would be invoked in case of actions affecting the safety of occupation troops and of attempted sabotage of military government administration, General Hodge suspended three Leftist newspapers and ordered the arrest of a number of Left Wing agitators.(191) In addition, the arrest of Pak, the Communist leader, and of his chief lieutenants, Lee Kang Kook, was ordered on the grounds of suspected espionage. Both men fled into hiding. This show of firmness, timed with a reiteration of American

policy in Korea by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on 31 August 1946, (192) strengthened the hand of the Lyuh factions in each of the three major Left Wing parties, and they reacted accordingly.

The acting chairman of the People's Party on 7 September 1946 denounced the Communist Party for betraying the other two Left Wing parties and using coercive methods to obtain the alleged acquiescence to the Left Wing merger into the South Korean Labor Party. Within the Communist Party, the dissident or national communists, declaring the merger fraudelent, continued to organize as a separate group. Paik Nam Woon, chairman of the New Democratic (ex Yenan Independence) Party, on 19 September, recommended to his executive committee that it vote for participation in the unity talks. When this was rejected, he resigned the chairmanship. The party rank and file then met on 24 September, refused to accept Paik's resignation, and elected a new committee favoring participation.
As for Lyuh, he returned from his country retreat on 15 August, reassumed chairmanship of the People's Party, and called for the withdrawal of Communists from the ranks. On 17 September, he informed the American Command that he was working to overcome Communist resistance to the American-inspired coalition effort and suggested to General Hodge

that, as a means of keeping alive interest in the unity negotiations, the General issue another special statement commending the efforts of Dr. Kim and the other negotiators without mentioning names.(193) This, General Hodge did on 17 September via the following press release:

Lieutenant General Hodge, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, indicated yesterday that he was in full accord with the statement concerning unification made recently by Dr. Kim Kyu Sik. He said, "In my opinion unification in Korea is a most urgent step that must be accomplished by Koreans before they can hope for any final solution of their national problems. Bitter factionism among Koreans not only confuses and discourages the masses of the Korean people and gives rise to terrorism and disorders, but it is not understood by the rest of the world. It leads to an erroneous belief in many quarters that Koreans lack ability to handle their own affairs and establish a sound government representative of the people.

He pointed out that lack of unity among Korean groups and their inability to reach common grounds of discussion and a common basis to work together toward the rebuilding of their nation have definitely delayed Korean progress and will continue to do so until it is overcome. General Hodge expressed his full confidence in the patriotism and sincerity of those Korean leaders who work unselfishly for unification within their own nation and his hope that early and visible results will soon be forthcoming. He considers the matter of unification to be a problem that must be solved by the Korean people themselves.

Believing that Lyuh represented the majority of Leftists, the American Command pressed him once more to come out unequivocally for unity and to resume formal sessions with Dr. Kim, looking to a joint Rightist-Leftist declaration of unity on national matters and a peti-

tion to General Hodge for establishment of an interim legislative assembly. However, Lyuh stalled on the ground of inadequate Leftist support. Nevertheless, progress was being made in the Coalition Committee. Meetings were held on 7,9,16 and 20 September 1946. However, the personnel of the Leftist delegation changed from one meeting to the next. At the meeting on the 20th, Lyuh Woon Hyung reported that he had presented the following demands of the Communist Party to General Hodge.(195)

1. Retraction of the order for the arrest of Pak Heun Yung and Lee Kang Kook.

2. Release of members of suspended Left Wing papers and the end of their suspension.

3. Demand for a free press.

Lyuh said that these demands had been given to him by Hong Nam Pyo, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of South Korea, and that if the demands were not met, the Communist Party would not participate in any coalition movement.(196)

Obviously, no action was taken on the demands, and the Communist Party remained recalcitrant. At the next meeting of the Coalition Committee, on 23 September, the Anti-Pak Communist group was represented by Kang Soon and Pak Keun Yung. Also present was Chang Ku Rim of the younger Lyuh's Social Democratic Party. The elder Lyuh was absent. It later developed that he had depart-

ed for North Korea, leaving his Seals with two attorneys to "chop in" his name on any agreement they might reach with Dr. Kim. At this same meeting and at subsequent ones, the idea of an interim legislature, first suggested by the American Command, came in for considerable discussion, details of which will be treated in a later chapter. Suffice to point out here that the Americans had specifically directed the Coalition Committee to act on the proposal for establishing an interim legislative assembly in South Korea. In so doing, the Command had indicated a desire to have some decision on the subject by 1 October 1946.(197)

Finally, on 27 September, agreement on seven basic principles was reached by the Coalition Committee among which was one calling for establishment of an interim legislative assembly. Lyuh's representatives balked at signing such important papers as the proposed declaration and pleaded for further delay. A meeting the following day still failed to produce Lyuh. Thereupon Lyuh's men asked for a delay up to 4 October for a final decision. The American Command acquiesced in this and privately considered alternative courses of action in case the unity talks failed. In such event the possibility of a boycott of any American-sponsored program by a large element of the Korean people

was considered to be great.(198) On 30 October, Lyuh Woon Hyung reappeared and reported to the American Command on his trip to North Korea. Political Advisor Langdon radioed the story to Washington, D.C., as follows:(199)

> [Lyuh] A supporter in the North had brought word to him that Communist headquarters was organizing against Military Government a general strike immediately and a popular "revolution" in November in a determined and desperate effort to wreck unity talks and the projected legislature and to discredit our administration in South Korea and hasten withdrawal. Accordingly, he decided to go North and confer with certain contacts on measures to combat this campaign. There he conferred with Kim Il Sawng, head of the North Korean government and Kim Doo Bong, head of the single political (Labor) Party. (The latter was an old revolutionary associate of his and Dr. Kim's), and sought their approval of his forthcoming cooperation with Dr. Kim and with the American authorities and of his fight against Pak's program. He corrected certain misapprehensions in their minds about our administration, policies and aims, and argued that Pak's subversive campaign would lead to widespread violence, clashes with Americans, and discredit of the Korean people generally, with probable prolongation of the occupation. The third member of the North Korean triumvirate, Kim Mu Chong, he found in disfavor both with the Soviet Army and with his two colleagues, but allied with Pak in spreading communism in Korea.

Immediately upon his return to Seoul, Lyuh asserted that he was ready to cooperate with the American Command. On 2 October he stated that he was committed to both the Coalition Group and the proposed legislative body for South Korea.(200) On 4 October, Lyuh signed with

Dr. Kim the seven-article declaration of the Coalition Committee, a declaration which called for:(201)

(1) Establishment of a democratic transitional government in accordance with the Moscow Decision.

(2) Reconvening of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

(3) Land redistribution with little or no compensation to the large land owners and nationalization of important industries.

(4) Punishment of the pro-Japanese and national traitors by the legislative organ acting on the recommendations proposed by the Coalition Council.

(5) Release of political prisoners.

(6) Draft of plans for the legislative organ.

(7) Freedom of speech, assembly, and organization.

This working agreement reached between the two delegations, in effect, paved the way for the establishment of a legislative organ. A letter from Dr. Kim informing General Hodge of the agreement drew a quick response from the latter. On 8 October, the General issued the following statement in praise of the work of the Coalition Committee:(202)

> Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, the spokesman for the Coalition Committee, has officially informed me by letter that the Committee has unanimously recommended the establishment of an interim legislative body for Southern Korea to be participated in by representative democratic elements. I am very happy to hear that representatives of Rightist and Leftist groups have sat together in the interests of Korea and have agreed to recommend this extremely important milestone in the democratic progress of Korea leading toward self-government.

> I regard the establishment of an interim legislature as the greatest step forward to date on the road to Korean national unity and independence. The patriotic zeal of all Koreans who work for full unity of the people is worthy of the highest commendation. In their unity of purpose there is great hope for the future of this country.

The rest of the statement had to do with the establishment of a legislative body.

This was quickly followed, on 12 October, by a statement by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief of the American Delegation, Joint Soviet-American Commission: (203)

> As Chief of the American Delegation to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, I desire to extend my congradulations to the patriotic members of the Coalition Committee, who have worked so zealously for political unity in Southern Korea.
>
> I cannot too strongly stress the importance of political unity. As all of you will understand, the political disunity which has prevailed in Southern Korea has constituted a serious impediment toward progress in Korea and has definitely delayed your independence. The firm establishment of a real working coalition will go far toward eliminating that obstacle.
>
> One of the most valuable of the traditions of all self-governing peoples is the concept that in times of national emergency political differences should be subordinated to the vital necessity of working together for the comman end. We who are greatly interested in seeing this country become a strong democratic nation are particularly pleased to see this sound democratic instinct now asserting itself in Korea. We are pleased also that the Coalition Committee has wisely recognized the need of reaching a still wider measure of unity. The door is not closed. I urge all to join in supporting the coalition effort.
>
> I regard the work of the Coalition Committee as a great step forward. On behalf of the American Delegation, I congradulae all those who have so unselfishly and diligently made these gains possible. It

> is our great hope that this progress will continue and will bring ever closer the attainment of the great goal which we share as our common objective--the independence of a united Korea.

In the Right Wing, the Hankook Democratic Party led the opposition to the statement of principles made by the Coalition Committee. Composed predominantly of large land owners and wealthy businessmen, the party had good reason to look askance at the land reform program proposed by the Coalition Council. The Emergency National Assembly also opposed the seven principles, although Toh'ei Dong O, vice-chairman of the assembly, was one of the Rightist members of the Coalition Council. As for the attitude of Dr. Rhee, (204) Corps G-2 commented:

> Dr. Rhee Syng Man stated that he had nothing to say in regard to the seven principles. It seemed that Dr. Rhee, who draws a great deal of support from the Hankook Democratic Party, could not afford to offend that extremist group by supporting publicly the agreement of the Coalition Council. In addition, he seemed reluctant to boost the ever-rising political star of Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, who only a few months ago had to look up to Dr. Rhee.

Later, however, on 14 October 1946, Dr. Rhee broke his silence and declared his "continued" support of the coalition of the two political wings. On 18 October, Kim Koo also made a statement in which he likewise gave his complete support to Dr. Kim Kyu Sik's work of unification. (205)

In the disorganized Left Wing, a spokesman for the Democratic People's Front maintained that the Leftist delegation which had signed the agreement did not represent the Left. It

was true that, except for Lyuh Woon Hyung, the Leftist Delegation on the Coalition Committee bore no resemblence to the original delegation. However, it had become evident long before that no cooperation would be forthcoming from the extreme Left. Representatives of the Left who had signed the agreement were Chang Kwan of the moderate Social Democratic Party and Pak Kun Woong, an anti-Pak Communist who returned from Chungking, China in March 1946. To the objections of the Hankook Democratic Party were added the voices of the Communist Party and the New Democratic Party. Lyuh's People's Party vigorously supported the seven principles and severely criticized the Communist and New Democratic Parties. It flatly stated that all those opposing unification were traitors of the people. (206)

The Shin Ik Hi Plot

At the 10-11 June 1946 convention of the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NSRRKI), Shin Ik Hi was named to one of the vice-chairmanships as a reward for bringing "his" Special Political Corps (Teuk Byul Chung Chi Boo Dai) into the NSRRKI fold. It soon became apparent that Shin, one of the smoothest, most personable, and shrewdest political operators in South Korea, had ideas of his own. (207)

According to Shin, the Special Political Corps had been established as an organ of the Provisional Government at a secret meeting on 8 December 1945 shortly after the arrival in Korea of the last of the Chungking Provisional Government personnel. Above the Special Political Corps in the hierarchy was established a Political Committee charged with formulation of policy. The Corps, in Shin's own words, was to be a "preparatory organ for future political operations." As Home Minister of the Provisional Government, Shin was entrusted with the task of organizing the Special Political Corps.(208)

On 28 and 29 April 1946, a "Provisional Representative Meeting" of both the Special Political Corps and the political Committee was called by Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo. At that meeting it was decided that a national movement was necessary. Consequently, it was resolved that both the Special Political Corps and the Political Committee should join the NSRRKI. The actual amalgamation did not occur until the June convention of the NSRRKI.(209)

With Shin's assumption of an NSRRKI vice-chairmanship, it was not long before the Special Political Corps was gaining control of the NSRRKI staff functions. The NSRRKI was being referred to, and with justice, as Shin Ik Hi's organization. The personal eminence of Shin had its repercussions. Lee Sei Young, chairman of the NSRRKI and

one of Korea's esteemed elders (usually regarded as an adherent of the Kim Koo Provisional Government cause) became particularly incensed at the actions and success of Shin, who had, in fact, replaced Lee as the organization's top executive. The other vice-chairman, Oh Ha Young, was equally alienated because it had been largely due to his sincere, well-intentioned, and above-board administrative leadership that the NSRRKI had attained the structural strength it possessed by June. (210)

The American Command became particularly interested in the activities of Shin Ik Hi in August 1946 when XXIV Corps CIC agents began picking up information indicating that Right Wing groups led by Shin Ik Hi were planning to take over government buildings and declare an "Independent Government" on 29 August 1946, the anniversary of Korea's formal annexation by the Japanese in 1910. (211) The American Command was further informed that this movement originally had been slated for 15 August, but that Dr. Rhee Syng Man and Kim Koo had vetoed it. Nevertheless, there were indications that Shin Ik Hi planned to carry through with the plan on the 29th. Allegedly, the schedule of events called for first occupying the capitol building and then proceeding to the Chan Duk Palace where the Rightist-inspired government would be declared. It was suspected that Shin

had been obtaining large amounts of money from wealthy men on the promise of prominent positions when a new government was set up.(212)

The plot was rapidly laid bare by CIC. On 16 August, Kim Kwang Soo, a prominent member of the Communist Party and of the Democratic People's Front,(213) was interviewed by a confidential informant. Kim stated that Shin Ik Hi had some kind of control over the police organizations throughout Korea. He further stated that Shin was currently traveling about the country soliciting funds from Rightist leaders in various communities. It was thought likely by Kim that Shin still had in his possession the seal of the Department of Interior of the Provisional Government and was using that to aid in the collections.(214) On 21 August, Chang Duk Soo of the Hankook Democratic Party, informed CIC Headquarters that Shin Ik Hi was plotting to form a provisional government by force tonbe declared on 29 August. Allegedly, Shin had approached several members of the Hankook Democratic Party, as well as Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo, but all had rejected the plan.(215)

The next day, 22 August, Dr. Rhee himself was approached by CIC agents. He stated that he had heard all the rumors concerning Shin's attempts to form a provisional government, but not directly from Shin himself. It was further learned that Rhee had invited shin to his office that afternoon, and

had requested Shin and all of his followers to resign from the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. This action had resulted ostensibly from an altercation arising between Lee Si Yung, chairman of the NSRRKI and Shin, the vice-chairman, over a petition submitted to the Kyonggi Provisional Court requesting the arrest of several Leftist leaders who had accused the NSRRKI of being a terrorist organization. Although the petition had been submitted in the name of the National Society, it did not have Lee's approval.(216) Rhee stated to the CIC agent that the NSRRKI had selected him as director and in that capacity he was responsible for the acts of the organization, but that he did not wish to be held responsible for Shin's acts. Rhee further stated that he had told Shin that he (Rhee) was in a position to assist the Right and Left Wing coalition movement and did not want to be involved in any of Shin's schemes. When asked whether or not Shin would go through with his plans, Rhee stated that he did not know. However, when reporting the interview, the informant expressed the belief that Rhee did not think that Shin would be stopped.(217)

That same day, 22 August, Yoon Chi Young (personal secretary to Dr. Rhee and general secretary to the HQ for National Unification), stated to a CIC informant that Shin had

the following four plans:(218)

(a) To seek recognition of the old Provisional Government on 29 August 1946.

(b) To place new men in this Provisional Government, their positions to be effective on 29 August 1946.

(c) To seek to form a new government for South Korea which would be recognized on 29 August 1946.

(d) To hold a mass demonstration against Military Government, showing its inefficiency and raising a demand for a new government.

Yoon further stated that Shin boasted some seven million followers and the support of some 2,000 branches of the NSRRKI.(219)

On 27 August, two days before the new government was scheduled to appear, Shin Ik Hi was cross-examined by CIC agents.(220) The following questions and answers were recorded.

Q. What are your plans for 29 August?

A. Our group plans to celebrate Humiliation Day by suggesting a proposal which will later be transmitted to General Hodge.

Q. What does this proposal include?

A. It includes the setting up of the Provisional Government group to take over certain of the administrative duties of Military Government. (The following proposals were given to the agent by Shin:

1. Legislative authority to be turned over to the Emergency National Conference.
2. Administrative authority to be turned over to Koreans.
3. Concentrate all of the might of the people to form a transitional government.)

Q. How do you expect to carry out this proposal?
A. We expect to give the proposal to the people at the celebration meeting on 29 August for their approval. The whole matter is being left up to the decision of the people.

Q. Do you consider the group which will attend this meeting to be representative of the Korean people?
A. No, we do not consider it to be representative of the people, but we consider it to be representative of the majority of the people.

Q. Does Dr. Rhee Syng Man know and approve of your plans?
A. Yes, Dr. Rhee knows of the plans, and he does not disapprove.
(Note: obviously either Rhee or Shin was lying.)

Q. Does Kim Koo know and approve?
A. Kim Koo knows of the plans, and he does not disapprove.

Q. If you are given permission by General Hodge to set up this group, how will you put the plan into effect?
A. We will leave that up to General Hodge.

Q. If General Hodge does not approve of your plans, what will be your next move?
A. That I do not know; the committee will have to determine that.

Q. Who heads this committee?
A. Oh Ha Young (Note: Oh Ha Young was fined 20,000 yen and given a three-months suspended sentence by an American Provost Court for troubles resulting from the Right Wing meeting of 13 May 1946 following the breakup of the Joint Soviet-American Commission)

Q. If General Hodge decides to let your group take over, who will fill the positions? Do you have a list of names?
A. I do not know. Rhee Syng Man is the only one who knows; he has the list of names in his possession.

Q. Do you plan a parade after your demonstration on 29 August if the demonstration is approved?
A. No, we do not intend to have a parade; however, certain groups may cause a parade to form, and that will be beyond our control.

Q. Do you remember what happened during the last meeting which your organization sponsored? (Reference to the 13 May 1946 meeting)

A. Yes, that was very unfortunate, and I assure you that such a thing will not happen again.

Q. Why did you submit your resignation to Rhee Syng Man?

I resigned because Lee Sei Young had resigned because of his ill health. In sympathy with Lee, several others of the group submitted their resignations. This was to show our respect to Lee. The resignations are now in the hands of Rhee Syng Man, and we are continuing our duties as usual. (Note: This was another evasion of the truth on the part of Shin. Refer pages 72 and 134)

Q. Was this the reason for Oh Ha Young's resignation also?

A. Yes, his was a sympathetic resignation also.

Q. Do you completely understand the United States Army outlook concerning terrorism and violence against the Military Government?

A. Yes, we understand that there must be no trouble, and we assure you that there will be no violence at the meeting of 29 August unless it is performed by groups not under our control.

Shin Ik Hi was brought to CIC headquarters after a meeting had been called by him of the leaders of the Preparation Committee for the 29 August celebration. At this meeting, a CIC agent explained that the United States government did not allow terrorism in any way, and explained to the group exactly what terrorism meant. Members of the Committee replied individually that they understood and did not plan any trouble for 29 August. They further stated that they would be responsible for notifying all the groups in attendance that no violence would be tolerated and that they would be responsible for any acts which were committed

by members of any of these groups. The committee reported that no parade was planned and that they would make statements to the effect that a parade would not follow the demonstration.(221)

During this time Shin was being interrogated at CIC headquarters, search parties, already assigned, made a complete search of Shin's home and his various residences, including his desk in the headquarters of the NSRRKI. Even Shin's personal portfolio was obtained from one of his aide's. Information collected from these sources was carefully examined by American investigators. Several documents were found to be suspicious in nature, but nothing of an outwardly subversive nature was actually unearthed except the following two inflammatory statements:(222)

> "It is time that we were delivered from these hell-like sufferings by establishment of our government with our own hands and accomplishing our independence"---from a handbill to be distributed at the 29 August celebration.
>
> "In building a separate government, we should get the approval of the Military Government, but the Military Government will not consent because of the international situation. (The article goes on to laud Military Government for cooperation until the present, but requests strong action to have Military Government's help for a new government in the future) ...We will have to discharge all officials appointed by the interpreters of Military Government. After August 1945 all pro-Japanese and national traitors under the Japanese first went into hiding...and later came out to buy off the interpreters so that they would get positions in the provincial governments, the district governments,

and the police. We must clean out all of these people for the sake of the government and the people, and at the same time stop this spirit of dependence on foreign countries. We will have to establish investigation organizers for personnel. We must pick the best man for each position"---Taken from a letter-form manuscript found in Shin's private portfolio.

Humiliation Day, 29 August, was celebrated throughout South Korea without incident, the major celebration being held in the Seoul Stadium by the Right Wing. Approximately 10,000 members of Right Wing parties attended. The speeches given pertaining primarily to the party, were entirely innocuous. However, an attempt was made to introduce plans for provisional government into the meeting, resulting in minor agitation among the spectators, which was quickly broken up by the police. (223) Handbills distributed at the meeting revealed that the slate of officials proposed for the Korean Provisional Government included some twenty positions. Of these only three were given to Leftists; namely Lyuh Woon Hyung and Hu Hun of South Korea and Kim Doo Bong, vice-president of the North Korean Labor Party. The remaining "ministers" were predominately Kim Koo's Provisional Government crowd. The proposed government was headed by Dr. Rhee Syng Man as president, Kim Koo as vice-president, and Dr. Kim Kyu Sik as prime minister. The proposed National Council of thirty-three members included only four Leftists, among whom were the two Communist

leaders, Pak Heun Yung of South Korea and Kim Il Sawng of North Korea. Commented XXIV Corps G-2, "The cabinet is believed to be the brain child of Shin Ik Hi, a prominent Rightist with an unsavory character. Although introduction of the proposed government was attempted by some obscure politician, Shin Ik Hi again is believed to be the responsible person".(224) Apparently, not too much of a stir was made in political circles by the proposed government. On 1 September 1946, however, the Rightist Dai Dong Shinsun (Great Eastern News) reported that Dr. Rhee's GHQ for National Unification had warned the Koreans not to accept the so-called provisional government set up by "irresponsible" persons.(225)

A Military Government political analyst reported, relative to Dr. Rhee's complicity, as follows:(226)

> It was not without significance that the handbill proclaiming the Great Korean republic was disseminated...It is believed that Dr. Rhee was, at least in part, responsible for it...It is believed that the extreme Right was wholly sympathetic to the nature of the handbill--as a test of strength if nothing else. It is known that Shin Ik Hi who has customarily been referred to--depending upon the viewpoint--as a lone wolf of Kim Koo's man, is, in reality, a member of Dr. Rhee's fold. In respect to the NSRRKI, it has been said that Shin may be working for Rhee in a plan to force the NSRRKI back under Rhee's control and

thereby form a basis for the master plan involving Kim Kyu Sik, Kim Seung Soon, Cho So Ang, and the possible amalgamation of the Headquarters National Unification with NSRRKI. It is a plausible theory, a theory supposedly substantiated in part by: (1) the handbill was a trial balloon to determine just how far the coming operations, with NSRRKI as the primary base, could extend; (2) Shin was Dr. Rhee's chief secretary when Rhee was briefly president of the Provisional Government in Shanghai, a fact which supposedly supports the personal ties between Rhee and Shin; (3) Shin says Rhee asked him to remain in one of the NSRRKI's chairmanships, but Shin did not comply because of his need for a "rest." It is said that Rhee's request was not devised to save Shin's face, but was a sincere acknowledgement of Shin's aid and power; (4) Dr. Rhee has admitted that he is trying to obtain for the discredited Shin a responsible position in the Headquarters for National Unification. Such a move would avoid placing Shin directly within the NSRRKI where the sigma he carries would be detrimental to his and Rhee's efforts. But it would place him in a position where he could exert indirect control, and he would be rewarded properly for services rendered.

Apparently, however, Shin Ik Hi was not to be thwarted. On 27 September 1946, CIC reported that there were indications that some 28,000 persons would participate in a general dissatisfaction and hunger strike planned by Shin, by the NSRRKI, and by other groups and individuals. Three demands were to be made of Military Government: (1) recognition of the Provisional Government; (2) the organization of a Korean cabinet composed of Rhee Syng Man, Kim Koo, Kim Kyu Sik, Cho Sung Whan, Kim Chang Soo, Ch Sei Chung, and Rhee Shi Young; and (3) the cessation of American Military Government in Korea, but the retention of American forces. (229) Upon learning this intelligence, General Hodge caustically

commented, "Dr. Rhee promised to step on any activities of Shin Ik Hi along that line. He also promised to hold back the Rightist youth groups."(228)

Nevertheless, on 20 October 1946, CIC reported that Shin's group was still planning to seize governmental power, the date having been postponed to 27 October. Allegedly, Rhee Syng Man had been asked to contribute five million yen to the project. This time the plan called for a mob of from three to four thousand to enter the capitol grounds and occupy the premises without violence. Remaining on the premises, negotiations were to be opened toward the end of turning all administration over to the Chungking Provisional Government group. One of the Rightist "youth" organizations, the Kwang Bok Young Men's Association, was said to be planning the assassination of some of the key Korean members of Military Government.(229) However, 27 October came and went without incident. Apparently, the time was not deemed ripe for the proposed revolution, and it had met with the disapproval of Dr. Rhee. Nevertheless, on 22 October, Shin Ik Hi had been elected as chairman of the Seoul Branch of the NSRRKI, undoubtedly with the tacit approval of Dr. Rhee.(230)

These plots and counter plots, within the ranks of the Right, seemingly lacking in everything but words,

are told because they shed light on events of the second year of occupation. Using hindsight, it becomes apparent that Rhee was, at least in part, directing Shin's activities. Rhee's objective probably was to determine just what method and what time would be most propitious for challenging the authority of Military Government and setting up his own personally-controlled government in South Korea.

Summary

By September 1946 the American Command was being caught squarely in a cross-fire between the extreme Right and Left. It had become painfully obvious during the year that neither side was to be entrusted with governmental authority. To do so would only have meant the merciless oppression of the opposition, for neither the Right nor the Left had given any indication that they had grasped true the nature of representative democracy. Faced with this dilemma, the Americans attempted to find a liberal middle-of-the-road group. The first attempt was the Representative Democratic Council. The Council failed to achieve its purpose when the defection of the Left occurred two days after its formation, a defection intentionally caused by careful maneuvering on the part of the Right Wing. Shortly thereafter, a brisk reversal of

policy was effected by the United States, and the personal cause of Dr. Rhee Syng Man and Kim Koo was deserted in favor of Lyuh Woon Hyung and Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, moderate Leftist and moderate Rightist, respectively. Dr. Kim had already left the field of the Provincial Government. It was with difficulty, however, that Lyuh was enticed out of his Communist-dominated shelter within the Prople's Party. Nevertheless, ultimately both were brought together to lead in the formation of a Coalition Committee. The extreme Left and Right now had a new target for their sniping. Attempts were made by extremists on both sides to sabotage the Coalition movement. First, the Communist-dominated Left withdrew their delegation. Only Lyuh's followers and anti-Pak Heun Yung Communists remained. Then, the Right started a loudly vocal campaign for a separate South Korean government, hinting darkly at plots to seize the government, with or without American approval. Both Right and Left had armed forces at their disposal. On the Right were the police, on the Left were armed units of various types augmented by trained assassins and saboteurs from North Korea. In the middle stood the United States Army, alternately damned by both.

This exasperating situation caused General Hodge to report as early as April 1946 as follows:(231)

Based on six months' occupation, I submit the following summarization:

A. The Korean people are the most difficult of all peoples I have ever encountered. They have only one common idea---independence. Independence means that all should be freed from any distasteful work and from any and all restraints on actions or words. With few exceptions, Koreans are stubborn, are highly contentious among themselves, can only cooperate to the extent that each individual can have his way, have small concept of patriotism of a national basis, are highly volatile and unpredictable, can be easily bought, have low individual integrity, have low capacity for citizenship, are pro-self and anti most everything else. Although they know we are trying to help them, they are highly suspicious of United States motives in Korea, resent need for help as well as any controls, and blame all their national ills on anyone who is not Korea. Their history as a corruptly governed hermit nation before Japanese domination, plus the years as a slave nation of Japan and the high illiteracy rate, operate greatly against their capacity for competent self-rule in modern times.

B. Generally speaking, Koreans fear Russia and Russians, and feel friendly toward the United States, believing that we are willing to help them. However, outside propaganda is making them suspicious of undisclosed United States motives in Korea. Like all Orientals, they tend to follow the man who shows the power. They know almost nothing of the history of the war. The great mass of Soviet troops and heavy material rolling into North Korea and the Russian handling the Japanese ruthlessly both before and after surrender, makes it easy for them to believe Russia is the greatest of all world powers and did the most to drive out the Japs. They are watching the world-wide steamroller tactics and political successes of Russia and the growing political belief that if they don't tie to Russia they are lost appears to be in some degree overcoming their distrust and dislike.

.....

E. Our occupation here has been reasonably successful, and, fundamentally, what we have done is appreciated by thinking Koreans. However, they all expected complete

freedom and independence before or as soon as we removed the Japanese Army, and can see no need for continued occupation. Although the United States Military Government has worked well under tremendous handicap, it has now passed its peak in powers of leadership of Koreans who want their own divergent way in everything..

.....

Q. I am more than ever convinced that there will be a real blood purge in Korea at some stage of her reestablishment. It may or may not come while we occupy, but it will be all the more violent for delay and suppression. Korean people are convinced that they will eventually have to fight for their independence and a strong factor in their idea of independence ranges from a personal matter of removing those not liked to group removal of all those of the opposite political camps, or those in power. Pressed hard enough they would happily open guerrilla warfare against occupying troops of any nation.

This summation was still true as the first year of occupation ended in the fall of 1946.

Footnotes to Chapter II Part II, --- Korean Politics and People, the First Year

1. Press conference with a group of American editors and publishers, statement by General Hodge, 15 Feb. 1947, Historical Journal.
2. JCS 432/23, 29 Jan. 1946, Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Political Policy for Korea", AG files.
3. Letter, Gen. Hodge to Gen. MacArthur, 15 Sep. 1945, AG files; see also I & H Journal, 12 Sep. 1945.
4. Interview with Lt. Gen. Hodge, GC USAFIK, March 1948.
5. Press Releases, Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Information, 6 Oct. 1945.
6. Radio, GC USAFIK (for Benninghoff) to CINCAFPAC ADV, 090417/I, 9 Oct. 1945, AG files.
7. Ibid.
8. Report: "Survey of Political Parties in South Korea", 11 Feb. 1946, Hqs, USAMGIK, Office of Civil Administrator, Signed H. W. Hay, CAS, Civil Administrator, to AG of S, G-2.
9. See Part II, Chapter IV, "American-Soviet Relations, the First Year".
10. Refer files, Hqs, USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Information, Opinion Sampling Section.
11. Ibid.
12. See Part II, Chapter IV, "American-Soviet Relations, the First Year".
13. Interview with 1st Lt. Leonard M. Bertsch, 14 Feb. 1947.
14. Interview with Sal Kook Whan, staff reporter for Korea Pacific Press a leading Korean news agency, 27 Jan. 1947. Mr. Sal has done considerable political research relative to Korea and is believed to be thoroughly reliable.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Memo, Communist Party, CIC File No. 4-44, 10 Aug. 1946, G-2 File GB-2.
20. Interview with Sal Kook Whan, refer foot note 14.
21. "The Communist Party of South Korea, its organization and Activities", 1 Oct. 1946, Hqs USAFIK, G-2, p.1.
22. "The Program of the Communist International", adopted by the Sixth World Congress on 1 Sept. 1928 in Moscow. Reprinted in Blueprint For World Conquest, (Washington, Chicago, 1946, pp. 210-211.

23. Interview with Sul Kook Whan; see foot note 14.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Report, "The Communist Party of South Korea, its Organization and activities", p.1, Oct. 1946, G-2.
27. Interview with Sul Kook Whan, refer note 14.
28. Letter, "Dissension in Communist Party", 224, CIC Detachment, 20 Dec. 1945, G-2 file 7.
29. Political Trends #42, 29 Oct. 1946, HPI, Hqs USAMGIK, Relative to the "Inchon Letter" challenging Pak's leadership. Released to the public on 7 May 1946. See G-2 Weekly Summary #88, 12 May 1946.
30. Political Trends #40, 20 Aug. 1946, HPI, Hqs USAMGIK.
31. G-2 Weekly Summary #2, 25 Sept. 1945, p.3.
32. G-2 Weekly Summary #64, 1 Oct. 1946, Encl. 2, "Revised Who's Who in Korea."
33. G-2 Weekly Summary #2,25 Sept. 1945, p.3.
34. Interview with 2nd Lt. L.H. Bertsch, Political Advisor to the American Delegation, Joint Soviet-American Commission, 16 Aug. 1946, I & E Journal. Bertsch's source of information was Lyuh Woon Hong and is considered to be accurate.
35. G-2 Weekly Summary #2, 25 Sept. 1945, p. 3.
37. Hqs. USAMGIK, Department of Public Information, "Political Trends #17, 20 Jan. 1946.
38. Ibid.
39. Interview with Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, CG USAFIK, 17 April 1946.
40. G-2 Periodic Report #1, 9 Sept. 1945.
41. G-2 Periodic Report #4, 14 Sept. 1945.
42. Ibid.
43. G-2 Periodic Report #25, 5 Oct. 1945.
44. G-2 Periodic Reports #97, 95, 91, and 89, 8-16 Dec. 1945 inclusive.
45. G-2 Weekly Report #7, 21-28 October, 1945.
46. Hqs. USAMGIK, Dep. of Public Info. Political Trends #6, 9 Nov. 1945.
47. Hqs. USAMGIK, Dep. of Public Info. Political Trends #11, 8 Dec 1945.
48. Hqs. USAMGIK, Dep. of Public Info. Political Trends #15, 22 Dec 1945.
49. Hqs. USAMGIK, Dep. of Public Info. Political Trends #7, 14 Nov. 1945; Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.

50. Ibid.
51. Hqs. USAMGIK, Dep. of Public Info. Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.
52. Ibid. See also Radio, TFGBI 44, CG USAFIK (for Langdon) to SCAP, 011433/I 1 Dec. 1945, AG files.
53. G-2 Periodic Report #75, 24 Nov. 1945. See also Radio TFGCG 139, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 241655/I, 24 Nov. 1945 AG files.
54. "Statement from the Commanding General USAFIK", Hqs. USAFIK 12 Dec. 1945.
55. Hqs. USAMGIK, Dep. of Public Info, Political Trends #52, 15 Dec. 1945.
56. Letter referred to is probably one sent to Ha Han by Colonel Nist, Corps G-2, for General Hodge on 28 Nov. 1945, listing the points to which the Korean People's Republic would agree.
57. Political Trends #47, Dep. of Public Info., Hqs. USAMGIK.
58. Radio TFGCG 245, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 2219301, 22 Jan. 1946, AG files.
59. Political Trends #33, 14 May 1946, Dep. of Public Info. Hqs. USAMGIK.
60. Memo, "Communist Party", 2nd Lt. L. M. Bertsch to Major General Arnold, 17 July 1946, G-2 CP-2 file.
61. Radio TFGCG 451, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 040720/2, 4 Aug. 1946, AG files.
62. Radio, TFGCG 467, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 090120/2, 9 Aug. 1946, AG files.
63. Memo, "Split in Communist Party", 9 Aug. 1946, CIC to G-2, CP-3 file.
64. G-2 Weekly Summary #49, 22 Aug. 1946, p. 6.
65. Memo, "In Min Dang (People's Party), Dissension Within", CIC to G-2, 19 Aug. 1946, Source 2nd Lt. L. M. Bertsch, G-2 file 2 A People's Party.
66. G-2 Weekly Summary #55, 3 Oct. 1946, p. 6.
67. G-2 Weekly Summary #54, 26 Sept. 1946, p. 8.
68. G-2 Weekly Summary #63, 29 Nov. 1946; G-2 Weekly Summary #69, 9 Jan. 1947, Inclosure #2
69. Political Trends #42, 29 Oct. 1946, Dep. of Public Info, Hqs., USAMGIK.
70. G-2 Weekly Summary #12, 4 Dec. 1945, p. 5. See also "Report on Relations Between the Korean Provisional Government and China", 18 Jan. 1946, Hqs. USAMGIK Foreign Affairs Section.
71. For early history of the Provisional Government, see also "Korea and the Provisional Government" prepared by Clarence M. Weems, Jr. Captain, AC, 28 Sept. 1945, Hqs. USAMGIK.
72. Report, "Survey of Political Parties in South Korea", 11 Feb. 1946, Insl. 2, Hqs. USAMGIK, Office of Civil Administrator to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, D.C.

73. G-2 Weekly Summary 2, 25 Sept. 1945, p. 6.
74. Report: "Survey of Political Parties in S. Korea", Refer note 72.
75. Letter, Kim Koo to Lt. Gen. A.C. Wedemeyer, CG U.S. Forces in China, 19 Nov. 1945, AG files.
76. Report: "Survey of Political Parties in South Korea", Inclosure 8, Refer note 72.
77. Ibid.
78. G-2 Weekly Summary #12, 4 Dec. 1945, p. 4.
78 A. Political Trends #11, 8 Dec. 1945, p. 2.
79. Message, AG, XXIV Corps to all units and HQ, 5 Dec. 1945, AGO 14 (SWNCC).
80. Report, "Survey of Political Parties in South Korea", Inclosure 8, Refer note 72.
80 A. Political Trends #11, 8 Dec. 1945, p.2.
81. Report of Press Conference, USAMGIK, 11 Dec. 1945, I & H Journal.
82. Radio, WEDI 134, CG USAFIK to CG CHINA, 221815/I, 23 Jan. 1946, AG files.
83. Report: "The National Society for Rapid Realization of Independence", Hqs, USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., 1 July 1946, Prepared by Philip Rowe, Political Analyst.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. G-2 Weekly Summary #15, Dec. 1945.
87. Refer speeches Dr. Rhee Syng Man delivered over radio station JOBK, Seoul, on 21 and 26 Dec. 1945, Hqs USAMGIK, Department of Public Info. files.
88. "Report of the Great Korean Economic Contributors' Association", 15 Dec. 1945, Hqs USAMGIK, Department of Public Information, Prepared by Lt. Richard D. Robinson.
89. Interview with 1st Lt. L.N. Bertsch, Political Advisor to the American Delegation, Joint American-Soviet Commission 7 Mar. 1947.
90. SEOUL SHINMUN (Seoul Times), 21 Dec. 1945. Interview with Chang Kun Sang of the Provisional Govt. staff.
91. Memo, 1st Lt. L.N. Bertsch to Maj. Gen. Brown, 17 July 1946, G-2 file GP-2. Source of info. Won Sei Koon. See also Interview with 1st Lt. L.N. Bertsch, 16 Aug. 1946, I & H Journal. Source of information Chang Taik Sang, Seoul Police Chief.
92. Report, "Survey of Political Parties in S. Korea", inclosure 8, Refer note 72.
93. G-2 Weekly Summary #17, 8 Jan. 1946, p.4.

94. G-2 Weekly Summary #18, 15 Jan. 1946, p. 5.
95. Report: "Survey of Political Parties", Incl. 8, Refer note 72.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. G-2 Weekly Summary #21, 5 Feb. 1946, p. 8.
99. G-2 Weekly Summary #22, 12 Feb. 1946, p. 7.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Report: "The National Society for the Rapid Realization of Independence", Hqs, USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., 1 July 1946, Prepared by Philip Rowe, Political Analyst.
103. G-2 Weekly Summary #24, 26 Feb 1946, p. 11.
104. G-2 Weekly Summary #31, 17 Apr. 1946, p. 9.
105. Report: "National Society for the Rapid Realization of Independence", Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., Prepared by Philip Rowe, Political Analyst, 1 July 1946.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Political Trends #31.
109. Ibid.
110. G-2 Weekly Summary #39, 13 June 1946.
111. Ibid.
112. Report, "Recommended MG Policies in Respect to Public Relations", 6 May 1946, Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., Signed Captain Richard D. Robinson, 1st Lt. Thomas L. Smith, and Pfc Arthur N. Perazo.
113. Interview with Major Brown, Police Inspector, Department of Police, Hqs, USAMGIK, 2 Mar. 1947.
114. Report, "Summary Recent Info., Concerning the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence", 25 Sept. 1946, Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., prepared by Philip C. Rowe, Political Analyst.
115. Report, "National Society for the Rapid Realization of Independence", Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., 1 June 1946, Prepared by Philip Rowe, Political Analyst.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Report, "Summary of Recent Info., Concerning the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence", 25 Sept. 1946, Hqs. USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., prepared by Philip C. Rowe, Political Analyst.
119. G-2 Weekly Summary #42, 5 July 1946, p. 8.
120. Report, "Summary of Recent Info. Concerning the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence", 25 Sept. 1946, Hqs, USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info., prepared by Philip Rowe, Political Analyst.

121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Statement by Lt. Gen. Hodge at the first meeting of the Korean Representative Democratic Council, 14 Feb. 1946.
126. Radio TF900 257, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 261147/I, 26 Jan. 1946, AG files. See also TF981, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 021800/I, 7 Feb. 1946, AG files.
Also radio, TF900 265, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP 281321/I, 28 Jan. 1946, AG files.
127. Political Trends #21, 17 Feb. 1946, Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Pub. Info.
128. Ibid.
129. List submitted by Gen. Hodge to the Dept. of Public Info., Hqs. USAMGIK about 1 Feb. 1946. I & K files.
130. G-2 Weekly Summary #23, 19 Feb. 1946, p. 10.
131. G-2 Weekly Summary #23, 19 Feb 1946, p. 9.
132. G-2 Weekly Summary #23, 19 Feb. 1946, p. 10.
133. Political Trends #21, 17 Feb 1946, Hqs USAMGIK, Dept. of Public Info.
134. Source, Sal Chung Sik, Hqs USAMGIK, Dept of Public Info. and later, secretary to Kim Kyu Sik.
135. Political Trends #21, 17 Feb. 1946, Hqs USAFIK, Department of Public Info.
136. Ibid.
137. Hqs XXIV Corps Info. Bulleting #39, 14 Mar. 1946; see also Hqs USAMGIK Ordinance #68, 28 Mar. 1946 "Regulation of Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic; Hqs USAMGIK Declaration #8, 21 Feb. 1946, declaring 1 Mar. a national holiday.
138. Radio, TF900 302, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 221141/I, 22 Feb. 1946, AG files.
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Part II

Korean Politics: The Second Year

Chapter III

(Rough notes only – filed Bulky Files)

SECRET

Part II

American-Soviet Relations: First Year
Chapter IV

(Rough notes [redacted] filed Bulky Files)

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CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS,

THE FIRST YEAR

Perhaps the most significant of the complex and many-faceted problems facing the XXIV Corps in the occupation of South Korea lay in the field of American-Soviet relations. Only 30 miles north of Seoul the 38th parallel of north latitude bisected the country, and to the north of that line lay the domain of the Red Army, [victorious over the Japanese after five days of crushing victories sweeping across the mountains of Manchuria and North Korea. By the 26th of August the Soviet forces had reached the 38th parallel.](1) deleted by Col. Ekmanis

The 38th Parallel

There has been much discussion as to the origin of this division of Korea at the 38th parallel. Actually, the parallel of latitude only one degree north of the 38th had had historical significance many years before. In the late 1890's Russian influence was on the ascendency in the Korean peninsula. In February 1896, the Korean king, in dire dread of the Japanese who had engineered the assassination of his queen, fled to the Russian legation in Seoul for protection. The Japanese were frankly alarmed at the Russian penetration in this potentially strategic area, Korea being considered by the Japanese strategists as a "dagger" directed at the heart of Japan." Soon thereafter the

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Japanese offered to divide Korea into northern (Russian) and southern (Japanese) spheres of influence, the suggested dividing line apparently being the 39th parallel. However, an accord reached on 9 June 1896, later known as the Lobanov-Yamagata agreement, both parties promised to withdraw their forces from Korea and cooperate in the work of reform. It is possible that later, immediately prior to the war of 1904-05, a similar partitioning of Korea along this line of latitude again was suggested, but this time by the Russians.(2) In any event, the offer was ignored by the Japanese, for they were already planning armed conflict with the Russians and had designs on all of Korea, designs which ultimately saw realization in the formal Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.(3) This historical precedent gave rise to an undercurrent of rumor and suspicion on the part of the Korean people all during the first year of occupation that there was actually some sort of secret agreement to the effect that the Soviet Union would be allowed to maintain control over North Korea, if not actually to organize it as an integral part of the Union, at least to hold it firmly within her orbit of influence.

The first word received by XXIV Corps as to the most recent partition of Korea came on 15 August 1945 in the operations instructions which assigned to Corps the mission of occupying South Korea.(4) Two weeks later, on 29 August, General MacArthur transmitted to General Hodge the information that the

occupation of Korea was to be a four-power affair, and that this had been determined at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945. Although a clear definition of the areas to be occupied by the four powers had not yet been communicated from Washington, United States Army Forces were directed to accept the surrender of Japanese forces south of 38 degrees north latitude.(5)

As early as September, General Hodge reported to CINCAFPAC; "Dissatisfaction with the division of the country grows. Many intelligent Koreans have already reached the conclusion that the Allied Powers have no intention of building up a Korean nation. Older Koreans recall a tentative agreement between Russia and Japan before the Russo-Japanese war for the division of Korea along the same boundry, and believe Russia is again making a bid for this old demand. This division has created a situation impossible of peaceful collaboration with credit to the United States unless immediate action is forthcoming on an international level."(6)

By way of explanation to the Korean people as to the division of their country, General Hodge issued a press release on 7 November 1945 quoting Secretary of State Byrnes to the effect that "because of the distribution of Japanese troops at the time of the surrender, the Allied Governments, through General MacArthur, directed that the enemy forces use the 38th parallel as a means of facilitating their capitulation to the two occupying forces."(7)

The State Department spokesman went on to say that "this operational line was intended to be temporary and to serve only to fix responsibility for the purpose of carrying out the aims of the general order. It was realized, however, that this line, even though temporary, might have the effect of jeopardizing the fundamental unity of the country". (8) It was clearly indicated in this and succeeding statements that the United States was working toward the unification of the country at the earliest possible date.

However, by the spring of 1946, the thought had grown in the Korean mind that the division of the country had been agreed upon at the Yalta Conference of February 1945, and was part of the so-called Yalta secret pact. In March 1946, General Hodge took cognizance of this turn of public opinion and asked for further clarification from the State Department: "Arising from recent news dispatches concerning various secret agreements at Yalta and other conferences, there is a strong and widespread belief on the part of the Koreans that the division of Korea at the 38th parallel was based on one of the secret agreements and was done by the United States for some dark and sinister reason. This is strengthened by local knowledge of the old tentative Russo-Jap treaty prior to 1904." He then requested the State Department to give out a clearcut statement to the press and over the radio as to the origin of the 38th parallel boundary. (9)

At the same time, General Hodge issued another statement to the Korean press, reiterating his previous denial as to the existence of any secret agreement covering the partition of Korea, this in the following words: (10)

> "Judging from the recent trend in the Korean press, there seems to be a growing belief among the Korean people that the 38th parallel boundary between the American and Soviet occupation zones, was established by secret agreement at Yalta or some other meeting of the heads of the Great Powers. This boundary line has no such history. Mr. Byrnes stated in his broadcast of December 13, 1945, 'For purposes of Military Operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of latitude 38° into Soviet and American areas.' This was done as the surrender of Japan became apparent in order to expedite the Japanese surrender, the removal of the Japanese from Korea, and repatriation of Koreans. It is the hope and wish of the Americans that the Joint Commission, to meet in Seoul sometime next week, will be able to remove the restrictions of the 38th parallel in so far as Koreans are concerned."

The following day, in a XXIV Corps Staff meeting, General Hodge further amplified this statement by commenting that "the division was decided upon as a matter of expediency just before the surrender for two reasons; (1) to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese, and (2) to give us a foothold in Korea to prevent the whole of Korea from being run over by communism." (11) All of this was based upon information released by the State Department and substantiated by a statement made by General Frank B. Merrill at a 10th Army staff

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meeting as early as August of 1945 to the effect that the entire question of American occupation of Korea was being discussed on a high political level and that there was a distinct possibility that United States troops might not go there after all.(12)

However, in June 1946, the Institute of Pacific Relations published the categorical statement that Korea was divided at the 38th parallel pursuant to an agreement reached at Potsdam.(13) The discussion was once again revived in October 1946, when the American-Chinese Policy Association addressed a request to President Truman calling for disclosure of the contents of the Potsdam secret pact which allegedly divided Korea into two parts and promised the Soviet a slice of Chinese territory.(14) USAMGIK soon countered with a press release maintaining that information had been received from the Department of State to the effect that the Potsdam Conference had simply indorsed the Cairo Declaration which had promised Korea her independence "in due course" and to which the USSR had been a signatory.(15)

On 24 October 1946, a NEW YORK TIMES dispatch declared: "The decision to allow Russia to occupy the northern part of the country while we occupied the southern half was taken during the Yalta Conference of the Big Three."(16) Four days later the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, was quoted in the Korean press as having told the House of Commons that the occupation of Korea by the two powers with the 38th parallel as the dividing

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line was the outcome of the Yalta secret agreement.(17) An editorial in the WASHINGTON POST reiterated this contention.(18)

That there was in fact a secret agreement entered into at Yalta whereby the USSR gave her pledge to enter into the war against the Japanese three months after the Nazi capitulation in return for certain Pacific concessions (i.e. the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin) seems to be generally accepted.(19) It could therefore be argued that some operational delineation between the two armies might likewise have been determined. However, this is only conjecture. It is likewise reliably reported that the 38th parallel was selected as the border between the two zones by reason of a previous agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union whereby American submarines were prohibited from moving north of the 38th parallel in either the Japan or Yellow Sea. Thus, the partition of Korea at the 38th parallel was merely a land extension of this former delineation of the waters surrounding the peninsula.(19A)

But whatever the truth of the matter, General Hodge was left in doubt and the Korean public left with the belief that secret agreements entered into either at Yalta or Potsdam—probably the former—were at the root of their country's ills. On 27 October 1946, the Korean Democratic Party (HANKOOK MINJU DANG) actually telegraphed a message to the Big Four Powers asking them to repeal the Yalta secret pact and the Moscow

Decision by reason of their violation of the spirit of the Cairo Declaration.(20)

Nonetheless, the sobering fact remained that during the period which this chapter covers—the first year of occupation—not only had the country not been unified, but there was not even a really hopeful indication that such unification would in fact be accomplished within the foreseeable future. This chapter tells the story of that year of largely fruitless negotiations between the two powers.

Prior Instructions

Almost immediately after XXIV Corps received the South Korean assignment, inquiries were directed to higher headquarters relative to liaison with the Soviets. General Hodge radioed CINCAFPAC: "Due to the nature of the Korean occupation, early direct liaison with the Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Forces in the Far East, is highly desirable from the viewpoint of this headquarters. Request information and instructions pertaining to your plans."(21) Evidently an answer was not forthcoming in Manila, for two days later a request was transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington as follows:(22)

> "Inasmuch as the occupation of Korea is to be on a quadri-partite basis, it is requested that this headquarters be furnished at earliest (opportunity) with agreements reached with Allied Powers, especially with Russia, regarding direct contact between commanders of occupational forces in continuous and overlapping areas, together with any pertinent instructions thereon pertaining to Korea. Information urgently required for incorporation in letters of instruction to CG USAFIK."

A week later, a letter of instructions arrived in Corps Headquarters giving preliminary directions governing relations with the Soviet forces in Korea. It was pointed out that, although the United States was clearly authorized to enter Seoul for the purpose of receiving the Japanese surrender, it was desired that the American landing proceed with caution. Prior contact was to be effected with the Russian commander on the ground and necessary arrangements made in order to avoid "untoward incident." It was further directed that "should events indicate that international complications would result, it is desired that the landing be delayed and that you communicate directly with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo giving a full statement of the facts."(23) It was obvious from this that it was not known by American authorities whether or not the Soviets had advanced south of the 38th parallel into Seoul. As a matter of fact, they had not.

The next day, 30 August, CINCAFPAC added to this general dearth of information by radioing Corps, "No information has been obtained from the Russian delegation (in Tokyo) with regard to the situation in Korea. You will be immediately advised when such information becomes available."(24)

The fog of war still hung over the Korean peninsula as XXIV Corps troops landed at Inchon on 8 September 1945.

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Establishing Liaison

The initial problem faced by General Hodge was that of establishing effective liaison with the Soviet 25th Army Headquarters in Pyongyang, the administrative and military capitol of North Korea. Even as the American landing at Inchon was taking place, a radio went out from General MacArthur's headquarters to the Chief of the United States Military Mission in Moscow suggesting that "either direct radio communications between commanders or exchange of liaison officers be initiated." It was also requested that representations be made to Soviet authorities for establishment of direct contact between the commander of Soviet Forces in Northern Korea and the American Commanding General in Seoul in order to facilitate coordination of border security and control. (25) An answer was forthcoming in three days to the effect that the Soviet General Staff had no objections to the exchange of liaison officers. Time and place of the transfer were to be specified later. (26)

It was of interest to all concerned to find that the Soviet Consulate in Seoul was still active upon the arrival of the Americans, the staff never having left its post or been interned by the Japanese. (27) Immediate advantage was taken of this situation to establish direct liaison with the Soviet Commander in the north, and on 11 September a small group of officers from XXIV Corps, accompanied by two officials from the Soviet Consulate, opened rail communication across the 38th

parallel in a special train which arrived at Pyongyang the following day. The party was met by staff officers of the 25th Red Army, and the reception was "cordial but unproductive." However, upon arrival of Major General Nicholai Georgevich Lebedeff of the War Council of the First Far Eastern Front, arrangements were completed for tactical liaison, including radio and telephone communication between the 25th Army and the XXIV Corps Headquarters. On 14 September, the group was sent by rail to Kinsen where it was met by the commander of the 256th Infantry Division and taken to the division command post at Haeju. Arrangements were completed for personal contact between battalion commanders on the ground and for both radio and telephone communication between their command posts. "Complete tactical liaison had been established with the Soviet forces."(28)

During the same visit to the North an invitation was transmitted from General Hodge to the Commanding General of the 25th Red Army, Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov, to fly to Seoul to discuss various pressing economic and political problems toward the end of achieving greater integration of the two zones.(29) Ten days passed, and still no answer was forthcoming. On the 27th the invitation was repeated.(30) It was not until some little time later that the Soviet Commander officially declined the invitation.

The report of this first official American sally into the Soviet zone concluded:(31)

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"Staff discussions concerning some of the economic and political problems caused by the present separation of a formerly closely integrated country into two isolated portions were amicable but unproductive. It is believed that local Red authorities are awaiting instructions in this regard. It is urgently requested that steps be taken to initiate action on a higher level with a view to obtaining economic cooperation between the two occupation zones. The most urgent requirements are: (a) release of coal from the northern part of Korea for operation of railroads and other utilities in the United States zone and to heat buildings; (b) continuous flow of electric power to utilities and essential private industries in Southern Korea; (c) and a coordinated monetary program.....It is recommended that a fully empowered Joint Soviet-United States Commission above a strictly military level be created here immediately to study joint problems and to make appropriate arrangements in regard to immediate political and economic matters."

In the meantime, radio communications had been established with the 25th Red Army by the Corps Signal Officer.(32) Three days later, three radio operators from the 329th Signal Operation Company arrived in Pyongyang to assist the Russians in the transmission of messages.(33)

All of these gains were soon proved illusory, however. In spite of amicable talk, General Hodge reported on 21 September:(34)

"Can get no action out of the Soviet Forces on any point. Still have hope they will live up to the promise that they will move prisoner of war camp to Keije (Seoul), but this has not materialized. We did establish radio communications, after which they would not accept messages.....except where they pertain to Soviet consular affairs and then action is prompt. Query: is anything being done or can anything be done on a higher level to assist?"

Again, on 24 September General Hodge reported on the Russian situation.(35)

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"There is a lack of satisfactory military liaison with the Russians. The 38 degree line creates an insoluble problem which is disturbing the Koreans greatly. Refugees are crossing the line from the North. The only successful arrangement so far concluded with the Russians was the transfer of the Allied PW's from Konan, and even that required a great deal of negotiation. [For full details of evacuation of Allied PW's from North Korea see Chapter 5, pages 11 ff.] Koreans suspect the Russians of reviving their historic designs to partition Korea. There have been few border incidents except that the Russians have turned off the electric power for an area north of Seoul."

The next day a slight gain in Russian relations could be reported with the arrival of a Soviet liaison party in Seoul composed of four officers and a communications detachment.(36) However, they arrived with a threatening protest concerning American planes flying over an area north of the 38th parallel. On the other hand, information was forthcoming that it was believed General Hodge would be "permitted to send a liaison detachment to 25th Army headquarters in a few days."(37)

Likewise on the 25th, the long awaited telephone communication across the boundary was established by one of the Soviet communications detachment simply calling the border and directing a Russian to close a switch. "However, the switch was immediately thereafter reopened, thereby establishing the fact that communication is for the Russians only. Moreover, the intermittent radio that operated at Soviet volition was discontinued by Soviets three days ago."(38)

A number of other incidents marred this period, causing further irritation in Seoul. For instance, a group of American press correspondents attempting to reach Hamden were held under hotel arrest overnight at Pyongyang, and then ordered to return to Seoul. Their requests for an opportunity to see something of Pyongyang were refused.(39)

At the end of September, Lt. Col. James A. Scott, with 1st Lt. A. F. McHenry accompanying him as interpreter, went north as the XXIV Corps Liaison Officer to the 25th Red Army headquarters. But this period of liaison was shortlived: within two weeks time a letter from General Chistiakov arrived in Seoul indicating a brisk reversal of policy. "I consider further presence of my Liaison Officer on your staff in the city of Seoul useless," wrote the General, implying at the same time that the continued presence of the American Liaison Officer in Pyongyang was both useless and undesirable.(40) To Lt. Col. Scott, in Pyongyang, the General commented that he had been directed by the headquarters of the First Far Eastern Front to withdraw his liaison team from Seoul, the reason being that there was little need for permanent liaison prior to the solution of certain economic and political problems. At the same time, General Chistiakov expressed hope that normal liaison activity might be soon resumed.(41) Both liaison parties were withdrawn, the Soviets on 11 October and the Americans on the 13th.(42)

General Chistiakov further explained the situation by letter to General Hodge, saying in part: (45)

> "Taking into consideration the fact that up until now there has been no decision on such questions of principles as the formation of a control committee in Korea, the formation of a Korean government, and the determination of mutual relationships between the zones of Korea occupied by the Soviet and American Armies, I, to my regret, am unable to answer your letter positively since these questions are within the competence of the governments of the USSR and the USA. I believe that only after their solution by both governments will it be possible to begin the consideration and the solution of the questions mentioned by you."

With this exchange of letters began the somber undertone which characterized and menaced all negotiations between the two powers during the first year of occupation, an undertone which could be defined in terms of inaction and delay on the part of the Soviets, intentional or otherwise, as the 25th Red Army forwarded letters from the American Commander to Moscow and awaited the official verdict even on what seemed to be minor matters of administration. General Chistiakov seemed to be empowered with almost no authority whatsoever to negotiate locally with the Americans. Moreover, apparently the Russians possessed no will to cooperate in the rapid solution of the very serious problems besetting Korea. It was as though an intentional stalling for time were the official Soviet policy.

This withdrawal of liaison officers was countered by General Hodge with a request that radio and telegraph commun-

lections nevertheless be maintained between the two headquarters.(44) This was agreed to by General Chistiakov in a letter dated 12 October. Consequently, the three American radio operators remained in Pyongyang maintaining hourly communication with Seoul on a 24-hour schedule. In his letter, General Chistiakov(45) went on to say:

> "I am thankful to you for the appraisal which you gave to my officer, Lt. Colonel Lanin and his group, and I promise that after the settlement of questions which were raised, he will continue to fulfill the functions of carrying out the liaison between our headquarters after the exchange of officers is brought about."

By mid-December 1945 G-2 pessimistically reported as(46) follows:

> "The Russian attitude discouraging liaison or even contact between our respective forces has recently been intensified. A proposed survey or weather reporting facilities in Northern Korea by U.S. Army weathermen was bluntly refused. A more recently proposed inspection trip by Mr. Maury Maverick's commission to study business conditions in North Korea has been ignored."

It should be pointed out that this mutual withdrawal of liaison groups still left a fully staffed Soviet Consulate operating in Seoul through which messages could be channelled. This remained the situation until well after the Joint Soviet-American Conference met in Seoul 16 January--5 February, 1946.

The Soviet Consul

When the Americans entered, the Soviet Consulate General in Seoul was a Mr. Alexander Sergeievitch Polianski.

Connected with the Consulate was a group of 36 persons, including 11 women and 14 children.(47) Polianski, who had been out of communication with his government for some time, expressed a desire to fly to Tokyo with a party of six to confer with the Soviet Ambassador. General Hodge recommended approval;(48) the party was cleared, and on the 19th of September departed for Tokyo.(49) Among other things, the Soviet Consul procured money in Japan to defray expenses in operating the Seoul establishment, but by 12 October he reported that his funds were exhausted and that another trip had to be made.(50) Again permission was granted. No sooner had the Consul's representatives returned to Seoul than they reported to the American Command that they had 90,000 yen in Bank of Japan notes and wished to exchange them for a like amount in Bank of Chosen notes.(51) The matter was referred to SCAP, which pointed out that, if the currency were taken from Japan by the Russian Consul General prior to 15 October 1945, exchange was authorized.(52) Apparently, it was so determined, and there the matter rested.

Along the 38th

Prior to the American landings, there were innumerable rumors flying about that the Russians were advancing with force into South Korea. For instance, on 30 August, XXIV Corps headquarters received a radio from Tokyo stating in part that

"communication from Tokyo to---Keijo (Seoul) has been severed in consequence of the entry of Soviet forces." (53) The next day General Hodge admitted that he had no definite knowledge as to where the Russians were. (54) However, on 3 September, just as XXIV Corps was beginning its movement to Korea, a radio came in from the Commander of the Japanese 17th Area Army in Korea reporting that the Soviet forces had advanced south of the 38th parallel only in the Kaesong area, having occupied that town, selected local officials and removed supplies. At the same time it was indicated that officially the Soviets had not moved with any force into southern Korea. (55) This single large scale infringement might be blamed on poor maps, unfamiliarity with the terrain, and inaccurate instruments, Kaesong being located only some ten miles south of the 38th parallel.

Very shortly thereafter, General Hodge radioed CINCAFPAC: "...believe some Russian troops are advancing south of 38th parallel...Request SCAP direct Soviet commanders to withdraw these troops as rapidly as U. S. forces arrive to take over." (56) By way of answer, CINCAFPAC directed XXIV Corps to request the withdrawal of any Russian troops found south of the 38th, and in the event they refused to do so, to report the circumstances to CINCAFPAC. (57) Upon landing, the Americans found that the Soviets had not appeared in Seoul, but that certain towns closer to the 38th had been, in fact, invested by the Reds.

On 11 September, one company of the 32d Infantry, 7th battalion, arrived in Kaesong and found a few Russian soldiers wandering about, but no units. (58) Some looting was in progress. The American troops were under instructions to avoid creating any incidents, and so acted with tact in informing the Russians they they were supposed to stay on their own side of the 38th. Without a great deal of difficulty they were persuaded to leave the town. It seemed as though these Russians came into Kaesong largely because they were stationed in isolated country areas and this was the only town of any size within a considerable radius. (59) The next day, 12 September, an American roadblock was established north of Kaesong to prevent reentry by the Soviets. (60)

By this time the American press had arrived, attracted to the 38th like hounds on a scent. Richard Johnston of the NEW YORK TIMES described the meetings (61)

> 'In a noisy celebration last night at Kum Kyo (about 25 miles north of Kaesong and north of the 38th), a Russian tank battalion welcomed six U. S. war correspondents who were the first Americans they'd seen since the occupation of Korea.
>
> 'Despite admonitions from Army public relations personnel that Soviet forces were 'hostile', correspondents pushed off from the town of Kaesong.....Twenty miles inside Soviet territory we encountered a column of marching Russians who screamed welcomes,

shook hands, and invited us to their headquarters in this town.

"Major Boris Pamynos, Russian commander in the town, threw his arms around correspondents, shouting, 'Truman, Stalin—Tovarischi!' He ordered a party in honor of the Americans, who drank countless toasts, ate a huge quantity of steaks, and danced with Russian officers .....The Russians displayed their weapons and equipment, slapped the 'Amerikanski correspondenski' backs and were slapped back with equal vigor. Every one had a marvelous evening".

This tumultous evening had its repercussions the next day as two groups of Russians appeared at the roadblock north of Kaesong saying that they had given a big party for American correspondents the night previous and had come to receive the same from their newly made friends. They could not understand the American attitude in preventing their entry after the cordiality they had shown the American press. However, they were told diplomatically that until more information was available, it would be impossible for them to enter the town. With this, apparently the Russians understood and left in good order. (62)

It was later ascertained that the Russians had first moved into Kaesong on 29 August and had evacuated on 8 September, evidently in anticipation of the American entry into the town. Local residents confirmed the many stories of looting by Red soldiers and seemed to be terrified of them, looking to the Americans for protection. (63)

On 25 September, General Hodge ordered that roadblocks be established immediately along the 38th to prevent the entry

of all civilians and military personnel from north of 38. "Positive action will be taken to prohibit infiltration across the border."(64) The border towns were occupied by American forces in quick succession after this, Chunchon on 19 September, Kangnung and Sumchok on the 25th, Uijongbu on the 30th, Yonan and Paekchon in early October, and Ongjin on October 5th.(65) By mid-October some 20 road blocks had been set up along the 38th. The 32d Infantry was assigned the mission of maintaining border security from coast to coast along the 38th.

Facing the Americans was a series of some 18 or 20 Russian roadblocks, each guarded by about six men armed with rifles and tommy guns.(66) As of 17 December 1945 G-2 commented, "the Soviet attitude regarding the 38° parallel is consistent with reports of Soviet policy in other occupied countries. Border outposts are heavily manned and traffic in both directions across the border is strictly controlled. The Russians treat the 38th parallel as a barrier between the occupational forces."(67)

In the meantime, the everlasting series of "air incidents" had gotten well underway. The entire first year of occupation was punctuated by caustic remarks flowing back and forth across the frontier relative to violations of the 38th by aircraft. The pattern was set with the receipt of a letter from General Chistiakov on 26 September which complained that American aircraft were repeatedly flying over Russian-occupied

territory at low altitudes, and requested that an end be put to such practice.(68) General Hodge countered rapidly with the reply that he had forbidden American aircraft to fly over North Korean territory, and the request that he be notified as to the serial numbers of the planes violating this order so that the responsible personnel might be punished.(69) Simultaneously, a radio was addressed to SCAP by XXIV Corps requesting that rigid instructions be issued and enforced forbidding Allied aircraft from flying over Soviet occupied territory without full clearance from USAFIK.(70)

It was inevitable, of course, that the Soviets would be caught in their own web of petty stringency. Within a month, on 24 October, a Soviet plane crash-landed south of Kaesong well within the American zone. Plane and pilots were immediately interned awaiting full explanation from the Soviet Command. It was determined by interrogation of the pilot that the flight had been a routine one, the pilot having lost his bearings and forced to land because of engine trouble. In landing, the plane suffered a broken propeller.(71) The matter was reported to General Chistiakov, and the pilots turned over to the Russian commander on the border.(72) In the meantime, the damaged plane remained as it had landed. It was not until January 1946 that a letter from General Chistiakov arrived in Seoul: "I ask your disposition concerning the repair of the

plane, or, if it is impossible to make repairs by any of your means, then that a pass be given to several of our officers with automobiles or prime mover for towing away the plane to territory north of the 38th parallel." (73) Permission was granted, and the plane was towed away. (74)

Meanwhile, on 21 October, two American planes had made landings in North Korea, one by reason of an error in navigation, the Haejo airfield being confused with that at Kimpo, and the other, because of adverse weather conditions. The first plane was detained for a day and a half, and the second, for three. In both incidents the Americans were treated with hospitality. In the former case, at Haeju, the plane was sealed and guarded while detained, but not inspected. A Soviet general flew down from Pyongyang to inform the Americans that permission to release the plane must be obtained from Moscow. (75) In the meantime, the Russians promised to notify Seoul of the plane's fate. However when the plane was released and had arrived in Seoul, it was found that the Russians had not sent such word to the American Command in Seoul; searching planes had been scouring the country for the missing aircraft.

It will be noted on a map of Korea that the Ongjin peninsula, projecting south from the coast northwest of Seoul, is so intersected by the 38th parallel that the portion lying south of that line cannot be reached over land except by trespassing

on Russian controlled soil. On 10 October a letter was addressed to General Chistiakov relative to utilizing a road through Soviet territory in order to obtain access to the American portion of the Ongjin peninsula. It was specified that traffic would amount only to enough to sustain one rifle company.(76) Ten days later, 1st Lt. A. F. McHenry made a trip to the area to negotiate locally with the Russians on the matter. Evidently, word already had reached the local commanders that permission would be forthcoming, and the trip was successful. Lt. McHenry's report is of interest and is quoted here at some length:(77)

> "Purpose of trip: to make plans for U.S. troops to use the stretch of road north of 38, 25 miles in length, to supply a platoon of the 2d battalion, 32d Infantry, in the vicinity of Ongjin, 95 miles WNW of Seoul. The trip was successful and the U.S. may use the road on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays between 1000 and 1600. There is no limit on the number of vehicles to be used, but the same must move in convoy and will be escorted by Russian troops.
>
> "The Russians, officers and enlisted men, are very very friendly towards all Americans. They openly admire the equipment that we have furnished them during the war. They are quite demonstrative in their eagerness to get along with Americans. They don't consider any hostilities toward the United States. They are believed to be sincere. Lt. McHenry was allowed complete freedom of movement to go anywhere he pleased."

On 25 October, official word was received in Seoul from the Soviet Commander confirming the above arrangement.(78) However, the privilege of using this road through North Korean territory tri-weekly soon was to be summarily curtailed. In early December the privilege was reduced to one trip per week by order of the Soviet Command with no explanation being offered.(79)

Just east of the Ongjin peninsula a minute point of land is shown on American maps as projecting south of the 38th. On this point is located the town of Yong Dang Po. On 9 October 1945 an American party landed at Yong dang po, only to find the Russians in control. General Hodge answered the 7th Division report on the subject as follows: "because of the difficulty of exactly locating the 38° parallel on the ground, no issue will be made over the presence of Russian troops at Yong Dang Po...For the present they will be permitted to remain where they are."(80)

All during the fall and early winter the informal relations between the American and Soviet troops along the 38th were generally cordial and friendly, even though the official attitude exhibited in Pyongyang was one of suspicion and cold correctness. At some border stations, American and Soviet personnel exchanged hospitality at frequent informal dinners and parties, despite strict orders from both commands to the contrary.(81)

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Power Politics in Korea

To understand the relationship of the United States and Soviet forces in Korea, one must appreciate the military situation and the play of power politics in the Far East and elsewhere in the world. As early as 21 September 1945, General Hodge radioed CINCAFPAC saying in part:(82)

> "The following considerations make necessary a larger occupation force in Korea in comparison with a similar sized province in Japan:
>
> ••••••••••••••••••••
>
> c. Presence of Soviet Army in North Korea is known throughout South Korea. Fear of the Russians is great. Presence of United States forces in strength alone will render null consideration of the potentiality of the Russian force in South Korea."

A month later another radio was sent requesting information concerning any Soviet plan which might indicate a tendency to reduce or withdraw Russian armed forces.(83) And in February 1946, at the time when the retention of the 6th Infantry Division in Korea was being discussed, General Hodge radioed that he considered the retention of the division to be essential, saying that "if the command is reduced to 29,000, it is believed that hostile political and foreign elements will strike quickly to discredit the prestige and power of the United States Armed Forces in Korea."(84)

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By December 1945, the Soviet strength in North Korea was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 200,000, and possibly more.(85) However, this estimate was rapidly revamped upwards. By January 1946, General Hodge estimated the Soviet strength to be between 370,000 and 375,000.(86) As to the organization of the Soviet Forces, little detailed information was available by the end of 1945.(87) This much was known:

> "Northern Korea is occupied by the 25th Red Army with headquarters at Heijo (Pyongyang). It is a part of the 1st Far Eastern Front which has headquarters at Khaborovsk, Siberia. Troops of the 25th Red Army are disposed in strength in the Heijo-38th parallel area as well as along the eastern coast of North Korea where the greatest concentration is in the Wonsan-Konan area. Headquarters of an unidentified Corps is located at Kanko in the Wonsan-Konan area. It is possible that a second corps is located in the Heijo-38th° border area, with Sariwon as a likely location. All border troops are believed to be a part of the 25Sth Inf. Div. which has headquarters near the border at Heeju.(88)

Likewise little was known about armament and air strength.

> "It is believed that there are a considerable number of tanks near the border.....A considerable number of 57 mm anti-tank guns were reportedly employed in the Heijo area during October 1945. At the same time, an increase in anti-tank guns and 150 mm artillery was reported in the Kanko area.....Troops are commonly armed with submachine guns (7.62 caliber).....There are two squadrons of

> Yak fighter planes and 1 squadron of Stormovik attack bombers based at the Heijo airfield...The Russians are reported to be using captured Japanese fighter planes.

During this same period it was reported that some of the troops withdrawn from Manchuria had been sent into North Korea.(89)(90)

G-2 summarized the situation by saying:

> "In spite of actions which indicate a limited occupation (i. e. lack of any move to establish a central government, apparent disinterest in befriending the Korean people, looting of industrial equipment) by Russian forces, there are other indications that withdrawal may not be in the immediate future. Troops are being rotated with fresh replacements being brought in. Officer's families are moving into North Korea."

Early in the spring of 1946 American authorities became alarmed at large scale Soviet Army maneuvers taking place under full battle dress along the 38th parallel. Rumors ran rampant among the Korean people that war between the Soviet Union and the United States was imminent, and that Korea would be the battlefield for World War III. In March the situation was reported by General Hodge to SCAP:(91)

> "Recent reports from agents north of the 38th parallel indicate some new activity on the part of the Soviet forces near the boundary, particularly in the Haeju area. We have had similar reports in the past months. Other information indicates that Soviet forces have been directed to undergo strenuous combat training which would account for current activity.

"With my normally understrengthed, poorly trained occupation force and the fixed requirements for performance of tasks, there is little I can do to prevent or delay an invasion of South Korea if the Russians should elect to pursue such a course. From the standpoint of combat, my force's efficiency is near zero. At best, my troops north of an east and west line through Seoul would constitute only a screen to give warning of an offensive move south. Any modification of my current occupational activity in attempt to gain any degree of combat efficiency in opposing a Soviet move would result in serious disruption of handling South Korean affairs, would be known to the Russians and might lead to an incident. I propose to continue as at present without any shift of troops or preparations of delaying positions, but with plans for concentrations and movements of troops. For security purposes, these plans would be concealed under need to meet civilian crisis in northern areas of my zone. Request any comment you may have and any information available to you as to probable Soviet action".

Alarming reports continued to come into Corps G-2 from both agents and refugees from North Korea. Air raid shelters and anti-aircraft gun positions apparently were being constructed in the principal cities. Additional troops were reported as being brought in from Manchuria. The Soviet forces were engaging in combat firing exercises, artillery firing, and practice bombing. Soviet security measures were subjected to general tightening, with large areas being placed off limits to Koreans. (92) (93)

G-2 evaluated the military situation as follows:

"There is an increasing activity on the part of the Soviet Army in Northern Korea. Reinforcements appear to be arriving from Manchuria. There is a

general displacement southward of Soviet troops. Training appears to have been stepped up. Installations such as air raid shelters and anti-aircraft gun positions are under construction. Air fields are being improved. The meaning of all of this activity may well be the subject of considerable speculation.

"Possibly this increased tempo in military activity may be in line with Stalin's announced policy of keeping the Russian Army in top condition. Possibly also it is for the purpose of impressing the population of Northern Korea and prevention of any further increase in what appears to be a growing opposition to Soviet control. It is probable, however, that there are more far reaching reasons for this activity. The character of the Soviet Army activity, the redistribution of troops, the general dissemination of anti-American activity, together with a studied hostile attitude, are not acts of a nation seeking peace and good will. The least that can be said of it is that the Soviet Army activities are purely defensive in nature. But why should such steps be necessary in a country which is about to be integrated into a single unit and supposedly given it's independence?

"To be considered also is the possibility that the Russians are trying to impress the U.S. with size and potentiality of their forces in Northern Korea. This is quite understandable on the eve of negotiations between the U. S. and Soviet forces for the establishment of an Interim Korean Government. It is quite apparent that Russia is committed to Sovietization of Northern Korea. It is possible that she intends to maintain her position and the progress made, regardless of the outcome of the meeting of the Joint U. S. - Soviet Commission.

"Lastly, we cannot ignore the Russian capability for aggressive action. However, the probabilities of the Soviets adopting this capability cannot be determined entirely from the local situation. Russian aims and commitments in the world today are both involved

and extensive. Any conclusions which might be drawn in regard to possible offensive action on the part of the Soviet Forces would have to be the result of an analysis of the overall picture beyond the scope of this summary."

During this period various security measures had been taken by the American forces. All Russian nationals, White Russians included, within the American zone were placed under surveillance.(94) All information concerning relations with the Russians or Russian forces was classified as "secret".(95) Special Korean agents were employed by G-2 to secure military information in North Korea, the first group reporting back on 2 March 1946.(96) In the latter part of April General Hodge issued the following orders to the 7th Division:(97)

"1. a. You will take immediate steps to initiate the development of positions and installations south of the 38° North Latitude and north O-1 line indicated on the inclosure designed to delay a hostile force moving by railroad trains, vehicles, and foot from North Korea.

b. These measures will include:

(1) Reinforcement of present roadblocks.

(2) Establishment of installations to stop armored vehicles.

(3) Preparations for destruction of critical points along railroads and highways.

"2. It will be emphasized that these measures are precautionary only and therefore must be implemented in a manner to arouse the minimum of speculation and discussion on the part of U. S. troops, Koreans and other people.

"3. A report of your proposed measures together with the progress of development will be rendered this headquarters on 1 May 1946 and on the last day of each month thereafter.

During this same period it became painfully evident that the Soviet attitude toward the United States had changed for the worse. From Moscow came the information that the Soviet editorial restraint which had hitherto characterized the treatment of United States policy had been discarded for "a veritable propaganda barrage with the obvious design of convincing the Soviet public that the United States, under growing pressure from 'reactionary' elements within and outside the administration, had all but deserted the Roosevelt heritage and was rapidly succumbing to the militarist, expansionist, and imperialist tendencies incompatible in the long run with the maintenance of world peace and security."(98)

This propaganda line set the pattern for that reiterated in Northern Korea by the Soviets and their puppets, and in South Korea by the Korean Communist Party and its fellow travellers, a subject treated in more detail in a later section. (See pages 323 ff.) In July 1946 the American liaison officer in Pyongyang reported that the "Red Army attitude to any but Russians is that they are enemies of the Soviet Union and therefore to be distrusted," and that since May the attitude toward Americans had definitely deteriorated, and anti-American propaganda in North Korea gradually increased in intensity. Even Koreans trading with members of the American liaison section were subjected to abuse and questioning in the hope of revealing hidden motives for contact with Americans.

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"To date three Koreans have been put into jail for having had more than nodding acquaintance with the individual members of the American Liaison Section," reported Lt. Col. Walter F. Cheinski, the American Liaison officer in Pyongyang, on 3 July 1946. (99)

In South Korea the Communist-inspired Left Wing groups steadily intensified their propaganda campaign directed against the United States Military Government and became actively engaged in espionage activities against the American military forces. Proof was forthcoming to substantiate this latter charge on 27 July when the CIC raided the Communist Party headquarters in Seoul and seized a number of incriminating documents. At the same time CIC agents arrested a number of Soviet agents gathering information in South Korea. On 9 August General Hodge discussed these recently uncovered espionage activities, saying in part "we are well armed," and concluding, "if you think they aren't working for somebody, you have another thought coming." (100)

All of this was enough to create grave suspicion on the part of General Hodge as to the sincerity of Soviet friendship and their oft expressed desire for cooperation in settling Korea's ills. As had been suggested earlier, an alert plan was drawn up to be used in the event that the immediate evacuation of Korea became a military necessity. The inferior American Forces could hope for no more than an orderly retreat and destruction of all

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remaining military material in the event of a Soviet advance.

The assumption, more or less a disguise, on which this plan (101) was based was as follows:

> "1. Assumption.
> a. Hostile
> 1. That subversive elements have assembled a large hostile force in Northern Korea and have prepared to make an initial threat to gain control of Military Government of Southern Korea.
> 2. That partially trained and equipped underground organizations in Southern Korea will actively strike at U. S. forces by guerilla activities and/or acts of sabotage.
> 3. That the combination of (1) and (2) above will present such a serious threat to the security of our forces and supplies as to necessitate the concentration of our personnel and equipment."

The plan was never actually put into operation, for the threat was never more than a potential one. Moreover, soon after this, the Soviet attitude seemed to take another turn, (102) this time for the better.

> "In the meantime, the upsurge of anti-American propaganda in Russia was apparently tapering off. Quite possibly someone high up in the Kremlin was becoming worried over a growing wave of anti-Soviet feeling in America expressed by such authoritative figures as Mr. Dulles, Brooks Atkinson and Walter Lippmann, all during June and July."

Moreover, the many rumors received during June and July to the effect that the Russians were reducing their forces in North Korea were finally substantiated. In August, G-2 reported that

the troop movements of the past two months represented a general reduction of the Soviet North Korean occupation forces. The (103) following explanation was given:

> "Of interest in connection with the foregoing reports is a report from other than refugee sources and believed to be somewhat more reliable to the effect that a contemplated reduction of the Soviet occupation forces was discussed at a joint Russian-Korean conference in Pyongyang in late June. The meeting was reported to have been attended by both Russians and Korean officials from each province plus representatives of the central administration. The announcement is reported to have been made that by the end of July 46 the occupation forces would be reduced by 25%, and that in the near future a further reduction would be made.

Whether or not this seeming change in official Soviet attitude toward the United States was any more than a paper edict remained to be seen as the first year of occupation ended.

The situation in Korea, military as well as political, was confused all the while by Korean-Chinese-Soviet relations and the existence of several potential military forces in Korea other than those of the Americans and Russians. Although mentioned but infrequently, affairs in China lent to the Korean scene a threatening undertone.

It will be remembered that the original plans called for occupation of South Korea by the 10th Army, under General Joseph W. Stilwell, rather than by the XXIV Corps, and that it

was not until practically the last minute, 12 August 1945 to be exact, that XXIV Corps received the assignment.(104) The reason for this sudden change in plans did not come to light until later, the explanation being in part at least, objection by Chiang Kai Shek to General Stilwell's being given the Korean assignment, possibly because the General was not considered sufficiently friendly to the Kuomintang. The Generalissimo announced in no uncertain terms that if Stilwell were given any command on the Asiatic mainland he would make it as difficult for him as possible.(105)

General Hodge further clarified the issue by commenting in November: "We are walking on the edge of a volcano. Political affairs in Korea simply mirror political affairs throughout the Far East, particularly in China. Chiang Kai Shek is fighting communism in China and he wants a democratic Korea on his flank. He is therefore backing Kim Koo, the president of the Korean Provisional Government, and this fact is well known to Korean radicals. The point at issue now is whether or not the entire Far East will go communistic."(106)

The Kuomintang-Korean Provisional Government tie was far more than mere verbiage. Ever since the establishment of the latter in Shanghai in 1919, its members had been intimately connected with the Chinese National Government, Chiang Kai Shek

at one time having recognized it as the de facto government of Korea and supported it financially. During China's long struggle with Japan, the Korean Provisional Government raised a 200,000-man, all-Korean army in China to fight with Chiang's forces. (107) This was the so-called "Kwang Bok Army" (or Shing Again Army), which slowly infiltrated back into Korea after the United States occupation of South Korea began. By 21 January 1946 General Hodge radioed General MacArthur that "in addition to the unit [of the Kwang Bok Army] in Korea it is alleged there are 4 units being organized and trained in China and due to return to Korea about March. This headquarters apprehensive consequences of repatriation of Kwang Bok Army as units. Request has been made CG China to have all units broken up and members mixed with other repatriates." (108) (109)(110)

On 19 February 1946 G-2 reported on the Kwang Bok Army:

> "Reports which arrived during the Period now indicate very clearly that this group, one of the elements supporting the right wing Provisional Government, has continued to exist and function as a military organization despite orders to the contrary from Military Government..... Indications are that the Rightists still expect to utilize this Army as a strong-arm group after the formation of an Interim Korean Government."

Earlier in the same month G-2 stated:

> "An interrogation of 60 alleged members of the Kwang Bok Army who recently arrived in Inchon...disclosed....that they

were under the impression that they were full-fledged Kwang Bok Army soldiers awaiting call to active duty. All pledged allegiance to Kim Koo as the official head of the Korean state. Further interrogation indicated that the Kwang Bok Army in China is growing and will be held inCChina until Korea received complete independence."

One must assume that the Soviets were fully cognizant of this infiltration of the Kwang Bok Army into South Korea and its relation to the Kuomintang and to Kim Koo. Moreover, Dr. Rhee Syngman, the Washington representative of the Korean Provisional Government, had long been in disfavor with the Soviet government. He had once rejected several overtures from Lenin and had gained a deep measure of unpopularity with both the Korean Communists and the Russians.(111) Moreover, as soon as Dr. Rhee returned to Korea he further antagonized the Soviets and local radicals by making some rather strong anti-Russian and anti-Communist speeches. Much of the Soviet-inspired Communist propaganda became little more than bitter diatribes against Kim Koo and Dr. Rhee Syngman. The fact that the American military authorities in South Korea during the fall and winter gave the impression of awarding at least nominal support to this group was no doubt a contributing factor to putting a damper on relations with the Russians.(112) By spring of 1946, American political policy had shifted, but the impression nevertheless must have remained.

The counterpart of the Kwang Bok Army in the Chinese Communist camp was the Yenan Independence Alliance, originally the Korean Volunteer Corps. This small Korean army was organized on 10 January 1941 in Yenan for the ostensible purpose of fighting in various districts of China for the emancipation of Korea. At one time the Alliance had been ordered to dissolve by Chiang Kai Shek, at which time it returned to Yenan and became a Corps under the leadership of Chu Pp, apparently as a unit of the Chinese 8th Route Army. The Corps was said to consist of 80,000 men as of February 1946, at which time the leaders of the Alliance first began appearing in Pyongyang, namely Hun Bin and Kim Doo Bong, both of whom were known to have had long association with the Chinese Communist Party. (113)

By April, G-2 reported that recent information indicated that the Yenan Independence Alliance, the Kim Il Sung Volunteer Corps (recruited in North Korea by the Soviets) and the Railroad Defense Corps were all elements of a North Korean military group commonly referred to by Koreans as the "Defense Corps." Elements of this new "national army" were drawn from Manchurian troops of the Yenan Independence Alliance (including some members of the Chinese 8th Route Army) who had been crossing intermittently into North Korea, where they were largely employed as instructors by

reason of their background. Since command channels for this North Korean army appeared to run directly to Pyongyang, the name Kim Il Sung Volunteer Corps was often applied to the entire force. Uncertainty existed in American circles as to the ultimate purpose for training these troops, although all sources were agreed that political as well as military indoctrination was being given. G-2 reported three possible objectives, none of which were necessarily incompatible with each other: (114)

> " (1) training of future administrative personnel for the People's Committee.
> (2) training of a force to do guard duty, check travelers, maintain thought control, collect rice levies, and otherwise assist the Police.
> (3) training of a Korean national army which will be used as a political instrument of the North Korean government, to uphold its regime or even force Communism on the rest of Korea.

As of April 1946 the strength of this force was estimated to be about 10,000, with expansion still continuing. It was then felt that in the event of a joint [redacted] States - Soviet withdrawal, this North Korean army could play a vital role in supporting any move the Communists wished to make, including a possible revolution or coup d'etat. "The frequency of the rumor to this effect throughout the North, at any rate, indicated that this possibility had also occurred to the Korean population and had had a decided

psychological effect."(115)

In South Korea, meantime, the United States Military Government was organizing the Korean Constabulary and Coast Guard in addition to the National Police. That this force was likewise of international significance was recognized by G-3 XXIV Corps(116) in a November 1945 staff meeting when he remarked:

> "There is a campaign to increase the constabulary from 4,000 to 10,000. Studies are being made for bases for new constabulary units, none to be closer than 40 miles to the 38th parallel. We have received a request from MG to place 40 constabulary officers with U. S. officers' basic course. General Hodge fears that placement in U. S. schools would give the Russians a propaganda line that we were training a military force to attack North Korea---the same accusation we are making against the Russians."

By August 1946 these plans had been expanded, and an ultimate constabulary force of 25,000 was envisioned. The current strength at that time was in the neighborhood of 5,000. In addition, there were some 15,000 police and 1,500 in the Coast Guard.(117) In the meantime, there was reason to believe that former members of the Kwang Bok Army were enlisting in the Constabulary in South Korea.(118) The Constabulary, Coast Guard, and underground units of the Kwang Bok Army, plus the National Police and the Rightist Young men's associations which aided the police in their work in many localities, comprised a significant potential military force within South Korea. Facing

this force, to the North were the North Korean police, in part armed with Russian weapons and loyal to the Communist cause (119) and the North Korean "Defense Corps." The relative strength of these two potential military forces was unknown. Suffice to say that one was Rightist and the other was Leftist, and if the Soviets and Americans had withdrawn simultaneously, the Koreans no doubt would have been at each other's throats in an all-out civil war.

Before closing this section on the background of power politics in Korea, a word should be said relative to Manchuria. G-2 analyzed the situation in June 1946 (120) as follows:

> "The position of North Korea as a Soviet bargaining point is becoming increasingly apparent with the development of the Manchurian situation and the crystalization of Soviet policy with regard to North Korea, and in their relations with the United States in Korea. That Korea is in the process of becoming a principal Far Eastern football, and must figure prominently in any solution of the Manchurian difficulties that may be arrived at, appears to be a direct result of the Far Eastern policy of the Soviet Union.
>
> "The bearing of Military events in Manchuria on the Korean picture is at least twofold. In the first place, the success of the Nationalist forces in Manchuria is rapidly changing and affecting Russia's security requirements. These factors, of course, are closely related to the prospects in North Korea. In the second place, these events affect directly the fate of a large Korean population in southeastern Manchuria.....
>
> "According to all indications and pronouncements Generalissimo Chiang and his field commanders are determined to extend Central Government rule over

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entire Manchuria.....Complete control of Manchuria by the Chinese Central Government..... would mean that in terms of Chinese-Soviet relations, the authority in many parts of Manchuria would be removed from those whom the Soviets have good reason to trust (the Chinese Communists) and vested in the Kuomintang Army (whom the Soviets have good reasons to distrust). The Soviet strategic position will be weakened. Although Russia will continue to have the use of the railroads specified in the 1945 Chinese-Soviet treaty (Chinese Eastern RR and the South Manchurian RR), she will be increasingly aware of the strategic lines not subject to the Moscow agreement.....

'Under these conditions, North Korea would assume overwhelming strategic importance to the Soviet Union, lying as it does near the jugular vein of all Manchurian railway lines at Mukden, guarding all practical approaches to the Trans-Siberian railroad between Chita and Khabarovsk, guarding also the right flank of Vladivostok and the left flank of Dairen and Port Arthur. As long as American-Chinese military friendship continues, the Chinese are seen as a potential back-stabbing enemy, the Soviets must keep vast forces in and hang onto North Korea, weathering any number of conferences, withstanding any number of strong notes.

To isolate Soviet-American relations in Korea from the pulse of affairs in China and elsewhere in the world would be to diagnose a stomach ache without taking into consideration what the victim had eaten and prognosis without consideration of bodily resistance. Appropriate and adequate treatment would be as equally impossible. And so it was in Korea as the country was caught in the vise of power politics in the role of a commodity being bargained for over the international counter.

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Economic Negotiations

The 38th parallel bisects Korea approximately 30 miles north of Seoul in such a way that approximately two thirds of the population and most of the food supply lie in the Southern Sector and practically all of the Korean industrial plants, hydro-electric developments, and coal and iron resources fall in the North. The maladjustment of the country's economy caused by the artificial barrier at the 38th parallel, which paralyzed all north-south intercourse, was painfully obvious to all, and chiefly to the Koreans. Therefore, it was a prime prerequisite for the welfare of the country that it be united economically---even if not politically---at the earliest possible moment.

The Soviet Forces had lost no time in establishing a strict patrol of the 38th parallel early in September 1945. All southbound traffic was restricted and rail traffic entirely suspended, this before the American border posts had even been established.(121) There were numerous reports of jail sentences handed out by the Russians to those caught attempting to cross the 38th to the South.(122) Visitors from South Korea were held under suspicion and frequently detained for questioning about their activities in the South and their attitude toward the Americans.(123) Actually, in spite of these restrictions,

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there was a considerable amount of foot traffic crossing the 38th parallel in both directions over back roads and through the mountains at night, thus by-passing the Russian patrols and sentries. By December 1945 the Soviet border posts were heavily manned, and traffic in both directions across the border strictly curtailed. "The Russians treat the 38° parallel as a barrier between the occupation forces." (124) It was as though a tourniquet had been applied around the collective Korean neck.

With no manufactured goods, chemicals, or coal coming in from North Korea, it was inevitable that prices should rise in the South and a disastrous inflationary spiral touched off. The farmers refused to sell their rice unless the prices received were commensurate with those asked for the scarce manufactured goods which they wished to purchase---specifically, chemical fertilizer, clothing, and tools. This rise in food prices accelerated the rise in the general price level, not to mention the cost of labor. The situation was further aggravated by the inability of American Military Government to enforce a rice collection and rationing program for the fall harvest in 1945. This allowed farmers and unscrupulous speculators to hold rice off the market and realize an even higher price through the

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creation of a false scarcity. The absence of any rationing system made the people desperate and willing to pay the price. As the winter of 1945-46 wore on, much of the rice crop was diverted illegally into Japan through a well organized smuggling system and squandered in the manufacture of rice wine and candy. By late spring a real shortage had developed, and remained until the summer grain harvest had been collected and distributed.

Because of the obviously destructive nature of the barrier thrown up by the Russians along the 38th, the American authorities from the very beginning sought to reestablish commercial relations with Soviet-controlled North Korea. As early as 24 September 1945, General Hodge was granted authority "to permit transfers of currency to Korean areas north of the 38th parallel for purposes of paying such proportions of the costs of operation of concerns furnishing essential goods or service to your area as you deem necessary to execute your mission." (125)

On 27 September, shipments of 70,000 metric tons of coal per month and chemicals for water purification purposes were requested of the Russians. (125) Three days later, Lt. Col. Scott, in a temporary liaison position, was sent to Pyongyang, one of his major missions being to negotiate for the required coal and chemicals. He returned empty handed except for a small amount of coal to be used by the Soviet Consulate in Seoul. (127)

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All along there had been considerable pessimism among the Americans that any positive action could be secured from the Russians on a local level. Almost at the outset, on 16 September, during the fruitless efforts to establish effective liaison, it will be remembered that General Hodge had radioed CINCAFPAC to the effect that it was believed that local Red authorities were awaiting instructions in this regard (economic negotiation). It was urgently requested at that time that steps to be taken to initiate action on a higher level with a view to obtaining economic cooperation. It was further recommended that a fully empowered Joint Soviet-United States Commission above a strictly military level be created in Korea immediately to study joint problems and to make appropriate arrangements in regard to immediate political and economic matters. (128) It was again a question of the Soviet commander's not having the authority to act whereas the American commander was fully empowered to do so.

It was not long before SCAP acted on this recommendation. (129)

> "On 12 October, War Department advised in substance as follows: to nullify so far as practicable objectionable economic and governmental features in Korea occasioned by 38 degree parallel. It is proposed to open immediately negotiations on diplomatic levels with the Russians. Specific proposals and avoidance of generalities considered necessary. It will be necessary to import coal, metals and power from northern Korea according to information available here."

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At the same time, SCAP requested General Hodge to supply data relative to quantities of import requirements needed quarterly and further information as to food or other resources which were surplus in Southern Korea, together with an indication of the availability for exchange of products in North Korea. (130)

By way of answer, General Hodge sent a detailed report to SCAP that same week, (131) Included therein was a 28-item list of materials believed to be available in the Russian sector and required in the American zone. At the top of the list was coal, considered at the time to be the most urgent requirement in South Korea. Other items needed were railroad equipment, chemicals, chemical fertilizers, steel and iron, salt, wheat, soy beans, and barley. The supply of electrical power was not considered critical because the Russians had not as yet interrupted the service. However, it was pointed out that South Korea was absolutely dependent upon power generated in North Korea, and it was necessary that the cost per kilowatt be adjusted at an early date so that the service could be continued without interruption.

As bargaining points, certain items were listed which were available in the south and might be desired by the Russians. Heading this list was rice, the pending rice crisis in the South being as yet unpredicted at that time. The 1945 crop had been a bumper one, and a surplus was contemplated. During the first

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quarter of 1946, for instance, it was estimated that some 1,000,000 koku of rice would be available for export, and during the second quarter, in the neighborhood of 2,000,000. Of course, as has been already indicated, later events showed this to be an erroneous prediction. Other items listed for possible export were: molybdenum concentrates, manganese ore, fluorite mineral, copper, and zinc metallic, asbestos mineral, and amorphous graphite mineral. It was further reported that the resumption of inter-zone rail operation was required because of the acute shortage of other transportation facilities, including the non-availability of suitable highways. Likewise, it was pointed out that an agreement covering the maintenance and exchange of rolling stock and the establishment of interchange and inspection stations would be necessary to the implementation of any such agreement.

Other agreements essential for the economic well-being of Korea, according to General Hodge, included an inter-zone monetary arrangement, a boundary adjustment along traditional political divisions, mutual understanding relative to the maintenance of civilian communication services, the resumption of inter-coastal shipping, and agreement on the movement of persons between the two zones.

It was finally recommended that "when policies are established by agreement,...a joint commission or board, with

Russian and American membership, be formed in Korea to take action on the day to day problems, within the scope of the policies established, with permission to report direct to the respective capitals for further instructions when needed." (15E)

However, for a time some progress seemed to be made on a local level. On 15 October, Colonel Kenneth C. Strother, Deputy Chief of Staff of XXIV Corps, was informed by Mr. Constantinoff, USSR 2d Vice Consul in Seoul, that water purification chemicals could be obtained for the city of Seoul from the Russian-occupied zone. He stated further that permission had been obtained and all that was necessary was to assemble and ship the material. At the suggestion of Mr. A. Polienski, USSR Consul General in Seoul, it was agreed to send several American officers to the Soviet Army Headquarters in Pyongyang to expedite the shipment and receipt of the needed chemicals. The American representation, consisting of Major T. H. Black (observer from MG), Captain H. Bacha (XXIV Corps Russian interpreter), and Captain Reed (XXIV Corps engineering specialist), arrived in Pyongyang in the company of Mr. Polienski on 19 October. On the 20th, the American group was informed that the problem had been taken up with the USSR authorities and that the group need not go to any other point since the chemicals would be assembled at Pyongyang. By reason of the fact that some of the chemicals were coming from distant points, difficult of

success, it was indicated that there might be some little delay and patience was needed. As the days went by, the Americans were informed that it would be another "two or three" days. Finally it was reported that twenty-five tons of aluminum sulphate actually had arrived in Pyongyang. However, this shipment was never seen because the "exact location of the car was not known." During the interim, it should be pointed out that the American group was treated with the utmost cordiality and hospitality by the Russians.

At this juncture General Hodge, fully believing that the Russians were acting in good faith, publicly announced that at least some measure of success had been achieved in the negotiations with the Russians, and that arrangements had been completed for a shipment of chlorine and alum for water purification purposes. This was considered to be the opening wedge, the first crack in the "walls of Jericho" as it were, and General Hodge optimistically commented, "we are hoping that they [the American negotiators in Pyongyang] may be able to arrange for some coal too."(155)

As so often was the case during the first few months of occupation, this flash of hope was but momentary. Hardly had General Hodge gotten the words out of his mouth than the entire negotiations collapsed, and for no apparent reason.

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On 30 October a Major General Kuklin, believed to be concerned with North Korean industrial problems, arrived in Pyongyang. Suddenly the next morning, Major Yurichev, host to the American party, informed the American negotiators that they would be returned to Seoul that same morning, the explanation being that the chemicals could not be furnished until proper policies were agreed upon on a higher level between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With that the American group returned South, (154) their mission apparently a complete failure.

However, on 23 December 1946, a telephone call was received from the Soviet Consul reporting the unheralded arrival in Seoul of a shipment of water purification chemicals. The shipment consisted of 25 metric tons of aluminum sulphate and 9 metric tons of calcium hypochloride. The Consul stated that another 25 tons of the former and an additional 3 tons of chlorine would be delivered during the first part of January. (155) The matter had finally been cleared with Moscow.

In the interim, during November, there had seemed to be no progress made whatsoever. On the 15th General Archibald V. Arnold, Military Governor, reported to the Korean press, "Higher levels of authority are trying to arrange relations with the Korean territory to the north so as to effect an exchange of necessary goods. We have asked for 40,000 tons of coal. They need rice and we will be able to supply it as soon as the last of the rice harvest is in." (156)

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Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff, State Department representative in Korea and Political Advisor to General Hodge, reported on the stalemate in the latter part of December 1945 to the State Department, as follows: (157)

"Developments here since submission [of] original estimates of commodities required from, and exportable to, Soviet-occupied Korea have necessitated certain revisions which we believe should be transmitted to Embassy Moscow for use if present negotiations there include Korean problems.

"We still need coal and other commodities from the North in substantially the same quantities as those originally indicated. With regard to metals and minerals which can be shipped to the North substitute concentrate for metallic zinc, lead and copper. Moreover, delivery of all these products cannot now be made until second quarter of 1946, time of delivery depending considerably upon receipt of coal from North for industrial use.

"Our original estimate included possibility [of] our shipping to Soviet zone four to five million bushels [of] rice [during] first quarter 1946. There are now no, repeat no, immediate prospects of any rice being available, although the crop of 1945 has been good. This condition caused by following factors:

a. For first time in many years Koreans can get all they wish.
b. Consequently individual consumption has increased with a corresponding decrease in consumption [of] secondary cereals which in any event came largely from [the] North and are not now available (preference is, of course, for rice over the other cereals).
c. Farmers are reluctant to sell rice because:
   (1) with scarcity of consumer goods money has little value;
   (2) they have been misled to believe that much of their rice will be shipped to

Japan, although MG's fundamental policy is Korean products for Koreans;
(3) Many are withholding rice in the hope of increased prices later.

d. Refugees from Japan and Soviet-occupied areas are rapidly increasing the population of our area of Korea.

e. The shortage of trucks, rolling stock, and coal for the railways has created a serious transportation problem.

"Military Government is devising measures designed to correct the conditions described above, and when a surplus of rice is on hand it will be made available to Northern Korea on conditions to be determined at the time. In meantime, Embassy Moscow should know that according to present indication the Soviets will probably be interested in obtaining rice from us as they have requisitioned large amounts for their troops in Northern Korea, which are living off the country, thereby presumably creating a food shortage in that area."

Here was the first warning as to the pending food crisis in South Korea. Even as SCAP was transmitting a report to the War Department on 7 January 1946, covering the situation in Korea and saying in part that "the stocks of rice quoted as available from Southern Korea give her a very favorable trading position in the Orient this winter," the ominous fact was radioed from Korea correcting this optimistic prediction, "contrary to previous estimates, rice will not be available for bargaining with the Soviets unless Military Government institutes forceful methods to unfreeze stocks." (138)

The net result of four months of bargaining was the single shipment of sulphate and chlorine and the continued flow of electrical

power into South Korea, the price of neither having been settled. It was apparent that if any real agreement were to be reached, it would be done on a higher level. And so, in December the focal point of attention on Korean affairs shifted from Seoul to Moscow with the convening of the 'Big-Three' Foreign Ministers' Conference on 16 December 1945.

The Moscow Conference and Korea

All during the fall of 1945 the stage was being set for the consideration of the Korean problem on a high diplomatic level by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. The first opportunity which presented itself was the conference of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in Moscow in December 1945, the reverberations of which were keenly felt in Korea at the time and later in all negotiations between American and Soviet forces in Korea. To the Korean people the issue was very simply one of trusteeship, to be or not to be. On that issue Korean political parties and leaders rose and fell and the verbiage on the subject passing among General Hodge, General Chistiakov, the State Department, Embassy Moscow, and the Kremlin increased by the hour. The full story however began in Cairo in 1943.

Prior Discussion

The first assurance the Korean people received that their best interests were the underlying motive for the decisions handed down on the Korean problem by the Great Powers was contained in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 which stated in part that the United States, the United Kingdom, and China "covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion." The declaration stated further that: "the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, President Roosevelt proposed to Marshal Stalin that an international trusteeship be established for Korea, with the administrative powers to be the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China. Later, on 28 May 1945 and on several other occasions, Stalin agreed to this view in conversations with Mr. Harry Hopkins, the President's personal envoy.(139) Dr. T. V. Soong, special representative of China, after being informed of the plan by the President in June of the same year, also concurred.(140)

Up until this time, according to William Henry Chamberlain, the Cairo Declaration was like a check requiring the signature of a joint partner before becoming valid. The necessary

agreement was forthcoming at Potsdam in August 1945, when the Soviet Union accepted the Cairo Declaration without qualification.

Korea became a possible nominee for trusteeship under the United Nations Charter, Article 77, which states in essence that "territories which may be detached from enemy status as a result of the Second World War" are eligible. However, the Charter goes on to say that "it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories....will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms."

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee saw trusteeship for Korea within the framework of the United Nations as an adequate solution to her problems because, under it, Korea would be able to present petitions to the General Assembly, assuring her some voice in her own affairs, and that she would be visited regularly by a United Nations commission. It was also pointed out that Korea's strategic position formerly had caused rivalry between the three great Eastern powers, Japan, China, and Soviet Russia. (141)

In November 1945 the State Department analyzed the situation thusly: (142)

> "Historically it [USSR] regards Korea in much the same light as Finland, Poland, and Rumania---springboard for attack on the USSR. Therefore, USSR may be expected to seek predominant influence in Korea. Soviet [aims] more likely to be realized through establishment of independent friendly Korean regime than through any system of international tutelage. Far from insuring Soviet [interests], a trusteeship

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would probably mean USSR having but 1 of 3 or 4 equal votes. So, consequently, until such time as question of what to do with Korea is raised by other powers, USSR is probably content to concentrate on action, not debate on political consolidation, in North Korea and political penetration of South Korea so that by time issue of civilian rule is raised Soviet political ground work will have been laid."

Although subject to considerable discussion later in top circles, the American policy relative to Korea was stated in the 20 October SWNCC directive: (143)

"The present zonal military occupation of Korea by United States and Soviet forces should be superseded at the earliest possible date by a trusteeship for Korea."

Negotiations were to be initiated at once with a view toward abolishing the 38° boundary and for the establishment of a centralized military command. In order to terminate the proposed trusteeship as speedily as possible, the administrating authority was to utilize Korean personnel to the fullest possible extent, provide necessary facilities for training Koreans to assume the responsibility of independence, and furnish the means by which Korea might choose her own government when the time came. (144)

This announced policy from Washington was in large measure the result of representations made from the first by Political Advisor William R. Langdon, and indorsed by General Hodge, urging the abandonment of the trusteeship principle

for Korea. On 9 October 1945 General Hodge radioed:(145)

> "..... reference at the Foreign Policy Association to trusteeship for Korea cast gloom on all political elements. The press attacked trusteeship as conceived by Japanese colonial propaganda and called it an insult to the Korean people..... Some reassurance was reflected when the actual text was received and it became clear that trusteeship was projected rather than absolute. Mr. Byrnes statement on the twentyfifth that talks were going on to end it received a good press. Concern over this question, however, does not seem to be as great or as abiding as over possible trusteeship."

On 10 November, Mr. Langdon radioed to the State Department a further word of warning:(146)

> "So far as can be determined, the trusteeship idea is repugnant to all parties and elements in Korea. If established it may cause a revolt and complicate problems to the extent of nullifying its advantages. If trusteeship is necessary recommend it be given no publicity and be camouflaged under new terminology. Judged by occidental standards, Korea is not ready for independence and probably never will be. Most certainly, the exact type of government used by the United States will not be suitable for these oriental people. It is my considered opinion, that regardless of all measures taken and regardless of our success or failure in the Korean occupation, the establishment of Korean independence will be accompanied by violence and some form of blood purge, during and after its establishment."

The idea of a governing commission as opposed to a trusteeship was first introduced into the discussions by Langdon in a November 20 radio to SCAP which began with the following strong argument against trusteeship:(147)

"After one month's observation of liberated Korea and with my background of earlier service in Korea I am unable to fit trusteeship to actual conditions here or to be persuaded of its suitability from moral and practical standpoints, and therefore believe we should drop it. It is thought wrong because the Korean people have always been a distinct nation except for 35 years of Japanese rule and have high literacy, cultural and living standards judged by Asiatic and middle Eastern standards. It is thought unpractical because it certainly will not be accepted by the Koreans and perhaps will have to be maintained by force...In the Korean people are certain bad traits that cannot be overcome except by actual experience of their evil consequences; division, factiousness, inordinate self seeking, strong sectional rivalries and intolerance of opposition. The Japanese did not give the Koreans the opportunity to work these faults out of their system. A trusteeship would also have to repress these faults in order to function. Thus at the end of trusteeship the natural process of self improvement would still lie before the Korean people as it does now.

"Our caution over becoming associated with the so-called Provisional Government in Chungking seems unwarranted now as Kim Koo's group has no rival for the first government of liberated Korea, being regarded as a quasi-legitimate by all elements and parties. Jubilance prevails over its impending return and widespread arrangements are being made for a triumphal welcome. The wide esteem enjoyed by Kim Koo offers us an opportunity for attempting a constructive Korean policy that can hardly be resented or introduced. In broad outline this policy might be as follows:

"1. The Commanding General directs Kim Koo to form a council in HQ representative of the several political groups to study and prepare the form of government of Korea and to organize a governing commission.

"2. The governing commission is integrated with MG (presently rapidly being built up as an all-Korean organization)."

"3. The governing commission succeeds MG as an interim government, with the Commanding General retaining power of veto and of appointing such American supervisors and advisors as he deems necessary.

"4. Three other powers concerned are requested to supply some supervisors and advisors in the governing commission in place of Americans.

"5. Governing commission holds election of head of state.

"6. Government formed by elected head of state recognized, treaties made with and missions accredited to it, and Korea admitted to the UNO.

"Note: Somewhere in the transition above, perhaps 4 and 5, negotiations to be opened with Russia for mutual withdrawal of troops and extension to Russian zone of governing commissions's authority. Russia should be informed in advance of above plan and invited to further it by allowing persons in Russian zone nominated to governing commission by Council to proceed to Seoul, but if Russian participation is not forthcoming, plan should be carried out for Korea south of 38th parallel..."

In the meantime, the State Department was thinking along somewhat the same vein, taking into careful consideration the views of both Mr. Langdon and General Hodge. However, it was pointed out by Secretary of State Byrnes that it still might be necessary to adopt the trusteeship principle in order to eliminate the barrier erected at the 38th parallel. There was considerable doubt as to the Soviet feeling on the matter, particularly

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so in light of the oral agreement made on two separate occasions between the Soviet and United States Governments calling for the establishment of a four-power trusteeship. In respect to this type of administration, Secretary Byrnes, on 29 November, commented: (148)

> "It has been our thought that such an arrangement (trusteeship) would serve best to train Koreans adequately to assume the responsibilities of full independence and at the same time to assure the emergence of a united, independent Korea with a minimum of continued foreign interference in Korean affairs. However, if adequate specific guarantees for the unification and independence of Korea can be obtained from the Soviet Union, it is possible that we might not wish to continue to advocate trusteeship as you are aware,..."

As for the governing commission suggested by Langdon, Secretary Byrnes commented that "present thinking in the Department is that it would be safer, in the interest of Korean unity and early independence, to negotiate with the USSR before attempting to introduce a new idea such as a governing commission concerning which the USSR has made no commitments." He went on to say, "The Department feels that the formation and support of the "Provisional Government (Kim Koo's) or even a governing commission may carry with it implications that such a body has, or might at least claim in the near future, jurisdiction over all of Korea. The Department believes that the USSR would react

unfavorably to the creation by us of such a body, and if consulted would not agree thereto. Consequently, its premature establishment might prejudice negotiations with the USSR." (149)

By this time, representations in Moscow by the American Ambassador had already been contemplated. On 3 November the State Department sent a message to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow directing him to approach the Soviet Government for the purpose of settling problems created by the 38th parallel. The message contained a brief background of the Korean situation, and mentioned the previous Soviet agreement to international trusteeship and future independence for Korea, as well as the history of non-cooperation on the part of the Soviet Commander in Korea based upon information forthcoming from General Hodge. The Ambassador was instructed to attempt to gain Soviet agreement in principle on the following: assurances of adequate regular delivery of coal and electric power to the American zone from the Soviet zone, resumption of rail traffic and other means of communication between North and South, adoption of uniform fiscal policies throughout all Korea, resumption of coastwise shipping, orderly settlement of displaced individuals including repatriation of Japanese to Japan, and resumption of normal trade in minimum commodities needed in both areas. In addition to these general terms, the State Department message to Moscow contained the list,

furnished by XXIV Corps, of specific commodities in North Korea needed by the South as well as those available in the American zone for export. Moreover, in respect to the unnatural boundary between the two zones, the message specified that all of Kyonggi-do should be in the American zone and all of Hwanghae-do should be in the Soviet zone, and that if the Soviet Government would not agree to give up all of Kangwon-do, that the boundary should fall by local agreement on previously established political subdivisions. It was further specified that the inter-governmental agreement should include assurances that the Soviet Government would issue instructions empowering the Soviet Commander in North Korea to act by mutual agreement with the American commander in implementing the details. The message drew Mr. Harriman's attention to the urgency of the matter, but left to his discretion the time and manner of presentation to the Soviet Government. (150)

By the latter part of November, it was known in Korea that the Korean problem was to be a major item on the agenda of the Moscow Conference of the Big-Three Foreign Ministers. Evidently, Ambassador Harriman felt that this was the most propitious time to bring the matter to Soviet attention. (151)

However, there was still an element of doubt about the wisdom of the State Department's thought on Korea on the part

of Mr. Langdon, General Hodge's political advisor. On 11 December (151-A) he radioed the State Department:

"Department's views have been studied earnestly by USAFIK which is glad to note that we might be willing to abandon international trusteeship for Korea if adequate specific guarantees for unification and independence of the country can be obtained from USSR..... We ask ourselves whether it might not be more realistic to by-pass trusteeship and seek these guarantees directly in forthcoming discussions.....One more thought on international trusteeship; although out of touch with the sentiment of Congress and American people, USAFIK senses beginnings of a tugging to get the troops and Military Government out of this liberated land, and wonders whether a physical structure for such trusteeship can be erected in time to take over from Military Government even if the task began now. Two months ago Military Government asked for 40 professional assistants. To date none have arrived and only a dozen or so found..

"With regard to proposals to be taken up in the pending discussions with USSR regarding the status of Korea until and after complete independence, the Department might wish to put forward the program I laid before it, which was an elaboration of General Hodge's scheme shaped to mesh into Military Government. As an alternative the Department might wish to consider proposing a US trusteeship for South Korea and a USSR trusteeship for North Korea, both under UNO, and to end mutually with reciprocal withdrawal of troops and invitation to UNO membership, say after five years, with free movements for persons and goods between two zones in meantime. The latter idea came from a source one would hardly expect, Mr. Ho Hun, leader of the radical Korean People's Republic who thought a short period of American protection over Korea similar to that over the Philippine Commonwealth ideally suited to the present Korean situation.

"In principle we, of course, favor settlement with Russia of every aspect of the Korean problem. However, we feel here that our Korea policy so far had been predicated solely on Russian cooperation,

with no planning beyond this premise. A factor seemingly missing too from State-War-Navy CC papers is the present mood of the Korean people; impatient of spoon feeding, conscious of independence and eager to exercise it. We believe that only by making important concessions to this mood can the situation be kept in hand, conflict avoided, and cooperation obtained in our zone. What course to follow in situation where Russian cooperation or agreement is not forthcoming and has to be done without in the interest of our position here, is a matter no doubt engaging the Department's study."

It will be noted that several new thoughts were introduced in this radio; namely, the idea of a zonal trusteeship arrangement, concern for American public opinion and its effect on the availability of adequately trained American personnel to carry on under a trusteeship, and a warning against too much emphasis on gaining Soviet agreement at the sacrifice of American principles. On 14 December, USAFIK submitted a series of questions and suggestions to the State Department of sufficient (152)
import to reproduce at length:

"We would also like the following specific questions taken up with Moscow at this time:

"A. We have admitted into our zone from the Russian half a million Koreans without question on the assumption that they belonged in our zone originally. On the other hand we would wish the Russians to place no obstacles on the return to North Korea of those Koreans among the 600,000 that we have already repatriated and more to come from Japan who have their original homes there.

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"b. 70,000 Japanese civilians, including over 1,000 soldier stragglers have entered our zone from the Russian. Our burden is heavy enough with the repatriation of Japanese civilians from our zone, 300,000 so far, and we wish the Russians to evacuate directly to Japan the Japanese in their zone.

"c. We do not understand the reasons for the fortification by the Russians of the 38th parallel as no Japanese soldiers remain in our zone and as Koreans are not allowed to have arms. Such fortification may be misinterpreted to the harm of our relations.

"d. We do not understand the refusal of the Russians to have liaison with us on local administrative and military levels and their refusal to allow visits to the Russian zone of our officials and correspondents.

"e. Does the USSR intend to maintain its large consular establishment in Seoul and if so what are the reasons therefore. Query, we can see no need of it in the absence of important physical Russian interests in South Korea or of the absence of any questions between it and Military Government or the Korean people.

USAFIK hopes that at Moscow Mr. Byrnes will bring up and stress the importance of an early and definite settlement of the Korean question. In addition to the exchange of specific goods and free movement of persons and merchandise between the two zones, with which subject the Department is familiar, it is hoped that the more fundamental questions will be taken up, namely:

"a. Would our plan already submitted for a transitional process to full independence accord with Russian policy? Query.

"b. Would an exclusive trusteeship in our respective zones for a maximum of five years, followed by complete reciprocal withdrawal and with free travel and exchange of goods in the interim, fit in with Russian policy? Query.

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"c. If neither program suits Russian interests, may we know what the Russian program is so we may study it and perhaps adapt our own program to it? Query.

The stage for the Moscow Conference in respect to Korea was set with the transmittal of a frank discussion of the entire problem by General Hodge, in which he suggested that serious consideration be given to an agreement with Soviet Russia, whereby both American and Soviet forces would be withdrawn simultaneously, "leaving Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self purification." His argument in support of this point of view had considerable strength: (153)

"After three months in occupation of South Korea I have reached the following definite conclusions. These are considered as further crystallization of previous reports.

"A. The dual occupation of Korea with Russia north and U. S. south of the 38° parallel imposes an impossible condition upon our occupation missions of establishing sound economy and preparing Korea for future independence. In South Korea the US is blamed for the partition and there is growing resentment against all Americans in the area including passive resistance to constructive efforts we make here. No explanation can reach through to the people since it [is] counteracted by the existing facts. Every day of drifting under this situation makes our position in Korea more untenable and decreases our waning popularity and our effectiveness to be of service. The word "pro-American" is being added to "pro-Jap", "national traitor" and "Jap collaborator." The only advantage of the Russian presence is to absorb a portion of the people's resentment against the partition of Korea.

Every Korean knows full well that under the dual occupation any talk of real freedom and independence is purely academic. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, even to establish unity of spirit in the Koreans until they see the present 38th parallel barrier removed. Every day of delay fosters further and permanent division of the people.

.....

"O. The situation in South Korea makes extremely fertile ground for establishment of communism. In my opinion Koreans do not want communism, but the unsettled conditions, the lack of clear cut policies for the future, and the lack of hope for early national sovereignty by the people may easily push those in the US zone to radical leftism, if not raw communism. There is currently a flow of Manchurian and Chinese trained Korean communists to south of 38 degrees who are giving active assistance to communistic elements already present. Cho Man Sik, a great Korean democratic leader operating north of 38 degrees, assures me through intermediaries that communism will be no problem there—that the people are cured by Russian occupation. He warns, however, that we must be careful south of 38 degrees if we do not want to encourage it. The proximate international influences and our occupation policies of insuring all freedoms and maintaining property rights and order among liberated Oriental people favor communistic activities. Under these policies conservative groups tend to obey laws and ordinances while the radicals do not. The latter operate largely underground using terroristic or coercive measures and their activities are almost impossible to stem with the untrained civil police and the small occupational forces available with its extremely low effectiveness due to current disintegration through the discharge system now in effect.

.....

"Q. Russian methods of occupation north of 38 degrees are not understandable to Americans. There is every reason to believe that they have constructed and are maintaining

effective field works system of defense against invasion just north of 38°. It is certain that they have constructed and constantly man with armed guards a line of road blocks facing south with weapons emplaced to fire south exactly across the line they interpret from their maps as the 38° parallel. Actually parts of this line are 1000 to 100 yards south of the line shown by US maps. Although outwardly friendly relations between troops of the two nations exist, persistent reports come from the north that the Russians repeatedly speak of war with US. There are also rumors south of 38° that the US and Russia are preparing for war. Under current conditions, border incidents of a dangerous character could easily occur. Russian consulate is maintained in Seoul with a large staff with no legitimate reasons. The consul general and ranking members of his staff are making increasingly frequent trips across the occupational boundary and are conferring with local Koreans. Despite the Russian border control, there is a daily flow southward of 5000 to 6000 destitute refugees, both Japanese and Koreans, giving strong indication that the control valve is open for southward movement of undesirables. Koreans well know that the Russians have a force locally of about 4 to 1 to Americans and with the usual oriental slant are willing to do homage and are doing homage to the man with the largest weapon. On the part of the masses there is an increasing tendency to look to Russia for the future."

Two days later, on 16 December 1945, the Moscow Conference was under way. Suffice to say, by way of summary, that the prevailing opinion among the American authorities in Korea was against a prolonged trusteeship. Two alternatives had been suggested, namely, a rapid evolutionary process for establishing a Korean government, with or without Russian cooperation; or a simultaneous evacuation by both

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Soviet and American troops. As it so happened, neither view prevailed at Moscow.

Aftermath

The conference at Moscow ended on 26 December, but it was several days before the full text of that part of the agreement having to do with Korean affairs was received. In the meantime, incomplete and rather garbled accounts began to come in. Late in the afternoon of the 28th a brief dispatch arrived stressing a five-year trusteeship. By then it was known that the Moscow Conference had risen and that news could be expected momentarily. During the morning of the 29th dispatches were received from United Press and Associated Press, accessible to both Koreans and Americans. The releases merely mentioned that plans had been mapped for the establishment of Korea as an independent state during a period of five years of joint trusteeship by the United States and Soviet occupation forces. Upon these releases the first protests by the Korean people were based.(154) All the Korean people could see was the word trusteeship, the same word under which the Japanese had imposed their reign of tyranny and exploitation over the Koreans in 1910, a year known as "the year of snakes" in the Korean calendar. A wave of unrest swept over the country.

Two days after the adjournment of the Moscow Conference, the official text still was not available in Korea. In the

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interim, on 29 December, General Hodge issued the following (155) instructions to all American military personnel.

> "The early release to the press of the Moscow conference with respect to Korea has given rise to many conflicting stories which have become the basis of wild rumors. There is grave danger that civil disturbances may result. This headquarters will release the official texts of the results of the Moscow conference when received. In the meantime, major unit commanders will direct the members of their commands to refrain from any discussion or speculation on the subject with Koreans, either privately or in public. Further, it is highly important that no member of the US occupational forces now or in the future make any statement which may be accepted as or implied to be a commitment to the Korean people or to the Russian occupational forces. Major unit commanders will warn their units of the possibility of widespread civil disturbances and will take necessary steps for the protection of U. S. occupational forces and vital installations."

That same afternoon, however, the official communique finally arrived. As rapidly as possible it was broadcast to the Korean public and copies distributed. (156) It will be noted that the Korean section of the so-called "Moscow Decision" reproduced below does not make trusteeship mandatory:

> "Section III - Korean Section
>
> "1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for consideration to the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic Organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship for Korea, period up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a conference of representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

To quell the irate Korean people the State Department suggested that certain points covered in the communique be emphasized

and elaborated upon to the Koreans; namely, the provision for immediate steps to integrate the two zones, the provision for early establishment of a democratic provisional government, the agreement that the trusteeship terms would be framed by the Joint Commission in consultation with the Korean Provisional Government, and finally, that the period of trusteeship would be terminated within five years at the longest and with a clear promise of complete independence at the termination of trusteeship. It was further pointed out that the State Department intended to emphasize these points in a Korean program broadcast from San Francisco. The Department suggested that this program be broadcast by the local Korean stations as well. The propaganda experts of the State Department expressed the belief that emphasis should be on the points listed above rather than on voluntary attempts to explain or justify trusteeship. However, at the same time it was believed that if United States Military Government personnel were questioned by responsible Koreans as to the reasons for trusteeship, that they should be prepared to give full and complete answers. It was recommended that such answers point out that Allied forces were present to eradicate all the evil vestiges of Japanese control and to protect and advise the Korean people during the period in which

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a government was being created, and, further, that this period must naturally be protracted since the Japanese deliberately kept the Koreans from highly specialized, administrative and technical posts, for which Korean personnel must be trained. (157)

The first broadcast beamed to Korea from the United States relative to the proposed Korean trusteeship was a statement made by the Secretary of State: (158)

> "The administration of Korea has been a trying problem since the surrender of Japan. For purposes of military operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and south latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas. The continuation of this division after surrender has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons and goods and the functioning of public services on a nation wide scale has been hampered. Under our agreement at Moscow the two military commands are to form a Joint Soviet-American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations to the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China for the formation of a Korean Provisional Democratic government. They will also make proposals to these governments regarding a 4-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years. The Joint Soviet-American Commission, working with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nations. In the various agreements and understandings reached in Moscow the interests of China were taken into full account. China is to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers, in the Far Eastern Commission, in the 4-power Allied Council in Tokyo, in the formation of a Korean Provisional National Government, and any trusteeship for Korea."

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Later, General Hodge referred to the broadcast as providing a small loophole for the saving of Korean face and was therefore, helpful. He went on to point out however, that the use of the word "trusteeship" should be avoided in the future by reason of the bad connotations the word has acquired in the Korean tongue. "There is no use to define it, since no Korean listens to a definition", radioed the General. "I do not want to be in Korea when the issue arises again."(159)

It was soon discovered that in much of the Russian comment relative to the Moscow Decision a word which was frequently translated "guardianship" appeared in place of the distasteful word "trusteeship", so much so that it was once thought that perhaps the Russian and English texts of the Moscow Decision differed in this respect. However, a check proved that there was no such inconsistency.(160) Nevertheless, the Russians continued to refer to "guardianship."(161)

After the confusion and wave of unrest which swept Korea with the first unofficial reports of the Moscow Decision, General Hodge reported the situation in terse phrases:(162)

> "Reaction was much less violent in Provinces than in Seoul area, but was widespread in the American zone. Principal reason for less violent reaction in provinces, was my ability to get out a true statement of communique

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before local news got to provinces and Korean minds were crystallized on false impressions of early press. Please inform all concerned that Korea has UP and AP press service and long range radio reception, are extremely conscious and astute on political issues and that to do my job that I be kept up to date on all diplomatic and other developments concerning Korea. I firmly believe this entire unpleasant incident could have been averted if I had been informed early on the results of the Moscow Conference."

That the Soviet Union was largely the party to be blamed for the contemplated enforcement of a trusteeship on Korea was the popular conviction held not only among Koreans, but likewise by the American authorities in Korea. (163) It will be remembered that General Hodge and Mr. Langdon had made frequent urgent recommendations to the State Department against the imposition of a trusteeship, recommendations which seemed to receive at best the tacit approval of the Department. Moreover, in recent Department broadcasts the trend had been to shy away from the trusteeship idea and to hold out the hope that possibly it might not be necessary. In Korea there was every reason to believe that the initial American stand at Moscow had been the support of immediate Korean independence as against the Soviet demand for a trusteeship.

This conviction was supported by the rapidity with which the Korean Communist Party changed its spots after receiving the official edict on trusteeship. A copy of the document entitled

"Instructions to All Levels and Branches Concerning the Decisions on Korean Problems Made By the Three Power Conference at Moscow", was taken from a Korean crossing into South Korea in early April. The document was mimeographed, dated 3 January 1946, and signed by the Pyongyang Bureau, North Pyongyang Provincial Committee of the Korean Communist Party. Actually, the orders must have arrived in South Korea on 3 January, the day on which they were dated, for on that day the Korean Communist Party of South Korea changed its loud outburst against trusteeship into general acclamation for the idea. The party organ, CHOSUN INMIN PO (Korean People's Times), stated on 29 December: "traitors made trusteeship possible. This news stunned thirty million Koreans and made them resolve to eliminate the trust system."(164) Pak Heun Yung, the leader of the party in South Korea, on 1 January, indicated a violent opposition to trusteeship in a conference with General Hodge. Two days later, in another conference, Pak completely reversed himself: the orders had arrived.(165) On that same day a Communist-inspired demonstration was formed in Seoul originally intended as a protest against trusteeship. However, at the last moment an attempt was made to switch banners and slogans, and the demonstration evolved into a confused affair with signs appearing

both for and against trusteeship. It was quite evident that last minute instructions had been received, but it was not until the above mentioned document turned up on the 38th parallel four months later that their exact nature became known. It is worthwhile to quote ~~two paragraphs~~ from this document:

> "1. The solution of the Korean problems resolved by the Three Power conference at Moscow was the best decision under the present circumstances of Korea, and our party recognizes this. At the same time, we instruct you to agree in and uphold this decision and to recognize the following statement.
>
> "2. This settlement of Korean problems decided at Moscow is more progressive and speedy than that of the Conference of Ministers of England, the US and China held at Cairo in November 1943. This Moscow Decision was made for the establishment of a truly democratic country in Korea. The Cairo decision is that 'Korea shall be independent in due course of time'. We cannot but think it to be a vague decision. Why? Because 'in due course of time' may mean ten years later or twenty. Within due course of time, whether we are subject to a nation or not we do not know. However, the Soviet Union joined the conference at Moscow, and opposed the enslavement of Korea to an Imperialistic country. Therefore, recognize that this decision means the earliest possible establishment of an independent country in Korea".
>
> "3. This decision of the Three Power Conference is a proposal for liquidating the separation of north and south, and establishing a united government in Korea which will rapidly develop all industries, culture, agriculture and communications for promoting and developing the life and welfare of the Korean people.
>
> "4. In order to assist the economic, political, and social progress of the Korean people, and with a view to help and cooperate in the establishment of a

free united independent country in Korea, it is said that the four Allied Nations will carry out a guardianship of Korea for a period of up to 5 years. It is not at all a trusteeship. A trusteeship will never give an independent government to the Korean people. We recognize that the guardianship is their help and cooperation to us in driving away Japanese Imperialism from Korea and in establishing our independent country and promoting our life, at such a present time when our racial unification has not yet been formed and our people's life is not yet stable.

"5. We must fight to be among the democratic countries, and we insist that one of our duties is to shorten the period of 5 years of guardianship".

Note the distinction between the words "trusteeship" and "guardianship", the State Department advise notwithstanding. Even if there were no such difference in the official text of the Moscow Decision, the word had been changed at the local level.

In any event, without any advice from the State Department to the contrary, General Hodge had every reason to believe that the American stand at Moscow had been one of supporting immediate Korean independence as against Soviet demand for trusteeship. This idea was allowed to gain support among the South Korean public with the tacit approval of the American Command. The Communist Party stand seemed to afford complete substantiation. And then the dam broke.

Events followed in quick succession, the end result being the acute embarrassment of the American Command in South Korea.

On 15 January 1946 a Washington radio arrived, saying in part, "Communique (Moscow Decision) reflects Soviet attitude at Moscow Conference agreeing to trusteeship for consideration if proposed by Joint Commission and Koreans." (165-A) On 19 January, a State Department radio program was broadcast, in which the following exchange of comments took place: (165-B)

> "Fisher: Mr. Vincent, you went to Moscow with Secretary of State Byrnes---can you give us the story on the Moscow Agreement on Korea?
>
> "Vincent: Well, Mr. Fisher, the basic draft of the agreement was submitted by the Russians---but the encouraging thing was that their draft went far toward meeting our viewpoint. We proposed a few amendments which were found acceptable by the Soviet and British representatives.
>
> "Fisher: But have the Russians given any indication of their stand? Do they agree that a trusteeship may be dispensed with?
>
> "Vincent: As I have said, the Russians drafted the original text of the agreement, the clear implications of which are that self-government and independence are the goal, and that trusteeship is only a procedure, which may or may not be necessary.
>
> "Fisher: Now, then would you summarize the United States position?
>
> "Vincent: We have one objective only in Korea---to bring about self-government and independence at the earliest possible moment. The Moscow Conference demonstrated that this was also the desire of the Soviet Union and Great Britain.....

This was the prelude. The main act began on 22 January with a TASS release from Moscow accusing the United States

military command in Southern Korea of inspiring "reactionary" protests against the Moscow conference of foreign ministers. The dispatch went on to say that "the behavior of the American command in Southern Korea astonishes one. It has assumed a position of inspiring reactionary demonstrations against the Decisions of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in which, as is known, the Government of the United States participated". (166)

As soon as the TASS release was received, General Hodge called a session of all the American press representatives present in Seoul. His remarks were very much to the point in denying the TASS charges and further stating, that he was endeavoring to explain the true intentions and values of the pact to the Korean people. (167)

It should be pointed out that the American-Soviet Conference, called for by the Moscow Decision, had been in session in Seoul since 16 January and the Russians were present in the city. On 26 January, Colonel General Terenti Fomich Shtikov, chairman of the Soviet delegation, appeared before the South Korean press for the first time, and without any prior notice to the American authorities. The officials present for the interview were the General himself, Minister Plenopotentiary Semeon Konstantinovitch Tsarapkin, Colonel Victor Pavlovich Butusov

(both members of the Soviet delegation), and Captain Choi (an American-Korean). General Shtikov made a few remarks by way of prefacing a new TASS report which was handed out, simply pointing out that this report explained "very clearly and accurately the true story of the Moscow Conference." He went on to comment: "I notice that the Korean papers published misinterpretations and wrong articles on Russian policies in regard to Korea. That is why I am convinced that it is very necessary to release to you this TASS report. I do not think that it is necessary for me to explain to you that it is the Russian policy to see that any liberated nation gets enough sympathy and to help them to get independence as soon as possible. This report from TASS will show you the correct course under the present situation. I believe that you will let the Korean people know the true standing of Russia in regard to Korean problems."

The essence of this TASS release, reproduced in full below, was that the American stand at Moscow had been a proposal for a four power trusteeship for a maximum duration of ten years, and with no mention of the establishment of a Korean national government during that time--this, as contrasted to the Soviet stand which was that the period of trusteeship should be absolutely limited to five years with no power of extension, and that during this period help should be rendered in the establishment of a Korean government.

(168)

"The Korean question was introduced for discussion at the Moscow Conference of foreign ministers on the initiative of the United States delegation, which introduced a project for decisions on Korea. In the project the government of United States expressed its desire for the establishment of a single administration under the command of two military commanders acting together on all Korean national interests, i.e., the questions in regard to currency, trade, transport, etc. It was also pointed out that the Koreans will be united, as far as possible, into a single administration as administrators, consultants and advisers for Military Commanders.

"In this project it was also pointed out that a single administration is proposed as a stepping stone to a non-military administrative governing of Korea on a wide basis, and establishing an independent Korean government. And that the trusteeship of four governments will insure the most appropriate apparatus for establishing an independent Korea. It was also proposed that the interested governments would study as fast as possible the question of establishing a single administration in Korea on the basis of agreement for trusteeship.

"In the American project it was further proposed that the agreement should consider the administrative organ (United States, United Kingdom, China and Russia) acting for the United Nations and the people of Korea. This administrative organ must realize such executive, legislative and judicial power which may be necessary for the effective governing of Korea, until the time that the independent Korean government will be established. The powers and functions of the administrative organ will be realized through the high Commissar of executive Soviet, composed of the representatives of the governments of the administrative organ. It was further proposed in the American project that the high Commissar or Executive Soviet would insure as quickly as possible the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, and to establish the legislative organ elected by the people system of Korea, all this is to be done with an idea in mind of establishing an independent Korean government within a period of five years, if necessary, such a period can be prolonged for five more years, as by

agreement of the four governments represented in the administrative organ after the American project was received, the Soviet delegation presented for the study of the three ministers its project for Korea. After the American delegation acquainted itself with the Soviet project it withdrew its project from the study and accepted the Soviet project with minor changes. The delegation of Great Britain also agreed with it.

As a result of this, the Soviet project was the basis of discussion of Korea by the Moscow Conference of the three ministers. The discussion of the three ministers on Korea, which was accepted by the Moscow Conference, was published 28 December 1945 and differs in the following points from the American project.

"1. In the American project it was proposed to create a single Korean administrative under the command of two military commanders who would have to realize the governing of Korea before the establishment of a trusteeship. The participation of Koreans in the administrative organs of the military commanders was permitted only as administrators, consultants and advisors. The establishment of a national Korean government during that period was not at all considered by the American project. In the discussion of the conference of the three ministers according to the proposal of the Soviet Government, the methods for the solving of the urgent administrative and economic questions concerning north and south Korea were submitted, and, as it is known, the conference which is taking place at the present in Seoul between the representatives of the Soviet and American military commanders in Korea, is the beginning of the carrying out of the decisions, at the same time decision recognizes the urgency for the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Government which corresponds to existing national demands of the Korean people, and to help for a quick liquidation of destructive results of long Japanese oppression of Korea.

"2. The American project proposed that for the establishment of trusteeship an administrative organ of four powers (United States, Russia, Great Britain

and china) which will realize the responsibilities and functions through the high Commissar (Commissioner) and Executive Soviet (Council), composed of the representatives of the above named governments be established. This administrative organ of the American project had to realize legislative, executive and judicial powers during the period of trusteeship in Korea. However, during that time the American project did not consider the establishment of a National Korean Government. The decision accepted by the Moscow Conference of three ministers according to the project of the Soviet Government is absolutely different.

"This decision not only does not postpone the establishment of a national Korean government, but just the opposite, takes into consideration the rendering of help for establishing a Provisional Korean Government by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. With this idea it was decided to create a Joint Soviet-American Commission which must help to speed up the establishment of the Korean Government by consulting with Korean Democratic parties and public organizations. In this manner the trusteeship of four governments in Korea would have to be realized through the Korean Provisional Government and its organs which will insure the national interests of the Korean people.

"3. In the American project it was proposed a trusteeship for Korea for five years and it was understood that such a trusteeship could be continued for five more years. In the decision accepted, according to the project of the Soviet government, the period of trusteeship was only for five years and the continuation of trusteeship for a longer period was excluded.

The inconsistency of the Soviet stand was apparent. On the other hand it claimed that it was the United States which had insisted upon trusteeship for Korea, and on the other, that those opposing trusteeship were reactionary, implying that their utterances should be suppressed.

After this TASS barrage, General Hodge again appealed to the War Department for clarification and requested that he be preinformed of all releases made in Washington. (169) On 30 January, the State Department forwarded a report received from Embassy Moscow re the Korean problem. (170)

> "With respect to TASS statement on Korean question which appeared in today's Soviet press, I wish to invite Dept's attention once more to Isvestia editorial reported in Embassy's 124 Jan. 12. At that time editorial appeared embassy (Moscow) drafted telegram of comment, transmission of which was withheld in view of Ambassador Harriman's early arrival. Although I did not have opportunity to bring this draft to Ambassador's attention during his brief stay in Moscow .....forth submission now as background for issuance of this TASS communique. Intended message was as follows: USSR has since San Francisco UNO made it plain that in general it did not go along with either American or British conception of trusteeship. With regard to Korea in particular USSR has indicated that it favored prompt independence for that former Jap colony....dispensation for Korea handed down at Moscow conference therefore provided compromise formula: acceptance of principle of trusteeship to which Anglo-Americans had become committed, but emphasis on Korean "Democratic" parties, social organizations and provisional government. If there has been any doubt as to the interpretation of word "democratic" as applied to Korea it should now be dispelled by Isvestia attack on Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo and followers. These men impractical and poorly organized though they may be nevertheless present a pro-American opposition to Soviet sponsored "democratic" parties and social organizations. As to concept of Soviet domination of future provisional government, that Isvestia would go to lengths it did in condemning this opposition as reactionaries and collaborators with the Japanese is indicative of attitude which USSR will probably adopt in Korea under Joint Commission and trusteeship. Lacking solid popular support and long

experience of opposition in Balkans, opposition in Korea can hardly be expected to stand up under highly organized attack of Soviet political roller. Articles in Soviet press imply that after seeking to discredit opposition and seek provisional government with its protegees USSR will wish to operate through provisional government to oust any other foreign influence. If this scheme works out we may expect an obstreperous provisional government which will loudly protest its democratic qualities and its competence to manage its own affairs. Any attempt from non-Soviet sources to guide or check its activities will in such circumstances elicit charges of reactionary interference and collusion with Jap collaborators. Today's TASS statement seems to us to be directed primarily to Korean people. If so it is not without certain connotations. By contributing to USSR responsibility for trusteeship Koreans 'reactionaries' have induced USSR to reveal fully its true attitude...There can now be little doubt that USSR wishes to secure earliest and most complete exclusion of other great powers from all connection (with Korea). Document which it submitted at Moscow Conference designed to achieve this aim. USSR does not hesitate to advocate arrangements which formally call for early complete exclusion of all outside powers because Soviet regime in contrast to governments of other great Powers has elaborate existing techniques and machinery for penetration and puppet domination of neighboring countries which it is sure she can apply successfully to Korea if other foreign influences are removed. It is reasonable to assume in fact that USSR has in reserve at least strong nucleus of ready made native governmental apparatus including bureaucrats militia and Koreans units from Red Army with can be depended upon to follow obediently Moscow direction.'

It will be noted that this was in essence almost a complete verification of the TASS version of the Moscow Conference. In view of General Hodge's previous comments to the Korean press on the subject, based on earlier State Department reports, the

American command was seriously embarrassed by this turn of events. The Korean press and the local populace were fully cognizant of the situation, so much so that on 29 January a special political observer in Military Government reported that "the overwhelming majority of the people of Seoul are giving tentative credence to the statement of General Shtikov, made to the press on 26 January. The result is that there is present general belief that the United States sought to impose trusteeship, while the Soviet Union opposed it...A direct consequence is a lessened trust in American integrity." (171).

At this point, General Hodge sent off a caustic radio to the State Department reporting the effect on American-Korean relations of this apparent duplicity on the part of the United States. (172) It is of sufficient import to include in full.

> "Reference message (radio quoted on page 87-88) contains and implies information that should have been passed to this headquarters by the State Department several weeks ago for guidance in planning, policies, and handling emergencies. It is in itself complete evidence that the Department has paid little attention either to information painstakingly sent in from those actually on the ground as to the psychology of the Korean people or to the repeated urgent recommendations of the Commander and State Department political advisers. The verification of the full truth of TASS statements comes as real news to me, particularly in view of my urgent recommendations beginning in October and the recent State Department attitude and broadcasts shy away from the trusteeship idea and hold out hope

that possibly may not be necessary. Just after the quelling of the revolt and riots brought about by announcement of trusteeship, our position here was the strongest since our arrival. As the significance of the TASS statement recently released here by General Shtikov sinks in, the Korean people are feeling that the United States has again sold them down the river, this time to the Russians instead of the Japanese. Without a denial by US nothing we can say or do locally will clear the atmosphere of a newly growing distrust of the United States. The TASS statement was very cleverly worded to make clear to the Koreans that the Soviet tried to arrange for the Koreans at and prior to the Moscow Conference everything Koreans had wanted, including full independence at an early date, but had been thwarted in their benevolent wishes by the strong American pressure for a ten year trusteeship. Up to now the Koreans have hated and feared the Soviet because of their actions within the Northern zone and have looked to the United States for salvation believing that US would give some consideration to the wishes of freed Koreans. The Russians are improving materially in behavior North of thirty eight degrees and through clever propaganda are beginning to rise in stature as the saviors of the "thirty million Korean people". Communist activity, on the wane for almost a month up until January 15, is locally again increasing materially both in boldness and effectiveness, while thinking and educated Koreans are again becoming sure they will now have to fight for their freedom and independence. It might be added that so far there is nothing in the attitude of the Russians to indicate that they have any thought of unifying the Korean nation while we keep forces here. So far all discussion includes adjustment of flow of everything from mail to persons through control posts along the boundary. My best guess now is that North and South will never be really united until the Russians are sure that the whole will be soundly communistic. Based on current trends, I question our ability to stem the propaganda and controlled political manouvering of the Soviets.

"I do not know who have been the experts on Korea, who have advised and guided the State Department in their disregard of my recommendations. It may be educated Koreans in the United States. It certainly has not been anyone who has seen and really knows Korea since the war. I hope that it can be impressed upon the Department that here we are not dealing with wealthy US educated Koreans, but with earthy, poorly trained, and poorly educated Orientals strongly affected by 40 years of Japanese control, who stubbornly and frantically hold to what they like and dislike, and who are definitely influenced by direct propaganda and with whom it is almost impossible to reason. We are opposed by a strongly organized, ruthless political machinery designed to appeal to the millions of this type.

"I hope there is some way in which you can pass my ideas to the State Department and get over to them the thought that we must repeat must, be kept informed and that it might be worth while to consider some of the information and recommendations we have conscientiously sent in from the Korean hotspot, based on fact and not theory.

"Regardless of my strong feeling of being let down by the State Department, I will do everything in my power to carry out all policies laid down or implied and to make the best of this difficult situation."

After it was known that the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, was to visit Seoul in the near future, General Hodge radioed General MacArthur as follows: (178-A)

"I will talk to Mr. Harriman when he arrives and hope to be able to get enough information of what went on at Moscow that I at least may know what I should say and do to keep in line with American policies. I have previously made specific request for this information.

"Please believe my sincerity when I repeat what I said in our last conversation, namely that I will gladly accept relief in the role of a sacrificial goat for any muddle here if need be to save face for U.S. with either Russia or Korea. I am deeply interested in our own success in this handicapped task and in the future of Korea."

This was the setting as the first American-Soviet conference got under way in Seoul on 16 January 1946.

The Soviet-American Conference

Section III of the Moscow communique (refer pages 72-73) called for the creation of a Joint Soviet-American Conference within a period of two weeks (dated from 26 December 1945) for the purpose of giving consideration to the "urgent problems effecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters" between the two commands. It should be noted that this was quite distinct from the Joint Soviet-American Commission which was to be soon created, likewise under terms of the Moscow decision. As XXIV Corps G-2 pointed out, "From the original communique, it appeared that two bodies would be required for the solution of Korea's problems, one for coordination of internal administrative affairs and one for the creation of a Provisional Government." (175) This section treats only the former.

Instructions

On 31 December 1945 preliminary and informal instructions arrived at XXIV Corps Headquarters from Washington, D.C., for the handling of the impending conference in Seoul. In addition to the discussion of economic coordination between the two zones, General Hodge was directed to "seek agreement on a limited interchange of Soviet and United States Military personnel." It was suggested that military liaison sections be established on a reciprocal basis at the two headquarters. Further instructions called for an American request that "there be no removal of capital goods from the Soviet zone and that, where possible, goods which have already been removed shall be returned." It was considered expedient to limit the agenda of the conference purely to administrative and economic matters, and for that reason it was advised that General Hodge avoid requesting a commitment by the Soviet Commander to the effect that Communist activities in the American zone be forbidden. "It is expected that the Soviet Commander will disclaim any connection with the Communist movement in southern Korea," the radio said. "Rather than a commitment from him it is believed that effective implementation of a uniform agrarian policy and other economic reforms will do much toward reducing the real dangers from Communist activities in southern Korea." It was also

pointed out that agreement should be reached on the removal of all fortifications except those which might be mutually agreed upon by the two commanders, with particular emphasis given to those along the 38th parallel which emphasized the division of the country. Finally, the American commander was instructed to arrange for an early meeting of the Joint Commission as provided for in the Korean section of the Moscow Decision and to defer consideration of all political matters until the commission was convened.(174)

SWNCC directive 176/13, approved 3 January 1946, provided for negotiations with the Soviet Command in Northern Korea on economic-administrative matters but postponed discussion of political matters pending further instructions. It concluded as follows: "In connection with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Korean section of the Moscow communique, you will arrange for an early meeting of the Joint US-USSR Conference. You will receive from SWNCC, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, early political guidance for meetings of the Joint Commission."(175) This was passed to USAFIK on 8 January, with General Hodge designated as SCAP representative to accomplish the agreement with the Soviet within the scope prescribed.(176)

The directive governing the American stand at the Soviet-American Conference did not arrive until 18 January, two days after

the conference sessions had opened in Seoul. This document (177) is reproduced in full below:

"The following directive, received from the State, War, and Navy Departments, is furnished for your guidance.

"(1) You are hereby charged with the responsibility for carrying out for the United States the provisions of Section 5 (Korea) of the Moscow Communique.

"(2) In connection with paragraph 4 of the Korean section of the Moscow communique, you will arrange for the conference specified therein. The following points are furnished you for the guidance of the US representative at the Conference.

(A). Pending further Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, you will retain full responsibility for the administration of Korea south of the 38 degree north latitude, subject to boundary changes of the sort suggested in your OA 53789 of 24 October and WX 81584 of 7 November.

(B). Pending further Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, political matters will not be discussed, the US representatives limiting their discussion to administrative and economic matters.

(C). It is believed that you should seek so far as possible Soviet concurrence with the economic and administrative matters outlined in your OA 53789 and such other economic and administrative matters as you desire. In this connection, you are authorized to reach all necessary agreements to achieve these ends, so long as they are in consonance with the basic objectives expressed in SWNCC 176/8, the basic directive with regard to Korea.

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(3). You are further authorized to make such agreement for exchange of liaison personnel and such other movement of US and Soviet military personnel between the two zones as you believe desirable and advantageous.

(3). In connection with paragraph 2 and 3 of the Korean section of the Moscow communique, you will arrange an early meeting of the Joint United States-Soviet Commission. You will receive from the State, War, and Navy Departments, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, early political guidence for the meetings of the Joint Commission.

(4). You will keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully informed of the results of all conferences between your representatives and those of the Soviet Commander in Korea."

Negotiating With The Russians

Some little time elapsed after the Moscow Decision was released on 26 December 1945 before the Soviet Command in North Korea gave evidence of any willingness to negotiate with the Americans, even though the Moscow Decision had called for the convening of the Joint Conference within two weeks, that is, by 30 December. Representatives of USAFIK discussed the Moscow Communique and the preliminary conference informally with Mr. Anatole Shabshin of the Soviet Consulate General in Seoul on 2 January 1946. He was noncommittal, having received no official word from his government and having at hand only an unofficial radio announcement of the communique. (178) This conversation was followed by an official letter to the Consul General on 4 January requesting permission for

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Major General A. V. Arnold and a party, not to exceed ten, to visit Pyongyang for the purpose of discussing mutual problems with the Soviets in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Decision.(179)

On 8 January General Hodge issued a press release to the effect that he was still awaiting a reply to his request put to the Russians "for the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Northern and Southern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters."(180) Within hours, however, a letter from General Shtikov arrived in Seoul stating in part:(181)

> "I have received orders from my commanding officer that for the consideration of urgent problems having to do with South as well as North Korea, and for working out of measures for the establishment in the administrative-economic field permanent coordination between the American Command in South Korea and the Soviet Command in North Korea, it is necessary within two weeks to conduct a conference of representatives of the American and Soviet Commands in Korea.
>
> "Hereby I have the honor to inform you of our readiness to conduct such a conference.
>
> "The representative of the Soviet command appointed to this conference is Colonel General Shtikov, who is ready to meet with your representatives between the 15th and 20th January 1946 in Seoul, or any other place convenient to you.
>
> "Colonel Guard General Shtikov will be accompanied by political advisor Tsarapkin, Major General Shanin, Major General Romanyenko, and a group of advisors and technical personnel of between 12 and 15 persons.

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"If you are ready to conduct the above ordered conference, will you kindly appoint your representatives and inform me of your agreement and wishes in the matter of conducting this conference."

The arrangements were completed with General Hodge's acknowledgement of the letter on 9 January 1946. The American General further suggested that the place of the meetings be Seoul (182) and that the date be not later than 15 January. General Chistiakov readily acceded to these suggestions. (183)

The American command was hard pressed to find trained men of the required rank to negotiate with the Russians. A 6 January radio from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower gave emphasis to the importance of the pending conferences. (184)

"In view of great importance of forthcoming negotiations with Soviets on Korean problems as prescribed in Moscow communique War Dept. is anxious to furnish you any assistance you feel necessary in augmenting Hodge's staff with officers experienced in dealing with Soviets. I have particular reference to establishment of the commission directed by the Moscow agreement. Brig. Gen. William L. Ritchie who has been air attache in Moscow will shortly be coming to the Far East accompanying Ambassador Harriman. If agreeable to the latter Ritchie can be made available. If so it is suggested you might wish to assign him on temp. duty on Hodge staff in view of above considerations. Also available is Col. Richard Park who could be sent from US at once. Col. Ivan D. Yeaton has been highly recommended but is at present on duty in China. CG China has been queried as to whether Yeaton could be placed on duty with you for period of conference should you need him. Major Gen. Sydney P. Spalding who was very successful in Moscow as chief of US supply mission might possibly be made available also if needed. Early answer would be appreciated.

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General MacArthur requested General Ritchie's assistance in the forthcoming conferences without delay.(185) Both Brigadier General Ritchie and Major General Spalding were ordered to report to SCAP. General Wedemeyer reported that Colonel Yeatem was carrying out very important work with Nationalist-Communist negotiations in China and could not be spared.(186)

It was suggested by General Hodge that Ambassador Harriman, enroute from Moscow to Tokyo, be invited to visit Seoul for consultation, bringing General Ritchie with him.(187) This suggestion was accepted by General MacArthur. In fact the General at that time proposed that he himself accompany Ambassador Harriman from Tokyo to Seoul.(188) On the 21st General MacArthur informed General Hodge that the following message had been received from the Ambassador:

> "Planning to leave Moscow for Tokyo on Wednesday, January 23, 1946, via New Delhi, Chungking and Shanghai. Schedule for trip 8 days, subject to weather and unforeseen factors. My only official business is to see you and anyone else you desire in connection with the discussions regarding Japan and Korea at the recent Moscow Conference. Would be interested to visit Korea, but my plans are entirely as you will wish."

General MacArthur went on to comment that in view of the fact that the conference would undoubtedly be in session by the time the Ambassador would arrive in Tokyo and that harmful speculation

might result from his bringing the Ambassador to Seoul, that this idea of a joint visit had been abandoned. (189)

Arrangements

On 15 January, the Soviet delegation arrived in Seoul. The delegation consisted of five principals, ten advisors and some sixty service personnel. On the top level were Colonel General Terenti Fomich Shtikov (Chief of the Soviet Delegation); Extraordinary Minister-Plenipotentiary Semeon Constantinovitch Tsarapkin (Political Advisor to the Commission); Major General Andrei Alexseyevitch Romanyenko (Military Governor of Northern Korea); Major General Gregori Ivanovitch Khanin (Chief of Staff to General Shtikov); and Mr. Gerasim Martinovitch Balasanov (political advisor to the Soviet XXV Army and recently stationed at the Soviet Embassy, Tokyo). The advisory staff included Colonel Victor Pavlovitch Sutuscv (Liaison officer), Lt. Col. Basil Basilovitch Zotov (Aide de camp to General Shtikov), Aschik Avetitch Manukyan (advisor), Dmitri Konstantinovitch Staredymov (advisor), Basil Basilovitch Lavroff (advisor), Col. Tikhov Ivanovitch Korkulenko, (technical advisor), Lt. Col. Zakharov, Captain Odnoledkov (engineer), and Sr. Lt. Krupnikov. (190)

The American delegation which proceeded to meet with the Russians on 16 January consisted of Major General Archibald V. Arnold,

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(Military Governor of Korea and CG 7th Infantry Division); former

H. Merrell Benninghoff (State Department Political Advisor to XXIV Corps); Major General Sydney P. Spalding (former chief of U. S. supply mission in Moscow); Colonel Robert H. Booth (former executive assistant to the Military Governor of Korea); and Colonel Frank H. Britton, (Representative of GHQ SCAP). The technical advisory staff included Colonel J. C. Underwood (USAMGIK, Director, Bureau of Mining and Industry), Colonel J. W. Merlihy, Lt. Col. A. J. Cornelsen (USAMGIK, Director of Department of Transportation), and Lt. Col. Gordon S. Enders (USAMGIK, Chief, Office of Foreign Affairs). (191)

The disparity in rank between the two delegations was pointed out by General Hodge to SOAPs (192)

"Your attention invited to composition of Soviet Delegation....Since head of Soviet Delegation is a three star general, we are placed at a disadvantage with our delegation headed by a Major General. The early arrival of Generals Spalding and Ritchie will offset to a certain extent this disadvantage in lower rank. In the field of political advisors the Soviets again have the advantage both in numbers and rank. The head of the Soviet Advisory group is Mr. Tsarapkin with title of Extraordinary Minister-Plenipotentiary with a simulated three star rank. It is reliably reported that he is second only to Mr. Molotov in Soviet Foreign affairs.

"The need for increased rank of our delegation is not extremely urgent as long as the negotiations remain on the economic-administrative level. However, I urgently request that prior to the starting of negotiations on the political subjects and the future government for Korea, at least one high powered individual from the State

Department and one three or four star general officer be added to our delegation. I have no objection to selection of officer senior to me, provided it works to the best interest of the service and accomplishment of our mission."

Living arrangements were provided for the Soviet delegation in Seoul by the American Command. Quonset huts were erected for the enlisted men, a large house was made available for the lower ranking officers, and rooms in the Chosen Hotel were assigned to general officers. The Red Army officers took their meals in the Chosen and Heute Hotels with the Americans.(193) The Russians brought three automobiles and two 2½-ton trucks. Other transportation was made available by XXIV Corps.

General Hodge described the Soviet delegation as being highly suspicious, not even wanting to divulge the number of persons in their party.(194) There was to be no publicity given to conference sessions other than that which was released by joint communiques. However, the opening session, being largely a ceremonial affair, was open to authorized spectators and thoroughly covered by local and foreign newspaper correspondents. The initial session was held in the Throne Room of the Capitol. The stage was properly set with the Korean flag in the place of honor on the throne platform with the Soviet flag on a lower level to the right and the American flag in a corresponding position to the left. Some forty Korean newspaper

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men and twenty or thirty American spectators were present. The Korean radio station JODK broadcast the proceedings.(195) All utterances were translated into English, Russian and Korean.

Conference discussion

General Hodge opened the conference with a brief speech of welcome to the Russian delegation. The General said in part:(196)

> "It is my hope, and that of my government as well, that these present conversations will result in an agreement which will, in the administrative and economic spheres, bring to an end the trials and difficulties of the Korean nation brought about by over thirty-five years of Japanese oppression and misrule.
>
> "In opening these important sessions, I wish you to know (General Shtikov), both personally and officially, that I feel it a great honor to welcome as guests, representatives of your great nation that fought so valiantly and steadfastly against our common enemies. It is my sincere belief that our great victories on the battlefields of the world will be followed by complete cooperation and collaboration around the council tables of great nations, resulting in continuance of world peace, and that our conferences here will solve the pressing problems of the Korean people."

General Shtikov answered with a short statement thanking the Americans for their welcome and hospitality, pointing out that this was the first joint effort of the American and Russian allies in Korea to work out the country's problems for the benefit of the liberated Koreans, and expressing hope for the success of the conferences.(197)

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With that, the room was cleared of the spectators and press, and the business at hand began. Both the American and Soviet delegations presented suggested agendas, and a subcommittee of two Americans and two Russians was appointed to combine points of procedure. It was likewise agreed that the results of the conferences would not be final until approved by the American and Soviet commanders in Korea and that no information regarding the proceedings of the conference would be released to the press except as a joint release by Generals Arnold and Shtikov. (198)

At the close of the third day it was possible to draw certain conclusions regarding the Soviet position. At the first meeting General Arnold had presented the American twenty-point agenda, together with the following statement: "As its objective, the conference, applying the principle of the fundamental unity of Korea, will take all possible action in the administrative and economic fields; such action must necessarily be consistent with the broad program for Korea envisaged in the Moscow communique." (199) General Arnold endeavored to convey to the Soviets the desire of the American delegation to remove the unfortunate effects of the 38° parallel barrier by doing everything possible to restore Korean administration and economy to a unified whole. The American

delegation expressed the desire to work out methods whereby the railroads, posts, and telegraphs, banks and commercial institutions, and all other factors important in the national life (outside the realm of politics) could be operated on a national scale with as little interference as possible caused by the artificial division of the country into two zones of military responsibility.

The Soviet agenda as presented at the first session (200) contained only five points for discussion, namely:

"a. Conference procedure.

"b. Delivery of electric power from northern to southern Korea.

"c. Delivery of rice and other commodities from southern to northern Korea.

"d. Rail and motor connections between the two zones.

"e. Evacuation of Japanese refugees from northern Korea to Japan."

This was in sharp contrast to the much more inclusive and detailed agenda introduced by the American delegation appearing (201) below:

"1. Reestablish the railroads of North and South Korea as a single operation unit under complete control of the central organization located in Seoul."

"2. Ensure continued delivery of required electric power to all of Korea, under control of the Transmission-Line-Dispatcher in Seoul."

"3. Reestablish telephone and telegraph communication as a single operating unit under complete control of the central organization in Seoul."

"4. Permit transportation of bituminous coal and agricultural products from Manchuria to South Korea."

"5. Adjust the boundary of the U. S. and Soviet zones of military responsibility by:

The transfer to the Soviet Military Commander of that portion of Hwanghae Province lying south of 38° parallel.

The transfer to the U. S. Military Commander of that portion of Kyonggi Province lying north of 38° parallel.

Adjustment of the boundary in Kangwon province to conform to administrative local sub-division boundaries."

"6. Remove all military fortifications along the 38° parallel."

"7. Establish Joint U. S. - Soviet control posts along the boundary of U. S. and Soviet zones of military responsibility.

"8. Permit passage between zones of U. S. and Soviet military responsibility under a system of controlled permits for:

a. Persons who are:
   1. Returning to their homes for permanent occupancy.
   2. Engaged in commerce.
   3. On Government business.
   4. On special missions.
   5. Covered by special agreement.

"b. Producer and consumer goods.
"c. Any and all types of transportation.

"9. Adopt fiscal policies in respect to methods of handling financial institutions; restrictions and rates of foreign exchange, inter-area deposit transfers and trading in credits, exchange, and commodities both North and South we must have some agreement for the payment of this material, and this paragraph takes care of the payment.

"10. Establish uniform regulation of ports and of waterborne commerce between North and South Korea."

"11. Resume normal flow of producer and consumer goods to stimulate commerce and industry."

"12. Permit communication by home offices of commercial organizations with their branches in North or South Korea."

"13. Reestablish mail service by honoring stamps being used in either area.

"14. Prepare mutually agreeable plans for the settlement of displaced persons."

"15. Reestablish the central broadcasting network over all of Korea."

"16. Extend newspaper circulation to all of Korea."

"17. Prohibit the removal of capital goods from Korea."

"18. Exchange liaison groups which shall have unrestricted travel."

"19. Permit a representative of an interested government to inspect real property of his government or of a national thereof anywhere in Korea."

"20. Arrange meetings of sub-committees to work out details of above-mentioned items."

During the second and third sessions, when the agenda (see pages 116-125 for final agenda) was finally worked out, it became apparent that whereas the American delegation was pressing for a broad interpretation of the objectives of the conference, the Russians desired to limit the proceedings to a discussion of arrangements, resembling barter, for the delivery of carefully specified commodities and services. For instance, the method of payment for commodities exchanged remained on the agenda, but the establishment of a unified financial system was relegated to future study. Similarly, the Russians shied away from suggestions of the American delegation that the railways, telephones, telegraphs and the like be placed under a central administration, although they were willing to discuss limited and carefully controlled services between the two zones. Although these items remained on the agenda it had become apparent by this time that anything resembling a removal of the barrier at the 38° parallel would be difficult if not impossible to bring about.

The Russians flatly refused to place the prohibition of capital goods removal on the agenda on the ground that such prohibition already was in effect in both zones. The matter was dropped before the Americans made any specific accusations, although the right was reserved for the American commander to take it up directly with

the Soviet Commander. Free circulation of newspapers likewise was dropped when the Soviets implied this was a political and not an economic question.

The Chief of the Soviet delegation requested omission of the problem of border readjustment pending receipt of instructions on the subject from his Commander. However, when presented with recommendations for administrative adjustments along the 38° parallel, the Chief of the Soviet delegation indicated agreement and began considering details. The American proposal to exchange liaison groups was, after considerable discussion, watered down so that the agenda item was changed to read, "the working out of measures of future coordination", which might or might not include the exchange of representatives.

The American delegation was by this time already at a disadvantage in the negotiations since it was necessary to ask for so much more than the Soviet delegation was asking. The Soviets were not swayed by American arguments for a unified Korea. On the other hand, their approach was quite practical and realistic. Their principal demand was for rice and other commodities, for which there was an urgent need in Northern Korea. The only concept of inter-zone trade was on a strictly barter basis.

Tsarapkin, who had been present at the Moscow Conference in December, stated that the understanding reached at Moscow was

that only specific subjects, on a barter basis, were contemplated as within the purview of paragraph 4 of the Moscow Decision. On the other hand, the American delegation contended that this paragraph contemplated complete economic integration even prior to political discussions, and urged that the entire matter be approached from a broad viewpoint. However, since the Americans lacked knowledge of the actual commitments made by Secretary Byrnes and of the general background of the conversations at Moscow on the subject, an urgent radio was transmitted to Washington (205) requesting information.

On the 23rd General Hodge addressed a letter to General (206) Shtikov in an attempt to widen the area of discussion.

> "It is becoming apparent that present Soviet delegation desires to limit discussions in the current Joint Conference to a specific stopgap measures for solution of limited problems only. It is the view of the US representatives that this conference should start immediately to work on major basic problems for the complete economic and administrative unification of Korea as an entity. Although it is essential that the problems enumerated in my previous communications to you be solved at an early date, their solution is by no means considered to be all that is necessary at this time.
>
> "In order that the Korean people shall receive all the benefits which it is believed to be the intention of our countries to bestow upon them it is respectfully requested that the present delegation be empowered and directed to discuss all problems which are essential for the complete administrative and economic unification of Korea. If this is not possible under your directives from higher levels, it is requested that authority be obtained for such discussions at an early date."

The entire conference was threatened at the sixth session when General Shtikov rose to announce that he understood from the sub-committee that the United States zone was not able to provide rice for the Northern zone and further, that if South Korea were in fact unable to supply the desired food that it would be impossible to reach an agreement on the exchange of goods.(205) He cast some doubt on the whole matter by pointing out that the year's crop was harvested after the occupation began and that rice, therefore, should be available for shipment to the North as had been the case in previous years. It was apparent that the Russians doubted the truth of the American contention that there was no rice available, particularly in view of past American statements offering to barter rice with North Korea for other goods. Indications were that the Soviet delegation considered this to be the most important question before the conference.(206)

The next day's session was spent entirely in discussion of the supply of rice and other foodstuffs for Northern Korea. The essence of the Soviet attitude was that North Korea needed rice and other grains, and since the Southern zone had more foodstuffs than the Northern zone, the United States command should make some of it available. Moreover, the Russians seemed to feel that the supply of rice and grain for the North was the only matter of real importance

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to the Korean people at this time. General Shtikov refused to see any value in the appointment of a Joint Food Committee to establish the actual figures on the South and North Korean food supply. In return for electric power, chemicals and other commodities delivered to South Korea, the Russians demanded payment in rice.(207) The Russians emphasized that the food situation in three of the northern provinces was desperate, and that all they requested was that the food supply be "balanced" throughout Korea. When General Arnold produced figures indicating that the food situation was practically the same throughout Korea, North and South, General Shtikov replied, "I ask General Arnold to realize that our demands for the delivery of foodstuffs and rice in question do not mean that we want the people of the South to live worse than the people of the North. We have already a very hard food situation. You can call it catastrophic in three provinces. It is necessary to take relief measures and prevent starvation. This is why we must insist that commodities be delivered from the South to the North."(208) The General went on to say later that "if the American Command refuses to deliver commodities or food to the North we shall be obliged to exchange these industrial products which the North produces in another place."(209) To this, General Arnold replied in part, "nothing which I have said so far

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as the representative of the US delegation can be construed as an unwillingness to cooperate in this joint effort for Korea. As I have stated previously, we cannot guarantee to supply foodstuffs. Since we cannot provide rice, we shall go ahead with arrangements for the exchange of other items in so far as possible. (210)

In the ensuing discussion, it was pointed out that the figures on the goods which the United States was willing to trade were only one-twelfth of the value of the commodities desired from the North. General Arnold tried to point out that although for a time there would be an unbalance, that trade would eventually balance itself. General Shtikov, however, would not consider that viewpoint and asked categorically, "I would like to know whether Northern Korea will have any foodstuffs or not." To this General Arnold replied that some might be found available in the South, for instance, fish. In return, the Russians pointed out that there was sufficient fish in the North, and what was needed was rice and other grains". They went on to say, "We consider that the American Command, having at its disposal great foodstuffs and resources, must give us a definite answer as to the amount and date it can supply them." (211) Since the Russians demanded a balanced trade at the outset, a list was compiled of commodities available for trade in the two zones. The result was that the Russians offered goods worth 89,000,000 yen as against a total of 10,250,000 yen

listed by the Americans. The Russians insisted upon 1 August 1945 prices. The final American list of items to be exported to North Korea included textiles, transformers, copper wire, electric light bulbs, motors, replacement parts for railroad equipment and machinery, the total value being 25,768,000 yen when the cost of certain railroad stock demanded by the Russians was included. The goods requested from North Korea amounted to 28,602,443 yen and included metals, chemicals, lumber, fertilizer and electric power. (212)

In the attempt to convince the Russians of the truth of the American contention that the food situation was no more desperate in the North than in the South, figures were introduced into the discussion which indicated that the per capita production of rice in the North was 1.7 koku per individual as against 1.69 koku in the South (1945 figures). (213)

On 5 February, in the 15th session, the Russians were still arguing about the inability of the South to furnish rice. At one point, the Soviets proposed that items covering the exchange of goods, the payment for goods, and the supply of electric power be removed from the agenda. The Soviet Delegation stated that when the United States command in South Korea made available surplus foodstuffs which could be exchanged for goods, the Soviet Command would agree to the renewal of discussions on this question. (214) It was also indicated by the Russians that their figures in regard to past exports of rice

from Korea, the number of workers, and the per capita food production did not agree with those submitted by the Americans. General Arnold countered by calling attention to the United States proposal calling for the exchange of goods and services worth 25,000,000 yen, which the Soviet Delegation would not consider because rice was not included. The General concluded with a statement that it was regrettable that there could not have been a complete solution of the problems posed by paragraph 4 of the Korean section of the Moscow communique and that the Soviet Delegation must accept full responsibility for the failure because it withdrew these pertinent items from the agenda. General Shtikov referred to his earlier statements and said that it was useless to debate further on these questions, and with that the Conference closed. (215)

The following results were obtained:

"1. Conditions of supplying electric power to Southern Korea from Northern Korea.

a. The representatives of the Soviet and American Commands in Korea were unable to reach any decisions on this item.

"2. Permit exchange in commodities such as rice, raw materials, fuel, industrial equipment, and chemicals between North and South Korea.

a. The representatives of the Soviet and American Commands were unable to reach any decisions on this item.

"3. Railroad and motor transportation between the two zones and coastwise shipping between ports of Northern and Southern Korea.

e. Movement by rail, truck and coastwise transport between the Soviet and American zones of military responsibility in Korea will be established.

h. Each military Commander will be responsible for the control and operation of the transportation facilities within his zone of military responsibility.

c. The re-establishment of transport movement will insure shipments in fulfillment of the agreements concerning the exchange of goods and movement of the population as agreed to in item 2 and item 8 of the joint agenda.

d. The United States Command will do everything practicable to supply deficiencies in regard to transportation needs (railroad trains and vessels) in order to insure the complete transfer of freight from the Soviet zone of military responsibility to the American zone of military responsibility.

e. For the accounting of rolling stock, moving from one zone to the other, and to secure its return in due time, exchange points will be established at suitable locations.

f. All payments for transportation service between the two zones will be made at the point of origin and in accordance with a mutually agreed upon uniform tariff, with subsequent settling of accounts.

g. The movement of vessels between ports of the two zones will be coordinated prior to movement and will be in accordance with plans approved by the military commanders of the two zones.

h. The movement of motor transportation will be on highways passing through control points established in accordance with agreements reached in item 7 of the joint agenda.

i. In order to effect average and major repairs and the production of spare parts for the repair of locomotives, the American and Soviet Commands in Korea, each in their respective zones, will undertake

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all possible measures to bring about by 1 April 1946 the maximum standards which existed on 1 August 1945 in the locomotive repair shops at: Wonsan, Seoul, Pusan, Inchon and Pyongyang, and will:

(1) Resume the repair of locomotives of the railroads of North and South Korea in the ratio which existed on the schedules of 1 August 1945.

(2) Have as an objective the manufacture of the required number of spare parts for the repair of locomotives of the railroads of both zones of military responsibility and to distribute them between the shops of the two zones in the ratio which was in effect on 1 August 1945.

j. Within thirty days after the approval of this agreement by both Commands, the American Command in South Korea will deliver one hundred railroad passenger cars to the Soviet Command in North Korea.

k. A technical Joint Transportation Commission will be created to insure coordination in regard to all problems of railroad, sea, and truck transportation, and for the preparation of recommendations to both Commanders concerning all problems which may arise in connection with the re-opening of transportation between the two zones. This commission will consist of six members, three for each zone. Meetings will be held at least once a month or oftener upon the request of the military Commander of either zone. Meetings will be held alternately in Seoul or Pyongyang, insofar as practicable. The decisions of the Joint Transportation Commission will be effective in the two zones after approval by the military Commanders of both zones.

"4. Establishment of uniform regulation of the ports of Northern and Southern Korea.

a. Solution of this item of the agenda was included within the scope of the decisions reached on item 3, joint agenda.

"5. About the mutual payment for goods which are being delivered from South Korea to North Korea and vice versa.

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a. The representatives of the Soviet and American Commands in Korea were unable to reach any decisions on this item.

*5. This item is being studied by the American Command and their proposal for the working out of the appropriate measures will be forwarded to the Soviet Command for study.

*6. Movement of approximately 252,000 Japanese in the category of displaced persons from Northern Korea to Japan

a. To remove this item from the joint agenda.

*7. Establishment of joint US-USSR control posts along the boundary of zones of US-USSR military responsibility.

a. Control posts for the regulation of the movement of Korean citizens and goods from one zone to the other will be established.

b. The Soviet and American Military Commands will establish control posts in their respective zones of military responsibility. American and Soviet control posts will be located as near as possible to each other and in no case more than two kilometers apart. Communications between joint control posts will be maintained by telephone or messenger.

c. The location of these posts and the regulations for their operation will be established by special agreement between the two Commands after item 14 of the joint agenda (Change of Boundary between the Two Zones) has been decided.

*8. Movement of Korean citizens from one zone to the other.

a. (1) Korean citizens will be permitted to return to their former places of residence in either zone provided they file appropriate applications with the local authorities within sixty days after publication of this agreement.

(2) Korean citizens will be permitted to travel from one zone to the other in accordance with plans approved by both Commands and by any means of travel within the capabilities of transport facilities.

(3) In the movement of Korean citizens from the Southern zone to the Northern zone, and from the Northern zone to the Southern zone, to their former permanent place of dwelling, the Soviet and American Commands will respectively deliver to each other sufficient quantities of foodstuffs to last until 1 August 1946 for the number of citizens transferred from the respective zones. Actual delivery of foodstuffs will be made monthly and in the amount to provide for the difference in the number of citizens moving from one zone to the other. Quantities of foodstuffs will be computed based on the existing ration. Each Command will make appropriate distribution to the citizens involved.

b. Korean citizens engaged in all kinds of trading and commercial activities (and those goods which are the object of this business) will be permitted to move from one zone to the other for such purposes. These movements will be authorized by special permission of the Commander of the zone to which the Korean citizen intends to move, either with or without goods.

c. Students of universities, middle and special schools, and pupils of elementary schools in the vicinity of the boundary of the zones of military responsibility will be permitted to move from one zone to the other for school purposes. In addition, those Korean citizens whose trips are necessary because of pressing personal or family needs will be permitted to move from one zone to the other after specific approval by the Soviet and United States Commands in each case.

9. Movement of mail, except parcels between zones.

a. The Postal authorities of both zones will be permitted to bring about the exchange of ordinary first class mail (letters in envelopes and postcards) and of registered mail.

b. In exchange of mail the postal authorities of each zone will prepare and exchange lists showing the number and types of pieces exchanged. Postal authorities

of each zone will sort and bundle exchange mail according to provincial designation.

e. Until the introduction of common type of postage stamps in Korea, each Commander will recognize postal symbols existing in the other zone (if any other such symbols as may be put into use) as evidence of proper payment of postage.

d. Exchange of mail will be made at Kaesong.

e. Each mail shipment to the point of exchange will be accompanied by representatives of the appropriate military Command and of the postal authorities, together with a suitable armed guard.

f. The first exchange of mail under this agreement will be made as soon as possible with later exchanges as needed upon request of the postal authorities of either zone.

g. There will be a mutual settlement of accounts.

"10. Transportation of coal and agricultural products through the territory of North Korea into South Korea.

a. This point was proposed for inclusion in the joint agenda by representatives of the American Command. The Soviet delegation contends that this item has no relation to Paragraph 4, Section III, Korea, of the Moscow Communique, and therefore should not be discussed.

"11. Re-establish telephone and telegraph communications between North and South Korea.

a. The Soviet delegation requested the American delegation to present the American proposal for the resumption of communications in order that the subject could be studied. The proposal of the American Command in North Korea will be communicated to the United States Command in South Korea by a letter.

b. The American proposal as presented is as follows:

(1) 'The primary considerations necessary for the re-establishing of telecommunications between the Soviet and United States zones of responsibility are the resumption of services between Seoul and P'yongyang, Seoul and Wonsan, Seoul and Chinnamp'o, and Kangnung and Wonsan.'

(2) (Listing of circuits omitted.)

(3) 'This proposal of the American Command does not exclude the establishing of communications between other towns of North Korea with other towns of South Korea.'

"12. In regard to the establishment of regular communications between the offices of trading organizations.

a. Solution of this item of the agenda was included within the scope of the decisions reached on item 8, joint agenda.

"13. To verify the distribution of frequencies and wave lengths for broadcasting stations in Northern and Southern Korea.

a. The American and Soviet military Commands will authorize the operation of radio broadcasting stations in accordance with the attached table of frequencies and power output. (Frequency table omitted.)

b. In order to regulate radio broadcasting in Korea, changes in established frequencies or power output as scheduled will be made only after mutual agreement between the American and Soviet Military Commands in each case.

"14. In regard to the partial and local changes of boundaries along the 38th parallel.

a. To present the recommendations of the United States Command to the Commander of the Soviet Forces in Korea for study.

b. The approval, or changes recommended by the Commander of the Soviet Forces in Korea will be transmitted in a

letter to the Commander of the United States Army Forces in Korea upon completion of the study being made by the Soviet Commander.

"15. Measures for the future coordination btween the Commander of the Soviet troops in North Korea and the Commander of the American troops in South Korea (on administrative and economic questions).

a. For the purpose of establishing permanent coordination between the Soviet and United States Military Commands in Korea concerning administrative and economic problems, special meetings of the representatives of both Commands will be held upon request of either the Commander of Soviet Forces in Korea or the Commander of the United States Army Forces in Korea.

b. By mutual agreement each military Commander will epoint the necessary number of representatives, advisors, and technical experts for the discussion of problems presented.

c. Joint recommendations of the representatives at the special meetings called in accordance with Paragraph 1 above will become effective upon approval of the Soviet Commander in North Korea and the United States Commander in South Korea.

d. Such special meetings will be held in Seoul or Pyongyang as mutually agreed upon by the two military Commands.

e. The Soviet Command and the United States Command agree to maintain in good order telephone communications between Seoul and Pyongyang. Each Command will maintain an officer on duty during the period 0900 to 1200 and 1500 to 1700 for the purpose of insuring communication between the two Commands."

To satisfy public curiosity, a joint communique was issued covering briefly the few points on which agreement had been reached:

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"The Conference of representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea which met in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique, held meetings in Seoul between 16 January and 5 February 1946.

"A Joint agenda was agreed upon and subcommittees were appointed; the principal ones being the Economic, Administrative and Transportation Subcommittees.

"The Soviet and United States Delegations presented their views and proposals on the items of the Joint Agenda and agreements were reached on the following items:

1. Railroad, motor and coastwise waterborne transportation.

2. Movement of Korean citizens between the two zones.

3. Exchange of mail between the two zones.

4. Radio broadcasting frequencies within Korea.

5. The future coordination between the two commands in regard to economic and administrative matters.

"In addition to the above, the Soviet and American Delegations exchanged views regarding the exchange of goods, settlement of mutual accounts and release of electric power.

"The conference reached a decision regarding the establishment of a Commission in accordance with Paragraph 2, Section III (Korea), of the Moscow Communique.

"All meetings took place in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere."

General Hodge had remarked to SCAP earlier that as the conference progressed it became clear that the Soviet group had only two immediate goals: one, to secure rice for North Korea; the other, to get the Americans to evacuate the Japanese in North Korea.

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In return, the Russians indicated willingness to allow power to continue to flow southward and perhaps to ship some coal. In a subcommittee meeting on 25 January, the Soviet delegation had threatened to cut off power if rice were not furnished without delay. Accordingly, General Hodge asked SCAP whether it would possible for UNRRA to furnish cereals to North Korea. (217)

On 27 January, General Hodge analyzed the conference proceedings as follows: (218)

"Soviet Delegation showing increasing reluctance to continue negotiations as it becomes conclusive to them that there is no surplus rice in South Korea. They are aware that Japanese used to ship rice north, but do not recognize that this was possible through substitution of coarser cereals from Manchuria and North Korea. Apparently believe we are lying. Very clear to us that they definitely regard Korea only in the light of Russian Korea and American Korea rather than as the Korean nation.

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"Best information is that top representatives are from Moscow and Moscow instructed rather than representatives of the local Military commander. Also that every move and word is dictated by strict orders.

****

"Indications are that Soviet is getting concerned about their status with Korean people and are starting propaganda campaign to discredit US and build up their own prestige while at the same time bolstering up the currently waning Communist Party in South Korea. Other than Communist followers, Koreans are becoming more wary of Russian intent and some Rightist newspapers are openly critical. My policy of free press here may prove handicap in dealings. US press much upset and very critical of Shtikov's actions."

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On the subject of the Joint Commission called for in the Moscow Decision, General Shtikov called on General Hodge on 26 January 1946 and informed him that he had orders from Moscow to approach the Americans in order to make arrangements for the Joint Commission. General Hodge proposed, and General Shtikov agreed, that the Commission be composed of five official members for each nation and that it meet in Seoul whenever the Soviets were ready. This was apparently General Shtikov's answer to General Hodge's earlier request to broaden the base of discussion. An urgent radio was immediately sent to SCAP, saying the parts "This development makes absolutely essential that directives to us be rushed to this station and that final decision be made and acted upon by Washington as to whether or not they intend to bolster personnel available to me for the Commission. Please push them for decisions. In my opinion we can accomplish nothing until final Commission begins deliberations since Russians tie almost everything to political decisions." (219)

During the conference three rather unhappy incidents marred Soviet-American relations. Just as the conference opened, the trouble among American troops over demobilization was at its height. General Hodge commented at the time that "they (the Russians) would take great pleasure in our embarrassment and unwillingness to continue as soldiers." (220) On 26 January, the famous Shtikov interview was

held with the Left Wing Korean press giving the Soviet version of what happened at Moscow in December 1945, in which the Russian General placed the full responsibility for the trusteeship provision on the United States and accused the American Command of inspiring reactionary demonstrations against the Moscow Decision. (see pages 84-86). Early in February, a copy of TIME, the weekly news magazine (28 January 1946 issue) apparently came into possession of the Soviet delegation. In it appeared a thoroughly scurrilous account of the supposed misbehavior of the Russian delegation in Seoul, covering such matters as alleged Soviet dissatisfaction with billeting arrangements in the Chosen Hotel, and altercations over garage space for their "land-lease limousines" which they had brought from the North. The American billeting officer had given some sort of story to an American correspondent, only to have it badly warped in the telling. (221)

Aftermath

In order to placate the Korean people relative to the disappointing results of the Conference, General Hodge issued a public message shortly after the Russians left Seoul. It was patiently pointed out that this was merely a preliminary conference and no great achievements had been expected. He went on to say, "I well understand and appreciate the strong desire of the Korean people for speed in solution of all their problems. I myself get impatient

with what appears to be slow progress. However, it is a fact that sound progress is being made."(222)

At the same time the General was radioing SCAP, saying in part, "I feel it unwise to give either the Americans or Koreans a full account until after Russian final approval (not yet taken) of agreements reached. Thereafter, I am in full agreement with full publicity on the entire subject as a means of pressure in the future. [We] can make releases here or they can be made from Washington based on detailed data already furnished. If [it is] to be handled from this end, [we] will furnish releases proposed for use after final action of Russia, and inform you when to be turned loose logically."(223) In this the War Department Chief of Staff concurred, and further requested that XXIV Corps prepare a "factual, temperate release on [the] joint conference to include United States' efforts to obtain Soviet consent to removal of all possible barriers between zones."(224) Such a release was prepared and held in abeyance. On 27 February 1946 General Hodge sent the following radio to SCAP:(225)

> "Three weeks have elapsed since agreements signed with Soviets but no word of approval or disapproval has been received from General Chistiakov. In meantime reports from North indicate that Soviets are making preparations to implement agreement concerning mails. I am today sending letter to Chistiakov referring to such reports and inquiring as to his intentions regarding all agreements which I have already signed.

"Based upon the dual conference agreement, the Joint Commission should meet by middle of end of next week. If Russians propose to open meetings before giving any indication of previous conference, I shall, without refusing to have the Joint Commission convene, assume the attitude that we should at least know the Soviet intention regarding the former conference before it is possible to discuss matters of substance.

"I feel that this is important in view of the extreme desirability of doing as much to open up the country as possible and removing the 'blackout' north of 38° parallel. When opportunity offers, I shall let it be known through a press conference or otherwise that I have approved the agreements but the Russians have not in turn notified me of their approval."

On 1 March it became known in Seoul that the Soviet command had approved the decisions reached by the conference, and further action was delayed pending the exchange of signed copies of the agreement. (225) On 5 March, Colonel Booth returned from Pyongyang with the signed agreements. The Soviet Commander had approved all items as agreed on at the conference except those having to do with the movement of Koreans across the 38th, and those having to do with the frequency of the Seoul broadcasting station JOAK. The Soviets further stated that they were still studying the proposal for a boundary change along political divisions. In this matter, Colonel Booth had pointed out the excessive time already involved and requested the Soviet Commander to take steps to expedite the decision. To this, the Soviet General agreed. Relative to the Joint Commission, General Shistiakov stated that Soviet members of the Commission had

not yet been selected although both Colonel General Shtikov and Mr. Tsarapkin would be members. The tentative date for the first meeting was set as 11 March, although it was thought likely that it might be necessary to postpone it until 13 March due to the delayed return of General Shtikov to Pyongyang. (227)

The next day, 7 March, a long statement was released to the press covering the American stand at the conference and the results achieved. It is reproduced in full below:

> "In compliance with paragraph 4 of Section III (Korea) of the Communique of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, representatives of the American and Russian Military Commands in Korea conferred in Seoul from 16 January to 5 February and submitted their agreements to their respective military commanders. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding the U. S. Forces in South Korea, and Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov, Commanding the Soviet Forces in North Korea, have now approved and signed these agreements which will be implemented in the immediate future.
>
> "Agreement was reached to establish movement by rail, truck and coastwise transport between the two zones so as to insure the movement of commodities exchanged by the two commands or resulting from commerce between individuals or business organizations. In both zones every effort will be made to improve the repair and maintenance of locomotives and other rolling stock and to produce spare parts. A technical Joint Transportation Commission made up of three members from each zone will coordinate all problems. This technical commission will meet at least once each month, alternating between Seoul and Pyongyang.
>
> "The conference discussed the movement of Koreans from one zone to the other and agreed that citizens will be permitted to return to their former places of residence in either zone provided they file appropriate applications

within 60 days. It was also agreed that students of universities and pupils of those elementary schools along the boundary between the zones will be permitted to move from one zone to the other for school purposes. Two additional items, agreed upon in the conference, would have permitted Koreans whose trips were necessary because of pressing personal or family needs to go from one zone to the other and the same privilege was to be accorded the Koreans engaged in all kinds of trading and commercial activities along with their trade goods. Although the joint conference agreed to these two items, they were disapproved by the Soviet Commander of North Korea and will therefore not be put into effect. The U. S. representative had hoped that the establishment of interzone commerce by Koreans would be a step toward the removal of the barrier of the 38' parallel but the Soviet disapproval postpones this progress.

"Postal service of first class mail, letters in envelopes and post cards, will be resumed between the two zones beginning March 15 by exchange of mail sacks at Kaesong. The stamps or postal symbols used in each zone will be honored in the other zone. Shipments will be continued as required by the postal authorities of either zone.

"The U. S. in its desire to integrate North and South Korea submitted a plan for reopening telephone and telegraph communications between the two zones. This plan indicated the number of circuits required between key-points in both zones. The Soviets agreed to accept this proposal for further study by the Soviet Command and to communicate their decision by letter. In the meantime, it was agreed to continue the open wire circuits between Seoul and Pyongyang which were established for the joint conference.

"A minor point was the agreement to require the radio broadcasting stations of both zones to conform to a table of frequencies and power output so as to avoid interference with each other's programs.

"The U. S. proposed a change of boundary between the U. S. and Soviet military zones from the straight line of the 38° parallel to a line which would follow local provincial or county boundaries and which would restore the administrative unity of those political subdivisions. This proposal has been under study by the Soviet Command for 6 weeks, but no report of the U.S.S.R. decision has as yet reached the U. S. Command.

"To tie in the headquarters of the Military Commands of North and South Korea, there will be an exchange of small liaison groups. In addition there will be special meetings for the purpose of working out economic and administrative details of the agreements reached by the joint conference.

"Although the conference represents progress in the collaboration between the U. S. and U.S.S.R. Military Commands in Korea, its achievements fell short of the aims expected of it by U. S. Representatives. In the American view, it was the task of the Conference to do as much as possible to eliminate the administrative and economic hardships created by the 38° parallel which divides Korea in to two zones. The American representatives, therefore urged that the Conference include in its agenda such matters as the unification of Korea's transportation system, the reestablishment of the Korean communications network, the creation of a unified fiscal and currency system and the revival insofar as possible of normal internal trade in raw materials for the purpose of reviving Korea's industries and increasing as rapidly as possible, the production of consumers goods urgently needed in both North and South Korea. The American position was based on the belief that the Conference should take all possible steps to reintegrate Korea in preparation for the formation of a national government.

"The Soviet representatives on the other hand, took the position that the Conference should concern itself solely with a limited number of the most urgent problems requiring coordination between the two Military Commands. Therefore, the agreements reached by the

Conference were limited to the matters referred to in the agreements already mentioned. A number of others on which agreement could not be reached were discussed. Chief among the latter was the exchange of urgently needed raw materials which was discussed in lieu of the American proposal to revive as far as possible normal commercial trade.

"Among the items to be exchanged was electric power. Many hydro electric power stations exist in Northern Korea which are operated by one of Korea's natural resources, water power. Distribution is made to all of Korea by the established power system. Besides electric power a very pressing need in South Korea is fertilizer which the Soviets indicated was available in their zone. Since the production of foodstuffs in South Korea showed a decline during the war years an effort to increase production was indicated. Fertilizer from the Northern zone was the key to increased production.

"The Soviet Representatives indicated that they expected an exchange of materials and commodities of equal values. They particularly desired rice from South Korea. Although the U. S. Representatives recognized that for a variety of reasons there was an acute shortage of rice in the zone occupied by the Red Army, they pointed out that there was no rice in South Korea available for exchange and that although a systematic collection was taking place it was too early to predict what results could be expected. The U. S. Representatives pointed out that South Korea had received 1,500,000 Korean refugees from Japan and North Korea. They also pointed out the fact that according to reliable official statistics the average per capita production of all grains and cereals in North Korea average slightly greater than in South Korea. When the Americans were unable to guarantee delivery of rice to the Northern zone, the Soviets stated that they considered it expedient and necessary to exclude from the agenda the questions of electric power, the exchange of foodstuffs, raw materials, fuel, industrial equipment and chemical products.

"Among the matters not discussed because of difference in viewpoint as to the scope of the Conference's functions were the American proposals to permit the free circulation

of newspapers throughout all Korea and the unification of the Korean broadcasting system. The problem of establishing a unified currency system was postponed pending study by Soviet experts of American proposals in this regard.

"The American representatives also raised the subject of the removal of capital goods from Korea. However, the Soviet representatives declined to discuss this question stating that they did not consider it urgent within the meaning of the Moscow Communique; that, so far as they knew no removals were taking place and that, in any event it was a matter of regulation by each Commander in his own zone.

"In view of the failure of the Conference to accomplish all that had been expected of it, the American authorities at Seoul express the strong hope that the Joint Commission which is to convene shortly, will take up where the Conference left off in its efforts to reintegrate the administration and economy of Korea as an essential prerequisite to the formation of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government."

It now remained to be seen just what the Soviets would do by way of implementing the agreements which had been reached in Seoul. In a radio from General Hodge to General Eisenhower, dated 25 July 1946, the final results of the conference were summarized (228):

"Basic agreement discussed is Moscow Decision of December 1945. Under provisions of this Decision, 'Preliminary Conference' [illegible] in January-February reached certain agreements. Attitude [illegible] of Soviets throughout Conference guided by need of rice for northern Korea. No sincere effort to solve major problems either temporarily or permanently as we envisaged paragraph 4, Moscow Decision. Soviets obviously interested in welfare of own zone only. Strong evidence that no arrangement will be carried out for benefit of South Koreans. Agreements reached and manner of fulfillment follow:

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(1) 'Railroad, motor and coastwise transportation to be resumed'. No action to date although meetings of Joint Transportation Commission were to be held monthly to implement agreement. My followup letter (urging such meetings) 24 April as yet unanswered.

(2) 'Movement of Korean citizens between two zones for business and change of residence permitted under specified conditions'. Soviet Commander emasculated agreement to permit movement for change of residence only. Procedure agreed upon for such movement ignored by Soviets. During 60 day effective period of agreement 71,327 Koreans moved south of 38, of necessity through Soviet boundary outposts. Soviets deny any movement, obviously to avoid shipping foodstuffs to feed these Koreans until 1 August as agreed. Consider such action willful violation of spirit and letter of agreement.

(3) 'Exchange of mail between two zones to be permitted'. Being carried out as agreed.

(4) 'Establishment of frequencies of broadcasting stations.' Being carried out as agreed, so far as possible to determine.

(5) 'Future coordination between the two commands in regard to economic and administrative matters'. No action except exchange of liaison detachments despite my efforts to put into effect other paragraphs by requesting joint meetings of technicians for consideration of economic matters in particular.

(6) 'Proposed change in boundary to conform to provincial lines.' Letter sent through Shtikov to Soviet Commander 22 January as yet unanswered, although several queries made through liaison officer.

(7) 'American proposal to unify telegraph and telephone communications throughout Korea accepted for study by Soviet delegation 5 February. Although agreed I was to be informed of Soviet decision by letter, no letter received to date.

(8) 'Soviet delegation rejected my offer of assistance in arranging repatriation of over 200,000 Japanese

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from northern Korea because I would not accede to unreasonable demands, and they withdrew item from conference agenda. Since from that date over 80,000 Japanese have crossed south of 38° line obviously with Soviet knowledge and probably encouragement.

In the matter of the Joint Transportation Committee, the Soviet Commander even went so far as to name the Soviet members of the Committee and to request that General Hodge make known to him the members appointed by the American command.(229) This was done, and a tentative agenda was suggested.(230) On 6 June 1946, in a conference with General Shanin (General Chistiakov's Chief of Staff), Lt. Col. Choinski (the American liaison officer) learned that General Chistiakov felt that there was no need for a meeting of the joint transportation commission; that there was nothing for it to do; and further, that the only people using the railroad between North and South Korea were the American and Soviet Liaison sections. "Other users," he said, "could be taken care of individually as the need arose."(231)

All in all it must be admitted that the January-February economic conference did not accomplish the purpose for which it was held, namely, the economic and administrative unification of North and South Korea. Three things did come out of this seemingly abortive conference, however, which were of significance: specifically, the establishment of the Joint Soviet-American Commission; a reconsideration of the

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geographic location of the 38th parallel and of border control; and certain very limited—but nevertheless significant—economic negotiations. These will be treated in succeeding sections in the order listed.

The Joint Soviet-American Commission

Only once during the first year of occupation did the Russians and the Americans face each other across the conference table for the purpose of formally discussing the political unification of Korea. This was at the Joint Soviet-American Commission sessions held in Seoul from 20 March through 6 May 1946. This Joint Commission was called for under the terms of the Moscow Decision. Discussions relative to its formation began immediately after the results of the December deliberations in Moscow were released. However, it was not until the Joint Conference, designed to discuss economic and administrative matters, was under way that serious plans began taking shape for the Joint Commission.

Early Discussions

An 18 January 1946 radio from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted through SCAP, authorized and instructed General Hodge to arrange for an early meeting of the Joint Commission for the discussion of political matters. However, General Hodge radioed SCAP that he felt that the Russians should not be approached by him

until political directives were received in Korea. The General went on to suggest the advisability of waiting until the current economic discussions were concluded before calling the political meeting. He said in part, "not only will we know more about the general Russian attitude by that time, but also such a delay may give the Koreans time to form some kind of united front regarding an interim government. Finally, I suggest that the political meeting be convened as a result of intergovernmental communications rather than on my own initiative. Such an approach would, I feel, give the proceedings greater dignity and demonstrate to the Russians the importance we attach to our Korean and other Far Eastern commitments." (252) These suggestions were submitted immediately to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Hodge was informed that since the War and Navy Departments already concurred informally in the recommendations, action might be deferred in the establishment of a Joint Commission.

However, on the afternoon of 26 January, General Shtikov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Joint Conference then in session in Seoul, called on General Hodge and stated that he had received instructions to open discussions concerning early organization of a Joint Commission. General Hodge appraised this approach as apparently being exploratory, rather than specific. The Soviet general raised the question of a place for the Commission's sessions, and General

Hodge suggested Seoul, pointing out that buildings already were being prepared. General Shtikov appeared delighted and said that Seoul would be his recommendation to his Commander. At that time, Mr. Benninghoff commented to SCAP, "Soviet reluctance to have us visit Heijo believed caused not only by supersensitive security factor but also because large army and families have exhausted facilities." Generals Hodge and Shtikov likewise agreed upon the size of the Commission, each delegation being given five seats. (233)

This early approach on a local level by the Russians for the establishment of the Commission came as somewhat of a surprise to the American Command. Benninghoff felt that in making his early approach the Russians were motivated by the following factors: (234)

"A. Our insistence during present conference of a broad, and therefore to them, political interpretation of paragraph 4 Moscow communique, and followed by a personal message from General Hodge to Soviet General Chistiakov on 25 January urging his adoption of our viewpoint.

"B. Recent Russian loss of political influence among Koreans because of widespread belief that US opposed and Soviet advocated trusteeship, (later exploded by TASS statement), coupled with indiscreet remark in press conference of Korean Communist leader to effect that he hoped eventually Korea would join Soviet Union.

"C. Serious food situation in North Korea, probably caused by demands of Red Army as well as by shipments to Siberia. Population in Far East for which Soviets are responsible has been greatly increased not only by larger armies in Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea, but also by several hundred thousand Japanese and perhaps German war prisoners."

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Although General Hodge, as we have seen, originally had suggested that the Commission meetings be convened as a result of inter-government communications,(235) the approach by General Shtikov on a local level edged the State Department to modify General Hodge's original suggestion and merely send the following message to Embassy Moscow: "On suggestion of General Shtikov, head [of] Soviet group [in] Korea, that arrangements be made for a two power commission, General Hodge recommended that a commission of five official members for each country meet in Seoul as soon as [the] Soviets are ready. Please express hope to the Foreign Office that arrangements between the two commanders will lead to [the] creation of the commission as soon as possible." It was felt that this was the only governmental action necessary.(236)

It was likewise felt at this time that a meeting of the Joint Commission at the earliest possible date was highly desirable from the American point of view. It was predicted that the Koreans would be vociferously disappointed by the failure of the economic conference then in session to break down the barrier along the 38th parallel, and alleviate current economic troubles. It was therefore urged that the political directive be approved and forwarded to General Hodge with the least possible delay. It was likewise requested that XXIV Corps be informed as to whether or not the State and War

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Department proposed sending high ranking officers to sit on the Commission. Benninghoff went on to comment, "the results of this Commission will have important bearing on the success of our whole Far Eastern policy, and the heavier the artillery we can bring up the better." (257) An urgent request was also transmitted for Russian language interpreters. (258)

A political policy for Korea was promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 January 1946, and transmitted to XXIV Corps. Pertinent extracts from this document appear below, (only those sections colosed in quotation marks are repeated verbatim. Others are condensed): (259)

"1. The problem: to determine a policy for the guidance of General MacArthur in conducting negotiations with the Soviet Command in Northern Korea regarding the initial powers and functions of the Joint Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of Section III (Korea) of the Moscow communique and regarding the formulation of a plan for the creation of a Provisional Korean Government."

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"4. It is concluded that:
a. Arrangements for an early meeting of the Joint Commission will be made with the Soviet Government by the State Department. The Joint Commission will have the following functions:
(1) To formulate plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and to be presented to the other two powers.
(2) To work with the provisional Korean government for helping and assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

(3) To integrate the civil administration of the northern and southern sectors as rapidly as possible under the centralized control of the Joint Commission, which should ultimately be 'civilianized'."

.....

"c. With a view to facilitating the creation and smooth functioning of a provisional Korean Government, the US Commander in Korea should, without delay, encourage the various Korean political factions to reach fundamental agreements on political, economic, and social policies to be applied by the new government, including essential democratic reforms."

"d. US members of the Joint Commission are to be given wide latitude in their negotiations with the Soviet representatives regarding the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government, but the following points are submitted as an indication of the position favored by the US government."

(1) Consultation with representative democratic Korean leaders in preparing proposals for the establishment of a provisional Korean government, should represent the will of the people so far as practicable. The electoral process may be used if considered feasible and advisable. "Special efforts should be made to find and select a definite majority of strong competent leaders who are not extremists of either right or left. Care should be taken that the Korean leaders chosen are true Koreans and not puppets of foreign powers."

(2) If the Joint Commission cannot reach agreement on the method of election of a group of leaders, "it should be proposed that the US and Soviet commanders in Korea should separately choose the members of the group from their respective zones." The number should be roughly proportionate to the population or to the number of provinces in the two zones.

(3) The Joint Commission should provide a meeting place and quarters for this group of Korean leaders, and should arrange for defrayment of the expenses of the group from funds within Korea.

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(4) The Joint Commission should then call upon the group to formulate plans, in consultation with the Joint Commission, for a provisional Korean government. The plans should then be submitted by the Joint Commission, with such modifications as the Commission deems desirable, to the four powers.

(5) Plans for the provisional Korean government should be in accord with the final points and principles:

(a) Name should indicate the provisional nature of the government.

(b) The organization of the provisional government should be simple and consonant with its provisional character.

(c) There should be provisions whereby changes can be made in the organization of the provisional government to meet changing needs and new functions and whereby there can be a gradual increase in the use of popular electoral processes for the selection of key officials.

(d) The group of Korean leaders, or specific individuals in the group, should, if possible be used to form the nucleus of the provisional government.

(e) There should be concrete proposals for the initial membership of the provisional government, including the names of the individuals who are to fill the key offices.

(f) "The duties of the provisional government should be:

"I) Progressively to assume, under supervision and control of the Joint Commission, responsibility for administering and developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people, as provided for in paragraph 1 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique."
"II) To perform such other administrative duties as are assigned to it by the Joint Commission."
"III) To participate with the Joint Commission and under its supervision in working out measures for the political, economic and

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social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishing of the national independence of Korea as provided in paragraph 5 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique."

"e. If it is impossible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the creation of an advisory group of Korean leaders as provided in paragraph 4 d (1) and (2) above, the US commander in Korea should independently form such a group to act in an advisory capacity to the US members of the Joint Commission in matters relating to the creation of a provisional Korean government."

"f. In view of the possible delay between the completion by the Joint Commission of proposals for a provisional Korean government and the final decision by the US and the USSR on these proposals, the US members of the Joint Commission should take the position that, subsequent to the submission of the proposals to the four powers and pending final decision of the US and the USSR, the Joint Commission has the power, under paragraph 4a (3) above, to take whatever preliminary steps it deems desirable to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans. Such a transfer would be in accordance with the proposals for the provisional government which have been submitted to the four powers."

APPENDIX "B"

.....

"5. Since there is not always agreement as to the meaning of the word democratic, it would be best to adopt the principle that any Korean party, organization or individual regarded as democratic by either the US or Soviet members of the Joint Commission should be accepted by both sides as being democratic and only those parties, organizations and individuals considered to be non-democratic by both the US and Soviet members should be excluded on that score from participation in the groups of Korean leaders."

"6. The group of Korean leaders should be both representative of the views and aspirations of the Korean people as a whole and also of such political composition as to be acceptable to both the US and the USSR. It is felt that no group dominated by totaliterian leftists, such as communists, or by rightists elements, is representative of the Korean people as a whole or mutually acceptable to the US and USSR."

General Hodge took issue with some aspects of this directive. For instance, on 11 February 1946 he radioed SOAP that he felt that the problem of creating an interim Korean government was secondary to that of opening up the country and breaking down the Soviet-imposed blackout on the North.(240) He went on to point out that the arrangements in this regard reached by the recent joint Conference in Seoul were 'most unsatisfactory from the U. S. standpoint.' The Soviet delegation had refused to consider free circulation of newspapers, a combined radio network for the benefit of all parties on an equal basis, and travel of Koreans between zones except under a strict permit system. For these reasons, General Hodge wrote, 'I accordingly propose to instruct the American delegation to begin proceedings of Joint Commission with a strong demand for complete freedom of speech, press, and movement of Koreans on the grounds that until that is accomplished the Joint Commission will be unable freely to consult Korean parties and leaders and learn the desires of the Korean people regarding their government, a prerequisite stipulated in the Moscow communique.'(241) This line of thought was further expanded and explained in the following words by the General:(242)

> 'I am prepared to press this point with considerable vigor and to postpone joint consideration by the commission of structure of interim government until solution satisfactory to US is reached. If this viewpoint is approved, I suggest asking State Department to inform USSR that despite considerable

progress achieved by recent economic conference, US government feels that Koreans are still so restricted in freedom of speech and movement that Joint Commission will have difficulty in making proper evaluation of the desire and aspiration of all classes Korean people.

'The Soviet government might not respond to such an approach but at least it would put US government, in addition to USAFIK, on record and would prepare Soviet delegation on Joint Commission of our viewpoint.

'If my position has the backing of the US government, and if Soviet delegation displays reluctance to come to such agreement, I could discreetly make known to Korean people through their consultative group in South Korea that US has from beginning tried to break down barrier of 38th parallel but that USSR has failed to follow our lead. Such disclosure should strengthen our hand and might cause USSR delegation to accede to our desires.

'I am convinced that the more we open up the country and convince the people of our real aims, the greater will be the chance of achieving truly democratic rather than a Soviet directed communistic Korean government.'

Approval of these suggestions put forward by General Hodge was rapidly forthcoming. A 21 February SWNCC directive (243) gave them official policy status with certain minor modifications.

'Decisions of General Hodge to instruct the American delegation to press for agreement on freedom of speech, press, and travel within Korea of Koreans as the beginning of the forthcoming proceedings of the Joint Commission approved here. Should Soviets not agree initially to such action, rather than forcing an adjournment of the Commission, Hodge should (1) reserve his position in respect to freedom of speech, press and travel for final decision prior to the time the interim government begins to function, (2) press for initial agreement on travel by members of the Commission and their staff throughout Korea to consult with 'Korean democratic parties and social organizations', and (3) then proceed with consideration of the structure of an interim government.

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'Ambassador Harriman has recommended here, and the State Department concurs, that nothing would be gained by taking up such matters as the question of freedom of speech, press and travel on a governmental level prior to the discussion of these topics in the Commission.

'It is suggested that in order not to prejudice the effectiveness of the work of the Joint Commission, and at the same time to accomplish Hodge's purpose should the Soviet representatives in the Commission prove obstructionist and refuse to agree to his demands under (1) or (2) above, you may wish to consider the desirability of requesting your government to make public a statement citing your attempts to encourage freedom of speech, press and travel. In such a public statement, reference would be made to paragraph 2, Article I of the Charter of the United Nations which reads: 'To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.' "

Political Manoeuvre

During this period local political byplay had among its purposes, the strengthening of the American hand in the forthcoming commission sessions. On 14 February, the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea was organized with American assistance. The original list of thirty-two persons was composed of both Right and Left, in a ratio of about four to one. Included were Kim Koo, Dr. Rhee Syngman, Lyuh Woon Hyung, Cho Man Sik, and Kim Kyu Sik. Pak Hoen Yung, leader of South Korean Communist Party, was asked to select a delegation of four but refused to do so. Lyuh Woon Hyung refused to cooperate at the last minute and failed to appear. At the second meeting, his two henchmen, Pak San Kyu and Hwang Chin Hoe, likewise failed to take their seats. The Council, therefore, rapidly

developed into a Rightist organ with Dr. Rhee Syngman as its president, later with Dr. Kim Kyu Sik as acting chairman. The organization of this advisory council took place rapidly, without advance publicity, and without the knowledge of the Russians. It was thought that the element of surprise would still further strengthen the hand of the American delegation politically. (244)

Shortly after the Representative Democratic Council was formed, further direction was received from Washington, D. C., on the matter of selecting a political advisory group to assist the American Command. In effect, this called for a change in American political policy in Korea, whereby American support was to be shifted away from the rightist Kim Koo-Dr. Rhee Syngman group to more progressively minded Koreans. (245)

"While it is realized that at the present time it may be difficult, it is felt that every effort should be made to find leaders in our zone who are neither associated with the Kim Koo group nor the Soviet dominated groups who will put forth a firm progressive program for Korea. Such a group should be encouraged to elaborate in detail progressive program which will stress the four freedoms and basic land and final reforms which would appeal to the vast majority of Koreans, with the effect of winning over to such progressive program people who now believe that the Communist program offers the best hope for them. We should be prepared to give our full backing to such group as a counterpart to the Soviet backed Communist groups. Because of their background as exiles, the fact that they are apparently being supported by the Kuomintang, and the State Department's unsatisfactory experience with Rhee in dealing with him over a period of years, we should not show any favoritism to the Kim Koo and

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Syngman Rhee groups. If it should prove impossible to find such a group of progressive leaders, it might be necessary to make strong effort to force the Kim Koo group to adopt and put into effect a progressive program along the lines outlined above. If the Kim Koo group will not adopt such a program it should be made clear to them that they can receive no further US backing. All discussion, both public and private, should stress our basic aim, the unification of the country, both economically and politically, based upon the four freedoms for the Koreans, with the right for American representatives to consult with any and all leaders and the country as a whole and for these leaders to have the right freely to consult among themselves."

Obviously, this directive arrived too late to have any effect upon the political complexion prior to the Joint Commission. Efforts were made to entice some of the absent Leftist leaders into the Democratic Council, but to no avail. They balked at the Rightist majority and Dr. Rhee's leadership. On 11 March 1946, nine days before the Commission opened, Dr. Rhee Syngman stated to the Korean press: "since our Council represents the will of the whole people and acts as an advisory organization for Lt. General Hodge, it is preparing for the questions which will be asked by the coming Russo-American Joint Conference."(246)

On 18 March General Hodge radioed SCAP that the American delegation had been holding closed hearings with Korean leaders (247) and had formulated its initial position and proposals. First, the task of the Commission was seen as being a two-fold one: "(a) to

assist in the formation of a provisional government, and (b) recreate conditions to facilitate the formation and functioning of such a government." By way of implementing these objectives, the proposed American stand was that the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea should consult with the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations in North Korea, and, in agreement with them, submit to the Commission a list of leaders, both in and out of the Council and the northern representation, to form a consultative union whose duty it would be to prepare for the Commission a slate of candidates for the provisional government. General Hodge reported, at this time, "my delegation intends to insist on a population ratio of representatives in the union of South and North Korea and to reserve for the Commission the right of approval and/or alteration of the membership in the union and in the provisional government." Further discussion of the proposed American (248)
stand by General Hodge was as follows.

> "In connection with paragraph 2 above (the creation of conditions to facilitate the formation and functioning of a provisional government) we will propose that all restrictions on travel between zones and on free circulation of information by radio, newspapers, and public speeches be removed immediately; also that the Joint Committees be established to study and recommend to the Commission measures to prepare for the development by the provisional government of the industry, transport, agriculture, and the national culture of Korea. It will be proposed that the first of such committees work on administrative measures, namely, the adaptation of the civil government of South Korea as the machinery of the provisional

government and the reintegration of the postal, transportation, power and telecommunication services, the educational system, and other governmental agencies. The second committee, according to our proposal, would work on the following: a single currency and a single note issuing authority, uniform accounting practices for Korean currency and local supplies obtained by the two occupying forces, removal of restrictions other than jointly agreed essential controls on movement of goods and currency within Korea, and joint control over exports and imports."

Prior to the opening of the Commission two subjects had come up that were causing the American Command some little concern. These were the repatriation of Japanese nationals from North Korea and the disposition of Japanese property in South Korea. On 5 March, the American command expressed the view that it would be unwise to open discussions with the Soviets in regard to the former, specifically the repatriation of the Japanese from North Korea through South Korea to Pusan. This method of evacuation, first suggested by the Russian commander, was thought to hold no concrete benefits to the American Command and, furthermore would, add to transportation and control problems in South Korea. It was therefore contemplated by General Hodge to hold this proposal for bartering purposes at the Joint Commission. (249)

On the second matter, that having to do with Japanese property, Washington (War-State Departments) replied to inquiries from USAFIK by stating that no commitments had been made to the Russians by the United States government on the disposition of

Japanese property in Korea, and further, that Japanese property in Korea or its equivalent value should be turned over to the Joint Commission in trust for the Korean people and the future government of Korea "as recognition of Korean suffering at the hands of the Japanese in order to assist Korea in becoming economically independent of Japan."(250)

Likewise constituting a worry to the American command was the problem of receiving information copies of all published statements, published and unpublished notes and news reports emanating from Washington, D. C., bearing on United States relations with the Soviet Union, Korea, Manchuria and China, all of which were considered as intimately connected with the tasks of the Joint Commission. It was pointed out in a March 8 radio to SCAP that the only source of information available to USAFIK was the Army News Service, which arrived late and was very incomplete, and garbled. General Hodge went on to comment "we do not get the State Department bulletin or any adequate wire service. Thus we have never had a text of Byrnes speech of 28 February, announcement of protest on the removal of Manchurian equipment, or any other information reliable and complete enough to keep us informed and oriented."(251) This was a problem which plagued the American Command throughout the first year of occupation, and frequently caused the Command serious embarrassment.

It was hoped that just prior to the opening of the Joint Commission, Korean public opinion could be encouraged to reach a new high in pro-American sentiment, thereby weakening the Soviet position. Two actions were suggested by the American command to enhance American prestige in the Korean mind, namely, the announcement of a program providing for the sale of agricultural lands and for American financial assistance to the Korean economy. SCAP stated that the announcement of the former was felt desirable so as to cut the ground from under the main point of Communist propaganda in the American zone and to strengthen the hands of the United States delegation on the Joint Commission.(252) As for the program of financial assistance, the American Command "suggested that the government reach a decision on this matter, even if only in principle, within a short time, so that an announcement thereon can be made simultaneously with the opening session of the US-Soviet Joint Commission scheduled for the first week in March."(253) However, the plans misfired. Although General Lerch on 7 March 1946 announced that he was issuing orders authorizing the sale to Koreans of certain formerly-owned Japanese property, especially farm land, and on 18 March, Lt. Col. Maurice Lutwack, Military Governor of Kyonggi-do, announced the pending sale of Japanese property, two ordinances came out which completely overshadowed these rather

vague pronouncements on the sale of land. One was ordinance No. 52 creating the New Korea Company and the second was ordinance No. 55 requiring the registration of all political parties. Korean public opinion charged that the first was a form of American economic exploitation and that the second closely resembled Japanese methods of political control. Suffice to say here that the sale of Japanese property did not come off as announced, but was rather kept in abeyance for decision by the future Korean government.

Likewise, the Soviets were attempting to consolidate their position in Northern Korea. There was evidence that the policy of the Russians was undergoing a change, and that they were making a genuine effort to ingratiate themselves with the Korean people on a personal level. On 8 and 9 February representatives of all political groups in North Korea were called together for the purpose of organizing an Interim People's committee as the 'New Korean Provisional People's Government.' The Communist team of Kim Il Sung and Kim Du Bong became its president and vice-president respectively. The liberal Cho Man Sik was ousted from leadership of the Korean Democratic Party on 24 February, Cho being held under 'protective custody' by the Russians in a Pyongyang hotel at the time. With that move, the political situation in North Korea jelled in the Soviet mold and remained frozen. The Russians could

claim almost complete unification of political thought, at least that which was allowed public expression. Finally, on 5 March 1946, the Interim People's Committee met in executive session and drew up a law abolishing the tenant farmer system and calling for redistribution of the land, (254) a move which gave rise to an increasing crescendo of Soviet-inspired propaganda against the lack of similar policies in American-controlled South Korea. The Russians were prepared for the impending discussions in Seoul.

The basic long-term interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in Korea which colored the Commission negotiations throughout were perhaps best analyzed by an adviser to the American delegation shortly before the Commission met. (255)

> "The major problem of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission for Korea is to bring about an independent, democratic, stable Korean Government capable of resisting Russian domination over a protracted period of time. In the American view, freedom from Russian domination is more important than complete independence.
>
> "It is assumed that the Soviet Government's long term strategic aim is to establish complete domination over Korea, and that in pursuance of this aim it will endeavor either to install initially a Government dominated by individuals subservient to Russia or, to create a democratic Government satisfactory to the United States on condition that both Allies withdraw at an early date. In this way the Kremlin would be left free to employ its traditional infiltration tactics over a long period of time with the aim of eventually seizing power through a Soviet dominated minority or by creating some excuse for armed intervention when American forces and American interests in the Far East are less active. Judging from the Soviets actions elsewhere and from their initial reactions to U. S. trusteeship proposals at Moscow, it is believed that the latter tactics are the most likely. Doubtless the present unpopularity of the Russians and of Communist ideology throughout Korea constitute an incentive to the Russians to take this line.

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"It is likewise assumed that Korea can never expect to defend its territorial integrity against Russian force of arms and that the Koreans themselves cannot be expected for some time so to run their affairs as to avoid charges of misgovernment which might serve as an excuse for Russian intervention. However, unless coerced by force, it is believed that Korea will, if left to itself, orient itself toward the United States rather than toward Russia for the foreseeable future.

"On the other hand, trusteeship is so unpopular that the Koreans at present would probably prefer the risk of eventual absorption by Russia rather than submit to an undisguised mandate.

"Since the primary objective of the United States is to prevent Russian domination of Korea, and since Korean independence is a secondary objective, it is not believed to be in the U. S. interest to form a Korean Government which could be granted complete independence within the next few years. Unless and until the U.N.O. can give reasonable proof of its ability to prevent aggression, the United States, together with Russia, if necessary, must extend some form of territorial guarantee to Korea and exercise certain essential prerogatives in Korea's international relations.

"It is to be expected that the Russians, anxious to get the United States out of Korea, will oppose this point of view vigorously.

"Any method of forming a provisional government of Korea must, therefore, be based on the condition that some form of disguised control at least on the highest level shall continue to be exercised by the United States for some years."

To the Korean public, the situation was described somewhat differently. On 11 March, in a further attempt to solidify Korean public opinion behind the projected American stand, the following statement was released to the press by General Hodge: (256)

"On the eve of the convening of the Joint Commission, it is considered appropriate to state the aims of the U. S. Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission and the steps taken thus far by the American Command to prepare for the achievement of these aims.

"First and foremost, it has been the object of the American Forces to establish and perpetuate the freedoms of speech, assembly, religion and press in Korea. These freedoms are not mere words to be used to gain political favor. They represent principles on which any genuine democracy must be based and are as old as democracy itself. Furthermore they are absolute and not relative or subject to exceptions. They apply to all democratic persons, all democratic schools of thought, all democratic parties, no matter how small their following or whether or not their programs may correspond to the ideas of the existing authorities. Thus in South Korea it has been the American policy to permit all democratic groups, whether moderates or extremists, capitalist or communist to establish their own parties, hold their own meetings, broadcast their own speeches, propagate their own ideas and philosophies and publish their own newspapers without censorship, restriction or special privilege. These freedoms are basic in the American idea of democracy. They are also what we believe the vast majority of the Korean people want, and it is what the American delegation of the Joint Commission wants to help the Koreans to attain throughout their entire country.

"The purpose of the Joint Commission as stated in the Moscow communique is to assist the formation of a provisional Korean Government and to undertake the preliminary elaboration of appropriate measures to that end. It is also the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures for assisting the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The Communique specifies that in preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic political parties and social organizations.

"It is of course impossible to say at this time the precise manner in which the details will be worked out, since this is a matter to be determined by the Joint Commission and approved by the four great Powers. However, it is the view of the American delegation that one of the primary requisites for accomplishing the Commission's tasks is the early unification of Korea both economically and politically. Until the economic entity of the country has been restored and the effects of

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the 38° parallel eliminated in the internal functions of Korea and until all democratic elements of the country have freedom to hold meetings, to confer among themselves, to propagate their ideas by speeches, by radio and by the press, and to organize parties, recruit members, and carry on political activities not only in North and South Korea separately but between the two areas, it is not considered possible to form a genuinely representative democratic government. In the carrying out of its functions as part of the Commission it is the intention of the American delegation to travel throughout the country and to confer freely with representatives of democratic political and social organizations. It is the American view that Korean political leaders of all democratic parties both in north and in the south should enjoy the same opportunities.

"In its efforts to assist in forming a provisional government for Korea, it is not the purpose of the American delegation to bring about a government of any particular group or wing. It is their purpose to see that a government that corresponds to the views of the majority is established. The programs thus far published by the political parties in southern Korea differ considerably from those of the leading parties in America, but these programs have not been opposed nor will they be opposed by the American authorities so long as they represent the views held by most of the truly democratic Koreans. At the same time it is the earnest intention of the American delegation to prevent the domination of Korea by small minorities, no matter how vocal and well organized they are or how energetic they may be in their political activities.

"This statement is to present the attitude of the American members of the Joint Commission in solving the problems of Korea. The Soviet members of the Commission represent another great nation that fought for liberation of Korea from the Japanese, was a signatory to the Moscow agreement and is greatly interested in making Korea an independent democratic nation. Therefore it is safe to assume that the two delegations will work together harmoniously and in a truly cooperative effort to accomplish the aims expressed in that agreement."

Preliminary Arrangements

Another problem facing the American Command was the difficulty in securing suitable personnel to sit on the Commission and to act as advisers to the American delegation. In the final

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analysis the five American delegates at the opening session were Major General Archibald V. Arnold, Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, and former Military Governor of Korea; William R. Langdon, United States Consul-General to Korea; Charles W. Thayer, United States State Department representative specially briefed on Russian affairs; Colonel Robert H. Booth, former executive assistant to the Military Governor of Korea; and Colonel Frank H. Britton, from General Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander.(257) Shortly before the Commission sessions opened, the Bunce Mission arrived in Korea. Its purpose was to assist General Hodge in economic matters. In addition to the head of that mission, Arthur C. Bunce, on loan from the Federal Reserve Board to the State Department, were Gordon Strong, Henry D. Appenmeller, Maxwell M. Becker, Moore A. Hennay, Edward B. Gradon, Eugene V. Frantov (Russian language interpreter), John H. Rose, and Miss Thelma Williams. Lauren Cassidy and Allen Loren, United States Treasury representatives in Korea, were available to advise the American delegates on financial matters. During the period the Joint Commission was in session, the only change in the American delegation was the replacement of Langdon by Bunce on 27 April 1946.(258)

On 1 March, Mr. Pelianski, the Soviet Consul General in Seoul, stated that the Russians delegation to the Joint Commission

would probably arrive in that city about 6 March, and that it would number approximately 40 persons.(259) The next day a party consisting of Polianski, Colonel Booth, M. Denisenghoff, and five other Americans proceeded to Pyongyang at Russian invitation to complete arrangements for the initial meeting of the Joint Commission.(260)

Under the terms of the agreement reached at the Joint Conference ending on 6 February, the Joint Commission should have convened not later than 6 March. However, delay ensued, the reason for which was not explained to the Americans until later. Meanwhile, the Russian delegation was expected momentarily to arrive in Seoul. On 8 March General Hodge commented that they were supposedly coming the next day.(261) Actually the Soviet delegation's advance liaison party did not arrive in Seoul until the 18 March, three days after a letter had arrived from General Chistiakov explaining that "Col. General Shtikov, appointed by me as chief of the Soviet delegation, has been ill for a long time and only today arrived in Pyongyang."(262) On the following day, 19 March 1946, the main body of the Soviet delegation put in its appearance.

This delegation consisted of some 108 persons, as follows:(263)

Commission members

Col. General Terenti Fomich Shtikov
Minister Extraordinary Semeon Konstantinovich Tsarapkin
Major General Nicholai Georgevich Lebedeff
Political Advisor Gerasim Martinovich Belasenov
Colonel Tikhon Ivanovich Kovalenko

Advisors and consultants

Colonel of Engineers Victor Pavlovitch Butuseff
Lt. Col. Ivan Platonovich Grebe
Lt. Col. Semeon Ivanovitch Chukov
Expert Aschik Avetich Mamikyan
Expert Dmitri Konstantinovitch Skorodynov
Advisor Boris Basilevitch Sokhotinin

Secretariat

Col. Anatoly Konstantinovitch Zubchenko
Lt. Col. Basil Basilevitch Zotov
Mr. Alexander Sergevitch Maslov

Administrative and office personnel

Secretariat:	officers	7	
	women	7	
	remaining staff	5	
Communications Detail		15	(Capt. Udovihin, Cmdg)
Guard Detail		26	(Lt. Kuksin, Cmdg)
Administrative & Medical Det.		19	(Maj. Tuskin, Cmdg)
Drivers		5	
Railroad personnel		5	

On 19 February, General Hodge had addressed a letter to General Chistiakov saying in part: "with reference to paragraph 1 (f) of the agreement signed on 5 February 1946 by Generals Arnold and Shtikov concerning the establishment of the Joint

Commission for Korea, you will, I am sure agree that it is essential for the Commission to undertake its work as outlined in the Moscow Communique without wasting time on long preliminary discussions of matters of procedure. With this thought in mind, I have prepared a draft directive on the method of operation (or order of work) of the Joint Commission, a copy of which I enclose herewith, for your consideration. (264)(265)

"I. Operation of the Joint Commission

"1. Composition and Functions

The Joint Commission shall be composed of one Chief Commissioner and four Commissioners from each of the two Allies. Its duties will be to carry out the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers as outlined in Section III (Korea), Paragraphs 1-3, of the final Communique of the Conference, and to complete the work of the Conference of Military Commanders as outlined in Paragraph 4 of the same Section.

"2. Chairmanship

The chairmanship of the Commission normally will alternate weekly between the two Chief Commissioners but for special cases and by mutual agreement between the chairmen may alternate more or less frequently. As a rule the nationality of the Chairmen of such committee and subcommittees as it may be necessary to establish will alternate at corresponding intervals and will correspond to the nationality of the Chairmen of the Commission. In the absence of a Chief Commissioner, he shall designate one of his Commissioners to act as his deputy.

"3. Meetings

The Commission will meet in formal session as frequently as the two Chief Commissioners may decide. In case of necessity, either of the two Commissioners may call for a meeting, after giving reasonable notice of his intention to do so.

"4. Attendance at Meetings

The following will attend meetings of the Commission: the Chief Commissioners (or in their absence, their duly authorized deputies), the Commissioners, and, as invited, advisers and specialists of the two nations, and representatives of Korean democratic political parties and social organizations.

"5. Preliminary Dissemination of Agenda, etc.

Every meeting shall be preceded by the preliminary dissemination of proposed agenda, draft resolutions, and other essential documents which shall have been submitted to the Joint Secretariat (see below) for distribution in appropriate form and language 2 days before the meeting. Agenda are subject to final approval of the Commission at the commencement of each meeting, but each Chief Commissioner has the right to include in the agenda any matter he may consider appropriate for discussion.

"6. Documents of the Commission

The following will constitute the principal documents of the commission: Minutes of meeting, agenda, resolutions and decisions of the Commission, proclamations and press communiques.

"7. Languages

All meetings will be carried on in the English and Russian languages, and all documents will be distributed in the Commission in both languages by the Joint Secretariat. In case of necessity, documents will be translated into Korean by the Joint Secretariat.

"II. Operation of the Joint Secretariat

"1. Composition

There shall be established a Joint Secretariat of the Commission composed of one Chief Secretary from each of the participating powers, and such other clerical, stenographic, and translating personnel, contributed in equal numbers from each of the participating powers, as may be found necessary.

"2. Secretary General

The two Chief Secretaries shall alternate as Secretary General of the Commission, so that the nationality of the Secretary General corresponds to that of the Chairman of the Commission.

"3. Duties

It shall be the duty of the Joint Secretariat:

(a) to prepare on the basis of instructions from the two Chief Commissioners, the agenda of meeting, and to disseminate them 24 hours in advance of each meeting to each member of the Commission in the appropriate language.

(b) to prepare and disseminate for amendment and correction draft minutes of all meetings of the Commission. These draft minutes should include brief resumes of discussions, as well as all decisions and conclusions of the Commission. Minutes will not be considered final and official until they have been submitted for amendment to and approved by the Chief Commissioners or their designated deputies. (Ordinarily the approval of the minutes of the previous meeting will be the first point on the agenda of each subsequent meeting)

(c) to assemble, translate, and disseminate to members of the Commission all documents submitted to it for discussion by either delegation. Such documents should ordinarily be distributed not later than 24 hours before the meeting at which they are to be discussed, in order that they may be adequately studied before the meeting.

(d) to translate, distribute, and publish in Russian, English, and Korean all such proclamations, press communiques, and announcements as the Commissioners may jointly authorize or direct.

(e) to notify all members of the Commission and all other persons, invited to attend jointly by the Commission, of the time and place of meetings.

(f) to perform all functions outlined in (a) (b) (c) and (d) for such committees and subcommittees of the Commission as it may be necessary to establish."

General Chistiakov accepted this draft procedural directive with certain modifications as follows: (a) the exclusion of paragraph 1 giving consideration to the functions of the Commission on the grounds that these had been clearly defined in the Moscow Decision, (b) the addition to paragraph 4 of "on special invitation, agreed upon by the heads of both delegations", (c) substitution of the last clause by "both heads of the Commission have the right to include in the agenda any question which concerns itself with the function of the Commission", and (d) exclusion of a joint secretariat on the grounds that it was unnecessary. (256)

Physical arrangements for the Commission and for the Soviet delegation were completed well in advance. Adequate working space for the commission was found in the Duk Soo Palace, one block from XXIV Corps headquarters. The Russian delegation was supplied rations, billets, and PX privileges. The Commission was distinctly a Corps function, although Military Government was delegated the task of furnishing the building and guards. (257)

The Commission Meets

At 1 p.m., on 20 March 1946, the Joint Commission got under way with appropriate fanfare in the Duk Soo Palace. "Arriving at the palace after a drive through streets lined with throngs of

Korean citizens and passing through aisles of colorfully uniformed Korean mounted and foot police and U. S. Army honor guard, the delegates were greeted by music of a U. S. Army band. Before entering the conference room Generals Hodge, Shtikov, and Arnold inspected the U. S. Army guard at the palace.* (258)

The first part of the initial session which was open to the press and to a limited number of American observers, consisted chiefly of a ceremonial appearance of the two delegations and welcoming speeches. However, these speeches were significant for they put forward the American and Soviet points of view for all to understand. General Hodge rose first and said in part:

> "Today is an important day in Korean history. It is a day to which all Koreans have looked forward with great hope for the future of their nation, and should be a day Koreans will celebrate in the future as the start of a new era in Korean history. The eyes of the entire world, as well as of the Korean people, will be watching our deliberations here. The results of the work of this commission will prove the ability of two great nations of the world to cooperate fully in capitalizing upon their victory over oppression and deception and to restore a less fortunate, long oppressed nation to an independent, sovereign status among the family of free nations. Our successful results in the councils of this commission will have lasting effect upon the peace and happiness of the world, as well as the future of Korea.
>
> "As a representative of the United States, I express my hope and confidence that our joint efforts here will be able to solve amicably and justly all Korean problems presented, whether they be political, economic, or administrative."

General Shtikov read the Soviet reply, the significant parts of which appear below:

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"....With their blood and innumerable sufferings, the Korean people have earned the right for independence and a free way of life.

"The Soviet people warmly supported this right of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always championed and will always champion their self determination and free existence of any nation without exception.

"As all of us are convinced, the people of Korea are bent upon and have already shown their determination to create, with the help of the Allied Powers, a free democratic Korean government, friendly to all the freedom loving nations.

.....

"However, in the way of gradual democratization of the whole of the internal life of the Korean people, there stand serious difficulties, brought about by the furious resistance of reactionary and anti-democratic groups and certain elements, whose object is to undermine the work of creating and firmly establishing a democratic system in Korea.

"The task of the U. S. - Soviet Commission is to help the Korean people create a provisional Korean democratic government capable of fulfilling the tasks arising from the democratization and reconstruction of the country.

"Only such a government will be able to abolish entirely the remnants of the former Japanese domination in the political and economic life of Korea, to launch a decisive battle with reactionary anti-democratic elements inside the country, to carry out radical measures in the rehabilitation of economic life, to give political liberties to the Koreans and fight for peace in the Far East.

"The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly* to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.

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* The word 'loyal' was used in the original. The literal meaning is 'faithful' rather than 'friendly'.

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"The task of the Joint U. S.-Soviet Commission deriving from the decision of the Conference of the Three Ministers concerning Korea consists also in working out, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and assistance of Korean democratic organizations, the measures of aid and assistance with respect to trusteeship in political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and in establishing sovereign independence of Korea. Such temporary trusteeship corresponds with the fundamental interests of the Korean people, inasmuch as it assures the condition of a most rapid national reconstruction and a revival of an independent Korean state on a democratic basis."

This initial statement by General Shtikov pointed up two very significant views: (a) the assumption on the part of the Soviet Union that the Moscow Decision presupposed and made mandatory the imposition of a trusteeship upon Korea, and (b) that the Soviet Union would sanction no Korean government not considered "friendly" to her.

Immediately following the close of these ceremonies, the members of the Joint Commission posed for photographers and newsreel men, after which the room was cleared for the opening of the business sessions. (259) These sessions, twenty-four in all taking place between 20 March and 6 May, and the statements made therein were considered temporarily secret except for the seven joint communiques released during the period.

The routine formalities of approving the mechanics of operation of the Commission were quickly settled without incident.

the chairmanship of the Commission proper, and of the sub-committees was to alternate weekly; meetings were to be called as decided by the two chief commissioners with either empowered to call an emergency session upon notice; admission was to be as agreed jointly; minutes were not to be formal until approved. (270)

During the ensuing discussion in the first meeting it became painfully apparent that the Russians would reject consultation with those Korean parties and groups opposing the Moscow decision, meaning specifically, those opposing hostile to trusteeship. It likewise became apparent that the Soviets intended that only the heads of parties should be consulted. With this last, the reason became obvious for the recent hasty elimination of Cho Man Sik as head of the Chosun Democratic Party in North Korea and his replacement by a man more sympathetically inclined towards Soviet policies. (271)

The principal argument of that first day developed over the question of news releases or communiques. There was evident a Russian desire to forestall the possibility of a separate American report in event of the failure of the Commission. The Russians first argued that communiques should be issued infrequently, or when some one problem had been settled. This point was compromised in the agreement that there should be a communique once a week and more frequently in the event of any decision being made worth

reporting. Secondly, the Russians contended that there should be no unilateral statements issued. The Americans attempted to gain recognition of the right of either party to issue such statements. However, the Russians insisted that such a course would jeopardize the success of the sessions. General Arnold finally withdrew this demand, and tentative agreement was reached on this point. (272)

In the matter of adopting a method "for assisting the formation of a provisional government" and the "creation of conditions for formation of such a government" (Item 4 on the agenda), serious snags were hit which were to plague the Commission throughout every session. The initial American proposal provided for a Korean Consultative Union composed, in proportion to population, of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of North and South Korea and such other prominent individuals as might be suggested by the Commission. The function of this Union was to prepare a slate of candidates, and to draft a constitution for the Provisional Government. The action of the Union was to be subject to approval and amendment by the Commission. In addition, to facilitate the implementation of the foregoing proposal all restrictions on intercourse between North and South Korea currently in effect were to be removed.

Countering this was the Soviet proposal which closely adhered to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Section II of the Moscow Declaration namely: (a) elaboration of a recommendation on personnel and composition of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government; and (b) elaboration of measures for aid and assistance (trusteeship) in the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, in the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the sovereign independence of Korea. (273)

Specific Soviet proposals called for the exclusion from consultation with the Commission of any group which had voiced opposition to the Moscow Declaration, and accepted for consultation only those groups "officially recognized." Furthermore, it was proposed that subsequent to such consultation with South Korean democratic parties that the Commission should adjourn to Pyongyang to consult similarly with North Korean democratic parties. Obviously, it was not proposed that Korea should be unified prior to the establishment of a Provisional Government. It was likewise clear that under the Soviet proposal the Commission would select the personnel and determine the structure of the Provisional Government. (274) Already doubt was creeping into the minds of those Americans present as to whether the Soviet delegates had any genuine desire to put an end to the current divided status of Korea. (275)

In the second session, there was more discussion on the subject of communiques, until General Arnold assured the Russians that the Americans delegation would entertain no thought of making any unilateral communique without notice and discussion and expressed the hope that the Russians would observe a like policy. The Soviet viewpoint was put summarily by one of the delegates, "It is not expedient to release details of a conference merely to satisfy the need of the public."(276)

The Soviet delegation likewise took issue with the American sponsored idea of a Consultative Union. Rather than such a consultative body, the Russians pointed out, "the Moscow Decisions do not foresee any consultative body, but rather foresee discussion with democratic parties and organizations."(277) Another Soviet concept was hereby given expression, which was to harass and exasperate the American delegates at every turn, namely, the tight, literal and limited interpretation placed upon the Moscow Decision, often with apparently little thought of the necessary enlargement of these concepts expressed therein if the Decision were to be implemented.

In this specific case the American delegation tried to elicit some tangible statement as to how the Soviets proposed to implement the discussion. Among the specific questions asked were: who would compile a list of parties and organizations to be consulted? What was the precise meaning of the Russian statement that such parties

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and organizations must be 'officially recognized!' By way of answer, General Shtikov stated at one point that consultation should be 'only with central organizations which are representative of the people.' Again, he said, 'officially recognized' means 'known to the Korean people by their work and known to the American and Soviet Commands.'(276) When it was pointed out that in the American zone there were between 100 and 500 groups which would fit this description, the Soviet response was that such a figure was impossible. However, the Russians added that there were in the North probably a thousand such groups; but that the thousand had their central bodies which reflected the will and the strivings of all the units that belonged to them, and that the number of such central bodies would be about 50. However, asked whether or not the only criterion for official recognition was to have a central organization, the answer was a categorical 'no.' To the question 'what then?', the response was still more vague, according to 2d Lt. Leonard M. Bertsch, special political observer for XXIV Corps.(279) Lt. Bertsch went on to comment at this point:(280)

> 'The intention of the Soviet delegation is clear. They have in mind the recognition of the right of influence in the Interim Government for all parties, both North and South. Since in the North they have effectively throttled any organized opposition other than underground, and have made the Chosun Democratic Party their tool and the Independence Union (or New Korean Democratic Party) their ally, they hope by this device to secure outright control of such government as may be created. They confidently expect that the freedom of opposition expression which has prevailed in the American zone can be turned into strength for them'.

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The second session closed with a suggestion by General Arnold that each side prepare a written list of questions for submission to the other for the purpose of clarifying the problem before the next session. Prior to the third session on 25 March, (281) the Americans submitted the following questions to the Soviets:

"1. It is respectfully requested that the American delegation be furnished answers to the following questions relative to paper #1 of the Soviet proposal for the formation of a provisional Korean Democratic Government.

"2. By what method do you contemplate that the commission will compile lists of parties and social organizations as specified in point 2 of agenda of paper #1?

a. Specifically what is the first step in this procedure?

b. Who will be responsible for the compilation of these lists?
(1) Will they be compiled jointly or separately for northern and southern Korea?

c. What will be the rules for the compilation of this list? Specifically:

(1) What qualifications must a social organization have to be included?
(2) What qualifications must a political party have to be included?
(3) How and by whom will these qualifications be determined?

d. How long do you believe it will take to accomplish this compilation?

"3. Under agenda point 3: Outline your proposed method of the elaboration of recommendations for the structure and principles of organization, specifically to include:

a. By what method will invitations to submit recommendations be submitted?

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b. In what form will these parties and organizations present their views?

c. How will these views be evaluated? For example:

(1) Will weight be given to the number of members and, if so, who will determine the number?
(2) Will weight be given to their active participation in government and, if so, how will this be determined?
(3) Will weight be given to the popular support of an organization or party and, if so, how will this be estimated?
(4) If more than one criterion are used in evaluating the views of parties and organizations what specific weight will be given to each of these criteria?

d. How long do you believe it will take to complete the work under paragraph 2?

"4. Under agenda point 4 for the elaboration of the political platform of this government, specifically:

a. What is meant by the expression "political platform"?

b. Outline your proposed method for determining a political platform to include specifically:
(1) In what form will the parties and organizations present their views?
(2) How will these views be evaluated? See 3b above.
(3) How will the various platforms be coordinated and integrated?

c. How long do you believe it will take to complete the work on this item of the agenda?

"5. Under agenda point 5 for the elaboration of recommendations for the political composition of the provisional government:

a. Outline your proposed method for determining the personal composition of the provisional government, specifically to include:
(1) In what form will these parties and organizations present their views?

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(2) How will these views be evaluated?
See 3a above.
(3) What criteria will be used to qualify a person for a position in the government? For example:

(a) Will it be on the basis of popular support? And if so, how will this be determined?
(b) Will it be on the basis of allegiance to the platform announced by the Commission, and if so, how can this be determined?
(c) Will party affiliation be a requisite?

(4) How will the recommendations of the various parties and organizations be integrated?

b. How long do you believe it will take to complete the work on this item of your agenda?

"6. I assure you, it is not my intention to cause you any unnecessary work. However, I do feel that if the American delegation is to study your proposal intelligently, it is necessary that I be furnished the above information."

Before the third session of 25 March, two joint communiques had been issued, both of which merely covered procedural matters and were of little significance. (252) Also, prior to that session, on 25 March, the American delegation submitted to the Russians their list of questions. The next day the Russians responded by ignoring all the specific questions and by affirming that all answers would be found in the subsequent debate. The Soviet delegation itself submitted no questions, and in the third session it stated that it intended to submit none and had no intention of answering any of the American questions, despite its promise to the contrary.

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The view of the United States was expressed by General Arnold: "the purpose of this session is to debate the Soviet proposals. It is our desire to do so. We are honestly unable to understand your plan at this time. Our questions have been asked, as agreed, to enable us to understand. Until we can, this commission can make no progress." Shtikov replied: "it is not a good way of doing...It is not right to ask questions about points that are already clear....If you agree that the topics fall into two phases, then let us start debating them....Our proposal is very clear and consistent; we must obey the decisions of the Moscow conference. The Soviet delegation understands how to fulfill them, and it outlines the order of how they are to be fulfilled." The session ended with a statement by General Arnold, "The Soviet delegation must determine whether they will or will not answer these questions. If they will not, I will not try longer to consider the Soviet proposal, which I cannot understand. I must therefore reject the Soviet proposal as a basis for discussion. I propose that we take up instead the consideration of the American proposal." (283)

In order not to hold up the proceedings of the Commission any longer, at the beginning of the fourth session the American delegation requested that the Soviets give the clarifying answers that had been promised. In so doing, General Arnold commented,

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"We are willing to entertain the assumption that your proposal is meant to be a broad outline rather than a detailed plan. If this is the case, it understandable that you cannot give specific answers to the questions we have raised. If this is true, we are willing at this time to withdraw the questions, and to proceed. Upon your confirmation of this assumption, we shall do so." However, the Russians refused to concede that their proposal had been only an outline. Both sides did agree, however, that the Commission activities fell into two phases; (a) that having to do with the creation of a government; and (b) that having to do with measures subsequently to be taken in aid of the Korean state.

The Russians argued that the agreed program must read "compilation of lists of parties and social organizations with which the Commission must consult." The Americans took issue with this point of view, expressing the belief that the program should more properly read, "determination of how and with whom to consult among Korean democratic parties and social organizations." Briefly, the Soviets wanted at once to start compiling the lists of groups to be consulted, whereas the Americans wished first to establish a principle upon which to select the groups. The Americans desired to postpone joining battle on this crucial question until a method of procedure had been agreed upon. General Arnold pointed out that the language suggested by him would not result in a present decision

either to admit anyone or to exclude anyone, but would merely establish a method by which the problem could be decided later. (284) This argument produced no results whatever, and the session closed.

Opening the fifth session, General Arnold said, "You are seeking a decision at a time when only the outlining of the problem is appropriate. We do not seek to prevent your proper presentation of your solution—at the proper time—just as we propose to present ours...If no rules shall prevail, then there is no need for a program, because either of us will bring up any subjects whenever we see fit. If this is what you prefer, we propose that you do away with the program, and we shall proceed to the first issue, which we both agree to be first, the discussion of how to creat the Korean provisional government. There is no compromise possible on this. Either we follow the accepted rules of international discussion or we do not. Either we have a program or we do not. We are willing to follow either course you prefer. We are not willing to waste further time."

To this General Shtikov queried, "Will you then entirely refuse to join in creating a list [of parties and organizations] in the future?" General Arnold replied, "Under a broad program, we can consider any solution that is proposed. Certainly, we can discuss the creation of lists, just as for our part we shall bring up our belief in the value of a consultative union."

General Shtikov summarized the Soviet position, "The compilation of lists is not a violation of any international rules of negotiations.... Such compilation is in conformity with the Moscow decisions...It is a thing which cannot be avoided....I do not recognize any consultative body. Such a body would contradict the letter and spirit of the Moscow decisions....No persons can substitute for the Korean people. We shall speak with the people only through the parties and organizations. The parties correspond with the spirit of the people; individuals do not so correspond." This discussion turned into a debate, and "General Shtikov flew into a towering rage that", according to Lt. Bertsch, "had the appearance of being genuine; shouting across the table the Russian General cautioned General Arnold not to 'play with fire'." (205)

However, the sixth and seventh sessions saw a more friendly attitude prevailing, and agreement was reached on the phrasing of four objectives to be attained during the first phase of the commission's work. These were: (a) "conditions for and order of consultation with Korean Democratic parties and social organizations"; (b) "elaboration of recommendations for the structure and principle of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the local organs of authority (Provisional Chapter)"; (c) "the

preliminary elaboration of a political platform and other appropriate measures for a future provisional Korean Democratic government; and (d) "elaboration of recommendations for the personnel of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government." This agreement was essentially a compromise, which only postponed the impending verbal battle. But it did set up an order of business.

The Soviets suggested that the work of implementing the first three of these objectives be assigned to committee under the Commission. This resulted in the appointment of three subcommittees and adjournment of the full Commission for four days to permit them to work. The subcommittee appointed consisted of Tsarapkin and Thayer (consideration of objective "a"); Lebedeff and Britton (consideration of objective "b"); and Balasanov and Bunce (consideration of objective "c").(286)

Among these subcommittees, the one assigned the mission of discussing the "conditions for and order of consultation with Korean Democratic parties and social organizations" held the most interest, for this subject had held the Commission deadlocked up to this point. Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative in this subcommittee, indicated the belief that it would be impossible to trust anyone who had not fully approved of the Moscow decisions. The American representative, Thayer, pointedly asked, "Would it not be proper to place confidence

in a political leader who had stated that he did not desire trusteeship and in fact would prefer independence, but had stated further that it was necessary to bow to international necessities." Tsarapkin replied that it would indeed be unwise to place reliance upon such a leader. Thayer then revealed that the remarks which he had quoted were practically verbatim from statements which had been made by Pak Heun Yung, head of the Korean Communist party. Tsarapkin was obviously chagrined, according to Lt. Bertsch. Thayer then went on to quote Lyuh Woon Hyung, president of the leftist People's Party: "All the Korean people oppose trusteeship. My actions in favor of it were entirely wrong." Tsarapkin finally conceded the point by saying in effect, that probably no Koreans actually preferred trusteeship to independence. Nevertheless, he continued to insist that a formal acceptance of the Moscow Decisions was the essential element in allowing any group into consultation. The American response was summarized in Thayer's comments: "there are no parties which prefer trusteeship to independence...So far as we know, there are no parties which will rebel against trusteeship, though some favor it...All parties then are factually upon the same ground. They do not like our idea, but they will not fight it....The talk of 'accepting' the Moscow Decisions is therefore irrelevant." Thayer went on the challenge Tsarapkin to name any party or parties of South Korea which would

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dare to make a public unequivocal statement without qualifications in favor of trusteeship. Tsarapkin conceded that he could not name such a party. In the eighth session of the full Commission on 3 April 1946, the inability of the subcommittee to agree forced the Commission to reopen discussions on the matter precisely where it had left it four days earlier, namely, in complete disagreement.

The Soviet proposal at this juncture specified two conditions for parties and organizations to be consulted: (a) "democratic parties and social organization to be consulted by the Joint Commission must be officially recognized"; and (b) "the Joint Commission must consult only orgahizations, which fully support the decision of the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers concerning Korea and will cooperate with the Commission in the fulfillment of this decision." American opposition to these criterian was based on the clause requiring support of the Moscow Decision, it being felt that it would suffice for those desiring to be heard by the Commission merely to pledge that they would willingly submit to the decisions of the Joint Commission and carry them out. It was further stated that if the Commission decided to consult only those parties which had not voiced opposition to the Moscow agreement (against trusteeship) it would not have anybody to consult in South Korea. To this the Soviets took issue, stating that in South Korea there were parties

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and organizations which fully supported the Moscow Decision. Moreover, the Soviets expressed the conviction that the Joint Commission had nothing about which to consult with those parties and organizations which had voiced opposition to any part whatever of the Moscow decision, and did not support it, including the provision for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. This was the final Soviet proposal of the day. In contrast was the final American stand which, in essence, was that the Joint Commission should consult with all political parties and social organizations which were truly democratic in their aims and methods and were prepared to cooperate loyally with and to support fully the Joint Commission in the fulfillment of the tasks under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Moscow Decision. 'Were we to accept the Russian proposal, I am convinced that our action would be instantly repudiated by our Government,' concluded General Arnold. (287)

In the ninth session, 5 April, the Soviets offered a compromise, the compromise being that it would agree to consult parties, even though their leaders had opposed trusteeship, upon the condition that the parties now repudiate such leaders, and conform. 'In a democratic state there must be no non-democratic elements', said

the Soviets. General Arnold answered, "To require parties to retract the expression of their desire for independence would be imposing a belief upon them; it would be an effort to prevent their democratic rights. A dictated purge of parties is not in accord with our idea of democratic activity...In this position we are standing upon the Moscow Decision as it is written...Here, democracy is in its infancy; less than 20 per cent of the people are represented by parties. We cannot exclude the unrepresented 80 per cent."

The stand taken by the American delegation on the matter of excluding from consultation Korean parties and organizations which had opposed trusteeship was fully vindicated by the State Department (256) in the following radio:

> "No useful purpose would be served by entering into debate now over trusteeship, and we therefore concur in your view that Korean dislike for this provision of Moscow agreement cannot be used as a criterion to exclude Korean parties from consultation. Final decision with regard to trusteeship rests neither with Commission nor with Koreans but with the 4 governments to whom Commission's proposals are submitted in accordance with second half of paragraph 3 of Moscow Agreement.
>
> "We feel that it can be usefully reemphasized to Russians, if it has not already been done, the purpose of the Commission acting under paragraph 2 of Moscow agreement is to make recommendations on the formation of a Korean Democratic provisional government;... [garbled] ...that this purpose could be more readily carried out if the 38th parallel barrier were completely removed with regard to interchange of persons and information between areas; that we are prepared, if it would facilitate

agreement in Commission for drawing up proposals, to undertake jointly with Soviets supervision of local elections to decide issue as to representative parties; that, as stated in Moscow agreement, our sole objective in Korea is the development of Democratic self-government and the establishment of an independent Korea which we might reasonably expect to maintain amicable relations not only with the USSR and the US but also with other United Nations; and that, we are prepared to accomodate our views on reasonable procedure to those of the Soviet group on the Commission, we are not prepared to compromise on the objective and intend to persevere until that objective is achieved.

"There is no question of our agreeing to a hasty, unsatisfactory settlement in order to relieve ourselves of responsibility which we fully intend to discharge and we therefore feel that you resolve not to prejudice fundamental objective by anxiety and impatience to reach early agreement is very well taken. While desiring of course to reach a satisfactory solution as soon as practicable, we feel under no pressure to hasten matters and fully approve your action."

The tenth session saw the Americans present for discussion a prepared draft of so-called "instructions to the subcommission", the gist of which was the direction to prepare at once an initial list of democratic parties and social organizations of North and South Korea to be consulted by the subcommittee in determining what other groups to consult, and then, with their advice, make additions to the list. The deciding voice in naming those to be consulted from the North was to be the Russian Command; for those from the South, the American Command. The initial list was to

be composed of such numbers as to give adequate representation to the diverse schools of thought as well as the relative populations of North and South Korea. At this point, the Soviets asked whether the first point took into consideration the conditions that they had insisted upon, viz., the exclusion of those who opposed the Moscow Decision, whereupon General Arnold pointed out that the subcommittee would demand that the parties consulted declare their loyalty to the Commission in the performance of its duties and thus would satisfy the reasonable requirement for the exclusion of the disloyal. Actually, this was a strong repudiation of the Soviet position, according to Lt. Bertsch. It was a pretended belief that the Soviet delegates could not possibly have meant anything so extreme and unreasonable as a wider exclusion. The tentative American list of political parties and social organizations in South Korea appears below. (239) This was never acted upon--merely debated.

1. Emergency National Assembly
2. Democratic People's Front
3. Korean Independence Party
4. ~~Korean~~ Hawkuck Democratic Party
5. Korean Communist Party
6. New Korean People's Party
7. New Korean Nationalist Party
8. ~~A~~ Korean People's Party
9. New Korean Democratic Party

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10. Korean Farmer's Federation
11. Korean Labor Federation for Independence
12. Association of Christian Churches
13. Chuntokyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way)
14. Korean Buddhist Central Council
15. Confucian Society
16. Korean National Red Cross
17. Korean Christian Young Men's Federation
18. Central Council for Independence
19. Preparation Committee for National Convention
20. Korean Women's Nationalist party

The Soviets continued to demand exclusion of those who had opposed the Moscow Decision. Further debate ensued, and gradually the Russians yielded ground. On one occasion, General Shtikov even indicated assent, only to be brought back to rejection by protest of Tcherapkin. The formula which was nearly, but not quite, approved was, "all parties and organizations consulted must declare that they recognize the Moscow decision, and will support it as implemented by the Commission." In closing, General Arnold rose to say, "Our conception of free speech and free thought here in South Korea, is something that we cannot and will not change.

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We repeat again---we will not accept any plan that punishes any individual for his expression of political belief. We will go no further than to require that those consulted must declare that they recognize the Moscow Decision on Korea and will support its implementation by the Commission." (290)

This apparent hope of agreement was transitory, however, for the Russians declared unequivocably their opposition to any formula in which there was no mention that the parties to be consulted must support the Moscow Decision. The debate raged and familiar pieces were mouthed over and over. The Russians went to extremes by declaring that "those who oppose the decisions of the Moscow Conference are not honest...We think that the supporters [of trusteeship] are in overwhelming majority, both in the North and South. We cannot longer consider the profit of the minority."

The American reply was frosty and biting. "With regard to the 'overwhelming majority' supporting the Moscow Decision---if General Shtikov means trusteeship, there is scarcely a Korean in Southern Korea who supports it. There is no use deceiving ourselves on this point. Further, Southern Korea contains the great majority of all Koreans....The introduction of your idea, of exclusion, was without any basis in the Moscow Decision....that basic document demands that we consult with democratic parties.....The United States

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delegation does not support any group or party. It supports a fundamental democratic right, the right of Koreans to hold their own opinions. Every Korean had the right to oppose any part of the Moscow Decision...General Shtikov proposes that we consult only the majority. We disagree as to which side is in fact the majority. But that is not the question. We shall hear both---including the few---the infinitesimally few---who prefer trusteeship to independence. We ask only that they abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission. That is the limit of our agreement on exclusion. Let us then proceed to our work, without more mention of it." In the words of Lt. Bertsch, "it may well be conjectured that the insistence upon the exclusion formula has been motivated, not so much by the desire to exclude, as by the wish to bring the United States under joint blame for the Soviet's own accomplished error."(291)

In an effort to shock the Soviets from the position which they themselves must have recognized as untenable, General Arnold, in the twelfth session, read an extract from his instructions from Washington, D. C., (refer pages 104-5 for full text), "Korean dislike for a provision of the Moscow agreement cannot be used as a criterion to exclude Korean parties from consultation." Debate ensued, but finally General Shtikov agreed to the American suggestion that the

Commission allow the subcommittee to try again in compiling a list of parties to be consulted. However, in so agreeing the Russian General informed the Americans that the Soviet delegate would be instructed to be guided by the conditions previously discussed and that it would be best to instruct the American delegate likewise, for "otherwise, the subcommittee will be unable to agree."

General Arnold then asked bluntly, "Does the Soviet delegation understand that we will not require support of the Moscow decision to be the condition of consultation?" To this Shtikov responded, "Does the American delegation understand that the Soviet delegation will not consult with those who oppose the Moscow Decision until they announce their support." When it was pointed out that this retort did not constitute an answer, the Soviet General replied, "No, we cannot understand the viewpoint of the Americans." At the close of the session, General Arnold proposed that a joint communique be prepared stating the substance of the disagreement. Behind this proposal lay the implied suggestion of a unilateral announcement by the Americans in event of disagreement. The Soviet delegation agreed to mediate upon the question. (292)

During this period news broke from San Francisco in an Associated Press dispatch dated 6 April 1946, the impact of which was felt in the halls of the Duk Soo Palace. As reported in the CHOSUN ILBO (Korean Daily News), 7 April, it was based on "an informed source" which stated that, the Joint Commission not having succeeded

as yet in the establishment of a Korean provisional government, a separate independent government in South Korea would be set up by the American occupational authorities. Still another informant, according to the dispatch, had said that Dr. Rhee Syngman would be appointed president of the South Korean government. The grounds for the alleged United States' proposal were the Soviet attempt to prolong the Joint Commission and the anticipated reduction of American officer personnel through demobilization. (295)

General Shtikov opened the 15th session with a prepared statement to the effect that the Soviet delegation had restudied its position and was now reassured of the correctness of its previous view, namely, that it should consult only those who would support the Moscow Decision and strive for its fulfillment. He went on to add that the parties of the Democratic People's Front (Left wing front in South Korea) had declared their full support of the Decision on every issue, whereas there was abundant evidence that the other parties had opposed trusteeship. As an example he quoted statements made by Kim Koo at a recent meeting, which indicated his opposition to trusteeship. General Shtikov explained how the Russians had succeeded in educating the people of the Northern zone to the point at which they all came to desire trusteeship, and intimated that the same course of action could have been followed in the South. Finally, he charged the Americans with a lack of interest in fulfilling the Moscow Decision.

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Quoting the United Nations charter on the subject and pointing out that a final decision was not envisaged by the Moscow Decision until after consultation with Koreans, General Arnold asked again, "Where do you find the right to impose an exclusion clause? I suggest that we proceed to implement the Moscow Decision as written, not as altered by the Soviet delegation." This led to a discussion of the UNO charter on trusteeship, with the Soviet delegation expressing the opinion that it was entirely irrelevant to the discussion. Thereupon, General Arnold stated, "The UNO charter is the law which describes the forms of trusteeship. I note that it is signed by Mr. Tsarapkin for the Soviet Union. I assume that it must be binding upon the USSR. I concede that the American delegation does not know what form trusteeship will take in Korea. That is why we were not bold enough to explain it to the people of Southern Korea."

General Arnold next reminded the Russians of the pledge made in General Shtikov's opening remarks that the Soviet Union would champion self-determination for all peoples. General Arnold concluded in strong language, "Is the Soviet delegation redefining the Soviet Union's position on self-determination? Why does the Soviet delegation distort the communique of the Three Ministers? Is the Moscow Decision not satisfactory as it is written? The Joint Commission will never make any progress by double talk."

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At the end of the day's discussion, the American delegation raised the point that the Soviet government had been showing great concern and sympathy for the desire of suppressed peoples for independence and the question was asked at precisely what point such universal desire became synonymous with undemocratic reaction. General Shtikov retorted sharply, "I do not recommend to the American Delegation to discuss the international policy of the USSR. This is not our function."

An interesting commentary on the Soviet insistence upon the exclusion formula was made by Lt. Bertsch in a report dated 11 April: (294)

> "Soviet insistence upon the exclusion formula to date, lends credence to reports from the North that this was part of a definite bargain entered into between the Soviets and the Korean Communists. It may be observed that the Korean Communists during all of the past 15 years have succeeded in giving Moscow a succession of disciplinary problems. They are not fully-Bolshevized and their discipline is not in the best Communist tradition. Definitely power-hungry, they were probably won over to the Soviet demand that they publicly espouse the unpopular cause of trusteeship, by the Soviet promise that the exclusion formula would be enacted."

Between the 13th and 14th sessions, General Arnold called General Shtikov into a private friendly conference. He pointed out that his duty would now lead him to require the issuance of a statement explaining why no agreement could be reached. The assumption underlying this strategy was that the Soviet delegation must

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have been aware of the weakness of its position. Suffice to say that the two Generals worked out an almost complete agreement. This was submitted at the 14th session, on 15 April 1946, in the following form: (Phrases underlined were those included before the session of the Commission at Soviet request.)

"The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declarations:

We _____ declare that we will uphold the aims of Moscow Decision on Korea as stated in Paragraph 1 of this decision, namely:

(a) The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state,
(b) The creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and
(c) The earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.

Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision on the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

Further, we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out, by it, and with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government, of proposals concerning measures provided by the Moscow Decision Part

Helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

General Shtikov said that this was acceptable to him but for one exception, that exception being the inclusion of the word

"trusteeship" in parenthesis after the phrase "helping and assisting" in the last paragraph. In support of this proposal, General Shtikov used an approach of considerable strength, in that this would be repeating the exact phraseology of the Moscow Decision. General Arnold, however, stated that he would present to his Command the American viewpoint that the word should be omitted, but that he would request further instruction. (295)

During the interim of four days between the 14th and 15th sessions the Soviet delegation transmitted a request to General Chistiakov for instructions as to the acceptance of the American version which omitted the word "trusteeship." General Chistiakov had in turn passed the inquiry on to Moscow, and presumably word had come back rejecting the American draft. When this became known in the 15th session, on 17 April, General Arnold proposed that the entire last paragraph of the suggested declaration be dropped. To this, Soviet assent was forthcoming and Joint Communique No. 5 was issued. Lt. Bertsch remarked in his report, "It is apparent that the strongest American weapon is the threat of publicity." (296)(297)

JOINT COMMUNIQUE NO. 5

"The U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission continued discussion on the question of conditions of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. Colonel General T. F. Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation, was chairman at sessions held on 8, 9, 11 and 15 April 1946, in the Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea, and Major General A. V. Arnold, Chief of the United States Delegation, was chairman at the session 17 April 1946.

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'As a result of thorough investigation and analysis of the points of view of the Soviet Delegation and the Delegation of the United States, the Joint Commission reached the following decision on the first point of the Joint program of work covering the conditions of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations:

DECISION

'The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declarations:

'We _____ declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow Decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely:

'The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and; the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.

'Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government; further we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out by it with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision.'

Signed_____

Representing the _____ party of Organization.

The procedure for inviting representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations to consult with the Joint Commission is being worked out by Joint Sub-Commission No. 1. When details of the procedure are completed, it will be announced publicly.

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"Joint Sub-Commission No. 2, taking into consideration the proposals of the Korean democratic parties and social organizations with which it will consult, will prepare for the Joint Commission a charter on the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government at all levels. This charter will designate the various agencies of government that will exercise executive, legislative and judicial authority, with their duties and functions.

"Joint Sub-Commission No. 3 has been directed to work out a political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

"This Sub-Commission, also will consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

"The platform will be a document stating the aspirations and objectives of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government in the political, economic and cultural fields. It will be comprehensive enough to embrace such questions as industry, agriculture, transportation, finance, public education, and freedom of speech and press, etc."

It seemed at this point as though the Joint Commission had made significant progress, but again this optimism was but shortlived. Prior to the 16th session, 20 April, the subcommittees had been at work. The major problem now before the commission was the virtual deadlock prevailing in two of these subcommittees.

The Thayer-Tsarapkin subcommittee had been created to set up the mechanics for consulting with Korean parties and organizations. The cause for the deadlock was a repetition of the demand made by the Soviet member that only those parties which had not opposed trusteeship should be called into consultation, a stand having an

all too familiar ring by this time, and one which gave evidence of bad faith on the part of the Russians. Actually, they had proposed in the subcommittee a restriction which they had abandoned in the full Commission. The most probable explanation for this line of action was advanced by Lt. Bertsch, "...they are again having recourse to their favorite tactic. They are taking a position which is impossible in order to have ample ground from which to retreat by apparent concessions which will not in fact concede anything." (298)

The second deadlock was that in the Bunce-Solomonov committee. Here the Russians had simply refused to discuss any measures whatever for the economic rehabilitation of Korea and for minimizing the unfortunate consequences of the division at the 38th parallel. General Arnold commented, "If the Soviet attitude continues unchanged, the American delegation must now disclaim the responsibility for the failure of the Commission". He also pointed out that the delay was causing "severe criticism of this Commission throughout the world." (299)

Actually, all during this period Korean public opinion was crystallizing against both the Americans and Soviets for their apparent inability to make any notable progress. On 14 April, the Department of Public Information in Military Government reported:

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"The prevailing attitude concerning the Joint Soviet-American commission is one of utter pessimism and hopelessness. At first, the people held the Soviet Union to blame for the delay. The vast majority still do, but as the day of Korean independence grows no nearer, a slow trend seems to be developing toward the belief that the Soviet Union and the United States are both to blame for the long delay....It is predicted that the longer a decision on Korea is postponed, the more people will believe that the Soviet is not alone to be blamed for the continued partition and occupation of their country." (500) The Commission was virtually deadlocked. It was speculated that "the return of the Soviets to the position which they had abandoned was the result of protest by their political followers locally." (501)

In regard to the removal of the barrier along the 38th parallel, the Soviets argued that such items as unrestricted travel, exchange of goods, and the like, which were proposed by the United States delegation already had been regulated by the Joint Conference of January 1946. XXIV Corps G-2 pointed out that "in this connection it is interesting to note that, although the Soviets are essentially correct in this...nothing has been done of a concrete nature to date on the matter, the decision of the Joint Conference notwithstanding. This has been the result principally of Soviet indifference and hedging, and their continued reluctance to have an influx of outsiders

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into North Korea. Actually, the results of the Joint Conference as amended and finally approved by General Chistiakov are little more than a piece of paper." (302) By way of rebuttal, the United States delegation argued that the Provisional Government was charged by paragraph 1 of the Moscow Decision with the development of industry, transportation, agriculture, and the national culture of the Korean people, and that the Commission should lay the foundation for this program. This argument naturally fell on deaf ears, and no decision or agreement was reached, since the Soviets steadfastly refused to alter the status quo of the 38th parallel, and insisted that the Koreans should work out all these matters after the establishment of a provisional government. (303)

The Soviet position continued to be one of ignoring the fact that the Moscow Decision itself did not make trusteeship a definite objective. In the 18th session, on 24 April, the Soviet delegation made what it described as a compromise offer. "If any political party or social organization designates for consultation with the Joint Commission a representative who, because of his attitude towards the Moscow Decision or his attitude towards the Allies (USSR and US) turns out to be unsuitable to either delegation, the Joint Commission will refuse to accept him as a representative of such party or organization for the consultation with the Joint Commission." During this same session, General Arnold again threatened publicity by suggesting a communique. (304)

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In the next session, the 19th, General Shtikov made no bones about coming right out and saying they could not have anyone in the new government who had expressed opposition to the Soviet Union. The Soviets went on to complain that the Americans had refused to go ahead with the preparation of lists of parties to be consulted. To this, General Arnold replied that such lists would not be drawn up until there had been joint approval of a document setting up the plan of consultation, which had to come first. The Soviets then brought up a demand that a deadline be established for the filing of applications by the parties. The American answer to this latest demand was that the time was not yet ripe to establish such a deadline since the parties had not yet been formally invited for consultation. General Arnold added that the American delegation was particularly interested in having adequate time to hear from the small groups, and that he was certain that the larger ones could be brought in on reasonably short notice.

It seemed to appear probable by the end of the session that there might be a Soviet agreement forthcoming to defer the consideration of a general policy on exclusion, in return for an American agreement that any individual considered objectionable by the Soviets would be discussed by the Commission before being accepted for consultation. (305) At one time during this discussion the Americans,

in subcommission, offered a concession that the Russians would be allowed to place their objection to any individual before the Commission for decision, but with the announcement on the record that the Americans had no intention of barring from consultation any Koreans selected to represent eligible accredited groups. This was not accepted, and General Hodge instructed the American delegation to withdraw the compromise and stand upon its original proposal calling for democratic representation without any punitive or exclusion provision aimed at parties or individuals. (306)

On 27 April 1946, General Hodge issued a press statement attempting to clarify Joint Communique No. 5, which had made public the declaration to be signed by groups desiring to be heard by the Commission. (307)

> "General Arnold, my chief representative on the Joint Commission, confirms to me the understanding that by signing the declaration outlined in Communique #5 of the Joint Commission, political parties and social organizations thereby assure themselves of the privilege of expressing their views to the commission, either for or against trusteeship. Signing the declaration for a consultation with the Joint Commission does not indicate that the political party or social organization favors trusteeship, or that the organization commits itself to support of trusteeship.
>
> "Those who will not sign the declaration, however, will not be consulted by the Joint Commission."

This had the effect of putting the Russians on the spot. It was made clear that the Americans did not consider that the requirement, making it mandatory for participating parties to sign a pledge of support, was exclusive in the sense that the Russians did. By thus making

the American claim painfully clear, a possible future Russian claim that both delegations had agreed to exclude those not supporting trusteeship was forestalled.

The discussion of exclusion of "compromised individuals" continued, and in the 19th session the United States proposed to urge the political parties to consider selecting representatives who would be acceptable to the Russians. This, as probably was expected, was rejected; but if designed to force the Soviets into action, it was not without result. The Soviet delegation declared that such proposal would be unthinkable as it would indicate unilateral defense of the Moscow Declaration by the Soviet delegation, and would reflect a wide difference in approach toward implementation of the Moscow Decision. Then, in this spirit of fellowship, the Soviets temporarily withdrew their exclusion clause from discussion. This act was followed by a withdrawal of an American proposal to discuss personnel for the Provisional Government at this time, the only one of the four items on the agenda which was not deadlocked. (308)

Although the exclusion controversy did not come under discussion at the 20th session, the Soviets unveiled a scheme at that time whereby a party would be notified if its delegate was not acceptable, and would be asked to provide another. However, no action was taken on this matter. The remainder of the session was spent in discussing questionnaires to be sent to the parties to be consulted, agreement on which was reached as indicated by the text below: (309)

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"Questionnaire to be submitted to democratic parties and social organizations of North andSouth Korea regarding the Provisional Charter for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

"Request your point of view concerning the structure and principles of the organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) to be given to the Joint Commission (... date...). It is desired that your reply state your views on the following subjects in sufficient detail that these replies can be used in compiling the Provisional Charter:

"1. Rights of the people. (Bill of Rights. For example, freedom of speech, press, universal suffrage, religion, assembly; inviolability of personal freedom; equality of sexes, and others)

"2. The general type or character of provisional government to be established.

"3. The organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions.

(a) Is it necessary to give the Provisional Korean Government the right to make laws before the creation of a legislative organ founded upon general elections?

(b) Composition and structure of the organ or organs to perform these functions (For example: Organization, designation and function of the ministries; designation of the chief executive or body to perform the chief executive functions; organization, designation and functions of any organ to perform the legislative functions).

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(c) Powers and duties of the various ministers and officials.

(d) Election or appointment and replacement of ministers and other principal members of the organ or organs to perform the legislative and executive functions (for example: terms of office, succession to office; removal from office).

(e) Method of discharging executive and legislative functions.

"4. Local organs of authority, their formation, structure, powers and duties.

(a) Method of election of local authorities. (Should the local authorities of provinces, counties, cities, townships, towns and villages be elected or appointed?). If elected, then on what principles should the elections be conducted? If appointed, then by whom?

(b) Composition and structure of the local organs of authority of provinces, counties, cities, townships, towns and villages, to include the designation, duties, and rights of local authorities.

(c) Jurisdiction, powers and duties of the local organs of authority (provinces, counties, cities, townships, towns and villages.)

"5. Judicial organs.

(a) Composition (For example: type, size, and number of courts, establishment of any other judicial organizations.)

(b) Powers and duties of courts and other judicial bodies.

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(c) Selection and replacement of judicial personnel. (For example: Election or appointment of members, term of office, removal from office.)

"6. Method of changing and amending Provisional Charter.

"Subjects not listed above which appear appropriate for inclusion in the Provisional Charter may be included in your reply."

This matter of questionnaire was summarized in Joint (310)
Communique No. 7 released on 1 May 1946 as appears below:

"The U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, at its meetings from 22 through 27 April 1946, in the Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, discussed the question of the manner of consulting with Korean democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea, and also the questions worked out by Joint Sub-Commissions No. 2 and No. 3 for consultations with these parties and organizations.

"The head of the Soviet delegation, Colonel General T. F. Shtikov, presided.

"The Joint Commission neared the end of the discussion of the report of Sub-Commission No. 1 on the manner of consultation with Korean Democratic parties and social organizations.

"Lists of questions worked out by Joint Sub-Commissions No. 2 and No. 3 for submission to democratic parties and social organizations were approved. The full questionnaires will be published in the nearest future. The fundamental questions on these lists follow:

"A. Regarding the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority.

1. Rights of the people.

2. General type or character of the provisional government to be established.

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3. The organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions.

4. Local organs of authority.

5. Judicial organs.

6. Method of changing and amending the Provisional Charter.

B. Regarding the political platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government,

1. Political policies.

2. Economic policies.

3. Educational and cultural policies.

Discussion during the 51st session reverted to another impasse over the Soviet insistence on exclusion of compromised individuals. At this juncture, XXIV Corps G-2 gave vent to the following comments on the state of the nation. (311)

> That the Koreans are ready and willing to take a back seat in the formation of their government, and that Korea has become a U.S.-Soviet dueling ground is becoming increasingly apparent. The divergent and conflicting ideologies of the U.S. and Russia are already manifesting themselves in the Commission proceedings, and in all Korea. The type of government and the leaders that the Korean people desire (if such could be ascertained), if considered at all in Soviet circles, certainly must have been done in a perfunctory manner; and, after all considerations in implementation of Russian foreign policy have been satisfied. To date the American and soviet ideals of government, thrown so intimately together in Korea are making strange and unwelcome bedfellows, and just what sort of hybrid monstrosity will be born from this brief flirtation certainly will be unique, if not predictable; and, if current Korean thinking and vocalizing is any guide, will be named Democracy.

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At the 22d session, the exclusion question was again debated. The Americans offered a concession to the effect that the Joint Commission discuss and decide the possibility of requesting Korean parties to appoint a substitute for consultation in case the original representative was not satisfactory to both delegations because of his attitude toward the Moscow Decision or the Allies, provided that their appointment was made at the request of the Soviet delegation. It was added that the American delegation considered any duly selected representative competent to be consulted whose party had made the required declaration specified in Joint Communique No. 5, and further, that the United States delegation had no intention of objecting to any representative of any such group. When the Soviets refused to accept this proposal, it was withdrawn. (512)

The impasse continued into the 23d session on 5 May, with no solution or agreement being reached. The United States delegation then restated its stand, taking the position that the Moscow Decision need not be defended by repressing freedom of speech, and that the voicing of opposition to trusteeship did not constitute an attack. It was further stated by the American delegates that dislike for a provision of the Moscow agreement could not be used as a criterion for exclusion from consultation. (513) General Arnold then proposed

that each side prepare a statement of its position to be included in a joint communique explaining the delayed progress of the Commission. This was temporarily shelved by General Shtikov when he stated that he would require instructions from higher authorities. (514)

In the meantime, and prior to the 24th and last session of the Commission, Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, acting chairman of the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea, provided the spark that, when introduced into sub-committee No. 1 (which had to do with political affairs), hastened the breakdown of negotiations. Said Dr. Kim in part on 1 May 1946, when outlining the Council's attitude towards the fifth communique, "to sign the declaration of the fifth communique would mean an opportunity to oppose the trusteeship at the Joint Commission." Tsarapkin, in a subcommittee meeting on the morning of 6 May, flatly stated that as a result of this stand by Dr. Kim and his Council, "no party affiliated with the Representative Democratic Council would be consulted." At the Commission meeting which followed that afternoon, and in answer to the query as to whether or not the foregoing constituted the official position of the Soviet Delegation, General Shtikov with great hesitation and after considerable verbal prodding answered affirmatively. The effect of such sweeping exclusion would have been "to rule out all parties other than the Communist Party and its controlled satellite fronts...operating directly or indirectly under Soviet control. (515)

The American Delegation refused to agree to any such exclusion and suggested, instead, passing on to the elaboration of measures toward breaking down the barrier lying across Korea at the 38th parallel. This was refused by the Soviet Delegation, and the American Delegation moved for adjournement, since under the conditions no further business could be conducted. The four-point agenda had been exhausted with complete deadlock on every point.(316) General Hodge summarized the significance of the breakdown in negotiations in a radio to SCAP:(317)

"It is unknown whether or not the Soviet Delegation will recede from its position of exclusion of all who do not support the Moscow Decision including a mandatory five year trusteeship. If not, I see no reason for any further negotiations under the present conditions. There has been no indication at any point so far that the Russians have any intention of cooperating in establishment of anything other than a fully Communist controlled Government in Korea, excluding all Koreans who have announced and maintained their stand against trusteeship. It is believed that the opponents of trusteeship include 97% of all Koreans, although the Communist controlled groups are obeying Soviet orders to support trusteeship after their early strong antitrusteeship stand. Since there are in effect only two parties in Korea today (regardless of large number of subdivisions) namely the Communist group under Russian control and all others that are either under the Representative Democratic Council in South Korea or ruthlessly suppressed in North Korea, the latest move by the Soviet Delegation is a patent attempt to wipe out all representation except of the Communist groups.

"Soviet Delegation takes the attitude that because we do not agree without qualification that the Moscow Decision makes five year trusteeship for Korea mandatory and because we do not prohibit any further discussion of the subject on the part of the Koreans that we are not living up to the Moscow decision. In this respect their interpretation of both the Decision and the general

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aspects of democratic procedure are diametrically opposed to our own. It is my considered opinion that unless they recede from their present position all further argument here is futile and further proceedings are a waste of time as well as demoralizing to the Korean people. I consider the next move to be up to the Soviet Delegation since there can be no change in our position here without complete surrender of principles as well as of Korea. If there is no new move apparent on their part today, I shall release the entire situation to the press. Release is being prepared and copy will be furnished you as soon as ready. Folsd concurs.

"Do you have any further instructions or comments?"

In order to make the issue a clearcut one and to place the American stand on record, General Shtikov was sent a proposed draft agreement by the Joint Commission to the effect that no party or organization was to be excluded "because of the exercise of their right of freedom of expression in re trusteeship, the Moscow Decision, or any other political issue." At the same time, a copy of a proposed American unilateral communique was transmitted to the Russian General in another attempt to force the Soviet delegation into a more reasonable frame of mind by the threat of publicity. On the morning of 8 May, General Hodge had a three-hour session with General Shtikov in which the American and Soviet stands were re-examined. The latter requested that action on the proposed unilateral release await reception of word from his superiors. In the meantime, General Hodge summarized the situation for SCAP as follows:

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"If break comes we feel we could not be on better ground. We further feel that publication of communique will cripple Communist fifth column in South, damage Communists puppet authority in North, and handicap Russians for a long period in any attempt to dominate Korean affairs. However, we realize undesirability of of suspending negotiations and shall give Russians every opportunity to withdraw provided that the exclusion issue is definitely and finally settled as we propose."

At 1000 on the 8th, General Shtikov called on General Hodge with the information that he had orders from his superior commander to stop work with the Commission and to return North with his entire delegation at once, the next day being the projected date of departure. The Soviet General issued a final statement (319) covering the Russian stand, the salient parts of which appear below:

"We know from the statements of General Hodge and General Arnold that the Koreans themselves cannot rule the country. They need help. This help is foreseen by the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation considered that help and assistance to the Korean people in rehabilitation of their government and establishment of democracy is unnecessary and such help should be rendered by strong countries such as the United States and Russia. Because of this, we have to say to those who object to the Moscow Decision that they should not interfere and should not lead astray the Korean people and stop their hostile propaganda and agitation against both American and Russia.

"The main reason why the Soviet Delegation insisted on barring certain persons from consultation, is that Russia is close neighbor to Korea and, because of this, is interested in establishing in Korea a provisional democratic government which would be loyal to the Soviet Union. The leaders who objected to the Moscow Decision and raised their voices against the Soviet Union, slandered the Soviet Union and smeared it with mud. If they seized power in the government, the government would not

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be loyal to Russia, and its officials would be instrumental in organizing hostile actions on the part of the Korean people against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Delegation would have been agreeable to the American view if the U. S. had demanded that people hostile to America should not be in the government.....

"Likewise, it is also not clear to us when, while compiling the list of parties and social organizations, the American member in the sub-committee submitted a list of parties and organizations in which were not included large workers and peasants organizations, trade unions, peasant unions and the democratic union of youth, though these unions represent the largest part of the Korean population.....

"We consider trusteeship a matter to discuss with the Korean government after it is formed....."

Aftermath

At this time the future status of the Commission was an uncertainty in mind of the American Command. General Hodge, in a radio to SOAF, commented, "It is not known for sure that this action [departure of the Soviet delegation] will end the Joint Commission, but doubt if it will reopen until [there are] further negotiations on a higher level." (320) However, in the 9 May, XXIV Corps Staff meeting, General Hodge expressed the belief that the Commission as such had not terminated. (321)

Likewise on the same day, a transcript of the conference between the American and Soviet generals was forwarded to General Chistiakov. The covering letter expressed the willingness of the

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Americans to reopen discussions at any time:

"The Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day notice. All accomodations used by the Soviet Delegation remain open for their use.

"If there remain any other issues to be cleared up before the Commission reconvenes, I suggest that we meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you request. I will gladly come to Pyongyang for such a meeting, or I will be delighted if you would accept my long standing invitation to visit me in the Korean metropolis of Seoul".

In the meantime, a statement on the adjournment of the Joint Commission was issued by USAMGIK, in which full responsibility for the breakdown was placed on Soviet shoulders, and the American stand (323) vindicated. It appears in full below.

"When the Joint Commission commenced discussions on the formation of a Provisional Government, the Soviet delegation proposed that all Korean elements which 'had voiced opposition to the Moscow Decision' be excluded from participation in the formation of the Provisional Government. The American delegation opposed any such exclusion rule on the ground that it denied the Koreans the fundamental democratic right of freedom of expression.

"When the Moscow Decision on Korea was made public, all parties and party leaders in southern Korea, practically without exception, expressed opposition to that provision of the decision which foresaw the establishment of trusteeship in Korea. The vast majority of southern Koreans objected to this clause because they believed that it might unduly postpone their independence. Subsequently, a minority of Southern parties dominated by an inspired group, abruptly reversed their position on this issue. With this exception, dislike of trusteeship prevails to this day throughout the South.

"After prolonged negotiations, the Soviet delegation offered as a compromise to consult with parties and organizations declaring their future support of the Moscow Decision and publicly 'denouncing

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the leadership which had misled them". Further, such leaders were to be excluded from any participation in the future Provisional Government of Korea. The American delegation rejected this suggestion on the ground that it amounted to a dictated purge of parties and was not in accord with the American conception of democratic political activity.

"As a result of four weeks of negotiation, the Joint Commission agreed to require a reasonable degree of cooperation on the part of democratic parties and social organizations which were to be consulted. This agreement published in Communique #5 did not require support of trusteeship but merely that parties and organizations to be consulted should cooperate with the measures regarding trusteeship. In other words, parties and organizations would be free to express themselves against a possible trusteeship when the Commission undertook the working out of recommendations on the matter. This was clear in the declaration itself and was made a matter of record by the American delegation when the agreement was reached. Furthermore, in a number of explanatory statements, the American Commander publicly stated that no matter what form trusteeship might or might not take, Southern Koreans were free to speak their minds on the subject.

"Having made this agreement and having thus, in the view of the American delegation, disposed of the problem of exclusion from participation in the formation of a government, the Commission was later presented with an additional proposal by the Soviet delegation to exclude as representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations, those who "actively oppose the Moscow Decision." As this appeared to be a violation of its previous agreement, and was clearly contrary tothe principle of freedom of expression, the American delegation refused to agree to the Soviet proposal. However, in order to facilitate the progress of work, it offered to discuss in the Commission the eligibility of a representative if the issue were raised in individual cases. The Soviet delegation, however, insisted that a statement be published warnings the organizations not to select representatives who were opposed to the Moscow decision.

"Discussions on this point were still in progress when the Soviet delegation informed the Commission that all parties and organizations affiliated with the Representative Democratic

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Council of southern Korea, an advisory body to the American Commander, were considered by it to be ineligible for consultation because of a statement of the acting Chairman of the Council, whom the Soviet delegation quoted as follows:

"After detailed discussion of Communique #5, we have decided that signing the declaration means cooperation with the American-Soviet Joint Commission in the matter of forming a Provisional Government and that after the government is formed we may express our opposition to trusteeship."

"The Soviet delegation made it clear that it was not prepared to consult with those parties, unless and until they renounced such views, despite the fact that they signed the declaration in Communique #5.

"Inasmuch as the new situation thus created by the Soviet delegation will inevitably involve considerable delay in forming a Provisional Government, in addition to the six weeks already devoted to this question, the American delegation suggested that pending clarification of the point, the Commission undertake to remove the 38 degree parallel boundary as an obstacle to the reunification of Korea. The Soviet delegation refused to consider this proposal. Since there was no other task that the Commission could undertake at this stage, the American delegation was left with no other alternative but to ask for the adjournment of the Commission. This was agreed to and the Commission adjourned on 6 May 1946, sine die pending clarification of the matter of consultation.

"In accordance with established democratic principles, the American Command in southern Korea has permitted complete freedom of expression for all elements of the political community to the limit consistent with military security. In the exercise of this right, political parties and leaders have been free to express their objections to the trusteeship clause, just as others have been free consistently and actively to criticize the policies of the American Command. To deny any democratic elements a voice in the formation of a Korean Government would mean penalizing them for expression of their views and denying them a right which has been enjoyed impartially by all parties and organizations in southern Korea since the American troops liberated it.

It is not the purpose of the American delegation to defend any school of political thought or to permit obstruction to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, nor is the American delegation defending the views of those who believe that trusteeship may unduly delay Korea's independence. However, it cannot and will not agree to any action by the Joint Commission which would deny over 100 Korean democratic parties and social organizations the right guaranteed by the Moscow Decision to participate in the formation of their own government simply because they have expressed, honestly and openly, their preference for immediate independence rather than for trusteeship. To agree to such an exclusion would not merely mean the elimination from political activity of all but a small group who have submitted to the prospect of trusteeship, but would violate the universally acknowledged right of all peoples to freedom of expression promised them in the Atlantic Charter.

It was to be expected that the Korean people would be bitterly disappointed over the breakdown of negotiations, and that this disappointment might take the form of mass demonstrations and perhaps some violence. General Hodge lost no time in cautioning (334)
the Korean people not to become unduly excited over the adjournment.

I take this opportunity to warn the Korean people against undue excitement over the temporary adjournment of the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission. It is to be expected that rumors and conjectures will be exciting and widespread. Most of them will be without foundation. The local radio will carry news on any new developments. The American delegation remains on duty at the Duk Soo Palace, ready to resume joint meetings on short notice. It is the intention of the United States to carry out the Moscow Decision to attain the sovereign independence of Korea. Cool, calm heads and calm behavior on the part of the Korean people will be the greatest assistance known for speeding the wheels of progress toward reestablishment of the Korean nation. Mud slinging, personal attacks, demonstrations and derogatory remarks about any of the Allied Powers or their representatives can only operate to hurt the cause of Korean Independence.

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Actually, civil disturbances were few and unimportant. There was an attempted demonstration in front of the Soviet Consulate which was promptly broken up by the civil police. Several other small outbreaks were reported throughout the city of Seoul. A number of posters appeared blaming the breakup on the Right Wing for opposing the Moscow Decision, upon the Representative Democratic Council, and upon the "racial traitors." (325) The general feeling was apparently one of cynical resignation to fate.

Even as the American Command cracked down on three rightist Seoul newspapers and several rightist political leaders for slander and libel against members of the Allied Nations, specifically, the Soviet Union, (326) the Soviet press unleashed a veritable propaganda barrage against the American stand in Korea, or, rather, what they conceived to be the American stand. On the evening of the same day on which this story of American action against the extreme Right Wing press was filed, an Izvestia story was broadcast from North Korea in which it was pointed out that the Soviet delegation regarded the Moscow Decision as an "integral document" and that the American delegation did not so regard it, it wished to annul paragraph 5 by consulting with" reactionary anti-democratic elements that had opposed the Decision." It was further contended that when the United States found it could not force these views upon the Soviet delegation it closed the meeting. (327)

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A more complete report of the Isvestia attack came from Moscow as reported by Brooks Atkinson. (328) Significant extracts appear below:

"The article said, '.....the Soviet delegation to the very last remained true to the decisions of the Moscow Conference...The Soviet delegation insisted that the Commission consult only those parties and public organizations that completely recognize and support the Moscow Decision...The American command not only strove to justify the action of reactionary parties and organizations, but also th encourage them in their struggle against the Moscow Decision to mislead the Korean people and to break up the ranks of genuine democratic parties and organizations...'

"The Soviet delegation finally proposed widening the consultation to all parties and organizations that had revised their opposition to the Moscow Decisions, although the Soviet delegation continued to insist that no undemocratic elements be admitted to the Provisional Government, Isvestia reported.

"But, according to the account, the Joint Commission could not agree on a list of the chief democratic parties and public organizations, even on the new basis.

"It declared that the 'American delegation presented a list of twenty democratic parties and public organizations in South Korea, which included only three democratic parties of the Democratic National Front, which unites the most progressive and genuinely democratic parties of South Korea.'

"The American delegation did not include such mass public organizations as the all-Korean Federation of Labor, with a membership of 600,000 trade unionists, the All-Korean Women's Federation with 800,000 members, the All-Korean Democratic Youth Federation with 650,000 members, the article declared.

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"When the work of the Joint Commission bogged down over the list of consultative parties, the American delegation proposed to postpone the question of consulting with parties and start discussions on the question of the liquidating of the zonal frontier and making an economic union of North and South Korea, according to the Izvestia report. But the Soviet delegation said that was a matter for the Koreans to decide."

Further embarrassment was caused the American command in South Korea by a United Press story appearing in the Korean press on 18 May, in which "official sources" were quoted as blaming Secretary Byrnes, General Hodge, [illegible] and the Russians for the break in the Commission negotiations. (329)

"A misinterpreted remark by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes after the Moscow foreign ministers' conference was blamed by some diplomats for setting off a chain of events which led eventually to collapse of American-Soviet negotiations over Korea.

"Many other factors including Russian insistence on excluding certain Korean groups from the provisional government, also contributed to collapse of the conference.

"However, observers stressed that the total blame cannot be placed on the Americans or the Russians.

"Much of the misunderstanding can be traced back to Byrnes statement which first hinted it might be possible to avoid trusteeship in Korea. Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, American commander in Korea, then used the statement to counteract Korean opposition to the Big Three decision for trusteeship. This resulted in Russian suspicion that the United States was trying to revise the Moscow Decision."

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The American Command urgently sought advice from Washington, D. C. On 18 May, General Hodge radioed, "as that [press stories given above] is causing considerable embarassement to me locally, request Washington immediate authority to deny official source of news." (330) And again on the 25th:

> "This official attribution of the two stories ...and their factual authoritative character have created strong impression in this command that they are officially inspired, perhaps to clear the atmosphere for resumption of Joint Commission talks on basis of mutual admission of unwarranted departure from Moscow decision provisions. If there is any ground for the impression that the two stories represent the American Government's current policy, it would be very helpful if this Command would be advised to future negotiations. If such is not the case, a strong restatement of the United States position made in Washington would be of assistance." (331)

At this point the matter rested. For all intents and purposes the Joint Commission had not only adjourned but had become nonexistent, and the Korean people held little hope for any agreements being reached between the two powers in the near future. In spite of various American approaches during ensuing months the Russians remained adament and immovable. The story of this effort to reactivate the Joint Commission is told in Section II Chapter 4, "Soviet-American Relations, Second Year."

Trouble on the 38th

A chronic irritation caused by a never ending series of border disputes and misunderstandings seemed inherent in the

division of the country at the 38th parallel. These incidents involved unauthorized air travel, unofficial repatriation of Japanese by the Russians through South Korea, and troop activities along the frontier. The frequency of these alterations made necessary a more accurate location of the 38th parallel at the points of interzonal travel. The matter was further complicated by restrictions imposed by reason of a summer cholera epidemic. These subjects are treated in following paragraphs in the order mentioned.

Repatriation:

For a full discussion of the repatriation of the 252,000 (332) Japanese from North Korea see Chapters XI and XII, Section I. However, it is of significance here to mention briefly the problems arising between the American and Soviet Commands on this count. As early as September 1945, the Japanese government expressed concern over the safety of Japanese nationals in North Korea. (333) In the latter part of September, a plan was being discussed whereby the Russians would evacuate Japanese from North Korea by rail through South Korea to Pusan, the rail equipment, fuel, and necessary food being supplied by the Russians. (334) By December, reports from several sources confirmed the suspicion that the Russians "were encouraging, if not compelling," Japanese in Northern Korea to cross the 38 degree boundary to the South--this, without American permission. (335)

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A plan for repatriation of Japanese from North Korea by sea was presented by the Russians at the January Soviet-American Joint Conference. In so doing, the Russians requested American ships. The Americans agreed, but on the condition that the Russians would accept those Koreans waiting in Japan for repatriation to their homes in North Korea. This brought a further Russian demand, namely, that these Korean repatriates be fed by the Americans until they reached their homes in North Korea. General Hodge termed the request as "unreasonable and not appreciative of our effort to help...with a strictly Soviet problem." The American delegates refused to accept the responsibility of feeding the repatriates past the port of debarkation. No agreement was forthcoming, and thus the matter was dropped from the agenda ~~with no decision having been reached~~. (see page 118) However, by spring General Hodge found it necessary to communicate with General Chistiakov regarding the number of both Japanese and Koreans coming south across the 38th. The General wrote in part, "It is requested that this matter be given early consideration and that your local commanders along the boundary be directed to confer with my local commanders nearby to reach some satisfactory working agreement which would be acceptable to both commands and in line with the procedure set forth in the agreement." (336)

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Likewise, illicit shipping from the North was on the increase. On this subject, General Hodge commented to the Soviet Command, "I request that you assist us by instituting at the source appropriate measures to help prevent the continuation of this unsanctioned traffic of refugees and thus, by our mutual efforts, insure control over a situation which unmarked, may well get out of control." (337) It was obvious by this time that the Russians were tacitly sanctioning travel South in order to alleviate for themselves the pressing problem created by the great influx of refugees from Manchuria and the necessity of repatriating Japanese nationals, not to mention the fact that the problem of the American Command would be made that much more acute through the swelling of the South Korean population and congestion of transportation lines.

Letters from the American Command grew more insistent that the Russians "institute appropriate measures to stop this illegal traffic" across the border. On 27 May, General Hodge wrote again, this time pointing out that during the first 20 days of May the traffic of unauthorized Korean refugees had decreased, but that of the Japanese had increased. From 1-21 May, a total of 22,715 Japanese had entered South Korea through the control areas of Haeichak, Kaesong, and Uijongbu. It was pointed out to the Soviet

Command that these figures were reliable, having been tabulated by American troops. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, was that these refugees were passing the Russian roadblocks. The General concluded, "Although I cannot fully verify the statements, many Japanese say that their movements South are coordinated by North Korean police.....I am fully aware of the difficulties of complete control of refugee flow by military commands. However, the average flow of over 2,200 Japanese per day for the last five days of the period covered appears to warrant further attention. I request that you take additional control measures to prevent the flow of Japanese refugees south of the 38 degree parallel." (538)

Actually, Lt. Col. Chojnacki, American liaison officer in Pyongyang, had reported earlier that he had personally observed cases of North Korean police aiding refugees in crossing the 38th parallel. (539)

Interrogation of Japanese refugees at the 38th by Americans revealed some interesting accounts. For instance, it was alleged that on 12 May, Soviet authorities in Hamhung published an order to the effect that there would be no more rations issued to the Japanese. A committee from Nippon Sewakai (Japanese Relief Society) appealed to the Soviet commander for permission to leave the city. Permission

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was not officially granted, but the Japanese representatives were told that if they fled there was nothing the Russians could do to stop them. On 23 May, the policy became even more frank and open and 2,500 Japanese left Hamhung on direct orders of the Soviet Commander. They were given a special train as far as the town of Ampen, situated a short distance south of Wonsan and near the 38th. (340)

In June and July, a marked drop occured in the number of Japanese refugees crossing into South Korea. On 17 June, General Hodge wrote to General Chistiakov in a somewhat different vein, "I take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the effectiveness and cooperative action taken by you to reduce the number of Japanese refugees moving into the American zone." (341) On the 28th of July, the American Command commented to SCAP that the cause for the drop was not known since no reply had been received from the Soviet Commander to two letters on the subject addressed to him by CG USAFIK. It was considered possible, however, that the Soviets were planning to regularize repatriation of Japanese by sea direct to the home islands. (342) At the same time CIC reported that since 1 June the Russians had tightened their coverage of the border, both through the use of Russian troops and North Korean police. However, the optimistic hopes of the American Command that the unwanted flow of Japanese would be brought

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to a permanent halt was but shortlived. On 30 July, General Hodge sent off another letter to the North reporting a rising tide of refugees crossing into South Korea. (343)

> "Since my letter of 19 July, 1766 refugees from your zone have been apprehended by my troops. From your 19 July letter it was my understanding that you had directed complete cessation of refugee movement between our zones. However, it is apparent that your border patrols are not effectively halting those persons traveling to the south. I request more positive measures be taken to stop the movement of refugees into my zone, and I assure you again that I am continuing every effort to prevent the movement to the North." (344)

And again on 5 August:

> "Illegal movement across the 38th parallel from North Korea is continuing despite my protest to you on 30 July. The apprehension of 1,938 refugees has taken place in the last 5 days. It is, therefore, evident that your patrols are not taking energetic measures.
>
> "In an effort to discourage and to stop Koreans and Japanese from crossing the 38th degree boundary, I issued instructions that refugees found actually crossing the boundary from the North be returned to the nearest Soviet outpost."

XXIV Corps G-2 reported on 14 August that the Japanese were being helped south by the Red Army, and that the major reasons for the Japanese migration were the difficulty of living and the fear of winter. (345) Between 14 and 18 August, inclusive, the daily average influx of Japanese from the North was about 1700, (346) and for the period 15-31 August, 3402 Japanese and 2264 Koreans arrived

from North Korea. Apparently the Soviets were taking no heed of General Hodge's protestations.(347) By the end of the first year, the American Command had repatriated something in the neighborhood of 222,356 Japanese civilians arriving illicitly from North of the 38th parallel, as well as admitted into South Korea, 689,850 North Koreans.(348)

Air Incidents

Typical of the strict interpretation of the delineation of the 38th parallel was the Russian irritation at any violation of the frontier by American aircraft. Perhaps it was Soviet security consciousness which lay behind the insistence that American air traffic, even that engaged in official liaison business, be kept to a minimum. For instance, in March 1946 clearance requested of the Russians for an American C-47, carrying important documents from the American Command, to land at Pyongyang. Upon first receiving the request General Shanin stated that the plane was too fast for the Pyongyang landing strip. This was countered with the statement that Russian fliers were using the same strip for operations with land-lease C-46's and C-47's. The next reason for turning down the request was that weather conditions would continue to be bad for several days, and a train could make the trip before the weather cleared to permit flying. This statement was countered

with the fact that flying was possible since the visibility and ceiling were adequate. The fact was stressed that the request to fly to Pyongyang would not have been made unless the American Commander had an important mission. Reconsideration was requested. General Shanin, the Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff in North Korea, then telephoned to the Commanding Officer, Red Air Force, at the landing strip. The Red Air Force reply was an emphatic "no". (349)

Border incidents involving air traffic took place in rapid succession. On 9 April a B-17 enroute to Okinawa from Kimpo was intercepted five miles south of Wonsan by Russian fighters, and was forced to land at Wonsan. The crew and passengers were well cared for, and the plane was permitted to proceed to Kimpo on 10 April, but under escort to the 38th by Russian fighters. (350) On 11 May a letter from General Chistiakov arrived in the American headquarters stating in part, "In my letter of September 25, 1945, I requested that you order your Air Force not to allow the violation of the demarcation line. However, there were cases of violation of the 38th parallel by American planes. (Five cases were cited, dating from 12 January to 10 May)...I request that you give necessary instructions to the pilots for the prevention of violation of the demarcation line." (351) Two days later General Hodge answered, "I have

issued strict orders on the subject to members of my command. I regret the incident and can assure you that I have and will continue to punish offenders who violate my orders. In order to assist me in enforcement, I request that any incidents of this nature be properly reported, giving not only type of plane, but any identifying marks, such as; special coloring, lettering, and numbers." (352)

This reply had hardly reached the Russian commander before another caustic letter was received by the American Command, this one sounding a rather threatening tone. Two additional violations were cited. The Soviet General concluded, "The reason for such frequent violations of the 38th demarkation line by your planes at various points is not clear to me. I am requesting you to warn and to take stricter measures than you have taken to date towards the violation of the 38th parallel, and to forbid any future violations of this demarkation line in order to prevent any serious incidents. I am asking you to inform me of the more realistic measures undertaken." (353) By way of reply, the American Command pointed out that the problem was aggravated by many new American pilots, heavy air traffic, and the many planes piloted by men who had never before been in the area. (354)

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This same harsh tone was taken again on 7 August by the Soviet Commander in protesting another violation of the 38th by American aircraft. This time it was a plane which, according to the Russians, had flown over Haeju and been forced down by Soviet pilots. General Shistiakov concluded, "Informing you of the premeditated incident, I am forced to register a protest and expect you do take measures which would eliminate any possibility of future repetition of similar cases. Please inform me of the measures taken by you."(335) What had actually happened was that on 5 August an American plane came in for a landing at Haeju under the misapprehension that it was the Kimpo airfield. When about to land the pilot realized his mistake, and immediately turned his plane southward. This had been reported to the Soviet Commander on 7 August.(336) In a 19 August letter these facts were pointed out to the Soviet general. In conclusion, General Hodge wrote, "I cannot accept your allegation that it was premeditated as previously stated. I regret the incident and assure you I will continue to do all in my power to prevent these occurrences."(337)

As was the case earlier in the year, the Russians again were caught in their own web. On 25 August, 8 Russian planes made an unauthorized landing at the Kimpo airfield. Plane and pilots were

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interned pending investigation. It was made known to the Soviet Command that General Hodge desired a request in writing for the release of the airplane and personnel and an explanation as to why the aircraft landed in the American zone without specific authority from the American Command. In the meantime, the Russians were notified that the plane and personnel would be detained until the receipt of the letter.(358) The Russian Command immediately came back with the report that the landing had been unintentional and was due to adverse weather conditions. The return of the plane and pilots was requested.(359) The matter had been given considerable publicity by the American Command, and shortly after the incident, SCAP released a statement from the two Soviet fliers that they had been "afforded every courtesy by the United States Air Force."(360)

On the Ground

Meanwhile, relations along the 38th on the ground remained relatively quiet throughout the winter and early spring, 1945-1946. Soon after that, however, "acts of depredation, thievery and attacks on civilians by Russian soldiers" increased and several incidents occurred which were potentially serious.(361) On 22 April, a patrol, consisting of two American soldiers and six Korean policemen, was investigating the alleged seizure of rice from Koreans by Russian soldiers in the vicinity of Mundong,(362) a village located well

south of the border. While the American patrol was investigating on foot, a Russian soldier attempted to drive off in its vehicle. The Korean policemen fired several rounds into the air over the Russian's head, who, by this time, had dropped his rifle, abandoned the vehicle and was fleeing. The American sergeant in charge of the patrol unsuccessfully attempted to restrain the Koreans from firing. The Russian was uninjured. The Soviet Commander charged that American soldiers had forcibly disarmed the Red soldier north of the boundary and requested return of the rifle. (363)

As a result of this incident, representation was made to General Chistiakov once more to fix definitely the location of the 38th parallel on the ground, either by a joint survey by engineers or by local tactical commanders. In addition, orders were issued that in the future, Korean police would not accompany United States troops on any border mission. The rifle was returned to the Soviets. (364)

On 16 April General Hodge addressed a communication to the Soviet Command on the subject of illegal encroachments by Soviet troops on American territory, pointing out that there existed a "recent increase in reported acts of depredation, thievery, and attacks on civilians by Russian soldiers south of the 38th parallel." He went on to say that he had originally hoped that some sort of "neutral zone could be maintained along the 38th, but that this

seemed to be impossible because of "intentional infringements" on the part of the Russians. General Hodge concluded by stating that he was reluctant to delineate the 38th parallel any more closely than necessary, but that if the Soviet command considered it necessary, the American Command would cooperate in fixing it exactly. (365)

A caustic reply to these charges came from the North. The Soviet General contended that the American letter contained no concrete facts, and further, that the Russian Command knew of no such cases. Shistiakov wrote in part, "Apparently the reports available to you on the given question do not correspond with reality...I am also, as you are, interested in having nothing effect the peaceful relationship between our countries, and, therefore, I am in agreement with your proposal to determine the position of the 38th parallel directly on the ground with special engineers and officers." He went on to say, "I will take all measures to increase the guard of the border along the 38th parallel and also request you, in order to avoid any sort of misunderstanding, also to give instructions to your troops to strengthen the guard on the 38th parallel, and to keep back and not allow to cross the border all Korean and Japanese citizens crossing the border without the decision of both commands." (366)

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The preliminary survey of the 38th is posted in the next section. In the meantime, the number of boundary disputes mounted, particularly those involving a question as to the precise location of the 38th parallel. The Russians seemingly were becoming increasingly security conscious. For instance, on 9 May 1946 the American Command sent a pilot train ahead of that carrying the returning members of the Soviet delegation on the American-Soviet Joint Commission, the purpose of the train being to insure the protection of the Russians from any attempts at sabotage. As the pilot train approached the 38th and stopped, it was forced by Red Army guards to continue north, even though the train was in American territory at the time. It was several hours before the train and its crew were allowed to return south. A letter from General Hodge on the subject to General Chistiakov elicited a reply to the effect that the pilot train was stopped north of the 38th, because the Russian control post had not been notified in advance. According to the Soviet commander, the American train commander was asked to continue to the next station for clarification and that he raised no objection to so doing. The Soviet General concluded, "I wish to express my deepest gratitude for concern shown by you in assuring the safety of the Soviet Delegation in its trip from Seoul to Pyongyang."(367)

On 28 May the American Command requested that an Agricultural Association truck, which had been driven across the

38th at Kaesong by mistake and detained by the Soviet outpost, be returned.(368) On 31 May, General Hodge received word from the Soviet general that an order had been issued for the return of the truck.(369) This incident is cited merely to give an indication of the petty infractions which were handled by the highest military echelon of each command.

On 17 May, the Russians reported by letter to General Hodge that boats from North Korea had been fired upon by American troops. It seems that a North Korean police boat had been pursuing a vessel which had departed illegally from the port of Yongdangpo, just north of the 38th. Both vessels were stopped by the Americans and detained. The Red General concluded, "The retention of the police motor boat shows that on the part of some of your patrols there exists a policy of non-cooperation with police measures connected with the guarding of the demarkation line. I am requesting you to give instructions to return these two impounded Korean motor boats with the policemen, and to give necessary instructions to your patrols to assist our posts and police patrols for the apprehension of violators of the demarkation line."(370)

The American version was slightly different, and the Russian general was so informed in a letter of 26 May. The United States guards had observed a 30-foot diesel motorboat traveling

north with a fishing boat in tow. It was intercepted and stopped without firing a shot. Both boats were considerably south of the 38th at the time. However, the American Command directed that the policemen be delivered, together with their launch, to the commander of the Soviet outpost at Yangdongpo on 1 June. The second vessel was released.(571)

Again, on 7 June 1946, a letter from the North arrived complaining about the "tactless behavior of officers and enlisted men of the American outpost stationed in the vicinity of Sinde," referring specifically, to an American attempt, on 5 June, to seize an anchored motorboat belonging to the North Korean police. The Americans were driven away, but on the following day they took possession of the boat and brought it to the American-held shore. General Shistiakov pointed out that the boat was north of the 38th parallel, and that the Americans did not respond to the signals of the Soviet patrol. He concluded thus, "I am informing you of this, and hope, that you will issue an order to investigate the incident and give instructions to your post to cease these unlawful actions which affect the normal relations between the two armies, and to return this motor boat captured by your post."(572) To this General Hodge apologized and ordered the boat returned.(573)

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The constant barrage of Russian charges relating to pinayune incidents along the border, all of which might well have been settled on a local level, was a source of constant irritation to the American Command. General Hodge was loath to retaliate in kind, but felt that the Soviets had set the pace. Moreover, investigations were time-consuming, and before an accurate letter could be written covering a given incident the matter frequently was so far outdated that the American authorities felt it best to drop the subject. Nevertheless, Soviet excursions into territory south of the 38th continued unabated.

On 5 June 1946, three South Korean policemen were captured by Russian soldiers south of the 38th, forced to march to the Soviet outpost, and jailed for the night. They were released the next day after being stripped of their personal belongings. On 13 June four Koreans were approached by five Red soldiers in the American-occupied zone and were robbed of their baggage. On 8 June, at the point of a gun, Russian soldiers stole two bulls from a Korean farmer living south of the 38th parallel. (374)

Meanwhile, letters from the North continued to arrive. For instance, on 3 July, General Chistiakov wrote as follows: "On 1st of July 1946 a Korean, Hwan Y Kak, engineer from the depot at Haeju, without permission took an engine, Number 4, out of the

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depot and at high speed crossed the 38th degree north parallel toward An'Ahn. I am requesting that you take necessary steps for returning the engine number 4 and take disciplinary action against the violator of the boundary line." (375)

This time, the American Command retaliated by protesting a Soviet violation, namely, a case of rape alleged to have been committed by two members of the Red Army on or about 20 June in Pyong Chong Dong (12 kilometers northeast of Kaesong and south of the 38th). Affidavits accompanied the letter. General Hodge concluded, "I must register a protest against such unwarranted and licentious conduct. It is requested that you take necessary action to prevent further occurrences of this nature and suggested that appropriate disciplinary action be taken." (376)

The most serious incident on the 38th, and one which later broke into public print via a highly inaccurate report by Drew Pearson, occurred on 1 July near Paekshon, a village lying only a short distance south of the 38th. On that day, the local Korean police reported to Company F, 32d Infantry, that one of their force had been beaten by Red soldiers in a nearby town slightly north of the 38. Thereupon, a small party of Americans and Koreans under the Command of 1st Lt. George D. Kirby, commanding officer of Company F, advanced north of the 38th parallel until challenged by a Soviet border guard. The

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party failed to stop, however, and the guard took to his heels. At this juncture one of the Americans commanded him to halt, the command being given in English. The guard did not do so, and one of the party fired into the ground at his feet. The Russian took shelter in a nearby house in which a number of other Russian soldiers were lodged. Fire was exchanged. Efforts were made by the American party to get the Russians to come out and talk things over but to no avail. In the meantime, a report of the situation was sent back to battalion headquarters. During the interim, a party of Red Soldiers began outflanking the American party. The Americans then withdrew. Shortly thereafter, battalion orders arrived directing the American group to leave the area.

This incident occasioned another exchange of letters between the two commands. On 12 July, General Chistiackov wrote, (578) saying in part:

> "Informing you of this incident and of the unworthy actions repeatedly occurring on the part of your individual officers and soldiers I evaluate this as a premeditated action directed toward the undermining of friendly relations between the Allied armies which have done so much for the common good of the world. I am deeply convinced that you will take severe measures towards the violators of the established order on the 38th parallel between our armies and will not allow a repetition of similar cases in the future; taking into consideration the preciseness and punctuality in which my sentries perform their duties. Please inform me of your decision and action taken."

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By 16 July, the American command had investigated the matter and reported to the Soviet commander that the officer responsible had been relieved of his command and severely disciplined, and that the battalion commander in the sector where the incident occurred had been replaced with a more experienced officer. General Hodge concluded: (579)

> "I regret the occurrence of this unfortunate incident, for which I offer my sincere apologies. I assure you such incidents are as distasteful to me as they are for you, and that I am taking positive action to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. It is my aim to insure that the most harmonious relations are maintained between my troops and the adjacent troops of your command."

The incident was once again momentarily the subject of discussion late in August when the SEOUL TIMES reported a Drew Pearson moment to the effect that American and Soviet soldiers had deliberately fired at each other in several days of skirmishing at the border. This brought an official denial, and with that the incident was finally closed. (580)

Late in July, the Soviet General objected to American soldiers posting signs north of the 38th reading, "This territory belongs to South Korea." The General used strong language, saying in part: (581)

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"The purpose of such behavior by an American officer is beyond my comprehension; it seems as if he desired to create an incident between my posts and the posts of the American Army. I do not think this officer was guided by orders from higher commanders. In my last letter I requested that you not allow violation, for the purpose of preventing incidents which might break out between my control posts which are operating on the demarkation line."

The American Command replied that the patrol posting the sign had discovered their error and on 25 July had removed it. (382)

A common American complaint concerned the frequent forays by Soviet soldiers south of the 38th in search of food. For instance, on 20 August 1946 the Russian general was informed about such forays near three villages lying along the 38th. General Hodge wrote, "I urgently request that you take necessary measures to prevent your troops from molesting the populace in the immediate vicinity south of the 38 degree parallel." (383) Another such incident was made known to the Russian commander on the same date. In this case on 30 July, seven Koreans carrying their weekly rice ration encountered Soviet soldiers south of the 38th parallel at Hapung-ni. The soldiers directed the group to proceed north into Russian territory. Several nearby townspeople were informed of the act, overtook the group, and pleaded with the Soviet soldiers, whereupon the spokesman for the Koreans was shot and killed by one of the Russians. As of 20 August the captured rice and the seven Koreans were still being held north of the 38th. The American command requested immediate

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return of the Koreans and the rice.(384)

In a letter to the Soviet commander on 29 August, General Hodge requested that American forces be permitted to use a road in the Russian zone, which ran from Chujon-ni along the north bank of the Choyang-gang River to Pupyong-ni. The purpose of this request was to facilitate the supply of the United States outpost at Pupyong-ni. The supply route then in use had a total map distance of 44 miles as against only 19 miles if the proposed route were made available. An arrangement was desired similar to that agreed upon with the Russians for the supply of American troops in the Ongjin peninsula.(385) After considerable delay, the Soviets gave a negative answer on 14 October, stating that a route was available in the American zone and that movements through Soviet territory would inconvenience the Soviet Command.(386) XXIV Corps G-2 commented at the time that this decision was "in line with the recent change in Russian attitude toward contact with Americans on the boundary and their recently revitalized security campaign."(387)

Preliminary Survey of the 38th

It was evident all during this time that at the root of many of these altercations along the 38th lay the lack of any mutual agreement as to the exact location of the 38th. The American

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Command initially took the attitude that exact demarkation would be unwise for it would tend to emphasize the division of Korea and, in the public mind, give rise to a suspicion that the partition was to be permanent. As indicated previously, General Hodge originally had envisioned a sort of neutral zone along the 38th, with informal relations being maintained between Soviet and American commanders on the ground for the settlement of any local differences. However, the Russians set the pace and soon established a tight border control with their outposts in several places being south of the 38th. Apparently, the Russian and American maps did not agree as to the exact location of the 38th parallel.(388) For example, a dispute arose in November 1945 between the two commands as to whether the port of Kongdongpo lay north or south of the 38th parallel. On American maps it was clearly shown to be a short distance south. However, rather than make an issue of it, American forces gave way to Soviet insistence and withdrew from the town. As a result of this incident, a letter was drafted to the Soviet command pointing out the differences in the maps being used by the two forces and requesting that a joint survey of the 38th be undertaken.(389) However, it was not sent.

Soon thereafter, while the Joint Conference was in session in Seoul, General Hodge proposed to General Shtikov that the boundary be readjusted along political lines instead of the arbitrary division at the 38th.(390) The American proposal called for:

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1) All of Hwanghae-do province to be within the Soviet zone.
2) All of Kyonggi-do province to be within the United States zone.
3) Kangwon-do province to be divided by guns (equivalent to a county in the United States) as follows:

   a. To be under Soviet control; Tongchon, Pyongyang, Chorwon, Koseng, Inje, Hoeyang, Ichon, Kumhwa, Yangju, Yangyang.

   b. To be under American control; Hwachon, Hongchon, Pyongchang, Samchok, Chongson, Chunchon, Hoengsong, Kanghung, Wijin, Yongwol

This proposal was transmitted to General Chistiakov but was never specifically answered. (See page 134)

By mid-April 1946, American patience was worn thin by the recent increase in reported misbehavior of Russian soldiers south of the 38th parallel. On the 16th of that month, General Hodge communicated with the Soviet Commander and, after expressing reluctance for "delineation of the 38th any more closely than necessary", wrote, "However, if you consider it necessary, we will cooperate in fixing it exactly." (391) Later that same month, April, it was learned that the Soviet Command had no objection to establishing a definite demarkation line. (392) General Chistiakov suggested to Lt. Col. Walter F. Choinski, the American liaison officer in Pyongyang, that the matter be settled on the ground by him and Major Kmuikov, the Soviet liaison officer in Pyongyang. (393)

By 18 May the so-called preliminary survey of the 38th parallel had been completed. The twenty-one control points along the border were numbered consecutively from west to east, starting with the Ongjin area. The method used in establishing the points was a simple one. In each case the survey party proceeded to the area along a road which the parallel presumably crossed. The topographers then took over, and using 1:50,000 Japanese source maps, ground forms, and rough measurements, located a spot on the ground agreeable to both parties as being approximately the 38th degree parallel. A stake was then driven bearing the following markings in English and Russian: "38° N temporary, ВРЕ МЕННО". Then the existing Russian and American outposts were spotted on the ground and on the map, and the necessary orders for (394) advances or withdrawals were issued to the local commanders. It was the mutual understanding of all members of the preliminary survey party and the local commanders that changes made or recommended were subject to approval of the Commanding General, 25th Soviet Army, and the Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

Members of the Joint Survey Party consisted of Major U. A. Torbin (personal representative of the Commanding General, 25th Soviet Army and in command of the Soviet members), Major N. I. Simirigin (Soviet engineer member), Sr. Lt. Gergel

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(representative of the Soviet tactical command), Lt. Col. Walter F. Choinski (personal representative of General Hodge and in command of the American members), Lt. Col. Norman Farrell (representative of American tactical commander), and Captain Francis M. Knezovitch (American engineer member).(395)

As a result of this preliminary survey of key points along the 38th, it was found that eleven Russian road blocks were south of the line. Of these, five were immediately moved north, two were dropped altogether, and two were allowed to remain because they were fairly permanent installations. The others were to be adjusted later. Only one American outpost was found north of the line. It was further reported by Lt. Col. Choinski, that the Russians were "most cooperative and friendly." XXIV Corps G-3 commented on 3 June 1946 that the American Command currently was not contemplating a more detailed survey.(396)

All military personnel and retainers of the American forces who might have occasion to travel in the vicinity of the 38th parallel were directed to contact the nearest 7th Division unit for the exact location of the boundary and to use only well-defined highways and other routes of communication.(397) The 32d Infantry Regiment was directed to post signs in every south Korean village within 800 yards of the 38th parallel and in such other communities as were deemed

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necessary by the battalion commanders. Such signs were to be written in Russian, English, and Korean, and to read, "This area is south of the 38° parallel and is in the American occupation zone." The location of the particular villages, split by the 38th parallel, was to be decided by conference with the appropriate corresponding Soviet commander. (398)

All of this seemingly would have settled most of the misunderstandings arising along the 38th, but such was not to be the case. By 14 June 1946 it was reported that the Russians had moved the border markers south of the parallel in three places from the location agreed upon by the Joint Survey party. (399) Again on 5 July, General Hodge objected to General Chistiakov as to the placing of a border marker by Soviet forces two kilometers south of the village of Hwanjang-ni (Kajo), shown of the maps used by the Joint Survey party as being south of the border. Corrective action was requested. (400)

By 10th July the American Command again had communicated with the Russians in the North. General Hodge pointed out that since the setting up of markers along the 38th, several incidents had occurred which indicated the desirability of further delineation of the line on the ground. By reason of the fact that the May survey had resulted in the virtual elimination of incidents at certain

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critical localities, the belief was expressed that further delineation of the line might eliminate all difficulties of that nature. Therefore, it was requested that an accurate survey be made as early as possible by a Joint U. S. - Soviet Survey Party. It was further suggested that a preliminary conference be held on 18 July. Lt.Col. Walter F. Choinski, Lt. Col. Norman Farrell, Major James W. Free, and Captain Francis R. Knezovitch were designated as American nominees for the proposed party. (401) An early reply to the proposal was requested. As the year ended no definite answer had been received from the Soviet Command to this request (402) other than a telephone call from the Russian Commander on 15 July requesting that the permanent survey be postponed until the cholera epidemic in North Korea was over. (403)

Health Restrictions

There was considerable suspicion on the part of the American Command that the Russians made use of a fever plague outbreak in the spring and the tragic cholera epidemic of the summer months as excuses to limit further intercourse between the two zones.

For instance, there was the matter of the press. In February 1946 the Soviet Foreign Office, through SCAP, requested clearance for a Mr. Anatoli Vershowski, a representative of the TASS news agency, to visit Southern Korea. General Hodge replied directly to General Shistiakov saying that clearance would be gladly given

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and it was a splendid idea to permit correspondents to visit each other's territory on a basis of enjoying similar privileges." With this, the General proposed the names of Richard Johnston (NEW YORK TIMES), Relmer Hoyt (UNITED PRESS), and Morris Lanzberger (ASSOCIATED PRESS) for an excursion into North Korea. The American commander concluded, "I recommend that these correspondents be accorded the privileges of unrestricted travel throughout all of your territory, and freedom of censorship. In return, I shall be delighted to accord Mr. Varshowski and others in equal numbers similar privileges."(404)

By April no answer was forthcoming from the North relative to this American proposal, and the request was reinitiated by General Hodge.(405) Still no reply, and the request was repeated a third time on 20 June, this time accompanied by a letter from the correspondents involved specifying that "the purpose of the visit would be to inform the Allied peoples of the world of the conditions and progress of the Soviet occupation of Korea."(406) Finally, on 22 July, a terse reply came from the Soviet Command citing the cholera danger as the reason why permission could not be granted for the proposed press visit to North Korea.(407)

All during the period of the cholera epidemic, which started in the South Korean port of Pusan, the Soviet Command indicated

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great alarm about its possible spread into North Korea. On 5 May the Soviet commander wrote that as yet there were no cases in North Korea, but it was considered necessary that the American command strengthen its guard on the 38th parallel. The Russians reported that they had already done so. It was also specified that during the peak of the epidemic it was essential that motor transport be stopped to the city of Ongjin via the Seoul-Haeju highway, thus in effect threatening the former agreement allowing the Americans to use this route. (406) (See page 25)

By July 1946 the cholera epidemic was at its worst in North Korea, and General Chistiakov requested tighter border control on the part of the American forces to control its spread. The Americans increased the number of patrols along the border, so as to minimize both north-and south-bound traffic across the frontier, and so informed the Soviet command. (409)

The Russians continued to criticize American border control, the emphasis being on the danger of cholera. On 18 July, General Chistiakov wrote that several boats had arrived from South Korea with cholera victims aboard and specified that as the source of infection in North Korea. More effective border control was requested of the Americans, particularly on movements to North Korea by the sea route. (410)

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The matter was closed with an American reply, in which General Hodge informed the Soviet command, "Please be assured that I am making every effort to prevent the movement of persons by land or by water from my zone to yours. For your information, the overall situation with respect to cholera in my zone is considerably improved."(411)

In early August 1946, XXIV Corps G-2 commented on the situation as follows: "Using the cholera epidemic as an excuse for placing more restrictions upon U.S. - Russian cooperation, the Soviet iron curtain across the 38th parallel was drawn tighter. All correspondence from the Soviet Commander implied 'keep out'." This excuse was given not only to exclude foreign news correspondents and to postpone a permanent survey of the 38th parallel, but also to interrupt the weekly mail exchanges which had been agreed upon at the Joint Conference.(412)

Suffice to say here that the period ended with American and Soviet border patrols keeping their distance in silence. There was none of the easy informality of the first days of the occupation, and the most trivial differences became matters of concern for the highest echelons of military command.

Further Economic Negotiations

It was apparent after the breakdown of the Joint Commission on 6 May 1946 that there was no hope for the political unification of

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Korea during the immediate future. Earlier, in January and February, the failure of the Joint Conference to open normal commercial relations between the two sections of the country deemed economic negotiations to the petty state of bickering over individual shipments of specified commodities. That the American Command was able to effect any exchanges with the Soviets at all was a notable achievement. These negotiations of an economic nature largely had to do with fertilizer, chemicals, electrical power, water, transportation, mail, UNNRA, and reparations. In treatment, this sequence will be followed.

Fertilizer

In February 1946, General Hodge sent a communication north expressing regret that the conference had been unable to come to any agreement on the exchange of goods between North and South Korea. It was pointed out that because fertilizer was so important for future food production in South Korea, the American Command wished to negotiate for its delivery from North Korea. The farmers in the American zone would need large quantities of fertilizer in March, if anything like a normal rice harvest were to be expected, wrote General Hodge. (413) In the meantime, Mr. Benninghoff suggested that the State Department might wish to instruct Embassy Moscow to back up this proposal with representations on an inter-governmental

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Embassy Moscow to back up this proposal with representations on an inter-governmental level to the Soviet Foreign Office.(414)

Soon thereafter, General Chistiakov notified the American commander that on his part he presumed "that the negotiations would bring practical results," if it was guaranteed that in return for fertilizer North Korea would get southern foodstuff (i.e., rice). If this provision were not, the Soviet General indicated willingness to carry on negotiations.(415) At this juncture, the Soviet Command received notice that no rice was available in South Korea, but that authority was being requested to make available United States dollars for the purchase. The fertilizer needs were specified as being 300,000 tons of ammonium sulphate and 285,000 tons of calcium superphosphate.(416)

By mid-March the Soviet Command indicated that fertilizer was not available in the quantities requested, but that it probably could be furnished in the following amounts: 20,000 tons in March; 30,000 tons in April; and 30,000 tons monthly thereafter. It was recommended that it be moved by ship, rather than by rail.(417)

By this time, the American Command had received word that the War Department had authorized payment in American dollars for the fertilizer if found necessary to satisfy the needs of South Korean farmers.(418) On 22 March General Hodge informed the Soviet Command that he was

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delighted to learn that fertilizer could be supplied and that payment could be made by deposit of United States dollars in New York. (419) Further details of the shipment were requested. Because of the urgency of the fertilizer requirements in the South for starting new rice beds, the following offer was made to the Russians: ammonium sulphate, $25 per metric ton; calcium superphosphate (16%), $20 per metric ton. These prices were for the fertilizer as loaded aboard American ships at Hamhung. (420) There was considerable delay in securing a Soviet answer to this offer. It was felt that the explanation for the delay was that the Russians were stumped by the suggested method of payment (i.e. payment in dollars to the credit of the North Korean government) and that they had had to radio Moscow for an answer. It was further intimated that since the Soviet Union had appropriated Korean wealth in some cases, it would have preferred that the dollars be paid to the Soviet Union. (421) On 7 April, the American liaison officer in Pyongyang, Lt. Col. Choinski, telephoned that he believed the Russians were "stalling" and that he had made himself "somewhat disagreeable" by pushing them for an answer. As a result, he commented that Generals Chanin and Chistiakov would not see him for further discussion of the subject, but were going to give the answer in writing. (422) However, the next day, Lt. Col. Choinski reported that the Russians were having trouble at the Kanko

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fertilizer plant, the plant's engineer having departed suddenly for points South. (425) Later, in another conversation with General Shanin, the American liaison officer learned that the Konko plant had not begun operation until about 30 March end, although it had had a large stockpile of fertilizer, the supply on hand had been distributed to North Korean farmers. (424)

By the latter part of April, information arrived from Washington to the effect that the War Department currently was of the opinion that utilization of United States dollars for procurement of fertilizer from North Korea would be unsatisfactory. At the same time it was suggested that in negotiations for procurement of any commodities either Russian-Korean yen be used, which could eventually be charged as an occupation cost through an American account; or, an account should be established for the delivery of fertilizer, the same to be considered as a portion of the future inter-governmental settlements between the two zones. (425)

With no apparent progress toward the completion of the negotiations taking place, the American Command in early May considered the fertilizer situation to be critical. On 2 May 1946 General Hodge radioed as follows: (426)

> "Offers of Korean yen for fertilizer and other goods have been made without success. At the US-USSR conference in January the Soviets took the position that exports must produce immediately accessible imports.

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"It is not possible for this command to negotiate a barter transaction to obtain fertilizer in time for this season's use. Dollars represent the only means by which fertilizers can be readily obtained. This Command abandoned difficult barter negotiations on fertilizer when authorized to offer dollars in your radio W97706-700 (See page 248). In accordance with our TFDO 1825 (in which CG USAFIK notified CINCAFPAC of offer of payment in US dollars), dollar offer to Soviet has been made to 31 July 1946 when hope of 1946 crop benefits will end. We have no reason to believe USSR will demand dollars for any North Korean products for which we are able to barter accessible goods. If War Department funds are definitely not available, request immediate advice and assistance on action to be taken in view of present commitment to USSR to supply dollars and in view of critical importance of fertilizer to food position next winter and failure thus far to procure any elsewhere."

Soon after this, on 7 May, to the further embarrassment of the American Command the Soviets agreed to furnish the fertilizer at the agreed price, payment to be in cash. (427) This implied payment in American dollars to the credit of the North Korean government in a New York bank as originally proposed. On 16 May, General Hodge informed the Soviet Command that delivery would be accepted even though the price was considered to be high. It was further specified that deliveries after 31 July would not be desired since it could not benefit the then current crop. Preference for delivery to American ships at Seikoshin rather than at Kanko was indicated. (428) On 20 May, General Chistiakov was informed that the American Command was prepared to send three LST's, manned by Japanese crews with an American officer in charge, to Seikoshin. Information as to dates,

the amount of cargo, and navigation was requested. General Hodge concluded, "I wish to thank you for your cooperation in securing this critically needed commodity for South Korea." (429) By 28 May, the Russians had replied that the LST's might arrive at the port on 30 or 31 May, and that the estimated amount of fertilizer available would be 6,000 tons. (430) Navigational instructions were included.

However, the American ships were delayed and did not sail for North Korea on the expected dates. Lt. Col. Cheinski was requested on 31 May to inform General Chistiakov that the departure of the ships was delayed pending completion of satisfactory arrangements for the payment of this fertilizer. (431) Three days later the Russians were told of the reason for the delay and the uncertainty on the part of the American Command, namely, the withdrawal of the authorization to spend American dollars for South Korean needs. General Hodge wrote further: (432).

> "The need for fertilizer still exists, and we desire to send for it at the earliest date possible...I request, therefore, that you let me take immediate delivery of the fertilizer offered in your 7 May letter beginning with 6,000 metric tons at Seikoshin. We are prepared to pay for this fertilizer in Korean yen, at prices to be determined by negotiations or we will pay by exchange of goods needed in North Korea in accordance with their availibility in South Korea.
>
> "Please inform me of your decision at an early date. I am holding ships prepared to move on short notice to begin loading."

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The payment for fertilizer in Korean yen apparently was not acceptable to the Soviet Command, but a tentative acceptance of payment in commodities was expressed. In conference with Lt. Col. Chojnski, General Shanin, stated on behalf of General Shistiakov that North Korea needed practically everything; and, therefore, it was suggested that the American Command submit a list of everything available in South Korea for exchange purposes, together with the unit prices. The Soviet General commented that in a day's time the matter could be settled.(433) In the meantime, General Hodge notified the Soviets that he was willing to pay at the rate of sixteen yen to one American dollar and that the prices stated on 7 May by the Russians were acceptable. He further specified that the money could be paid at Seikoshin upon delivery of the fertilizer. He concluded, "In view of the necessity of this fertilizer beginning at once if it is to be used for this season's crop, I will greatly appreciate an early and favorable reply."(434) By this time, the American Command was beginning to feel the desperate nature of the situation. On 9 June, General Hodge radioed SCAP as follows:(435)

> "This Command has exhausted every available means of negotiation with the Soviets and is not able to secure delivery of any fertilizer from North Korea. 6,000 tons

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are available for shipment near Wonsan with an additional 34,000 tons said to be available before deadline for use is past. I feel sure that higher echelons must be aware of the urgent need for fertilizer in South Korea within the next few weeks if the 1946 rice crop is to be anything near normal, and if South Korea is to be kept off the needy list for food in 1946. Although the amounts mentioned are only a part of our essential needs, they would go a long way toward raising the morale and inspiring more effort on the part of the South Korean farmer who hears that his northern brother is well supplied. Am asking UNRRA for aid but have no idea of the answer. Request information concerning any other fertilizer that can be made available to us or any other possible offer I can make to the Soviet Commander beyond unacceptable meager resources available to me here. If no fertilizer can be made available, request that long range quantities of cereal foods support the American effort in South Korea.

On 16 June 1946 General Hodge communicated with the Soviet headquarters offering to trade certain equipment and materials coming to an approximate value of $500,000 for 6,000 metric tons of fertilizer, the value of which was specified as about $192,000. Permission to (456) take immediate delivery of the fertilizer was requested.

It was not until 12 August, well past the deadline set by the American Command, that a Russian answer was forthcoming, and then it was a negative one: the materials offered in exchange for the fertilizer were not needed in North Korea. It seemed as though the delay were a deliberate one. A counter proposal by the Russians called for payment for the $192,000 worth of fertilizer in fuel and spare parts. A list of these parts and fuel desired

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was forwarded. It included 21,000 tons of gasoline, 1,000 tons of kerosene, and 100 tons of machine oil. In addition, the American Command was informed that rice would be received as full or partial payment instead of the fuel or spare parts if the Americans so desired.(457) The American Command notified the Russians that it had available for shipment 243 tons of transformer oil and 26,000 pounds of cotton yarn.(458) Silence on the part of the Soviet Command indicated disapproval of this offer, and there the matter rested. The full effect of the lack of fertilizer was felt the following year and with disastrous results for South Korea.

Chemicals

It will be remembered that in the fall of 1945, negotiations had commenced with the Russians for the purchase of chemicals for water purification purposes, namely chlorine, aluminum sulphate and calcium hypochloride. One shipment of some 25 metric tons of aluminum sulphate and 9 metric tons of calcium hypochloride actually had been received by the American Command on 23 December 1945, and future shipments had been promised. (See above, pages: 53-54)

On 21 January 1946, a further shipment of ammonium sulphate, clorine powder, and liquid chlorine arrived, followed by similar shipments in April and May. In the interim, negotiations continued over the price and method of payment. The monthly

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requirement of chlorine for South Korea was estimated to be 6 tons.(439) On 15 March the American command was notified that chorine could be furnished at the rate of 4 tons by 30 March, and 6 tons monthly thereafter.(440) In exchange, South Korea was prepared to ship cotton yarn.(441) At the suggestion of the Russians further discussion of the prices was postponed until the chemicals were ready for shipment.(442) Actually, however, shipments of liquid chlorine were received in Seoul on 23 April, and it was not until 5 May that General Chistiakov expressed his desire to establish the prices as of 15 August 1945. The price of chlorine was quoted by the Russians as 479 yen per pound and yarn at 1.36 yen per English pound.(443) These prices were accepted by the American Command, and on 28 May the Soviets were notified that a shipment of 2,000 pounds of yarn could be made at once. It was proposed that 1,000 pounds of yarn be exchanged for 6,000 kilograms (13,227.6 pounds).(444) Silence was the only answer from the North on the subject. On 27 June 1946 the Soviet Command was informed that immediate shipment to the North of chlorine cylinders for recharging had been ordered, and that at the same time some 2,000 pounds of yarn would be shipped. General Hodge commented, "The

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relative values of chlorine and yarn are still undecided, but I believe shipments can be exchanged to our mutual benefit without delaying for such a decision." (445)

However, the last shipment of chlorine to arrive in the South was received on 19 May. By August it had been learned that the exchange rate suggested by the Americans (1,000 pounds of cotton yarn for 6,000 kilograms of chlorine) was not acceptable to the Russians. It seemed as though they would stick to their original prices without yielding, even at the expense of permitting negotiations to be broken off and thereby losing the cotton yarn which they needed so badly. (446) At these August 1945 prices, however, the Russians expressed willingness to ship monthly 6,000 kilograms of chlorine. (447)

By this time, 32,642 pounds of chlorine had been received in South Korea, according to American reports, and 4,000 pounds of yarn had been shipped to the North. (448) These figures were quickly refuted by the Soviets, however, by pointing out that American calculations did not include December and January shipments. The American liaison officer at Pyongyang reported that the Soviet Command was ready to accept all the cotton yarn that South Korea could furnish up to two million English pounds a year at the prices specified. It was learned that a similar amount had been requested by the Soviets from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Local

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UNRRA authorities were quickly informed that cotton yarn was a barter item for South Korea, and that if it were furnished by UNRRA, the American bartering position would be considerably weakened. (449) (450)

The Russian version of the account appears below:

	Date Shipped	Amount in metric tons	Price per ton	Shipment Cost
Ammonium sulphate	25/12/45	25	¥ 588	¥ 14,625
	21/1 /46	30	585	17,550
Chlorine powder	21/1 /46	25.47	220	5,603
	25/12/45	8.7	220	1,914
Liquid chlorine	21/1 /46	1	479	479
	25/4 /46	2	479	958
	25/4 /46	3.3	479	1,580
	17/5 /46	12	479	5,748

The Russian prices from which they would not deviate were 479 yen per metric ton of liquid chlorine and 1.46 yen per English pound of cotton yarn as contrasted to the American prices of 580 yen and 1.818 yen, respectively, for the same unit measures. The Soviets, at their own price, credited the United States with 4,000 pounds of yarn, resulting in a balance of 42,718.10 yen outstanding against the United States. (451)

On the last day of August the American Command asked for resumption of the liquid chlorine shipments at the rate of at least 6 tons per month, but here the matter stood as the first year of occupation ended. (452)

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Electrical power

With a few minor exceptions the source of Korean electric power lies in the northern sector of the country. It was thought, however, that the city of Seoul could provide up to over 90 percent of her electrical requirements through local or Military Government controlled plants. (453) Even so, there was no doubt but what the throwing of switches by the Soviets could pretty well paralyze South Korea. Power continued to flow southward across the 38th without any significant interruption all during the first year of occupation. This fact, need not imply any agreement with the Russians, as to price or payment, for, in fact, none was reached.

The matter of the electrical power supply first came under discussion at the Joint Conference of January and February 1946, and then only briefly. When the American delegation refused to guarantee the delivery of rice to North Korea, the Soviets demanded that a number of topics be stricken from the agenda, including electrical power. On 3 March, General Chistiakov wrote to General Hodge, pointing out that during the period from 15 August 1945 to 28 February 1946 the power stations of North Korea had supplied to South Korea some 220 million kilowatt hours of power. The indebtedness as of 1 March 1946, figured at the 1 August 1945 rate of 2.9 sen per kwh, totaled 6,534,000 yen.

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according to the Soviet General. He went on to ask that the bill be settled in the form of deliveries of rice, spare parts, and materials at August 1945 prices. He concluded, "unless the indebtedness for power is settled, the Soviet military Command is unable to guarantee further regular delivery of electric power." (454) This last was nothing but a thinly veiled threat, and the American Command was badly worried. General Hodge quickly parried with a counter proposal. The amount of power supplied to the South was admitted. However, against these charges for power, it was contended, there should be credited the cost incurred by South Korea for the operation and maintenance of transmission lines in the South, and the funds confiscated by the Soviets in northern branch offices of the Korea Electric Company, the head office of which was in Seoul. According to American calculations, the costs were considerably in excess of the cost of power furnished to South Korea to that date. General Hodge suggested that the cost of electricity from the North simply be charged against these credits. (455) It was not until July that the Soviet answer arrived. In essence, it was the Russian contention that the American financial calculations could not be recognized as being correct. Nor was there any more foundation

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to the American claim that South Korea should be reimbursed for the Southern Korean Electric funds in the Soviet zone than there would be for North Korea to claim reimbursement for funds of firms which, similarly, had branch offices in South Korea up to the time of the entry of the United States forces. In addition, it was stated "that the question of payment for electrical energy is a question of recent, mutual furnishing of supplies in the form of exchange of goods between North and South Korea and is not connected with the question of mutual claims to the ownership of the capital of different companies." However, the Russian General went on to say that compensation for expenses of transmission of electric energy from the 38th parallel to other points, was acceptable to him. The total American indebtedness as of 1 June 1946 for electric power from the North was thus calculated to be 11,412,000 yen. The letter concluded by pointing out that North Korea was still supplying the South with electrical power, regardless of the fact that the American Command had taken no steps toward for payment, and that this injury to the financial status of the power companies was causing a deterioration of their work which ultimately would result in difficulties in transmitting a normal supply to South Korea. (426)

In the latter part of July 1946, General Hodge suggested that "in accordance with item 15 of the jointly approved agreements

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of the January conference, [See page 121] I suggest that a board of Russian experts, especially chosen for this purpose, meet with a similar board of American experts in order to reach a reasonable solution." (457) No answer was forthcoming by the end of the period, but fortunately power continued to flow southward across the border.

Water

In a few areas along the 38th difficulties arose over securing adequate water for irrigation and municipal systems whose source of supply lay north of the frontier. For instance, the water supply for the town of Kaesong was obtained from a reservoir lying north of the 38th. On 25 April 1946 the American Command requested that the Soviet authorities prohibit local residents from entering the area contained within the watershed. (458) A Russian answer was returned with amazing rapidity informing the Americans that all necessary measures had been taken to establish a permanent guard on the watershed beginning 2 May. (459)

Another matter was the irrigation project in Yon Baik Gun in Hwanghae-do province. The reservoirs serving that area lay north of the 38th. In late spring of 1946, at a critical time in the rice cycle, the water was turned off. The American Command immediately protested, General Hodge saying in part, "I am sure

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that you understand this and that you desire as I do to maximize Korea's rice production. Therefore, I feel sure that you will want to take the earliest opportunity to investigate the matter. I request that the traditional water service in Yon Baik Gun be resumed as soon as possible." (460) On 14 June, General Shanin commented to the American liaison officer that South Korea wanted everything but was not paying for anything, and that payment for the water was expected. (461) On 19 June 1946 it was learned that the water had been released, apparently without concern for payment. (462)

Transportation

It will be remembered that at the Joint Soviet-American Conference in January and February 1946 it had been mutually agreed to establish movement by rail, truck and coastwise transport between the two zones and that a technical Joint Transportation Commission made up of three members from each zone was to coordinate all problems. This commission was to meet at least once a month, alternating between Seoul and Pyongyang. (See above, pages 129-130) General Hodge sent a follow-up letter on 24 April urging the Soviet Command to participate in such meetings, but no answer was forthcoming on the subject.

During the late spring and summer of 1946 considerable Russian shipping was reported along the coast of South Korea. On 30 August, XXIV Corps G-2 noted that some eight Russian vessels had been sighted

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recently, presumably enroute from Vladivostok to Dairen. However, when contacted in coastal waters of South Korea, the masters of these ships offered rather flimsy excuses for their presence. Military, civilian, and naval personnel were found aboard. G-2 considered it remotely possible that the vessels were engaged in smuggling arms into South Korea.(463) In one case, a Russian ship apparently had gone aground off the island of Cheju-do. An American officer was first refused permission to board the ship for inspection.(464) The next day he returned and boarded, but found nothing suspicious.(465) Shortly thereafter, two other Russian vessels approached the same position and continued to move back and forth about four miles offshore. A military police patrol boat from Cheju was sent out to investigate, but both Russian vessels fled at the approach of the American craft. Subsequently, the two ships remained at such a distance that no positive identification could be made.(466)

On 20 July 1946, still another Soviet vessel was found in the area, anchored close off the coast of Cheju-do. The skipper reported that she had run into a storm while rounding the southern tip of Korea, during which all her food had been washed overboard. Rations were supplied to the ship, but the American Command viewed her presence with suspicion.(467) On 25 July an American guard on Cheju-do reported the approach of unidentified submarines,(468)

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possibly Russian. In this connection, it should be noted that the island of Cheju-do has been the most solidly organized stronghold of extreme Leftists in South Korea.(469) Although direct evidence is lacking, it is possible that the personnel aboard the Russian ships sought to establish contact with the Communists in Cheju-do.

Mail

In the Joint Conference the exchange of mail between the two zones was agreed upon, and this was one of the few agreements reached which actually was implemented. On 15 March 1946 the mail exchanges began, at the town of Kaesong situated just south of the 38th. Taking place first at irregular intervals, mail exchanges were put on a weekly basis with a 5 May concurrence by General Chistiakov to an American proposal on the subject.(470) XXIV Corps G-2 commented at the time that "mail exchanges, although a relatively minor matter, are outstanding inasmuch as they have proceeded smoothly and satisfactorily, and represent the highest state of accord yet reached between the two commands."(471)

In the early summer of 1946 the American Command announced that it would accept mail from the United States addressed to North Korea on a non-guaranteed delivery basis. The cooperation of the Soviet Command was requested so as to put such mail on a guaranteed delivery basis.(472) This proposal was concurred in by General Lerch, who said in part, "I believe it is another gesture of trying to open up the 38th parallel. Some day we may want to publicize all the efforts we have made."(473)

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Again, however, cooperation seemed but shortlived. In late July the Soviet Command announced that there would be no further exchange of mail until the then critical cholera epidemic was over, and that the United States Command would be notified as to when the exchange might be resumed. (474) As of 8 September 1946 there was no legalized transmission of mail across the 38th parallel.

Proposed Economic Conference

The entire subject of the economic integration of the two zones was approached in a July 2 letter from General Hodge to General Chistiakov, quoted in full below: (475)

"It becomes increasingly evident that economic arrangements between North and South Korea are essential to the success of our respective missions. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 1, item 15, of decisions reached by the Joint U. S. - Soviet Conference held in January and February, I propose a conference between economic technicians of our respective staffs. South Korea will be represented by the Military Government National Economic Board which is responsible for our economic planning. This board has a full time chairman and secretary. The other four members are directors of the Military Government departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Finance, and Transportation. I suggest that you elect a similar group of technicians and have them confer with this board. I suggest the first meeting of the conference be held in Seoul on or after July 15, 1946. We will furnish space for meetings, all secretarial assistance, and quarters, subsistence and transportation for your representatives.

"I propose that the agenda include discussion of electric power, chlorine, yarn, machinery, fertilizer, and paper materials. I believe that the proposed discussions should continue until definite recommendations are formulated on all economic subjects that we may submit to them by mutual agreement. I do not intend

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that these meetings shall in any way disturb the matters of high policy which will be the concern of the Joint Commission when it reconvenes. I recommend that the Conference I now propose confine itself to the immediate situation.

"I will be glad to receive your comment on these proposals at an early date."

This proposal met stony silence on the part of the Russians. On 5 August 1946 General Shanin commented that General Chistiakov had made no decision on the matter, and that was all. (476)

UNRRA

No discussion of the inter-zonal economic difficulties is complete without mention of the part which United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration played. As early as 28 January 1946 the American Command learned that one million dollars of UNRRA funds had been earmarked as an emergency fund for Korea, and that an additional sum of ten million dollars was pending. General Hodge was informed by UNRRA that a formal request from both the American and Soviet Commands for aid would be necessary, and that it was a XXIV Corps responsibility to so inform the Russian commander. (477) The Americans lost no time in notifying the Russian Command and in submitting a formal request for UNRRA aid on behalf of South Korea. (478)

On 22 February, the formal Soviet request for aid was received by Miss Constance Dumoan, the UNRRA representative in Seoul, as follows: (479)

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"I address you with a request that you lend support in obtaining from UNRRA for the population of Northern Korea living necessities such as foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, transport supplies, and other items.

"Our evaluation of the needs of supplies is based on a minimum ration. The purchase of supplies shown in the attached list is absolutely necessary in order to avoid hunger and epidemics.

"The list prepared by us includes foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, means of transportation and other items of supplies which are absolutely necessary to satisfy the urgent needs of the populace. It is of course understood that everything received from UNRRA by the Soviet Military Command will be apportioned in full accordance with UNRRA's regulations."

The American authorities were notified that an essential prerequisite for approval of an UNRRA relief program for Korea would be the assurance of free exchange of locally available commodities, and the unimpeded flow of such commodities and UNRRA supplies between the two zones. On 26 March 1946 this information was conveyed by General Hodge to the Soviet Command, together with a request for clearance into North Korea for an UNRRA inspection party. (480) The Soviet answer came in the letter of 12 April, which stated that there was no objection to such a visit. It was further suggested that it would be advisable to limit the party to three or four persons "due to limitations in accomodations and facility in their work." (481)

On 29 April the following letter was sent to the Soviet commander by Miss Dunscan:

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"I have the honor to inform you that UNRRA Washington had advised me by cable(26 April) that the Administration has approved an immediate token emergency shipment of medicine and transportation items to meet critical emergencies in both North and South Korea.

"In a letter from Washington dated 16 April which arrived this morning, I am informed that the proposed initial shipment of relief supplies for Korea will consist of the following five items:

1½ ton trucks
Ambulances
Medical supplies (unspecified)
Insecticides (unspecified)
Locomotive boiler tubes

"I presume therefore that the token shipment referred to above will comprise these articles. If any further information comes to hand either at the nature of the supplies or time of their expected arrival, I will be glad to communicate with you again.

"General Hodge has conveyed to me your approval for three or four members of the UNRRA Survey party, to visit Northern Korea and I cabled this information to our office in Washington. There has been a delay in the departure of the Survey Party, but latest advice is that it is leaving the USA this week by air for Korea via Shanghai. Immediately the Party arrives in Seoul we will be pleased to get in touch with General Shtikov and make the necessary arrangements for a small group to visit Northern Korea."

The Soviet General was notified on 16 June that the UNRRA inspection party finally had arrived in Seoul and was desirous of proceeding at the earliest possible date to the Red Army headquarters in Pyongyang for conference. The mission was composed of five members,

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namely: Clyde B. Sargent, Director; Boris A. Roskoff, Deputy Director; Glenn Briggs, Agriculture and Supply; Stanley Leland, Public Health; and Miss Constance Dumaan, Welfare and Liaison Officer. (482) Prior to departure for the North a letter covering 'UNRRA policy on the interchange of relief and rehabilitation items between the Northern and Southern Zones of Korea' was forwarded to the Soviet Command. This letter, which clarified UNRRA's position in Korea, (483) appears below:

> '1. There has been uncertainty about UNRRA's policy regarding 'free flow' of relief and rehabilitation commodities between North and South Korea. The following is the essence of UNRRA policy on the subject.
>
> '2. The basis of UNRRA policy on 'free flow' is (a) to effect the most economical and efficient distribution of limited UNRRA supplies, and (b) to avoid any action that interferes in any way with problems which are the exclusive concern of the two commands in Korea.
>
> (a) UNRRA desires a 'free flow between North and South Korea of all commodities classified by UNRRA as 'relief and rehabilitation supplies'. UNRRA is not concerned with 'free flow' of commodities that do not fall within UNRRA's concept of 'relief and rehabilitation supplies', and that are not regarded by either command as 'relief and rehabilitation commodities'. (UNRRA's interpretation of a command's classification of a commodity as a 'relief and rehabilitation commodity' rests solely on inclusion of such commodity in a request to UNRRA.)
>
> (b) UNRRA, however, cannot effect bartering arrangements between North and South Korea. Effecting these arrangements is presumed by UNRRA to be the exclusive prerogative of the Joint Soviet-American Commission. UNRRA will avoid any activity which constitutes interference with economic problems that are exclusively the concern of the two commands.

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(c) UNRRA will not consider providing to either zone, supplies that are available or that reasonably can be made available, in surplus quantities in the other zone (It should be noted that this policy of UNRRA prevents both from expending resources that are not needed with existence of arrangements between these zones for exchange of existing needed commodities, and from interfering with the basis of barter required by the two zones to develop normal economic relations between the North and the South)."

The UNRRA Mission actually put in an appearance at Pyongyang on 16 July. The visit of the mission to North Korea was reported by the American liaison officer in Pyongyang as follows: (484)

"UNRRA saw less than any agency sent up here. Only one official trip was made and that to Sariwon where they saw nothing they wanted to. General Shanin told me that the two interpreters we were sending were not necessary since they (the Soviet Command) would furnish Mr. and Mrs. Maslof. During the entire stay of UNRRA no interpreters were furnished. Mr. Rockoff did all the talking for the mission and many of the commitments without detailed discussion with Mr. Sargent. It is noteworthy that the Russians are asking for such commodities as cotton yarn to be suplied by UNRRA when cotton yarn is what we have offered them in exchange for chlorine. I discussed this matter with Mr. Sargent and he assures me that the Russians will get nothing from UNRRA which can be supplied by South Korea. As a result of the pitiful little which UNRRA saw and Mr. Rockoff's extreme favoritism I have been told by Mr. Sargent that he is personally going back to Washington to make an oral handwritten report on the lack of cooperation in the Russian zone. Originally it had been planned that Mr. Rockoff would take the written report to Washington and that the other members of the mission would remain in the East."

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On 25 July the mission returned south. Sargent, the head of the mission, lost no time in sending off a top secret message to (485) Washington, saying in part:

> Returned today from North Korea after one week's cavalier treatment without official courtesies or permission to visit any places requested by me with direct relations to Soviet request for UNRRA supplies. In my judgement, due to peculiar circumstances attending my mission, it is imperative that recommendations from my mission be considered only in the light of my personal report that I am prepared to give only to Lindsay-ie, Jackson, Rooks, and Harris. I am not prepared conscientiously to make or endorse unconditionally recommendations without your prior personal approval. Any report cabled ROA prior to my personal report is to be interpreted with knowledge of my personal reservations.
>
> "Hodge with reasons with which he alone besides me is familiar agrees to facilitate speed of my travel to Washington...."

All the findings and recommendations of the mission were submitted to UNRRA. The question of aid to Korea was ultimately referred to, and discussed at the fifth session of the UNRRA Council which met at Geneva, Switzerland on 6 August and adjourned on 16 August (486) 1946.

Meanwhile on 2 July the first UNRRA allotment was unloaded at the port of Inchon. It consisted of 7,043 bundles of used clothing and footwear contributed by the people of the United States and Canada. An equal division was made between the two zones, and on 11 October (487) the North Korean shipment arrived in Pyongyang.

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Reparations

The reparations tangle first came under public discussion in Korea when the local press reported Ambassador Edwin Pauley, head of the Far Eastern Reparations Commission, as having suggested in a Tokyo interview on 28 November 1945 that Japanese investments in Korea be used as reparations. The Korean public interpreted this remark as meaning that such investments would be used in paying reparation debts levied on Japan by the Allies. (488)

Word of a pending visit to Korea by the Ambassador did not arrive until 28 April 1946, when the American Command was notified that he was expected to reach Seoul by mid-May. General Hodge was requested to negotiate with the Russians in making the necessary arrangements for Ambassador Pauley to carry out his mission in North Korea. The purpose of the Ambassador's trip to Korea was to continue his study of the Japanese reparations problem, particularly in relation to external assets. (489) The American Command lost no time in dispatching a request to the Soviet Commander requesting clearance for the Pauley party to visit North Korea. (490)

In the meantime representations were being made by the United States Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Government to clear the Pauley party. (491) Unfortunately, however, the length of time desired in North Korea by Pauley was specified by the State Department

as from three to five days.(492) Pauley immediately radioed General Hodge; "the statement that the probable length of stay will be three to five days is in error. The question of probable length of stay should not be raised at this time. Will depend upon number of men we can take and the kind of facilities the Soviets provide."(493) By this time, however, an answer had been received from General Chistiakov which stated in part: "I have been informed that the U. S. Ambassador to Moscow has requested my government to permit Mr. Edwin Pauley and his group of specialists to visit Northern Korea for a period of five days...Such permission has been granted."(494) The following day, 16 May, a radiogram from the State Department likewise informed the American Command that "appropriate Soviet representatives in Northern Korea had been notified of the forthcoming arrival and sojourn of Pauley for five days."(495) It is of interest to note that this sequence of events indicated that the Soviet General was notified of the approval of Pauley's proposed visit through Soviet channels faster than the American Command had been so informed through American channels. There was likewise misunderstanding as to the size of Pauley's party, but on 15 May General Chistiakov indicated that the entire party of fourteen would be permitted to visit North Korea.(496)

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On 16 May 1946, the Pauley Mission arrived in Seoul. Pyongyang was informed that the group wished to move to North Korea on 20 May, and clearance was requested for that date. Meanwhile on 18 May, General Hodge sent north a list of the personnel comprising Pauley's advance party, namely, Major General Archibald V. Arnold, Colonel William Meyer, 2d Lt. A. V. Arnold, Mr. Eugene V. Prostov, and M/Sgt John Matles.(497) This quickly elicited a reply from the Russians to the effect that they had not received instructions on the movement of any advance party headed by General Arnold.(498)

By this time the State Department was trying to rectify the earlier mistake of having requested permission for Pauley to spend only three to five days in North Korea. The Soviet Government finally received a request to permit the Ambassador to remain from fifteen to twenty days.(499)

On 20 May Ambassador Pauley forwarded to the Russian commander a reiteration of the request for clearance for the advance party and a letter outlining the objectives and proposed itinerary of the visit to North Korea, both of which were immediately forwarded to Moscow for decision. General Chistiakov commented

that the itinerary was much more than he had anticipated. (500)

The essential points of the Pauley letter are outlined below: (501)

Objectives: To make a study of Japan's external assets and to determine the present production capabilities of Korean industry and agriculture, both North and South of the 38th parallel.

Party: 14 principals, 9 technical assistants, members of the secretariat, 6 Russian interpreters, and 5 Korean interpreters, plus necessary personnel to operate, guard, and service the transportation available.

Route: To visit these five general areas:

1) Pyongyang area
2) Supong (Suiko)—Sinuiju (Shingishu) area
3) Hungnam (Konan) area
4) Chongju (Seishin) area
5) Wonsan (Gensan) area

Plan: The party will be split into three groups. All three will operate from the train as far as Pyongyang. There the groups will separate—Party A (under Mr. Norman Cleland); Party B (under Mr. John T. Hurndall); and Party C (under Mr. Earl Shener.)

Requests: Necessary locomotive coal, extra engines for grades, such Soviet liaison and guard personnel as you may consider necessary. The two planes required can be supplied by either American or Soviet sources. The party will be dependent upon Soviet authorities for other transport, mess, and billets.

By 23 May, still no Russian reply was forthcoming, and Pauley's patience was worn thin. Another letter was dispatched to the Soviet Commissar, the Ambassador saying in part, "my mission

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has been organized, equipped and ready to move into your area by special train for the past four days. I feel certain that neither you nor your government would want me to keep inactive this important group of my government's staff of technical experts." (502)

By 25 May, the American liaison officer in Pyongyang was checking with theSoviet General at two hour intervals for an answer. Finally, on 27 May, the Soviet General gave permission for Pauley's visit, but with the party being restricted to ten people, plus fifteen guards, train crew, interpreters, etc., and limited to a stay of five days. (503) Embassy Moscow commented by way of explanation (504) as follows:

> "I saw Molotov this afternoon and raised the question of the Pauley Mission. He informed me that Pauley and his party had already arrived in Northern Korea, but he declined to agree officially to any modification of the original time limit. I gathered from his remarks that the Soviet Army obviously had been objecting to the Pauley Mission, and that the original concession was about as far as the Foreign Office could go."

In the meantime Ambassador Pauley reported to Washington that a compromise solution had been worked out with General Chistiakov and that the party would depart on 29 May be train for North Korea. There was no agreement as to itinerary, however. Pauley's idea was to split the group into several small parties, but thus far the Russians had not agreed to this plan. Ambassador Pauley

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requested that the State Department continue to press Moscow on both these points. (505)

On 29 May the Pauley party at long last arrived in Pyongyang. (506) Two days after its arrival in the Soviet zone, a special press release was issued in Seoul by the headquarters of the Mission, indicating that its staff in North Korea was operating under heavy restrictions imposed by the local Soviet authorities. Movements of the goup took place under heavy guard and only by prearrangement. It was reported that Pauley had lodged protests against these restrictions. Of the five industrial areas singled out for inspection by the Pauley party, two were barred on direct orders from General Chistiakov, (namely, the Haungnam and Chongjin area) the excuse given being that large scale demobilization of Soviet troops was taking place in these areas. The use of air travel to facilitate the party's work was denied on the grounds that North Korea lacked proper landing facilities. Likewise the party was prevented from splitting into smaller groups for the purpose of operating more efficiently. The official photographer of the mission was forbidden by General Chistiakov to take photographs on official trips. (507)

On the subject of the alleged stripping of North Korean industry by the Russians, long charged by the Americans, General

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Chistiakov declared to the mission that instructions from Moscow had forbidden him to remove industrial equipment from plants located in North Korea. However, the mission found it difficult to substantiate this contention because of the restrictions imposed by the Soviet authorities. (508)

On 5 June, Richard Johnston, New York Times correspondent in Seoul, reported, "ill concealed skipticism marked United States Military authorities' reaction today to Edwin W. Pauley's report that he had found no evidence of the removal of capital goods by the Russians from North Korea...It was the generally expressed feeling that Mr. Pauley saw what the Russians wanted him to see and nothing more..."

Along this same line of thought the American commander reported the following: (509)

> "Factual information Mr. Pauley's report and reports of observers accompanying party do not contradict intelligence available on large scale stripping of industrial plants in northern Korea. Eye witness accounts stripping largely confined to areas and plants not visited by Mr. Pauley, particularly northeastern Korea. Stripping does not appear to be complete as case in Manchuria but should be termed selective stripping. Items taken appear to be those essential to Soviet economy and of nature to be easily transplanted, namely communications equipment, transformers, generators, electric motors, machine tools, etc."

Obviously, Pauley could not make a complete report without having been allowed to visit two of the most important industrial areas of North Korea. On 30 May, and again on 8 June,

he wrote to General Chistiakov requesting specific information concerning the present status of industrial installations in the areas that had been declared off limits.(510) On 14 June, the Ambassador departed from Korea.(511) On the same day, the American liaison officer in Pyongyang reported that extracts of Pauley's last letter to General Chistiakov had been sent by the General to his area commanders with instructions that they provide him with the information upon which to base his answer to Mr. Pauley.(512) By the end of July, in answer to an inquiry from Washington, D. C., General Hodge radioed that the American liaison officer in Pyongyang was pressing General Chistiakov for a reply, but that there was no indication when, if ever, the reply would be forthcoming.(513) And there the matter rested.

Maintaining Liaison

Military

In early October, 1945, the Soviet and American liaison groups in Seoul and Pyongyang were withdrawn by their respective commands. It was not until March of the following year that liaison was reestablished. In the interim, communications initially were channeled through the Soviet Consulate operating in Seoul, and after the first of the year, by direct wire to the Russian headquarters--station "Minsk" on the American telephone exchange.(514)

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The renewal of liaison activity in March 1946 was accomplished pursuant to an agreement reached at the Joint Soviet-American Conference. The Americans were the first to move, and on 11 March Lt. Col. James A. Scott, Lt. Col. Walter P. Choinski, and Major Walter E. Monagan, arrived in Pyongyang to represent the American Command at the Soviet Headquarters.(515) The exact duties assigned this Liaison Section were detailed in a letter of instruction as follows:(516)

"1. As liaison officers between this headquarters and the 25th Soviet Army, you will:

a. Represent this headquarters in expediting the delivery to the Commanding General, 24th Soviet Army, messages, letters, documents and requests.

b. Be prepared to assist the CG, 25th Soviet Army, in expediting the transmission to this Hqs. of messages, letters, documents and requests.

c. Take such action as is necessary in insuring that telephone communication between this Headquarters and the Liaison Party remains open at all times.

d. Be prepared to assist the CG, 25th Soviet Army, at all times upon request, in any matters of joint interest to two commands.

e. Make such arrangement as are necessary with Hqs, 25th Soviet Army, to insure that a copy or a digest of all messages and information passed from 25th Soviet Army to this Hqs. is furnished the Liaison Party.

"2. As soon as the Liaison Party is properly established, has made the necessary contacts with members of the 25th Soviet Army Hqs., and is fully prepared to perform its duties, Lt. Col. James A. Scott will return to this Headquarters.

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"3. This Headquarters will keep the Liaison Party informed as to matters being discussed and progress being made in settling the joint problems of the two commands."

The American Liaison Party in Pyongyang took up residence in what was formerly the American Consulate in the city. By 15 March direct telephone communications had been established with XXIV Corps Headquarters, (517) and the group was on an operating basis.

The Russians were a little slower in moving. The Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission arrived in Seoul on 19 March. On 27 March General Hodge reported the following course of events relative to maintaining liaison: (518)

"This headquarters has been desirous of reducing contacts with Soviet Consulate in Seoul to minimum. With this end in view Col. Butuseff, member staff Soviet Commission, was requested and consented to act as liaison officer for Col. Gen. Chistiakov, Commander Soviet XXV Army, pending detail permanent liaison officer. On 26 March, a letter to General Chistiakov requesting exchange of weather information was presented to Col. Butuseff for transmission to Heijo. Col. Butuseff refused to accept it stating Soviet Consul General was proper agency for transmission of letter. Request then made to General Chistiakov thru USAFIK liaison officer Heijo to fly U. S. plane to Heijo for purpose of delivering letter. Gen. Shanin, Soviet Chief of Staff, XXV Army, gave several reasons why it was impracticable to fly U. S. plane from Seoul to Heijo such as bad weather, etc. When minor objections were explained away, Gen. Shanin finally disapproved request and also declined to place refusal in writing stating matter was too trivial for such action. This despite the fact that Soviet planes on several occasions have been permitted to land at Kimpo airfield for same purposes."

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Finally, on 3 April an official Soviet liaison team arrived in Seoul. It consisted of Majors U. S. Torbin and K. A. Ivanoff. A few days later, a third member, Captain M. A. Lebedeff, (519) arrived.

In the meantime, the American group in Pyongyang was running into minor discord. In late March 1946 General Chistiakov indicated displeasure over the flying of the American flag in front of the liaison detachment headquarters. Curiously enough, it was likewise noted that since the Americans had arrived in Pyongyang many American flags had appeared in the city where none had been (520) observed before. In any event, a letter was dispatched to (521) General Chistiakov's headquarters by Lt. Col. Choinski:

> "I deeply regret to learn through Major Knicuff that the raising of the American national colors at the house occupied by the American Liaison Section was done in such a manner as to cause you to feel that I was not an appreciative guest of yours. The raising of the flag was done as has been my custom wherever I acted in the capacity of a liaison officer. This same custom I have observed has been followed by members of the Red Army whenever and wherever I have had the privilege to work with them in Japan, Alaska, and along the German Rhineland.
>
> "I assure you that I shall observe every nicety of respect to you and your wishes in the future."

The colors continued to fly, and the matter was dropped.

When Major Monaghan was temporarily replaced by Major Carl J. Dougovito in late March, the Soviet Command complained that

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the Americans were not keeping it informed as to changes in personnel on duty in Pyongyang. General Hodge answered, saying (522) in part:

> "Since I was not informed of changes that occurred in Soviet personnel on duty in Seoul during the January conference, I presumed that I would be accorded the same courtesy in respect to my liaison detachment at Heijo..... If any member of my liaison detachment is unsatisfactory to you, I will replace him.
>
> .....
>
> "In the future you will be advised of the names and duties of train crew members arriving in Heijo. I likewise expect to be provided with similar information for each Soviet train proceeding from Heijo to Seoul.".

Eventually, in late April, Major E. Giblo was sent to Pyongyang to replace Major Monagan. (523)

By 3 June, Chojnski was able to report that he had definite proof that messages transmitted by telephone to Seoul were intercepted by the Soviets. In several instances Soviet officers inadvertently had referred to information in communications before communications were delivered. (524)

In the latter part of June, the Soviet Command replaced Captain Lebedeff in Seoul with Major I. F Kornisheff. (525)

The matter of telephonic communications between the Soviet and American headquarters came up again when the Americans urged that a two-circuit line be placed in operation. On 17 June 1946,

a written request was presented to the Soviet Command to extend a second line from the Soviet border control station north to Pyongyang. Construction of a second circuit already had been completed at the time, between XXIV Corps headquarters and the Soviet border. Within the week General Shanin disapproved the request, saying that the second line was unnecessary. This, General Hodge refuted in a further discussion with the Soviet commander. The two-circuit line was deemed a necessity "due to danger of interruption caused by unpredictable line accidents." He pointed out also that the lines would serve both headquarters and their respective liaison representatives. "I request that you direct the immediate completion of the second circuit", concluded the General. (526) No more was heard on the subject.

It is of interest to note that the Soviet Liaison Party in Seoul was provided with billets, quarters, utilities, and access to the Army PX's. (527) These courtesies were reciprocal ones, in that the same privileges were extended to the American group in Pyongyang.

Technical Liaison

In the fall of 1945, a proposed survey of weather reporting facilities in North Korea by American weathermen was bluntly refused after two months of silence on the part of the Russians. The reason

given for the refusal was that the existing American station at Khaberovsk was adequate.(528) It was not until March 1946 that orders came from Washington to seek agreement again with the Soviet Command in North Korea on this subject.(529) The importance attached to this subject is indicated by the following: "Letter on subject of requesting Korean and Manchurian weather reports being sent safe hand to you for study and compliance. Will require action and coordination with Soviet Liaison Office of XXIV Corps. Desire you take immediate action and submit report on results to this headquarters at very earliest date by telephone or radio. Very important you give this matter highest priority or report reason for delay."(530) On 26 March, General Hodge wrote to the Soviet Command requesting meteorological data from Manchuria and North Korea, stating that if it were agreeable, a weather observer would be dispatched to Pyongyang.(531) By May it was learned that this request had been forwarded by the Soviet Command to the Soviet Civil Meteorological Service.(532) However, no action was forthcoming.

It seems that prior to the occupation there had been eleven main weather stations in North Korea. By June 1946, it was known that the Russians had cut the personnel and were not broadcasting weather data. The Korean head of the South Korean weather service commented, "this and the fact that no data is coming out of Manchuria nor Mongolia,

means that a Russian blindspot in the world weather picture exists, handicapping the weathermen of China, South Korea, and Japan, who regularly supply to the Russians as well as the rest of the world up-to-the-minute data for them to profit by."(555)

Evacuation of Remains

On 27 April 1946, negotiations with the Soviet Command commenced to the end of removing remains of British, Australian, and American war dead from North Korea. At that time General Hodge informed the Soviet Commander that he had been instructed by SCAP to arrange for the removal. Information was requested as to number and location of graves and clearance for a small party.(552) In a letter of 27 May the American Command was informed that there was no objection to sending an American party north to photograph the graves and to remove the remains. The Soviet Command also gave the number and location of the graves which had thus far been located.(553) However, it was not known by the Americans whether these graves were war-time ones.

On 3 July 1946 the American burial train proceeded to the city of Kanko (Hamhung), with personnel from the 107th Graves Registration Platoon aboard. The party totaled twenty-nine, with Major Alfred C. Rench in command and 2d Lt. Edwin B. Smith, second in command.(555) The group, which visited only Hamhung and Pyongyang

left North Korea on 10 July. A request to visit Gensen (Wonsan) was disapproved, a cholera quarantine being cited as the reason. Permission to visit Haeju was denied on the ground that there was only one grave, which the Soviets knew to be old and therefore, saw no reason to visit. The net result was that no war-time graves were found, and no remains were recovered. (537)

Closing the Soviet Consulate

A long series of events through the preceding winter and spring led to the ultimate closing of the Soviet Consulate in Seoul on 2 July 1946.

In the fall of 1945 the activities of the Consulate in Seoul seemed somewhat mysterious. The consul, Mr. Alexander Sergeievitch Poliansky, had not been interned after the Russian declaration of war on Japan. It is considered possible that he and his staff carried on communistic activities during this period. (538) His exact relationship with the Korean Communists later became one of the XXIV Corps essential elements of information. (539) It has been stated, on rather dubious authority, that the members of the Soviet Consulate maintained an efficient spy system in Seoul, encouraged disturbances during the period following the Japanese surrender, and printed handbills to be distributed throughout the city. (540)

The showing of Soviet-manufactured films in South Korean theatres harassed the American Command throughout the fall, winter, and early spring of 1945-1946. On 17 September 1945, Colonel Cecil W. Nist, XXIV Corps G-2, informed the Soviet Consul that there was no objection to showing Soviet films to Koreans or American groups; (541) but it was not contemplated that the Consulate would go into a large-scale distribution of film. By January 1946 the American Command learned that the Soviet Consulate was renting films to the Korean film industry on a commercial basis. (542) Shortly thereafter, reports began coming in telling of showings of these films in Korean theaters throughout the American zone. (543)

On 25 February, General Hodge ordered that if the Soviet motion picture, "Victory Parade" were shown anywhere in South Korea that it should be impounded immediately and his headquarters informed. (544) On the same day the officer-in-charge of the Motion Picture section in USAMGIK reported that the Russian Consulate had distributed at least eleven motion pictures in South Korea on a commercial basis, and that three were being currently shown in Seoul theatres. As for these three, he commented, "I have seen these three and do not consider them objectionable in the sense that they distort the truth." The last, "Surrender Ceremony on the Missouri," is "a perfectly straightforward account of the surrender ceremony, identical with that shown in our newsreels." (545)

General Hodge acted, and on 6 March handed Mr. Polianski a letter requesting that he cease the dissemination of these films, (546) saying in part:

> "Commercial ventures of such a nature are not deemed to be in keeping with the status of your office, and are not included in the agreements recently negotiated by representatives of the American and Soviet Commands.
>
> "It is therefore expected that you will cease releasing moving picture films to any and all individuals and organizations, or activities, irrespective of whether remuneration is involved; that all moving pictures of Soviet origin currently in South Korea will be recalled by you, and that your office and personnel therein refrain from conducting commercial activities that have not been specifically sanctioned by us."

The American letter had mentioned specifically the showing of several Soviet motion pictures by name. Polianski replied to these charges by listing the reason for the showing of each.

> "Six Hours after the War"—written permission signed by Colonel Hist, 17 September 1945. Film distributed.
>
> "Rainbow", and "A Guy From Our Town"—distributed. Not commercializing. Only accepting a minimum fee for wear and tear of the films. Managers of theatres were warned by us that prior permission by MG was necessary before showing them.
>
> "Ivan the Terrible"—shown by us at the meeting of "Soviet-Korean Culture Society" at which a CIC representative was present.
>
> "6 PM After the Victory"—does not exist.
>
> "News of the Day"—(Victory Parade, Taking of Vienna, Signing of the Act of Capitulation of Japan)—distributed by us among the Union of Theatre Workers in Seoul. Shown in two theatres. Previewed by MG, and permission for showing granted.

Polianski's reply concluded: "if you find it imperative to revoke permission, granted by your Military Administration, for the showing of these films we will immediately propose the return of the films to us. Request that you explain whether or not we shall consider your letter as one that forbids the showing of Soviet films in Southern Korea." (547) The American Command answered this query by simply stating, "the letter sent to the Consulate should be interpreted as one revoking any previous instructions received by the Consulate." (548) The desire was expressed that the films be withdrawn.

Three days later, on 9 March the following order was issued by the American Command: (549)

> "Effective this date, moving picture films produced or made through the direction of the USSR or other Soviet agency, are forbidden to be shown to Koreans in the American occupied zone of Korea. Any theatres having films of Soviet origin will immediately return them to the Russian Consulate at Seoul through channels on reception. Effective 20 March Soviet produced films in hands of Korean movie houses will be confiscated and this headquarters immediately informed. No publicity will be given to this directive or Army action taken thereon.

At the same time Political Advisor Langdon, the former American Consul in Seoul, reported on the matter: (550)

> "Evidence was clear that the Soviet Consul General acted on a commercial basis and accepted funds from Korean distributors. He never asked permission of CG USAFIK or of MG to show the films. He made no attempt to deny his activities, appeared embarrassed and ill at ease when the matter was discussed, and tried to say 'I did not know any better.' Some of the films had been shown to several American officers and the Soviet Consul General tried to contend that he received permission from them to distribute the films publicly.

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"It is suggested that the State Department pass above information to Embassy Moscow to be used in such manner as seems appropriate. If such activities continue, CG USAFIK will probably ask for closing of Soviet Consulate or at least for withdrawal of Consul General."

In this, Langdon was partially wrong, for what could have been interpreted by Polianski as official permission was the previously mentioned letter of 17 September 1945 from Colonel Nist, XXIV Corps G-2. Moreover, on 22 February 1946, the Moving Picture Section of the Department of Public Information, USAMGIK, had issued this permit to the Soviet Consul: "The following Russian-made motion pictures have been viewed by this office and passed for public distribution, subject to contrary decision by higher authorities: 'Moscow Victory Parade', 'March Toward Vienna', and 'Surrender Ceremony on the Missouri'." (551)

In any event, the matter was not closed. On 10 May 1946 a representative of a Korean motion picture distributing company approached Military Government for permission to show certain Soviet films. They were immediately seized. The Soviet Consulate was notified of the incident and informed that the films would be turned over to it if the Russians would agree to their removal from South Korea and guarantee that they would not be returned until commercial traffic in motion pictures was legalized. (552) Polianski countered with the contention that on his part, there had been no intent to evade the restrictions and that he had given the films to the company only for the purpose of obtaining approval of the censors of Military Government and the

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consent of the American Command.(553) Later statements made by the Korean film company officials apparently confirmed this.

In the meantime, the contents of the order of 9 March 1946 forbidding Soviet films in South Korea apparently had leaked out to the public. On 12 March the CHA YOO SHINBUN (Korean Free Press) headlined "Russian Films Prohibited on the Screen in Korea South of the 38th Parallel", and mistakenly explained that an ordinance to that effect had been issued by Military Government.(554)

This altercation over the distribution of motion pictures was merely one phase in the long chain of events which ultimately led to the closing of the Soviet Consulate. As early as October 1945, General Hodge questioned the status of the Soviet Consul General and his staff. It was also considered possible at that time that the consul was assisting the Korean Communist movement in Seoul and trying behind the scenes to discredit the United States and its occupational policies in the eyes of the Koreans. (For further details see below, p. 323) At the same time, the American Command was furnishing the Consulate a certain amount of food, not to mention rail transportation to North Korea and air transportation to Tokyo as requested.(555) This incongruity was pointed out by the Generals

> "We are thus in the position of giving them (the Consulate staff) every facility for observation and political activity for which we in return receive absolutely nothing.

"This headquarters does not, repeat not, recommend at this time that the Soviet Consul General be asked to withdraw. Nevertheless, the situation should not be permitted to pass unnoticed, and the occasion might be taken to ask for the acceptance of an American official in Manchuria, having communications facilities. In the meantime this headquarters would appreciate policy guidance as to the status of consular establishments under conditions which now obtain in Southern Korea."

It was not until February 1946 that a radio from Washington, D. C., set up a tentative policy as to foreign consular representation in Seoul. It was pointed out that the British had been given permission to send a Foreign Office representative but that he would not have consular status. The inconsistency arising from the fact that a Soviet consulate was functioning in Seoul was thought to be potentially embarrassing. Moreover, the American Command was informed that the State Department desired to reopen the American Consulate-General at Seoul for purposes of performing purely consular functions. Therefore it was believed in Washington to be desirable to permit the reopening of foreign consular offices in Seoul to perform strictly consular functions. It was pointed out that this act would constitute a basis for putting pressure on the Soviets, whenever the time seems propitious, to allow the establishment of consulates in North Korea." (356)

By way of answer General Hodge commented as follows: (357)

"Although I would welcome reestablishment of American consular office here and would not object to British and other consulates if such was policy of United States Government, I would prefer adoption of some formula whereby size and activities of

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Soviet Consulate General here could be curtailed when deemed necessary. It now has 21 persons, including women and children.

"Solution must be to set up informal American office for service to Americans, and when military liaison groups agreed on at recent conference have been established to suggest to Soviets that consular officers be attached there to act only on limited consular matters. If they demurred, the U. S. could then request consular representation in North Korea, to be followed, if appropriate, by request for closing of Soviet office in Seoul. Benninghoff concurs if American and foreign consular offices are ultimately authorized and established."

(558)

To this CINCAFPAC appended the following remarks:

"It may not be practicable or advisable to attempt to restrict size or legitimate activities of such offices except insofar as billet and office shortages may dictate. The suggestion of General Hodge in regard to attachment of consular officers to military liaison groups might be practicable as means for securing consular representation in North Korea."

On 15 March, the American Command was notified that the position of the War and State Departments on the matter was that the United States, as the occupying authority, might take such action as it deemed desirable in the opening, closing, and functioning of any consulates in Seoul without prejudicing the position of the others. It was further felt by the State Department that a quid pro quo basis should govern the effort of General Hodge in reducing the size of the Soviet Consulate General. Finally, it was suggested that the American Command inform the Russians along the following lines: (a) that the United States believes the question of maintaining of Soviet consular representation

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in South Korea and that of the United States in North Korea were closely related; and (b) that the Commanding General, USAFIK, desired to establish an American consular office with a small staff at Heijo in North Korea, and, moreover, intended to restrict Soviet facilities in the American zone equivalent to those facilities granted to United States authorities in the Soviet zone. (559)

In a 19 March reply to these suggestions, General Hodge radioed: (560)

"In line with State Department's suggestion, I have ready for signature following letter to Soviet Commander:

"'My government has directed me to approach you in the matter of establishing at Pyongyang an American consular office with a small staff to give appropriate care to American interests in North Korea.

"'For your information, I may state that American interests in North Korea consist of important manufacturing, missionary, cultural, business and residential properties; also of personal interests requiring such consular assistance as notarization of deeds for United States courts, citizenship documentation, citizen relief and visa issuance.

"'Should there be no objection to the opening of an office as above indicated, I shall be glad to allow in return the maintenance in Seoul of a Soviet Consular office of like size to perform parallel services for Soviet interests in South Korea.'

"I propose, however, to hold this letter for the time being as it may possibly sound a wrong note for the opening of the Joint Commission meetings.

"While I reiterate my desire for early establishment of consular service within my command to perform essential consular services for Americans and Koreans, it is my feeling that until

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a Korean Provisional Government, the maintenance of separate State Department representation might result in some duplication, if not confusion, of United States activity in Korea. There would also be present shortage of billets and office space to consider."

The final blow was delivered on 27 April when General Hodge called in Mr. V. S. Polianski, the Soviet Consul General in Seoul, and delivered the following oral statement reproduced below in full. (5618) In effect it was an ultimatum.

"The time has come to regularize the status of yourself and your staff in Seoul. You know international law better than I do, I am sure, and must realize that your position is quite irregular; first, because no consular establishment may ordinarily function in an occupied territory except by special arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief; and secondly, because you are in Seoul by virtue of your former clearance from the Japanese Emperor. As consular officials of a friendly power, caught in occupied area, and because you have been helpful to my Command from time to time as liaison with the Soviet Command in North Korea, I have, for reasons of courtesy, allowed you to remain in Seoul and have accorded you every privilege within my means--transportation, food, post exchange privileges, etc. In this connection I would like to mention that the French Government withdrew its consular representative, also accredited to Japan, some months ago. The Chinese consular office was closed when my forces occupied Seoul and has not been reopened. A representative of the British Foreign Office, by special arrangement with the U. S. Government and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Tokyo, arrived in Seoul last week as liaison with my Command, but he is not authorized to perform consular services. Even my own government has no consular representation in Seoul as yet. Thus any claim made to consular representation and your exercise of consular functions such as the distribution of Soviet

Government films, and the display of your brass consular plaque at your gate, your official relations with political parties, are not only irregular but operate in discrimination of other allied powers.

"I have been expecting your Government to approach my Government about your status and continued functioning here, but as no steps in this direction have been taken in seven months, as far as I know I am compelled to take this up myself, especially since with the establishment of the Joint Commission and the Soviet Military liaison office, there is no further need of your office as liaison with the Soviet Command. I have no authority or discretion to allow consular representation or functioning within my military jurisdiction. I, therefore, ask you to inform your Government that if it desires to maintain a consular official or two in Seoul for civilian liaison with my Command, or for caretaker or essential consular duties, it approach my Government in the matter. Meanwhile, it is requested that you do not perform consular functions and the displaying of the brass plaque at your gate until the authority of my Government has been obtained or until my military occupation is replaced by some other authority or until other Governments, including my own, are permitted by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, to exercise general consular functions."

"Please also note that until your official status is regularized, I must treat you and your staff as private friendly nationals and can no longer allow you privileges of rations, post exchange, gasoline, diplomatic immunities, and other special privileges. Exceptions will be made in the case of former consular personnel employed directly by the Soviet delegation of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, such as Mr. and Mrs. Maslov. Please also make it clear to your Government that any arrangements that might be made with my Government for accrediting one or two consular officials to my Command in Seoul for limited functions, are expected to be on a reciprocal basis, that is, would automatically allow the United States at any time to accredit a like small consular representation to the Soviet Commander at Pyongyang where the United States nationals have title to important manufacturing, missionary,

cultural, and residential properties. In approaching my Government for the opening of an authorized consular establishment in Seoul, your Government should name the individuals who will be assigned to the establishment in order that I may know who may be allowed to remain within my jurisdiction."

Polianski's immediate reply was merely to point out that the Soviet Consulate had existed in Seoul and Korea in general since 1884, and that there were still Soviet citizens in Pusan and others who were trying to obtain citizenship. (562) On 6 May the following written reply was received.

"The question which you put to me on 27 April regarding the Soviet Consulate in Seoul, together with the demand which was presented in regard to the accrediting on a reciprocal basis of American consular representatives in Pyongyang must be settled through diplomatic channels between the American and Soviet governments. Hence, any unilateral measures on the part of the American Military Command, directed toward depriving the Soviet Consulate of the opportunity of normally continuing its work, or the depriving of its workers of a supply of food, gasoline, etc., I will have to consider as an unfriendly act on the part if the American Military authorities towards representatives of the Soviet government."(563)

At this time no action was taken by the American Command to deprive the Consulate of such services as supply of rations, and gasoline, access to the post exchange, diplomatic immunities, and other special privileges. General Hodge explained that since certain members of the Soviet consular staff were working with and formed a part of the technical staff of the Joint Commission it was

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felt necessary to continue furnishing such services to the Soviet Consulate. Some members of the Soviet delegation to the Commission, in fact, were being fed and quartered at the Soviet consulate. (564)

Meanwhile, on 30 April 1946, the American Command was notified of the pending arrival of a Soviet Commission for granting Soviet citizenship. The group was to leave Tientsin on 30 April for Seoul by a United States Marine Corps plane. (565) That same day Polianski was called in by General Gervin and informed of the matter. After expressing surprise at the early arrival of this group, Polianski categorically and persistently denied any knowledge of its arrival or of its mission in South Korea. He admitted knowledge of the other three members of the party, (Kniaefu, Kakina, and Zatov). Petroff as Vice-Consul from Darien, but denied knowledge When General Gervin attempted to draw out Polianski along the line that the party was a commission for granting Soviet citizenship nothing but evasive and indifferent replies were elicited. However, he did enter a request to meet the group at the airport, which was denied. Actually, bad weather prevented the arrival of the party as scheduled. Polianski appeared to be still piqued at the attitude of the American Command toward his activities and was uncooperative and unresponsive, during the course of this [illegible] conversation. With respect to the request that he cease consular

activities in South Korea, Polianski stated that he could not do so until he had received instructions from his government. (566)

The matter of the Soviet Commission was dropped after General Hodge dispatched a radio to the CG China, saying in part: (567)

> Your radio...indicates that three of the officials are members of a Soviet citizenship. [Commission] The granting of Soviet citizenship is a normal function of a Consulate General. Due to the small number of White Russians now in southern Korea, this routine procedure can be handled by a small consulate staff already here if and when such consular office is authorized. Unless I receive instructions to the contrary from higher headquarters I do not propose to grant clearance to these Soviet officials now or in the future unless cogent reasons not stated in reference radios are forthcoming.

By 25 May 1946 the pending closure of the Soviet Consulate was a matter of public discussion. A Seoul dispatch to the NEW YORK TIMES reported: (568)

> Closing of the Soviet consulate here by United States authorities was awaited here today as the deadline passed in the ultimatum issued by the State Department to Moscow in which Washington demanded that a United States consulate be established in Heijo (Pyongyang), the capital of the Soviet occupation zone in Korea, or Soviet consul here cease consular activities.
>
> While A. S. Polianski, Soviet consular officer in Seoul, has received the offer of an opportunity to 'readjust his functions', no reply has been received from him...

On 29 May Polianski was informed by the American Command that as of 1 June, post exchange, ration, and commissary privileges for members of the Soviet Consulate would not be further extended. By way of explanation it was pointed out that the Russian supply

line to Korea was much shorter than that of the American forces. (569)

Thereafter, the matter was taken up on inter-governmental diplomatic levels. XXIV Corps was informed as to the course of events in a June radio from Washington, D. C. as follows: (570)

"Following is text of telegram from Moscow, 1756 dated 5 June, 5 PM:

"'After my conversation with Molotov on May 25...I confirmed our conversation with letter of May 29th, requesting him to review and reconsider adverse decision given to proposal of US Govt. to open Consulate in Pyongyang. In letter dated June 4 Lozovski, on instructions of Molotov, replied as follows, 'Recently Command of American Troops in Southern Korea has undertaken number of arbitrary actions in relation to Consul General of USSR in Seoul. The actions have been directed not only to complicate, but also to make impossible normal function of Soviet Consul General. In view of above, I request you to bring to knowledge of Government of USA that Soviet Government in connection with these circumstances, has decided to close Consul of USSR in Seoul. For safeguarding of buildings and property of Soviet Consul general, a few persons will remain whose names will be communicated to American Command in Seoul.'

I intend to make following reply to Lozovski in event that Dept. finds it contains no error in statement of fact:

"'This will acknowledge your letter of June 4, 1946 informing me of decision of Soviet Government to close Consul general of USSR in Seoul, Korea. I will inform US Government accordingly. I have also taken note of statement in your letter that this decision is result of number of arbitrary actions by command of American troops in Southern Korea in relation to Consul General of USSR in Seoul which has made impossible normal functioning of Soviet consul general. I must inform you that only action taken by Commander of American troops in Southern Korea with respect to Soviet Consul General has been to request regularizing of status of this consul general by agreement either between our two governments, or directly with United States Army Commander in Southern Korea, and suspension of its activities until this was done. I am aware that as late as May 10,

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personnel of Soviet Consul General were being provided with rations and gasoline, were given privilege of purchases of goods at American Military Stores (Post Exchanges), and were accorded diplomatic immunity and other special privileges, and that no action was taken to require Mr. Polianski to cease his consular activities pending decision of Soviet Government on request of United States for accrediting, on reciprocal basis, of a small consular representation at Pyongyang. Since, in all respects, personnel of Soviet Consul General in Seoul have been treated with full consideration by American Military authorities, from time of capitulation of Japan and occupation of Southern Korea by American troops approximately nine months ago, I am sure you will realize that the statement that actions of American Command have complicated or made impossible normal functioning of Soviet consul general in Seoul is without foundation. All suitable facilities will be afforded for safeguarding of buildings and property of Soviet Government in Seoul. Although I do not wish to press unduly for reply, your reference to my letter of May 29 leads me to inquire if I may have at an early date decision on my request of my Government for establishment of United States Consulate in Northern Korea, since it is my understanding, as a result of recent conversation with Mr. Vishinski, that it is view of Soviet Government that Consulates should be established as needed and not necessarily on reciprocal basis. As pointed out in my previous communication, US government desired to open US Consulate at Pyongyang where United States Nationals have title to important manufacturing, missionary, cultural and residential property, as result of which my Government feels need for carrying out in that area normal Consular functions."

"Instructions to Moscow as follows: "1032, June 7, 2 Pm., Department concurs in your proposed statement to Lomovski..... which contains no error."

On 11 June 1946 Polianski reported that he had received instructions from his government to close the Soviet Consulate in the very near future. He had further been informed by the Soviet Foreign Office that Mr. Konstantin Gregorievich Sikoff, already in Seoul,

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would be left as a caretaker, and that two additional Russians would be sent to assist him, namely Sergei Semonovich Zudin and Nikolai Alexeevich Krivosheef. Polianski stated that he was starting to pack immediately and requested that four Soviet soldiers and one truck be authorized to come to Seoul from the north to assist in his departure. This request was granted. It was mutually agreed that there would be no statement issued at that time. (571)

Two days later, on 13 June, the American Command was notified that Krivosheeff, and Zudin, the two additional men delegated by the Soviet Foreign Office to act as caretakers for the Consulate, had arrived in Pyongyang. Clearance was requested for their trip to Seoul. (572) Although General Hodge had transmitted a request to the State Department on 11 June for any information known about the two proposed caretakers coming from North Korea, (573) it could furnish no information not already known by the American Command. (574)

The matter was closed with the departure of Polianski, together with his staff of co-workers consisting of seven men, nine women, and thirteen children, by train from Seoul for Pyongyang on 2 July. The three aforementioned caretakers were the only Russians remaining t the Consulate. In addition, an American guard was placed over the grounds for protection of the property. (575)

In this discussion of events leading up to the closing of the Soviet consulate in Seoul, the relationship of the consulate

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staff to South Korean Communist activities has been but barely mentioned. Although there was very little proof, in a strictly legal sense, of political intrigue on the part of the Soviets, there was adequate reason for a well-founded suspicion on the part of the American Command that all was not quite as it seemed on the surface. This subject is dealt with in greater detail in the following section.

The Americans, the Russians, and the Korean Communists

The story of the Soviet-dominated Korean Communist Party was one fraught with intrigue directed toward the end of discrediting all things American in Korea. No tactics were barred, up to and including libel, lies, direct interference with official programs, counterfeiting, inciting to riot, intimidation, terrorism, and espionage---to mention only a few.

Of significance in this study of Communist activities in relation to Soviet-American relations are such factors as the international affiliations of the Korean Communist Party; the relationship between the parties of North and South Korea; Communist policy for Korea as outlined in official party documents; the Soviet-Communist sabotage of American efforts in South Korea; espionage directed against American forces; and the American efforts to control

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communist activity. These will be treated in the order listed.

An account of the political manipulation of the Korean Communists is related in Section II, Chapter II, "Korean People and Politics; The First Year."

Internetional Affiliations

On the subject of the international affiliations of the Korean Communists, Prostov reports as follows: (576)

> "Scattered information available in Seoul indicates that Korean Communists have long participated in the meetings of the Comintern, being represented there first, by an observer, later (since 1928) by an unofficial delegate. Officially, the Korean Communist Party was apparently represented in the Comintern by the Japanese delegate...The current relations of the Korean Communist Party to the successor body of the Comintern are not known, since the entire question of international Communist organization, following the dissolution of the Third International, is veiled in impenetrable secrecy. Local Korean sources close to the Communists assert, however, that Kim, Tan Ya, one of the founders of the Korean Communist Party in 1925, is now the official Party representative in Moscow..."

There was some further indication of liaison between Japanese and Korean Communists. Korean Communists showed particular interest in the trip of Kozaka, Japanese Communist leader, through Korea enroute to Japan in late 1945. Communist newspapers in Korea displayed a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the Japanese Communists, despite the fact that such an approach was most unpopular with the mass of Koreans. A SCAP report, dated 16 April, stated that Communists in Japan allegedly were receiving supplies of rice and

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other goods from North Korea. Finally, several significant items substantiating the suspicion that Communist liaison existed between Japan and Korea were found in the financial accounts of the Korean Party seized in a raid of 18 May 1946 on the Communist Party headquarters in Seoul. For instance, on 24 November 1945, the sum of 9,000 yen was recorded as having been expended to send men to Japan to investigate. On 6 January 1946 some 5,000 yen were expended for the expense of a trip to Japan by one Chu Chai Puk. (577) There was some indication that in May 1946 an agent passed through Korea and acted as liaison between Korea and Japan, with possibly an exchange of money taking place. (578) However, in this matter, the realm of speculation was approached.

Indications were that there existed a certain amount of informal liaison between the Korean and American Communist Parties. In June 1946 sufficient evidence had been uncovered to prove beyond doubt that at least four American soldiers (and possibly more), all members of the American Communist Party, had contacted Communist Party headquarters in Seoul. (579) A search of one of these men aboard ship returning to the United States revealed several letters of commendation for the men concerned signed by Puk, together with a long letter from the Korean Communist Party to its counterpart in the United States likewise signed by Puk, and a carbon copy of

an article on Korea which later appeared as an anonymous front page feature in the LOS ANGELES KOREAN INDEPENDENCE NEWS. (580)

Also indicating possible American-Korean communist liaison was the following entry appearing under a 4 January 1946 dateline in the official Communist diary of events: "Comrade Pak Hong Yung interviews two American reporters (one of them a member of the party) E. Snow, from 6 o'clock. From 5-7, interviews with American Communist workers." (581)

The strength of the Communist Party in South Korea has always been a subject of conjecture. When required to register as a political party under Military Government Ordinance No. 55 (released 15 February 1946), the Party reported a membership of 80,000. (582) Earlier in the same month, the Department of Public Information, USAMGIK, had estimated the membership to be only 3,000. (583) As of 1 July 1946, Procter reported that the Party claimed a membership of 107,000——a figure disbelieved by most competent American and Korean observers. However, regardless of the actual numerical strength of the Korean Communist Party, its influence was disproportionately great by reason of the several organizations which it controlled under various guises. (584)

Soviet-South Korean Communist Links

By the end of the year 1945 it was evident that the Communists in South Korea were but the recipients of orders from the Soviet-

inspired North Korean Communist Party. The first official speculation on the subject from USAFIK was a radio sent out by General Hodge on 1 November 1945. (585) It stated in part:

> "Positive proof has not been obtained of outside Communist control of Communist activities in Southern Korea and will be most difficult to obtain. Informants report local communists are subordinate to and receive orders from headquarters in Pyongyang. Communist leader for all Korea alleged to be Toh'ai Ik Han with Kim Tan Ya (Kim Tai Yun) and Toh'ai Moo Cheung as additional important personages. Significant, however, is statement by one delegate from Northern Korea attending recent conference (of) Korean People's Republic that he had been called to Russian Army Headquarters at Heijo. He was told by Russians that since he had been selected as a delegate he would be required to attend the conference in Seoul and would be provided a pass thru the Russian border outpost. A few days later this was modified to make attendance voluntary. A pass thru the Russian outpost was said to have been issued. This statement at variance with statement of Hu Han, chairman of the conference, who said delegates from North Korea attended at their own personal risk.
>
> "Circumstantial evidence indicating possible outside assistance includes the following: a) presence of Russian consul in Seoul; b) Russian confiscation and withdrawal from circulation for possible use in southern Korea all Bank of Chosen money in North Korea and which is valueless except in Southern Korea; c) reports that Communists have received funds from outside sources, presumably Northern Korea; d) reports that 300 Communist organizers are to be sent from Kanko in Northern Korea to Southern Korea; e) internal events show organization and direction beyond the estimated capabilities of local communist leaders."

That the South Korea contingent was acting upon orders from the North was apparent when a sudden and momentarily bewildering

change of party spots occurred on 3 January 1946, relative to the Communist attitude toward trusteeship. Although at that time this was but a conviction in the minds of the American authorities, (286) a document taken from a Korean crossing into South Korea later, in early April, indicated that the conviction was well founded. (see above, pages 77-78)

The first definite evidence of actual contact between Communists in the two sections of Korea actually came to light in late January 1946 when one Toh'ai Hun Ni was apprehended for attempted robbery in Kyongju. Toh'ai stated that along with five others he had been sent by General Kim Il Sung, the principal Korean Communist leader in North Korea, to report to Pak Heun Yung, head of the Communist Party in South Korea. Toh'ai claimed that he was only a subordinate member of the group and was not cognizant of the group's mission. (287)

The failure of the Representative Democratic Council (see above, page 146) to achieve a true coalition of Right and Left was blamed on Soviet intrigue by Political Advisor Langdon. He went on to point out in a radiogram of 22 February 1946 that General Hodge faced the dilemma of either supporting his present Representative Council to the limit, or of striving to convert it into a genuine coalition. If the first alternative were taken, the United States might be accused of backing fascists, pro-Japanese, and the like;

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while if the second alternative were chosen, the Representative Council that finally emerged might be so strongly inclined toward the Left that when it met with the group from the North on a five to eight basis (by provinces) or even a two to one basis (by population) (588) the Soviet-sponsored groups would dominate. This dilemma was a conditioning factor all during the period. If a balanced political group were formed in South Korea and later combined with a Soviet-approved group from North Korea for the purpose of setting up a unified political structure, the future Korean government might be delivered right into the arms of the extreme Leftists.

At the same time, 22 February 1946, General Hodge summarized the political situation as follows: (589)

> "Russians have set up their group for North Korea (Interim People's Committee established on 8-9 February), camouflaging Communists under names of three parties [Chosen Democratic Party, Yenan Independence Alliance, and Korean Communist Party / People's Party in South Korea headed by Lyuh as a definite Communist have gathered in many other named groups to class as 'democratic' societies, groups who will insist on being considered, while Rightist and center have undergone great consolidation of groups behind outstanding leaders. Blackout over North Korea is recently intensified. Travelers from South without Communist visas being arrested as American spies. Russians no doubt plan to force us to accept their government as the democratic representatives of North Korea while trying to force us to give enough Communist representatives from South Korea to gain control of Korean Interim government by Communist. For the present I plan to keep up prestige of South Korean Representative Council, make every effort to gain full backing of Korean people, and discredit the Communists. This will probably get liberal and pink press of US on my neck, but feel that any other local action now would be fatal."

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By this time, intelligence giving indications of liaison between the Northern and Southern branches of the Communist organization was flowing into the XXIV Corps G-2. There was considerable evidence that early in March 1946 negotiation for a transfer of funds to the South Korean Communist Party took place at the Soviet Consulate in Seoul. The Soviet Union allegedly promised to finance the Korean Communist Party to the amount of seventy million yen in support of the latter's efforts to dominate Korea. Pak Heun Yung was reported as having at his disposal two million yen of the above amount, largely for use in financing newspapers. (590)

At this same time, information came to light from a "usually reliable Korean informant" that the Soviets had issued Red Army money in North Korea for the specific purpose of making available a surplus of Bank of Chosen notes for use in organizational work in South Korea. It was also reported that at the preparatory meeting in Seoul for the organization of the Leftist Democratic People's Front on 2 February 1946 some twelve million yen had been voted for the support of the CHOSUN INMIN PO (Korean People's News), the official Communist Party organ in South Korea. Hong Cherng Sik, editor-publisher-owner of INMINPO, told this same informant that

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some 8,000 yen were being spent daily to guard the newspaper plant, the inference being that the sum was from party funds. Hong, strangely enough, was a comparatively poor man before the occupation, but from September 1945 on, he became progressively more affluent. The same was true of many other Communist Party leaders who began to sport good clothes, automobiles, and to provide lavish entertainment. (591)

By the end of March 1946, General Hodge commented that a considerable amount of brand new money had arrived in South Korea and that it was "perfectly obvious where it had come from." The General went on to point out that the Communists in Korea started with a pot of sixty million yen (probably from official Japanese sources), but that that was being gradually used up and was being replenished. (592) The General radioed SCAP, "Although I have been unable to establish clearly how it arrived, there is increasing evidence that several million yen for Communist use made its appearance in this zone simultaneously with the arrival of the Russian delegation (to the Joint Commission). Do not consider these facts as anything new or unexpected in Russian technique. Merely report them to indicate no change from other areas." (593)

The authorities in Washington, D. C., immediately wanted to know more and requested information as to the extent local Korean political leaders were meeting with members of the Soviet delegation

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to the Joint Commission or with the Russian Consul in Seoul.(594)

CIC was put on the job cultivating those who frequented the Consulate. Informants were obtained who actually attended parties there.(595) Within a week General Hodge radioed the following information by way of reply:(596)

> "Consistent and reliable reports have been received and confirmed that Pak Heun Yung, Communist leader of South Korean, and Lyuh Woon Hyung, leader of People's Party, have been frequent visitors at the Russian Consulate over a period of past three to four months, with some reports indicating that both individuals frequently maintain temporary residence at Consulate. There is reason to believe that there have been political meetings with Koreans held at Consulate. We are investigating rumors that Kim Il Sung, Communist and leader of People's Government in North Korea, has recently arrived in Seoul and is staying at Consulate. Further reports will be made. Lesser members of the Soviet delegation living in billet known here as 'Stalingrad' engage in considerable entertainment of Koreans. Whether or not political leaders is not known. A Korean, Captain in the Russian Army and member of Soviet delegation, is known to hold meetings with local Koreans. Constant surveillance is maintained concerning this subject with a view to obtaining additional specific information.

Further information followed:(597)

> "...Following is account of activities of a Major Kim and a Major Sneg (first names unknown), Soviet Army officers of Korean blood on duty in Seoul as interpreters for Soviet delegation to Joint Commission. Kim and Sneg are reported to be making frequent visits in civilian clothes to various parts of Seoul each time requesting a different driver. They usually have the driver wait near their destination, and proceed remainder of distance on foot or walk about in vicinity of the vehicle while in conversation with various Koreans.

The close link between the southern and northern Communist elements and the Soviet Union was further indicated by the constant

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stream of pro-Soviet propaganda along well established party lines being mouthed by South Korean Communist leaders and organs. Most vocal among the local 'newspapers' was the CHOSUN INMIN PO, official Communist Party organ in Seoul--official, by its own admission.

Moreover, abundant evidence was uncovered during this period indicating that South Korean Communists were being sent North to attend political schools. For instance, in a raid of the CIC 16 May 1946 on the Party's Seoul headquarters an actual pass permitting a Party member to travel to Wonsan in North Korea to join the Laborer's Political School was found. On the back of the pass appeared the man's name in Russian. (598) Another document, likewise taken from the Party Headquarters, consisted of credentials and letters of attorney for four Koreans dispatched to the Pyongyang Political School. (599) In an August 7 raid on the home of Kim Sei Tung, Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the People's Party, another Communist pass to North Korea was discovered. It was signed by Pak Heum Yung and written partially in Russian. (600)

By late spring and early summer of 1946 the link between North and South had been definitely established beyond all shadow of doubt. From the Communist Party books seized in the May 16 raid on the headquarters in Seoul it came to light that numerous trips to North Korea had been financed every month from Party funds. Of

special significance was one less entry, possibly a slip, which gave the actual source of the money received for a particular deposit: "7 January, Chung Tchei Dai, from North, Received 10,000 yen." Significant also was the discrepancy between the receipts and expenditures of the Party as reported to Military Government pursuant to requirements of Ordinance No. 55 (Registration of Political Parties) and those recorded in the seized books, books not intended for American eyes. Moreover, of the actual total income amounting to 2,846,185.25 yen for the period November 1945 through May 1946, some 2,487,100.00 yen had been received from Lee Kwan Seol, later the principal defendant in the counterfeiting case. This scheme of using the name of the man receiving the money for the Party, rather than giving the actual source, effectively concealed the real source. There was abundant evidence that Lee had at his disposal some master fund of indeterminate source into which he dipped whenever Party funds became low. This master fund no doubt was accounted for by another set of even more carefully guarded books, books which never were unearthed by American investigators. (601)

Of course, the frequent visits by South Korean Leftist leaders to confer with their northern counterparts on matters of policy made the close alliance between North and South obvious.

This outside direction of the extreme Leftists harassed the American occupation throughout the first year. In fact, the major aim of these puppet leaders seemed to be the creation of chaos in the American zone so that any semblance to good administration by the Americans would be impossible, thereby driving the restless and despairing Koreans into the apparent solace of the extreme Leftist camp. If this could be accomplished, it was clear that the Soviet hand would be considerably strengthened at the international card table by the insertion of at least one more trump card.

Communist-Soviet policy

Just what the Communist-Soviet policy was in respect to Korea was of vital importance to the American forces occupying South Korea. Little by little it was pieced together by XXIV Corps G-2, knowledge of which ultimately led to carefully planned counter moves on the part of General Hodge in the struggle to maintain the prestige of the United States in Korea and for the way of life it espoused.

Before the occupation was barely two months old, General Hodge reported (602):

"Communist activities are well organized and effective and are definitely opposed to and hampering the efforts of the United States Forces to establish an effective Government and sound economy. Communism is apparently backed by both Soviet and Japanese activities in apparent effort to create chaos. Believe Soviets want chaos to discredit United States Forces in order to force withdrawal and Japanese influences

want chaos in hope that Japan may gain economic control... Communism is strengthening as Chinese Communists show strength in North China and Manchuria."

On 26 January 1946 Pak Heun Yung said in a press conference, apparently speaking for the Communist Party, "We have no objection to a single nation Soviet trusteeship...We hope for ten to twenty years development as a free and independent democracy along socialist Sovietized lines." In answering a question as to whether this would lead ultimately to Sovietization of Korea with the possibility of incorporating that country into the Soviet Union at some time in the future, Pak commented, "Yes, possibly, but this is not possible at this time...Now, the Korean people would not favor this and also geographically it would not be possible to be included in the Soviet Union at this time." (603)

By March of the same year General Hodge did not hesitate to comment in a XXIV Corps Staff Conference that the Communist aim was to communize Korea and make it a Soviet colony. (604) By mid-March the General reported to SCAP that the ready strength of the Soviet close at hand had a powerful influence on the thinking of Orientals, a large portion of whom desired to be under the wing of a strong nation and on whom force made a great impression. He also pointed out that the newly formed Soviet-inspired North Korean government, the Interim People's Committee, had given great publicity to its

land and property confiscation program which included the seizure of all property, that belonging to both the Japanese and to Korean landlords, for reported free distribution to tenant farmers. (605) By this act, the Soviets had created a very considerable vested interest in their new puppet administration, thereby strengthening it, as well as causing serious embarrassment for the American authorities in the South who were not empowered to effect a similar land reform. South Korean Communists made the most of the situation and painted a glowing picture of North Korea as contrasted to South Korea under the American "reactionaries" and "imperialists."

That trusteeship was a foregone conclusion on the part of the Soviet, to be settled even before a Korean provisional government was formed, was made painfully obvious as a result of the Joint Commission deliberations. (606) Meanwhile the Communist Party of South Korea loyally continued to cry out for the imposition of a trusteeship.

By the end of June 1946 the so-called "Joint Soviet Communist Master Plan for Korea" had been pieced together and well verified. Following were the main points of strategy as outlined by CIC in a 29 June report: (607)

> "a. In North Korea, within a period of two, and not more than three, years, a minimum of 500,000 Koreans are to be given thorough military training. This will not only be done in various so-called 'armies', but also in the police organizations, in factories, mines, young men's organizations, and in schools. As many as possible of these trainees will be infiltrated into the various governmental agencies in South Korea, especially in the police agencies.

"b. During this same period of two or three years, the Communist Party in South Korea will first strive with all speed to become as strong as possible in membership. The Party will at the same time set up branches throughout South Korea on every administrative level from province down to myun, and will staff these branches with loyal and efficient men and women. Various auxiliary groups will be formed, such as young men's groups.

"c. As soon as the proper organizational perfection has been achieved in South Korea, several moves will be carried out simultaneously. Members of the party, singly and in groups, will begin to go underground. Various allied organizations will publicly disassociate themselves from the Communist Party. "Factions" within the Communist party will be "permitted" to become known to the public (and to the Americans). Also, at the time when the party has reached its utmost peak in influence with the public and with the Military Government, it will begin to be "willing" to compromise with the Korean right-wing. As the party begins to go underground and, seemingly, to be steadily losing ground, they will finally reach a compromise with the right-wing in establishing a government for Korea which will be as far left as it is possible to procure in making the compromise.

"d. Once this government is set up, and the power of the Communist party becomes increasingly weaker, ostensibly, it is felt that the American forces will be ready to withdraw from Korea. At the opportune time, the Soviet forces will offer to withdraw from North Korea, provided the Americans also withdraw from Korea.

"e. Soon after the Allies have withdrawn, various kinds of incidents and disorders, in widely scattered areas of the country, will occur. On the excuse of restoring order, the trained Communist armies and police will begin action in all parts of the country simultaneously. Kim, Il Sung, boasted that they would have control of every police agency in Korea within 48 hours. While "order" is thus being restored, the government will be taken over by the Communists, and during the same period, objectionable persons such as national traitors and pro-Japanese will be eliminated."

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Actually, events seemed to be falling into this pattern. By the end of July 1946, intensified military training of various Communist organizations in the North by the Red Army was reported, with the goal being set at 500,000 armed Koreans three years hence. It was General Hodge's opinion that these military groups would presumably form the basis for a continuation of Communist influence following the ultimate withdrawal of foreign military forces from Korea and the unification of the country. There was also considerable indication that Soviet authorities were sending numbers of young Koreans to the Soviet Union for education and indoctrination in a long range program to perpetuate local Communist influence. (608)

Moreover, as the first year of occupation ended there was no little evidence that the Communist Party as such was in the process of going underground. The identity of the party was pretty well submerged in the ranks of the Korean Labor Party---both North and South. As for the Communist Party in South Korea specifically, Prostov comments that the most plausible explanation of its submergence into the South Korean Labor Party was that, with Moscow's concurrence, the Party had found it convenient to go underground, thus completing the process which had long been taking place in the provinces. He goes on to say, "a comparable phenomenon has already taken place in the case of the Communist Youth Alliances (the Komsomol of Korea)

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which has become submerged in a respectable sounding Democratic Youth Alliance, without, however, losing its cellular structure, developed for the purpose of clandestine operation, and becoming a "secret society within a society."(609)

As for the general overall Soviet intent on this move, Prestov goes on to speculate:(610)

> "In the final analysis, the Soviet contention, implicit in the 'United Front' pattern, that the USSR intends to set up a 'democratic' Korea will be greatly strengthened by the disappearance, however illusory, of the two Korean Communist Parties, and of the two Communist Youth Alliances, and the emergence of new groups theoretically pledged to parliamentarism."

It is a well established Comintern policy to consider the social-democrat, the liberal, or the progressive as the archenemy of communism, rather than the reactionary. Thus it was that the Communist Party of South Korea fought and opposed any working political coalition of moderate Rightists and Leftists. If such a group could be formed and the Korean governmental machinery fell under the direction of such a liberal group, it was apparent that the Communist Party appeal would be minimized and its influence shattered. One American effort to form such a group was the Representative Democratic Council. Of this group Pak commented, "The character of this Council has always been undemocratic. Therefore, we will not participate."(611) Pak's opposition to the later left-of-center Coalition Committee led by Kim Kyu Sik and Lyuh Woon Hyung has already been described in

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a preceding section. Suffice to say here that there is much to indicate that these were not merely arbitrary actions on the part of Pak nor was it coincidence that they were in line with Comintern policy written many years previous.

By August 1946, the Communists had apparently pretty well accomplished their purpose by promoting the disintegration of any political group occupying the middle ground in South Korea. It seemed that any political figure who cut loose from either the extreme Rightist or extreme Leftist camp and attempted to steer a middle course simply committed political suicide. The extremists were in power. XXIV Corps was caught in the cross fire. If it turned to the extreme Right for assistance it would be the unwelcome recipient of a veritable storm of protest and criticism from many sides. On the other hand, if it turned to the Left, the danger of unknowingly delivering power into Communist hands was a very real one. This dilemma was pointed out by General Hodge in a 4 August 1946 radio to SCAP (612) In the meantime, the Communist leader, Pak, informed his subordinates in a "secret" letter dated 1 August 1946: (613)

> "The Americans have recognized and stated that the Korean people have the ability to self-govern and Korea can get her independence immediately. That is what we heard and if that is true, the United States should realize these claims and carry them out. If the United States has in mind to abolish the 38th parallel for the Korean people, the U. S. Army itself has to be withdrawn from the 38th parallel and from South Korea immediately. If the U. S. Army shows such good faith first, the Soviet Army will also withdraw from North Korea."

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More information as to Communist strategy was brought to light in Pusan on 29 August 1946, when a document labelled "top secret" and entitled "Instructions on New Tactics" was seized. This revealed that the Communist Party intended to depart from blaming all of Korea's ills on Right Wing parties and was contemplating an attack on USAMGIK as "an organ established by the United States to make slaves of the Korean people." Moreover, in the future the adjournment of the Joint Commission was not to be blamed on the right Wing, but rather, on the "international reactionary strategy of the American representatives." (614) General Hodge summarized the situation early in the same month by commenting that the Communist group was actively engaged in an all-out attempt to discredit the American effort, to sabotage Military Government, and to build up hatred against the Americans. (615) To these charges, the General might have added the possession of unauthorized arms, and espionage against the American forces.

Sabotage

Soon after the occupation commenced it had become apparent that tactics of the Communist Party in South Korea called for the creation of chaos in the American zone through the sabotage of the

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efforts of American military government.(616) This took the form of seizing upon some situation or activity which had caused some degree of irritation among the Korean public and building it up out of all proportion to the truth of the matter. Such clouds of accusation, propaganda, rumor, and confusion were created that the progress made by South Korea under American Military Government often was momentarily obscured from public sight. Particular sore points were the grain collections; inflation; personnel within Military Government; and the lack of land reform or of an all-Korean administration--these last two allegedly being in contrast with the situation in North Korea. Inciting groups to violence, counterfeiting, and the twisting of American statements to mean something quite different from that originally intended, were all included in the list of approved Communist tactics. These activities were so many and diverse that it is impossible to do more than to cite examples.

For instance, on 21 December 1945, Hong Cheong Sik, a known Communist and president of the CHOSUN INMIN PO, stated, in direct contravention of the truth, that General Arnold had been "bought" by the Hankook Democrats and opposed the Communists. Hong said that this was the reason for General Arnold's "dismissal" as Military Governor.(617)

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In January 1946 posters produced by the Korean student scouts, under Communist domination, stated that the interpreters for the Americans should leave their jobs and return to their homes. (618) Late in the same month, it was reported that the Pyongyang Communist Party in North Korea had sent men, money, and propaganda to South Korea for furthering their aims and terrorizing right wing groups. (619) Again on 25 March, CIC reported new groups of terrorists being sent from the north. (620)

By April, it was known that communist controlled farmers' groups and People's Committees were ordering farmers in South Korea to keep their rice crops and to sell them on the black market. (621) In the raid on the Communist Party headquarters at Seoul, evidence was unearthed indicating that the Party had paid money to various individuals and groups for demonstration purposes. (622) In May, two Communist agitators spoke on a tour through Cholla-namdo province, blaming Military Government for corruption in the province and urging its Korean employees to riot. (623)

A constant verbal lashing of the Military Government-sponsored police by Communist leaders and organs characterized the entire first year of the occupation. The charges of pro-Japanese, brutality, corruption, and Left Wing oppression by the police were heard constantly.

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At times this opposition to the police was incited into violence. (624) It was likewise reported on good authority that many of the strikes and other labor troubles in various cities throughout South Korea were provoked by Communist organizers infiltrating into South Korea from the North. (625) The Communists were quick to exploit minor labor difficulties and fan dissident workers into violence, the aim being, of course, to embarrass the American Command.

On 25 May 1946 the much discussed counterfeiting case broke, news of which pushed even the problem of the Joint Commission momentarily into second place and severely shook Communist prestige and Pak's control of the Party. During the spring months of 1946 a huge amount of counterfeit 100 yen notes had flooded Seoul and South Korea. It was later estimated at the trial that some nine to eleven million yen had been printed. On 3 May, the police finally tracked down the source to presses housed in the building in which both the Communist Party headquarters and the printing presses of the extreme left wing newspaper the HAI BANG ILBO (Emancipation News), were located. Members of the Communist Party were immediately implicated. Included among them were Lee Kwan Soo, financial Director of the Communist Party, and Kwon O Chik, a known Communist and president of HAI BONG ILBO. (626) Actually, all but one of those ultimately arrested subsequently were found to

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he Party members, although American authorities moved carefully so as to bring charges only against the individuals per se and not as members of the Party. The Communist Party, in return, branded the entire affair as an outright lie, and denied that the Party or any of its officials had had anything to do with the counterfeit ring. The episode was, according to them another "vicious plot" to "undermine the dignity of our party."(627) On 29 July 1946 the accused counterfeiters were brought to trial amidst the confusion and bloodshed of an unprecedented Communist-inspired riot in front of the court house in Seoul in which one student was shot.(628) At that time General Hodge directed that the trial continue as a trial of individuals on the same basis as planned, even though "the Communist Party had by its actions brought grave suspicions as to the extent of its interest in the affair."(629) Sentence was finally handed down on 30 November 1946, Lee Kwan Soo and three others being sentenced to life, and the four other defendants given lesser sentences. The final proceedings were highlighted by the defendants singing the Communist International.(630)

Typical of the increasingly hysterical propaganda directed against the Military Government was a handbill distributed by the Seoul Committee of the Korean Communist Party on 15 August 1946, saying in part:(631)

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"The American Military Government should discard its colonization policy and turn over the political power to the People's Committee immediately:

"Hurrah for complete democratic independence on the first anniversary of August 15:

"Fellow countrymen: Look at North Korea:

"Land reform, labor ordinance, ordinance for equality of men and women were enforced completely. Enterprises of Japanese and national traitors were nationalized. Factories are in active operation and there are no unemployed. The people of North Korea are now having their day! That is not all! The political power is in the hands of the people. Construction of democratic fatherland is growing steadily.

"This is what was given by the Red Army in the first year of liberation in North Korea!

"But, our fellow countrymen, how about South Korea?

"The joy of liberation was shattered by hunger and the freedom of people by the bayonets and guns of reactionary police. Pro-Japanese and national traitors under the leadership of, Rhee, Syngman and Kim, Koo robbed the people of their rights with the assistance of the American Military Government! Is this all? They caused the U. S. - Soviet Joint Conference which assists the establishment of the provisional government to adjourn and try to make Korea the colony of a foreign power! This is the state of things in South Korea under the American Military Government!"

Early in August 1946, General Hodge summarized for higher authorities the activities of the Communist Party in a blistering attack. He made the following specific charges, all based on verified Communist documents which had fallen into the

(632)

hands of American investigators:

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1. Communist-ordered infiltration into the Korean police, constabulary, and Coast Guard "for the purpose of undermining their morale, efficiency, and loyalty."

2. Communist Party efforts in Southern Korea "to do everything in its power to create dissension and to confuse and split the Korean people."

3. Orders issued through the Communist-controlled All Korean Farmer's Union for farmers to withhold their 1945 rice harvest and 1946 summer grain harvest from the MG grain collection program.

4. Efforts "to prevent distribution of food in large cities and food deficiency areas, thus giving a greater opportunity to create suffering, unrest, and dissension among the people and to discredit legal agencies, thereby gaining a larger party following."

5. Communist Party advice "to its adherents not to pay taxes or rents, which go to keep up public works and utilities and to repair damaged economic facilities."

6. Instructions "to seize upon every opportunity to instigate riots and create civil disturbances", including the "infiltration of trained agitators into activities and crowds and assemblies" to stir up trouble whenever the opportunity offers."

7. The maintenance of a "widespread spy system."

8. Mass propagandizing of student and youth movements and the inculcation of Communist doctrines.

9. The gaining of control by "a few thousand inspired Communists" of the inner circles of some of the trade unions, farmers' unions, and youth groups, this by careful manipulation, multi-party membership, and secret undercover activity.

The General concluded this indictment by saying:

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"The inevitable conclusion is that in Southern Korea the Korean Communist Party, taking advantage of those very democratic rights and privileges which are existent in Southern Korea, is attempting to create confusion in the minds of Koreans, to prevent Korean unity, to sow seeds of mistrust against the United States Administration and assistance, and to further the political ends of the Communists. The actions of the Korean Communist Party are not those of a political group in a democracy seeking political power in the accepted manner, but are a well planned project on a broad scale to discredit and interfere with the economic and political progress of South Korea.

"The motives which actuate the inner circles of the Korean Communist Party leaders are foreign to the nature and interests of Korea. There exists little doubt that their actions are definitely and rigidly directed from outside of Southern Korea. The aim of these leaders patently to add Korea to the list of Communist dominated countries regardless of its effect upon the Korean nation."

Needless to say, all this activity sorely tried American patience, but it was out-and-out espionage against the American forces which finally provided the straw that broke the camel's back.

Espionage

On 5 March 1946, two Koreans acting as Soviet Army agents were apprehended in Seoul. Signed confessions were obtained. Both had been briefed by Soviet Army officers and sent south to join the USAMGIK-sponsored Coast Guard School. If they found it impossible to join the school, the men had been instructed to pursue a secondary mission, that of visiting the principal cities of South Korea in

order to obtain information on United States Army strength and local economic conditions. They had been especially directed to visit Inchon and secure information as the amount of shipping present, the nature of imports and exports, and the presence of warships. They were to call upon the Communist Party if in need of funds. Failure of the mission was to result in court-martial and reprisal against the families of the agents.(655)

Shortly thereafter, evidence of a nationwide Communist-organized espionage system began to pile up rapidly. On 18 May, CIC agents seized "secret" documents at the headquarters of the Korean Communist Party in Seoul, which clearly implicated the Party. These documents indicated that instructions had been issued on or about 5 March to the Communist headquarters in each city, county, and sector of South Korea, requesting the collection of information on the United States Army Forces. On 25 June, additional documents were obtained from the headquarters of the Communists in Wonju, Kangwon-do, which were addressed to the Central Committee of the Party and gave proof that subordinate Communist organizations were gathering and reporting United States Army troop strength, movements, and activities. On 27 June, General Hodge reported that no information was available to indicate the ultimate destination of the reports, but that "circumstances would indicate that they were probably delivered to the Russian Consulate in Seoul."(656)

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The American Command was immediately alerted for further evidence of espionage. On 29 June, CIC headquarters sent out instructions to all district offices. (695)

"If documentary evidence can be obtained to show that the Communist Party is actually engaged in espionage on American Forces in Korea it would be of paramount importance. To attain this end a quiet raid on gun or county branch offices of the Communist Party is authorized, using as a basis for such a raid a report that weapons are being concealed in said office.

"If this evidence can be discovered, every effort should be made to tie this espionage set up with Communist Party Headquarters in Seoul. This could be done by showing that a request for this information came to the gun or county from the Seoul headquarters, investigation instituted was based on this, and that the report was forwarded to Seoul headquarters. It is noted that all Communist Party offices keep a record log of all documents received and sent. This log should be used to trace this document. Since this original document was sent from Seoul around the 5th of March, receipts around this date should be closely scrutinized, and if found, it might provide the nomenclature used by that office in referring to this document, which would be useful in checking later entries."

Results were not long in forthcoming. An 18 July raid on the Farmer's Union in Kongju, Chungchong-namdo, produced a document signed by the provincial committee requesting information from the district committees relative to the American Forces. From Pusan came the report that copies of documents similar to those found in Seoul had been seized from a known Communist and also at the headquarters, Kyongsang-namdo committee of the Democratic People's Front. A similar request for information was unearthed in Chinju on 17 July

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at the local headquarters of the Chinju People's Committee. (636)

In the meantime, a number of Communist agents from North Korea were intercepted by CIC. On or about the first of July 1946 a Korean was arrested in Chonju for not possessing a cholera pass. He was found to have the tattoo mark of the Communist Party of North Korea on his person, and so, was turned over to the CIC. During the ensuing interview it was found that he had attended a secret political school in North Korea run by four Soviet Army officers and one Korean lecturer. The subjects taught had to do with methods of collecting information, guerrilla tactics, communism, politics, economy, sabotage, and general affairs of South Korea. The enrollement was 600, the entrance qualification being the ability to speak a South Korean dialect. (637) This encounter was typical. So much so, in fact, that at one time CIC agents posed as medical inspectors in the Seoul railroad stations, thus providing a logical excuse for examining incoming passengers for the distinguishing tattoo marks. Several such marks were found, but none of the persons apprehended appeared to be engaged in espionage. (638)

More evidence kept coming in, however. Late in July 1946 a Korean was intercepted who confessed that he had been dispatched with several other Koreans from Hamhung by a Korean 1st Lt. of the Red Army for the purpose of gathering information concerning the political

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situation in South Korea and American Army equipment and movements. He claimed to have visited the Propaganda Department of the Korean Communist Party of South Korea on 14 June, at which time he was informed that a group in Inchon was collecting information on harbor installations. (639)

The Cjonju CIC detachment on 6 August reported information which substantiated earlier intelligence from other areas. (640)

> "This office has received information that espionage agents have been dispatched to South Korea from North Korea for the purpose of obtaining U. S. classified documents and gathering information of American Forces, Military Government and Korean Government. These agents are to be disguised in three ways: (a) as printing company and hand stamp salesmen in order to gain access to Military Government and Korean Government offices; (b) as beggars in order to obtain information of U. S. tactical troops; (c) as blacksmith venders in order to go from house to house and obtain information from Korean civilians. These men might be identified by the communist mark of North Korea, which is a small black dot (¼"in diameter) on the left forearm and the buttocks; however, not all might possess this mark."

Ostensibly in a search for concealed arms, the civil police raided the home of Kim Sei Yong, Chief of the political affairs section of the People's Party, on 7 August. Five pistols and numerous leftwing documents were found, including detailed but not too reliable information on United States Army installations and units, detailed information on the Korean constabulary and Coast Guard, Military Government, and the police. Translations of these documents revealed that infiltration into the Constabulary

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and Coast Guard had been most successful. Suffice to say that Kim Sei Yong conveniently disappeared. Subsequently, the home of Lee Kang Kook, a member of the general standing committee of the Communist Party was raided, on a similar pretext. This raid revealed a map of the harbors and naval installations in South Korea reportedly prepared by an official of the Korean Coast Guard. (641) Lee likewise vanished. On the following day, 8 August 1946, the Seoul headquarters of the People's Party was entered and searched. Still further evidence was uncovered indicating considerable spy work. General Hodge commented that the American Forces in South Korea seemed to be well "cased." (642)

By the end of August 1946 warrants were out for the arrest of not only Kim Sei Yong and Lee Kang Kook, but also Pak Heun Yung himself as the responsible leader of the Communist group. All three men, however, had disappeared and were still eluding the police as the period ended. (643)

American Policy on South Korean Communists

The American Command was aware at the outset of the difficulties in dealing with the local Communists. As early as November 1945, General Hodge commented that communistic activities were reaching a point where they might get out of control unless some positive action was taken. (644) He went on to say:

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"Activities are hampering efforts to establish sound Korean economic system and a foundation upon which there can be established an independent government. Communist propaganda is so insidious and well handled as to have influenced materially American press at times in criticism of United States efforts in Southern Korea. When it becomes necessary to take drastic action, it maybe expected it will be followed by a flood of wails both by Korean and Russian communists and by American press against discrimination or suppression of 'civil liberties', etc. My observation leads me to believe that Koreans basically do not favor or want Communism and that the great majority are actually nationalists. The entire activity has the smell of being agitated by a well trained group of outside experts. As doing all I can do avoid a real crack down but may be forced to such action."

Later in November, the General suggested to SCAP that the Chungking Korean Provisional Government either be officially recognized as the South Korean government or used as a nucleus about which to construct an interim government. The motive for this suggested move was to provide a counter-irritant to the spread of communism in the Korean area. (645) However, no positive action was taken on the suggestion.

In order to provide adequate security for the United States Armed Forces in Korea, it was necessary that an extensive intelligence organization be put into operation. For instance in the late spring of 1946 the following appeal was radioed to SCAP, the subject of which was an "increase of fund requirements for.... Military Intelligence, needed for the hire of informants and

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undercover agents in the highly sensitive area of Korea;"(646)

> "Communist activity, inimical to the best interests of the United States Military Government in Korea, is widespread, and there is extensive proof that agents of a foreign government have and are operating in this area. This estimate is based on experience of the past six months during which time a system has been set up which, if it is to be continued, will need the maximum amount requested herein for efficient operation."

Actually the policy of the American Command was one of scrupulously maintaining political impartiality. Communist publications and Party leaders and members were allowed the same freedom as all other political groups---at least, so far as the Americans were concerned. Some evidence indicated that the Korean civil police took exception to this policy, and on occasion waged warfare on extreme Left Wing factions. For instance, in the late spring of 1946 an order was apparently issued down through Korean police channels to arrest all prominent Leftist leaders. As a result, scores of Leftist leaders were placed in confinement, either on the charge of seizing governmental authority illegally during the previous fall; for failing to register the names of political party members; for interfering with MG administration; or on no charge whatsoever.(647) Additional information relative to widespread illegal political activity on the part of the police was uncovered in an official investigation in the early summer of 1946.(648) It also developed

in the early fall of the same year that the police had been making a practise of augmenting their forces by elements of the Right wing young men's groups. (649)

It was not until the Chickering counterfeiting case broke in May 1946, and the Communist Party was obviously implicated, that the American Command began to take direct action. However, in the trial of the alleged counterfeiters the American officials carefully specified that the persons concerned were being tried as individuals and not as members of the Communist Party. The Communist Party was never directly accused of complicity in the counterfeiting activities, although General Hodge did state on one occasion that by its actions the Party had given birth to grave suspicions as to the extent of its interest in the affair. (650)

The investigation of this case led to a raid on the Communist Party Headquarters in Seoul on 18 May, at which time evidence was found indicating espionage. With that, the American Command moved, and searches of various Left Wing headquarters were conducted throughout South Korea. Evidence mounted against the Communist Party and its affiliates. On 30 July, General Hodge radioed CINCAFPAC as follows: (651)

> "I believe the time has arrived locally for us to blast the Korean Communist Party by a full statement of their activities and aims, and to denounce their activities in South Korea. This will of course have international repercussions.

> My one concern is that such a statement at this time might embarrass the State Department in current or future negotiations. If you personally agree with me, request Washington be queried as to its effect. I am willing to accept the title if a goat is needed for the U. S. Government to slide out from under."

On 4 August 1946 General Hodge submitted to CINCAFPAC a suggested press release regarding Communist-inspired activities in South Korea. In this, the General pointed out, "When the American Forces came to Korea they brought with them the idea of democracy. We were determined to allow the democratic freedoms to the Koreans in the American occupied zone. We have made every effort consistent with the safety of the American Forces to carry out that determination...We have tried to stay out of Korean politics." The General continued by pointing out that the purpose of this statement was to acquaint the Korean people with the facts behind the scenes, and that they were free to draw their own conclusions. And with that, he drew attention specifically to the Korean Communist Party and to those groups completely dominated by it. The General went on by listing in its entirety, the catalog of charges against the Communist Party up to and including espionage. The statement (652) concluded:

> "The motives which actuate the inner circles of the Korean Communist Party leaders are foreign to the nature and interests of Korea. There exists little doubt that their actions are definitely and rigidly directed from outside of Southern Korea. The aim of these leaders is patently to add Korea to the list of Communist dominated countries regardless of its effect upon the Korean nation.."

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General Hodge commented at that time that such a stand would strengthen the hand of the American authorities in Korea and decrease the confusion in the minds of the mass of Korean people. "Continuing any attempt to be tolerant to them [the Communists] may be fatal in the end."(653) Although this direct attack upon the Communist Party suggested by General Hodge received a "hold fire" from Washington(654) and did no more than pass the planning stage during the first year of occupation, action was taken in a more indirect manner against the Party.

In mid-August the Commanding General expressed disapproval of the proposed visit to Korea of a mission representing the World Federation of Trade Unions. In expressing his disapproval the General pointed out that the All-Korean Labor Union (Ledong Cho Hap Chaun Pyaung Choi Hwoy) had joined the WFTU on 28 July 1946 "via channels of communication through North Korea" and was a "completely Communist-organized, controlled, and dominated organization." Commented General Hodge, "The visit of the WFTU group to South Korea at this time is deemed highly inopportune in view of the strained Korean political situation and the adverse effect that it may have on our mission here...The arrival of the WFTU mission to South Korea, with quasi-official backing of the United States in permitting and

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facilitating its movements, would boom the prestige of the Chwun Pyeung, and, in turn, strengthen the power of the Communist Party, whose political fortunes now appear to be at a low ebb." (655)

On 20 August 1946 General Hodge issued a public statement expressing his deep appreciation of the manner in which the Korean people had handled the celebration of Liberation Day on 15 August. The concluding paragraph, however, touched on a different note and one which could hardly have been misinterpreted by those who read it: (656)

> "In this connection, I feel impelled at the same time to express my great regret that one dissident political group felt that they could not afford to be smirched by any association with the great mass of their fellow Koreans nor in any way cooperate with the Americans to have a grand joint celebration of an internationally important occasion celebrated jointly over the entire world. I also regret that some imported agitators of this group, operating in one of the southern provinces, caused some unsavory and unwarranted disorders. Of course, we are all fully aware of the activities of this group and the source of their orders for non-cooperation. Because of this I have hope that no one will attempt to place any blame on the good people of South Korea."

On 31 August another statement came from the office of the Commanding General, this time directed against Communist-inspired propaganda against the United States. Said the General:

> "It has been interesting to watch the recently growing play of vicious propaganda coming from the mouths, press, pamphlets and posters of some political groups in South Korea, particularly the 'line' aimed at the United States as a nation, at its representatives here in the occupation of South Korea and at the Military Government operating under United States guidance. It is clearly apparent that somewhere there are well organized propaganda factories working in all out effort to discredit all American effort to help the rebuilding of Korea."

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In a lengthy statement, General Hodge went on to give specific examples of what he meant, but without once mentioning the Communist Party. However, it was obvious at whom the release (657) was directed. The statement concluded:

> "No honest man fears truth. All honest men stick to truth in statements and in writings. I advise the Korean people to learn to differentiate between true facts as opposed to distortions, falsehoods and fabrications that are presented for selfish aims. We should examine carefully the statements of politicians who sling mud, so that we may separate truth from pure propaganda. When violent political mud-slinging starts we may be sure that there is something beyond fact to be presented and that this diversion from fact has some definite purpose. We should follow the advice of those sound leaders who preach unity of all truly Korean people and unification of truly Korean efforts for a better nation and better life. Above all, beware of any leader who preaches and practices terrorism, violent revolution, class warfare and class hatred as a means to separate the people, and who makes great promises of something for nothing."

That the barbs struck home was illustrated by immediate replies published in the CHOSUN INMIN PO (Korean People's Times), the Communist Party organ in Seoul. Said it on 5 September: "The best thing the U. S. Military Government can do is to transfer the supreme power to the People's Committees, the representatives of the Korean nation, and withdraw from Korea as soon as possible."

Meanwhile, American patience had at long last been exhausted. On 4 September, General Hodge ordered that three of the most extreme Left wing newspapers—the CHOSUN INMIN PO, HYEON DAI ILBO, (Modern Daily News) and CHOONG ANG SHINMUN—(Central

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Times of Korea)—be suspended from publication and their responsible officials brought to trial before a military tribunal for violation of Proclamation 2, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces Pacific, dated 7 September, 1945). The 971st CIC detachment was delegated the task of carrying out the orders without the assistance of any Korean police. Likewise the decision was made to arrest Pak Heun Yung and Lee Kang Kook, both prominent Communist Party leaders. The CIC immediately launched an investigation to discover their whereabouts so that prompt arrest might be made in conjunction with the suspension of the three Left Wing papers. In this, CIC was unsuccessful.

On 6 September 1946, CIC agents made simultaneous raids on the three newspapers and the homes of their principal officials. It was apparent that the CHOSUN INMIN PO and the HYEHN DAI ILBO had been prewarned, for no one was found but a few insignificant clerks. Prisoners were taken from the CHOONG ANG SHINMUN, but it was admitted that sufficient evidence against that paper had not been uncovered to warrant prosecution of its staff members. However, in the case of the CHOSUN INMIN PO, a number of published articles were cited as possible basis for prosecution. These contained either inflammatory statements directed to so arouse the public as to cause civil

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disturbances or bitter animosity toward American soldiers; or they interpreted calculated falsehoods directed against Military Government; or, they consisted of violent and insidious attacks on Military Government presented in such a way as to motivate Koreans to obstruct its program and to estrange its Korean employees. For instance on August 6, this statement made by Pak Heun Yung was published: "Set all the patriotic comrades free from the jails of the violent police." On August 7, a Communist party statement concerning the credit program appeared as follows: "The credit program which has been decided by the U. S. alone indicates clearly that the U. S. intends to control Korea." And on 25 August, another Party pronouncement appeared: "We must protect ourselves against the American authorities. We cannot sit idly by and watch our brethren being killed or injured without reason." An August 28 statement was entirely a figment of imagination: "The workers are on strike at the Kyong Sok Palace. They say they cannot go on with the work because they think the work is not good for Korea." At the same time General Hodge commented: "It is no use trying to prosecute anyone on whom we have no good evidence."(678)

The matter was made public by special press release on 6 September.(679) It was also generally known that Pak and Lee were

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sought by the American authorities.(660) Surprisingly enough, little protest was made regarding the closing of the three newspapers. Subsequently, XXIV Corps G-2 reported that the three papers were being reorganized and eventually would be reopened.(661)

The closing note to this period came from Washington, D. C. in a blunt statement made by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to the effect that the United States Government would oppose the establishment of any minority groups in power, an obvious reference to the Korean Communist Party. The State Department further asserted, "We believe in the right of the Korean people to determine for themselves the kind of economy and democratic political organization they required." That American troops would remain in Korea until a representative provisional government had been established likewise was made clear to all concerned. This American position was made public in conjunction with a new invitation extended to the Soviet Union calling for another joint effort to establish an independent Korean Government.(662) On this note, the first year of occupation came to a close.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV - PART II

AMERICAN - SOVIET RELATIONS - THE FIRST YEAR

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25. Radio, Dtg, 080317/z, SCAP to Chief US Military Mission, Moscow, 9 Sept. 45., AG files.

26. Radio, DEANK to SCAP, 12104/1, 12 Sept. 1945, AG files.

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29. Radio: TFGOS, CG USAFIK to CG 25th Army of the USSR, 16 Sept. 1945, AG files.

30. Letter, DG/S XXIV Corps to Soviet Liaison Officer 25th Army, 27 Sept. 1945, G-2 files.

31. Radio, TFGGS 49, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 16 Sept. 1945, AG files.

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410. Letter, Gen. Shistiakov to Gen. Hodge, 18 July 1946, G-2 files.

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646. Radio, CG USAFIK to SCAP, undated, (probably Mar 1946), AG files.

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Part II

American-Soviet Relations: Second year

Chapter V

(Rough notes only – Field Bulky files)

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
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REMARKS

Reference is made to the request of BG James K. Terry USA (Ret) of Lawrence, Kansas. I am sending the final document back which we borrowed from OCMH on 24 Nov 71. (8 were returned on 7 Dec 71, 2 were returned on 19 Jan 72, 1 was returned on 4 Feb 72, and 1 was returned on 3 May 72).

This document has been regraded UNCLASSIFIED. Appendix B to Part 2 of Chapter III, and the paragraphs on pages 32-34 of Part 2 of Chapter III, which contain the conclusions and recommendations as regards punishment to be meted out (annotated by footnotes 123-125) have been marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. These pages are exempt from the automatic removal of the protective marking UP Para 13a, AR 340-16. All the other pages contained in this document are UNCLASSIFIED, and may be released. Upon removal of these FOUO pages document becomes UNCLAS. THIS COMPLETES OUR REVIEW.

Incl - Hist of US Army Forces in Korea, Ch I thru V Pt III.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF HISTORIAN

SUBJECT: Review of Part III, Chapter VI, History of Occupation of Korea, (Agriculture in South Korea).

1. Part III, Chapter VI, History of Occupation of Korea, (Agriculture in South Korea), Accession No. 490-1-3, was prepared at Headquarters, Far East Command. The author of the manuscript is not known. It consists of 475 double-spaced, typewritten pages and is amply documented by use of footnotes.

2. This manuscript gives a comprehensive account of the problems concerning agriculture that had to be resolved by American Military Government in Korea. It is of special significance because Korea had been held largely to an agricultural economy by Japan and the Russians occupied the industrial area which previously had drawn heavily on the region occupied by the U.S. for food and other agricultural products.

3. The manuscript includes much unnecessary detail. It should prove of value to anyone interested in the problems of military occupation in a country where an agricultural economy prevails. As source material it should be of value to a historian concerned with the preparation of a definitive history of the Korean occupation.

4. I recommend that the manuscript not be reproduced, but that it be filed for future reference.

Att -
Manuscript.

PAUL M. ROBINETT
Brig. General, Ret.

Submitted to TAGO for review of classification
19 Dec. 1957. Returned without action
31 Jan 1958. See correspondence.
CH
4 Feb 58

[redacted]

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OCMH Request for Classification Review

Document Review Officer OCMH 19 Dec 1957 I Wice/77317
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1. The inclosed historical manuscript, History of the Occupation of Korea Chapters I through V (Confidential), is submitted herewith for review for possible regrading to UNCLASSIFIED.

2. This action is taken at the suggestion of the Book and Magazine Branch, Public Information Division, in order that a portion of this manuscript may be made available for unofficial research. The specific portion under inquiry is the Chapter entitled "The Quasi-Revolt of October 1946" (See tab B)

FOR THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY:

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D. C. SWEGER
Colonel, Artillery
Executive

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OCMH FROM TAGO DATE: 31 Jan 58 COMMENT NO. 2
Mr. Culhane/71643/eam

1. Returned per telephone conversation with Mr. Wice.

2. Mr. Resnick intends to submit his manuscript to the Book and Magazine Branch, Public Information Division, for security clearance.

FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Incl
n/c

as for by C. M. Talley Major, AGC
J. E. ENGELHARDT, Lt. Colonel, AGC
Ch, Special Records Branch TAGO

No action taken by TAGO, since applicant was authorized to use classified material. IWice 4 Feb 58

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PART III

Chapter I

Creating Military Government

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HISTORICAL MUNSCRIPT ON KOREA

History of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea
Period September 1945 to 30 June 1946 in 3 parts and 4 volumes
Part I Volume I
Part II " II
Part III " I and II

TO

Colonel Kaufman
G-3, G.S.
Room 3 D 548

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PART III

I CREATING MILITARY GOVERNMENT
II SETTING UP A NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
III PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IV POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY
V JUSTICE
VI AGRICULTURE
VII COMMERCE
VIII FINANCE
IX EDUCATION
X PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
XI TRANSPORTATION
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CHAPTER I

CREATING THE MACHINERY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The occupation of Korea found the United States with three years of experience in military government in World War II alone. By then Civil Affairs was a recognized function of every major staff overseas. In the United States, the army maintained a School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, buttressed by special training programs in civil affairs in several major universities and elsewhere. The navy had its own comparable establishments. Yet such is the nature of military government, and such were the conditions attending the occupation of Korea, that months passed before it was possible to bring more than a relatively small portion of this training and experience to bear on the problems met with.

Warfare in the Pacific did not at first require much attention to civil affairs and certainly none to military government. The islands of the South and Southwest Pacific remained under the control of one or another of our Allies: Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, France, or Holland. Responsibility for the welfare and control of the scattered aboriginal peoples we found there -- in the Solomons, New Guinea, and elsewhere -- fell to the civil officers

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of these countries. Not until we reached the Marianas, in the campaign which ended in mid-1944, was it found necessary to establish a formal military government organization. Even then, civil affairs on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian was largely a matter of disaster relief; the areas were small, the people backward or consisting of laborers imported by the Japanese. Initial arrangements were admittedly inadequate and military government was established almost as an afterthought.[1] It was about the Marianas experience that the Commanding General, Tenth Army wrote later that year:

> In all invasion actions to date, Civil Affairs operations have been inadequately manned and supplied during the early stages. This is primarily due to the "orphan" status enforced upon this activity by combat commanders who are naturally primarily concerned with operations against enemy forces. The field is still open for a demonstration of the "approved solution" to this problem.[2]

In October 1944 the forces under General MacArthur invaded the central Philippines. Before them stretched a civil affairs problem of huge proportions and with many unique features. The islands were highly organized politically, the people for the most part were civilized and in many cases well educated. Much of the Filipino governmental machinery mirrored American influence, and all was familiar to our command. Economic conditions were tight but, except in some of the larger cities, there was little of the devastation which characterized other Pacific combat areas. Finally, it was the avowed intention of the United States to turn over to the Filipinos the management of their own country as soon as possible.[3]

It would appear that early in the planning phase of the Philippine operations it was decided by CINCAFPAC to dispense with military government as far as possible by transferring control of recaptured areas to native authorities. Plans were made in the United States, based in the main on European experience, to organize specially designed teams, called Philippine Civil Administration Units (PCAU's), to handle the civilians until such transfers could be effected. Yet the actual invasion of the Philippines followed rapidly upon a radical change in high strategy, and so short was the interval of time between the decision and the landing on Leyte that no PCAU's could be staged and lifted in time to be present at the beachhead on D-day. Relief work there was at first conducted by a few Navy Civil Affairs Units, designed originally for the occupation of Yap, who happened to be present. Gradually PCAU's arrived and the naval teams were concentrated on Samar. The army units continued on with the combat forces throughout the fight for Leyte and thereafter on the various islands of the group.

The PCAU's were organized at the 5th Replacement Depot, Oro Bay, New Guinea, at first largely out of personnel without military government training who had come into the Pacific with the Philippine infantry units. Later ones contained officers with training received at Charlottesville and at one of the several Civil Affairs Training Schools. Many of the men were routed out through the Civil Affairs Staging Area, Presidio of Monterey, California. There were thirty PCAU's and all saw service in the Philippines. Their organization

and equipment was generally uniform: 11 officers, 26 enlisted men, five one-quarter tons trucks, and two heavier vehicles. They operated under tactical command almost without exception.[5]

It could be repeated that the PCAU's did not conduct "military government" in the areas they covered, theirs was the function of returning natives to their homes, providing medical aid and temporary shelter, and distributing emergency relief supplies. As rapidly as possible they reestablished local government under pre-1941 officials. Furthermore, after a short while many were succeeded by Emergency Control Administration Units established by the Provisional Commonwealth Government and staffed entirely with Filipinos. Theirs was solely the function of "civil affairs;" by then the distinction between the two functions was quite sharply drawn. Gradually all the PCAU's were withdrawn from the field and assembled in areas like Camp Morgan, on Luzon, where they awaited employment in Japan or elsewhere.[6]

Radically different in almost all respects was the military government experience in the Ryukyus Campaign. On Okinawa and its adjacent islands Americans conducted the largest military government operation under actual combat conditions in the Pacific theater, caring for by far the greatest number of enemy civilians under the most appalling conditions of devastation yet experienced in the Far East. For reasons partly in the nature of the operation, partly accidental, military government on Okinawa represented an extreme example of joint operations, from highest to lowest echelons.

Throughout the entire campaign and for months afterward the predominance of either army or navy control remained unresolved. Staffing of the military government headquarters and of the various detachments was part army, part navy.

The landing on Okinawa occurred 1 April 1945. Planning for the operation began about the middle of the preceding October, but as early as August 1944 the nucleus of the military government staff had been formed on Oahu. In spite of this length of time available for preparation, and the good work done therein, failure to arrive at certain basic interservice divisions of responsibility and the inability in Washington to establish a firm military government troop strength, military government organization in the Ryukyus left much to be desired. After considerable fluctuation an assault organizational plan was arrived at using a military government headquarters, four types of team, and two types of naval medical unit. Specialized units were attached: a quartermaster truck company, a military police battalion, a navy construction battalion, three civilian intelligence sections, and others. The "A" teams, of which there were six, each with 4 officers and 11 enlisted men, were to be employed for a variety of duties during the assault. Behind them came "B" teams of 8 officers and 19 enlisted men with more permanent installations for the care and evacuation of civilians. These two types were to be attached to divisions. With the corps and the Army were the "C" or camp teams of 10 officers and 26 enlisted men, and with the Army were "D" or district teams, of 22 and 60. "C" and "D" units were

to be landed on the target sometime after the initial assault, as needed. It was anticipated that eventually only the 'B' units would remain; in general this system was followed. The teams employed on Okinawa were composed of army and navy officers in about equal proportion, but with exclusively naval enlisted personnel. All medical installations were exclusively naval in personnel and equipment.[8]

Without doubt, the planning for military government on Okinawa was thorough and adequate. Much of the discrepancy between what was planned and what was eventually employed in the way of organization and method was due to the almost complete destruction of towns, cities, and installations of every type following the advance of our forces. Native economy had come to a standstill, for months tens of thousands of the people existed in caves on what little food they had saved or could forage from the shell-pitted fields. The training in politics, law, and economics given officers at the military government schools was, as one of the officers expressed it, thrown out the window, and the teams labored on a vast disaster relief program.[9]

One additional factor weighed heavily in the operation of civil affairs on Okinawa. The island is relatively small with a mountainous northern half that precluded human habitation save on an extremely limited scale. Following its capture the American forces launched an ever expanding base development plan with an eye to the final assault on Japan. In the face of this plan the area reserved for the native grew less and less until, had the war lasted, it is

difficult to see how he could have been maintained except in crowded tent cities on American rations. Reestablishment of the Okinawan in his native economy and way of life was a project despaired of by military government in the days just before the end of the war.[10]

The assignment of the Tenth Army as the occupation force for Korea found it with a small Military Government Section of seven officers and nine men, headed by Lt. Col. Walter Killilae. Officers of the section were familiar with the Okinawa experience; indeed, some had been with the work since the early planning stages on Oahu. The section, however, was not then concerned with active military government operations on the island; such civil affairs matters as still came to the Tenth Army for action were being handled by the G-1 Section. Colonel Killilae's group was concerned with future military government planning and to it first fell the job of setting up the organization for Korea.[11]

Next to nothing was known of the problem. Early in 1945 the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department had disapproved a recommendation of the Civil Affairs Staging Area at Monterey that officers be trained for military government in Korea and other areas, in addition to Japan. On 13 August the Section Executive, Major Wayne Estes, submitted a long list of questions which required clarification.[12] Among them were such basic matters as the type of military government organization desired, the necessity of establishing a structure to embrace the various provincial governments as well as the national administration, the character of relationships with Japanese nationals and native born Koreans, the procurement of military government personnel and equipment, and contact with the State Department. At the same time he appealed for all literature obtainable.

Planning was commenced on the organization. The joint army-navy manual Military Government and Civil Affairs, issued in December 1945 and using experience gained in Italy, listed two general types of civil affairs organization, the "operational" and the "territorial."[13] In the former

> . . . commanders of combat units or of military administrative areas are responsible for civil affairs within their respective zones of operation or areas . . . the chain of civil affairs control conforms to the operational or administrative chain of command.[14]

In the territorial form

> . . . a separate civil affairs organization is created under the direct command of the theater commander, or under a subordinate commander . . . the chief civil affairs officer of a territory is responsible to the military governor for the military government throughout the area, and has command of subordinate civil affairs officers assigned to political subdivisions within the territory. The line of communication within the organization is direct from higher to lower civil affairs officers. Local civil affairs officers are not responsible to operational unit commanders stationed in the area with regard to the administration of civil affairs, but report directly to higher civil affairs officers.[15]

The first system, obviously, was more suited to combat conditions, guaranteeing unity of command and obviating "possible friction and misunderstanding which are likely to arise when two mutually independent officers with overlapping responsibilities are present." On the other hand, it placed officers in charge of civil affairs who tended to relegate such work to a secondary position, and who were untrained in and often psychologically unsuited for the handling of

civilians. Combat units are necessarily disposed according to strategical and operational requirements, and it is usually by chance that their areas of responsibility accord with political areas. Thus civil affairs personnel may be required to divide political areas artificially to the confusion of local officials. Where sufficient military government personnel is available and when the territory occupied is at peace, the territorial system is more desirable -- certainly from the civil affairs point of view. The manual conceded, of course, that the system adopted might involve features of each type.[16]

The Tenth Army Military Government Section outlined for higher consideration four plans within the framework outlined above. First there was the straight operational or combat type, in which they used the Okinawa experience as a model. The second was a staff integration plan in which civil affairs specialists were integrated with the army staffs down to or including the battalion, and in which the combat units became the military government operating agencies in the field. The third plan envisioned the employment of the military government companies recently established by the War Department; they were to operate under a single military government head on generally the territorial system, with a special staff section attached to the Army staff to handle military government affairs. The last plan outlined an out-and-out territorial system following the existing bureaus and political subdivisions of Korea, largely independent of the military structure and also utilizing the specialized military

government companies. All of these plans were in the formative stage when the responsibility for the occupation of Korea was shifted from the Army to the XXIV Corps.[17]

Civil affairs planning had in the meanwhile occupied other staff sections of the Army. It was clear that the military government of so sizeable an area as Korea would demand a huge staff, virtually a separate command. Such a command would require its own housekeeping force to administer personnel and supplies. Rather than form a new headquarters unit in the few weeks available the Tenth Army planned to use one already in existence, experienced and completely staffed, which the end of active combat made available. This unit was the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Tenth Army AAA. It had been organized and activated in February 1945 on Oahu as the administrative headquarters for all AAA units of the Tenth Army, and was commanded by Brigadier General Charles G. Harris. The unit had served through the Ryukyus Campaign. On 31 July its strength was 21 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 60 men.[18]

When the XXIV Corps took over responsibility for the occupation it took over from the Army what little existed in the way of data and plans. General Hodge secured the loan of Colonel Brainard E. Prescott from Tenth Army G-1, together with Major Estes, and to them he gave the task of continuing military government planning.[19] It was decided to carry out the AAA Headquarters scheme, and the unit was attached to the Corps for operational control effective 15 August. Later it

was reassigned to AFWESPAC and further attached to the Corps.[20] Around it as an administrative core was built the entire organization of Military Government, USAFIK.

Hardly had Colonel Prescott arrived at Corps headquarters when GHQ AFPAC asked that the Corps's 'chief military government officer' report to Brigadier General William E. Crist at Manila. General Crist had headed military government on Okinawa during the combat phase and now headed the newly formed Government Section, GHQ AFPAC. Prescott flew down on the 19th; he was joined there later by General Hodge and General Harris. The latter, in his capacity of Tenth Army AAA Commander, had been brought into military government work.[21] In the six days Colonel Prescott was at GHQ he learned principally that there was little to be learned. Military government matters nominally fell to the Government Section of GHQ, but inevitably they had to be cleared through one or more of the other staff sections.[22]

Colonel Prescott carried with him several questions upon which General Hodge wanted information. He was only partially successful in securing answers. The Koreans were to be treated as liberated people, yet the liberation was to be accomplished gradually. Circumstances and common sense were to rule in matters of disarmament and the removal of police officials. Prescott was able to get action hastened on the appointment of a political adviser by the State Department, but he was less successful in determining the scope and

manner of relations with the Russians. A proposed GHQ military mission to Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky's headquarters was then being discussed, but the idea was given up, and in the end the problem of Russian liaison remained where it was — and where to all intents it was to remain for many months.[25]

While in Manila Colonel Prescott was shown the draft of Military Occupation Annex to Operations Instructions No. 4.[24] At the time it was clear that General MacArthur planned to dispense with military government in Japan and to exercise his authority through the Emperor and such Japanese governmental machinery as he would require. The Annex bore out this policy. It stressed over and again the objective of destroying militarism and ultra-nationalism and the encouragement of a democratic way of life. We could furnish the guidance, the Japanese were to be left to carry out the program. Yet it said nothing about how this policy was to be applied to Korea. When Colonel Prescott appealed for more specific statements on this point, he was advised by General Crist to use his own judgement. The fact was that the Annex had been written exclusively for Japan; it furnished the scantiest kind of framework around which the Corps could build its own policies.[25]

One effect it had, not intentional, was to place the Japanese in Korea in a more favorable position than certainly the Koreans wished.

Such statements as:

> The inhabitants [in return for helping maintain law and order] will be granted freedom from all unwarranted interference with their individual liberty and property rights. . . .[26]

and:

> Maximum responsibility for carrying out essential administrative functions and implementing the directives and policies of military government will be imposed on the Japanese administrative machinery at all levels. . . .[27]

left the Japanese in Korea, who owned most of the property and had given the Koreans precious little individual liberty, about where they were before the surrender. The Koreans, after thirty-five years of oppression, wanted -- as it turned out -- not only their own personal liberty but all of the Japanese property. With the Japanese still running the show they would have little chance of gaining either.

Another provision of the Annex required all civilians to be disarmed, except for civilian police who were allowed to retain their weapons. This meant that the most patent and most intensely hated symbol of the Japanese regime would continue in power while the Korean would be left no means of defending himself against the tyranny he knew so well.[28]

One of the principal considerations in Colonel Prescott's mind was the source of trained civil affairs personnel wherewith to run the occupation. Some while before, General Crist had recommended to the War Department an organization for military government in the

field which did away with the different types of team found on Okinawa.[29] Along the lines he had suggested, the War Department, on 22 July, issued tables of organization and equipment for a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Government, Group, and for a Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company.[30] The former, commanded by the Senior Military Government Officer, a colonel, and comprising 15 officers and 26 enlisted men, was designed to man a major political subdivision. Six of its officers were lieutenant colonels and they embraced the specialties of engineering, law, medicine, public safety, resources and industry, and supply. Four majors were labelled interpreter, labor, salvage, and transportation. The enlisted men held chiefly administrative jobs, but there were two interpreters.

The Headquarters Company consisted of 12 officers and 60 enlisted men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Its three majors were responsible for engineering and construction, medicine and public health, and public safety; its eight captains for civilian feeding, engineering and utilities, labor legal matters, public safety, salvage, sanitation, and supply. Only about 26 of the 60 enlisted men were concerned with administrative and housekeeping functions; the balance were apportioned among the specialties covered by the officers. Both of the organizations were furnished ample equipment. The Headquarters Company, for example, was allowed ten trucks and ten trailers, a field range for its seven kitchen personnel, and four portable typewriters. The Group Headquarters Detachment had seven trucks, six typewriters, but no messing facilities.[31]

A number of such companies were being formed in the Philippines from personnel of the former Philippine Civil Administration Units. GHQ agreed to furnish the Corps with three companies then on Luzón, and a few days later it received a request to the Civil Affairs Staging Area to ship an additional two headquarters groups and eight companies to Korea by "fast water transportation."[32] Yet CINCAFPAC warned the Corps:

> Recent changes in operational plans requiring activation and movement of military government units from widely separated locations. It is probable that in some cases these units will arrive in occupied areas of Japan with incomplete organizational equipment and supplies. It is requested that in such cases sufficient supplies and equipment be furnished military government units attached to your command until such time as supplies and equipment consigned to them are received.[33]

Colonel Prescott returned to Okinawa 25 August. Three military government officers accompanied him, and the small staff commenced work at once on the military government annex to the Corps Field Order No. 55.[34] By working night and day, the annex was written and published by 1 September.

The Corps military government annex adopted much of the wording of the one issued by the Commander in Chief. As a result, in places it also appears to be aimed more at conditions in Japan than in Korea. Yet in one very important section, dealing with the objectives of the occupation, the Corps annex comes right to the point:

> Objectives: The immediate objective of the military occupation of Korea is the abolition of militarism; the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment;

> the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan; the abolition of discriminations on grounds of race, nationality, creed, political opinions; the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes; the encouragement of liberal political, economic and social institutions; and the creation of conditions in Korea which will facilitate the emergence of a responsible Korean government capable of administering internal affairs and maintaining peaceful relations with other nations and with which the United Nations can deal.[35]

The specialized sections of the annex will be treated in the appropriate chapters below; they need not be repeated here. Existing government machinery was to be utilized as far as practicable. Freedom of religion was to be proclaimed, but the dissemination of Japanese militaristic, National Shintoistic, and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form would be prohibited. Finally

> Political parties, organizations and societies will be placed under control. Those whose activities are consistent with the requirements and objectives of Military Government will be encouraged. Those whose activities are inconsistent with such requirements and objectives will be abolished.[36]

On 28 August General Hodge established Military Government as an integral part of USAFIK. His Deputy for Military Government was made responsible to him for "the operation of civilian activities in Korea," and was given command of all military government units assigned or attached to the Corps.[37] The following day saw the appointment of General Harris as Deputy for Military Government, the assignment of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Tenth Army AAA to Military Government, and the announcement that the XXIV Corps

staff would also be the staff of USAFIK. Like General Hodge, the Corps staff officers were to wear two hats.[38] On the same day General Harris assumed command of Headquarters, Military Government, USAFIK.[39]

Military Necessity vs. Military Government

One basic consideration which faced the planners at this time should be mentioned. The object of civil affairs control through military government, as stated in our regulations

> . . . is to assist military operations, to further national policies, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law. . .[40]

But the importance of the first of the three objects over the other two is constantly stressed:

> The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. . . .[41]

The principle had been applied to the hilt on Okinawa; military government had been the poor relation from the beginning. In the combat phase its teams had operated under combat unit control with virtually no contact with military government headquarters. Throughout, the headquarters itself lacked adequate representation on the

high command, and was reduced almost to begging for certain vital items of equipment and supply. Its components were pushed remorselessly around the island because of military necessity. Indeed, the principle was applied to such a point that military necessity itself suffered, to say nothing of the fulfillment of our obligations under international law and basic humaniterianism.[42]

Now, with the war over, it would seem at first glance that military necessity as an outside object did not exist. Military government was the big show. Indeed, at a later date General Hodge called it the "main thing" in our occupation of the area.[43] Actually, to the planners still on Okinawa, the paramount position of military government was not so obvious. While it would at some unpredictable date become paramount, for the moment the war had to be considered as still going on. No one knew what to expect from the Japanese. A combat landing had been planned for Inch'on and it was expected that full dress precautions would have to be taken for some months to come. Furthermore, combat troops would have to carry on military government themselves until the military government teams arrived, and they were not expected for some time. Thus it was decided to apply the combat type of occupation in the beginning; later it could be transformed gradually over to the territorial type.[44] The Military Government Annex stated that "Command Channels will be used initially for all military occupation command matters. Direct communication between military occupation staff detachments is authorized for military occupation technical matters."[45]

Coincident with the issuance of the Annex, directives were received from CINCAFPAC pointing "a major change in the concept of conditions under which the occupation of Japan will take place."[46] The annexes to "Blacklist" and Operations Instructions No. 4 had been prepared with continuing offensive action in mind, and viewing a possible collapse of the Japanese Government. Now it seemed most probable that there would be no violence and General MacArthur shaped his new plans toward using the Japanese government machinery to the fullest extent possible. The demobilization of the enemy's armed forces was to be accomplished by the enemy's own General Staff, his communications systems were to continue in operation, his civilian institutions were to carry the load of administration.[47] The change spelled the end of Military Government in Japan, but it had little effect on civil affairs planning for Korea. It did strengthen arguments for using the existing government personnel, but even at this stage it was clear that Japanese officials could not remain in office indefinitely and that the military government teams would be necessary. It is not clear if the plan to place the evacuation of Japanese troops in the hands of their superior command, the 17th Area Army, was born at this time, but certainly General MacArthur's new policy pointed in that direction.[48]

Pending the arrival of military government specialists from the United States, officers were gathered from every possible source, three had come from Manila; about thirty more came from there prior to sailing. Early in the planning stage the Corps was loaned six

experienced officers from Military Government on Okinawa. These were later assigned to USAFIK and, in all, some thirty-eight were secured from this source.[49] The Tenth Army AAA, of course, furnished its administrative personnel, and a few of its senior officers went into specialized civil affairs jobs. General Harris has been referred to above. Colonel Reamer M. Argo, who had commanded the 44th AAA Group -- the army garrison force in the Kerama Retto -- and was later the Assistant AA Officer of the Tenth Army, was made Deputy Provost Marshal General.[50] In this capacity he became the actual head of all Korean Police.

When it became apparent that the Tenth Army AAA would, in effect, be Military Government rather than merely the Military Government Section of the Corps, efforts were made to augment its personnel. To its 22 officers and 60 men were added, first, 25 enlisted men selected as having administrative qualifications from units slated to remain on Okinawa. Eventually 99 men were secured this way. Fourteen interpreters arrived from Manila and joined the AAA unit.[51] On 25 August the Corps Intelligence Officer was advised that the Psychological Warfare Detachment, AFPAC, of 3 officers and 11 enlisted men was then at Manila awaiting shipment to the Corps. Its commander, Captain David B. Ake, wrote that his unit was "equipped to assist in effecting an orderly transition from war to peace, in the area of occupation, through the dissemination of information." Among his enlisted men were two radio men, an artist, a writer, an interpreter,

a lithographer and two press operators. The Corps ordered its key personnel on by air and the rest to follow by water.[52]

GHQ radioed that a liaison officer be sent to discuss personnel needs, and Major Estes flew to Manila for a one-day conference. He presented the need of civil affairs specialists and of trained teams. When he returned the military government troop list still remained at three companies to come from Luzon and ten from the United States, with no one able to predict when they might arrive at the target. Major Estes discussed at some length the legal problems which had come up during the preparation of the Corps military government annex.[53]

In view of the uncertainty of the arrival of the promised military government companies, Military Government USAFIK created three provisional teams of approximately 10 officers and 30 enlisted men apiece. In the main the officers came from military government jobs on Okinawa while the troops themselves were drawn from seacoast artillery battalions there. The teams were numbered 1, 2, and 3; the first was designed to accompany the 7th Division, the next was to be at Inch'on with AKRON 24, and the last was to operate the municipal government of Seoul. All three teams were attached to the 7th Division for loading and mounting out; 36 officers and 92 men came to Korea in division shipping and entered upon their duties immediately after landing.[54]

Four military government officers came to Korea by air while the balance -- 47 officers and 67 men -- were distributed on two

APA's and the command ship.[55] The strength of Military Government, reckoned as of 10 September when all of the first echelon had landed, was as follows:

	Assigned	Attached	Total	
Officers	60	39	99	Of whom 87 were then in Korea
Warrant Officers	1	0	1	In Korea
Enlisted Men	173	0	173	Of whom 159 were then in Korea
Total	234	39	273	247 in Korea[56]

Within a few days of taking over the government it became apparent that Military Government would require considerably more personnel to run the administration of Korea. By then it was clear to General Hodge that the occupation would be peaceful and hence that the heavier implements of modern warfare would not be required. On 12 September he radioed to General MacArthur that he had directed that the shipment of antiaircraft, armored, and Corps artillery units "not considered essential to the success of the occupation of southern Korea be stopped." He contemplated converting at least one battalion of each of the above type units to military police, and he therefore requested authority to turn into the depots on Okinawa such heavy ordnance as 8-inch howitzers, 90-mm AA guns, and flame-throwing tanks.[57] By the same token he was able to turn certain of these type units over to Military Government. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery,

XXIV Corps Artillery arrived in Korea 24 September and was so assigned;[58] five days later Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 137th AAA Group, whose units had been relieved of assignment, arrived and was given to Military Government.[59] Two other organizations were attached in the same fashion considerably later: the 30th Transportation Corps Traffic Regulation Group and the 162nd AAA Operations Detachment.[60] Advance echelons of these organizations were usually put to work in Military Government as soon as they arrived.

Upon landing and for several days thereafter General Harris remained the senior civil affairs officer under his title Deputy for Military Government. Under him these principal officers were tentatively assigned:

Colonel Brainard M. Prescott, Civil Administrator

Colonel John Underwood, Chief of the Secretariat

Lt. Col. Hugh H. Bledsoe, Chief Liaison Officer

Major Gordon B. Enders, Foreign Affairs Officer

Lt. Col. Ronald F. Hartman, Director, Research and Analysis

Lt. Col. Paul H. Hayward, Chief, Korean Relations and Information

Lt. Col. Earl L. Mullinix, Property Custodian

Major Emery J. Woodall, Chief, Justice Bureau

Colonel Reemer W. Argo, Chief, Police Bureau

Lt. Col. Glenn McDonald and Lt. Col. Paul B. Lingenfelter, Public Health and Welfare

Lt. Col. William J. Merlihy, Chief, Bureau of Communications and Transportation

Lt. Col. Charles J. Gordon, Chief, Finance Bureau

Lt. Col. James Martin, Chief, Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce

Major Fred M. Louis, Chief, Bureau of Mining and Industry

Captain Earl M. Lockard, Chief, Bureau of Education [61]

On 12 September, in view of the political situation covered further along in the narrative, Major General Archibald V. Arnold was appointed Military Governor of Korea. [62] General Harris continued as his Deputy, and Military Government's General Order No. 1 was amended to show issuance by General Arnold and the subordinate position of General Harris. [63]

General Arnold, commanding general of the 7th Division, was a graduate of the United States Military Academy in the Class of 1912. Most of his service had been in artillery; and in September 1941 he was made a brigadier general and given command of the 69th Field Artillery Brigade, 44th Division. He assumed Command of the 7th Division Artillery in February 1943 and served with the division on Attu and Kwajalein. In February 1944 he became its commanding general and was promoted to major general the following May. In this capacity he had fought through the Leyte and Okinawa Campaigns. General Arnold was fifty-six at this time, a strong-jawed, heavy-set officer who had once been All-American center on Army's football team. [64]

The appointment of General Arnold resulted from a decision made by General Hodge after arrival in Korea. According to statements the latter made later, he had needed someone quickly and had delegated

General Arnold with the understanding that Arnold would be relieved and returned to his division as soon as a suitable replacement could be found.[65]

The amended General Order confirmed many of the positions assigned by General Harris; however, it appointed Colonel Underwood "Director" of the Bureau of Mining and Industry and split Communications and Transportation into two bureaus, leaving Colonel Herlihy director of the former and placing Lt. Col. Ward L. Hamilton in charge of the latter.[66] Six days later plans had crystallized to such an extent that it was possible to issue a memorandum outlining the organization of Military Government into the Civil Administrator's Office, the Secretariat with its seven sections, the bureaus, and the army administrative command.[67] At the same time these appointments to the Secretariat were announced:

Colonel Mettious W. May, Jr., Secretary of Planning Section

Colonel Arthur Roth, Secretary of Accounts Section

Colonel Glenn Newman, Acting Secretary of Intelligence and Information Section

Lt. Col. Hugh M. Bledsoe, Secretary of Personnel Section

Major Emery J. Woodall, Secretary of General Affairs (in addition to being Director of the Justice Bureau)

Major Gordon B. Endere, Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Major Wayne J. Estes, Secretary to Office of Civil Administrator[68]

The employment of tactical troops to operate and administer Military Government, as unavoidable as it was under the circumstances,

did not produce men prepared by training or experience to do the job. Few, if any, of the enlisted men possessed civil affairs backgrounds and there was no opportunity to give them even a superficial indoctrination on their duties and responsibilities. The case of the officers was better; about half of those working in the sections and bureaus of the Government General had received either formal training or practical experience in military government, a few, some of both. Out of the seventeen top ranking officers, nine could be called familiar with civil affairs methods and problems; the others -- and they included both the Military Governor and his Deputy -- were trained as soldiers only. Due to the extreme scarcity of personnel with experience in specialized fields of government it sometimes happened that none of the top ranking officers available to head a section or bureau were men with experience in the particular specialty. In most cases, however, there were at least some experienced personnel even if not high enough in rank for top positions. An example of this was in the Police Bureau where, although the Brigadier General, the Colonel and the Lieutenant Colonel, who held the responsible positions were not experienced in police affairs, the fourth officer in line had enjoyed a considerable amount of police experience.[69]

Headquarters, Military Government, USAFIK had been established provisionally as a command but it lacked authority for activation as a unit with a table of organization. Until such formal activation it had to be operated by personnel assigned or attached to the headquarters and headquarters batteries of Tenth Army AAA, XXIV Corps Artillery, and 137th AAA Group. Personnel administration was cumbersome at best, for it was necessary to consider the three (and later four) headquarters batteries as distinct units for purposes of morning

reports, readjustment of personnel, payrolls, supply and discipline. On 30 September Headquarters, Military Government was organized into four sections: Adjutant and S-1, Enlisted Personnel, Officer Personnel, and Miscellaneous.[70] In spite of this, personnel planning and procurement, together with assignments within Military Government, was from the start the function of the Planning Section of the Secretariat. Planning and military administrative officers worked closely and, in general, harmoniously together and with the personnel officers of the Corps. But it was a clumsy system and responsibilities could not be clearly defined. It lasted until late in the year when all personnel administration was centered under one head.[71]

Early in October work commenced in the Planning Section and elsewhere in Military Government on proposals for the establishment of a formal military government command with a definite table of allotments. There were numerous changes of plan and amendments of structure before the final proposal went to higher headquarters. More time was consumed in reaching a basis of approval, but at length this effort resulted in the establishment of United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) on 4 January 1946.[72] The details of this project will be treated later.

No authority having been received for the activation of the three provisional military government teams by 24 September, the Civil Administrator requested the Corps that they be activated as Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Companies under T/O & E 20-36 T to provide for the absorption of personnel, promotions and a basis for

requisitioning of organic equipment necessary for operation in the field." The Corps endorsed the request to higher headquarters suggesting that three of the companies already asked for from the United States be deleted. On 31 October the request was on its way to Washington.[73]

In the meanwhile, arrangement for the procurement of additional military government companies was progressing. It will be recalled that shortly before embarkation on Okinawa the War Department had advised that two headquarters groups and eight companies, fully staffed and equipped, were prepared to leave the United States for Korea. CINCAFPAC had promised three companies from Luzon. All other personnel, however, had been earmarked for Japan and any additions to the Korean quota would have to be deleted from the Japanese.[74] By 21 September the situation in Japan had altered to such an extent that it was possible to turn over a large percentage of the military government personnel to the XXIV Corps. CINCAFPAC in Tokyo radioed his rear echelon in Manila to furnish him with information on the number of groups and companies ordered from the Civil Affairs Staging Area in the United States to the Sixth and Eighth Armies and to the Corps, together with their estimated times of departure and arrival.[75] Manila summarized the situation as follows:

> Ordered to the Sixth Army: 5 groups and 28 companies; 4 groups and 2 companies ordered to move to Hawaii to stage with the 5th Amphibious Corps for the Sixth Army area.
>
> Ordered to the Eighth Army: 6 groups and 17 companies.

Ordered to the XXIV Corps: 2 groups and 8 companies, "awaiting port call."

Ordered to CINCAFPAC advance at Tokyo: 1 group and 1 company.

In all cases the expected times of arrival were unknown.[76]

On the same date as his inquiry about units in the United States CINCAFPAC ordered military government companies 33, 34, and 35, then in Manila, to be relieved of assignment to the Eighth Army and sent to the XXIV Corps.[77] He so advised the Corps. This made a total of six companies expected from the Philippines; Manila, however, reminded the Corps that the original three companies, numbers 26, 27, and 28, were "still awaiting shipping instructions."[78] On the 22nd the Corps requested shipment of the new companies to Korea, but was told that it would have to furnish transportation for them from the shipping it was allotted.[79] Steps were taken at once to lift the units and on 3 October the authorities at Manila radioed that

> Military Government Companies 26, 27, 28 and 33 and commanding, legal, economics and safety officers of Military Government Companies 34 and 35 departed Manila for Korea on LST 582 at 0730 today.[80]

The outlook for trained civil affairs personnel looked brighter, but the bonanza was yet to come. On 24 September Major Enders returned from Tokyo where he had conferred with General Hilst. The general had offered to make available to Military Government in Korea any part of the fifty companies and headquarters groups then believed to be still at CASA, there being no further use for them

in Japan. In addition to the sixteen units then known to be on the way, Military Government felt "that an additional 25 companies should be ordered out immediately, making a total of 41 companies to cover U. S. occupation of Korea." Further units could be ordered out if necessary.[81] The Corps therefore requested twenty-five of the available units.[82] A week later GHQ radioed that it proposed diverting to Korea twenty-eight companies and five headquarters groups then enroute to Japan; it asked if use could be made of them.[83] The Corps replied that it could use the units and on 7 October the organizations were formally assigned. Nineteen of the commanding officers, however, were retained by GHQAFPAC. The units so assigned were headquarters groups 98-102 inclusive, and companies 46-73 inclusive.[84] The units had sailed from the United States on 21 September and had to be diverted enroute.[85] The ten units originally earmarked for Korea did not sail until the 28th and in all cases were missing their interpreters together with some other personnel.[86] In early October, then, a total of 7 headquarters groups and 42 companies were known to be on their way to Korea -- around 5200 men and officers.

The placement of these organizations was planned well in advance of their arrival. In response to a verbal request of the Corps, the Secretary for Planning had on 3 October submitted Military Government's ideas on its future strength and dispositions. Each of the 132 counties of southern Korea should have a team of 1 officer and 3 enlisted men. Each city should have a military government company of 12 officers and 60 men -- there were fourteen cities to

be so covered. Each of the eight provinces should have a reinforced company of 27 officers and 90 men. The Chosen Food Company and the Oriental Development Company would require, respectively, 55 officers and 90 men, and 12 officers and 26 men. For the Government General staff and overhead, and for the other government monopolies, 600 officers and 1000 enlisted men were needed. This added up to 1175 officers and 3446 men.[87] In addition, Military Government requested the services -- but, apparently, not necessarily the assignment -- of a number of specialized units: 1 military police company, 1 medium and 1 heavy auto maintenance company, 3 truck companies and 1 car platoon, 1 gas supply company and 1 supply depot company, 1 APU (Type F), 1 prophylactic detachment, 2 criminal investigation sections (Type 3), 1 finance disbursing section, and 1 bakery platoon.[88] The Corps did not feel such units could properly be attached or assigned to Military Government for, although it possessed many of the attributes, it was not truly an independent command. For the time being, the Corps ruled, the services of such specialized units would have to be secured through the established commands, notably ASCOM 24.[89]

Specialized personnel was required by Military Government to perform intelligence and information functions. One psychological warfare detachment had already been assigned and found useful for work of this sort. On 18 September the Military Governor listed additional personnel required for his newly formed Office of Korean Relations and Information. He requested fifteen base censors -- the termination of military censorship rendered this category of officer

available for other jobs -- three additional army psychological warfare units (by this time called "information dissemination units") with their full T/E equipment including complete reproduction facilities, and twenty-five loud speaker units in addition to those carried by the psychological warfare teams.[90] A few days later CINCAFPAC offered the Corps two additional teams "as soon as assembled," both with equipment identical to that of the one already present. No loud speakers were then available, however.[91] Military Government waited,[92] but neither the units nor the loud speakers ever reached Korea.

The strength of Military Government on 25 September -- two weeks after its arrival in Korea -- stood as follows:[93]

	Assigned	Attached	Total	
Officers	79	48	127	All in Korea
Warrant Officers	2	0	2	Both in Korea
Enlisted Men	178	30	208	All except about 20 were in Korea
Total	259	78	337	About 317 in Korea

By this time personnel had begun to move out of Seoul and into the provincial areas. General Harris, now relieved as Deputy Military Governor,[94] had moved to Pusan with four officers and six enlisted men. From the general and from others who followed him into the provinces[95] came calls for more men. The superabundance of military government companies which were to arrive was as yet no more than suspected; at best they could not be anticipated for another month. And in the

meanwhile it would be necessary to run a complicated government from which the Japanese administrators were perforce being ejected and into which the Koreans were by no means prepared to go. Absence of wage scales eliminated some Koreans, otherwise qualified. Bureaus placed personnel shortage at the top of their list of problems. Wrote Agriculture and Commerce:

> Problem 1: . . . This bureau is in need of additional officers to accomplish reorganization of companies associated with this Bureau's interests and to re-establish control functions rendered inoperative. The lack of trained Korean personnel coupled with disappearance of trained Japanese management makes it necessary to employ trained American officers or civilian personnel for this purpose. . .[96]

Officers trained in agricultural economics are not to be found in most anti-aircraft outfits. The personnel issue was no secret. John Walker, correspondent for Time, wrote:

> The occupation had to be organized in tearing haste. Lieut. General John R. Hodge and the military governor, Major General Archibald V. Arnold, had to staff it with men who, like themselves, are combat officers and not proconsuls. They are shorthanded -- Arnold has only 109 men for the whole military government. Men already punchy from combat (and anxious to go home) are driving themselves 15 hours a day and more, trying to get a country of 25 million people rolling again. Before it is done, the job will take experts.[97]

Early in the occupation, on 13 September, General Hodge had radioed to his rear echelon commander on Okinawa appealing for military government specialists. He asked that a search be made specifically for personnel familiar with the wholesale business, with railway

operation, intelligence, police work, banking, and the law. Such persons, if found, were to be sent up to Korea by air immediately.[98] CINCAFPAC, aware of the shortage, advised three days later that all available civil affairs officers on Okinawa, to a total of about 108, and 40 more from Manila, had been ordered to report to the Corps.[99] He also ordered up all available military government officers then at Antipolo, Luzon, by highest air priority.[100] In this manner, gradually at first but with greater acceleration after military government had been abandoned in Japan, the Corps secured its quota of skilled civil administrators. On 27 September, Colonel Prescott estimated that he had about 100 officers on duty in one way or another at the Government General, 206 would arrive within ten days, and 121 more could be expected within a month.[101] This meant a total of about 450, far from the figure of 600 arrived at as necessary some days later, but nevertheless a decided improvement. It had become not so much a question of numbers as a matter of how to integrate these specialists of varying ranks, arriving in piecemeal fashion, into the various bureaus without completely disrupting the work and frustrating those already working, both American and Korean.

Yet the real personnel issue of the first month or so did not lie so much with a lack of officers. The issue which for a time threatened to bring all work at the Government General to a grinding halt was the absence of qualified administrative personnel on the enlisted level -- typists, stenographers, file clerks, switch-board operators, and the like. The crisis was army-wide, of course. Readjustment was in full swing and even the specialists actually

available worked with a half-heart and a half-mind as they counted their points and watched their friends sail home. Replacements arrived in a trickle and only by luck could an administrative category be discovered amid the infantry busies who entered the replacement center. Specialty cases too often were assigned with a forlorn hope that time would make up for deficiencies.[102]

Before quitting Okinawa, the Tenth Army AAA had submitted an MOS request for 155 enlisted specialists, including 114 clerical personnel, all of whom were urgently needed. Up to 20 September it had received no reply to the requisition and it took action again to get these people. The effort failed. Five days later it finally received a list of available enlisted men; on it was one administrative noncommissioned officer and six clerks, general -- seven out of 114, and even all of the seven were not in Korea.[103]

In the meanwhile, by the 22nd, the situation had become so critical that General Arnold was forced to appeal personally for specialists on the ground that military government operations would virtually cease unless at least temporary help was immediately forthcoming from the Corps. He listed about fifty men as needed; the categories included typists and stenographers (with typewriters in all cases), general clerks, switch-board operators, and mechanics. A special meeting of Corps staff section chiefs was held and each section was told to furnish men in accordance with its strength. Sixty-seven men were thus secured and on the following day they reported for temporary duty at Military Government.[104]

This was, of course, only a temporary expedient. On 27 September the Civil Administrator summed up the enlisted personnel issue in a letter to General Hodge. After tracing the background of fruitless requisitioning he pointed out that there were at the time about 100 officers and 217 enlistedmen either assigned to, or on detached service or temporary duty with Military Government and actually then at its headquarters. Of these enlisted men, scarcely twenty could be reckoned clerks. He wrote that he expected 206 officers to arrive within ten days time, 121 more within a month. In the same period he looked forward to receiving 125 enlisted men in ten days, 324 more in a month. Of these new enlisted men, however, only a small percentage were qualified by experience or education for clerical work. Thus, in a little over a week, Military Government would find itself with some 300 officers in its bureaus and sections with no more than 100 enlisted men to carry on clerical functions for them. Furthermore, about 60 of these men were merely on loan from the Corps.[105]

The Civil Administrator expected to lose 50 percent of his enlisted personnel by readjustment in October and an additional 25 percent in November. There was no proviso for retaining these enlisted men on the basis of scarce categories except in the case of one Korean interpreter.[106] He fully realized that clerical personnel was a critical item with all organizations in Korea. He saw no hope in simply requesting such personnel from other units -- they would most certainly plead equally pressing need -- or even from the replacement center. He asked that all units in Korea be ordered "to report by

name all enlisted men with any college training or any civilian experience in office work," giving a summary of such training and experience. These reports, he recommended, should be forwarded to Military Government who would select and receive those persons it felt were qualified. The letter left this statement implicit; "whether the tactical unit agreed to the transfer or not."[107]

The Corps felt it could not quite so cavalierly rob its units of personnel, but it did authorize a circularization of all commands, applying for volunteers.[108] The results were not impressive, as one might imagine, but by that time the advent of forty or more military government companies had been assured and the matter was dropped.[109]

The first of the new companies arrived at Inchon on 20 October -- four former FOAU units. The next day saw the landing there of thirty-one companies and headquarters groups. With it is the early period of military government ends. There only remains to summarize its overall strength during these last days:

	About 1 October		15 October		24 October	
	Officers	EM	Officers	EM	Officers	EM
Administration	27	219	32	377	35	283
Office of the Military Governor and Civil Administrator	64	101	90	98	92	129
Bureaus	112	87	162	105	161	99
MG at Pusan	10	6	12	6	15	19
Korean Commodities Co.	22	86	24	86	24	89
Oriental Development Co.	1	2	8	1	6	3
Provisional MG teams	37	76	49	76	49	74
Miscellaneous provincial	0	0	14	0	14	0
Unassigned	80	0	4	0	4	0
Totals	353	577	395	747	400	696

*Does not include newly arrived units.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. The official naval report of the operation makes no mention of civil affairs (COMPHIBSPAC, "Report of Amphibious Operations for the capture of the Marianas Islands," 25 Aug 1944). History of military government in the Marianas is included in the MS History of Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. Tenth Army, Staff Memorandum No. 4, 21 Aug. 1944 (copy included in MS "History of Military Government in the Ryukyus").

3. Based on conversations with several civil affairs officers who served in the Philippines. Plans were made long before the invasion for reestablishing the pre-1941 Philippines Government at the earliest possible moment.

4. XXIV Corps, "Operations Report: XXIV Corps in Leyte (PI) Campaign," undated, pp. 51-52; Civil Affairs Officer to CG XXIV Corps, "Report of Operations of Philippine Civil Affairs Units," 15 Feb. 1945; interviews with former PCAU officers.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. See MS "History of Military Government in the Ryukyus," prepared by 1st Information and Historical Service.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Interview with Maj. Wayne Bates, formerly Executive Officer, Military Government Section, Tenth Army, 10 Oct. 1945.

12. Memo, MG Sect, Tenth Army to G-1, Tenth Army, 13 Aug. 1945 (in MG files, 320); interview with Maj. W.L. Williams, former Ex O, G-5 Section, CASA, 21 May 1946.

13. U. S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, 22 Dec. 1943 (FM 27-5, OPNAV 50 E-5), pp. 25-27. (Hereinafter cited as MG Manual).

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Bates interview, op. cit.

18. HQ and HQ Co., Tenth Army AAA, Unit History, 1 Aug. 1945; GO 30, Tenth Army, 15 Feb. 1945. The unit was organized under T/O and E 44-200-1, 26 Oct 1944, and as such was considered a separate command.

19. Bates interview, op. cit.

20. Radios, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 161846/I and CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 182157/I; GHQ AFPAC OI 4, op. cit., Annex 3; GHQ AFPAC Assignment Letter (96), 18 Aug. 1945.

21. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 181639/I Aug 45; interview with Col. Brainard E. Prescott, Civil Administrator, 30 Nov. 1945.

22. Prescott interview, op. cit.

23. Ibid.

24. GHQ AFPAC, "Tentative Annex 8 to Operating Instructions No. 4 (Military Occupation)," 18 Aug. 1945.

25. Prescott interview, op. cit.

26. Annex 8, op. cit.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.; see Chapters IV and VIII for reactions of the Koreans to the original plans.

29. Prescott interview, op. cit.

30. T/O and E 20-527 and 20-56 T, 22 July 1945.

31. Ibid.

52. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG OASA, Presidio of Monterey, 261555/I Aug 45.

53. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, etc., 251301/I Aug 45.

54. Annex 7 (originally 8) to XXIV Corps FO 55 (Military Government), 29 Aug. 45. The annex is given in full in Appendix.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. USAFIK, GO 2, 28 Aug. 1945

58. USAFIK, GO 3, 2[illegible] Aug. 1945.

59. MG, USAFIK, GO 1, 29 Aug. 1945. (This order was later amended.)

60. MG Manual, op. cit., p. 3.

61. MG Manual, op. cit., p. 5.

62. MG, "History of Military Government in the Ryukyus," a study prepared by 1st Information and Historical Service, passim. The constant pressure put on Military Government to move natives into the uninhabitable northern reaches of Okinawa not only necessitated more personnel and supplies for military government, but greatly reduced the availability of native labor.

63. Corps Staff Conference, 14 Sept. 1945, Historian's notes.

64. Prescott interview, op. cit.

65. Annex 7 to FO 55, op. cit.

66. Radios, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 261609/I and 261413/I Aug 45.

67. Ibid.

68. Prescott interview, op. cit. See Chapter X.

69. USAFIK, SO 1, 31 Aug. 1945; Estes interview, op. cit.

70. Interview with Lt. Carl Cherin, Personnel Officer, Headquarters, Tenth Army AAA, 25 Sept. 1945.

71. Ibid.; USAFIK SO 1, 31 Aug. 1945.

52. Letter, Capt. David B. Duke (CO, Psychological Warfare Detach., AFPAC) to G-2, XXIV Corps, 23 Aug. 1945 [in MG files]; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC 310834/I Aug 45.

53. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, etc., 270117/I Aug 45; Estes interview, op. cit.

54. MG, USAFIK, GO 1, 31 Aug. 1945; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div 021645/I Sept 45; Cherin interview, op. cit.; backing papers in XXIV Corps AG files on 1st Ind. to letter, Civil Administrator to CG XXIV Corps, "Request for Activation of Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Companies," 24 Sept. 1945.

55. R/S Admin. Office, MG to G-3, XXIV Corps, circa 12 Sept. 1945 "Summary of troop movement by MG Sect, USAFIK. . . ." [in MG files, 370].

56. Morning Report, Hdqrs and Hdqrs Btry, Tenty Army AAA, 10 Sept. 1945; Cherin interview, op. cit.

57. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 122350/I Sept 45.

58. (Unit history); GO 10, USAFIK, 26 Sept. 1945.

59. (Unit history); GO 156, XXIV Corps, 5 Oct. 1945; the component units of the Group were reassigned by GO 128, XXIV Corps, 17 Sept. 1945.

60. GO 142, XXIV Corps, 12 Oct. 1945

61. Typescript list of MG officers, 12 Sept. 1945 [in MG files].

62. USAFIK, GO 7, 12 Sept. 1945.

63. GO 2, USAFIK MG, 14 Sept. 1945.

64. Data in PRO, 7th Division.

65. Notes on MG Press Conference, 11 Dec. 1945.

66. GO 2, USAFIK MG, 14 Sept. 1945.

67. USAFIK MG, letter (322), 20 Sept. 1945, "Organization of Military Government, Government General;" see Appendix.

68. GO 7, USAFIK MG, 20 Sept. 1945.

69. Comparison of USAFIK MG, "Bureau Breakdown and Officer Assignment" list with individual personnel records.

70. USAFIK MG, Military Administrative Section, "SOP on Personnel Administration," 30 Sept. 1945.

71. Interviews with Lt. Col. Howard Michelet and Maj. William A. Seddon, Administrative Officers, MG USAFIK, 25 Jan. 1946.

72. Ibid; USAFIK, GO 1, 4 Jan. 1946.

73. Letter, Civil Administrator to CG XXIV Corps, 24 Sept. 1945, op. cit.

74. Radio, WARCOS to SCAP, 262541/Z Aug 45.

75. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CINCAFPAC Manila, 211351/I Sept 45. See also MG unit histories (in historical file).

76. Radio, CINCAFPAC Manila to CINCAFPAC Advance, 26 Sept 45 (DTG not known).

77. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CINCAFPAC Manila, 211905/I Sept 45, with info copy to CG XXIV Corps.

78. Radio, CINCAFPAC Manila to CG XXIV Corps, 221519/I Sept 45.

79. Radios CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 251449/I Sept 45; CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Manila, 221122/I Sept 45.

80. Radio, CINCAFPAC Manila to C INCAFPAC Advance (info to CG XXIV Corps) 051257/I Oct 45.

81. R/S USAFIK MG (Col. Roth) to G-1, XXIV Corps, 24 Sept. 1945 [in MG files 370].

82. Radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC Advance, 271656/I Sept 45.

83. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, 041101/I Oct 45.

84. R/S Col. May to Cols. Prescott and Roth [in MG files 370]; radio, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Advance, 050930/I Oct; GHQ AFPAC, "Assignment of Units (160)," 7 Oct. 1945.

85. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CINCAFPAC Manila, 052253/I Oct 45.

86. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CG XXIV Corps, 061809/I Oct 45.

87. Letter, USAFIK MG (Col. May) to CG USAFIK, 3 Oct. 1945.

88. Ibid.

89. Interview with Col. Joseph B. Coolidge, G-3, XXIV Corps, 12 Dec. 1945.

90. Letter, Military Governor to CG XXIV Corps, 18 Sept. 1945; radio, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, TFAAG 562, 21 Sept. 1945.

91. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CG USAFIK, 252009/I Sept 45.

92. Interview with Maj. William F. LaMotte, Intelligence and Information Section, HQ USAFIK, 25 June 1946.

93. Tenth Army AAA, Morning Report, 25 Sept. 1945; Cherin interview, op. cit.

94. USAFIK, Letter Orders (TFAAG 300.4), 19 Sept. 1945.

95. Radio, Harris (at Pusan) to Mil. Gov., 241939/I Sept 45.

96. Letter, Director, Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce to CG USAFIK, "Staff Study Problem," 1 Oct. 1945.

97. Time, 8 Oct. 1945.

98. Radio, CG XXIV Corps to CG XXIV Corps Rear, 13 Sept. 1945 (no DTG).

99. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CG USAFIK, 162113/I Sept 45.

100. Radio, CINCAFPAC Advance to CINCAFPAC Manila, 151745/I Sept 45.

101. Letter, Civil Administrator to CG XXIV Corps, 27 Sept. 1945 (with backing papers, in Corps AG files).

102. Interviews with Cherin, op. cit., and other HQ administrative officers.

103. Letter, Civil Administrator to CG XXIV Corps, 27 Sept. 1945 (with backing papers in Corps AG 322).

104. Historian's notes; Cherin interview, op. cit.; USAFIK HQ, Memorandum, "Summary of the Readjustment and Replacement Status of Personnel," undated (circa 1 Oct. 1945) [in HQ files].

105. Letter, Civil Administrator to CG XXIV Corps, op. cit.

106. USAFIK HQ Personnel Memorandum, op. cit.

107. Letter, Civil Administrator to CG XXIV Corps, op. cit.

108. Booking papers to ibid.

109. Cherin interview, op. cit.

110. USAFIK MD, Strength Reports, 15 and 24 Oct. 1945, [in MD "Strength" file].

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PART III

Chapter II

Setting up a National Government

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CHAPTER II

SETTING UP A NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Japanese Administration of Korea

The hub around which the administration of Korea revolved during the period of Japanese domination was the Government General. With its government seat in Seoul it reached out into all the provinces like a giant bureaucratic octopus. Something has already been said of this in Chapter II above but it merits a brief review at this point in the narrative.

The head of the Government was the Governor General who was appointed by the Premier of Japan.[1] He was assisted by a Secretariat and by the Vice Governor General[2] who was charged particularly with the supervision of the entire business of bureaus and departments. A Central Council was organized as an advisory body for the Governor General; its members were appointed by him from among prominent Koreans.[3]

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Responsible to the Governor and charged with the actual detailed administration were the various sections, departments, and bureaus. This was the central government. There was no diet, no senate, no agency of any kind through which the people could even express their wishes, much less bring about any legislation. The Koreans were ultimately allowed to seat six men in the Japanese Diet but this was of little advantage[4] to the Korean people except as a slight sop to their pride.

The part played in the government by the ruling house of Korea after the annexation was nil. His Highness, Prince Yi lived in Japan, subsidized by both the Korean Government General and by the Japanese, where he married a princess of the Japanese imperial family. They visited Korea occasionally[5] but otherwise showed no interest in Korean affairs.

Provincial Administration

This central administration extended into the provinces through provincial governors appointed by the Governor General with the approval of the Premier.[6] The provincial governors like the Governor General were advised by a council but in this case two-thirds of its members were elected and only one-third appointed. This was not even as democratic as it appeared since the provincial governor retained absolute veto power. Below the governors were the pu (municipalities), the eup

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(towns) and myun (townships). The local pu heads were appointed by the Provincial Governor with the approval of the Governor General and most of them were Japanese. The myun heads, also appointed in the same manner,were mostly Koreans.[7] In these lower reaches, however, there had been some greater pretence at autonomy and consultation of popular opinion. Up to 1920 four elections had been held to accustom the Korean people to having some part in their own Government. As time went on their political aspirations were allowed to expend themselves in electing their fellow Koreans to the pu and myun councils. In 1935 for example 20,418 votes were cast by 21,976 registered voters for memberships on the local town councils. In 1937 general elections for local officials the percentage of registered voters participating in the elections had increased to 98%.[8]

Several things must be remembered, however. First of all, these elections applied only to provincial or local councils. The final executive power lay in the hands of the Governor General and Provincial Governors, who appointed even local magistrates and exercised absolute veto power. The councils, through theoretically exercising an executive function, were only advisory. The franchise was strictly limited. It was not even universal manhood suffrage. Only male residents of at least one year, at least twenty-five years old, paying at least five yen in municipal taxes, were allowed to vote in elections for the Municipal Council.[9]

The local administration was charged with collections of local revenue, police, education, water works, sewerage, road building, administration of justice and such other local functions as one would

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expect.[10] The Japanese felt that in 1920 they had decentralized the administration considerably by new regulations which gave local authorities wider competency with regards to matters formerly presented for decision to the highest authority.[11] This was a far cry from anything like real local administration except in small matters and except in so far as the provincial governors were given a fairly free rein by the Governor General.[12]

Government Control of Korean Economy

Consistent with the Japanese purpose to integrate the economy of Korea with a larger controlled economy for the whole Japanese Empire, government monopolies were established.[13] In this way not only were the Japanese able to strengthen the control of their Government General over the land but they were able to set up a situation which was ideal for milking Korea for the benefit of their own economy.[14]

The Government owned much state property which had formerly belonged to the Yi Dynasty for supplying post stations and border guards. This was not in the strictest sense a monopoly but the great amount of this land enabled the Government after the original need for the land no longer existed to enter into the real estate business in a large way. It proved a lucrative source of revenue for many years and as late as 1937 there was still some of this state-owned land left.[15]

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Among the important commodity monopolies were ginseng - valuable for medicinal purposes - tobacco, salt and opium. The government monopoly bureau controlled the importation and sale of these items.

Two further examples of the Government's participation to a monopolistic extent in Korean economy may be found in the Chosen Food Company and the Oriental Development Corporation. The former bought up the annual rice harvest and took charge of its distribution and sale at fixed prices. The other was devoted to investigating, appropriating and fostering any businesses or industries which gave promise of furthering the national economy. Numerous other examples of government control agencies existed in the form of companies, but many of these will be covered later in the accounts of the individual government bureaus which supervised their activity.

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Government Control of Korean Utilities

After 1906 when the Government took over all existing railroads and placed them under a government bureau the Japanese exercised control over most of the Korean railways. They expanded and improved this system steadily over the period of their domination. A measure of this expansion may be found in the increase of passengers carried from 2,024,000 in 1911 to 35,906,000 in 1937 and in freight from 888,000 tons to 11,369,000 during the same period.

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Private railways were allowed to grow up beside the Government

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system. They were regulated and after 1914 were also subsidized. By 1937 there were ten private companies carrying about 9,000,000 passengers and over 2,000,000 tons of freight.[18]

In the late 1920's the Communications Bureau of the Government General planned a trunk air route connecting Japan, Korea and Manchuria, and three airports were established. There were also several private air services established, notably the Japan Air Transport Company which was founded by a subsidy from the Japanese Government late in October 1928.[19]

There were also government controlled tramways in several of the chief cities. Two lines in Seoul owned more than half of the mileage in operation before the war though the total mileage for all of Korea, less than ninety miles, appears incredibly small by American standards.

In the field of shipping and navigation the Government had a controlling part having, in 1912, "induced" all the then existing small shipping companies to amalgamate into the Chosen Mail Steamship Company. Later other shipping companies grew up but all were under close government regulation and were required to perform certain services such as operating ferry service between Korea and Japan.

Postal, telegraph and telephone service were also under government control and they made considerable strides toward spreading their services during the period between 1910 and 1937. In the latter service there were 217 telephone offices in 1910 against 829 in 1937, 6,448 subscribers against 48,972, and 21,260,613 calls against 279,111,649.

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The postal service also offered a postal saving system, a postal money order system and post office insurance system.

The Government General made strides in encouraging the development of electric power from water power. There were two good sites for this. In 1933 a hydro-electric power company obtained a charter to develop this power and the Chosen Power Transmission Company took over the construction of trunk lines and the distribution of the power.

Attention was also paid to the development of gas producing undertakings. These had first been controlled by the Police Bureau but since the business of gas distribution was done as a side line of the electric companies it was transferred in 1919 to the Communications Bureau so that both might be under the same supervision.[20]

Government Control of Press and Education

Even during the liberal regime of Governor General Saito only four or five Korean newspapers were allowed. The two best known of these were Chosen Il Bo and Ma Il Sin Bo. When General J. Minami became Governor General, however, he suppressed all vernacular daily papers except Ma Il Sin Bo which was 50 percent Japanese owned, about 30 percent of its stock being held by the Government General.[21] It became one of the chief mouthpieces of the Government General along with the Japanese language paper Keijo Nippo.[22] The former reached a circulation of close to 500,000 and the latter slightly less.[23] The Japanese

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language papers were not widely read by the Korean people both because they were in a language which could be read by only 15 percent of the people and because they realized that they were primarily instruments of propaganda.[24] Every printed word in Korea in fact whether on newsprint or in a book was subject to the most rigid censorship. Freedom of the press was an idle dream.

The dissemination of information by radio was fully as strictly regulated as in the press. No short wave sets were allowed and all private radios were regulated so as to permit of reception on only two wave-lengths.[25] There were of course illegal sets but the influence of these could not be very wide-spread. Substantially all radio listeners therefore were fed on a diet of Japanese propaganda. This control furthermore was highly centralized since all the local stations which supported the central broadcasting station at Seoul were obliged to devote almost all of their radio time to relaying the programs sent out by this station - JODK.[26]

The schools too were closely controlled as can be seen from the chapter on education. Textbooks and all teaching were required to conform to the basic principle that education was to make students good, loyal and mentally efficient subjects of the "glorious" Japanese Empire.[27]

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XXIV Corps' Plans for Administration

As indicated in Chapter I, detailed instructions concerning the occupation of Korea were issued in the form of Field Order 55. Annex 7 of this order dated 29 August provided for the occupational control of Korea south of the 38th degree and also for the establishment of government administration in that area. The annex stated that the existing government machinery was to be utilized but at the same time said "no persons will be allowed to hold public office or any other position of responsibility or influence in public or private enterprise who have been flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression."[28] It also stated that "other encumbent policy making officials will be removed where such removal will not jeopardize the efficiency of the present government controls and administration."[29] This order by its very wording imposed at the outset an almost impossible problem on the shoulders of the Military Government which was charged with the conduct of the national administration. It required at the same time the ousting of the most obnoxious Japanese and the preservation of maximum efficiency of administration. The attempt to strike a reasonably happy medium between these two purposes was a serious problem at the beginning and continued to be one through the first two months at least. The problem, of course, was intensified by the fact that the tentacles of Japanese Government had reached so deeply into every recess of Korean life, politics, economics, business, education, justice and culture. To replace this entire structure in several months without loss of efficiency was a formidable problem for Military Government officers who were to carry

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the main burden of this national administration throughout the early period.

Before going into the actions taken by Military Government to implement these policies it would be well to note several general statements in JANIS 75, which had been the chief source of basic intelligence upon which the XXIV Corps staff had to depend in drawing up the "Baker" plans. These statements were a good intelligence estimate of what the attitude of the Korean people was likely to be under the several possible circumstances involved in an occupation.

> [The Korean people] would prefer initial inefficiencies of administrative inexperience to the danger of extended control. . . . [they] would favor an international regime rather than one of a single nation. . . . Korean cooperation [is] likely to be proportioned to Korean belief in the strictly temporary and short term nature of such control. . . . Appointment of a non-Korean official to a post for which a Korean is available, however, may have an unfavorable effect on public opinion.

Several broad policies over which the XXIV Corps had no control made it impossible for them to carry out a program more closely in step with these intelligence observations. The division of Korea and the administration of each half by a single nation combined the disadvantages of single control and joint control offering few of the advantages of either.[30] The basic principle that an orderly, efficiently operating and politically friendly Korea was more important than pleasing and winning the enthusiastic cooperation of all the Korean people, who, after all, had been an integral part of an enemy nation for thirty-five years, was another qualifying factor in determining the policies of the Corps in the national administration. A case in point is the broad statement

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concerning the disqualification for office of all persons who had been "flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism"[31] which cut more deeply into the former controlling elements in Korea than many Koreans would have wished. It did, however, allow the temporary retention of certain key officials who seemed necessary to the efficient administration of the country.

XXIV Corps Takes Over

It had been understood that at midnight on 9 September, after the surrender, the administration of Korea would be shifted from Japanese to American control.[32] Until that time the Corps had been preoccupied with establishing itself in Seoul and performing the first military phase of the occupation. On the morning of the tenth, however, U.S. Army personnel, but expediently assigned to Military Government duties, came to the Government General Building prepared to take over the supervision of civil administration, though it had been planned to continue the Japanese in their positions for the time being at least.

Although the Japanese in the government had been ordered to remain at their posts until the Americans relieved them; many civil officers had fled the country before our arrival. The initial plan of maintaining the Japanese and their Korean underlings in the government to permit a feasable transition, at least in the vital public service bureaus, was to give rise to criticisms, which however warranted failed to consider the fact that the XXIV Corps was yet to receive its first Military Government teams. Governor General Noboyuki Abe and Vice Governor Ryusaku Endo, continued on at their posts with General Harris, the deputy for Military

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Government, supervising their activity during the first three days. In the lower echelons of the administration, also, American personnel took over their supervisory functions, retaining at first the key Japanese officials to advise them, but due to the lack of trained Military Government Officers, administration of government was often but an additional duty of the tactical troops.

At the surrender ceremony itself General Hodge announced that there would be a conference with the members of the Korean press the next day at 1000 at the Chosen Hotel.[33] This conference was the first move toward establishing an effective means of contact with the Korean people through a U.S. Military Government agency. The agency which was charged with the conduct of this relationship was one which shortly came to be known as the Korean Relations and Information Section. The press was informed at the conference that the Korean people who had problems to present to the Government, who wanted recognition for a political party or who had any other business to contract with the Government should do so through this agency. By noon on the 11th a line had formed outside their office waiting with every conceivable mission, ranging from the desire to give information to the desire to receive recognition for a political party or to receive permission to start publication of a newspaper.

The problem of these first few days was, in an acute form, the same problem that plagued the administration for the first two months. It was essentially the attempt to set up a working relationship with the Korean people which took into account their hopes, their fears, their needs, and their eagerness to participate on the one hand and the attempt to keep in operation the far reaching bureaucratic administration of the Japanese Government-General of Korea on the other.

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Much time was devoted at first to consultation with the Japanese and to becoming familiar through their help with the functions of the sections and bureaus.[34] In most cases the Japanese seemed sincerely eager to help and even their Korean underlings seemed willing to continue temporarily under thier former Japanese chiefs, though this willingness became noticeably less in offices where it was necessary to retain a large percentage of key Japanese personnel in the interests of efficiency.[35]

After several days it became apparent to General Hodge, both through the attitude of the Koreans locally and from unfavorable press comments in the United States, that the top Japanese officials must be removed immediately, even at the expense of efficiency.[36] This had also become apparent to CINCAFPAC who radioed to General Hodge on 11 September to replace all Japanese in government positions "as rapidly as possible, consistent with safety of operations."[37] The latter replied that he had already reached the same conclusion and was about to remove the Governor General, but that in order to follow through with wholesale removals he would need a great deal of "material assistance in the way of Military Government personnel with experience and capabilities in civil government."[38] On 12 September, therefore, Governor General Abe was removed and General Arnold, Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, was made Military Governor of Korea.[39] This was the first step in a vigorous program of housecleaning and appeared to stop much Korean criticism.

Mr. H. M. Benninghoff, General Hodge's political advisor, reported this change to the State Department and indicated his desire for some

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guidance from them as follows:

> In the absence of policy directives this headquarters must continue operating on a day to day basis in an effort to control the local situation as it develops. 40

At the same time General Hodge too showed in a 13 September letter to General MacArthur that he hoped for some more definite information and guidance concerning the higher policy on the future of Korea so that he could handle the local situation in accordance with that policy. He suggested in fact that an international control group be set up on the spot which would be capable of making policy decisions. 41

Meanwhile the program of removal was pushed steadily with a view to eliminating as soon as possible all the most obviously objectionable Japanese from key positions and efforts were made to obtain the necessary personnel. 42 As might be expected, these removals were made more rapidly in some bureaus than in others and more rapidly in the central government than in the provinces. The Finance Bureau in particular had to retain many Japanese for a considerable length of time since they alone were familiar with the intricacies of their own bookkeeping methods. 43 In the provinces the process was slow simply because of the physical difficulty of extending Military Government over all of Korea in a few weeks. General Hodge explained this delay in provincial removals to CINCAFPAC in a 26 September radio as follows:

> . . . The removal of all provincial governors prior to actual occupation of their provinces by our troops and prior to the arrival of adequate Military Government personnel will cause disorder, confusion, and possibly lead to violence and bloodshed. The delay in arrival of adequate Military Government personnel has considerably hampered the carrying out of the program. 44

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Thus it was clear in General Hodge's mind that not only must military tactical occupation by troops come first but also that there must be adequate Military Government personnel available. The first of these requirements was not completed in many areas till the end of the first week in October. After this came the Military Government teams which gradually took over responsibility from the combat units but remained under administrative and operational control of the local commanding officer. Until at least the first of these steps was completed in each area, replacement of Japanese governors could not be made.

Other problems too became apparent and pressing in the first week of the national administration. The language problem as a whole, and particularly the problem of obtaining a sufficient number of interpreters and translators, became very troublesome as already indicated in Chapter IV.

There was also the personnel problem. After the removal of many Japanese, replacing them with Military Government officers or with competent Koreans presented many difficulties. This sudden rise in the number of army personnel needed resulted in increased demands on the reserves of Military Government personnel in the United States beyond the number originally planned.[45] These requisitions naturally could not be filled immediately since the personnel had to be brought across the Pacific.[46] Neither was it possible to solve the problem overnight by drawing upon the Korean people because there were not a sufficient number already trained. Later the selection of Koreans

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suffered from the further complication that those best qualified were apt to be tainted in the popular eye by either being Japanese-trained or by belonging to a privileged educated group. Anybody who had been able to enjoy the privileges of higher education under the Japanese regime was suspect. This problem of suspect Koreans continued well beyond the early days. In November General Hodge felt obliged to warn all the major units in his command that there was too much of a tendency to retain pre-occupation government personnel who were, even though Korean nationals, highly objectionable to the Korean people.[47] Furthermore, there was a natural tendency at first to select Koreans who had some knowledge of English and this gave rise to the feeling that the linguistic qualification was eliminating many otherwise better qualified men.[48]

John Walker, correspondent for Time magazine described these early days as follows:

> Some Koreans would have welcomed chaos, they were so impatient to get the slate wiped clean for independence. They were bound to be disillusioned by American insistence on retaining the forms of government, and by the Army's slow motion progress. That is passing. Koreans have replaced almost all of the hated Japanese police, and those who remain (as sources of information) are kept out of sight.[49]

General Hodge made a full report of these first few days to General MacArthur on 13 September in which he covered all the problems which were facing him. He also pointed out that the Corps was "operating under two tremendous handicaps." First was the lack of information about what the United States planned for the future of Korea. Second was the fact that the command was so small in strength and so short of

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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM




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specially trained personnel that he was unable to meet the urgent necessity for expanding throughout all the provinces.[50]

The Structure of the National Administration

Against this background the machinery of Military Government ground out a national administration for Korea and the Japanese structure was in a remarkably short time replaced by a similar Military Government structure, although the process was not a simple one.

In addition to insufficient time for proper planning, insufficient personnel, and the suddenness of taking over from the Japanese which have already been mentioned, there was a further difficulty.[51] The Japanese had no less than 144 central government agencies which were classified as the Government General and affiliated offices.[52] Forty of these were not subsidiary to each other in the Japanese-controlled hierarchy at the bureau level but enjoyed a semi-independent status under the Governor General.[53] The remaining hundred, it is true, were subsidiary branches of the dozen main bureaus or secretariat sections.[54]

To replace or simplify this complex structure with all its ramifications using the limited American and Korean personnel available was a task of considerable magnitude.

At the top of the structure the Americans placed three instead of two executives. Assisting the top executives were the Secretariat and the Bureaus which were only slightly changed at first from those operating under the Japanese regime.[55] Included in the Secretariat at the

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


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
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
beginning were the offices of General Affairs, Planning, Intelligence and Information, Accounts, Personnel, and Local Affairs.[56] Also on the Secretariat level there was created a section for the administration of the army personnel. This was not strictly speaking a section of the government because it dealt only with the army and had no responsibility for Korean affairs, but for practical purposes it must be considered along with the other sections of the Secretariat.[57] By 20 September, shortly after Military Government took over from the Japanese, the Office of Foreign Affairs had been taken from the General Affairs Section and made a section of the Secretariat in its own right.[58] On 1 October a new section was created to handle affairs connected with property which had formerly been Japanese. It was called the Office of the Property Custody.[59] The Bureau of Finance had tried to handle these matters within the framework of its organization but it had soon become apparent that the volume of this new work made a whole separate agency necessary.[60] At the same time the Local Affairs Section of the old regime was abolished as a separate section and was included in the Planning Section.[61] Several months later it became apparent from the volume of the work and from its operational nature that a section should be recreated to handle it. A staff study was made and as a result a section was created called the Provincial Affairs Section.[62]

There were also a few initial structural changes in the bureau category. The eight old Japanese bureaus were retained without much change except that a Bureau of Public Health and Welfare was created from the old Health Section of the Police Bureau and Welfare Section of the Bureau of Education and became a ninth bureau.[63]

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SECRETARIAT
GENERAL AFFAIRS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS
PLANNING
PROPERTY CUSTODIAN
PUBLIC INFORMATION
KOREAN CIVIL SERVICE
ARMY ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR OF NAT'L DEFENSE
BUREAUS
ARMED FORCES
POLICE
MINING & INDUSTRY
JUSTICE
COMMUNI-CATIONS
TRANSPOR-TATION
PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE



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The above were the changes made in the first month of the occupation. Other changes were made before the end of the year and the setting up of a separate Military Government command.

By the end of December the Military Government hierarchy contained eight secretariat sections and ten bureaus, two independent agencies at the bureau level and a Directorate of National Defense.[64] Though this does not represent a reduction in number of sections and bureaus, the great mass of minor agencies were made to fit into their proper place in the hierarchy as subsidiaries and the threads of responsibility followed a definite pattern up through these to the top level offices. They may have appeared at times during these early months to be overlapping and even to invite a conflict of authority before new precedents and procedures were completely established but by the end of the year the machinery was moving in a systematic manner.

This structure was considerably altered and simplified during the first four months of 1946 until it finally on 1 May took shape as indicated in Diagram 3b. The new structure contained eleven departments in place of the ten bureaus and four offices in place of the eight secretariat sections. Two of the formerly independent agencies became subject to the staff supervision of the Department of Commerce but three new independent agencies had appeared. Though independent, the work of these agencies was closely connected with both the departments of Agriculture and Commerce.

A Military Government officer, in writing about the characteristics of military government, pointed out that such government was inevitably

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a government of change, an impermanent government and one dominated by military chains of command. The first of these characteristics was indeed evident in the evolutionary period of the setting up of a national administration from September to May. The observation is further fortified by the figures on the changes wrought in the so-called "second echelon" or sub-bureau agencies. There were sixty-five of these "second echelon" agencies extant on 10 September 1945. After eight months of fairly constant shuffling and revision, nine of these had been abolished, thirty nine relocated or redefined, and only seventeen unaltered. Sixteen had been added for reasons of efficiency, nine had been added for emergency reasons and forty-four had been added to meet the needs of governmental expansion.

These figures do not include the three advisory boards indicated in Diagram 3b, nor do they include the four semi-independent agencies, since they were more properly first echelon agencies being subject to the departments only for staff supervision. These, if included, would further add to the picture of change and impermanency since the three boards did not have Government General counterparts and the activities of the other agencies have been greatly expanded and complicated by the handling of expropriated Japanese property.

It should also be noted by way of further explanation of the apparent complexity of the structure that, Military Government took over not only all the vast and far reaching functions of the Japanese controlled Government General, it also took over all the administration of Japanese private enterprise and private property. Thus Military Government was forced by the necessity implicit in the acquisition of Japanese

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property to reach even more deeply into the administration of Korean life and economy than had the Japanese administration. The increase in number of "second echelon" agencies from 65 under the Japanese to 86 under Military Government was probably not out of proportion to the increase of responsibility. It was also accounted for in a measure by the necessity to run the government temporarily on a deficit basis so far as the budget was concerned. Having to run not only the government railroads, but Japanese owned private ones as well and Japanese private industries worn out and depleted with war use and lack of repair took an above normal number of officers and an above normal number of yen.[66]

The Top Executives

After the removal of Governor Abe on 12 September Mr. Benninghoff recommended to CINCAFPAC that the name "Governor General" be abolished because it connoted "a colonial status in the eyes of the Koreans."[67] He recommended the term "Military Governor" be used until such time as the official nomenclature could be agreed upon.[68]

General Arnold became known therefore as the Military Governor and began immediately to carry out the duties of this office. One of his first acts was to issue General Order #2 which appointed General Harris, who had been acting as General Hodge's Deputy for Military Government, to the position of Deputy Military Governor.[69] The order also appointed Colonel Brainard E. Prescott to the position of Civil Administrator,

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Which corresponded closely to the Japanese position of Vice-Governor General.[70] This position carried with it the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the Governor's Secretariat, which corresponded to a staff, and the various bureaus, which constituted a cabinet charged with carrying out administrative functions. It had originally been planned that Colonel J. O. Underwood would occupy a post to be known as the Secretary of the Secretariat, with Colonel Metticus W. May, Jr., as his executive officer, but this plan was abandoned in favor of the one which corresponded more closely with the Japanese titles and functions. These two men were assigned instead to act as heads of the Bureau of Mining and Industry and the Planning Section respectively.[71]

On 29 September 1945, General Order Number 2 was amended by Appointment Number 3, which placed Brigadier General J. R. Sheetz in the position of Deputy Military Governor replacing General Harris who had been appointed Governor of Kyongsang Namdo on the previous day.[72] Later, when Colonel Prescott left for home, it was believed that the functions of Deputy Military Governor and Civil Administrator might be filled by one individual.[73] The Japanese had had only two men in the top executive positions. Thus it seemed as though the Americans should be able to simplify to that extent.[74] The Deputy Military Governor, General Sheetz, therefore, was officially appointed to fill the position of Civil Administrator as well.[75] Throughout December he continued to hold these two offices. It appeared, however, after less than a month that, if the Deputy Military Governor carried out

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the functions of his office, the paper work of the Civil Administrator would accumulate beyond control.[76] Consequently, on 3 January 1946 Colonel May, formerly Secretary of the Planning Section, was elevated to the position of Civil Administrator.[77]

These were the men who carried the bulk of the executive load throughout the early months of the occupation.

In December it was announced that Major General Archer L. Lerch would relieve General Arnold as soon as he had oriented himself thoroughly on Korean affairs. Immediately after the announcement some rumor mongers in the Korean press insinuated that General Arnold was being relieved "for cause". On hearing this the Commanding General came to the 11 December press conference meeting and made it absolutely clear in his typically forthright manner that the relief of General Arnold was only the result of a long-standing promise that he would be relieved of his temporary assignment as soon as a qualified successor could be found. There was no doubt as to the sincerity of General Hodge's admiration for the manner in which the Military Governor had performed his mission.[78]

As early as 23 October General Hodge had explained the situation to SCAP in a radio as follows:

> . . . As you know, have detailed Major General A. V. Arnold, COMGEN Seventh Div. temporarily as Deputy for Military Government. He is doing good work in that as a full-time occupation. However, he is needed in his division and there is no suitable replacement available for use as Military Governor, which is of extremely high importance. Talked to Major General Archer L. Lerch PMG upon his recent visit here and find him entirely willing to accept position as Military Governor. His background and training should make him highly qualified for this work and better than any combat commander.[79]

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General Lerch, a graduate of the University of California, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1917. Appointed to the Regular Army he later graduated from the Infantry School, Fort Benning, and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

His service included a tour of duty with the 31st Infantry in Manila, an assignment as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, Hawaiian Department, and membership on the staff of the Judge Advocate General in Washington. Upon the establishment of the Provost Marshal General's Department in Washington, in 1941 he was appointed Deputy Provost Marshal. He served subsequently as Commandant of the Provost Marshal General's training school at Fort Oglethorpe and at Fort Custer. In December 1942 he was promoted to Brigadier General and returned to Washington to serve as Assistant The Provost Marshal General. In April 1944 he became acting Provost Marshal General until June of that year when he was promoted to Major General and was designated as The Provost Marshal General. He served in this capacity until December 1945 when he was assigned to Korea.[80]

General Lerch arrived by plane on 16 December. He immediately began studying the situation. This study included what was to have been a ten day trip into the provinces starting on 27 December. The announcement of the Moscow decisions and the consequent events brought him back a little earlier than he had expected. He officially assumed command on 4 January 1946.[81] With his assumption of command the Military Government became officially known as United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) with an allotment of grades and ratings which included 663 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 1316 men.[82]


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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
PLANNING SECTION



FEBRUARY 1946

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The title USAMGIK was settled upon, however, only after it was pointed out by CINCAFPAC ADV that the title which had originally been recommended, United States Army Military Government OF Korea (USAMGOK), ended in three letters which sounded like "gook" which accordingly could be a source of embarrassment.[83]

After the establishment of USAMGIK there were a number of changes within the top offices. When Colonel May went back to the United States,[84] Lt. Colonel Raymond A. Janowski was appointed to replace him. He served only one week, however, from 1 March to 8 March 1946, for he was called home on emergency leave. He was succeeded by Lt. Colonel William A. Glass, Jr.,[85] the head of the New Korea Company, who served as acting Civil Administrator until 8 April when Colonel Arthur S. Champeny,[86] who had been Director of the Department of Police and Director of National Defense, was appointed. He too served only briefly, being elevated to the position of Deputy Military Governor when General Sheetz returned to the United States because of ill health. This left the Office of Civil Administrator vacant and for the second time it was filled by an officer from the Planning Section. In this case, Lt. Col. Seth Wiard, head of that Section, became Civil Administrator.

The Planning Section

The Planning Section of the Secretariat was inherited from the Japanese. Under the Americans it was charged with formulating policies

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of the government and adjusting existing policies. It also acted in the capacity of Inspector General, conducting periodic inspections to make sure the Bureaus, Sections and Provincial Governments were functioning smoothly and with a minimum of conflict. The compiling of over-all statistics, the making of analyses, reports, and recommendations, and maintaining liason with the staff of the XXIV Corps were also its responsibility.[87]

Several organizational changes were effected. The first occurred when the former Local Affairs Section was incorporated. Then, later as already indicated, it was removed and reformed into a separate section again called the Provincial Affairs Section.[88] Otherwise the framework of the Section was as appears in Diagram 4.[89] Responsible for the functioning of this structure were twenty officers, six enlisted men, one War Department employee, and approximately 150 Korean civilian employees.[90]

During the period of its existence under Military Government, the Planning Section had four chiefs. First, was Colonel May, who was replaced by Lt. Col. George E. Kahler when the former became Civil Administrator in January 1946. In the late winter Lt. Col. (then Major) Carroll V. Hill acted for Colonel Kahler, who was sent as a special liaison officer to Washington. Lt. Col. Seth Wiard replaced Colonel Hill on 8 April and remained as head of the Section until it was dissolved in May.[91]

The Administrative Sub-Section supervised the typist pool, the log, the files, and distribution of correspondence and assured that

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coordination had been effected. The coordination of outgoing radio messages from the national government was also its responsibility. Later this responsibility was transferred to the message center under the Adjutant.

The Civilian Supply Sub-Section coordinated plans and policies of all government controlled agencies for the allocation and sale of civilian supplies. This included the sale of appropriated Japanese commodities and all other supplies through agencies like the Korea Commodity Corporation.

The Census and Statistics Sub-Section performed the functions its name implied.

The function of Research and Plans was essentially one of policy and plan coordination. Assignments for them came from two sources:

First, the Military Governor or the Civil Administrator would indicate concern over some problem which had come to his attention and would direct Research and Plans, through the Secretary for Planning, to make a study and recommend a solution. Particularly in the early days, this involved setting up a number of "temporary committees" with a Research and Plans representative serving as either chairman or secretary. Examples of these committees were the Fuel Committee, Labor Relations Committee, the Wage and Price Board, and the Committee on Opening Plants. Following a series of meetings, a completed plan for handling the problem would be presented, usually involving recommended policy, allocation of specific functions to particular agencies and for establishing a new agency or function within an existing agency to carry out proposed procedures.

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Second, there were proposals submitted by bureaus and sections. They were funneled through Planning before going to the Office of the Civil Administrator. Research and Plans checked on the feasibility of the plans, their consistency with existing policies, and, if another agency or other agencies were involved, directly or indirectly, arranged for conferences between interested parties or secured individual concurrences. In either case, however, it involved the preparation of reports for the Military Governor with recommendations for action after experts from the various bureaus were called in to give specialized advice on specific problems. 92

The Reports Sub-Section consolidated the reports for the various Bureaus and from the Provinces. The consolidated reports were then transmitted through the Military Governor and XXIV Corps to the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP). To this responsibility was added also that of sending a daily informational radio to SCAP and the assignment of intelligence target reports. It was this Sub-Section's task as well to disseminate information from the reports to the interested government bureaus. To implement this obligation the Reports Sub-Section published a Weekly Digest of important activities, the first issue of which appeared 15 November 1945. After that it appeared at irregular intervals. The irregularity was due to the shortage of clerical help in typing and mimeographing. Another function was the compiling of a history of the Military Government in Korea. For this purpose a field grade officer was appointed historian late in November. 92a.
In February the Reports Sub-Section was transferred out of Planning

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into the Bureau of Public Information where it was believed there would be sufficient clerical help for carrying out the assigned mission effectively.[93] Later it was shifted to the Office of the Civil Administrator and finally in May to the Office of Administration.

The Inspection Sub-Section with duties similar to those of the Budget Bureau in the United States conducted both regular and special inspections. These inspections were primarily functional. Inspections of army administration were made in the regular manner by an Inspector General of the United States Army.[94] Later, however, even functional inspections were considered no longer the responsibility of Planning and were taken over by the Inspector General who was also Provost Marshal. In general it might fairly be said the reason for the appearance and later disappearance of so many governmental responsibilities within the Planning Section was that, when these functions became operational, they were transferred to some operational agency. A number of new functions were started in the Planning Section; once operating, they, and frequently the personnel involved, were shifted over into operating bureaus. Examples of this process were many. They include such things as Cost of Living Study, Economic Planning, and Patent Registration as well as those functions indicated as "removed" on the diagram.[95]

In December 1945 under the auspices of the Planning Section an orientation trip through the Provinces was organized. Each section and bureau was represented on the travelling group. Its object was to explain the purposes, policies and potentialities of the central National

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Administration to the provincial administrators, on the one hand, and to ascertain the needs and recommendations of the provincial administrators, on the other. It was shortly after this trip that a number of recommendations were made by the Planning Section. Notable among these was the recommendation that Planning's Local Affairs and Operations Sub-Section be combined, removed from the Planning Section, and made into a section in its own right to be called the Provincial Affairs Section.

Many of the recommendations which came up from the bureaus went through the Planning Section then to the Office of the Civil Administrator and finally to the General Affairs Section, to be drafted into laws and published in the gazette, concerned national problems and are treated later in the chapter on National Issues. In order to illustrate the functioning of the Section, however, several of the less complicated recommendations should be mentioned.

A reorganization of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce was suggested to the Planning Section. A board of five experts was selected by Planning including officers from the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce, from the Bureau of Mining and Industry and from the Bureau of Finance, all of which were involved. On 1 February 1946 Planning submitted the report of this board to the Civil Administrator. The report took cognizance of the fact that the Japanese, when they had run these bureaus, had separated war and consummer goods. This being no longer necessary or desirable, all commerce responsibilities were placed under the Bureau of Mining and Industry which was to be called the

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Bureau of Commerce; all the finance responsibilities were to be taken over by the Bureau of Finance. The Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce was to assume responsibility for lumbering and processed foods, which were essentially agricultural industries, and its name was to be changed to simply the Bureau of Agriculture. This was approved by the Civil Administrator and passed on to General Affairs to be drafted into a law. The result was USAMGIK Ordinance 48 of 13 February 1946.

A similar procedure was followed with a suggestion for the establishing of a National Economic Board and with the suggested transfer of Port of Pusan duties from ASCOM 24 to Military Government personnel. In the latter case, however, the procedure differed slightly in that it involved XXIV Corps. Consequently, Corps staff officers were included by Planning on the board of five which drew up the recommendations, which after being approved by the Office of the Civil Administrator, were embodied not in a law drawn up by the General Affairs but in a letter from Commanding General, USAMGIK, to Commanding General USAFIK requesting that he consider taking action along the lines recommended.[96]

A still different procedure was followed in regard to a suggestion that the names of the Bureaus be changed to Departments and that the terminology applying to the other offices of Military Government be standardized. In this case the suggestion was passed on to the Korean Civil Service Section for coordination. After coordination, it finally emerged as USAMGIK Ordinance 64 on 29 March 1946.

Thus it was that the Planning Section had its finger in every pie, large and small. On 17 May 1946, however, it was abolished as a separate

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office as part of the spring reorganization of USAMGIK. The functions of the Analysis Division were transferred to the Office of the Civil Administrator; Statistics, Research and Administration were transferred to the newly created Office of Administration. The Civilian Supply Division was likewise transferred to another agency. This ended the life of a section which had played an important part in the formative stage of a national administration.[97]

General Affairs Section

The General Affairs Section formed a part of the Secretariat of the old Government General during the Japanese regime. Except for the removal of Foreign Affairs, which was set up as an independent section, it maintained substantially its former structure until it was abolished as of 2 April 1946. Major (later Lt. Col.) Emery J. Woodall, who at that time was also serving as Director of the Bureau of Justice by prior appointment, became Secretary of General Affairs.[98] Major Woodall was a lawyer by profession with a broad and considerable experience not only in his profession, but also in the Far East. He had lived in China for some time and prior to his appointment to Military Government in Korea had served as the Civil Affairs Officer, CBI Theater. The organization of this Section of which he became Secretary is shown in Diagram 5. Responsible for the functioning of this organization from 8 October on were from seven to ten officers, fifteen to seventeen


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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
GENERAL AFFAIRS SECTION



FEBRUARY 1946

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enlisted men and approximately sixty Korean civilian employees, the number fluctuating only slightly throughout the first six months.

The Section described its purpose and functions as follows:

> The General Affairs Section of the Secretariat is headed by the Secretary of General Affairs who is also the "General Counsel." The General Counsel is the legal adviser to the Military Governor of Korea. In a General Staff sense, he is that portion of the Military Governor's personality which advises and correlates plans, policies and activities with respect to laws and legality.99

This indicates that the section had no part in determining overall policies except as to the law establishment of the country, but although the Section was not responsible for policy it could not keep entirely clear of general policy making for it was impossible to divorce law making and pure legality from higher policy. They did, therefore, in point of fact exercise policy making power inevitably through interpretation of directives. Ordinance 33 on taking title to former Japanese property, for example, was an attempt to interpret paragraph 42 of the basic SWNCC directive which dealt with property.

That the actual functioning of the section was not as simple and smooth as the statement of its purposes might imply, was due in some measure to several factors beyond the control of the Section.

The difficulty of the search to find the correct law which applied exactly to a given situation was one factor which presented many troublesome hazards. First, there was the necessity for adopting a definite stand, for purposes of writing a law, on unsettled questions of international law. Second, there was the necessity for dealing with

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and translating legal concepts not common to Anglo-American law and civil law. Often these concepts were not even comparable to Anglo-American law. Third, there was a need for the use of research materials which were not available. Fourth, it was necessary to use translators technically unqualified for this highly specialized type of work. Fifth, there was need for constant and endless research into customary or uncodified oriental laws. Sixth, there was an urgent need for a variety of specialized legal skills not represented in the diminutive legal staff of the section.[100]

Another problem was the tendency of government agencies to apply American concepts familiar to them, without sufficient examination into a given situation to determine the practicability of the concept in its specific operation in a strange land having totally different ideas. Added to this was the failure of the agencies desiring a law "to arrive at or seek a thorough understanding of existing institutions, systems and laws as the point of departure for effectuating social or political change."[101]

Occasionally, too, there were requests for the drafting of laws to rectify specific local situations without fully appreciating what effect a literal, legal, and nationwide application of such an ordinance would have.[102]

Other problems were: (1) The time factor, which rarely gave sufficient time for the painstaking research necessary for the coordination of all considerations. (2) The failure of proponents of regulatory measures to follow through the implications of those measures

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in detail - often not through any fault of their own but because of lack of personnel. This applied also to new problems resulting from the measures adopted which sometimes replaced the original problem with problems even more difficult in nature and scope. In many cases it appeared that the agencies had not given sufficient consideration to the question, "Will this work?" (3) The constant need for resolving legal questions was based on a duality of sources which sometimes conflicted. This occurred most frequently when strict and literal interpretations of "the law" conflicted with the orders of higher echelons.[103] It became on occasions a question of legalism vs pragmatism.

Further light might be shed on the difficulties of law making by the statement of an officer in the General Affairs Section who regretted:

> The practice by governmental agencies issuing avalanches of "directives", "orders", "memoranda", "instructions", "letters", etc. without clearance as to policy or legality, and with limited circulation but unlimited application, resulting in confusion and misunderstanding and in the impossibility of arriving at any adequate appreciation or estimate of just what constituted the law of the operation at any given moment. 104

The first law on farm rents was a most complex piece of legislation, since the policy it reflected cut squarely across a long-standing tradition of separate, individual bargains.[105] As soon as it was published in the Official Gazette and became effective, almost every farmer in Korea became a violator. Enforcement machinery was totally inadequate for such a large-scale task. Later some officials said the law was no good because it couldn't be enforced. An administrative

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"clarification" was thereupon issued by a bureau. The second farm rent document could not be enforced any better than the first, so a third attempt was ordered. This type of procedure was confusing and discouraging to Koreans, as well as to military government personnel operating in the field.[106]

Much of this confusion and back tracking was due to the extraordinary difficulty of translating American legal language into Korean. It was, however, the responsibility of the General Affairs Section to recognize this fact and simplify the language of the ordinances as much as possible.

When drastic and sweeping ordinance 31, relating to the vesting of title to all Japanese property in Military Government, was issued, Colonel Prescott, the Civil Administrator, took it to Tokyo for final approval. Several changes were necessary relative to removing from the wording the implication that the property of other nationals was involved. Because of the need for an expeditious release of the ordinance these changes were dictated over the long distance telephone to a high official in Military Government. This caused some concern among the lawyers of the General Affairs Section who were loath to be hurried and several felt that some of the confusion after the publication was due to this method of handling the draft. In any event the ordinance on vesting of title finally appeared on 6 December as ordinance 33. It opened with this unique statement:

> "Ordinance 31 having never been published in the Official Gazette is hereby declared null and void as though it were never issued."[107]

Perhaps the greatest factor which militated against a precise

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meshing of the gears of legal machinery was the lack of a clearcut, definite policy from the highest policy-making sources on certain basic questions affecting the future of the occupied territory and of the operation itself. An example of this may be found in General Hodge's repeated requests for a clarification of the much discussed problem of the ultimate disposition of Japanese property. Many times he requested that specific decisions be reached by the highest policy-making authorities.[108]

It must be recalled, however, that although there were some half a dozen major reversals or modifications such as free market in rice, property sale to Koreans, civilian wages, farm rents, turning in of Japanese yen, surrender of weapons, time for opening of schools and twice as many more involving merely structural changes in the National Administration, there were sixty-five ordinances passed between September 1945 and April 1946 involving many important issues most of which did become effective instruments of government.

Furthermore in addition to drawing up ordinances which were broad and tentatively permanent in nature with the force of law, there were other legal documents for which General Affairs was responsible. There were, for example, General Notices which had the force of law but usually covered specific problems. Bureau Orders were issued by bureaus to cover problems entirely within the realm of an individual bureau. They, too, had the force of law and were usually based on General Notices or Ordinances. General Licenses were legal documents which made exceptions to laws. They were to take care of special cases for the benefit of the

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people. For example, a General License was issued to permit Japanese to withdraw from the banks enough money to live on after the passage of Ordinance 33 had impounded all their property. Besides these law making functions, General Affairs also made specific interpretations of laws and gave regular legal advice in their capacity as General Counsel to the Military Governor.[109]

The General Affairs Section and particularly its chief completed a cycle in government structure on 2 April 1946 when Ordinance 67 decreed the abolition of the Office of General Affairs which had been its name for the final week of its existence under the provisions of Ordinance 64. By Ordinance 67 General Affairs was merged with the newly named Department of Justice, in an effort to make them into an agency more closely resembling the Department of Justice in the United States.[110] Lt. Colonel Woodall (promoted in January 1946) became Director of the Justice Department which placed him in almost exactly the same position he had held back in September when he was head of both General Affairs and Justice. Two of the subdivisions of General Affairs, Administrative and Records and Files, were transferred to Accounts. Except for that, the merger was complete and serves as a logical conclusion to the history of the General Affairs Section.

Korean Civil Service Section


Under the Japanese regime this Section was known as the Personnel Section. This continued to be its name until 20 December when the name

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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
KOREAN CIVIL SERVICE SECTION



FEBRUARY 1946

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was changed to Korean Civil Service Section of the Government of Korea. The internal organization of the Section changed considerably by slow development rather than by any revolutionary structural reorganization.

By the end of the first four months the framework conformed to that shown in Diagram 6. Five officers, one enlisted man and forty civilian employees kept this machinery in motion. The first head of this section was Lt. Colonel Hugh H. Bledsoe. He was succeded in December by Captain Robert W. Wiley. All five of the officers in this section at the end of 1945 had had experience in personnel work in civilian life and one was an expert in civil service classification. At first it had been the policy of the Secretary to increase the number of army personnel although even under this policy there were never more than six officers. Later it had seemed desirable to allow army personnel to drop to a minimum. This enabled those who were left, to work more closely together and also forced more responsibility on the Koreans. A Korean head of the section, Dr. Chyung, Yil Hyung had actually been appointed by the end of the year and was shouldering a large share of

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the responsibility.

The Administrative Sub-Section handled the business management of the office, the planning of procedures and instructions, the budgets and appeals. The Controls and Records Sub-Section was responsible for appointments, promotions, transfers, efficiency ratings, service records and leave records. The Pensions Sub-Section dealt with beneficiaries, retirement funds, control accounts, individual retirement fund records, payment of pensions, benefits and refunds. The Examinations and

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Recruitments Sub-Section handled the recruiting of personnel, qualifications standards, requirements and examinations. The Classification Sub-Section handled pay plans, wage studies, position classification and allocation of positions grades. Investigation was responsible for special investigations and analyzing the investigative program. Training and Public Relations was charged with organizing in-service training, orientation training programs and public relations.

One of the biggest problems which faced this Section, as can be imagined from what has already been said, was the replacement of Japanese personnel throughout all Military Government. The Examinations and Recruitments Sub-Section put on a strenuous drive to publicize the need for personnel and to screen the candidates, but they needed Koreans so badly and in such a hurry at first that it was impossible for the Section to be sufficiently discriminating. It had been impossible furthermore for the CIC to investigate more than a small percentage in such a short time. Mistakes were undoubtedly made but with the creation of a Personnel Review Board of which the Section's head was chairman, and with a tighter system of civil service selection, most of the former so-called Japanese collaborators had been eliminated from the government by the beginning of the new year. On 25 January all but 40 Japanese had been eliminated from Military Government and most of the vacancies had been filled. Only a few low priority positions remained vacant and the Section was waiting to fill them by most careful selection. They were giving first priority at this time to replacing the less desirable original appointees.

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Another big task which occupied the Korean Civil Service Section throughout the first four months was the drawing up of detailed civil service classification and compensation plans. These plans encompassed all of the 270,000 civil service workers throughout Korea, even north of 38°, and aimed at completely replacing the old Japanese rank system with a new system comparable to the American system based on merit.[114] The system which was evolved and which was put into effect on 1 February 1946 differed from the American chiefly in that the highest category in each civil service grade was "one" and the lowest "fifteen". This was a concession to the oriental attitude of mind which considers that "one" is always best. Within each grade there were five gradations which gave an added sensitivity to merit, time in service and dependency in each individual case.[115]

Every effort was made to complete this elaborate compensation system and put it into operation before there was any Russian participation in the government. A going system, the Secretary of the Section felt, was less apt to be disarranged by any newcomers than a plan in its formative stage only.[116] The new system was put into effect on 1 February.

The Korean Civil Service Section was fully aware of its responsibility in introducing a completely new system in a completely new milieu. The fact that it was the only Military Government office with authority to print rules with the force of laws for all people under civil service, increased this sense of responsibility and made it even more important to have the rules right. To meet this challenge

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the Section established the policy of keeping the rules fluid until they had been tried out for a while. Consequently, they were first put out on mimeographed sheets as tentative rules, then as flaws appeared they were altered until finally they seemed to be satisfactory.[117] Only then were they printed in final form.

Foreign Affairs Section

Under the Japanese administration of Korea, foreign affairs were necessarily a minor function of the Government General. Consequently, they were handled by a sub-section of the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat. On 1 October near the beginning of the American administration, the Foreign Affairs Section was set up as an independent and important Section of the Secretariat.[118]

This Section was organized internally into four sub-sections each of which was subdivided into bureaus as indicated in Diagram 7. In October the Section contained nine officers and four enlisted men.[119] By January this had increased to twenty-four officers and ten enlisted men. In addition there were forty-three civilian employees, who were almost entirely Koreans.[120] In the spring reorganization the structure was considerably simplified. Three divisions, Displaced Persons, Political Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, took the place of the original four main sub-sections.[121]

From the establishment of the Foreign Affairs Section in September until May it enjoyed continuity of leadership under Lt. Colonel (then Major) Gordon B. Enders. Colonel Enders was an officer of unusually


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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION



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wide experience in foreign service in the Far East and in military intelligence. He selected as his Korean assistant Dr. Moon, Chang Wook, who had received his graduate education in the United States and who had lived there for some time. Dr. Moon joined the Foreign Affairs Section on 2 October, consequently, the Korean leadership, too, was comparatively continuous.[122]

Their chief operation was the problem of displaced persons, for which a special sub-section was established. A full treatment of the repatriation work appears farther on in the narrative; consequently, only the other work of the Foreign Affairs Section will be treated in this chapter.

Concurrent with this major activity was the problem of dealing with unauthorized travel between Korea and Japan by other than displaced persons. Many of these people were Koreans who had been repatriated and then, for some reason or other, wanted to return to Japan. Many claimed they had to go back to look for members of their family who had been left behind or gave some equally pressing excuse. The Foreign Affairs Section issued a memorandum on 9 November stating that nobody could travel unless permission to do so was cleared through Foreign Affairs by the Provincial Governor. Still unauthorized travel for non-government purposes continued, consequently another memorandum was issued on 22 January 1946 prohibiting even more emphatically any travel without express permission from the Foreign Affairs Section.[123]

Another important task was drafting reasonable rules to determine what people were entitled to status as Koreans.[124] Technically, according

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to international law, until a peace treaty was signed, all Koreans were subjects of the Japanese Empire. It was suggested by Foreign Affairs that the JCS Directive be changed so that Koreans at least need not be considered enemy aliens, but there was no such thing as Korean citizenship, and there could not be until Korea was recognized as a free and independent sovereign power. Some official statement had to be made, therefore, which would indicate clearly who was entitled to Korean status. A staff memorandum clarifying this point was finally issued on 10 January 1946.[125] The memorandum made it perfectly clear that the Korean status so allowed was only an interim status and in no way could be considered to be indicative of ultimate Korean citizenship.

Closely connected with the determination of Korean status was the issuance by the Foreign Affairs Section of letters of identity to Koreans going anywhere abroad except Japan. This was provided for in Ordinance 49 of 19 February which became effective on 1 March 1946. It stated that a Korean desiring to leave the country who was neither included in a mass repatriation movement nor connected with the armed forces of the United Nations must obtain a letter of identity.[126] Request for such letters could be made through a local Military Government Team Commander who in turn would forward the application to the Foreign Affairs Section. The applicants were required to give reasons for the trip, itinerary, and addresses in the foreign countries to be visited. Their identity was to be substantiated with a birth certificate and photographs.

Provision was likewise made for checking persons who entered Korea. At the point of entry they were to give to the representative of the

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Foreign Affairs Section a passport or similar credential, a statement regarding the nature, purpose, length, and itinerary of visit as well as an address in Korea.[127]

The Foreign Sub-Section was charged with all questions of protocol and supervision of all ceremonies but, more important than this, it handled Korean relationships with the consulates of other countries. The consulates, for example, negotiated for supplies through this medium. Although the consulates had no legal status as such, since there was no sovereign Korean government to which they could be accredited, several were open and operating in a limited way. These were the Soviet, French, Chinese (Nanking), and American consulates.[128] There was also a Nanking Puppet Government consulate in Pusan, but since it stopped operation on 15 August and since the status of its three officials was so doubtful it should hardly be considered with the rest.[129] In March 1946 the British Consulate building was opened by the British naval liaison officer, Lt. D. P. Lury, RNR, on duty with the XXIV Corps. This consulate was not in any sense operative at that time, but the officer lived in the building and the British flag flew from the consulate flag pole.[130]

In a message of 29 October 1948, forwarded through SCAP, Secretary of State Byrnes had advised Military Government that although the foreign consulates could have no formal diplomatic status they were to be allowed to look after the nationals of the countries which they represented and were to be assisted in any way possible by Miliatry Government.[131] During the first six months of the occupation there were frequent occasions when

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the Foreign Sub-Section gave assistance to these consulates both in helping them with their nationals and in obtaining supplies.

In February the State Department considered the advisability of permitting the legal reopening of foreign consular offices in Seoul to perform strictly consular functions. They considered it for several reasons. There was already a Soviet Consulate General functioning in Seoul under conditions of extremely doubtful legality. The British had been given permission to replace their liaison officer with consular rank to Foreign Office representative who was to have no consular status. The inconsistency of this situation might become embarrassing. Furthermore, it seemed that it would soon be important to have an American Consulate General in Seoul,[132] because Military Government Foreign Affairs functions would necessarily assume a more and more non-American tone as the government of Korea came increasingly under Korean or international control. Although the prospective British Consul General actually arrived in April, the legal reopening of all the Consulates as such was waiting upon a reciprocal agreement with the Russians who were most reluctant to permit an American Consulate north of 38°.

Contact was also maintained with officers stationed in Pusan, Mokpo, and Kunsan, as well as those in Tokyo, Shanghai, Tsingtao and Tientsin. Their principal work was in connection with repatriation under the supervision of the Displaced Persons Office.[133] Finally as the activity of the Foreign Sub-Section increased it became necessary to create an additional bureau, the Chinese Bureau, to handle Chinese affairs and on 24 January 1946 a group of officers and men were sent to China.[134]

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The difficulty of carrying on Korean relations with other countries and laying foundations for a revival of foreign trade presented the Foreign Affairs Section with many unique problems and resulted in some unique solutions. Because representatives of the Military Government of Korea could not be accredited diplomatically to foreign powers and because foreign representatives could not be accredited to Military Government, the lines of communication were most cumbersome. When the Foreign Affairs Section had occasion to communicate with Chiang Kai Shek, for example, it was necessary to pass the message from the Secretary to CG USAMGIK to CG USAFIK to SCAP to the War Department to the State Department and back down the line to War Department to CG China to the United States Ambassador to the Generalissimo. Short cuts were taken on several occasions as when a representative of the Foreign Affairs Section felt obliged to protest directly to the Generalissimo concerning the treatment of Korean refugees in China and when foreign trade negotiations were begun directly with China through a Military Government liaison officer. This liaison officer approached the Military Attache who in turn approached the United States Ambassador. This created a precedent and the procedure was regularized. Although this was only one of the many new precedents which Foreign Affairs was called upon to establish in representing an unrecognized nation from within the military framework, it is illustrative of one of the most unusual responsibilities which devolved upon the Section.

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Perhaps the all inclusive foreign responsibilities of the Section can be more simply summarized by the following quotation from a USAMGIK

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bulletins:

Foreign Affairs Clearance: 1. Recent instances have arisen in which Bureaus have dealt with foreign governments without clearing through Foreign Affairs Bureau.

2. All matters dealing with foreign relations must be cleared through Foreign Affairs Bureau. 136

In addition to performing these immediately important functions the Foreign Affairs Section organized a school for training Koreans in international law and diplomacy for the future. One sub-section was devoted to running this school in diplomacy and arrangements were made for practical as well as theoretical training. By way of giving Koreans some practical experience, a number of them were included on the mission which went to Japan to look after the condition of the Korean miners there, with a view to making them willing to remain there and continue their job of extracting the coal which was so badly needed in Korea. 137 There were also daily classes conducted by members of the Foreign Affairs staff in administration and in international law. These classes were disappointing, however, because the Koreans, for the most part, did not seem to have the necessary educational background and it became necessary to teach very elementary general subjects and basic English instead of doing advanced work in the specialized fields originally contemplated. 138 The training program was further complicated by the fact that so much of the work of the Foreign Affairs Section involved highly classified documents which the provisions of AR 380-5 denied to Koreans. Consequently, very little of the most responsible work could be left to the Koreans who were trying to learn how to deal with the

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problems of the Section.[139] Courses in diplomacy were to be included in the Seoul University curriculum which Korean members could attend while still drawing full pay from the Foreign Affairs Section, but these arrangements had still not been completed by the spring of 1946. Plans were also laid for sending Korean diplomatic students to the United States.[140] On 13 March 1946 an officer of the Foreign Affairs Section set forth for the United States with six Koreans who were to prepare themselves to institute an educational program in Korea which would prepare participants for study abroad or to fit them for their work in Korea. Additional educational foundation stones were laid by six American soldiers who taught vocational English to Koreans in their off-hours for sixty dollars a month additional pay.[141]

The Property Custody Section

The Property Custody Section was an office created entirely by Military Government for a special purpose. General Hodge had been directed by Field Order 55 to seek out and take title to all Japanese property, a policy which was in compliance with SWNCC directive to that effect.[142] The control and regulation of this property was announced by Ordinance 2 of 25 September. Some agency had to be set up to administer this control.[143]

At first two officers in the Finance Bureau were directed to record and look out for the property. This assignment was in accord

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with the original conception of property custody in enemy territory as taught in military government schools and manuals. The Property Custodian was regarded as one who handled only small amounts of appropriated property like certain buildings necessary for government offices, billets and installations. These appropriations were comparatively small and on a temporary basis. In Korea, however, the problem was entirely different and infinitely more vast. Ninety percent of all the wealth in Korea was owned by foreigners and nearly eighty-nine percent of that ninetypercent was owned by Japanese. Consequently, it soon became obvious that two men could not possibly handle such a huge undertaking and it was decided to create a separate secretariat section known as The Property Custody Section.[144] This was actually accomplished by Ordinance 8 of 1 October 1945.[145] Lt. Colonel John B. Lapsley officially became the first Property Custodian on 13 November. He held this position till he was succeded by Lt. Colonel Cornelius Menger on 2 March.[146] At the turn of the year the Property Custodian was completely established in a separate building near the Bank of Chosen. He was assisted by a staff of twenty-one officers, six enlisted men and fifty civilian employees organized as indicated in Diagram 8,[147] which organization performed the property custody functions until 1 March 1946.


The names of the various branches shown in the illustration are indicative of their functions except possibly the two divisions of the Operations Branch. Though they both had to do with seeing to the utilization of Japanese property, its two subdivisions operated as two

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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
PROPERTY CUSTODIAN'S SECTION



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separate agencies. One dealt with army agencies using the property; the other dealt directly with Koreans who were using former Japanese property then under the jurisdiction of the Property Custodian. In the initial phase of activities an Operations Branch seemed essential because of the need for considerable direct operation. In the second phase which began after the reorganization in March 1946 all direct operations were transferred to provincial and other property custodians and the Property Custodian Section of the National Government devoted itself to staff and policy functions.[148]

This Section of the Secretariat was charged with seeking out all Japanese property, posting it and making sure that it was properly taken care of. It came to involve taking title, checking title, providing protection for all known Japanese properties, placing business and industrial properties under the proper bureau for operation, and renting the properties to which they had taken title.[149] At first, according to Ordinance 2 of 25 September, provision was made for the purchase of property from the Japanese owners by filing a purchase and sale application and depositing the agreed purchase price in the Bank of Chosen, which would hold it in escrow until such time as the transaction could be consummated or until its ultimate disposition was decided upon by those responsible for higher international policy.

There seemed to be some need for a clarification, at least to Koreans, of the attitude of the United States Government toward the property of all aliens and particularly Japanese aliens. An attempt was made to clarify this point in December 1945. Ordinance 33 was

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issued taking definite title to all Japanese property both public and private. This meant taking physical possession of the property beyond the mere posting of signs. It meant also the elimination of the opportunity originally offered to Koreans to purchase it. A letter order emanating from the Office of Civil Administrator on 12 January 1946 covered the point as follows:

> No transfer of title or negotiations or commitments respecting ultimate disposition of vested property, except sales of perishables, will be authorized pending receipt of detailed instructions from higher authority. 150

Not only was no more tentative sale or disposition of property allowed but the Property Custody Section became involved in paying back all the money which it had already taken in under Ordinance 2 and which it was then holding in the Bank of Chosen. This was a task of considerable proportions which might have been avoided had the policy been made clear at first.

The complete expropriation of Japanese property as provided in Ordinance 33 was not a new policy. These later moves were merely the implementation of the original SWNCC directive and consequent field order. They all were based on the principle that the Japanese were not signatories to the Hague Convention and consequently, had no right to claim property rights which were provided for in that convention. In any event the complete confiscation seemed necessary in order to break the Japanese strangle hold on Korea. 151

The prolonged lack of clarity concerning the ultimate disposition of this property caused considerable embarrassment in all quarters.

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Since, until clearcut instructions from the highest authority were issued, there could be no sale of the property, it was impossible for a company to save itself from continued ruinous operations by going into bankruptcy.[152] Meanwhile the only hint at a final policy on which the Property Custodian might have based his plans for future operations in disposing of property when that day arrived, was the public statement in December of Mr. Edwin Pauley, the American reparations envoy to Japan, and its interpretation for the Korean press by General Arnold. Both the statement and its explanation by the Military Governor seemed to indicate that the property or proceeds from sale thereof would be used for the benefit of the future Korean Government.[153] As late as mid-February there was still no further clarification on ultimate disposition and the Property Custodian's Office had to carry on its process of seeking out, maintaining, utilizing, and accounting for vast amounts of Japanese property without any firm knowledge of future plans for it.[154]

The responsibilities of the Property Custodian in the provinces were delegated at first to the Provincial Governors. They in turn were authorized to delegate the responsibility to subordinates on down the line who were in a better position to put into effect the actual seizure and maintenance of the property. The organization of provincial and city Property Custodian agencies and offices proceeded rapidly. As their organization was accomplished the national Property Custodian was called upon more and more to issue policy and procedure directives as well as advice and instructions, and less and less to engage in operations. Hence, on 1 March 1946 the second phase of

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Property Custody activity was entered.

The new organization effected to accomplish this work substituted five new subdivisions for the five shown in Diagram 9. They were as follows: Administration, Policy and Review, Records and Reports, Supervision and Coordination, and Special Assistants. 156 As already indicated and as their names imply these new branches tended to exercise more of a policy making and supervisory function than in the earlier phase of the Section's activity which necessarily involved many operational functions.

The Accounts Section


The former Government General of Korea during the Japanese regime contained an Accounts Section in its Secretariat. It was not completely clear to the American officers who replaced the Japanese what all the functions of this section were, and they received little help from their predecessors. Apparently, however, not only all regular disbursements but also special secret funds channeled through the Accounts Section before actual payment by other agencies. It may, indeed, have been used to cover up "extraordinary" expense accounts. The fact that the two Japanese employees who remained to tell what they knew about it were most reluctant to volunteer information and ultimately found themselves in jail, adds some credence to this theory. In any case the part played by the Accounts Section under the Japanese was most involved. 157

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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
ACCOUNTS SECTION



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When Military Government first took over the Accounts Section it came under the direction of Colonel Arthur Roth, who was also Chief of the Army Administration Section. These two tasks proved to be too large an assignment for one man, and the Accounts responsibility was delegated to a junior officer, until Lt. Colonel Almus P. Evans was assigned to the position of Chief of the Accounts Section on 29 September.[158]

After a short while the Accounting division of the Accounts Section was transferred to the Finance Bureau.[159] Also it was agreed by all the agencies concerned that there should be a decentralization of the disbursing function, consequently, several disbursing centers were set up. Only one of these, Number Three, was actually run by the Accounts Section. Although, even after the decentralization, the Section disbursed approximately 10,000,000 yen per month, two of the functions, accounts and disbursing, implicit in its name had been largely removed from its responsibility.[160]

Subsequent to these changes the Accounts Section became a housekeeping section. Its personnel cared for, maintained, improved, repaired, and allocated all government buildings not specifically controlled by other bureaus or government agencies. They were also charged with the repair and maintenance of all public government used buildings even though they did not belong to the Korean Government. In one case at least the Accounts Section was charged with the repair and maintenance of a building which was specifically controlled by another government agency and which was not being used by Military Government.

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The responsibility for the Duk Soo Palace, even though it was controlled by the Property Custodian and was used by the Joint Soviet-American Commission, was delegated to the Accounts Section by the XXIV Corps Engineer. 161

This housekeeping task was carried on at the start in September 1945 by two officers and one enlisted man who were assisted by 450 Korean civilians and 80 coolies. Later there were eleven officers, four enlisted men and two War Department Civil Service employees plus 404 Korean civilians and 80 coolies. 162 These officers and their assistants were organized into subdivisions as indicated in Diagram 9.

The General Affairs Division of the Accounts Section under the Japanese operated as the administrative unit supervising the general business of the Secretariat not directly concerning other bureaus or sections. This included payrolls, receipts, disbursements, audits, special funds, pensions, budgets and appropriations. With the advent of Military Government, translators were immediately put on the voucher disbursements in an attempt to trace and recover, if possible, the vast sums which had been paid in the month of August 1945. Other books of record were translated either in whole or in part, and audit teams were sent out to check and verify the balances and disbursements of the funding officials located in the various provinces. Questionable vouchers were scutinized carefully and investigations instituted to ascertain the disposition of funds. This resulted in the recovery of nearly 300,000,000 yen and the subsequent imprisonment of persons implicated in the attempted embezzlement of national funds.

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Once this initial tangle was straightened out, in order to eliminate duplication of work and books of record as has already been indicated above, the accounting, budgetary and disbursing functions were turned over to the Bureau of Finance. The payrolls were taken over by the individual bureaus.[163]

The Building Superintendent's Office of the Accounts Section was responsible for the care and maintenance of government grounds and buildings. Working for this office were 291 Koreans who were classified as buyers, contractors, electricians, carpenters, plumbers, labor foremen, guards, firemen, janitors etc. They also hired and supervised eighty day laborers to keep up the Capitol grounds and buildings and the Duk Soo Palace.

Some of the difficulties attendant upon this task were covered in a statement by Colonel Evans:

> The greatest difficulty has been in the difference in language and that the Koreans are in the habit of putting off work until later. The problem of heating the buildings has been very difficult. The coal obtainable was bad; the furnaces were not large enough for the load. One additional boiler was installed in the Capital to help in this respect. The Japanese had heated the buildings from 0800 to 1600 and not 24 hours a day as required by the Americans. Also the boilers were not fired until the temperature was below 52 degrees farenheit. During the last week in December there was considerable trouble and extra work for the American personnel when the Koreans went on strike due to the demonstrations protesting against trusteeship.[164]

The Construction and Repairs Division of the Accounts Section was charged with the designing, supervision of construction and repairs of the national government buildings. Four officers and nine enlisted men were responsible for the functioning of this section.

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There was considerable demand for new construction, repair and rehabilitation of buildings, houses, and all types of facilities for the use of Military Government for officers, troops, bureaus and other government agencies. It was not an easy matter to keep these buildings in good shape because of the poor material from which they were constructed as well as because of the type of construction used by the Japanese, coupled with the fact that very little maintenance was accomplished during the war.

Not only did the Korean Government own many large buildings and about 800 houses within the Seoul area which needed to be maintained, but between 15 November 1945 and 1 March 1946, 125 contracts were either completed or in process of completion at a total value of 28,500,000 yen. In March plans were being prepared for additional expenditures on construction estimated at 20,000,000 yen. Among these projects were the Duk Soo Palace for the Joint Soviet-American Commission at 2,500,000 yen; Suwon Hospital at 5,000,000 yen; the Constabulary Training School at 6,000,000 yen; the Rehabilitation Annex Building No. 3 at 6,000,000 yen; and numerous quonset huts at 2,500,000 yen. 165

The mounting pressure for additional building space caused by destructive fires and by an increase in Military Government personnel made it necessary to establish a new division in the Accounts Section. It was called the Area Allocation Division, and was staffed with four officers, two interpreters, and one driver. This Division was responsible for securing office space for all Military Government offices and agencies. It sometimes involved investigating tenancy and

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ownership of buildings and the eviction of occupants from allocated buildings. It also involved coordinating with the Property Custodian and other Military Government bureaus and sections.[166]

By March 1946 plans for a new governmental organization were in process in the General Affairs Section. These new plans eliminated the Accounts Section entirely and distributed its functions among the other departments of the government, the housekeeping tasks falling to the proposed administrative office.[167]

In April the reorganization took shape. Actually Accounts was not eliminated although its name was changed to the Office of Administration and the remainder of its disbursing functions were transferred to the Department of Finance.[168] The Administrative Division of the Office of General Affairs was transferred to Administration by this same order. In addition, the Statistics, Research, and Administration Divisions of the abolished Office of Planning were transferred into the Office of Administration as was the Reports Section of the Office of the Civil Administrator.[169]

A statement of the mission of this new office published on 3 May 1946 revealed an assortment of major functions, all of which had the common characteristic that they were service functions of an administrative nature.

> The mission of this office is: To render a general administrative, management, and statistical-research service to the National Government; to design and supervise the construction of all National Buildings of Korea; to maintain the Capitol Building and Grounds; the Duk Soo Palace, and quarters established for Government employees; to procure and allocate office and residential space; to procure

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and distribute equipment, furnishings and supplies to National Government offices and agencies; to provide engineering, construction and maintenance services for the American troops of Headquarters, USAMGIK; to operate Military Government Central Files, Korean Mail Service, and National Archives. 170

In addition to these functions the Dependency Housing Unit was transferred at the end of May from the Military Administrator to the Office of Administration. This task was divided among the three original basic divisions of the office - Construction, National Building and Grounds, and Property and Accounts.

In the structure of the office three of the five Divisions, National Buildings and Grounds, Property and Accounts, and Construction were little different from their predecessors. Two, Administration and Statistical Research, were somewhat altered. The former concerned itself chiefly with the internal administration of the office. The latter performed many of the functions which the office had absorbed from elsewhere. For this purpose it was subdivided into six sections: (1) Survey; (2) Statistics; (3) Analysis; (4) Reports; (5) Central Files and Mail; and (6) Archives.

Finally all the administrative affairs which seemed logically to come under the Civil Administrator had been concentrated in this Office. The overlapping with other offices and with the responsibilities of the Military Administrator had been considerably lessened.

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Provincial Affairs Section

Under the Japanese regime the so-called Local Affairs Section was responsible for the relationship of the national government with the provincial or local governments. Although, when Military Government took over, this Section was retained for one week, it was believed that its functions did not merit a special staff section and consequently, local affairs were taken over by the Operations and Local Affairs Sub-Sections of the Planning Section.[171] It became increasingly evident, however, that the work of this Sub-Section was more operational than it was policy making. It also became evident that as the volume of work increased it needed to be a full section in its own right. Consequently, it was decided to make a special independent section called the Provincial Affairs Section, combining both Local Affairs and Operations Sub-Sections of Planning.[172] On 20 December an ordinance established this new setup and a few days later its duties and functions were restated in a memorandum from the Civil Administrator's Office.[173]

The memorandum charged the Section with a large variety of administrative functions as follows: Control of elementary school funds, budgets and expenditures; levying of provincial taxes; supervision of provincial budgeting and expenditures; approval and facilitation of National grants and subsidies pertaining to provincial administration and schools; direct liquidation of real and movable property belonging to the government and National Shinto Shrines with approval of the Property Custodian; administration and disposal of the Emperor's


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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS SECTION



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Endowment Fund; approval of recommendations by National Bureaus for appointments or dismissals of provincial government officials of Sonin rank or above, except engineers appointed to provincial bureaus of Mining and Industry and Agriculture and Commerce; supervision of provincial advisory councils; supervision of provincial elections; establishment and supervision of all provincial government units and coordinating this with the Planning Section; maintaining liaison between the National Government and Provincial Governments explaining Military Government plans and policies and helping with the solution of various Provincial Government problems. 174

The above list of responsibilities is indicative of the scope of the functions of the Section. Just how they were to be implemented was also set forth in this same memorandum as were the relationships of the Provincial Affairs Section with the National Bureaus and sections and with provincial and lower levels of government. It stated that:

1. Proposed ordinance and directives which pertain to Provincial Governments and lower levels of government will be coordinated with the Provincial Affairs Section.

2. Correspondence emanating from National Bureaus and Sections for lower levels of government, where no counterpart of that particular Bureau or Section exists, will be channeled through the Provincial Affairs Section.

3. Matters pertaining to Provincial finance, taxes, and budgets will be conducted by the Provincial Affairs Section, after proper coordination with the Bureau of Finance.

4. National Bureaus and Sections authorizing and issuing subsidies and grants to Provincial and lower levels of government, will

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correlate such matters with the Provincial Affairs Section.

5. Provincial Affairs Section will keep the Property Custody Section informed of the status of real and movable Shrine property belonging to Government and National Shinto Shrines.

6. Bureaus of Police and Justice will coordinate with Provincial Affairs plans and policies affecting Provincial and lower level governments.

7. Relationships between the Provincial Affairs Section and the Bureau of Personnel is outlined in Section II, par. 1f.

It stated also that in general the government document entitled "System of the Local Governments in Korea - Laws and Regulations" dated 1 May 1944, would be used as a guide and directive for all provincial governments unless it violated Military Government ordinances and directives. The memorandum also enjoined provincial governments to issue no directives or ordinances which altered the organization, structure or functions of the provincial government or any lower levels of government under their supervision, without approval from the Provincial Affairs Section. Furthermore, all correspondence from provincial governments to the Military Governor of Korea was channeled through the Provincial Affairs Section.[175]

To accomplish all these functions the eleven officers under the leadership of Lt. Colonel F. R. Reidy, six enlisted men and sixteen civilians, who made up the section in early February, were organized as indicated in Diagram 10.[176]

This Section was faced with many problems. First, there was the organization of the section. Then there was the financial problem. They had to hire so many to do the work that they exceeded their budget

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allotment. They also, like other sections, were faced with the problem of finding proper Korean personnel to replace pro-Japanese personnel. Furthermore, there was a great shortage of Military Government personnel for teams in the provinces. They were even hard put to it for liaison officers who were responsible for maintaining contact with the Provincial Governors. On 12 February there were only three liaison officers for six provinces though plans called for more. Their routine made the shortage even more critical, for they were supposed to spend a week in the provinces and then a week at the National Capitol before going out again. In this way they were to keep posted both on the needs of the provinces and on the policies of Military Government. Equipment too, particularly transportation equipment, was so scarce that it was difficult for the units in the field to carry on their work. Housing accommodations for Military Government personnel in the provinces presented another problem. 177 All these problems required time to iron out.

Positive action was taken toward an implementation of the basic directive concerning the maintenance of contacts with the provinces by the calling of a meeting of the provincial governors. Although not specificially covered in the directive, arrangements were made for monthly meetings at the National Capitol. The first of these occurred late in January, the second on 25 - 27 February, and after that they became a regular monthly affair.

At the first meeting the bureau and section heads of the National Government as well as the heads of other governmental agencies, like

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the Korea Commodity Company, were present. Each reported on the activities and problems of his unit thereby giving the Provincial Governors insight into the problems, plans and policies of the National Government. General Sheetz reviewed the rice situation and outlined the program which was being instituted to meet it.[178] Price control was discussed and the plan to appoint a Korean Economic Advisory Board to help implement it was explained. The governors were given an opportunity both to express themselves on these matters and to learn many things of value. In several instances their suggestions played a part in guiding policies and programs which were in the formative stage.

> This was true, for instance, with reference to the distribution of petroleum supplies; the governors were able to learn from Mr. Martin of Petroleum Distributing Agency what was on the way and what their allocations were and were also able to suggest ways in which the distribution of petroleum products could be made to aid other provincial activities.[179]

The same sort of thing happened in regard to the repatriation of Japanese south of the 38th parallel. The representative of the Foreign Affairs Section announced that it was General Hodge's verbal order to have all but essential Japanese evacuated. The legal aspects of this order were brought out at the meeting and ways discussed of implementing it despite possible objection on the part of some Japanese.

The governors were also advised at their first meeting that a sufficient number of medical and public health officers were coming so that the requirements of each group and company in the provinces could be satisfied.[180] Thus, this meeting of the governors and the subsequent

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ones came to play an important part in the functions of the Provincial Affairs Section until the Section dropped out of existence in the spring. After that the meetings continued under other auspices.

There had arisen some question in March about the value of continuing Provincial Affairs as a separate Section but when a new tentative governmental organization was announced on 28 March calling for eight offices and nine departments to replace the old sections and bureaus, Provincial Affairs was included as one of the offices.[181] This tentative plan was changed, however, when the final reorganization was announced, and on 27 April Ordinance 74 abolished the Provincial Affairs Section. Its duties and functions were distributed among the appropriate departments.[182]

Public Information Section

There was an intelligence section in the secretariat of the Government General which performed some functions similar to those which the Military Government Public Information Section later performed.[183] When the Americans took over, several officers who had been charged with the responsibility for public relations established a Korean Relation and Information Section.[184] This Section absorbed during the first week all the functions of the former intelligence section and also continued its public relations function. Out of this


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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION*



* Later became a Bureau and then a Department

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formative period therefore a section emerged which was known as the Intelligence and Information Section of the Secretariat.[185] Since the structure of this Section is shown in Diagram 11 and since its activities are covered in the subsequent chapter on the relations with the Korean people, a more complete description here would not be justified.

In November its name was changed to Public Information Section.[186] Still later its status was shifted to that of a bureau and it became known as the Bureau of Public Information. One more change occurred when a new organizational plan was announced on 28 March 1946. According to the new plan Public Information appeared as one of the nine government departments and was called the Department of Public Information. None of these changes affected the original major functions of the Section although, when it became a department, a reports sub-section was added to the two already existing subdivisions, the Office of Public Opinion and the Office of Public Information. When reorganization finally came to a halt in May, the Department of Public Information was substantially unchanged except that the much-moved Reports Section was moved to the Office of the Civil Administrator.[187]

Directorate of National Defense


During the period of Japanese domination, the national defense was in the hands of the Japanese Government, which maintained regularly at least two divisions in Korea.[188] Later during the war this was increased

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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE



* Became a Bureau of Dept. of Natl. Defense by Ord. 64, 29 March 1946.

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to a field Army and toward the close of the war there were 200,000 Japanese troops in Korea.[189] Although one well known authority on Korea said, "the best insurance for Korea's safety is not to create a powerful army against her more powerful neighbors, but to win their goodwill by a peaceful friendly policy toward all", it seemed wise to set up an agency in the Military Government which would form the nucleus for a Korean governmental agency for the coordination of such national defense as circumstances made necessary.[190]

Since there was no framework for such an agency in the Government General, a board was created under the presidency of Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick on 10 November 1945 to draft a plan for Korean National Defense.[191] In order not to delay the setting up of a frame work for defense until this board was able to study the problems and submit its report, an ordinance was promulgated on 13 November creating the office of the Director of National Defense.[192] This office took under its wing the Bureau of Armed Forces which was created by this same ordinance. Within this Bureau were established an Army and Navy Department as indicated in Diagram 12. The existing Bureau of Police was also placed, for the time being, under the Director of National Defense. On 14 January, Ordinance 42 removed the Coast Guard from the Marine Section of the Bureau of Transportation and placed it too under the Director of National Defense.[193]

Because of high level policy the actual activation of the Army and Navy Departments was postponed. Instead a Department of National Constabulary was formed to meet any immediate needs which might arise.

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The mission of the National Constabulary was to function in support of local police in time of disorder or emergency when the Military Governor or his Korean counterpart called for such aid.[194] By early April there were 2,000 officers and men in this force. The plan called for 5,000. They were organized and trained by U. S. Army officers and clad in captured Japanese army brown uniforms rather than in the black of the local police.[195] They were, in fact, more comparable to the United States National Guard than to a police force.

The Coast Guard, which was deemed likely to be a safer and less aggressive organization than an Army or Navy, developed immediately, at first under the Bureau of Transportation, and then, after activation by verbal order on 14 January, under the Director of National Defense. Under the latter, its four-fold mission was clearly defined. It was responsible for inshore and inter-island patrolling against smuggling. It was to assist the water police. It was to guard known mine fields and it was to operate in the event of a marine disaster. The plan called for 5,000 men and by April there were 700 trained and on active duty.

On 1 April 1946, a third department was added to the Directorate of National Defense and activated by verbal order. It was called the Korean Supply Service and was charged with responsibility for procurement of all supplies for Korean Defense Forces. This move, combining the services of supply for Army, Navy, Constabulary and Coast Guard was made in the interests of both economy and efficiency.[196]

The activities of the several bureaus or departments under the office of the Director of National Defense are covered in a later chapter.

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Consequently, no further description is in order here. It is in order here, however, to point out the activities of the Directorate itself. They consisted chiefly in overall long range planning for the defense of Korea. The biggest and most comprehensive of these plans was the Alpha plan which included the recommendations of General Schick's report submitted 22 December 1945. For more immediate needs, the Bamboo Plan was drawn up. It actually was very little more than a detailed breakdown of the first part of the Alpha plan and provided in particular for the creation of the National Constabulary which has already been mentioned. Besides drawing up these plans, the activation of the Coast Guard as a national defense service was initiated.

The status of the Directorate was altered to that of Department by the general ordinance of 29 March 1946 which established a new nomenclature for all government agencies.[197] At the same time, Ordinance 63 removed the Police Bureau from under its wing and made it, too, one of the eleven newly named departments in the government.[198] These changes, however, altered very little the primary purpose of the office of the Director of Defense or its activities.

The Bureaus and Agencies

It seems clear that matters involving general planning, legal questions, or in fact any phase of government which cut through and across the various specialized operational fields of activity were

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handled by the secretariat sections. In several cases functions later appeared to be more operational and specialized. These then were removed from the Secretariat and were made bureau functions. The most obvious example of this was the Public Information Section (formerly Intelligence and Information Section) which became on 23 February a Bureau.[199]

The bureaus, of which there were eight under the Japanese regime, were responsible for specialized operational functions throughout Korea. Their activities are covered in subsequent specialized chapters on Finance, Agriculture, Education, Commerce, Justice, etc., but their structural position and their relationship to the other national administration agencies deserve at least some mention here.

The original eight bureaus grew to be nine with the creation of the Bureau of Public Health which split from the old Japanese Public Safety Bureau and became a Bureau in its own right. A tenth bureau was added when Public Information became a bureau on 23 February 1946 and the number was finally swelled to eleven by the inclusion of the Directorate of National Defense which had been an independent and superior agency. By that time, however, Ordinance No. 64 of 29 March had been issued. That Ordinance revised the nomenclature of all the Military Government echelons so that the eleven agencies of the bureau type became Departments while the seven remaining secretariat sections became known as Offices. According to this new ordinance each department was divided into bureaus, each bureau into sections, each section into sub-sections and each sub-section into branches.[200] Offices were divided into

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divisions, divisions into sections, and sections into sub-sections. The original seven of these offices later became four when the functions of three of them were absorbed by other offices and departments.

Whether called bureaus or departments, however, their functional relationship to and in the National Administration remained much the same as it was in the beginning. There were, however, internal shuffles between bureaus during the first seven months of the occupation which are worthy of comment. At the very outset, on 12 September 1945, the Bureau of Transportation and Communication was considered as one bureau with Lt. Colonel William J. Herlihy as chief. Two days later General Order 2 split the two, leaving Colonel Herlihy as director of the latter and placing Lt. Colonel Ward L. Hamikton in charge of the former.[201] The Bureau of Mining and Industry changed its name on 13 February 1946 to Bureau of Commerce and took on the duties, functions, records and property of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce Section of the Bureau of Agriculture. The Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce by that same ordinance became simply the Bureau of Agriculture. It lost in addition to its commerce functions its Finance Sub-Section which was transferred to the Finance Bureau but added the responsibility for lumbering and processed fish and marine products.[202] Another inter-bureau shuffle occured when the Coast Guard was shifted from the Bureau of Transportation to National Defense on 14 January. Although at that time National Defense was not yet a bureau, it became a department two months later and consequently this change should be considered an inter-bureau shuffle.[203]

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By 1 April 1946 the eleven departments which had developed from the bureaus were fairly well shaken down and had developed reasonably satisfactory operations. Most of their directors had Korean counterparts and in some cases, notably the Bureau of Justice, Koreans had taken over most of the functional work of the bureau or department. 204

It has already been indicated that the Japanese, both through their Government General channels and through private enterprise had reached very deep into Korean economy. Once this control was removed there was a pressing need for some substitute to prevent complete economic chaos. There were no Korean private companies which could possibly have controled these myriads of Japanese enterprise, both large and small, upon which the Korean economy depended. Since no National Administration could be set up and made effective in a state of economic chaos, Military Government undertook to control the situation by setting up several independent and semi-independent control agencies on the framework of former Japanese controlling corporations and by creating several new agencies to exercise this control. Although their importance warrants a fuller treatment of their operations in a subsequent chapter their relationship to the structure of the National Administration should be mentioned here.

Shortly after the assumption of control by the American Forces, Military Government revivified the former Japanese economic agencies known as The Oriental Development Company, the Chosen Food Distributing Company, the Korean Import Materials Control Corporation and the Chosen Petroleum Distributing Company. These were, respectively the New Korea

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Company (NKC), the Korean Commodity Company (KCC), the Materials Control Corporation(MCC) and the Petroleum Distributing Agency (PDA). The former two, the first of which controlled the use and development of all Korea's resources, were made subsidiary to the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce. The last two, MCC and PDA, were set up as independent economic agencies. These two later came under the staff supervision of the Department of Commerce. All four are listed here together as the point of departure for consideration of the factors which led to the establishment of other economic agencies from time to time and eventually to the promulgation of Ordinance 90 of 28 May 1946 which was entitled " Economic Controls". This declared in its opening section, [205] "the purpose of this ordinance is to clarify spheres of responsibility and to define functions and relationships of elements of the Government of Korea engaged in activities involving economic controls." It should also be added that certain other activities had also early been placed on a government corporation basis. Examples were the control of fisheries and trucking, the former by the Korean Fisheries Corporation in Agriculture and the latter by a company under Transportation know successively as Pan-Korean Trucking Union, Marune Trucking Corporation, and finally, Korean Trucking Company.

A common characteristic of these agencies was that they were operators. Of those just listed two were so-called independent agencies, two were under the control of Commerce and one each under Agriculture and Transportation. The Office of Civil Administrator was specifically charged with the coordination of governmental activities and under it in

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the Secretariat was the Office of Planning which, as its name implied, was charged with planning responsibilities. It seemed increasingly clear, however, that what was really needed was conscious and singly directed economic planning as a starting point rather than mere coordination of separately determined actions or the slow working out of plans by an agency (Planning) which had to rely on others for basic information and then had to secure innumerable concurrences from other agencies before it could even present its proposals to the Civil Administrator who, in turn, might have his own divergent ideas, and even after he had approved, still had to get approval from the Military Governor.

To restate the problem in other terms: Military Government was daily conducting numerous and far-flung economic activities, but while it was aware of the inter-relations involved and sought to coordinate all activities, the mechanism at hand for this purpose was cumbersome and the officers charged with planning responsibilities were unable to be single-minded because their responsibilities were not only numerous but diverse.

The first step in moving towards a resolving of this dilemma was laid by Ordinance 19 of 30 October 1945, the first section of which declared a national emergency. It stated, "Rigid emergency controls are therefore established, in order to prevent such conditions from existing which will harm the people."[206]

The "rigid emergency controls" remained on the loosely coordinated basis which has already been described, however, with an exception such as labor mediation which was dealt with in Section 2 of the same ordinance

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and by Ordinance 34 of 8 December 1945, and will be described in the section on the Department of Commerce.

Another half-step towards genuine integration of economic plans and activities was taken with the issuance on 1 February 1946 of a letter directive establishing "the National Economic Board within the Bureau of Commerce." The purpose of the Board was "to coordinate and effectuate the economic policy and program of Korea." It was to be composed of a Chairman, an Executive Secretary, and four members and was to have an "analysis, coordinating and economic planning staff." A final paragraph directed each "Bureau, Section, Instrumentality or Agency of the Government of Korea" to "adapt its operations to the programs determined by the Nation Economic(s) Board."[207]

This was followed on 20 February 1946 by Ordinance 53 which created a "Korean Economic Advisory Board." The purpose of the Board, composed entirely of Koreans, was:

> to provide a representative Korean agency to advise concerning the stabilization of the cost of living and the fair distribution of essential commodities, the curbing of rising prices, the prevention of scarcities of consumer goods, the development of a co-ordinated program of production and distribution, and the elimination of economic conditions adverse to the welfare of the people of Korea.

The Board consisted of seven members appointed by the Military Governor to serve during his pleasure.

By Appointment 76, 8 March 1946, Lee, Hoon Koo was named Chairman of the Board and Kim, Woo Pyung, Recording Secretary. A Board office was established in the Capitol Building.

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The Board was empowered to make studies and recommend to the Military Governor programs for establishing, administering and enforcing price control and rationing, and for allocations for production and methods of distribution. "Facilities and assistance" were to be furnished as the Board might require by the Director of the Bureau (later Department) of Commerce.

While it represented only a detail, mention may be made of Ordinance 75, 7 May 1946 (effective 17 May) which completely nationalized all railroads in Southern Korea. This was effected by condeming the few private lines which had existed under the Japanese. These were largely, although not exclusively, owned by Japanese nationals; provision was accordingly made for the filing of claims for compensation and for their eventual payment.

Meanwhile by Ordinance 52 of 21 February 1946 the New Korea Company, Ltd., which had previously operated without benefit of ordinance, was "created as an independent agency of the Government of Korea" for the following purpose:

> To transact all forms of industrial activity, including the extraction of metallic and non-metallic natural resources, the processing and fabrication of materials and chemicals, the manufacture of any articles for industrial or commercial purposes, machinery, motive and transportation equipment, ships and aircraft parts and equipment, electrical equipment and appliances, textiles, and food processing.
>
> To transact all forms of commercial business at all levels of distribution, warehousing and storage.
>
> To engage in all forms of agriculture including ownership or operation of leased lands, agricultural experimental stations or laboratories, and in all forms of forestry, including lands used for the propagation of nursery stock and lands under reforestration.

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To engage in all forms of fishing and acquisition of aquatic products, including the ownership or operation under lease or charter of fishing boats, docks, and other fishing gear and facilities for hauling, storing and preserving fish and aquatic products.

Under the directives of the Military Governor or his nominee to regulate and supervise, including the furnishing of technical assistance to, any business engaged in activities within the scope of the powers of the New Korea Company, Limited.

Criticism was made by Koreans that Ordinance 52 in setting up NKC as an independent agency of the Korean Government settled in a specific - and from the point of view of some, an unsatisfactory - way the disposition of the formerly Japanese controlled Oriental Development Company, Ltd. 208 In response to this criticism Ordinance 52 was amended by the issuance of Ordinance 80, 7 May 1946, which created NKC "as a corporate instrumentality of the Military Government of Korea" and specified that "upon the termination of the Military Government of Korea the New Korea Company, Ltd., will become the responsibility of the Korean Government."

Another step in the direction of governmental economic controls was signalized by the publication of Ordinance 82, dated 17 May 1946, and effective ten days thereafter. This ordinance was entitled "Regulation of Foreign Trade" and implemented Military Government control and licensing of foreign trade in accordance with Ordinance 39, dated 3 January. The earlier ordinance merely prohibited foreign trade except as authorized by Military Government; the latter ordinance designated the Bureau of Commerce, Department of Commerce, "as the authorized agent of Military Government of Korea for the control and licensing of foreign trade."

The duties of the Bureau of Commerce as set forth by the ordinance were as follows:

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Maintain liaison with the Office of Foreign Affairs and the National Economic Board with respect to foreign trade agreements and export and import programs and policies.

Formulate and administer necessary regulations to control and license individuals and firms engaged in foreign commerce, within the scope of approved foreign trade agreements and export and import programs of the Military Government in Korea.

Use funds alloted to it to implement the processing of foreign trade transactions which cannot be handled by private capital, subject to the approval of the Military Governor in Korea.

As indicated at the start of this section, economic controls were finally made the subject of a separate and single ordinance - Number 90 of 28 May 1946. Although it had been functioning for some time and had prepared the quite detailed Import-Export Plan No. 2 which will be analysed elsewhere, the National Economic Board was finally "hereby established." To consist of six members - including a Chairman, and Secretary, and Directors of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Finance, and Transportation - the duties and functions of the Board were set forth as follows:

1. Assist the Military Governor in harmonising policies, plans, and actions of all elements of the Government pertaining to economic controls.

2. Conduct national economic planning, determining the potentials and goals of production, the character and volume of imports and exports, allocation of producers' materials, plant, machinery, equipment, power, fuel and labor, the distribution and utilization of imported and locally produced commodities, the stabilization of prices and the rationing of consumers' goods, and the collection or control of goods in short supply.

3. Develop and supervise at the policy level any economic controls affecting prices, production, distribution, labor, and the coordination of such controls throughout Military Government, as may be authorized by the Military Government.

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4. Collect, analyse, correlate and make available to the Military Governor data necessary to the planning it undertakes.

5. Issue, subject to the approval of the Military Governor, such regulations, directives and orders as are necessary to establish the policies governing economic action by all agencies of the Military Government and to designate means of accomplishing such action.

In addition to establishing and defining the National Economic Board, Ordinance 90 stated the functions and inter-relationship of the following additional agencies: "Korean Economic Advisory Board", "National Price Administration", and "National Food Administration". The latter two were likewise legally established by this ordinance.

A final section on repeal of laws and saving provisions repealed General Notices Numbers 1 to 6 inclusive. These were, in order, the Notices (1) establishing a free market in rice; (2) establishing a free market generally except for commodities subject to Government monoply control; (3) establishing controls over coal and setting up the Chosen Coal Distributing Company; (4) establishing controls over fishing equipment and setting up the Chosen Fisheries Corporation; (5) establishing controls over petroleum products and setting up The Petroleum Distributing Agency; and (6) declaring rice to be in critical demand and modifying General Notice 1.

Obviously, however, some of the controls and agencies established by these General Notices were still needed, so saving provisions followed the general repeal which preserved (1) The Chosen Coal Distributing Company, which was renamed Korean Coal Distributing Company; (2) The Korean Fisheries Corporation; and (3) The Petroleum Distributing Agency.

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In a similar manner Ordinance 90 also preserved Department Order 1 of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, dated 2 May 1946, which set forth maximum prices on a long list of medical and pharmaceutical equipment and supplies.

Provisions were made that these prices might subsequently be modified by regulations of the National Price Administration; in a similar fashion, other saving provisions had stipulated that coal, fisheries, and petroleum agencies were to carry out their functions "in accordance with the policies, plans, and programs of the National Economic Board and the National Price Administration. . . ." The fisheries agency was, in addition, made subject to the further control of the National Food Administration.

The duties and functions of the National Price Administration were to make recommendations for the maintenance of relative price stability and the protection of the consumer interest; to maintain liaison and coordinate with all political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government of Korea concerned with price policies and programs; to fix prices within pricing principles and formulae established by the National Economic Board; to formulate other measures in connection with price policies and programs; and to direct the execution of such policies. Over all was the requirement that the National Price Administration "shall conform its policies, plans, and programs to the policies, plans, and programs of the National Economic Board."

The National Food Administration was identically charged in its field, which was defined as "the procurement, supply, allocation,

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distribution and rationing of all articles of human and animal food and drink, including collection, movement and stockpiling procedure for grains and other foods."

Ordinance 90, in other words, created the National Economic Board as the unquestionably supreme agency of Military Government in economic planning and in directing the carrying out of all approved plans. Other agencies were both to formulate plans for N.E.B. consideration and to carry out programs as approved by the N.E.B. Existing agencies were brought into this relationship with the N.E.B. and new organizations were created and placed in this relationship as needed; e.g., the National Food and the National Price Administration. This is given the force of laws by Section VII of Ordinance 90, which read:

> All political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government of Korea shall adopt and conform their policies, plans and operations to the policies, plans and programs of the National Economic Board, the National Price Administration and the National Food Administration.

Army Administration

This Central National Government, which had been set up, being a Military Government, was ultimately staffed with nearly 2000 officers and men in addition to Korean civilian government employees. To administer this military personnel an Army Administration Section was set up. This Section had nothing to do with the administration of


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ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
ARMY ADMINISTRATION IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT



FEBRUARY 1946

DIAGRAM #13

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Korea, was not properly a Section of the Secretariat and devoted itself entirely to administering, housing, feeding and looking out for the welfare of the military personnel who were governing Korea.

As previously indicated the Tenth Army AAA Headquarters Group was given the chief responsibility for the Military Government phase of the occupation. General Harris, its Commanding General, who had brought his staff with him assigned to his executive officer, Colonel Arthur Roth, the task of administering the army personnel. At first Colonel Roth's administrative staff was set up like a regiment but with only an S-1 and an S-4. Later, when Military Government had grown from a small headquarters group of sixteen officers and 62 enlisted men to a military unit of 671 officers and 1316 enlisted men, the S's became G's. An Adjutant General, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal and most other regular army staff posts, except for a G-2 and G-3, were also added.

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One of the biggest problems of the Army Administration faced was the billeting problem. It was very difficult to find places for the Military Government personnel to live in. Two former Japanese geisha houses, the Bizenya Hotel, the South Korea Electric Company, the Government General Apartments and the Capitol Apartments did not suffice. Quonset huts were set up on the grounds of the Capitol Building and many officers lived outside in former Japanese homes, but with the great influx of civilian personnel, housing was still a problem.

Other initial problems were setting up a finance division with a complete lack of personnel trained in finance, finding typewriters for

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clerks, finding cooks, and acquiring a sufficient number of vehicles. The only vehicles available were organic vehicles and the only tools were organic tools yet a motor pool had to be set up. Sometimes there was only one jeep on call.

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The task of supplying Military Government which devolved upon Army Administration continued to be a difficult one. The G-4 of USAMGIK was charged primarily with supplying the headquarters; Military Government units in the provinces were supplied by the tactical troops in their area. Although requisitions could be made direct to the Korea Base Command for organic supplies authorized on the table of allowances, these allowances proved inadequate and deficiencies had to be made up by special letter request to XXIV Corps G-4.

Since Army Administration was only authorized to supply the army, careful and detailed explanations had to be submitted with the requisitions to make sure that the supplies requested would not be diverted to civilian use. The line was often very hard to draw as in the case of typewriters which were requested by a government bureau containing large numbers of civilian personnel in addition to its military complement.

The greatest difficulties in supply were the shortage of office machinery and vehicles, particularly the latter, since transportation was important to everything. This problem existed at first and continued. Vehicles were particularly necessary in Korea where public transportation was either totally inadequate or non-existent and where telephone communications were so uncertain that an officer had to go somewhere himself rather than telephone. Vehicles were necessary even

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to transport personnel to the Capitol from their billets which were often too far away to make walking feasible. Roads were so terrible that the lives of existing vehicles were considerably shortened. In addition to this, trains of supplies were so often looted that units in outlying areas which needed supplies felt obliged to send their own trucks.[211] This both required trucks and wore them out.

Personnel was also a continuing problem. Although at several periods Military Government had been overstrength in enlisted men, it had never even at its peak had more than 85 percent of its authorized officer personnel. The enlisted men available for assignment to Military Government were often too young and immature for the responsible kind of positions they were required to hold. There was special need for officers with business experience or administrative training and officers who were specialists like mining and industrial engineers.

Although a great majority of the officers in Military Government had had Military Government training, this training was in many cases not entirely in line with what they were called upon to do. This was particularly true of the Military Government trained officers who were assigned to the Army Administration part of Military Government. Here these men had no part in Civil Administration for which they had been specially trained and found themselves performing functions which could have been done as well or better by regularly trained army officers. Some of them resented it and felt their efforts to become civil affairs specialists had been wasted.[212]

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During the spring reorganization Army Administration's non-governmental function and singular position were recognized in the new table of organizations which crystallized, for the time being at least, the structure of USAMGIK. Instead of having Army Administration as an agency within the framework of the National Administration it became an entirely separate and distinct half of Military Government, headed by a Chief of Staff who was on the same command level as the Civil Administrator. Under him was a Military Administrator assisted by a General Staff consisting of a G-1 and a G-4 and twelve Special Staff Sections.[213] It was General Lerch's belief that if an adequate and smooth functioning Army Administration could be set up all other phases and functions of Military Government would take care of themselves.[214] This may account in some measure for the increased importance placed on it as time went on during his tour of duty as Military Governor.

Conclusion

The first eight months of Military Government in Korea saw the replacement of the Japanese controlled Government General by a National Administration which, although similar at first, was in the end quite different from its predecessor.

The process of creation had been made difficult by a great shortage of military personnel and the absence of qualified Korean personnel. The difficulity experienced by Americans in understanding the Korean

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mind, Korean methods and Korean problems proved to be another obstacle in the rapid realization of an efficient administration. It had also been made difficult because of the vastness of the operational responsibilities which it had to take over from the Japanese. These responsibilities had been increased by reason of Military Government taking title to all Japanese private property. The Koreans were impatient; they wanted everything done at once; consequently, the administrative efforts during these first months were carried on against a background of pressure and criticism which often forced decisions to be made before all the angles and implications could be considered. Not the least of the difficulties which had to be surmounted was that so many practical and immediate decisions had to be reached in an atmosphere of uncertainty as to higher echelon policy in Washington, which in turn depended on international agreement.

The result of these factors was that Military Government inevitably revealed certain distinct characteristics worthy of note. It was a government which was temporary in outlook and in character, for everybody knew there was likely to be a change when the Russians joined in and again when the Koreans took over, whenever those events might occur.

It was a government of change working on the principle of trial and error, both in its internal organization and in its national operations.

It was a Military Government, not responsible to any national sovereign body but superimposed from above, carried on by military personnel always subject to the command of higher echelons, which in turn were responsible to still higher echelons, and consequently, less immediately responsive to local situations. It required, furthermore,

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a special military staff apart from civil administrative personnel to keep the entire military structure in operation and supplied through proper military channels.

In spite of all the difficulties, a reasonably effective national administration was set up in these eight months. Its structure functioned to the satisfaction of over 50 percent of the Koreans; it set in motion regulatory and productive operations; it preserved law and order without having to call upon the active assitance of XXIV Corps tactical troops except in small isolated cases. In addition the framework which was adopted was one which could readily be taken over by a Korean interim government with the mere removal of American personnel and strictly American agencies like Army Administration.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. JANIS 75 Korea, Apr. 1945, Chapter X, p. x-16. Other sources say "by the Emperor" but that is because the Premier acted for the Emperor.

2. Appointed by Premier as well.

3. JANIS 75 op. cit. Chapter X, p. x-16. Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen 1937 - 1938. Compiled by Government General of Tyosen, (Seoul) Dec. 1938, pp. 36-38.

4. Interview with Mr. Yusuma Oda of former Government General Foreign Affair Section, 30 Oct. 1945, I & H files.

5. a. JANIS 75, op. cit. Chapter X, p. x-16.
   b. Annual Report op. cit. p.6.
   c. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, New York, 1944, p.281.

6. JANIS 75, op, cit. Chapter X, p. x-16.

7. Ibid.

8. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 216.

9. a. JANIS 75, op. cit. Chapter X, p. x-16.
   b. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, New York, 1944, p. 247.

10. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 54.

11. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 45.

12. JANIS 75, op. cit. Chapter X, p. x-16.

13. Press Conference Report for 17 Nov. 1945 in I & H Journal. Report includes long statement by Capt. R. Moore of the Bureau of Mining and Industry, which he made in answer to prepared questions on Korean economic matters.

14. Grajdanzev, op. cit., passim; vide supra, Chapter II.

15. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 61.

16. Annual Report, op. cit. pp. 61-68.

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17. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 157.

18. Annual Report, Op, cit. p. 160.

19. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 163.

20. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 172 & 173.

21. Press Conference Report for 12 Nov. 1945 in I & H Journal, which was later modified by Lt. W. C. Wales of Office of Public Opinion, Military Government, to 27%.

22. Grajdanzev, op. cit. p. 272.

23. Korean Relations & Information Section, Military Government, Weekly Report #1, 9 Sept. - 15 Sept. 1945. Hereafter referred to as KRAI Weekly Report.

24. JANIS 75, op. cit. Chapter X, p. x-10.

25. Statement by JODK MG Officer, 26 Sept. 1945 in informal conversation with I & H officer.

26. Ibid.

27. Grajdanzev, op. cit. p. 261-268. Mannual of Education in Chosen, published by the Government General of Chosen, Bureau of Education, (Seoul), 1920, passim. Annual Report, op. cit. p. 92.

28. FO 55 Annex 7, 29 August 1945, p.2.

29. F O 55, op. cit. p. 3.

30. TS ltr General Hodge to General Mac Arthur, 13 Sept. 1945.

31. FO 55, op. cit. p. 2.

32. Interview with Mr. Yusuma Oda of former Government General Foreign Affairs Section, 30 Oct. 1945, I & H files.

33. Interview with Maj. David B. Tuke, Chief of Information Sub-Section of Intelligence and Information Section of the Secretariat, 26 Nov. 1945.

34. Radio TFXAG 501, Benninghoff to CINCAFPAC, 12 Sept. 1945.

35. Interview with Mr. Yusuma Oda of former Government General Foreign Affairs Section, 30 Oct. 1945, I & H files.

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36. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #2, 12 Sept. 1945, p. 2, par. 4b.

37. Radio, CINCAFPAC ADV to CG XXIV Corps, 111641/I, 11 Sept. 1945.

38. Radio, TFGOG #60, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, 120955/I, 12 Sept. 1945.

39. a. USAFIK GO #7, 12 Sept. 1945.
b. Radio TFXAG #524, USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 140939/I, 14 Sept. 1945.
c. Radio 141057/Z, CG XXIV Corps from Benninghoff to CINCAFPAC, 14 Sept. 1945.

40. RAdio TFXAG 514, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, 13 Sept. 1945.

41. TS ltr, General Hodge to General MacArthur, 13 Sept. 1945.

42. Radio 140630/Z, CINCAFPAC ADV. to CG XXIV Corps, 14 Sept. 1945.
Radio 141709/I, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 14 Sept. 1945.

43. Press Conference Report, 9 Oct. 1945, I & H Journal.

44. Radio 261045/I, Cg XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC ADV, 26 Sept. 1945.

45. Radio CAX 51913, CINCAFPAC ADV. to CINCAFPAC Manila, 14 Sept. 1945. See also Chapter VI on Machinery of Military Government for further information on personnel problem.

46. Radio CINCAFPAC to CINCAFPAC ADV (HAS), Info. to CG XXIV Corps, 26 Sept. 1945.

47. Radio TFGOG #137, CG USAFIK to MG, CG 40th, CG 6th, CG 7th, ASCOM 24, 020913/I, 2 Nov. 1945.

48. Interview with Lt. Col. Hugh H. Bledsoe, 7 Dec. 1945, files of MG Historian.

49. Time, 8 Oct. 1945, p. 16.

50. TS ltr, General Hodge to General MacArthur, 13 Sept. 1945.

51. Interview with Col. M. W. May, Jr., Civil Administrator on 14 Feb. 1946.

52. Annual Report, p. 44. This includes Secretariat, Bureaus and affiliated offices. Vide Supra Chapter VI.

53. Interview with Capt. Ketchum, 22 Jan. 1946.

54. See chart of Japanese Government General. Grajdanzev, op. cit. p. 240 - presents a different picture redistributing governmental functions between departments, bureaus, and secretariat.

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55. Hq USAFIK MG Memorandum #322 (MGTMG) Subj.: "Organization of Military Government Government General", 20 Sept. 1945.

56. See Chart

57. Interview with Lt. Col. EugeneG. Bennett, Army Administration Section, 25 Feb. 1946.

58. Hq, USAFIK, MG, "Organization of MG, Government General." 20 Sept. 1945.

59. USAFIK MG Ordinance #8, 1 Oct. 1945.

60. Interview with Capt. Sanford Ketchum, 22 Jan. 1946.

61. USAFIK MG Ordinance #7, 1 Oct. 1945.

62. Ibid. Staff Study, USAFIK, MG, Planning Section, 14 Dec. 1945, USAFIK, MG, Ordinance #36, 20 Dec. 1945.

63. USAFIK MG Ordinance #1, 24 Sept. 1945.

64. See Chart of MG.

65. Unpublished MSS on "Military Government" by Capt. (then Lt.) Lester Hewitt of Planning Section, MG, April 1946.

66. Lecture by Mr. Robert Kinney, State Dept. Advisor, member of Bunce Commission in Korea, 6 June 1946.

67. Radio 1419571/I, CG XXIV Corps (from H. M. Benninghoff) to CINCAFPAC, 14 Sept. 1945.

68. Ibid.

69. USAFIK, MG, GO #2, 14 Sept. 1945.

70. See chart of MG. Although JANIS 75, Chapter X called for position of vice-governor, Civil Administrator, the Korean employees in the Planning Section of MG were most emphatic in averring that this position was known during the Japanese reign as vice-governor.

71. Interview with Col. Metticus W. May, Jr. 14 Feb. 1946, USAFIK MG Ordinance #8, 1 Oct. 1945.

72. a. HUSAFIK, MG Appointment #2, 28 Sept. 1945.
b. HUSAFIK, MG Appointment #3, 29 Sept. 1945.
c. HUSAFIK, GO #11, 28 Sept. 1945.

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73. According to statement of Maj. Robert S. Gilliam Jr., executive officer OCA, the doubt about whom to appoint was the reason not the belief that one man could do two jobs. The other explanation was given by Col. May.

74. Interview with Col. Metticus W. May, Jr., Civil Administrator, 19 Feb. 1946.

75. HUSAFIK, GO #47, 10 Dec. 1945.

76. Interview with Col. Metticus W. May, Jr., Civil Administrator, 19 Feb. 1946.

77. USAFIK, MG, Appointment #65, 3 Jan 1946.

78. Press Conference Report, 11 Dec. 1945, I & H files.

79. Radio TFGOG 122, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 231352/I, 23 Oct. 1945.

80. USAFIK, MG, Press Release, 18 Dec. 1945, Item #1, I & H files.

81. USAMGIK, GO #1, 4 Jan. 1946.

82. USAFIK, GO #1, 4 Jan. 1946.

83. Radio CA 56323, CINCAFPAC ADV. to CG USAFIK, 240015/Z.

84. USAMGIK, Appointment Order #78, 19 Mar. 1946.

85. USAMGIK, APPointment Order #81, 30 Mar. 1946.

86. USAMGIK, Appointment Order #88, 24 Apr. 1946, (effective 8 Apr. 1946)

87. USAFIK, MG Memorandum #322 (MGTMG), 20 Sept. 1945. Section Memo. of Planning Section, undated p. 1, Planning Section, R&P file.

88. Vide Supra. p. 6.

89. Interview with Captain Sanford Ketchum of Planning Section, 22 Jan. 1945, I & H Files.

90. Figures furnished by Capt. Bernard E. Bobb, Administrative Office of Planning Section, 26 Jan. 1946.

91. USAMGIK, Appointment Order #4 of 29 Sept. 1945; #65 of 3 Jan. 1946; #88 of 24 Apr. 1946.

92. Interview with Lt. Lester Hewitt, Planning Section, 28 Mar. 1946, I & H files.

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92a. Major Wilbur L. Williams.

93. Statement of Major W. L. Williams. Ltr. 200 (MGPD), USAMGIK, Personnel Division, Army Administration, 25 Feb. 1946.

94. Section memo. of Planning Section, undated, p. 1, Planning Section R&P file.

95. MG Planning Section Report, Planning Section file.

96. Ibid.

97. Interview with Lt. Lester Hewitt, Planning Section, 28 March 1946, I & H files.

98. USAFIK, MG GO #7, 20 Sept. 1945.

99. USAFIK, MG Section Letter, General Affairs Section, 21 Jan. 1946, Subj.: Organization and Functions of General Affairs Section of the Secretariat; Relationship with Legal Officers.

100. Draft, "History of General Affairs Section" by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum of General Affairs Section, 1 April 1946, I & H files.

101. Ibid.

102. Interview with Lt. Thomas Talbot, General Affairs Section, 25 Jan. 1946, I & H files.

103. Ohlbaum op. cit. p. 2.

104. Ibid.

105. USAFIK MG Ordinance #9, 5 Oct. 1945.

106. Interview with Lt. Thomas Talbot of General Affairs Section, 25 Jan. 1946, I & H files.

107. Ibid. Interview with Maj. R. S. Gilliam, Executive Officer, OCA, 3 May 1946, I & H files, USAFIK, MG Ordinance #53, 6 Dec. 1945; SWNCC Directive 176/8 paragraph 42, 13 Oct. 1945.

108. Radio TFGCG #179, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 061455 /I, 6 Dec. 1945.
Radio TFGCG #190, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 141501/I, 14 Dec. 1945.
Radio TFYMG 669, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 291345/I 26 Jan. 1946; JCA Directive 1483/18, 18 Dec. 1945.

109. Interview with Maj. Gilliam, 3 May 1946.

110. Ibid.

111. USAFIK, MG Ordinance #58, 27 Dec. 1945.

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112. Interview with Capt. R. W. Wiley, Secretary of the Korean Civil Service Section, 26 Jan. 1946, USAFIK MG official personnel roster, MG files.

113. Interview with Capt. R. W. Wiley, Secretary of the Korean Civil Service Section, 26 Jan. 1946.

114. Corps Courier, 30 Jan. 1946, p.3.

115. Interview with Capt. R. W. Wiley, Secretary of the Korean Civil Service Section, 26 Jan. 1946.

116. Ibid.

117. Interview with Captain R. W. Wiley, Secretary of Korean Civil Service Section, 6 March 1946.

118. USAFIK MG Ordinance #8, 1 Oct. 1945.

119. USAFIK MG List of Personnel Assignments, 15 Oct. 1945.

120. Interview with Capt. Paul B. Hertz, Executive Officer of Foreign Affairs Section, 24 Jan. 1946.

121. Manual of Military Government Organization & Function, published by USAMGIK.

122. History of the Foreign Affairs Section of United States Army Military Government in Korea for the period of 1 September to 31 December 1945, by Capt. C. V. Britt WAC and 1st Lt. Robert M. Tierney, MSS typed but not published by Foreign Affairs Section, April 1946, pp. 12-13.

123. Interview with Capt. Paul B. Hertz, Executive Officer of Foreign Affairs Section, 24 Jan. 1946. See also HUSAMGIK, Foreign Affairs Section, Memorandum, Subject: "Permits to Travel", dated 22 Jan. 1946.

124. History of the Foreign Affairs Section, by Britt and Tierney, cited above, p. 43.

125. USAMGIK, Foreign Affairs Section, Staff Memorandum #11, 10 Jan. 1946. See also interview with Capt. Paul B. Hertz, 24 Jan. 1946.

126. Accomplishments by United States Army Military Government in Korea, mimeographed release by HUSAFIK, 14 Jan. 1946, p. 2.

127. USAMGIK Ordinance #49, 19 Feb. 1946.

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128. Intra-Office Memorandum Foreign Affairs Section, Capt. R. C. Beyer AC, to Lt. Col. Enders, 7 Mar. 1946, I & H files.

129. Interview with Lt. R. M. Tierney and Capt. C. V. Britt of Foreign Affairs Section, 11 Mar. 1946, I & H files.

130. Report of conversation with Lt. D. Patrick Lary, RNR, 11 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.

131. Radio State Serial 61 WAR 15741 SD Secretary Byrnes to SCAP, 291850, 29 Oct. 1945.

132. Radio 57607 SD, Washington to POLAD, Seoul, Info. CG USAFIK, 181117/Z, 18 Feb. 1946. See also Radio TFGCG #287, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 141604/I, 14 Feb. 1946, and RADIO TFGCG #303, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 230948/I, 23 Feb. 1946. See also Memorandum of verbal statement by General Hodge to Mr. A. S. Poliansky on 27 April 1946, AG classified records files - Korean Situation Binder for April 1946.

133. Intra-Office Memorandum Foreign Affairs Section, Capt. R. C. Beyer AC to Lt. Col. Enders, 7 Mar. 1946, I & H files.

134. Interview with Capt. Paul B. Hertz, Executive Officer of Foreign Affairs Section, I & H files.

135. Interview with Lt. Col. Gordon B. Enders, Chief of Foreign Affairs Section, 3 May 1946, I & H files.

136. USAMGIK Bulletin #49, 13 Mar. 1946.

137. Tierney-Britt interview, 11 Mar. 1946, cited above.

138. History of the Foreign Affairs Section by Britt and Tierney, cited above, p. 38.

139. Tierney-Britt interview, 11 Mar. 1946, cited above.

140. Press Conference Report, 21 Dec. 1945. Press interview with Major Gordon B. Enders, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Section, I & H files.

141. Ibid.

142. TS SWNCC Directive #176/8, 13 Oct. 1945, p. 68, par 42. See also JCS 7483/5.

143. Interview with Lt. Morton S. Jaffee, Administrative Officer of the Property Custodian, 5 Feb. 1946.

144. Ibid.

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145. USAFIK MG Ordinance #8, 1 Oct. 1945.

146. USAFIK MG, Appointment Order #58, 24 Nov. 1945 and USAMGIK Appointment Order #81, 30 Mar. 1946.

147. Interview with Lt. Jaffee, 5 Feb. 1946, cited above.

148. Written comment by Capt. Morton S. Jaffee (formerly Lt.) Mar. 1946.

149. Accomplishments by United States Army Military Government in Korea, mimeographed release by HUSAFIK, 14 Jan. 1946, p. 2.

150. USAMGIK, OCA, Letter Order #602 (MGPLN), 12 Jan. 1946.

151. Interview with Lt. Jaffe, 5 Feb. 1946, cited above.

152. Interview with Maj. Z. D. Blackstone, Executive Officer of Nippon Nitrogen, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi, 3 March 1946.

153. Press Conference Report, 3 Dec. 1945, I & H Journal.

154. Interview with Capt. Jaffee, 5 Feb. 1946, cited above.

155. Ibid and subsequent telephone conversation with Capt. Jaffe, 19 April 1946.

156. USAMGIK Memorandum, Property Custodian Section, 1 Apr. 1946, Subj.: "Manual of Military Government Organization and Function."

157. Interview with Lt. Col. Almus P. Evans, Chief of Accounts Section, 27 Feb. 1946, I & H files. See also Accomplishments by United States Army Military Government in Korea, mimeographed release by HUSAFIK, 14 Jan. 1946, p. 1.

158. Draft "History of Accounts Section" prepared by Lt. Col. Almus P. Evans, Chief of the Section, 26 Feb. 1946, I & H files.

159. Corps Courier, 4 Feb. 1946, p. 3.

160. Evans interview, 4 Feb. 1946, cited above.

161. Ibid.

162. Corps Courier, 4. Feb. 1946, p. 3. See also draft "History of Accounts Section", cited above.

163. "History of Accounts Section", cited above.

164. Ibid.

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165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid. See also Evans interview 4 Feb. 1946, cited above.

168. USAMGIK Ordinance #67, 2 April 1946.

169. USAMGIK Ordinance #81, 17 May 1946.

170. "Manual of Military Government Organization and Function," published by USAMGIK, p. 13.

171. USAFIK MG Memorandum #322 (MGTMG), 20 Sept. 1945, Subj.: "Organization of Military Government, Government General."

172. This was probably stimulated by the orientation trip.

173. USAFIK MG Ordinance #56, 20 Dec. 1945.

174. USAFIK MG, OCA, Memorandum, 300.6 (MGOCA).

175. Ibid.

176. USAMGIK Appointment Order #56, 24 Dec. 1945, effective 23 Dec. 1945.

177. Interview with Capt. R. B. Talbot, Government Administrative offices of the Provincial Affairs Section, 12 Feb. 1946. See also I & H Journal, entry 4 Jan. 1946, "Military Government in Provincial Areas." See also "Minutes of a meeting of Provincial Military Governors, National Capitol Building" 23-25 Jan. 1945, files of the Deputy Military Governor.

178. "Minutes of a meeting of Provincial Military Governors, National Capitol Building" 23-25 Jan. 1946, files of the Deputy Military Governor.

179. Notes of USAMGIK Historian, Maj. Wilbur L. Williams, on the meeting of the Provincial Governors.

180. Ibid, Military Government files.

181. USAMGIK "Manual of Military Government Organization and Functions", temporary draft, 28 Mar. 1946, MG files.

182. USAMGIK Ordinance #74, 27 Apr. 1946.

183. Annual Report, op. cit.

184. Korean Relations and Information Section, Daily Journal, MG Bureau of Public Information files.

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185. Memorandum Maj. Wm. F. LaHatte, CAC, to Secretary Planning Section, 19 Sept. 1945, Subj.: "Reorganization of Korean Relations and Information Section. MG files.

186. USAFIK, MG Ordinance #32, 30 Nov. 1945.

187. USAMGIK SO #72, 25 Apr. 1946. USAMGIK "Manual of Military Government", 28 Mar. 1946, cited above.

188. Grajdanzev op. cit. p. 311.

189. Corps Staff Conference, 3 April 1946, I & H Journal.

190. Grajdanzev op. cit. p. 290.

191. USAFIK SO #26, 10 Nov. 1945.

192. USAFIK MG Ordinance #28, 13 Nov. 1945.

193. USAMGIK Ordinance #42, 14 Jan. 1946.

194. Interview with Lt. Col. Loren. B. Thompson, Office of Director or National Defense, 2 Mar. 1946.

195. USAMGIK, Material Controls Corporation, "Historical Report for month of February," 18 Mar. 1946, MCC files.

196. Interview with Lt. Col. Loren B. Thompson, Office of Director of National Defense, 2 Mar. 1946.

197. USAMGIK Ordinance #64, 29 Mar. 1946.

198. USAMGIK Ordinance #63, 29 Mar. 1946.

199. USAMGIK Ordinance #47, 13 Feb. 1946.

200. USAMGIK Ordinance #64, 29 Mar. 1946.

201. USAFIK MG, GO #2, 14 Sept. 1945.

202. USAMGIK Ordinance #48, 13 Feb. 1946.

203. USAMGIK Ordinance #42, 14 Jan. 1946.

204. USAMGIK Press Release, 25 Mar. 1946. USAFIK MG Bureau Order, Bureau of Justice, #7, 17 Dec. 1945.

205. USAMGIK Ordinance #9, Economic Controls, 28 May 1946.

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206. USAFIK, MG, Ordinance #19, 30 Oct. 1945. See appendix.

207. Letter Directive, Subj.: "Establishment of National Economic Board," 1 Feb. 1946.

208. USAMGIK Ordinance #52, 21 Feb. 1946. See also Press Conference Report 23 Apr. 1946. "ember of the Korean press also criticized Section VII of this Ordinance which dealt with penalties.

209. Interview with Lt. Leonard H. Simms, Jr., Army Administrative Section, MG, 23 Feb. 1946. See also interview with Lt. Col. Eugene C. Bennett, Chief of Army Administrative Section, 25 Feb. 1946. See also interview with Lt. J. L. Plangere, 25 Feb. 1946, I & H files.

210. Lt. J. L. Plangere interview, 25 February 1946, cited above.

211. Interview with Maj. W. I. Berry, Assistant G-4, Military Administration, USAMGIK, 18 June 1946.

212. Interview with Maj. W. A. Seddon, G-1, Army Administration, USAMGIK, 18 Jun. 1946.

213. "Manual of Military Government Organization and Function", published by USAMGIK. See also Diagram 3b.

214. Interview with Maj. W. A. Seddon, G-1, Army Administration, USAMGIK, 18 Jun. 1946.

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MILITARY GOVERNOR

1. Brigadier General Charles S. Harris (Served 29 August 1945 to 12 September 1945) Appointed - Assumed Command, Hq Military Government USAFIK GO #1, 29 August 1945.

2. Major General Archibald V. Arnold (Served 12 September 1945 to 3 January 1946)

3. Major General Archer L. Lerch (Served 4 January -) Appointed - USAFIK GO #1, 4 January 1946.

DEPUTY MILITARY GOVERNOR

1. Brigadier General Charles S. Harris (Served 14-28 September 1945) Appointed - USAFIK GO #2, 14 September 1945.

2. Brigadier General Josef R. Sheetz (Served 28 September 1945 to 15 May 1945) Appointed - Appointment #3, 29 September 1945, USAFIK GO #11, 28 September 1945.

3. Colonel Arthur S. Champeny (Served 15 May -) Appointed - Appointment #98, 8 June 1946 (effective 15 May 1946)

OFFICE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR

Civil Administrator

1. Colonel Brainard E. Prescott (Served 29 September 1945 - 2 December 1945) Appointed - Appointment #3, 29 September 1945.

2. Brigadier General Josef R. Sheetz (Served 3 December 1945 - 3 January 1946) Appointed - Appointment Order #47, 10 December 1945. (effective 3 December 1945)

3. Colonel Metticus W. May Jr. (Served 3 January 1946 - 1 March 1946) Appointed - Appointment Order #65, 3 January 1946 (effective 3 January 1946)

4. Lt. Col. Raymond A. Janowski (Served 1 March 1946 - 8 March 1946) Appointed - Appointment Order #78, 19 March 1946.

5. Lt. Col. William A. Glass Jr. (Served 9 March 1946 - 7 April 1946) Appointed - Appointment Order #81, 30 March 1946 (effective 9 March 1946)

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6. Colonel Arthur S. Champeny (Served 7 April 1946 - 15 May 1946) Appointed - Appointment Order #88, 24 April 1946 (effective 8 April 1946)

7. Lt. Col. Seth Wiard (Served 15 May 1946 -) Appointed - Appointment Order #98, 8 June 1946. (effective 15 May 1946.)

SECTION CHIEFS

Planning (Abolished 27 May 1946)

1. Colonel Metticus W. May Jr. Appointed - General Order #7, 20 September 1945. Confirmed - Appointment Order #4, 29 September 1945.

2. Lt. Col. George E. Kahler, Appointed - Appointment Order #65, 3 January 1946.

3. Lt. Col. Seth Wiard. Appointed - Appointment Order #88 24 April 1946. (effective 8 April 1946.) Removed - Removal #88, 8 June 1946 (effective 27 May 1946)

General Affairs (Merged with Department of Justice 2 April 1946)

1. Lt. Col. (then Major) Emery J. Woodall, Appointed - Hq. Military Government USAFIK GO #7, 20 September 1945. Confirmed - Appointment Order #4, 29 September 1945.

Personnel

1. Lt. Col. Hugh H. Bledsoe, Appointed - Hq. Military Government USAFIK GO #7, 20 September 1945, Confirmed - Appointment Order #4, 29 September 1945.

2. Captain Robert W. Wiley - Appointed - Appointment Order #76, 8 March 1946. (effective 24 December 1945)

Foreign Affairs

1. Lt. Col. (then Major) Gordon B. Enders - Appointed - Hq. Military Government USAFIK GO #7, 20 September 1945. Confirmed - Appointment Order #4, 29 September 1945.

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2. Lt. Col. Thomas H. Ward - Appointed - Appointment Order #94, 1 June 1946. (effective 9 May 1946)

Administration (Formerly Accounts)

1. Colonel Arthur Roth - Appointed - Hq, Military Government USAFIK GO #7, 20 September 1945.

2. Lt. Col. Almus P. Evans - Appointed - Appointment Order #4, 29 September 1945.

3. Lt. Col. Archibald W. Melchior - Appointed - Appointment Order #102, 23 July 1946. (effective 7 March 1946)

Provincial Affairs (Abolished 27 April 1946)

1. Lt. Col. F. R. Reidy - Appointed - Appointment Order #56, 24 December 1945 (Effective 23 December 1945)

Local Administration (Abolished)

1. Colonel Glenn Newman - Appointed - Hq, Military Government USAFIK GO #7, 20 September 1945.

Intelligence and Information (became a bureau)

1. Colonel Glenn Newman - Appointed Acting Secretary - Hq Military Government USAFIK GO #7, 20 September 1945, Confirmed - Appointment Order #4, 29 September 1945. Appointed Secretary - Appointment Order #47, 10 December 1945.

Property Custodian

1. Lt. Col. John B. Lapsley - Appointed - Appointment Order #38, 24 November 1945 (effective midnight 13 November 1945.)

2. Lt. Col. Cornelius Menger - Appointed - Appointment Order #81, 30 March 1946. (Effective 2 March 1946)

Chief of Staff

1. Colonel Loren F. Parmley - Appointed - USAMGIK GO #2, 10 January 1946.

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Army Administration

1. Colonel Arthur Roth
   Held position by virtue of being Commanding Officer of Hq 10th Army AAA.

2. Lt. Col. Howard E. Michelet CAC - Appointed - USAMGIK GO #6, 11 February 1946.

3. Lt. Col. Eugene G. Bennett - Appointed - USAMGIK GO #7, 13 February 1946 - acting.

National Defense

1. Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick - Appointed - Appointment Order #31, 13 November 1945.

2. Colonel Arthur S. Champeny - Appointed - Appointment Order #57, 27 December 1945. (effective 20 December 1945)

3. Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard - Appointed - Appointment Orders #89, 18 May 1946. (effective 11 April 1946.)

4. Lt. Col. Loren B. Thompson - Appointed - Appointment Order #99, 8 June 1946. (effective 18 May 1946.) Removed - Removal #88, 8 June 1946. (effective 1 June 1946)

BUREAUS OR DEPARTMENTS

Public Health

1. Lt. Col. Glenn W. McDonald - Appointed - Appointment Order #1, 24 September 1945.

2. Major William R. Willard, Acting - Appointed - Appointment Order #51, 15 December 1945. (effective 12 December 1945)

3. Colonel John K. Cullen - Appointed - Appointment Order #89, 18 May 1946. (effective 31 March 1946)

Mining and Industry (later Commerce)

1. Colonel John C. Underwood - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

2. Lt. Col. Joe Thomas, Acting - Appointed - Appointment Order #84, 18 April 1946. (effective 9 March 1946)

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Finance

1. Lt. Col. Charles J. Gordon - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

Agriculture and Commerce (later Agriculture)

1. Lt. Colonel James Martin - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

Communications

1. Lt. Col. William J. Herlihy - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

2. Colonel Lloyd C. Parsons - Appointed - Appointment Order #87, 24 April 1946. (effective 15 March 1946)

Transportation

1. Lt. Colonel Ward L. Hamilton - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

2. Lt. Col. Arthur J. Cornelson - Appointed - Appointment Order #63, 4 January 1946.

Justice

1. Major Emery J. Woodall - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

2. Major Matt Taylor - Appointed - Appointment Order #37, 20 November 1945. (effective 20 November 1945)

3. Lt. Col. Emery J. Woodall - Appointed - Appointment Order #83, 2 April 1946, (effective 23 May 1946) Removed - Removal Order #88, 8 June 1946.

4. Lt. Col. John W. Connelly Jr. - Appointed - Appointment Order #99, 8 June 1946. (effective 23 May 1946)

Education

1. Captain (later Major) Earl N. Lockard - Appointed - Appointment Order #3, 29 September 1945.

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[redacted]

2. Lt. Colonel Aubrey O. Pittenger - Appointed - Appointment Order #82, 30 March 1946. (effective 18 March 1946)

Police

1. Colonel Arthur S. Champeny - Appointed - Appointment Order #31, 14 November 1945.

2. Colonel William H. Maglin - Appointed - Appointment Order #57, 27 December 1945. (effective 20 December 1945)

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

National Economic Board

1. Captain (then Commander) Owen T. Jones, USNR - Served circa March to 28 May 1946.

2. Lt (jg) Herbert P. Dunning, 28 May 1946. See Appointment Order 21 June 1946.

Material Controls Corporation

1. Lt. Colonel Harry A. Mc Colley - Appointed - Appointment Order #28, 6 November 1945.

Food Administrator

1. Major (later Lt. Col.) Carroll V. Hill - Appointed - Appointment Order #88, 24 April 1946. (effective 8 April 1946).

Korean Commodity Company

1. Major James N. Connally - Appointed - Appointment Order #64, 3 January 1946. (effective 7 December 1945)

Korean Economic Advisory Board

1. Lee, Hoon Koo - Chairman - Appointed - Appointment Order #76, 8 March 1946. (effective 2 March 1946.).

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National Price Administrator

1. Major Theron E. Roberts - Appointed - Appointment Order #92, 18 May 1946. (effective 30 April 1946).

New Korea Company

1. Major Wayne J. Estes - 11 October 1945 - 4 December 1945.

2. Lt. Col. W. A. Glass Jr. - Served 4 December 1945 -

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PART III

Chapter III

Provincial & Local Government

PART III

Chapter III

Provincial and Local Government

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CHAPTER III

PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

This chapter continues the story of the occupation of Korea with particular attention to the assumption of control of the provincial and local levels of government by the United States Military Government. Government by tactical troops was covered in another chapter, but to provide a coherent transition some mention of tactical government operation will be made here. The relationship between occupation troops and Military Government personnel was the subject of a letter of 9 November 1945, signed by General Hodge, which stated that from that date the Commanding Generals of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Divisions and ASCOM 24 were to be "Territorial Commanders" in addition to their other duties and were the direct representatives of the Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in Korea. Upon the arrival of Military Government units at their assigned locations throughout Korea, they were to be attached initially to the major command performing occupation duty in their area. As soon as Military Government units were capable of supervising the functions of government, Territorial Commanders were relieved of this responsibility. The tactical units, however, retained responsibility

for supply and administration of the Military Government units in their area. Provincial Military Governors were to be appointed by the Military Governor of Korea. The provincial governors, and those given command of smaller echelons, were authorized to request aid from tactical units if the Korean police were unable to maintain law and order. Direct communication between the provincial military governors and the Military Governor of Korea and between chiefs of national bureaus and their counterparts at the provincial level was authorized in all affairs of a technical nature. Territorial (tactical) commanders, however, were kept informed of policies and administrative matters of importance.[1]

There still remained the problem of the relationship between military government groups and military government companies. The first of these, the Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Group, was organized under T/O & E 20-52 T, 22 July 1945.[2] Its strength was 13 officers and 26 enlisted men, and it was organized for operation of the higher levels of government such as the province. The second type of unit was the Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company organized under T/O & E 20-56 T, 22 July 1945 with 12 officers and 60 enlisted men. Its function was to operate on the lower echelons of government, such as the township.[3] Hereinafter, these units will be referred to as group or company. What

the relationship of these two units should be was variously interpreted, and for a time, obscured by the fact that all military government units were assigned to one of the three major tactical organizations—6th, 7th, or 40th Divisions—or ASCOM 24, and normal channels of command were through these divisions or the service command. The whole matter was scheduled for, and received, fairly early solution with the establishment of Headquarters, United States Army Military Government in Korea (Hq USAMGIK) as of 4 January 1946. By prior agreement with the CG USAFIK, and consonant with the letter of 9 November, 1945, military government installations were removed from tactical command as of 14 January 1946 and placed under the command of Hq USAMGIK. Coincident with this change, Hq USAMGIK issued a "Letter of Instructions" dated 8 January 1946 which announced that "Effective at 0001/I 14 January 1946...all military government units will be assigned to Hq USAMGIK and will be attached to the Provincial Government Headquarters of their respective provinces." All military government groups assigned as provincial government headquarters were to continue as such in their respective provinces. This change-over did not remove all responsibilities from tactical commanders who were directed as follows by XXIV Corps:

"a. To assist Military Government units, upon request, in furthering the affairs of government within their assigned zones.

b. To maintain all presently established guard and patrol functions until properly relieved or until such activities are discontinued.

c. To assume the responsibility for 2d, 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance of Military Government vehicles within their assigned zones.

d. To assume the responsibility of medical administration and evacuation.

e. To continue to provide all classes of supply, except expendable office supplies.

f. To continue to appoint Agent Finance Officers for the payment of Military Government units.

g. To coordinate with appropriate Military Government agencies within their assigned zones, the establishment of a system of military patrols charged with the maintenance of orderly and proper conduct of military personnel within the zone, and to require of all military personnel the highest standards of military discipline and courtesy.

h. To assist Military Government units in emergencies by the use of tactical troops when called upon to do so.

i. To receive and process, with the assistance of Military Government agencies, repatriates entering southern Korea. Military Government units will be prepared to assume responsibility for repatriates immediately upon debarking. DDT dusters and typhus vaccine will continue to be supplied through tactical supply channels. Displaced persons will be handled in accordance with instructions issued by the Foreign Affairs Section of the National Government.

j. To maintain direct communications with Military Government units and to effect an efficient and smooth coordination within areas of mutual interest." 6

For a clearer understanding of the different levels of government on which these units were operating, the following list of Korean governmental echelons and their English equivalents is given:

Korean	English
Do	Province; also Island.
Pu	City
Gun	County
Up	Township
Myun	Village
Ku	Ward

Another term often used is gunsu, meaning county head.

Chronologically, the first major problem for all provincial military governments was whether or not to retain those Japanese officials found in office. As set forth in greater detail elsewhere, the initial decision was in favor of retaining these officials but under rigid American control. However, this solution was but short-lived. On 25 September 1945, the Commanding General, USAFIK, received the following radio:

> [The]....War Department advises for political reason earliest relief from office of governors of provinces and provincial chiefs of police,...The State, War and Navy Departments do not believe service of Japanese officials named above are necessary because of technical abilities. Also, removal of collaborationist Korean administrators and other Japanese officials should be accomplished as rapidly as possible.

Independent of this directive, General Hodge had already removed Japanese Governor-General Abe and had reached an identical conclusion to that presented him by the War Department. However, he saw an advantage--if not a necessity,--in making haste somewhat more

slowly than Washington advised. General Hodge felt obliged to move slowly because of the obvious necessity of maintaining some sort of government. His major difficulty was personnel. If Americans were to conduct the government with maximum Korean aid, they faced these problems: (a), Where to get the Korean help? (b), Which Koreans should be "fired"? And (c), where to find Korean replacements and counterparts? While the Japanese were removed promptly from official duty as directed, they were retained as advisors. The Americans were, in many instances, able to obtain from these Japanese officials a complete picture of the governmental structure as it existed prior to the American landing.

One serious problem faced by Military Government was the hiring of Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese government. Military Government recognized at the outset that many loyal Koreans were persecuted, tortured and imprisoned by the Japanese, and it both understood and sympathized with their bitterness toward Koreans who had escaped such persecution by reason of their collaboration. However, all Koreans were forced to cooperate with the Japanese in every-day life in order to keep themselves and their families alive. Therefore, collaboration and cooperation with the Japanese had to be considered as a matter of degree. Although Military Government could not in every case know which Koreans were active collaborators and to be considered as actual traitors, every effort was made to discover

and avoid appointing such people.[10]

General Hodge in a press conference with American newsmen on 8 October 1945 said good progress was being made in replacing Japanese by Koreans, but that the definition of a "pro-Japanese" consituted a knotty problem. The General stated that one venerable Korean said it was "anyone who had money;" another, "all are pro-Japanese but me," and a third said, "anybody who had been trained by the Japanese is pro-Japanese."[11]

Frequently, trouble originated from those who called others pro-Japanese and not always from those who themselves had collaborated with the Japanese. When this occurred, an investigation was instituted, and it was revealed generally that the charges were unfounded and that those who promulgated the charge possessed selfish motives. Pro-Japanese became a charge to be hurled indiscriminately at one's political opponents.[12]

At the outset of the occupation, American Army officers serving with provincial military governments directed the key officials found in the government to carry on with their duties--whether they be Japanese or Koreans who had served under the Japanese. On 25 November 1945 General Arnold radioed all provincial governors:[13]

> It has come to the attention of this headquarters that certain pro-Japanese Koreans still continue to hold key positions within provincial governments. It is desired that you take immediate steps to remove them and that you replace these individuals by individuals in whom the people have confidence; also, that you recommend to the Military Governor of Korea the names of other individuals whom you are not, repeat not, empowered to remove and that you recommend replacements for appointments.

Following this, advisory councils were established on a provincial level to help select loyal Koreans for the various positions. On 22 October 1945, a letter from the Secretary of Personnel in Seoul outlined the Standard Operating Procedure for appointment and dismissal of Civil Service employees. This directive stated that all persons of the Chokunin or Sonin ranks in the government were to be appointed and dismissed only by direction of the Military Governor of Korea. However, provincial governors were to make recommendations. For provincial governors, this meant that all personnel above and including the gunsus were to be appointed by the Military Governor of Korea. All lower ranks——that of Hannin and below,——were to be appointed by the provincial governors. In the case of these latter officials no processing through the national government was required. However, provincial governments were required to maintain records in their offices. Personnel other than civil service could be hired and "fired" at will.[14]

By 30 April 1946 this problem generally had disappeared. Except in a few minor cases all of the pro-Japanese were out of the government and each American Army officer had his Korean counterpart whom he was training. In many cases the Korean was actually in an operating capacity with the American maintaining very close supervision.[15]

This was the scene as military government was organized on the provincial and local level throughout South Korea. In the following sections, are discussed the principal problems encountered in the United States zone. In this connection it should be noted that originally there were eight provinces in South Korea, a figure which was later raised to ten, when the City of Seoul and the island of Cheju were elevated to the provincial level. However, at the outset, Seoul was under the Kyonggi provincial government, while Cheju was under the government of Cholla-namdo. That portion of Hwanghae-do lying south of 38 degrees North Latitude was considered as part of Kyonggi-do in the military government scheme of things.

KYONGGI-DO

Military Government Teams Number 1,2 and 3 arrived in Korea on 11 September 1945. The tentative mission was for Team # 1 to operate the city government at Seoul, Team # 2 to operate government at Inch'on, and Team # 3 to operate the provincial government of Kyunggi-Do. Due to faulty liaison of port control officials at Inch'on, Teams 2 and 3 were debarked before Team # 1, and because of the urgency of the situation were given the mission of taking over the government of Inchon and Seoul respectively. Team # 1 was then assigned to the Provincial Government of Kyonggi-Do. Subsequent assignments of Military Government units were: On 24 October the 47th Company arrived

to assist Team # 1 with provincial government; on 28 October 1945 the 54th, 60th, and 68th Companies arrived to exercise Military Government in Kaesong, Suwon, and Uijungbu respectively. On 6 November the Headquarters of the 68th Company was moved from Uijungbu to Seoul. On 2 November 1945 the 97th Group arrived and assumed control of Provincial Government. On 15 November 1945 the 39th Company arrived and was assigned to assist Team # 2 at Inch'on and on 19 November the 40th Company arrived and was assigned to assist Team # 3 in the government of Seoul. This concluded the assignment of military government units and personnel in this province.[16]

The first objective of Team # 1 was to establish the Military Government of Kyonggi-Do. This constituted two distinct problems; first, that of locating the seat of government; and second, establishing a sound government using the existing structure as a basis from which to work.

The first problem of Team # 1 was to locate the Kyonggi Government, which was not accomplished until 14 September 1945. On this date they located the Provincial Governor and part of the staff in the Belgian Consulate Building, and held a flag raising ceremony over the building. The reason for this confusion in locating the government arose because an order had been given by someone in the advance echelon of XXIV Corps to the effect that government officials would evacuate the Provincial capitol. Apparently, the capital building

was to be used as a troop billet. There being no other building available which would house all of the various departments and sections of the Provincial Government, it was necessary to disperse them about the city. Mr. Ikuta, the Japanese Provincial Governor, exercised sound judgment in keeping the government in the vicinity of the Seoul Central Post office and its units as close together as possible. It was not until 25 December 1945 when Military Government restored the seat of government to the Provincial Capitol Building. Operation was thus simplified in that all units of the government were centrally located, and better supervision by Military Government made possible.

These Japanese officials found in office by the Americans seemed to be competent men. The Governor was a retired Japanese Army Officer. Other personnel were civil service employees and college graduates who had been well trained. These officials, all Japanese, were told to remain on the job until such time as Military Government instructed them otherwise. Even though their operations were not effective, they cooperated very well with the American officials with one exception. This exception was in regard to financial matters about which the Japanese either knew nothing or refused to comment. Retaining the Japanese was in line with the American policy of temporarily maintaining the status quo.

During the first few days of the occupation Major William B. Myers, Commanding Officer of Team # 1, made a study of the Provincial Government as the Japanese operated it. Captain M. H. Abrahamson, Bureau of Home Affairs, spent two days with the Japanese Governor in outlining the governmental structure.[17] Chart I shows the governmental structure as of 15 August 1945.[18] Major Myers became Provincial Military Governor on 2 October 1945.[19] He immediately requested the Japanese Governor to submit to him a list of qualified Koreans to be top officials. In the government under the Japanese the Bureau Chief of Home Affairs was a Korean, a Mr. Shin. He was asked to prepare a similar list independently. When the two lists were compiled and compared by Military Government officers they were found to be almost identical, both men recommending the ranking Korean for each position.

The Koreans would not work for, and the Americans could not work with, the Japanese. In October 1945 all of the Japanese were removed from office but were retained in an advisory capacity for a short period. Subsequently, they were all returned to Japan. American officers were appointed by Major Myers to head the various departments until such time as Koreans could be selected.[20]

With the arrival of more units to supplement the personnel of Team # 1, Military Government was able to expand its operation

and control into outlying provincial areas. The officers were given verbal authority to remove officials and appoint new ones where such a change was necessary. Changes, however, were to be held to a minimum pending the making of appointments from the lists prepared by the former Japanese Governor and the Korean head of Provincial Department of Home Affairs. When the Provincial appointments were made, it turned out that in many places two men had been named to the same office. By reason of the fact that the men in the field was better qualified to judge the local situation and had selected men more acceptable to the people, yet competent for the job, subsequent appointments were made so as to enable the locally-appointed men to remain on the job. Removal orders were out for the officials appointed by the provincial government. Of those appointments by the Provincial Government, most consisted of simply shifting personnel from their former gun to a new location. Many persons were temporarily retained because so very few persons possessed the training and ability to step into and operate successfully government departments and bureaus.

By November 1945 all of the Military Government units had arrived in the province and had been assigned. On 23 November, Lt. Col. Maurice Lutwack was appointed Governor, and Mayor Myers was relieved.[21]

Government structural changes after three months of Military Government control and operation are indicated on Chart II.[22]

The three provisional Teams were replaced by the 115th, 116th, and 117th Military Government Companies in December 1945. The 115th, activated on 21 December 1945, was assigned both the City of Seoul and the provincial functions of Kyonggi-do. The other two companies were used on the national level.[23]


City Government (Seoul)

As previously stated, the problem of governing the City of Seoul was of sufficient importance as to require a shift of assignment of units when the first Military Government units arrived. It will be recalled that originally Team # 3 was assigned the city rather than Team # 1 which was delayed in debarkation. Seoul was the seat of the National Capitol, of the Provincial Government of Kyonggi, and of the municipal government. It was at times difficult to know where one level of government control ended and the next began. Political action, economic problems, refugees, and the myriad other problems stemmed in many cases from Seoul. It was possible to say that as Seoul went so went the rest of Korea.

Team # 3 found Japanese officials present within the City Government although there were no governmental functions being carried on. Koreans occupying secondary posts were likewise inactive. The Japanese

CHART I

ORGN OF MIL GOVT, KYONGGI-DO (20 December 1945)




* Performs all Dys of Legal Officer, but is not denominated such.
** Channel is apparently straight to Mil Govt Hq.
*** Entire Provincial Mil Govt Pers are under jurisdiction of 7th Inf Div, except "Team No. 2" (Inchon), which is under command of ASCOM 24

Sources: Orientation Team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date on chart.
Verified & Corrected by Captain N. H. Abrahamson formerly Bureau Home Affairs and [illegible] M.N. Shirven, Bureau of Home Affairs. Dates 28 May 1946

CHART II

Bureau Organization of Government, Kyonggi-Do, 15 August 1945



Source: Fixed Rules on Local Administration of Korea Published by Local Administrative Section of Govt. General Sept. 5, 1945

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park, Hi Hyun Korean Official in Provincial Affairs.
Capt. R.B. Talbot, MG Administrative Officer in Provincial Affairs.

were unable apparently to restore the normal operation of government. The Military Mayor, Major James S. Killough, interviewed the Korean sub-heads and several prominent business men, all of whom stated that the Koreans were most willing to work for Military Government and carry out any and all instructions they were given. They would not, however, work for anyone so long as any of the Japanese officials remained. The Major then relieved the Japanese officials and made temporary appointments of ranking Koreans to the position of Acting Department heads. After this action the Koreans returned to work and a government organization began to emerge.

Prompt action was required to insure continued relief and distribution of food. Likewise it was necessary to act with dispatch to prevent a typhoid epidemic. Actually, the entire city needed cleaning. Dead bodies littered the streets. Nightsoil had not been hauled away for a considerable period of time. Appropriate action was taken by the Bureau of Public Health and Welfare.[24]

On 17 November 1945 the 40th Military Government Company took over the administration of the City of Seoul. Lt. Col. James E. Wilson relieved Major James S. Killough as Military Mayor and Captain John D. Winter relieved Major John Busterf as Executive officer. Military Department heads remained on duty and members of the Company were gradually assigned duties in the city administration.[25]

The Provincial Governor agreed to leave Military Government

operations of the City of Seoul to the Military Mayor. The channels of military communication, however, remained through the 97th MG Group.

KANGWON-DO

On 28 October 1945, the 100th Group first occupied Kangwon-do by moving into the capital city, Chunchon. Concurrently, the 56th Company and the 52nd Company were moving into Chunchon and Wonju, respectively. The next day, the 66th Company occupied Samchok, and on 18 November, the 38th Company occupied Kangnung.[26]

Initially the jurisdiction over the counties was assigned as follows:

46th Mil. Govt. Company.....	Chunchon
	Hongchon
52nd Mil. Govt. Company.....	Yongwol
	PyongChang
	Wonju
	Hoengsong
	Chongsen
66th Mil. Govt. Company.....	Samchok
	Ulchin
	Kangnung

On 18 November 1945, when the 38th Company occupied the city of Kangnung, the areas were redistributed as follows:[27]

38th Mil. Govt. Company.....	Kangnung
	Chongsen
46th Mil. Govt. Company.....	Chunchon
	Hongchon
	Yongwol
52nd Mil. Govt. Company.....	PyongChang
	Wonju
	Hoengsong
66th Mil. Govt. Company.....	Samchok
	Ulchin

At the time of initial occupation, Lt. Col. Karl H. Mullinix was serving in the capacity of governor of the province[28] with headquarters at Chunchon. Military Government units assigned to the province worked under his jurisdiction until 23 November when Lt. Col. Carl H. Zwermann, senior military government officer of the 100th Military Government Group, was appointed acting governor of the province to succeed Lt. Col. Mullinix. Subsequently, on 27 November 1945, Lt. Col. Zwermann was officially appointed Governor of the province.[29]

When Military Government arrived in the province, the Japanese officials already had been placed under guard by the tactical troops. Military Government officials called in each Japanese who had headed a section or department for an interview regarding the organization and function of his former office. From the information gained in these interviews a summary of provincial governmental methods was undertaken, and Military Government officials formed a skeleton picture of government under the Japanese.[30] Chart III is a diagram of the governmental structure as of 15 August 1945. Considerable information of value was obtained from the Japanese.[31] This information was of great importance, particularly in view of the fact that all records prior to August 1945 had been destroyed.[32] After the interviews, the Japanese officials were evacuated to Seoul. Within two weeks after the arrival of Military Government all Japanese officials were out of the province.[33] The substitution of competent Koreans was accomplished by official order early in the occupation.[34] The subordinate officials (Korean) were

still in operation with the exception of some considered to be pro-Japanese. It was the policy of the Kangwon-do Military Government to remove policy-making officials if they were found to be pro-Japanese. Five top officials were so considered and all had been removed by February 1946. Normally, junior officials were not removed even if called pro-Japanese.[35]

In accordance with instructions from Commander Z. N. Williams, advisor to the Military Governor of Korea, an advisory council was formed at the provincial level to assist the Provincial Governor in the determination of governmental policy. The original council was not representative of the people of the province and was therefore disbanded in favor of a more representative group.[36] This body was presented with the problem of selecting personnel to fill major administrative vacancies. In its closed meetings there was apparently a good deal of difference of opinion, if not friction, but the council as a whole came out with compromise decisions. It presented many names for the office of governor. The final compromise nominee indicated that he did not think himself a proper candidate for the position and so was not selected. The Governor, Lt. Col. Zwermann, after adjournment of the council, suggested a Dr. Pak, Kun Won whom he had met in Kangnung. The council concurred and Dr. Pak, who previously had supervised a private hospital in Kangnung, was invited to Chunchon to assume the duties of Korean Provincial Governor. He reported for duty on 10 January

1946.[37] In addition, the council selected two of its members to form an executive committee which would always be available for consultation with the Governor. The council further agreed to abide by any interim decisions which these two men might make.[38] By December 1945 the Governmental structure had evolved to that indicated in Chart IV.

The political situation of the province was of a nature that tended to create various problems generally not found elsewhere. Probably the best account of this was that given by Major Myron M. Ruby, Chief of the Bureau of Home Affairs who had been in the province since the arrival of the MB Group. It was his responsibility to maintain contact with the political organizations of the province. He reported as follows: Initially, of the ten counties, seven were run by county chiefs appointed by Military Government. The People's Republic ran and controlled Kangnung, Samchok, and Ulchin counties in defiance of Military Government. County chiefs appointed by the Provincial government for these areas were jailed upon arrival. Tactical units advised that it would be better to recognize local leaders, utilize their personnel, and amalgamate them into the Provincial Government. On 5 December 1945 the existing heads of the People's Republic were appointed as county chiefs. Soon thereafter, they attended a meeting of county chiefs meeting at Chunchon. At this meeting the People's Republic leaders were ordered to disband

their committees insofar as their operation of the government was concerned. From that date forward it agreed that the operation of the government of these counties would be on orders from the provincial level. These three governments would operate as county governments with a radical tinge. On 12 December 1945 General Hodge made a statement that political parties, especially the People's Republic, would not be permitted to act as governments. The reaction within the province was mixed. This directive occasioned an aggressive attitude on the part of the recently-empowered People's Republic officials in the three east coast counties. When the Moscow Conference was held and the possibility of a trusteeship, announced, governmental employees walked out in all of the western counties (Chunchon, Hongchon, Chongson, Wonju, Yongwol, Pyongchang, and Hoensong). They remained away from their jobs for a week, returning 8 January 1946. Employees in the three eastern counties (Kangnung, Samchok, and Ulchin) remained on the job. Subsequently the Rightist elements gained power in the three eastern counties while the Left lost influence by reason of its pro-trusteeship stand.

During the sixth week of occupation a survey of conditions throughout the province was made by the Provincial Agriculture and Commerce officer.[39] The results of this survey indicated a food deficit, something that has long been true of the Kangwon area. Importation of rice had always been necessary. During the winter,

the food situation became more and more acute, with only meager supplies reaching the most destitute areas. Only in Hongchon gun did there seem to be a sufficient quantity of foodstuffs to satisfy the needs of the local residents.[40] Reports of starvation in isolated areas were investigated, but proved to be without foundation. Minor civil disturbances occurred along the east coast.[41] On 6 January 1946 a volunteer rice-rationing program was initiated by native county chiefs in a meeting held under Military Government auspices at Chunchon. On 16 January 1946 a rice-collection program was launched by the National Government. During the succeeding thirty days the program accomplished little.[42] The largest rice stocks were collected in Hongchon county, where seizures exceeded those of all the other counties combined. The project netted the province 8,178 suk of rice.[43]

Those persons possessing no rice were placed upon a provincially-established ration of two hop per person per day, a ration which would at least prevent starvation. The primary need of the province was for rice, wheat, barley, and rye. However, by reason of a deficiency of seed and fertilizer, a less-than-average output was predicted for 1946. Both fresh and dried fish were utilized to help alleviate the food shortage. Full utilization of this source of food was handicapped by lack of fisheries equipment.

During the second week of occupation the Provincial Resources and Industries (Mining and Industry) officer made a survey of the


province. Such industries as were dependent upon products subject to import were found to be inoperative. Revitalization of other industries was initiated. Bonded managers were appointed for all these industries.[45]

Mining of anthracite coal was one of the most important economic activities in the province.[46] However, for years coal had been removed without thought of future mining operation, the result being that the mines were in bad shape and much coal had been wasted. However, shipments of coal from Yukko to Pusan were stepped up and soon reached a 1000-tons-per-day average.[47] In addition to coal, there existed a tungsten mine in the province. However, control of this mine fell to the National Bureau of Mining and Industry. What iron mines there were had never been profitable, so the Americans learned. The mines had been subsidized by the government. For all mines that had any equipment a custodian was appointed by the provincial military government. Likewise, custodians were appointed to protect the shafts of all large gold mines, even though not in operation at the time.[48]

Communications were the greatest bottleneck in the efficient operation of Military Government within the province.[49] Telephone lines run from Sunchok, Wonju, and Chunchon to Seoul. However, contact with military government companies from the provincial capital was

CHART III

Bureau Organization of Government, Kangwon-Do, 15 August 1945



Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by local administrative section of govt. General Sept. 5, 1945.


Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park, Hi Hyun Korean official in provincial affairs. Capt. R. B. Talbot, MG administrative officer in provincial affairs.

maintained over army lines. Military Government officials were not able to contact Kangnung from Chunchon except by radio through tactical units at Samchok.[50] A provincial courier service was initiated during the period 15 January to 15 February 1946, but winter conditions caused delays.[51] In March 1946, a courier service was established twice weekly for Military Government and other military units. This proved to be a faster means of communication than the tactical lines.[52]

Transportation was almost non-existent. There were a total of forty-six old Japanese trucks in the province. Originally, of the T/E equipment authorized, Military Government had two 2½-ton trucks and two 3/4-ton trucks.[53] As of 14 May 1946, Military Government units were up to T/O & E strength in vehicles. The last week of April 1946, Military Government received seven additional American vehicles to haul goods, especially food. In respect to rail transportation, there was a gap in the east coast line between Mukho and Kangnung which prevented a complete line from the 38th parallel to Pusan. These two towns were connected by mediocre roads. One rail line ran from Chunchon to Seoul. Other than this, the province was dependent upon motor transportation. Poor communications and lack of adequate means of supply forced the withdrawal of the unit stationed in Chongson county. Thereafter, bi-weekly trips were made to Chongson to insure effective military government.[54]

CHART III

Bureau Organization of Government, Kangwon-Do, 15 August 1945




Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by local administrative section of govt. General Sept. 5, 1945.

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park, Hi Hyun Korean official in provincial affairs.
Capt. R. B. Talbot, MD administrative officer in provincial affairs.

CHART IV

Organization of Military Government, Kangwon-do, 17 Dec. 1945



Source: Orientation Tour Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date on chart.
Verified & Corrected by Lt. Hiram McDede, Adjutant 100th Group (with unit upon arrival, this chart checks with one of date indicated in provincial file.) Date: 14 May 1946

CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO

The first unit to arrive for duty in this province was the 27th Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company which reached Taejon on 21 October 1945.[55] It was followed by the 102nd Military Government Group, which assumed command of Military Government in the province on 28 October 1945.[56] The same day the 65th Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company departed in two sections from Inch'on; Section "A" with five officers and twenty enlisted men departed at 0500 hours enroute to Hongseong to establish the central headquarters of the unit while Section "B" departed at 0500 hours enroute to Kongju. During the period 29 October 1945 to 17 November 1945 this unit operated from both Hongseong and Kongju. On 17 November 1945 Section "A" left Hongseong, and both sections were consolidated in Kongju.[57] On this same date, the 41st Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company arrived for duty at Hongseong.[58] This total of three companies and one group completed the assignment of Military Government personnel to the province.

On 9 October 1945, Lt. Col. William A. Karp was appointed Military Governor of the province.[59] The Colonel's early arrival in the province resulted from the National Government's ordering a few officers and enlisted men to key points prior to the arrival of the various units. These officers and enlisted men functioned

as Military Government personnel of tactical units until such time as Military Government groups and companies arrived.[59A]

Under standard operating procedures only a Military Government Group was called for at the provincial level of government. In this province, shortage of personnel within the Group necessitated the use of both the 102nd Group and the 27th Company to staff the provincial headquarters adequately. Colonel Karp listed this shortage as a major factor in hampering the operation of Military Government. Neither the MG Group nor the Companies were at T/O strength, and initial replacements were not of the calibre required.[60]

Chungchong-Namdo has an area of approximately 8,106 square kilometers. The province is predominately agricultural, with about seventy-five percent of the population engaged in this occupation. The province possesses an extended coast line, and fishing is one of the main industries. The chief industrial products are rayon and silk cloth, hemp cloth, clothes, slippers, paper, leather goods, and brass work; mostly manufactured in small home industries.[61]

Local political activity initially constituted a difficult problem. As stated in the 27th Military Government Company unit history: "The most active of the existing parties in the province have been communist-dominated."[62] Many of these groups had seized control of administrative and police functions throughout the province, threatening and harming any who were likely to stand in their way.

In many parts of the province Japanese refugees were molested by Koreans while the former were being moved by Japanese troops to the entraining area. With the arrival of American troops and the revitalizing of the local police these elements were brought under control.[63] When the Moscow Decision of December 1945 with its threat of trusteeship was announced no trouble was encountered. The Colonel made a speech at the local theater and, by means of loud speakers, addressed a crowd of some 25,000. He declared that trusteeship was to the advantage of the Korean people as they would now have the guarantee of the world in protecting their independence instead of the word of merely three nations.[64] On 31 December 1945 the combined political parties held an orderly meeting in protest to the proposed trusteeship. Another orderly demonstration was staged on 2 January 1946. However, the ill feeling engendered by the Moscow Decision on the part of the Koreans soon vanished and they became anxious once more to cooperate with the Military Government.[65]

Another aspect of political activity involved the only newspaper in the province, the TAEJON SUN TIMES, which was controlled by the Communists and was considered a Communist organ by the people themselves. On 1 November 1945 the Workers Committee of the paper, without consulting the shareholders or the office of the Provincial Military Governor, changed the name of the paper to THE PEOPLE'S DAILY.

The Workers Committee was found to be allied with the leading Communist groups in the province. Publication of the paper was suspended on 2 November 1945. A meeting was held on 10 November 1945 by the shareholders in which they agreed to republish the paper under the management of three Koreans suitable to the Military Governor. Republication commenced 13 November 1945 under the original name, TAEJON SUN TIMES.[66]

Agricultural problems were not outstandingly significant in so far as being different from those of other provinces. However, one factor should be mentioned. Rice became short in this area just as in other areas, but the reason in this case was that a great deal of rice was shipped out of the province. A report dated 11 April 1946, stated that thirty-four bags of rice were confiscated from a group of Korean men and were paid for at the rate of 2,020 yen per bag. This was the total rice collection made by Military Government for one week.[67] This province had adequate road and rail facilities which facilitated transportation of commodities. During office hours one day a Korean official at Chonan counted two trucks every five minutes leaving with rice. A speculator from Pusan purchased ten railroad cars of rice at Nonsan. This practice was depleting the provincial supply to such an extent that on 10 December 1945 the Governor issued Provincial Ordinance No. 45 which prohibited the transportation of rice from the province without the approval of the Provincial Governor.[68] This provincial ordinance was published and in effect prior to the time the National Government announced its rice control program.[69]

Charts V and VI show how the government was organized on 15 August and how it evolved up to 1 December 1945. A few words of explanation are required as to the Emergency Provincial Advisory Council, which was peculiar to Chungchong-Namdo. This council was to act for the regular Provincial Advisory Council when an emergency occurred. During the early days of the occupation it took some three weeks for the regular council to assemble. Frequently problems required immediate action. Even though many of the members of the Emergency Council lived in Taejon, it was, nevertheless, a representative body.[70]


One other factor which was peculiar to the province was the action of the Provincial Military Governor in going into the field and personally investigating various problems, especially scarce items of consumer goods. During these travels he stopped in the villages and towns and talked to the people, informing them of what Military Government was doing for them and would attempt to do in the future. In Taejon, the Colonel held public meetings about once a month.[71]

CHUNGCHONG-PUKTO

The 35th Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company was assigned and arrived for duty on 1 November 1945 at Chongju, the provincial capital, with the mission of performing the

CHART V


Bureau Organization of Government, Chungchong-Namdo, 15 Aug.1945



Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by local administrative section of govt. General Sept. 5, 1945.

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park, Hi Hyun Korean official in provincial affairs.
Capt. H. B. Talbot, MO administrative officer in provincial affairs.

Organization of Military Government, Chungchong-Namdo, 1 Dec. 1945



Sources: Orientation team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Shilbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date: 1 Dec 45.
Verified & Corrected by Lt. Col. William A. Karp, Provincial Governor 18 Apr. 46.

duties of a provincial group.[72] They were preceded by the 49th and 67th Companies which had arrived at Yongdong and Chungju, respectively, on 28 October 1945.[73] This completed the assignment of Military Government personnel to the province.

Prior to the arrival of Military Government units, the province had been under the control of the 17th Infantry commanded by Colonel Robert H. Pachler, with regimental headquarters at Chongju. A small amount of Military Government work had been accomplished by the S-2 and S-3 in connection with (1) activities of political parties; (2) continuance of rail and motor transportation; and (3) the immediate welfare problems of returning Korean refugees. At the outset, Colonel Pachler indicated his desire to exercise a minimum amount of control of Military Government units and expressed his wish that Military Government take over its mission immediately.[74] Lt. Col. Ray C. Benate was appointed Provincial Military Governor on 8 November 1945 and remained in that position until February 1946 when Lt. Col. Murphy succeeded him.[75] The general condition of the provincial government at that time was rather discouraging. No governmental activities were being carried out except for a small amount of police work. However, in this respect, the police had been disarmed of all weapons except short swords, and had to a great extent lost the respect of the people. Both their uniforms and swords were symbols of Japanese rule and were deeply resented by the people.[76]

The sub-officials were present; but very little governmental activity was being carried on. The people had the feeling that there was no government. They were at this time becoming doubtful if Military Government would come to their aid, as considerable time having had elapsed since the initial landings at Inchon. The people were encouraged in the belief of there being no government by the People's Republic which announced itself to be the only true government of Korea. The Republic, through its local People's Committees had illegally assumed some of the rights of government.[77]

Officials and employees of the provincial and district governments were suspected by the people as being pro-Japanese.[78] There were no Japanese in office when Military Government arrived in the province, but there were some seventeen Korean officials still occupying posts which they had held under the Japanese. However, upon arrival of Military Government, they tendered their resignations. Military government officials did not accept them. The reasons cited for the refusal were: (1) the capability of these Koreans; (2) the fact that they could not be blamed for the actions of the Japanese; and (3) the obvious fact that their services were necessary if Military Government were to establish any kind of provincial government. As of 16 April 1946 ten of the original seventeen remained and had been approved by the National Government for their respective positions.[79]

One of the major factors contributing to the general disintegration of the provincial government and the general situation of the province was the ignorance by the people of provincial, national, and international events. Conflicting sources of information confused the people. This province was 85% agricultural, and the people were widely scattered, the only communication being over very poor roads and via telephone and wire facilities which frequently were disrupted. One radio station was rebroadcasting information from JOBK in Seoul, but this reached few people as the majority of radios were not in operating condition. There were no newspapers in the province except for TONG SHEK, the propaganda organ of the Left People's Republic.[80] It was vital that the people be informed of what Military Government was doing. Captain John Hall Jr., Head of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce and among the first of Military Government personnel in the province, summed up the situation:[81]

> The people seemed to stand by and do nothing. They would not talk or look at any Military Government official. Now [17 April 1946] a more friendly attitude prevails. They seem to realize we are here to help them.

Continual efforts were made to disseminate information and educational matter to the public. By using a combined civilian and military courier system it was possible to send printed materials to all district capitals twice weekly. Every available means, such as printed leaflets, posters, the Chukan Digest and Farmers Weekly, (printed in Seoul by the Department of Public Information, Hqs, USAMGIK) and

the radio were utilized in getting information out to the people. The editor of the Left Wing propaganda sheet, TONG HWA, the only locally printed paper at the time of the Americans arrival, insisted that he had registered his paper and had been given permission to operate on 22 October 1945 by the National Government. In December 1945, it was discovered that he had made no application to publish and print a daily newspaper; therefore, Military Government ordered it closed. In the same month a group of local citizens made application to publish a daily newspaper, the KOOK MIN IL BO. This was approved and the application forwarded to National Government.[82] The radio transmittal of information was not effective as many of the radios owned by the people were not operating and spare or repair parts were not available. However, Radio Chongju was used to make announcements of importance to the people and to acquaint them with the functions and accomplishments of the governmental agencies. Each agency of the government was allocated a period of time on the air.[83] Topics of interest were also presented. By March 1946, regular broadcasts by the various departments were being made.[84] After utilization of these means of communication, a more favorable response from the people in their attitude toward Military Government was noted.

Governmental organization of the province as of 15 August 1945 is indicated in Chart VII. The Koreans themselves tentatively had appointed senior section heads to act in the position of temporary

department heads. No temporary opposite for the Provincial Military Governor existed, and it was deemed best to wait until a better understanding of the system was obtained before an appointment was made.[85]

A meeting of the American officials and of the Koreans was held on 3 November 1945, at which the Governor was introduced to the Korean officials. They were told the aims of Military Government. This was done with the assistance of Dr. Kim Too Yon and his assistant, Mr. Yun Suk, who were sent to this province by the Military Governor of Korea.

One of the immediate problems confronting the governor was the overall control of the province. He held a conference on 4 November 1945[86] at Chongju with the commanding officers of the 49th and 67th Companies and defined territorial responsibility as follows:

67th Company.....Remain in Chungju with responsibility for Chungju, Tanyang, Chechon, Umsong, Koesan, and Chinchon guns.

49th Company.....Remain in Yongdong with responsibility for Yongdong, Okchon, and Poun gun.

35th Company..... Assume responsibility for Chongju gun in addition to its functions as a provincial group.

After operations officially began, headquarters was continually besieged by local groups, parties, and citizen's committees who had requests and inquiries to make. This reaction was typical, especially after the period of confusion when organization seemed to be emerging out of the chaos.[87]

The first major accomplishment of Military Government was the formation of Advisory Councils. Soon after the occupation of the province was accomplished, Dr. Kim, Too Yun and Mr. Yun, Suk went thru the province disseminating information pertaining to the formation of such councils. Political leaders in the provincial capital and representatives from outlying districts met in Chongju and a provincial Advisory Council was formed. With the assistance of this council, pamphlets were prepared on the advisory council system and distributed to units in the field and to all of the districts, myuns and kus.[88]

By the end of 1945, advisory councils had been elected by the people from ku levels upward, and a provincial council, representing the ten districts, plus a five-man nucleus appointed by the Provincial Governor, was meeting regularly in the provincial capital. This system had, in this province, the enthusiastic approval of the people. Recommendations of the council were valuable in selecting key officials on all levels of government.[89]

The People's Republic was one of the major sources of unrest and bickering in the province. The policy of Military Government in regard to this group was that of non-interference so long as its activities were overstepped, Military Government authority was used to prevent any untoward activity. In some cases, this party had tried to take over and reorganize the government in some of the outlying districts even after the institution of Military Government. Some success was noted.

However, these activities decreased with the institution of the advisory council system, and the increasing popularity of Kim Koo, and finally, the publication of General Hodge's speech pertaining to the activities of the erstwhile Republic. In the finally elected Advisory Council of eleven members, only two were from the People's Republic.[90] Activities continued in this same mode for some period of time. On 16 April 46 Lt. Col. Roland G. Murphy, who had become the Provincial Military Governor on 2 April 1946,[91] said:


> In regard to political parties...they have the People's Republic and some Communistic elements. However there are sufficient middle-of-the-road elements to far outbalance these two factions.

By 29 November 1945, the governmental organization had evolved as is indicated in Chart VIII.[92] Military Government had eliminated some of the departments that had existed under the Japanese as unessential. It also initiated some new bureaus which would enable better and more efficient operation of the provincial government. One of the most outstanding changes was the creation of a separate Bureau of Public Health and Welfare,[93] an innovation of Military Government in South Korea.

Mining and industry come under the bureau of the same title. The province had numerous metal mines but they were inoperative because the smelters were north of the 38th parallel. The one coal mine in the province was in operation. This mine was of considerable importance as it supplied the province with coal for the railroad and for some of the industries.[94]

CHART VII

Bureau Organization of Government, Chungchong-Pukto, 15 August, 1945




Source: Fixed Rules on Local Administration of Korea Published by Local Administrative Section of Govt. General Sept. 5, 1945

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park, Mi Ryun Korean Official in Provincial Affairs.
Capt. R.B. Talbot, MD Administrative Officer in Provincial Affairs.

CHART VIII

Organization of Military Government, Chungchong-Pukto, (29 November 1945)



Source: Orientation team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley H. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date: 29 Nov 45
Verified & Corrected by Lt. Col. Roland C. Murphy, ProvincialGovernor 16 Apr. 46.

Industrial activities were confined primarily to the production of silk thread. Other industry consisted largely of the small home type. Difficulty in procuring necessary raw materials was a major factor in the slow revitalization of industry.[95] The majority of the controls over mining and industry emanated from the National Bureau of Mining and Industry in Seoul, and actually the Provincial officer had little to do but carry out the policy of the National agency.

CHOLLA-NAMDO

The first unit of Military Government to arrive in the province was the 53rd Military Government Company which reached Kwangju on 22 October 1945.[96] The following day the 101st Military Government Group, along with the 53rd, 55th, 61st, and 69th Military Government Companies, also arrived at the provincial capital.[97] The 55th Company moved the same day to Mokpo where it established its headquarters.[98] On 28 October 1945 the 61st Military Government Company established headquarters at Chonghung,[99] and the 69th Military Government Company at Sunchon.[100] The city government of Kwangju with the three guns of Tamyang, Changsong, and Yongwang, was the assignment of the 53rd Military Government Company.[101] The 101st Group and the 53rd Company were merged for the provincial government with headquarters in the Provincial Building at Kwangju.[102] The last two units to arrive were the 59th Company on 9 November and the 45th Company on 22 November 1945.[103] They were assigned to Cheju-Do Island and Haenam respectively.

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This completed the assignment of units in this province.

On the day the first unit arrived in Kwangju, the Japanese officials of the province were still in office. The majority of the staff of the Provincial Government, including the police, were ostensibly on the job, but actually all work was at a standstill; workers were idle at their desks and the police were afraid to leave their booths. A local organization known as the "Whiteshirts" was, actually in charge of Kwangju. This organization had upwards of 300 men patrolling the streets, making arrests and was, at the time, the only organized government of the city of Kwangju, except the Military Police of the 20th Infantry, which has succeeded in establishing superficial order in the city. The White Shirt organization was under the control of one Kim Suk who had spent eleven years in prison under the Japanese for subversive activities. In addition to policing the city, the White Shirts were terrorizing the inhabitants, extorting money from them, expropriating goods from manufacturers,—largely saki and cotton cloth.

The first official act of Military Government was taken on 25 October when Major H. H. Bartlett, Commanding Officer of the 101st Group, later Vice-Governor of the province, visited the Governor and Vice-Governor, Mr. Yogi and Mr. Kineshita, both Japanese, and instructed them to have all provincial department heads on hand at 0900 the next day. No attempt was made at this time to remove the Japanese officials. On this same day, 25 October, Lt. Col. Julius H. Lintner arrived on YOGO from the Sixth Division with instructions to merge the 101st Group and the 33rd Company and assume control of the Provincial Government. The Colonel was to be head of both units. However, Lt. Col. Brockie and Major Bartlett retained command of the 101st Group and

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33rd Company, respectively.

The Commanding General, 6th Infantry Division, on 25 October 1945, ordered the removal from office of the Japanese Governor, Vice-

Governor, and the Chief of Police. Lt. Col. Lintner became Governor, Major H. H. Bartlett Vice-Governor and Major B. M. Seidl the Chief of Police. The following day, the remaining Japanese Department heads were removed and replaced with United States Army officers.[106] Subsequently, all Japanese and pro-Japanese personnel in the Government were removed. The province was very fortunate in having Dr. Choi, Yeung Mook, who had studied and practiced medicine for nine years in the United States. He was appointed (and subsequently approved by the National Government at Seoul) to the position of Deputy Provincial Governor.[107] By WDGO, 6th Division, Lt. Col. Lintner was relieved of duty and ordered back to Division Headquarters on 7 November 1945.[108] Lt. Col. John M. Brockie succeeded him as Military Governor of Cheju-mundo, the appointment being made official on 16 November.[109]

Military Government on Cheju Do Island was carried on by the 59th Military Government Company. Upon arrival no top level government was in operation. The Japanese were still present but inoperative. Military Government officials undertook to re-establish the police, remove and replace Japanese officials with competent Koreans, and restore governmental operation.[110]

One of the first problems facing Military Government of the province was that of controlling the various political groups. Primary of these was the People's Republic and the constituent People's Committees. Lt. Col. Lintner called a meeting in his office on 27 October of the

People's Committee of Cholla-namdo. Other meetings, lasting for several days, resulted in the admission by members of the Committee that their group had gotten out of control and had committed unlawful acts. The meetings were concluded with an order on 3 November 1945 to disband the People's Committee. Later it was given permission to continue as a political party, but with no other activities. The town of Kwangju, as stated previously, was under the control of the political faction known locally as the "White Shirts." Military Government ordered them to disband which they ostensibly did. Actually, however, they continued to operate. On 28 October, five days after the arrival of the 101st Group, the secret provincial police unearthed a plot to assassinate the Governor, Vice-Governor, Chief of Police and the Captain of "I" Company (The Military Police Company of Kwangju). Colonel Peploe of the 20th Infantry was advised of this plot, and he called out all available troops in a display of force, placing a cordon of guards around the Provincial Building and quarters of I Company and the 101st Group. This broke the back of the White Shirted following. Various citizens came forward with information which led to the arrest and conviction of Kim Suk, the White Shirt. Where the People's Committee was curbed in its illegal activities, many middle-of-the-road parties sprang up. The restrictions placed on the People's Committee were designed to prevent it from dominating governmental agencies, particularly the police. While such action curbed the power of the Committee in the Government, it did continue to control the Advisory

Council. Nominations made for government positions by this council were confined to members of the People's Committee. Since these nominations were frequently ignored, Military Government retained control of the political activities in the province.[111]


CHOLLA-PUKTO

Cholla-Pukto lies largely in the Kum River valley, an intensively cultivated region. More than eighty percent of the population were engaged in agriculture. The most important crop, of course, was rice, but wheat, barley, rye and other similar grains were also raised. Most important manufactured goods were paper and silk.[112] The principal metal mined was molybdenum.

The first Military Government unit to arrive in this province was the 28th Military Government Company which established its headquarters at Chonju on 21 October 1945.[113] On 23 October 1945, the 56th Military Government Company arrived in Kunsan.[114] The 64th Military Government Company arrived in Namwon on the 24th.[115] On approximately 25 October 1945 the 48th Military Government Company arrived in Chonju and was assigned to the city government.[116] On 14 November 1945 the 44th Military Government Company arrived in Chongup.[117] The last unit to arrive was the 96th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Military Government Group which arrived in Chonju on 17 November to relieve the 28th Company which was reassigned on 25 November 1945 to Iksan-gun

CHART IX

Bureau Organization of Government, Chella-Namdo, 15 Aug. 1945




Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by local administrative section of govt. General Sept. 5, 1945.

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park, Hi Hyun, Korean official in provincial affairs.
Capt. R.B. Talbot, MC administrative officer in provincial affairs.

CHART X

Organization of Military Government: Cholla-Namdo (7 December 1945)



Source: Orientation team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date: 7 Dec 45.
Verified & Corrected by Major Robert . Snow, executive and legal officer: 27 Apr. 46

with Headquarters at Iri.

Upon arrival in the province the 96th Group found the government generally disorganized. The Japanese had quit their offices in nearly every department of government and the Koreans who remained were inactive. The Government was not functioning. All industry was at a standstill. However, fortunately the rice crop had just been harvested and there was plenty to eat. On the other hand, the farmers could not exchange their goods for necessities of life. It was obvious the economy was badly out of balance.[119]

Lt. Col. Ralph F. Gellogy was named Provincial Military Governor on 20 November 1945.[120] Prior to this time he had been executive officer of the Military Government Section of the 6th Infantry Division. In this capacity, he had already made a tour of the province.[121]

The Japanese had placed a Korean, in office as Provincial Governor the last of June 1945. He remained until the end of November 1945, although he had no official standing with Military Government. Present also was a Mr. Yun, San Hi who under the Japanese had been head of the Bureau of Mining and Industry and later an advisor to the Provincial Governor prior to liberation. He continued to serve as an advisor to Col. Gellogy. He was removed by a National Government order during late December 1945. One other Korean, a Mr. No Sang Hun, remained temporarily in the government. Under the Japanese, he had headed the Welfare Section under the Japanese. He left his post on 25 December 1945.

The Japanese Police Chief was also in office when the Americans arrived. However, he departed when the Korean Chief arrived on 15 November 1945. In all cases of known Japanese collaboration, the person was removed from office. In the selection of officials, the Governor received the advice of his own personnel, the Advisory Council, and the Korean Department heads.[122]

In December 1945, the Governor created an Advisory Council composed of from 13 to 16 Koreans. He selected the members from men whom the Korean Government officials or the already selected Council members recommended. They were all interviewed by the Military Governor and care taken to insure that they represented all areas of the province and as many factions as possible. The Council performed its function in a most satisfactory manner. By 16 April 1946 the Department heads had been selected thereby making the Council an unnecessary appendage. The Korean Governor was selected without their approval. Many councillors resigned because of this, and no one was appointed to replace these persons.[123] Shortly, the Council activities of the local People's Committees were a constant source of trouble for Military Government. In general, the Committee opposed Military Government in almost everything it attempted to do. Many instances were recorded of coercion of the police, of civil service personnel, and of other employees to the extent that they hesitated to execute the policies of Military Government.[124] The Unit History states:

> As a general rule Military Government...hesitated to give the People's Committee a position of importance in the government because of its ties with the Communists and possibly with a Russian fifth column...(the Committees) seriously impeded political unity because (their) ideology is frankly terrorist and by considering themselves the voice of the people, they see no need of cooperating with any other group.

In Namwon the People's Committee refused to accept the order that all Japanese property be turned over to Military Government. In an interview with Lt. Col. Benton, Commanding Officer of the 64th Military Government Company, Mr. Kim, Chun Kan, a People's Committee official, produced an affidavit stating that the Japanese residents had decided that the People's Committee should handle the disposition of their property. The People's Committee was told this was impossible. Thereafter they tore down all posters put up by Military Government, and it became necessary to post armed guards over the posters. On 15 November 1945 affairs came to a head when the Chief of Police arrested five party members, including Mr. Kim, for violation of Proclamation No. 2. A few hours later the Chief of Police departed by car for Chonju. A short distance out of town his car was ambushed and about 100 persons who were armed with clubs and other weapons demanded that he release the prisoners. When he refused they proceeded to beat him. That evening additional troops were sent to Namwon. The following day sixteen of the mob were arrested. Early in the afternoon of the 17th a mob began to congregate in Namwon until between 700 to 1000 people were milling

around. From three directions they converged on the police station, which was guarded by tactical troops. The members of the mob were ordered to disband numerous times; finally they were given two minutes or they would be dispersed by force. When the two minutes were up the troops fired into the air and advanced with fixed bayonets. In the scuffle that followed two Koreans were killed, several injured, and one policeman stabbed to death. Following this incident, the town quieted down and no other events of violence were recorded.[125]

The conversion of the government was from a Japanese wartime type to a peacetime government in which the military was only transitory. Actually it amounted to a reorientation instead of reorganization. The structure of the government as of 15 August 1945 is indicated on Chart XI. The structure as of December 1945, after Military Government assumed control, is shown on Chart XII. The principal administrative changes were the creation of a Public Health and Welfare Bureau, removal of Agriculture from Commerce and making each a Bureau, and the addition of a public information section.[126]

This province was the first to initiate Koreanization of government in which Koreans took over the operation of the government. During the last two weeks in January 1946 the American officer in charge of each department maintained very close supervision of his Korean counterpart. All necessary changes in procedure were made. The first two weeks in February the American officers were removed

On arriving at Taegu, a skeleton military government structure was found already operating under Colonel Edwin A. Henn, FA, 40th Division, who was locally named Military Governor for the province on 14 October. Colonel Henn's appointment was confirmed by Appointment Order No. 27, dated 3 November 1945, Headquarters USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor. He was assisted by three officers, all of whom were assigned from tactical units of the 40th Division, which had tactical control of the province.[130]

Military Government moved into the provincial government building in Taegu on 1 November 1945. Appointments were made to the staff and governmental functions by Provincial General Order # 2. By this order, the 99th MG Group and the 54th Company were merged for Military Government operations in Kyongsang-Pukto. The companies under the 99th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Government Group, were assigned administration over areas as follows:[131]

54th Company.....Koryong, Talsong, and Songju Counties.

63rd Company.....Yongyang, Chongsong, Penghwa, Yongju, Andong, Munyong, Yechon, Sonju, Uisong, Kumchon, Sonan, Kunwi, and Chilgok.


71st Company.....Yongdok, Yongil, Yongchon, Kyongsan, Chongdo, Kyongju, and the island of Ulnung-do.

51st Company.....City Government of Taegu.

Those men appointed to governmental positions immediately moved into the appropriate office and began to operate or supervise the

CHART XI

Bureau Organization of Government, Chelle-Pukte, 15 August 1945.




Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by local administrative section of govt. General Sept. 5, 1945.

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park Hi Yun, Korean official in provincial affairs.
Capt. R. B. Talbot, MG administrative officer in provincial affairs.

CHART XII

Organization of Military Government, Chelle-Pukto, 1 December 1945.



Source: Orientation team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date: 1 Dec 45.
Verified & Corrected by Lt. Col. Ralph F. Gallagy, Military Governor, 30 April 1946.

On arriving at Taegu, a skeleton military government structure was found already operating under Colonel Edwin A. Henn, FA, 40th Division, who was locally named Military Governor for the province on 14 October. Colonel Henn's appointment was confirmed by Appointment Order No. 27, dated 3 November 1945, Headquarters USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor. He was assisted by three officers, all of whom were assigned from tactical units of the 40th Division, which had tactical control of the province. 150

Military Government moved into the provincial government building in Taegu on 1 November 1945. Appointments were made to the staff and governmental functions by Provincial General Order # 2. By this order, the 99th MG Group and the 34th Company were merged for Military Government operations in Kyongsang-Pukto. The companies under the 99th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Government Group, were assigned administration over areas as follows: 151

34th Company.....Koryong, Talsong, and Songju Counties.

63rd Company.....Yongyang, Chongsong, Penghwa, Yongju, Andong, Mungyong, Yechon, Songju, Uisong, Kunchon, Sonan, Kunwi, and Chilgok.

71st Company.....Yongdok, Yongil, Yongchon, Kyongsan, Chongdo, Kyongju, and the island of Ulnung-do.

51st Company.....City Government of Taegu.

Those men appointed to governmental positions immediately moved into the appropriate office and began to operate or supervise the

department in connection with the Korean Chief they found there. Those Japanese who were still present were relieved of all governmental functions and authority; although some were retained temporarily as advisers. The former Korean provincial governor, Kim Kyun, who was reported to have been a Japanese collaborator, was among those retained temporarily in this capacity.[132] All alleged pro-Japanese Koreans were out of the government by 30 November 1945.[133] On 26 November Lt. Col. Raymond A. Janowski was appointed Provincial Military Governor, vice Colonel Edwin A. Henn Relieved.[134]

Governmental organization as of 15 August 1945 was as indicated on Chart XIII. By General Order No. 4, dated 3 December 1945, the government of Kyongsang-Pukto was reorganized to bring it more into conformity with the organization of the National Government.[135] A Schematic diagram of the governmental structure as of 12 December 1945 is attached as Chart XIV.

The condition of the Military Government units was very poor upon arrival. They had left the States without the authorized winter clothing allowance and reached Korea in cold weather without overcoats. Accordingly, for most of the winter, men and officers alike were obliged to use Japanese army overcoats. Moreover, it was a month after arrival before officers obtained separate quarters. Until that time they lived with their men.[136] Despite all such difficulties morale remained high. Military Government units arrived in Taegu by train since they reached Korea without any organic transportation. This was later picked up in

Pusan and driven to the provincial capital. The available motor transportation was never adequate and "cannibalizing" was resorted to so as to keep as many vehicles operating as possible. The organic transportation was supplemented by Japanese vehicles, primarily trucks, and by Provincial owned vehicles. However, only a limited number of these could be put into operation.[137]

A change in provincial governors took place on 1 March 1946 when Lt. Col. Samuel S. Neill was appointed Military Governor of Kyongsang-pukto, and Lt. Col. Janowski was relieved.[138]


KYONGSANG-NAMDO

A Military Government reconnaissance party composed of Brigadier General Charles S. Harris and three officers entered the province on 16 September 1945 and arrived at the capital on the 20th. Headquarters for the provincial Military Government were established in the provincial building at Pusan.[139]

On 24 September 1945, four officers from Tenth Army AAA, which constituted Military Government Headquarters in Korea, arrived with orders for temporary duty with Military Government at Pusan. On 29 September six additional officers, who had seen military government service during the Okinawa campaign, arrived on similar orders.[140] On 25 September 1945 General Hodge radioed the Commanding General, 40th Division: "...your request is approved to appoint General Harris Provincial Governor General..."[141] General Arnold, the Military Governor of Korea, via radio, appointment number 2 which officially

CHART XIII

Bureau Organization of Government, Kyongsang-Pukto, 15 August 1945.




Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by Local Administrative Section of Govt. General, 5 Sept. 1945.

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park Hi Hyun, Korean official in provincial affairs.
Capt. R. B. Talbot, MG administrative officer in provincial affairs.

CHART XIV

Organization of Military Government, Kyongsang-Pukto, 12 December 1945.



Source Orientation team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Date: 12 Dec. 45.
Verified & Corrected by Colonel Francis H. Gillette, Provincial Governor 23 Apr. 46.
* Entire Mil Govt Orgn of province is under Comd of 40th Inf Div, except 63rd Mil Govt Co, which is under Comd of 6th Inf Div.

appointed General Harris Military Governor of Kyongsang-Namdo on 28 September 1945.[142] General Harris in a radio to the Military Governor, dated 6 October 1945, stated: "I have this date, 6 October (1945), relieved Mr. Osamu Tamiyama as mayor of the city of Pusan, and appointed ... [Major] ... [John P. Kelly] ... in his place."[143] Major Kelly was officially appointed Military Mayor of the city on 26 October 1945.[144] Major Matthew W. Gracey was named director of the Provincial Bureau of Police.[145] Other officers were placed in key Provincial Bureaus and City departments. Thus, after 29 September the Police, Welfare, Interior, Mining and Industry and Agriculture Bureaus were directed by Military Government officers. The military Mayor of Pusan was assigned two assistants at this time.

The structure of Provincial Government as of 15 August 1945 is outlined in Chart XV. With the arrival of the various military government units, the organization was expanded to all bureaus and sections, and by 10 December the structure of the government was as indicated in Chart XVI.

Colonel Francis H. Gillette, on detached service from ASCOM 24, was with the reconnaissance party which entered the province on the 16th, but it was not until 22 October 1945[146] that orders were issued transferring him to Pusan as Executive officer.

Until 24 October 1945 when the 26th Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company arrived in Pusan for duty as the Provincial level military government team, all military government functions had been

performed by tactical troops under the guidance of the Military Government advance party made up of General Harris and the other assigned officers. This same staff was amalgamated into the organized Military Government units as military government personnel when these units arrived.[147]

On 30 October the 98th Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Group arrived in Pusan the next day and went on a duty status. The Group was assigned a provincial Military Government staff for the Province of Kyongsang-Namdo, complementing the existing Military Government of the province composed of the 26th Military Government Company and certain officers assigned to the Military Government on detached service from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 10th Army AAA and the 40th Infantry Division.[148] On 1 November 1945 the 50th, 57th, 62nd, and 70th Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Companies arrived for duty as field Military Government units in this province. All of these units arrived with orders attaching them to the 40th Division for Military Government duty in the province.[149]

The assignment of the units was: the 98th MG Group with the aid of the 26th Company, to the provincial level with headquarters in Pusan; the 50th Company, to the city of Pusan area under the Military Mayor; the 57th, to administer Military Government in Tongyong, Koseng, Chongwon, Hamam, and Chonghyong gunn and the city of Masan, establishing headquarters at Masan; the 58th and 70th Companies jointly, to administer

Military Government in Namhae, Sachon, Hadong, Chinyang, Sanchong, Hamyang, Hyopchon, and Kochang gune and the City of Chinju, with joint headquarters at the last-named city; and the 62nd Company to administer Tongnae, Kumhae, Yangsan, Miryang, and Ulsan gune, with headquarters at the town of Tongnae. These teams were deployed in the field as of 7 November 1945.[150] This concluded the assignment of Military Government personnel in the province.

The control of refugee traffic was the outstanding Military Government problem, and it was undertaken jointly by Military Government and tactical forces of the 40th Division. Division tactical forces handled the physical movement of refugees at the piers. They conducted the inspections and regulated the exchange of money. Military Government controlled the refugee societies which mushroomed into existence. These organizations carried the brunt of the native refugee work. There were some cases of exploitation which were investigated and prosecuted by Military Government.

Up to 15 January 1946, the 110th day of operation, 614,616 Koreans had been processed into the country at the three provincial cities of Pusan, Masan, and Chinhae. During this same period, 427,186 Japanese civilians, 101,669 Japanese Army and 8,599 Japanese Naval personnel were processed out of the country. The daily average processed for the period was 5,450 Koreans and 4,800 Japanese nationals. The maximum processing days were 12 November when 23,500 Koreans were

processed and 17 October when 10,505 Japanese nationals were processed.[151]

Allied with this refugee problem was that of sanitation. It was necessary to organize a general clean-up of filthy and unsanitary conditions as a disease and epidemic control measure. In spite of the extremely unsanitary conditions in the cities of the province, the general level of health throughout the province was good. One of the last official acts of the Japanese in this area was the release of confined lepers. On 1 December 1945 a camp was established at the south end of Makino-Shima, which had the responsibility of moving affected persons to the Leprosarium.[152]

The political situation upon arrival of Military Government in September 1945 was chaotic. Acting under the various directives of General MacArthur and Lt. General Hodge the Japanese remained at their posts even though governmental functions were at a standstill. In many of the guns of the province, Japanese gunsus and police chiefs and officials considered by the populace to be pro-Japanese, had either fled or been removed forcibly from office by action of the people.[153] At the provincial level such officials were removed by order of General Harris, the Military Governor. The Japanese Governor was the last to go, leaving about 1 November 1945. In some cases, the Japanese were held, after removal from official duty, in advisory capacity. Likewise, those Koreans alleged to be pro-Japanese were removed as fast as replacements could be secured. In many instances, the


execution of this policy of immediate removal of pro-Japanese resulted in installing in office Koreans who were insufficiently trained to do the work required. All of the pro-Japanese were out of office by 1 November 1945.[154]

The People's Party, the main political pillar of the Left Wing Peoples Republic, was organized in Pusan on 5 October 1945. During that month, the organization usurped the power of government in Tongyong, Changwon, Kumhae, Hadong, Yangsan, and Hyopchon gune and in a great many myuns and ups. In at least one gun, Hyopchon, the seizure was by force and the gun house was set on fire. One of the first steps of Military Government was to remove the self-appointed gun and myun officials throughout the province. Those who had usurped offices were deposed and some were jailed. New gun officials were appointed on 24 October for fifteen gune. An election law for officials as high as myun master was promulgated on 22 November. This law provided for the election of Myun and Up Masters by representatives of the family groups in accordance with ancient Korean tradition. By 1 December all of the myun and up masters in the province had either been appointed by Military Government directly or later elected under the 22 November law. Since that time it was a case of testing these officials as removals and new appointments were made freely so as to place in office those with suitable administrative ability.[155]

Colonel Francis E. Gillette, assumed the office of Provincial Military Governor on 25 January 1946 succeeding Brigadier General Harris.[156] Colonel Gillette stated that since the beginning of the occupation political groups had created a very difficult problem. Kyongsang-namdo, primarily that area around Pusan, had been crowded with refugees who were politically excitable. The People's Committee was a strong, efficient, intelligently-led organization with a Communist background. This organization had a governmental organization including, for example, a public safety section. The organization collected taxes, took a census, and assembled other vital statistics. As previously stated, it had grasped control of the police in many gunes. In short, it had a large degree of control which actually amounted to a pseudo-government. It was not until 1 April 1946 that this threat to Military Government was removed. At this time Military Government initiated a province-wide purge of Left Wing elements, arresting about three-hundred persons. In addition, Military Government relieved four gunsus and 160 police, as well as numerous other minor officials. Many were arrested for violation of Ordinance # 19 which prohibited defamatory statements against, and competition with, Military Government. After this purge of officials, more encouragement and cooperation was forthcoming from the people, who then recognized Military Government as the legal government.[157]

CHART XV

Bureau Organization of Government, Kyongsang-Namdo, 15 August 1945




Source: Fixed rules on local administration of Korea published by local administrative section of Govt. General Sept. 5, 1945.

Approved and Verified by: Mr. Park Hi Hyun, Korean official in provincial affairs.
Capt. R. B. Talbot, MG administrative officer in provincial affairs.

CHART XVI

Organization of Military Government: Kyongsang-Namdo, 10 December 1945



Sources: Orientation team Trip Findings, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of Secretariat. Dated: 10 Dec. 45.
rified & Corrected by Lt. Cmdr. Sven A. Dunman, Public Relations Officer (with unit upon arrival in province.)

FOOTNOTES OF CHAPTER III

PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. Hq USAFIK, Letter, Relationship between Occupation Troops and Military Government Personnel, 9 November 1945 (Location: Historical file.) AF 014.15.

2. War Department T/O & E 20-52 T, 22 July 1945.

3. War Department T/O & E 20-56 T, 22 July 1945.

4. Hq USAFIK, General Order # 1, 4 Jan 46.

5. Hq USAMGIK, Letter of Instructions, 8 Jan 1946.

6. Hq USAMGIK, Office of Civil Administrator, Letter, Korean Names of Important Political and Geographical Terms and English Equivalent, 9 March 46 (Location: Hist. File.)

7. Radio, CINCAFPAC to CG USAFIK 25 Sept 45, 171525, Location: AG Top Secret file.

8. Hq USAFIK, Office of Military Governor, Leaflet, Your Military Government--present and future., 12 Nov 45, MG # 5.

9. Interview: Capt. N. H. Abrahamsen, Kyunggi Provincial Govt.

10. Hq USAFIK, Your Mil. Gov. Pres. and Future, OPOIT.

11. Statement by General Hodge to American Newsmen at a press conference held in his office, 8 Oct 45, from notes of Historian, 1st I & H Sv.

12. Interview: Lt. Col. Ralph Gallagy, Chelle Pukto.

13. Radio: Military Governor of Korea to all provincial governors. 251201/I November.

14. Hq USAFIK Office of Military Governor, Secretary of Personnel Letter, SOP for Appointment and Dismissal of Civil Service Employees., 22 Oct 45.

15. See Unit histories of Groups and Companies and also interviews with officials of this level of government in file of 1st I & H. Sv.

16. Hq USAFIK, Letter, Office of Provincial Military Governor, Kyunggi Do; Historical Report of Kyunggi Do Agriculture Department, 8 May 1946.
54th MG Unit History 25 Dec 45)
68th MG Unit History 2 Jan 46) Companies
60th MG Unit History 8 Jan 46)
Hq Military Govt, Operations Sub-Section of Planning Section of Secretariat, Oct 20, 1945 and Nov 20, 1945. For arrival of other Military Government units.

17. Interview: Capt. N. H. Abrahamsen, 29 May 1946, Letter, Historical Report of Kyunggi Do Agriculture Department, 8 May 1946.
Interview: Major A. M. Tunstall, 28 May 1946.

18. Fixed Rules on Local Administration of Korea Published by Local Administrative Section of Government General, 5 Sept 45. Verifications: See Chart.

19. Hq USAFIK, Office of Military Governor, Appointment Number 5, 25 Oct 1945.

20. Interview: Capt. Abrahamsen
Letter, Historical Rpt. Agric. Dept., Op. Cit.

21. Hq USAFIK, Office of Military Governor, Appointment Number 40, 24 Nov 1945, effective 20 Nov 45.

22. Orientation Team Trip, Prepared by Capt. Stanley N. Ohlbaum, General Affairs Section of the Secretariat. Verified as indicated on chart.

23. 1154th Military Government Company History.

24. Unit History, Team No. 1 and 40th MG. Co., City of Seoul, 11 Sept. to 30 Nov. 45.

25. 40th MG Co. Unit Hist., 10 Jan 1946.

26. Hq USAFIK Off. of Prov. Mil. Gov. Kangwon Do, Unit History, 17 Dec. 45, referred herein after as Unit History, then date.

27. Ibid.

28. Hq USAFIK Off. of Mil. Gov., Appt. No. 10, dated 2 Oct. 45.

29. Unit Hist., 17 Dec 45, and Hq USAFIK Off. of Mil. Gov., Appt. No. 41, dated 27 Nov. 45 effective 25 Nov. 45.

30. Interview: Major Ruby, Home Affairs, 14 May 1946, Unit Hist., 17 Dec. 45.

31. Interview: Lt. Col. Swensson, 14 May 1946.

32. Interview: Lt. H. L. McDade Jr., Adjutant, 14 May 46.

33. Interview: Maj. Ruby.

34. Unit Hist., 17 Dec. 45.

35. Interview: Maj. Ruby.

36. Unit Hist., 17 Dec. 45.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Unit Hist., 17 Dec. 45.

40. Unit Hist., 15 Jan. 46.

41. Unit Hist., 16 Feb. 46.

42. Ibid.

43. Unit Hist., 16 March 46.

44. Unit Hist., 16 March 46.
Interview, Lt. Col. Evans.

45. Unit Hist., 17 Dec. 45.

46. Interview, Lt. Col. Dinsmore.

47. Unit Hist., 16 March 1946.

48. Interview, Lt. Col. Dinsmore.

49. Unit Hist., 16 Feb. 46.

50. Interview: Lt. McDade, 14 May 46.

51. Unit Hist., 16 Feb. 46.

52. Interview, Lt. McDade.

53. Interview, Maj. Tuby.

54. Interview, Lt. McDade, Unit Hist., 15 Jan. 1946.

55. 27th M.G. Company Unit Hist., 11 Dec. 45, p-3.

56. 102nd Mil. Govt. Group 10 Jan 46, p-4.

57. 63th M.G. Company Unit Hist., 3 Jan 46, p-3.

58. 41st M.G. Company Unit Hist., 1 Jan 46, p-3.

59. Hq USAFIK Office of Military Governor Appointment Number 10, dated 9 October 45.

59A. Interview; Lt. Col. Karp, Mil. Governor, 18 April 46.

60. Letter, Hq USAFIK Office of Mil. Governor 15 Oct. 45, personnel assignment. Officers and EM assigned as indicated as of date.

61. 27th Mil. Gov. Co. Unit Hist., 11 Dec. 45, p-3.

62. Ibid., p-3.

63. Ibid., p-3.

64. Interview; Lt. Col. Karp, 19 April 46.

65. 27th MG Co. Unit Hist., 15 Jan. 46, p-2.

66. 27th MG Co. Unit Hist., 11 Dec. 1945, pp.3-4.

67. The information on rice and prices came to the Governor, Lt. Col. Karp, from very reliable Korean sources, so he stated. Interview of 18 April 46.

68. Interview; Lt. Col. Karp 19 April 46.
Interview; Lt. Lewis Narrows, Bureau of Agriculture, 18 Apr 46.

69. Interview; Lt. Narrows.

70. Interview, Lt. Col. Karp.

71. Ibid.

72. Unit Hist., 35th MG Co., 2 Sept 45 to 15 Jan 46, p-2.

75. Unit Hist., 49th MG Co., 3 Sept 45 to 1 Jan 46.
57th MG Co., 2 Sept 45 to 15 Jan 46.

74. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 2 Sept 45 to 15 Jan 46.

75. Hq USAFIK Office of Military Governor, Appointment No. 29 dated 8 November 1945; par1, S.O. 18, Hq USAMGIK, 30 Jan 1946.

76. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 2 Sept. 45 to 15 Jan. 46, p-3.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Interview with Lt. Col. Roland Murphy, Provincial Governor, dated 16 April 46., Interview with Capt. Edgar DuBois, Secretary to Governor and Adjutant of the 55th MG Co., 16 April 46.

80. Unit Hist., 55th MG. Co., 2 Sept 45 to 15 Jan 46, p-4.

81. Interview: Capt. John Hall Jr., Provincial Agriculture and Commerce officer, 17 April 46.

82. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 2 Sept 45, to 15 Jan 46, p-12.

83. Ibid, p-2., Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 15 Feb. to 15 March, p-1.

84. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 15 Feb to 15 March, p-2.

85. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 2 Sept 45 to 15 Jan 46, p-5.

86. Unit Hist., 67th MG Co., 20 Dec. 45, p-2.

87. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

88. Ibid., pp. 6.

89. Ibid.

90. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 2 Sept 45 to 15 Jan 46.

91. Interview with Lt. Col. Murphy.

92. Chart verified by Col. Murphy on 16 April 46 and by Capt. Edgar DuBois on same date during interviews cited above.

93. Unit Hist., 55th MG Co., 2 Sept. 45 to 15 Jan. 46, p.e10.

94. Interview; Lt. Commander Edward A. Renner, Bureau of Mining and Industry, 17 April 46.

95. Interview with Commander Renner.

96. 33rd M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 29 Jan. 46., confirmed in Unit Hist of 101st Group.

97. Unit Hist., 101st Group.

98. 55th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 28 Jan 46.

99. 61st M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 23 Feb 46.

100. 69th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 1945.

101. 53rd. M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 28 Jan 46.

102. Unit Hist., 101st Group.

103. 45th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 25 Jan 46.
59th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 26 Dec 45.

104. Unit Hist., 101st Group.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., p. 7.

108. Ibid., p. 8.

109. Hq USAFIK office of Mil. Governor, Appointment No. 34, dated 19 Nov 45, effective 16 Nov 45.

110. 59th M.G. Unit Hist., 26 Dec 45.

111. Interview; Capt. Edward B. Hansen FHD, 29 Apr 46;
101st Group Unit Hist.

112. 96th Group Unit Hist., 15 March 46.

113. 28th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 28 Dec 46.

114. 56th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 20 March 46.

115. 64th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 7 Jan 46.

116. Unit arrived Inchon 21 Oct 45. No record of date of arrival or assignment in history. In Chart, "Location of M.G. Units 14 Dec 45", Published by USAFMIDK, G-1, indicated the Co. had city government of Chonju.

117. 44th M.G. Unit Hist., 28 Dec 45.

118. 96th Group, 15 March 46, 28th M.G. Unit Hist., 28 Dec 45.

119. 96th Gp Unit Hist, 15 March 46.

120. Hq USAFIK Office of Military Governor, Appointment number 40 dated 24 Nov 45 effective 20 Nov 45.

121. Interview with Lt. Col. Gallegy, 30 April 46.

122. Interview with Lt. Col. Gallegy, 30 April 46; Interview with Capt. Colin F. Campbell PRO, which included Mr. Oh, Korean head of PRO and Mr. Kim, Pong Tu, Korean Head of Bureau of Home Affairs; 96th Group, 15 March 46; Interview with Col. Gallegy.

123. Ibid.

124. 96th Gp. Unit Hist., 15 March 46, p-7.

125. 64th M.G. Co. Unit Hist., 7 Jan 46.

126. Chart I. Fixed rules on Local Adm. of Korea by Local Adm. Sec. of Govt. Gen., 5 Sept. 45.
Chart II. Findings of Orientation Team Trip by Capt. C. N. Ohlbaum.
96th Group Unit Hist., 15 March 46.

127. Interview with Col. Gallegy.

128. 99th MG Group Unit Hist., 8 Sept. 45 to 28 Feb. 46, p-1;
71st MG Company Unit Hist., for 1945, p-7.

129. 63rd MG Company Unit Hist., 21 Oct 45 to 7 Jan 46; and Hq 40th Inf. Div. Office of CG APO 40 Appointment No. 1, 14 Oct. 45.

130. 99th MG Group, Unit Hist., p-1.

131. 51st MG Company Unit Hist., 10 Jan. 1946, p-3.

132. 99th MG Group, Unit Hist.

135. Interview: Lt.Cmdr. Owen S. Duncan, Bureau of Public Relations, 20 Apr. 46, Off. of Mil. Gov.

134. Hq USAFIK - Appt. order # 41 dated 27 Nov 45, effective 26 Nov 45.

135. 99th MG Group, Unit Hist., p-2.

136. Interview with Maj. Clyde E. Hurts, Bureau of Agric, who was one of the first MG officials in the province, 21 April 46.

137. 99th MG Group Unit Hist., p-8., Interview: Lt. Cmdr. Duncan, 20 April 46.

138. Hq USAFIK, Appt. Order No. 78, dated 19 Mar 46, effective 1 Mar. 46.

139. Hq USAFIK Office of Provincial Military Governor Kyong Sang Namdo, Pusan, Korea Provincial Military Government History, 22 Sept. 45 to 15 Jan 46. pp.1-2., referred to hereafter as MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo.

140. Ibid.

141. Radio, 26 Sept 45., CG,USAFIK to CG 40th Div. TFAGS76.

142. Hq USAFIK Office of Military Governor Appointment Number 2,dated 28 Sept 45. Text sent via radio to General Harris. (Radio undated).

143. Radio Military Governor Kyong Sang Namdo to Military Governor Korea, Hq USAFIK, Seoul, Korea dated 3 Oct 45, Number 061730/I.

144. Hq USAFIK Office of Military Governor Appointment Number 25, dated 26 Oct 45.

145. MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo. The history list both Major Gracey and Major Kelly being appointed on 1 Oct---Other documents believed more accurate confirm Major Kelly and logic indicates same date of appointment of Major Gracey. The latter's appointment did not require National Approval as did that of Major Kelly and so it is not in the official appointment record.

146. MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo, Interview with Col. Gillette, 23 April 46.

147. MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo; Letter USAFIK office of Military Governor, 15 Oct 45 "Personnel Assignments of Officers and EM" as indicated as of date. Interview: Major Gracey, Military Chief of Police Kyong Sang Namdo, 24 October 45 by Lt. Col. Todd.

148. MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo, p-1., Unit Hist., 98 Hq and Hq Det. Group, Pusan, Korea, Par. 12, p-1.
149. MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo, p-1.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid., p-4.
152. Ibid. p-4.
153. Ibid., p-4 and 11.
154. Ibid.
155. MG Hist. Kyong Sang Namdo, pp. 4 and 11.
156. Hq USAMGIK Appointment number 75, dated 6 March 46, effective 25 January 46. Unit Hist., Kyong Sang Namdo, 16 Jan 46 to 1 March 46.
157. Interview; Col. Gillette, 23 April 46. Unit Hist., 70th MG Company Kyong Sang Namdo Chinju Area par 12, MG operations for period 1 Apr 46 to 15 Apr 46.

P A R T T W O

THE QUASI-REVOLT OF OCTOBER 1946

THE QUASI-REVOLT OF OCTOBER 1946

In October, a series of civil disturbances which all but took on the proportions of an out-and-out revolt occurred in South Korea. The initial and most bloody outbreak was at Taegu, on 2 October. Taking Military Government, American troops, and Korean police by surprise, it was sufficiently successful to serve as a model for further serious rioting and to spur on the Communists to further fanning of the flames of disorder.

The fundamental causes of what came to be popularly known as the "Taegu riots" were varied. The spark, however, was lit by the Communists, who seized with alacrity inflammable materials already at hand and, with their customary diligence, exploited them for their own purposes. Their activity, however, was not a basic factor. Rather, Communist strategy, to which the Soviets were privy.

The Soviet strategy was to take advantage of discontent over rice collection, police misbehavior, Military Government mistakes, the ignorance, excitability, and anti-foreignism of the Koreans, and the unrest caused by economic conditions. Their plan of action was to use lying propaganda and to paralyze Military Government by strikes in companies involving public utilities, such as communications and transportation. The ensueing disorder would discredit Military Government, convince the Koreans that Communism was the solution to their problems, and give the Communists their chance to seize power. Failing actual acquisition of the government, the attacks still advertised Military Government's unpopularity.

The precipitating cause, however, was a Communist-inspired railway strike, designed as part of a general strike. Breaking out in the Pusan area on 23 September 1946, when 8,000 railway employees failed to report to work, it spread like wildfire and for a time completely immobilized rail transportation.(1)

It was quickly followed by strike action on the part of printers and Seoul Electric Company employees in Seoul and postal workers in Seoul, Taegu, and Kyongju, as well as smaller groups elsewhere. During the first six days, the strike was on the whole quite orderly, despite Communist agitation, with only a single civil disturbance, a short-lived riot at Seoul during the week ending 29 September.(2)

In fact, non-communist railway strikers, who constituted a definite majority, were already reacting against demands put forward in their name by Communist elements. Nevertheless, beneath the surface, there was a restlessness and tenseness whose intensity neither the police nor Military Government gauged accurately.

Suddenly, even as the railway strike was well on the way to settlement, "bloody rioting and lawlessness on a unprecedented scale" broke out in Taegu on 2 October and quickly spread to other South Korean towns, principally in Kyongsang Puk province, of which Taegu was capital and chief city. These were inspired by Communists, who amid the tense atmosphere engendered by the strikes, "found an explosive situation which could burst into wild disorders on the slightest provocation."(3)

These were the first of an obviously well-planned series of disorders which over the next several weeks (with one period of lull) systematically broke out, first in one area, then as law and order were restored, in another. The sequence was, broadly, Taegu and rural Kyongsang Puk,

thence to Kyongsan Nam and its chief city, Pusan, and into Chungchong Nam and Kyonggi provinces. Following a week of sudden quiet, disorders erupted in Cholla Nam, where they were rampant during the first weeks of November. In all there were four distinct periods aside from the late October lull. In each, the main disturbances were in one or two provinces, with comparative quiet elsewhere. (4)

The major disorders at Taegu had their inception in a food demonstration by some two to three hundred persons on the morning of 1 October. One policeman was seriously injured in an attempt to break up the mob. That evening an unauthorized crowd of several thousand gathered at strike headquarters. Altercations with the police, who were about a hundred strong, resulted in the fatal shooting of one striker by a policeman and injuries to four folice, and, presumably, to demonstrators too, although no other mob casualties were ever officially reported. The death of this striker was, in the words of G-2, "the spark which unloosed the blind fury and the beastly instincts of hoodlums and of the ignorant masses," the next day. (5)

About ten o'clock on the following morning, 2 October, a huge crowd collected. The Rightist version was that people had been gathered by the rumor that the Americans were about to ship the collected rice to Japan, and they were urged to get the food that was due them. In view of the popular excitement it seems improbable that any particular effort had to be made to get people together. The body of the man killed the evening before was dressed up in a student's uniform and carried out to the Medical College on a stretcher. As the procession went through the streets the body was bounced up and down for all to see. The mob placed

it on the steps of the police station and blocked the streets around the building. Major Plezia, Army chief of police at Taegu, twice ordered the police to break up the crowd, but they refused to cooperate. At 11:50 he telephoned to the headquarters of the Second Infantry and recommended that a detachment of troops be sent to the police station, although there were fifty police in the station, two hundred more at the railway station three blocks away, and a company of constabulary three quarters of a mile away. No troops having arrived, Major Plezia went to Military Government headquarters and requested the military governor to call for troops. The troops finally arrived at about 1300 hours.

In the meantime, the mob had taken over police headquarters. Twenty to thirty police escaped by climbing over the fence. The rioters took all the police weapons, but later Major Plezia talked a number of them into piling the captured weapons in the courtyard. The afternoon was spent in conference with the strike leaders. Meanwhile, reports coming in indicated the disorders were spreading. The conference between the police and strikers showed no results and martial law was finally declared about 1600 hours. For Taegu alone the provincial hospital reported 39 dead as of 5 October 1946. This figure, which included both civilians and police, was incomplete, for the bodies of many of the rioters were taken by their families and did not appear on the hospital records. (6)

That the station, held by fifty armed policemen, was taken with such ease seems to point up the charge that there were Communists among the police who collaborated with the rioters. Utterly demoralized, the police either ran, threw away their uniforms, or hid. It was asserted that the only efforts made by some of them were to defend their own families. At any rate, incompetent leadership, inexperience, and downright cowardice

were displayed. G-2, XXIV Corps, summarized:

> For a number of hours, Taegu was under mob rule. Roaming bands of rioters attacked outlying police stations under cover of the general disorders in front of the main police station. Policemen were attacked and killed in their homes. Homes of Military Government officials (Koreans) and of police officials were wrecked by rioters. It was stated that hospitals in Taegu refused to admit wounded policemen since some policemen, injured earlier, had been dragged from the hospitals by the rioters and killed. Stark fear seized the police force, which soon lost any semblance of discipline. The majority wished to resign and many divested themselves of their uniforms and arms and disappeared.

The tactical troops quickly restored order. However, because of the spreading attacks in other South Korean towns, the entire province was placed under martial law.(7)

Over the next four days similar disturbances occurred at literally dozens of towns and villages throughout Kyongsang Puk, with individual mobs ranging in size up to an estimated ten thousand at Yongchon. There, on 3 October, the forty police on duty were disarmed and kidnapped and the police station and postoffice burned. The rioters repulsed a police detachment sent against them from Taegu.(8) A similar mob, five thousand strong, seized control of government at Uisong.(9)

At Waegwan, two thousand rioters overran the police station, captured all weapons and ammunition there, killed the chief of police himself, and beat up other police personnel, then wrecked the homes of fifty police and gun officials.(10) One group of eighteen opened fire on a United States Army patrol, in contrast to the usual rioter's policy of avoiding contact with United States troops.(11) Pitched battles between a hundred Rightists and 250 members of the Communist Chosen Democratic Youth Alliance took place at Yongdong.(12) A similar fight, mostly between student groups occurred at Ka-wun.(13)

At Naksong-dong, on the 4th, a Communist-led mob of two thousand, armed with sticks, farming implements, and clubs seized the local summer grain collection (1,335 bags of wheat and 109 of rice), and distributed it among the people.(14) On 5 October, police at Kigye fled to the hills, leaving the town to a mob which burned the district office and homes of local officials and attacked a Korean missionary.(15) The following day, however, saw a stiffened police. When a mob said to be two thousand strong attacked the port town of Kuryongpo-ri with dynamite and grenades, the police, aided by some 150 Rightists armed with bamboo poles, drove them back.(16)

As the Kyongsang Puk disorders were brought under control, Kyongsang Nam became the focal point for further Communist-inspired outbreaks.(17) The timing and the points of attack indicated prior planning and good organization. A Leftist agitator arrested on 7 October had in his possession a Communist plan of attack which, as XXIV Corps G-2 pointed out, indicated the hand of someone with a military background.(18)

Rumor of a free rice ration drew a large, unruly crowd to Chinju on 7 October. To disperse it, tactical troops were obliged to open fire, killing four and wounding many more.(19) Troops were also required in Masan, where a mob stoned the quarters occupied by American Red Cross women.(20) In the ensuing week numerous other outbreaks occurred, with ten distinct attacks against police at Uiryong alone in a four-day period. Although support of tactical troops was required in some places, the police of Kyongsang Nam seem generally to have stood firm and to have repelled the rioters, driving them into flight.(21)

Topping off disorders in Kyongsang Nam was an attack on the 13th, by Rightists on the offices of two Moderate Pusan Newspapers who had

refused to print anti-Leftist handbills. They damaged equipment and beat up several employees. Hundreds of Communist pamphlets were found the next day in Sosaeng-ni, where a four-man patrol and a detachment of Ulsan police helped stave off a mob of 500 who destroyed the town hall and besieged the police station.(22)

During this period (6-13 October), most of the riot leaders escaped into the hills and carried on their reign of terror from there. The railway strike, however, was practically ended, and other strikes were gradually returning to work. Nevertheless, despite their failure to paralyze South Korea with a general strike, Communists continued their agitation and propaganda against Military Government by posters, leaflets, intimidation of officials, and sabotage.(23)

The Communists were not entirely unopposed in their vicious propaganda to stir up trouble in South Korea. To counteract such propaganda, Right Wing groups distributed handbills to the populace, exposing the crimes being committed by the Communists, urging all citizens to inform authorities of hiding places of fugitive rioters, and calling attention to the good work of police authorities who arrest "only the offenders in order to protect your property." The two Right Wing organizations concerned in the counter-propaganda were the widely organized National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence and its youth group, the General Youth's League for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence.(24)

In the provinces of Kyongsang Puk and Kyongsang Nam, both in the 6th Infantry Division Area, disturbances occurred in 37 towns during the period 1-10 October. The maximum estimated number of rioters at any one town was ten thousand in Yong Chon, the minimum forty. In eight

towns the number exceeded one hundred but was less than five hundred; in nine it was more than five hundred.(25) Among the weapons seized by the rioters were 288 rifles, 5 pistols, 200 dynamite sticks, and 1600 rounds of ammunition. Weapons taken from them included: 40 Jap short .25 caliber rifles, 10 Jap long .25 caliber rifles, 8 Jap grenades, 2 Jap mortars, and 3 Jap machine guns .25 caliber. An incendiary grenade was reported used at Pusan.(25)

The third week of October saw the Communists shift their field of operations to northern Chungchong Nam and then into Kyonggi, with a tendency to make small, isolated police boxes the targets for mob activity.(26) On the 13th, a police sergeant at Duksan village in Chungchong Nam fled to the hills before an approaching mob of three hundred, who fired on the police box, killing his 13-year old daughter whom he had left there.(27)

On 17 October, a mob of 300 (which later increased to a thousand) attacked the police station at Haptok, bound, beat, and threw into jail its four policemen, took over the postoffice and electric company, cut communication wires, and destroyed the bridges. Four American soldiers rescued the police the next day. Approximately thirty rioters were arrested.(28) On the same day, 18 October, a mob at Hongsong had planned to cut off all communications, and kill all the police, as well as all Koreans who might have attempted to give aid to Military Government. Accordingly, at 0200 on 18 October, they attacked police boxes at Kalsan and Kuhung, suburbs of Hongsong. The police fled the Kalsan box and warned the Hongsong police of an impending attack at 0600. At the stated hour the Hongsong police were thus ready for the approaching mob. When they fired upon them, killing four, the rest of the mob dispersed and

fled into the hills.(29)

Other attacks that were repelled with the assistance of American soldiers included those at Myonchon and Yeson, on the 17th and 19th respectively. In the one at Tangyin, on 18 October, assistance was rendered by police from Chonan.(30)

With their activities in Chungchong Nam thus rebuffed, toward the weekend the Communists erupted in Kyonggi, along the 38th Parallel, particularly around Kaesong, and to the south of Seoul. On 20 October, word reached the CIC Songdo District Office that there were wide attacks on police stations in outlying areas around Kaesong and that they were being taken over by the rioters. Immediately, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aason was alerted, the 54th Military Government under command of Major Stein was notified, and a general headquarters for action and coordination of information was established at Military Government headquarters in Kaesong. Reinforcements of Counter Intelligence Corps agents were sent to Kaesong. Others were strategically placed at Chongdon, Yonan, and Paekchon. A curfew was established, and by 21 October the uprisings had been broken. The use of volunteer police, made up of young men's groups, to reinforce police in all affected areas, proved quite effective. Reports indicated that the attacks were of Left Wing origin, with help from North of the 38th parallel.(31)

At Kaesong, the police chief was murdered. His assassin, a leading Communist in the area, was killed soon afterward. At Chongdon, a soldier was slightly wounded in a "Banzai" charge made on American troops at a point east of Outpost #7. North Koreans making the attack came from North of the 38th parallel, urged on by North Korean police.(32) In

the town of Paekchon, close to the Parallel, police were disarmed and their headquarters taken over by the Communists, but 7th Division troops restored order.(33) Translation of a handbill found in the town read:

> To Our Fellow-Countrymen:
>
> Dear Brethren, let's fight for Independence with our blood. Look, the people in the southern provinces (Kyongsang Nam, Kyongsang Puk, Chungchong Nam, Chungchong Puk, Cholla Nam, and Cholla Puk) are up with rifle and sword in order to avert colonization of our fatherland. Remember that the vicious "white" terrorists, the police forces, met the railroad strikers with shooting, batteries and arrests. Can these be a gift of liberation?
>
> Now our young patriots have risen in an effort to protect our fatherland from the danger of re-colonization! It is our aim to clear this land of bad policemen who repress our true patriots, bad officials who extort excessive quota of rice, and pro-Japanese national traitors who are behind them.
>
> We call to our brothers and sisters for your participation in this fight! (34)

In the Kaesong area, according to contemporary estimates attributed to National Police Director Chough, around forty police and an equal number of rioters were killed. Property losses to the people were estimated at 120,000,000 won, to police installations 100,000,000 won, and to Military Government agencies in general 160,000,000. Some 3,782 persons were arrested, though most of them were quickly released.(35)

After the unsuccessful spurt along the 38th parallel, Seoul and its vicinity became next in line for attack. The Communists thus decided to "Bring Taegu to Seoul," reasoning that after all Taegu also was a large city and they had succeeded in creating disturbances there. Although aware that Seoul was a Rightist city, with excellent communication, its police well organized and aid from American troops readily available, nevertheless, for them it was worth the attempt, as Seoul was the heart of Korea, and any "success" would be of great significance. Any disturbance would be deemed a success by them.(36)

The attacks first started in Kwangju, just south of the city, where a mob set fire to the police warehouse after beating up the police, one of whom died, and making away with their arms and ammunition. An hour later a similar raid by apparently the same band occurred at Tongbu, on the outskirts of Seoul. (37)

The planned attack on Seoul proper was reported to the Counter Intelligence Corps by Lyuh Woon Hyung, who advised that civil disturbances, led by members of the Communist organization, the Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, and Seoul University students, would occur there on 22 October. Accordingly, with the blast of the noon whistle on that day, a mob of approximately 2,000 persons, some with Japanese pistols, gathered on Chong No. Some firing occurred and a passerby was killed. However, within twenty-five minutes the police had dispersed the crowd and arrested several people. (38)

After three weeks of bloody rioting, agitated and abetted by Communists, the period 23-30 October marked a lull in disturbances for South Korea. General Hodge, in a special press release on 23 October, appealed "to the good people of South Korea to put an end to the disgraceful, agitated riots ... now prevalent in your country." The Commanding General emphasized the earlier "splendid record of good order" which had characterized the several months preceding the recent outbreak, then continued:

> In the past few days South Korea has presented a bitter picture to the rest of the world that may destroy world faith in the unity and ability of the Korean people. It is a sad situation when Korean agitators, who are enemies of their own nation, are able to draw fellow Koreans into disastrous riots involving horrible crimes against their fellow citizens. They hide behind all kinds of subterfuge and use the post-war hardships that exist here and all over the world to confuse and mislead honest people through lies and distorted propaganda.

* A village located at 37°28' N-127°10' E, distinct from the city of the same name, capital of Cholla Nam.

They work particularly on young students who are too young and too immature to know world affairs or to know their own minds, and on laborers and farmers whom they mislead with promises that they cannot and do not intend to fulfill.

Although their propaganda harps on the labor, food, and economic situation, the aims of these selfish men are political, pure and simple. They are not interested in assisting the Korean people in solution of their problems. If they were, they would advocate unity and harmony among the people. We have authentic written documents proving that their immediate aim right now is: First, to bfeak up the unification of the Korean people that the Coalition Committee is working so hark to achieve and which all the people want so greatly; and, second, to prevent the establishment of the Interim Legislative Body through which South Korea can start on the road to her own democratic self-rule. Their ultimate aim is to try to force the Korean people into submitting to the despotic rule of the same few self-styled leaders who are now so busily engaged in engineering the murders of their fellow Koreans.

Their killing pattern is now so well established that we can all know where they stand. They try to eliminate the following:

First: The police, because the police stand for and enforde law and order and protect law-abiding people and their property. The police stand in the way of other disorders these agitators wish to stir up, so they work up a great hate campaign in an attempt to destroy and demoralize them.

Second: Those patriotic Koreans who are enough interested in the future of their nation that they are willing to sacrifice self gain and to help the Military Government develop an orderly and sound democratic government in South Korea.

Third: Those leaders in the community who stand for law, for order and for individual liberties of mankind.

I call upon all the Korean people now to do everything in their power to stop this criminal defamation of the fair name of Korea; to stop this criminal murder of your law abiding citizens; to stop the dangerous flow of lies that mislead honest men; to build strongunity of all groups through true coalition and to get back on the great highway of the march to a new Korea, free and independent.

Do not listen to or participate in the filthy schemes devised by brutal murderers to further their own political ends.

It is my great hope that I will not be forced to use troops in stringent measures that unduly restrict or cause suffering to innocent persons. (39)

The Commanding General also called a Joint Korean-American Conference to investigate the causes of the disturbances. On 25 October, the Conference issued a statement signed by Dr. Kim Kyu Suk and Lyuh Woon Hyung, appealing to all Koreans for a return to sanity. (40)

While the response of the Korean public in the campaign to preserve the peace was encouraging, nevertheless, more violence was in the offing.(41) After only a week of comparative peace, mob attacks against the police were renewed. However, this time, the Communists did not continue with their northern raids, which had met with but little success. Instead, they returned again to the South, singling out the province of Cholla Nam as their next target for attack.(42)

The disturbances were similar to those staged in the other provinces; results were different, however, for the police held their own, albeit they did suffer casualties. They displayed vigorous resistance and, reassured by the backing of tactical troops, quickly suppressed disorders wherever they occurred.(43) And on the part of the Communists, good organization and planning were still in evidence, and their propaganda to confuse and mislead was increased considerably.(44)

On 30 October, striking miners at Hwasun started a march to Kwangju, capital of Cholla Nam. The 20th Infantry was notified and immediately sent patrols and set up road blocks in Hwasun and Kwangju. Col. Raymond G. Peake, of the 101st Military Government Group, met the marchers and talked them out of it, promising them a meeting with the Military Governor the following day. The meeting did not prove successful; more trouble was thus expected.(45)

A series of riots, centering mostly around the town of Naju, soon followed. On the same day, 31 October, a mob estimated at 5,000 converged on the town. They were headed off and dispersed by United States troops and the police, who fired into the crowd. Ten rioters were killed, and many inflammatory banners seized.(46) Several police boxes around Naju were attacked earlier in the day.(47) In Mokpo,

where the telephone workers were on strike and students were demonstrating, five police boxes were attacked successively. Two policemen were killed and ten injured. Troops were required to restore order; the police chief was suspended. Another riot in Mokpo a few days later was soon dispersed without casualties.(48)

During the night of 31 October, drums in the mountains around Naju summoned the Leftist mobsters, who assembled in groups of thirty or forty and then marched on to larger assembly areas.(49) At five in the morning a mob composed primarily of People's Committee members attacked the police box in Chopori; and at the same hour a Leftist mob made a similar attack in Hampyong.(50) Later in the morning, a mob at Nasan-Ni captured the mayor, postmaster, and a patrolman.(51) At mid-day, 3.000 rioters were dispersed by police in Yongsanpo. The mob retreated, then reorganized and marched toward Naju.(52)

On the same day, 1 November, 8,000 rioters were reported marching from three directions toward Kwangju, en route to Naju. Many out-of-town people, suspected of leading the Naju attacks, were spotted in Kwangju. Police morale was then high, and with the assistance of tactical troops, the situation was kept well in hand. Nevertheless, the Korean constabulary was alerted. Undaunted by this setback, 7,000 dissidents converged on Naju, 2,000 from the east, 3,000 from the west, and 2,000 from the north. They were met by one platoon of the 20th Infantry, 80 Korean Constabularymen, and 250 local police. The casualties among the rioters included 13 dead and 19 wounded; fifty were arrested.(53) Two police were killed, and four wounded. A mob of 2,000 miners marching on to Kwangju from Hwasun, on 2 November, was again dispersed by the police.(54)

Attacks against the police continued on 3 and 4 November in many small towns, in Chilson-Ni, Sochong-Ni, Hongnong, Pochon-Ni, Hyun Gol, Chisan, Pyongchang, Yongwang, and again in Kwangju.(55) At four in the morning on 3 November, a mob of 400 overran the New Korea Company's warehouse in Hwanjung, burning all the records, but leaving the warehouse itself undamaged.(56)

On the following day, 4 November, Colonel Peake, with twelve U.S. soldiers, four CIC agents, ten Korean police, and several military government personnel, left Kwangju for Hwasun to apprehend the leaders of the mining strike in Hwasun. Returning to Kwangju with five prisoners, they encountered a road block of three carts, and a mob of 1,000 to 2,000 miners who retreated. However, rescue of the prisoners was attempted in the next town. Some members of the mob threw a log through the window of one of the jeeps, causing it to go into a ditch. The second jeep rammed the first and also overturned. Both vehicles were abandoned., and the occupants returned to Hwasun in the remaining vehicles of the convoy. The convoy was stoned and fired upon, and was forced to run through a crowd which suffered 33 injuries and three killed.(57) Two American soldiers were injured.

The Korean constabulary was ordered to take over the mines; and the police were reinforced. The Police Record notation covering this incident included the statement: "These incidents have improved the morale, discipline, and knowledge, of Div. H police. We're definitely in control of present situation ... Prisoners in our cells."(58)

On 5 November, the Kwangju radio broadcast that the "Iron Blood Party" planned the disorders, with the intention of overpowering the police and removing Military Government officials.(59) Another raid

was carried out in the Hwasun mining area in the early morning of 6 November. Fifty arrests were made in a joint operation, including the police, Korean constabulary, CIC, and Military Government personnel.(60)

Rioting in Cholla Nam continued into its second week, although with diminishing frequency. Casualties among rioters were still high. Anticipated disorders on 7 November, anniversary of the Russian Revolution, did not materialize.(61) In the early morning hours of that day, in a raid on Pungryan, two policemen were killed, and two others severely beaten and tortured, one dying later.(62) Another raid took place the next day at Odea, in the mountains fifty miles northwest of Pyongchang;(63) and throughout the week, similar Communist-led raids occurred at many smaller police stations in Hwansun, Haenam, Kaun-Ni, Hwasan, Sangju, Hyonsan, Jayii, Pukpyong, Ockchun, and Kaikok.(64)

In Seoul itself, on 13 November, a hand grenade was thrown at Metropolitan Police Chief Chang as he was entering his automobile. Chang himself was wounded and his bodyguard killed.(65)

Large scale rioting was now definitely on the wane, with only one disturbance reported for the following week.(66) Some of the mob tactics employed during the South Korea riots have already been indicated. There were also others. For example, rioters preferred to attack in the early morning hours under cover of darkness. Thus, most of the attacks took place between 0001 and 0500. And when police fired a volley in the air, mobs would rush the police before they could reload their weapons. Also, small children were placed in the front ranks when attacking police stations in hope that the police would not fire on the mobs.

In order to draw U. S. troops away from a city's main police station, feints were made by attacking outlying police boxes. Weapons seized in police box attacks were used in subsequent attacks on other boxes. Wherever possible, official records were destroyed, especially those of rice and grain collections.

Farmers were forced to join mobs against their wills by threats of violence, sometimes even at the point of spears. The agitators themselves stayed well to the rear and were seldom hurt or captured. Indeed, they wore Rightist arm-bands after a riot to escape arrest. (67)

The tense agitations of the Communists, in connection with their many attacks against the police, prompted General Hodge to issue a special press release on 11 November, in which he said:

> They are building up a great hate campaign against the police, because they wish to destroy and demoralize the guardians of public peace and safety. Every time the police arrest a law breaker or a suspect for questioning, if he happens to be a member of the organized agitator group, loud cries of oppression and persecution go up. Every time such individual resists arrest or attempts to break away and has to be subdued by force, louder cries of cruelty on the part of the police are raised. Every time vicious riots occur and several persons are arrested for participating or are taken in for questioning, the agitators set up a great hue and cry of imprisoning 'patriots,' and demand their immediate release. It matters not that those taken in custody are murderers of fellow Koreans and arsonists who have violated laws common to all nations of the world. Common criminals are not classed in any country as 'political prisoners.'
>
> The Korean police force are all young Korean men, who are carefully selected and are instructed in their duties as rapidly as possible. They are doing a good job under extremely difficult conditions. For a police force that was organized a little over a year ago they have a fine record of performance. They are being constantly trained in democratic police methods. Admittedly, there have been a few cases of individual police who have misbehaved. Such cases occur among the police in every nation in the world. These individual cases are handled promptly by punishment or dismissal. The theme of the agitator is to magnify the few individual cases of police indiscretion and to get their followers to condemn the entire police force. They apparently want the police force out of their way, so they may have no one to prevent their lawless acts. (68)

Punishment of Riot Leaders

In Taegu and the surrounding areas, approximately 2,250 persons were arrested. Many, of course, were soon released; many others, however, were tried in military courts, as were similar offenders in other provinces. Some 57 death sentences were handed down, with other sentences ranging from thirty days to life imprisonment.(69) None of the death sentences were actually carried out, however. As General Hodge later told the Wedemeyer Mission, "There was ample evidence of their activity," but the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment "because of the political repercussions that would come, although by any occidental standards, those criminals should be hanged. I reviewed them and sent the cases over to General MacArthur, and he and his J.A. all agreed that the guilt was there, but the political repercussions would have been too much."(70)

The apprehension, trial, and punishment of the ringleaders had a salutary effect on the Koreans, especially the officials and employees of Military Government, who had been intimidated by the riots into tendering their resignations. The firm manner in which the Military dealt with the situation reassured the Koreans; they changed their minds about resigning.(71)

Causes Behind the Disturbances

Behind the quasi-revolt there was no single cause; rather there was a series of contributory factors which the Communists and their tools utilized to the fullest in fomenting trouble. Immediately after the events of 1 and 2 October at Taegu, Major General Brown undertook a full dress investigation, in the course of which numerous persons, civilian and military, Korean and American, were interviewed and their testimony taken. Later, at Seoul, General Brown was principal American representative at the Joint Korean- American Conference which conducted a further inquiry

over a six weeks period.

At Taegu, in a series of personal interviews with nineteen prominent citizens, their opinions as to the causes of the disturbances were elicited. General Brown's report of 14 October summarized these:

1. Military Government's grain collection policy.
2. Insufficient distribution of food, particularly rice.
3. Methods employed by police in enforcing collection of grain; arbitrary, sometimes cruel, and dishonest.
4. Police corruption in general.
5. Agitators' use of the above to incite the people to violence.
6. Careful planning and execution of disturbances by agents from North Korea.
7. Infiltration of Communists in the schools; among both students and faculty.
8. Rumor that the summer grain collections were not distributed.
9. Police failure to have planned defense.
10. Peoples' antagonism toward the police.
11. Unpopularity of Military Government with the masses.
12. Failure to keep people informed on governmental policies.
13. Poor quality of Korean officials in American Government.
14. Dishonesty of Military Government interpreters.
15. Attempt to Americanize Koreans too rapidly.
16. General unemployment due to influx of refugees. (72)

The interviews with the above citizens brought out some vital factors. In the case of small farms without sufficient rice, police made their collection through seizure of cattle or other property, selling these and purchasing rice with the proceeds. The masses were questioning where the summer crops went; and while the city population opposed the government's rice distribution plan, country folks resented its plan to collect the rice. (73)

Unable to live on their low salaries, government officials were forced to accept bribes. Dr. Sohn Ken Seek testified that the family of Kyongsang Puk's Governor "is sick because they do not have sufficient food." (74) Refugees, farmers, miners, and others who were employed under the Japanese, but were now without employment, proved a fertile field for the agitators. (75)

The president of Taegu Medical College commented specifically on the police. Pointing out the people's heritage from the Japanese of hatred for the police, he criticized the latter for current abuses and urged, "We must educate the people to realize that the police are to serve the people. The police must be educated to realize that they are to serve the people."(76)

As basic causes, maldistribution of food and the grain collection program were undoubtedly pre-eminent.

In conference with Col. Gordon J. F. Heron, Military Governor of Kyongsang Puk, Lee Je Bok, a leader of the Taegu rioters, maintained that there was a shortage of food, and that if three hops of grain were distributed to each person the disturbances would stop.(77) The riot instigators definitely picked on the food shortage as a means of inciting the people. A handbill picked up in Taegu read: "We are hungry, we want food, but we don't want American food." Handbills were generally signed "A Citizen," or some other anonymous phrase; one was signed by the People's Party.(78)

The people, especially in the rural areas, resented the Grain Collection program. They were incited to active opposition by Communists who told them the Military Government had no right to collect the crop from the farmer. They were repeatedly urged by agitators not to surrender their rice,(79) and rumor had it that the rice was being shipped to Japan. Another story was that the curfew in Seoul (actually imposed to guard against possible disturbances) had been ordered to prevent Koreans from seeing the hauling of rice through the streets for shipment to Japan.(80)

Food and grain had been moved with armed guards under the most serious difficulties. A patrol escorting grain trucks was stoned by Koreans in

the vicinity of Sonsan.(81) In another instance a lieutenant, who was engaged in a rice collection, was wounded in the wrist by a shot fired from north of the 38th parallel.(82) Also, the people resented the use of the police to enforce the grain collection.(83)

Military Government had to engage in counterpropaganda measures in an attempt to popularize the grain collection program among the farmers. It distributed approximately 1,800,000 handbills in South Korea, 45% by air drop, 5% by tactical patrols, and the balance through the provincial governments.(84)

The people generally had a strong hatred for the police, due in part to actual police brutality toward prisoners, in part to exaggerated and false accounts. Feeling was further enhanced by police participation in grain collection and attendant abuses..(85) These all made them easy prey for Communists, who incited them to attack the police. Koreans witnessing the beatings dealt strikers at the hands of police rebelled; there was a desire to "kill and get even with the police." Agitators took advantage of this resentment to fan their anger and channel their lawless reaction where it would do the most harm against Military Government.(86)

There was also friction between the constabulary and the police. The constabulary resented the authority now given the police to arrest them if the occasion arose. Under the Japanese rule, a soldier could not be touched by the police. On the otherhand, the police were jealous of the prestige enjoyed by the constabulary. There were instances of constabularymen being beaten by the police when taken into custody for questioning.(87)

Too, there was friction between the police and the medical profession in Taegu. This may have been due to the fact that the police resented loss of their control over the Department of Health, a branch of their service

under the Japanese regime.(88) Indicative of this antagonism was an incident recounted by Colonel Heron, Military Governor of KyongsangPuk:

> About two months ago a professor of medicine at the college, with two or three constabularymen, were on cholera control work. As I understand it the professor had ordered a certan police official at the local police box to place a guard on a quarantined area. He came back for two or three days and each day there was no guard on the premises. After his third visit he became involved in a verbal argument with this minor police official at the police box. The two or three constabulary with him also got involved with the policeman. During this discussion, which must have lasted about a half an hour, the policeman accused the professor of so involving him in an argument that two or three prisoners he had at the box escaped. At the end of the argument the professor and the constabulary, in their motor vehicle, left the police box.
>
> Later on, either that day or the next, the professor of medicine was arrested by the police, taken to the police station and accused of being implicated in the escape of the three prisoners. He was interrogated by the then Vice Chief of District 19. He was subjected to much humiliation. He was actually thrown into a cell and suffered other loss of face which the police are not supposed to inflict upon members of the learned professions.
>
> This incident appeared to me to be particularly important. I had a board of three officers investigate this case and the case resulted in the dismissal of the Vice Police Chief of District 19, and later Major Plezia told me he had fired two of the higher police officials. This instance of the police and the medical professor was thoroughly aired in all the newspapers of Taegu and was a matter, I am told, of great discussion in the city.(89)

As a result, there was discrimination at the Taegu Provincial Hospital in the treatment of police personnel. On 2 October, the peak day of rioting, several badly wounded police had been sent to the hospital in a truck,(90) only to be refused admittance. Others were taken from the hospital and beaten to death in the street in front.(91) Police rumor had it that wounded police admitted to the hospital were not only not being cared for, but were actually being further beaten and perhaps killed.(92)

Colonel Potts, Commanding Officer of the 1st Infantry, stated:

> October 4, at about 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock I received information that the Provincial Hospital, diagonally across the street from my

> headquarters, was not administering efficient hospitalization to wounded and injured Korean policemen and were in some cases administering cruel treatment to the admitted patients. I immediately arranged for a doctor of the Military Government to take over the hospital and dispatch a small squad, consisting of about 8 or 10 men--American soldiers--to the hospital to support the action of the medical personnel and to stop all cruel treatment to the admitted patients, and insist on correct medical aid to all incoming patients. (93)

The depth of the hatred toward the police was well illustrated by the barbaric treatment meted out to them by the mobs. In Taegu, faces and bodies of policemen were hacked by axes and knives. The hands of policemen were tied behind their backs and sharp-pointed slate rocks were then thrown at them until they fell to the ground from loss of blood. This was followed with dropping large boulders on their heads crushing them beyond recognition. In Waegwan, the police chief's eyes and tongue were cut out with rice knives before he was beaten to death. And in Sangju, five policemen were severely beaten and then buried alive. (94)

During the course of the disturbances there were numerous instances of extreme police brutality. Several were brought to light by the Inspector General's investigation of the disturbances at Taegu. An American lieutenant attached to CIC (1st Lieut. Robert O. Doley) testified:

> On 9 October I saw a Provincial Police detective strike a Korean across the shoulders with a club 30 inches long and approximately one and a half inches in diameter, two or more times. I disarmed him but had no authority to administer any disciplinary action. Another example, an agent from my office saw a policeman from the 19th District Police Station strike a Korean girl across the shoulders with a piece of steel tube one half inch in diameter and 32 inches long. My agent disarmed the policeman but had not authority to beat the living daylights out of him. The girl was supposed to have pointed out a house where the policeman lived during the mob violence.(95)

Lieutenant Colonel Max M. Roth told the Inspector General of visiting a room where approximately a hundred prisoners were held:

All Koreans were on their knees--had their face touching the ground and officers sitting around the tables questioning certain individuals. As we walked in, one Korean who is the interpreter for the police spoke sharply in Korean and I glanced toward the person he was speaking to and saw a man whom I later identified as a detective in civilian clothes striking a kneeling Korean who was a prisoner with a stick approximately 2" in diameter and about 2½" long. I spoke to the interpreter and said, "Didn't my Commanding Officer direct that this must stop!" At the same time Lt. Doley, the CIC officer who was a member of my raiding party walked over to the Korean Lieutenant, grasped a stick out of his hand and told him, "I had told you before never to do a thing like that--we are Americans and you Koreans are Korean, but decent people don't do things like that." On or about the 1st of October I saw another instance which occurred in the front of and across from our command post by uniformed policeman who was striking a young girl of approximately 14 years of age with his rifle, using the barrel part to strike with. This continued for a few minutes in the plain view of some military personnel who happened to be in front of our building. One of the men yelled across at the policeman to stop and the policeman glanced over, saw where the remark came from, and ran away leaving the girl there. This I saw from my office on hearing a commotion from down below. (96)

Both of these instances, it will be noted, occurred after the bloody rioting of 2 October. In view of what the police themselves had just gone through, police brutality was more open to condonement. Colonel Roth, however, insisted that "from conversation with Koreans before and after the events of the 1st and 2nd," he had "sensed" that the "people in this area felt that the methods being used by the police had not improved over those used during the Japanese regime and wondered if the military authorities were aware of this fact, as they had been led to believe that when the Americans assumed control all of these things would be corrected. (97)

Boiled down, all evidence points to the fact that, but for Communist instigation and direction, the bloody events of 2 October would not have occurred, nor would the serious disturbances which followed. In short, the riots were Communist-inspired and directed, and in no sense spontaneous.

Obviously, plans had been carefully drawn up and only an opportunity was needed.(98) The Communists' underlying objective was, through the disorders, to discredit and embarrass Military Government and the Occupation Forces. This was directly fostered from North Korea. Thus, instruction issued to his followers by Pak Heun Yung, South Korean Communist chieftain, upon his return from North Korea, were actively to oppose Military Government policies and to discredit Military Government in every way possible.(99) Indeed, almost a year later, Communist documents captured from time to time included Communist critiques of their own action, telling where they went wrong, what their weaknesses were, and their plans for the future to correct those weaknesses when they started trouble anew.(100)

The Communists were well organized and were able to spread information and to incite their ill-informed dupes throughout South Korea. Their leaders were well-trained, and plans well prepared and technically sound.(101) A Korean official at Taegu (Inspector General Hwang Okh) informed General Brown that he had personal knowledge of three occasions when persons had been sent from north of the 38th parallel to foment disturbances in South Korea.(102)

The Joint Korean-American Conference, in its "Conclusions and Recommendations," summarized Communist participation, declaring:

> Subversive elements without the true interest of Korea at heart, under the leadership of Pak Heun Yung, have taken advantage of the unsettled economic and political conditions to instigate and foment grave disorders in southern Korea. These Pak-inspired riots revealed thorough preparation, comprehensive planning, willingness to sacrifice numberless lives of innocent dupes, and the most barbarous mutilation of victims foreign to the Korean people's normal gentleness of nature. The ultimate objective of the leaders of the riots was the discrediting of the United States, regardless of its traditional friendship for Korea and primary role in liberating Korea, and the complete overthrow of the present government and the police in favor of a radical regime. (103)

The presence of trained agitators and leaders is further evidenced by a police report showing the close organization of the rioting bands. In one instance, the band was a "suicide squad" of the Chosun Democratic Youth's Alliance. The report recites that 500 members of the Alliance were screened approximately a month prior to the riots, and fifteen men picked for the squad. The squad had a Table of Organization ranking from Superior Private to General, as well as disciplinary regulations and rules for field promotions.

In a raid on the squad's headquarters, the diary of the "General" was seized. It disclosed the squad's activities over a ten day rioting period, and revealed that mobility, scouts, foraging bands, sentries, and patrols, were used to best advantage. The following are excerpts from this diary:

> 8 Oct - "At 1200 I received word from two of my scouts that there were two policemen on guard near our headquarters. I immediately sent five men out to attack them, with the result that both policemen were wounded and one rifle was obtained.
>
> 9 Oct - "At 0100 we moved our headquarters to a new location.
> "A few of our men stole three hunting guns.
> "This morning we awakened early due to the cold. We went without breakfast or lunch and I am proud of the way my men stood up under these conditions.
> "...By this morning we again moved elsewhere.
> "Chawng Sam Choon, Kim Il Tai, and Chawng Chong Kab robbed Lee Chong Koo of a hunting gun at Yangkum Li.
>
> 11 Oct - "At 1200 we attacked the Toksan Police Sub-Station with the following results: obtained one rifle, two swords, .. One person was killed and one seriously injured.
>
> 13 Oct - "Cho, Kim, and Chawng were promoted from superior privates to sergeant majors, because of their splendid job in the Toksan Police Station robbery."(104)

Testifying on the uprisings, Lt. Doley of the CIC Taegu District Office said:

> I believe the actual violence was caused by an outside element, particularly from Northern Korea. It was a systematic plan, using the food problem and the people's natural hatred of the police as the main issue -- A plan to kill police, interpreters, and Korean officials and in that way they could disrupt the Korean people and the Government so much and discredit and disrupt the American Military Government in Korea with the ultimate aim of installing Communists and Left Wing organizations in control of Government in the southern part of Korea. (105)

Some of the communist posters and handbills directly attacked the United States forces. Several read: "Down with Military Government." Various articles in the Leftist Taegu "Minsung Ilbo" were against Military Government and the police. (106)

The Right Wing press definitely blamed outside agitators for the riots. "Dai Dong Press", in an article headed "Plot of Communist Party to Cause Disturbances in South Korea", set forth the actual plans made by the Communists for the strikes and riots in South Korea. (107) Speaking of the Koreans as "a peaceful and benevolent race of people," an editorial writer in Dai Han Dok Rip Mun continued: "I cannot believe that the riots were staged only by our own race ... . I believe that the tragedy was led by some malicious agitators who practiced the Japanese method of barbarism and the foreign method of revolution." (108)

Han Sung Ilbo expressed its feelings, as follows: "Perhaps the riots have some connection with the administrative policy of Military Government, but the chief cause has been the agitation of ruthless ringleaders who have no consideration for the welfare of the people or the fate of the fatherland. .. When we think of the delay that these agitations brought about to the establishment of Korean independence we cannot help being indignant over them. (109)

The Moderate newspaper Be Pan Sin Mun referred to the riots as the greatest civil disturbances since the 1894 riot of the Eastern Theory

Party, except for the 1919 Independence Movement. Dissatisfaction with the government and bad economic conditions were attributed as the basic causes for the riots. The paper termed the riots nothing more than a communist revolutionary test. "No natural conditions could incur such widespread rioting. It was previously planned and organized." It recalled that on 24 September, Lee Kang Kook had broadcast from Radio Pyongyang that South Korea was in need of another "liberation." Commenting on their success and failure, it concluded that the riots were successful in that the Communists gained control of the South Korea Labor Party; they showed up the Right Wing as the vanguard of the police; and they were able to advertise to the world Korean opposition to American Military Government. On the other hand, they failed in that "They were so brutal as to outrage many good people who will in the future neither cooperate with nor believe in the Communist Party;" and they were poorly timed, since Koreans were not yet ready for a revolution. (110)

In October, reporting on the riot situation to Col. W. H. Maglin, Advisor to the Department of Police, the National Director of Police, P. O. Chough, said:

> It is more than a riot, it is a rebellion, planned and carried out on national scale. It has been an open secret that the Commies have been planning, since last May, to stage a nation-wide opposition to the Military Government. They did and are utilizing some unfavorable social factors such as high cost of living due to inflatory economy and food problem, for the realization of their political end. They are aiming at discrediting the Military Government. By so doing, they expect to enhance their political strength. This plan was mapped out by leaders of the Communist Party, and was and is carried out by mobilizing its organizations of national and local level and the nucleus of organizations of other sister institutions such as All Korea Labor Federation, All Korea Farmer's Association, All Korea Young Men's Association, All Korea Young Women's Society, Democratic Young People's Association, Peoples Committees of National and Local Level, etc.. Our criminal investigation of those rioters in Division "B" and "C" proves this very fact.

In order to combat such activity, Dr. Chough recommended that "all the important leaders of all the political and social organizations who have proven to be the instigators of the riot and are determined to continue their activities" be arrested "in advance of their actual criminal activities." All division chiefs and district commanders, he felt, should be given a free hand to take "these questionable persons" into custody. As a legal basis, he cited a Japanese administrative and executive ordinance of July 1912. (111)

In its essence, Chough's recommended procedure was the same as the old Japanese "Thought Control," and as such was not looked upon favorably by the American Command. Later (in early December) General Hodge took the occasion offered by a letter from members of the Korean press to express himself on the subject, at the same time defending the police against sweeping charges of responsibility which had been levelled against them.

> Acts of violence or terrorism are committed by human beings. Violence may be the result of the action of from one person to the action of a mob of several thousand. This means that if we expect the police to take the entire responsibility for stamping out every single act of violence, it would be necessary to put every citizen of the country under close and constant police surveillance. Each citizen would have to be suspected of planning an act of violence, his inner thoughts would have to be exposed and if he were planning violence he would have to be apprehended before the act could be committed. Any attempt to do this leads back to the old Japanese practice of having "Thought Control Police."
>
> I am sure you agree with me that such practice is not compatible with any really democratic philosophy and is not in line with the desires of the Korean people after their experience under the Japanese. Such practice is not carried out in democratic countries. (112)

On 23 October, General Hodge formally accepted an offer by the Coalition Committee, a politically middle-of-the-road group, to conduct an investigation. Representatives of this group, notably Dr. Kim Kyu Sik

and the Leftist People's Party leader, Lyuh Woon Hyung, immediately met with American representatives headed by Major General Albert E. Brown, as the "Joint Korean-American Conference."

The Joint Korean-American Conference conducted a long inquiry into the factors involved in the riots, sitting from 23 October through 10 December 1946. General Hodge's intention in setting up the conference was to have it represent the full sweep of political coloration. However, refusal of both Leftists and Rightists to participate resulted in its Korean membership being entirely Moderate.

The Extreme Leftists wanted their own investigation, requesting American transportation and Military Government directives to the police and others to facilitate their work. General Hodge denied the requests, pointing out that their efforts would be merely duplicating the work of the Conference. However, he did offer them membership in the Conference to the extent of any three persons they cared to designate. They refused such offer. (113)

In the course of 27 sessions between 23 October and 10 December 1946, the Joint Korean-American Conference reviewed the various factors involved in the disturbances which, during most of its existence, were still going on. Owing to limits of time, discussions and testimony were primarily on matters affecting the police and on grain collection and distribution, with only incidental attention to other points.

The Korean members of the Conference made a concerted effort to effect removal of National Police Director Chough and Metropolitan Chief Chang. The American members, on their part, stanchly defended both as efficient, diligent, brave, and loyal to Military Government. Ostensibly the removal demand rested on charges they were undemocratic; its actual

basis, however, was political, for both Chough and Chang had opposed the Coalition movement. In General Hodge's opinion, as expressed to General Wedemeyer, the motive was dual: personal enmity and an "attempt by the Leftists, through the Coalition Committee, to get control of the police force." In General Hodge's words, "It was their wish to destroy the South Korea police in order that they no longer would interfere with the communistic revolution in South Korea."(114) Even though this was not necessarily clear at the time, (later evidence did thoroughly corroborate it) none of the evidence given to the Conference justified the demand for Chough's or Chang's removal. Some Korean members appeared willing to compromise by approving Chough's continuance if they could be assured of Chang's dismissal. This, in the face of an absolute vacuum of evidence regarding the area under Chang's jurisdiction!(115) The American Members of the Conference pointed out that the Interim Legislative Assembly, which was to convene in a few weeks, had the right to review Military Government appointments,(116) and suggested that the matter be left to it. Actually the Legislative Assembly took no positive action.(117)

The Conference submitted to General Hodge a set of conclusions and recommendations on various points. "In general, the Korean national police has performed its functions as well as might be expected," it reported, but noted that there were "some individuals remaining in the National Police Organization whose concept of the democratic system is incompatible with the ideals of the new Korea that is being created," and enumerated nine points of criticism. In addition to the Korean members' recommendation that National Director Chough and Metropolitan Chief Chang be removed, it urged raising of police standards, issuance of "definite, clear instructions" to prevent abuses, avoidance of political activity, and extension of the period of police training. Other recommendations pertained

primarily to non-police matters. (118)

Persistent about having its own investigation, the People's Front sent a commission to Taegu. Its report, styled "The South Korean Riots Investigation Party of the People's Front," received considerable coverage in the Left Wing papers. The report was definitely against the police, and found much in favor of the riots. Published in part in the Left Wing Dok Lib Sinbo, it recited: "The cause of the riots was that the police shot against the people, who had been provoked to the utmost antipathy against the MG police. Because of the shooting there were many casualties and the city trembled with fear... . There is a feeling of general hatred against the police who refused the reasonable request of the strikers, and instead arrested or killed them." (119)

The report also contained a manifesto, reputedly issued by the Taegu Doctor's Association, which it maintained was a good example of the general feeling. The manifesto stated: "Stop the police from shooting the citizens. We will refuse medical treatment to the police who shoot the citizens." (120)

Military Responsibility

The extent of responsibility on the part of United States Army personnel for the unsatisfactory situation during the riots was investigated by the USAFIK Inspector General. (121)

On 5 October, the Military Governor of Kyongsang Puk, Colonel Gordon J. F. Heron, had been summarily relieved. (122) The Inspector General, however, considered Colonel Heron "a victim of circumstances, rather than derelict in the performance of his duty." Blame, according to the Inspector General, was much more on the governor's staff officers, who failed to keep him informed, and especially upon Colonel Potts, Commanding Officer,

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1st Infantry Regiment, who refused assistance of troops unless permitted to take over under martial law. This was contrary to prior orders making troops available to Military Government when needed to carry out governmental functions. Friction between Military Government officers and those of the 1st Infantry was noted as a contributory factor in Colonel Potts persistent refusal of troops. It appeared that the officers of the 1st Infantry lacked confidence in the Military Government administration and operation. (123)

Other officers censured by the Inspector General were Major Plezia and Captain Johnson, each for failure to make prompt report to Colonel Heron of incidents witnessed by them. Much bloodshed and police demoralization were attributed to this neglect. Although praising Major Plezia for exhibiting personal courage to a commendable degree, in twice staving off single handed large mobs of rioters attempting to storm the Taegu police station, the Inspector General's report nevertheless added: "Major Plezia in particular exhibited such a lack of judgment and common sense in handling the situation at the police station as to cause doubt of his fitness to retain his commission, and certainly enough to indicate that he should be removed from duty with the National Police of Korea." (124)

The recommendations of the Inspector General, as regards punishment to be meted out to the above officers, were as follows:

1. That no further action be taken in the case of Colonel Gordon J. F. Heron, Cav.

2. That Major John C. Plezia be relieved from duty with the National Police of Korea, and assigned to duty with troops.

3. That Major John C. Plezia be reprimanded under AW 104 for his failure to keep Colonel Heron informed of the grave situation existing in Taegu on the morning of 2 October 1946, this in violation of Colonel Heron's directive that staff officers would keep him informed of matters of importance.

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4. That Captain Edward L. Johnson be given an administrative admonition for his failure to promptly inform Colonel Heron of matters of grave importance coming to his attention during the morning of 2 October 1946.

5. That Colonel Russell J. Potts, Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, be admonished for his action in informing the Military Governor that troops could not be furnished to control domestic disturbances in Taegu on 2 October 1946 unless martial law was declared and he was placed in command, this in violation of the instructions contained in pars. 2b and 3x (a), Field Order 5, Hq. Inf. Div., dated 31 July 1946.

General Hodge approved the recommendations, with the reservations that the degree of punishment be at the discretion of the Commanding Generals concerned, and that the recommendation concerning Major Plezia read assigned "to other duty" instead of "to duty with troops." (125)

By the end of the year, civil disturbances had completely subsided. The Communist threat to the peace and security of South Korea had been abated for the time being. Moreover, valuable lessons had been learned, and the Department of Police was thereafter better prepared effectively to deal with disorders when they developed.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX "A"

Joint Korean-American Conference, "Conclusions and Recommendations" - 26 November 1946.

I - General

The Joint Korean-American Conference concluded that the recent disturbances in southern Korea arise from a number of factors rather than from any one single cause. In general, the liberation of the Korean people during last August and September 1945, engendered in the minds of many Koreans the feeling that the achievement of liberation was synonomous with the achievement of an Utopian state. The critical condition of the world was not fully understood or appreciated particularly the international economic and political phases. The rationing of rice by the government in order to prevent starvation of non-producers was considered essential. The wage, price and inflation spiral was already an accomplished fact when the United States forces arrived. The great influx of helpless and homeless refugees necessitated a wider apportionment of the already seriously depleted food and the available housing. Floods and cholera epidemics rounded out an increasingly dismal picture. The international political situation caused the 38° barrier between the parts of Korea which worked a tremendous hardship on the already overburdened economic structure of Korea. A heavy blow to the hopes of the Korean people was the adjournment of the US-USSR Commission during May 1946. The Korean people experienced disappointment after disappointment in the accomplishment of their ideals. The Korean people were in a state of mass discouragement, psychologically ill-prepared to withstand manipulation by clever and well-trained agitators who had a well-organized plan of widespread implications. All of the pent-up anger of the Korean people, normally a gentle, orderly race, fell on the nearest instrument of control -- the police.

II - Personnel

Enmity Toward the Police:

1. The Conference finds that in general the Korean National Police has performed its functions as well as might be expected in view of the difficulties of initial organization and the procurement, training and maintenance of suitable personnel. However, there are some individuals remaining in the National Police Organization whose concept of the democratic system is incompatible with the ideals of the new Korea that is being created:

(a) There is widespread antagonism towards the police because Korean police who served under the Japanese have been retained in power and have been put in the majority of control positions.

(b) There is the belief that the police have abused their

power to pursue political aims by arresting leftist leaders with the cooperation of rightist "youth groups" without sufficient evidence of crime or criminal intent, and that this has affected the election.

(c) The antagonism to the police is enhanced by reports that they have beaten and tortured people and followed certain practices of the Japanese police.

(d) It is reported that the police were unduly harsh and in some cases dishonest in their enforcement of the grain collection program.

(e) The greater percentage of the senbr officers of the Korean National Police Force had service under the Japanese.

(f) Of about 25,000 policemen constituting the police force as of November 8, 1946, approximately 5,000 had prior service under the Japanese.

(g) Members of the police force find difficulty in living up to their desired standard under the present wage scale.

(h) The desire to capitalize politically on the weaknesses noted above leads to more violent attack by certain political groups on the abuses noted than the actual extent that the abuses complained of justify.

(i) In view of the large expansion, youth and inexperience of the police force, a too drastic or rapid replacement of present leaders would reduce the efficiency of the police force below desirable standards.

2. Presence of Former Japanese Collaborators in MG:

"Former Japanese collaborators" have never been satisfactorily defined and it should be the task of the Interim Korean Legislature or future bodies to make this definition in order that all such so-called "collaborators" shall be eliminated from the Government's employ.

3. Effect of Interpreters in Government:

Interpreters are essential in any government organization such as Military Government where the language barrier is so great. However, dishonest and venal interpreters have unique opportunities not only for personal gain for the furtherance of the political power of the particular group with which they may happen to be associated. The utilization of interpreters should be carefully limited to tasks where the officials concerned cannot perform their mission satisfactorily because of language difficulties. Such officials should carefully check the work of interpreters in important matters.

4. Corruption of Some Korean Officials:

It is inevitable that some corruption will be discovered in a temporary government such as that established by Military Government

as the link between liberation from the Japanese and the independent government to be established by the Koreans. Little concrete evidence of corruption and malfeasance in the present Military Government, however, has been presented. From the available evidence it appears that Military Government has established inspection and investigative procedures to forestall corruptive practices on the part of both Korean and American officials.

5. Agitators Against Best Interests of Korea:

Subversive elements without the true interest of Korea at heart, under the leadership of Pak Heun Yung, have taken advantage of the unsettled economic and political conditions to instigate and foment grave disorders in southern Korea. These Pak-inspired riots revealed thorough preparation, comprehensive planning, willingness to sacrifice numberless lives of innocent dupes, and the most barbarous mutilation of victims foreign to the Korean people's normal gentleness of nature. The ultimate objective of the leaders of the riots was the discrediting of the United States, regardless of its traditional friendship for Korea and primary role in liberating Korea, and the complete overthrow of the present government and the police in favor of a radical regime.

V - RECOMMENDATIONS

The Joint Korean-American Conference recommends as follows:

1. (a) To raise, as rapidly as possible, the standard of efficiency of Korean police, practical measures should be taken which will gradually eliminate those policemen, particularly those who served under the Japanese with the rank of Lieutenant or above, whose actions are incompatible with the established principles of democracy in the police system.

(b) That definite, clear instructions be reiterated to prevent abuse of authority, brutality, political partisanship and persecution, and cruelty and torture, and that present inspection methods be strengthened in order to make these measures effective as well as to prevent bribery and corruption.

(c) That the Director of the Korean National Police, be directed to control the police force so that it is not used for political purposes and that individual policemen do not use their official positions for political purposes in opposition to, or support of, any political group.

(d) (Submitted confidentially to Lieut. Gen. John B. Hodge, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea). "It is the unanimous wish of the Korean members of the Conference that Dr. Chough as well as Chief Chang be removed from office for reasons already amply exposed in the Conference; namely, the success of the Coalition Committee is endangered. Dr. Chough and Chief Chang are opposed to the Coalition Movement." In a P.S. thereto, signed by Kiusic Kimm, there was also added: "Furthermore

if anybody is responsibly concerned in the Provincial disturbances (the investigation of which is the direct objective of the Conference), especially at Taegu and Kyungsang Pukto, it is Chough Pyung-ok and not Chang Taik-sang."

(c) That the period of training of police be extended and that measures to insure that teachers at the police academy are true patriots working in the interests of the people.

2. That Military Government be directed to search the records of all Korean personnel for possible "former Japanese collaborators" on its rolls and that the obvious, notorious collaborators as defined in the third paragraph of Section VII, Ordinance 118, USAMGIK, be discharged as rapidly as possible and replaced by patriots; that the remainder of the cases be prepared and held for the future action of the Interim or other Korean Legislature which would define collaboration.

3. That necessary instructions be given and safeguards instituted to prevent exploitation of the people and hoodwinking of non-Korean speaking officials by dishonest or incompetent interpreters.

4. (a) That the most stringent and careful investigation systems be maintained and enforced to prevent corruption of both Korean and American personnel in Military Government.

(b) That in the selection of officials for governmental positions, Military Government extend and improve its examination system, publish the names of eligible candidates prior to official appointment, and use all efforts to see that the examination system is not abused to make political appointments.

5. (a) Because of the vicious nature of much of the agitation fomented by malcontents, the agitators should be arrested and prosecuted as rapidly as possible. However, where there have been widespread arrests because of disturbances, every effort should be made to release those prisoners against whom there is little evidence of guilt as rapidly as possible.

(b) That more effective measures be taken by Military Government to disseminate accurate information which will reach the farmer in the field and the small, remotely located villages, including fishing villages and hamlets, in order to keep the public fully informed of political and economic matters; that present radio and newspaper media, largely ineffective in reaching this part of the population in remote areas, be expanded by the use of speakers, leaflets (if necessary), radio cars, town criers, official bill posters and other systems that will reach down to every member of the community with timely, pertinent information of the policies and the activities of the present Government of southern Korea.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S.Army
Chairman

KIMM, KIUSIC
Chairmen
Coalition Committee

LYUH, WON HYUNG

* Minutes, 21st Session, 26 November 1946.

APPENDIX "B"

Excerpt from Inspector General's
"Report of Investigation Re Disturbances
at Taegu, Korea," 12 November 1946.

The first serious disturbances occurred during the afternoon and evening of 1 October 1946. This was the first time that the police were required to resort to the use of firearms to disperse a mob. It appears evident that this occasion was seized upon by the agitators to test out police reactions to such demonstrations, as the leaders had assured the police they would disperse the crowd, and then failed to do so. Both the Military Governor and the Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, visited the scene and had ample opportunity to evaluate the situation, including the effectiveness of the police, and both appeared satisfied that the police were capable.

On 2 October 1946 two major and one minor demonstrations or riots, all in different localities, took place simultaneously, indicating careful planning and coordination. It appears that the police had some warning that demonstrations would occur but believed they would only involve the question of food, as had occurred in the past.

The mob which formed at the District 19 Police Station was a demonstration against the police, because of the killing of a rioter the previous evening, and was started by students of the Medical College, later being joined by hundreds of students from other schools, in organized formations. The size of the mob was also increased by the usual collection of curious Koreans. At the time Major Plezia, Public Safety Director, and the Chief of Division E arrived about 1000 the crowd was demanding that the police in the station lay down their weapons and leave the station. The temper of the crowd at this time was evidenced by the disarming and beating up of about fifteen police who drove up to the station immediately behind Major Plezia. Major Plezia attempted to talk to the mob but was shouted down. He then ordered both the Chief of District 19 and the Chief of Division E to use the police in the station (about 50) to disperse the mob. Neither of the police chiefs made any attempt to carry out this order, nor did they answer him. He then attempted to obtain assistance of tactical troops by calling various staff officers at the 1st Infantry Headquarters. He made no attempt to inform the Military Governor of the situation, nor did he attempt to inform the Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, direct. Through some misunderstanding his message asking for troops was garbled and no help was sent. The situation became worse and the rioters attempted to storm the police station. Major Plezia drove them out single handed on two occasions. At about 1145 the police in the station became so frightened that they jumped over the wall into the Military Government barracks area immediately adjacent and began discarding weapons and uniforms. Effective steps were taken by the Commanding Officer of the Military Government unit to protect his area and get the police to resume their uniforms and arms.

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In the meantime, at about 1200 Major Plezia decided the situation was entirely out of hand and went to the Military Governor's office. Upon arrival he stated the situation and Colonel Heron immediately asked for the aid of 1st Infantry troops to protect the Military Government barracks area, including the police station. This aid was granted and one officer and 12 men were sent immediately, followed later by the self-propelled weapons from the Cannon Company. At the same time a well organized mob of several thousand was demonstrating in the general area of the railroad station, and at about 1115 began an attack against approximately 200 police in that area. Gun fire broke out on both sides, resulting in many wounded and killed (18 to 20 estimated by eye witness). Captain Johnson, an officer on the Military Governor's staff, witnessed most of this incident but failed to make a prompt report to Colonel Heron. Had Major Plezia and Captain Johnson reported these two incidents promptly to Colonel Heron it is believed that troops could have been secured and broken up both demonstrations, thereby preventing much bloodshed and the demoralization of the police. Major Plezia in particular exhibited such a lack of judgment and common sense in handling the situation at the police station as to cause doubt of his fitness to retain his commission, and certainly enough to indicate that he should be removed from duty with the Nation Police of Korea. On the other hand, he exhibited personal courage to a commendable degree. Captain Johnson, although not on duty in connection with the police of law enforcement, should have realized the gravity of the situation and immediately made a report to Colonel Heron. Lt. Eslinger, Adjutant of the 1st Infantry, also appears to have performed his duty in a perfunctory manner in transmitting Major Plezia's request for troops to Colonel Potts, the Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, in that he did not make it clear as to where and why the troops were needed.

Colonel Heron, the Military Governor, appears to have been the victim of circumstances, rather than derelict in the performance of duty. He had no reason to believe that rioting of serious proportions would occur on 2 October 1946. When it did break out his staff officers did not keep him informed of events as they transpired so that he could take effective action. He was told by the Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, during the morning of 2 October that he could have troops only for the protection of U. S. property and personnel. Early in the evening of 2 October when he had obtained complete information and realized the police had lost control and came to the conclusion that troops would be required to restore order in the city, he went to the Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, and requested assistance. He was again told that troops could only be used to protect U. S. personnel and property but that if he wanted martial law declared the Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry, would take over. Although Colonel Heron did not believe this to be correct procedure, he acquiesced in this matter rather than to prolong an intolerable situation. In view of all the circumstances involved it is believed that Colonel Heron was not given opportunity to take corrective action, and that his summary relief from duty as Military Governor of Kyongsan Pukto Province was not justified. It must be borne in mind that the Military Governor has little control over the National Po-

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lice, their operations being directed in the main from National Police Headquarters in Seoul. Other extenuating facts over which he had no control was his extreme shortage of officers until shortly before this trouble started, his decreased strength in enlisted men, and his lack of adequate motor transportation. Under the provisions of Field Order No. 2 USAFIK, 23 July 1946 (Ex. G) and Field Order No. 5, Headquarters 6th Division, 31 July 1946 (Ex.H), occupational troops are required to furnish prompt assistance to Military Government agencies in carrying out governmental functions, responsibility for operations remaining with Military Government. By Colonel Potts' preemptory action in declaring martial law and assuming command Colonel Heron was denied opportunity to demonstrate whether or not he was competent to handle the situation in his Province. Colonel Potts also arbitrarily declared martial law in two other areas in the Province without consulting Colonel Heron.

Although it is not brought out in the testimony it was apparent to the investigating officer that some friction had existed between the officers of the 1st Infantry and the officers on duty with Military Government in Taegu. The officers of the 1st Infantry appeared to have the impression that Military Government administrations and operation was poor and could not be depended upon. It is believed that this feeling is general throughout the 6th Division area, and influenced Colonel Potts considerably in his decision not to render assistance without the declaration of martial law, at which time he would take over control and full responsibility in this emergency.*

* Pages 11 - 14

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FOOTNOTES

1. G-2 Weekly Summary No 55, 22-29 Sept 46, p 4

2. Ibid., Incl 1, p 2

3. Ibid., No 56, 29 Sept 6 Oct 46, p 4

4. The present account takes events as reported in contemporary G-2 Weekly Summaries as its main thread. Considerable corroboratory and supplementary information is to be found in transcribed National Police telephone reports, reports resulting from official investigations, notably that conducted by Maj Gen Albert E. Brown at Taegu, and in the proceedings of the Korean-American Conference

5. G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, 29 Sept - 6 Oct 46, p 4

6. Taegu Provincial Hospital, "Report on Civilian and Police Casualities Resulting from Violence Occurring in Taegu during the Period 1 October through 5 October 1946," 5 Oct 46, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 20 (CIC)

7. G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, [illegible] loc. cit.

8. Ibid., Incl 1, p 2

9. Rept, "Survey of Uisong, Kunwi, Pyungsu-dong, Hyoryong, Kum Koo Dong, Tabu-dong, and Tonam-dong," 11 Oct 46. Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 33, pp 2-3 (CIC)

10. Rept, "Survey of Walbu, Ha-wun, Okpoh, Nongang, Koryong, Waegwan, Kumi, and Sonsan," 14 Oct 46. Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 35, p 2 (CIC); G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, loc. cit.

11. Rept, Maj Gen Albert E. Brown to Commanding General XXIV Corps, subj "Riots and Disorders 6th Infantry Division Area, Korea, Oct. 1-10, 1946," 14 Oct 46. Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 27, p 1; G-2 Weekly Summary No 57, 6-13 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 3

12. G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, 29 Sept - 6 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 3

13. Rept, Inspector General to Commanding General, XXIV Corps, subj "Report of Investigation re Disturbances at Taegu, Korea," 12 Nov 46, Exhibit F, Items 20, 21, 37, 49, 52

14. Ibid., Ex. F, Item 141

15. G-2 Weekly Summary No 57, 6-13 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 2

16. Inspector General Rept, op. cit., Ex. B, Items 99, 258; Rept, "Survey of Walbu, etc.," op. cit., p 3; Rept, "Survey of Chongdo, Kyongsan, Un-Munsa, Yejon-dong, Kwan-ha, and Kunchon," 16 Oct 46, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 35, p 2 (CIC)

17. G-2 Weekly Summary No 58, 13-20 Oct 46, p 4

18. Ibid., No 57, [redacted], p 4; also, Incl 1, p 2

19. Loc. cit.

20. Rept, Maj Gen Albert E Brown to Commanding General XXIV Corps, op. cit., p 2

21. G-2 Weekly Summary No 57, [redacted], Incl 1, pp 2-3

22. Ibid., No 58, Incl 1, pp 2-3

23. Ibid., No 57, pp 4-5

24. Ibid., No 61, 3-10 Nov 46, p 4

25. Rept, Maj Gen Albert E. Brown to Commanding General XXIV Corps, subj "Riots and Disorders 6th Infantry Division Area, Korea, Oct. 1-10, 1946," 14 Oct 46. Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 27, p 1; [illegible]

26. G-2 Weekly Summary No 58, 13-20 Oct 46, p 4; also, Incl 1, p 8

27. Rept, "Civil Disturbances, Duksan-Myun," 18 Oct 46, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 43 (CIC)

28. G-2 Weekly Summary No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

29. Ibid., No 58, 13-20 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 2

30. Ibid., Incl 1, p 3

31. Rept, "Civil Disturbances, Kaesong Area," 22 Oct 46, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 49, p 1 (CIC); G-2 Weekly Summary No 58, 13-20 Oct 46, Incl 1, pp 2-3

32. G-2 Weekly Summary No 59, 20-27 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 2

33. Ibid., No 58, Incl 1, pp 2-3; Rept, "Civil Disturbances, Kaesong Area," loc. cit.

34. Rept, "Civil Disturbances, Kaesong Area," op. cit., p 3

35. Radio. CG USAFIK to SCAP (Pass to State Dept) 12 Nov 46 (S) TFGBI 515 (AG Radio Files)

36. G-2 Weekly Summary No 58, 13-20 Oct 46, p 4

37. Ibid., Incl 1, pp 2-3

38. Ibid., p 4; No 59, 20-27 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 2

39. USAMGIK Publ Inf Dept Special Press Release, 23 Oct 45, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 50

40. G-2 Weekly Summary No 59, 20-27 Oct 46, p 5

41. Loc. cit.

42. Ibid., No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, p 4

43. Loc. cit.; also, Incl 1, p 2

44. Loc. cit.

45. Police File: "Strikes, Riots etc.," 30-31 Oct 46

46. G-2 Weekly Summary No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., Incl 1, p 3; Police File, op. cit., 31 Oct 46

49. G-2 Weekly Summary No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, p 4

50. Ibid., Incl 1, p 2

51. Ibid., No 62, 10-17 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

52. Ibid., No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

53. Police File, op. cit., 2 Nov 46

54. G-2 Weekly Summary Nos 60-62, 27 Oct - 17 Nov 46, Incls 1, pp 2-3

55. Ibid, No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

56. Loc. cit.

57. Ibid., No 61, 3-10 Nov 46, p 3

58. Police File: "Strikes, Riots etc.," 4 Nov 46

59. Ibid., 5 Nov 46

60. Ibid., 6 Nov 46

61. G-2 Weekly Summary No 61, 3-10 Nov 46, p 4; also, Incl 1, p 2

62. Ibid., Incl 1, p 2

63. Ibid., No 63, 17-24 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

64. Ibid., Nos 61, 62, 3-17 Nov 46, Incls 1, pp 2-3

65. Summation of United States Army Military Government Activities in Korea, No 14 (Nov 46), p 24; G-2 Weekly Summary, No 62, 10-17 Oct 46, p 5

66. G-2 Weekly Summary No 63, 17-24 Nov 46, Incl 1, p 2

67. G-2 Summary # 1, Hqs 6th Inf Div Off of the A C of S, G-2, subj Kyongsang Communist Uprising of October, 1946," 1 Dec 46, p 3. (in Historical Files).

68. G-2 Weekly Summary No 62, 10-17 Nov 46, pp 4-5

69. Military Commission Orders, 1946-1947

70. "Verbatim Transcript of General Hodge's Discussion with Wedemeyer Mission, 27 August 47" (S), pp 21-22

71. G-2 Weekly Summary No 62, 10-17 Nove 46, p 5

72. Rept, Maj Gen Albert E. Brown to Commanding General XXIV Corps, subj "Riots and Disorders 6th Infantry Division Area, Korea, Oct 1-10, 1946," 14 Oct 46, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 27, pp 2-3

73. Ibid., Incl 2, pp 1, 6

74. Ibid., Incl 2, p 5

75. Ibid., Incl 2, p 7

76. Ibid ., Incl 2, p 8

77. Rept, Inspector General to Commanding General, XXIV Corps, subj "Report of Investigation re Disturbances at Taegu, Korea," 12 Nov 46, Exhibit B, Item 306

78. Ibid ., Ex B, Items 166, 540

79. Ibid ., Ex B, Item 53

80. G-2 Weekly Summary No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, p 4

81. Inspector General Rept, op. cit., Ex B, Items 118, 779, 784

82. G-2 Weekly Summary No 59, 20-27 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 2

83. Inspector General's Rept., op. cit., Ex. B, Item 697

84. G-2 Weekly Summary No 63, 17-24 Nov 46, p 5

85. Inspector General's Rept, op. cit., p 1

86. G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, 29 Sept - 6 Oct 46, p 5

87. Inspector General's Rept, op. cit., Ex B, Item 217

88. Ibid., Ex B, Items 109, 110

89. Ibid., Ex B , Item 111

90. Ibid., Ex B, Item 394

91. Ibid., Ex B, Item 398

92. Ibid., Ex B, Item 690

93. Ibid., Ex B, Item 426 (p 93)

94. G-2 Weekly Summary No 57, 6-13 Oct 46, p 5; G-2 Summary # 1, Hqs 6th Inf Div Off of the A C of S, subj "Kyongsang Communist Uprising of October, 1946," 1 Dec 46, p 3

95. Inspector General's Rept, op. cit., Ex B, Item 521

96. Ibid., Ex B , Item 615

97. Ibid., Ex B, Item 617

98. Ibid., Ex B, Items 52, 86; G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, 29 Sept - 6 Oct 46, Incl 1, p 2

99. G-2 Weekly Summary N o 54, 15-22 Sept 46, p 4; Seoul Communist instructions, issued by Pak Heun Yung upon his return from North Korea to all Communists in South Korea directed them to actively oppose MG policies and discredit MG in every way possible. Copies of these instructions have been seized at various localities throughout the 6th Inf Div Zone, which includes the Cholla and Kyongsang provinces; G-2 Summary #1, Hqs 6th Inf Div Off of the A C of S, G-2, sub "Kyongsang Communist Uprising of October 1946," 1 Dec 46, p 1

100. Cf. "Verbatim Transcript of General Hodge's Discussion with the Wedemeyer Mission, 27 August 47" (S), p 2 (copy in Historical File)

101. Rept, Maj Gen Albert E. Brown to Commanding General XXIV Corps, subj "Riots and Disorders 6th Infantry Division Area, Korea, Oct 1-10, 1946," 14 Oct 46. Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 27, p 5

102. Ibid., Incl 2, p 4

103. Joint Korean-American Conference, "Conclusions and Recommendations," Minutes, 21st Sess (26 Nov 46) Exhibit 23, p 5 (see Appendix 1)

104. G-2 Weekly Summary No 68, 22-29 Dec 46, pp 2-3

105. Rept, Inspector General to Commanding General XXIV Corps, subj "Report of Investigation re Disturbances at Taegu, Korea," 12 Nov 46, Exhibit B, Item 520

106. Ibid., Ex. B, Items 494, 496

107. G-2 Weekly Summary No 56, 29 Sept - 6 Oct 46, p 4

108. Ibid., No 58, 13-20 Oct 46, p 4

109. Ibid., p 5

110. Korean Newspaper Translations (South), Folder # 7, 28 Oct 46 (in Historical Files)

111. [redacted] Rept, National Police Director Chough Pyung Ok to National Police Director Advisor Col W. H. Maglin, subj "Riot Situation," 20 Oct 46, Civil Disturbances 2, Doc # 37

112. Letr, General Hodge to members of the Korean Press, 3 Dec 46

113. Special Press Release, CG USAFIK to The Committee Representing the Joint Meeting of the N ine Political Parties, 26 Oct 46

114. Memo, Lt Gen Hodge to Lt Gen Wedemeyer, subj "Joint Korean-American Conference" (S), n.d. (Aug 47)

115. Cf. Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, passim

116. Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, 21st Sess, 26 Nov 46

117. Memo, Lt Gen Hodge to Lt Gen Wedemeyer, loc. cit.

118. See Appendix - for the report in full

119. G-2 Weekly Summary No 60, 27 Oct - 3 Nov 46, p 3

120. Loc. cit.

121. See Appendix - for the report in full

122. Radio, Dep Mil Gov to Prov Mil Gov, Kyongsang Pukto (attention: Col Herron) TFYMG 2805 (c), 5 Oct 46; USAMGIK Official Gazette, Removal No 99, 13 Nov 46

123. Field Order No 2, USAFIK, 23 July 46, and Field Order No 5, Hq 6th Div, 31 July 46; Rept, Inspector General to Commanding General XXIV Corps, subj "Report of Investigation re Disturbances at Taegu, Korea," 12 Nov 46, pp 13-14

124. Inspector General's Rept, op. cit., pp 12-13

125. Ibid., pp 15-16

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P A R T THREE

THE POLICE AND NATIONAL EVENTS, 1947-1948

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PART III
THE POLICE AND NATIONAL EVENTS, 1947-1948

In a sense, the outbreaks of late 1946 constituted a turning point in the history of the police under the Occupation. While the years 1947 and 1948 were marked by several serious disturbances and numerous incidents of only less consequence, a general pattern had been set for handling them.

During 1947 the most important civil disturbances were those around 1 March (Sam Il Day, anniversary of the abortive Korean insurrection of 1919) and in August. In 1948 the arrival of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and the elections of 10 May brought quite serious problems in which the police were involved. Closely corollary to these was a long drawn out period of disorder, of Communist manufacture, in Chejudo. The police were involved, too, in friction with the Constabulary, border incidents, and rice collections during 1947, and in 1948 with measures to combat possible Leftist outbreaks during the transitional period when the infant Republic of Korea was getting on its feet. By and large, the police stood the test well, and the net, as the occupation came to a close, was definitely in their favor.

"Sam Il" Disturbances - 1947

The period around, and especially after, Sam Il Day (1 March) saw a series of civil disturbances in South Korea. However, widespread disorders and inflammatory demonstrations on the late 1946 scale were averted. On 1 March itself, casualties were held to 19 known dead and 150 known injured among the populace and three police injured. Bloodshed and disorder, G-2 reported, were held to a minimum by "widespread precautionary measures, with intensified activity on the part of intelligence and law

enforcement agencies."(1)

Clashes between police and demonstrating political groups of varied political affiliation were responsible for the majority of the casualties. In Cholla Nam, police at Nanjong Ni had to resort to firearms to turn back a thousand disorderly paraders. In Chejudo, five rioters, presumably Leftists, were killed by police fire when a mob attacked a police building. A potentially quite serious disturbance at South Gate in Seoul was held within bounds by effective police action, with two known dead.

Later in March further disturbances, serious in themselves but isolated, occurred. In Cholla Puk, on 22 March, a mob of 2000 attacked first a police box on the edge of Chulpo, then the main police station. Four mobsters were killed, and next day bodies of three policemen were found in the Chulpo reservoir, their hands and feet tied.(2)

In Chejudo, a prison rescue was attempted at the Chung Mun jail. A mob of a thousand, armed with clubs and rocks, demanded the release of a certain prisoner. When the mob began throwing rocks and attempted to rush the jail, the police fired on them. Four of their number were wounded; the crowd dispersed. Another mob also attacked the police building. They, too, were met with gun fire. Five rioters were killed and another was wounded.(3)

The month of March was marked, too, by a general strike effort which temporarily disrupted South Korean industry, communications, railroads, and some phases of government and maritime operations. Secretly conceived and initiated by the Communist-dominated All Korean Labor Union (Chawn Pyawng), the strike spread within fifteen hours to five leading cities of the Cholla provinces -- Kunsan, Mokpo, Chonju, Kwangju, and Sunchon -- all leftist strongholds, and to Seoul, Taegu, Taejon, Inchon, and several smaller communities in Southwestern Korea. The strike dis-

turbances were kept down to a minimum by the police; none assumed large scale proportions. The strike was broken within four days. Meanwhile, various suspects from leading left wing parties had been taken into custody.(4) Toward the end of the month, uprisings ceased save for scattered incidents.

August 1947 Disturbances

After March, relative quiet existed until August, when an upsurge of mob disorders required frequent police action. Geographically, these had a wide range. That they did not equal those of late 1946 in intensity and seriousness was due essentially to precautionary measures taken by police and other law enforcement agencies.

Some of the August troubles derived from police action in connection with clashes, imminent or actual, between Rightists and Leftists. Thus, on 13 August, police dispersed gatherings of rival groups at Somoktong in Kangwon before blows could be exchanged.(5) Actual fighting between Rightists and Leftists took place at Inchon on 22 August, with 14 combatants from each side hospitalized as a result. Police prevented resumption next day.(6)

Youth organizations on both sides played consequential roles in this partisan strife, and as such were the cause of much concern by the police. As a rule they were the chief provacateurs and "shock troops" in attacks and the principals in terroristic activities. At Seoul, members of the Rightist Northwest Youth Association had gathered after the Liberation Day parade (15 August) in front of the Chun Pyung headquarters and began throwing rocks at the windows. Before a riot could get started, the police interfered and dispersed the crowd.(7) A few days later, a Leftist's home was invaded by fifty members of the right-wing Northwest Korean

Youth Association. He was forced to accompany them to their headquarters, where they proceeded to beat him into unconsciousness. A police detective rescued him.(8)

Earlier in the month in Chungchong Nam, twenty-nine Northwest members attacked the village of Sillong. The villagers cornered the terrorists on the edge of the village and a riot ensued. The police opened fire; three villagers were killed. To get even for a minor incident which had occurred the day before, approximately sixty members of the Korean constabulary in Chungju (Chungchong Nam) abducted eighteen rightists from the headquarters of the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence. The men, who were also members of the Northwest Korean Youth Association, were taken to the nearby Constabulary barracks and beaten with sabres and rifle butts. It required a rescue squad of two truckloads of police to release the men.(9)

Most of the August disorders, however, were the direct outcropping of Leftist, usually at least Communist-inspired, activity, sometimes in defiance of law and order, and of the police, sometimes in direct attack on police and other governmental agencies. The first Leftist incident reported in August was at Chuksung, Cholla Puk, where four Leftists engaged in posting propaganda let loose a volley or rocks at police who attempted to arrest them. One was wounded when police fired.(10)

In the southern province of Kyongsang Nam, a sizeable crowd of leftists attacked the police box at Maum Myun on 12 August. Shots fired in the air by three policemen chased off all but some fifty men, who attacked with bamboo spears. The police fire which followed killed the leader and wounded one other man.(11) In Padeum myun, on the same day, the police killed one and seriously wounded a second when around a hundred Leftist, armed with

bamboo spears and other weapons, attempted to storm the police box. (12)

In Kyonggi, on 22 August, around thirty Communists attempted to take over the village government at Hyon Ni. Local police were obliged to call for reinforcements.

Nearly all the incidents occurring were taken care of by the police without aid from other agencies. In Cholla Puk, however, Chungju police called for American aid to suppress Communist disorders in Salmi and Hwanggang on the 15th and 16th. The trouble soon subsided when United States army patrols were sent. (13) An attack on a police box in Chongun, in the same province, was thwarted by constabulary, who dispersed a Leftist mob armed with knives and Japanese swords which had assembled three miles away. (14)

For these disorders, the Leftist rioters apparently possessed considerable arms and ammunition. Thus, a police raid on the home of a Social Democratic Party officer in Seoul netted 6 pistols, 64 hand grenades, 5 Japanese rifles, 3,700 rounds of ammunition, 21 Japanese swords, 7 officer's swords, and 23 bayonets. (15)

Without question, Communist-inspired and directed disturbances would have been much greater on 15 August (Liberation Day) and thereafter, had it not been for police action of preventive nature. On 12 August a drive was started to arrest numerous leading Leftist political figures, against whom there were "strong indications" that demonstrations in violation of Military Government directives, particularly Administrative Order No. 5, were planned for 15 August. Actual orders called for the arrest of 20 leaders in the Seoul area; however, instructions were construed loosely, and considerably more arrests - estimated as around two hundred - were made. At that, Ho Hun, chairman of the main Communist front, the South Korea

Labor Party, and most of the other out-and-out Communists escaped. Nevertheless, the net effect was two-fold: For the time being the Communist organization was so hard hit as to be almost disrupted, while many highly incriminating documents were captured in various parts of South Korea. These documents fully bore out the advance information received. (16)

In October 1946, after an analysis of the documentation had been made, Metropolitan Police Chief Chang Taik Sang issued a press release in which he charged that on orders from North Korea, the South Korea Labor Party had planned extensive disturbances for the purpose of discrediting the police and United States policies in South Korea. Chang's statement, based on information gathered by interrogation of persons arrested and on the documents seized at that time, hit directly at North Korean propaganda and other agencies.

General Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the US-USSR Joint Commission, then in session, called personally on General Hodge and lodged a vehement protest with him, demanding removal of Chief Chang. However, he met with no success. Instead, he received a terse reply a few days later, in which General Hodge unequivocably supported both Chang himself and Chang's statement. General Hodge further informed the Soviet representative that the South Korean police would be requested to continue their vigilance "against the subversive and terroristic activities on the part of any and all individuals and organizations directed against the interest of the Korean people and the peace and security of the American

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For the text of Chief Chang's statement and for a discussion of it as a factor in American-Soviet Relations, see Part II, Chapter "American-Soviet Relations: The Second Year." For the internal political ramifications of the abortive August disturbances, see Part II, Chapter, "Korean People and Politics: The Second Year."

occupied zone."(17)

Police-Constabulary Rivalry

Animosity between personnel of the Korean National Police and of the Korean Constabulary not only continued to exist, but in early June 1947 flared to quite serious proportions. A serious clash occurred between elements of the two when constabulary officers failed in an attempt to effectuate the release of one of their men from the Yongnam (Cholla Nam) police station, where he had been incarcerated after both physical and vituperative attacks on the local police.(18)

The officers immediately started to agitate among the constabulary. Soon they had incited about 175 men, who armed themselves and proceeded at once to Yongam in four trucks. On their way to Yongam they first stopped at the Shin Buk sub-station. The seven police on duty there fled when they found themselves greatly outnumbered. The constabulary then vandalized the interior of the station, searched nearby houses for the police, and proceeded to the Tuk Chung sub-station, located between Shin-Buk and Yongam. At that station, two policemen were on duty; one escaped but the other was captured and beaten.

Continuing on the the town of Yongam, the Constabulary searched many homes looking for policemen. One was seized while on his way to the station. Another, asleep at the time, was taken from his bed and beaten severely. He was then placed against a fence and fatally riddled with bullets. Several others were also captured. They, too, suffered brutal treatment.

One truckload of constabulary then drove to the rear of the station, and two to the front. A fourth group stayed in town to search houses and blockade the streets. The Yongam station was at the extreme end of town.

At a "charge" call from the bugler, the station was attacked and the police, who held their fire until fired upon, returned the fire. Five hand grenades were also used by the police. Due to their small amount of ammunition, the constabulary man were unable to make a second assault after being repulsed in their first attacks. They then had to rely on a sniping siege. After higher officials stepped in, the firing gradually subsided.

In all, 167 constabularymen and 163 policemen were involved in the clashes. Two constabulary members and one policeman were killed, and eight wounded.(19) Several suffered beatings.

The Yongam incident was the last of the more serious clashes brought on by the friction that had existed between these two forces in South Korea. Subsequently, only sporadic attacks were reported.(20) None was of much severity.

The whole situation was mostly due to the Oriental concept that the soldier was above and beyond the reach of civil authority.(21) Thus, there was the constant and eternal question between the Police and the Constabulary as to who was "Number One", or who was superior in his social or official capacity. As put by Captain Clarence C. De Reuss, Advisor to the 3rd and 4th Korean Constabulary Regiments:

> There is the constant question on the part of the Constabulary men as to why they must be subjected to control by the police, why they must obey curfew, and why they, who are, as they have been told, the future soldiers of Korea, why they should have to abide by the same laws as the civilians abide by. (22)

Explaining this superior attitude of the Constabulary, their own colonel, Kim Sang Kyum, Chief of Staff, Department of Internal Security, said:

> They saw the position of the soldier in war time or in the time

of the Japanese Government. The soldiers were respected by the general people and these young soldiers saw that attitude. The people have the feeling that the soldiers are superior so the soldiers themselves imitate a superior attitude toward other people. Even about 50 years ago when the Korean Government was existing, the Military was a strong power in the Government. So the young soldier has seen nothing but the superiority of the soldier. Before the 14th of August, 1945, that is before the liberation of Korea from the Japanese, the station of the soldier was equal to the station of the Police. Before the liberation, the Japanese Military Police had the authority to arrest the policemen and the police officers. So the young soldier imitates and thinks that this is still so. (23)

As the respective jurisdiction of the police and constabulary became better understood by the individual members of the two forces, it was expected that the friction between them would disappear entirely. To encourage better relations, joint police-constabulary parties were planned. Thus, a propaganda poster showing a policeman and constabulary soldier hand-in-hand was introduced. A hopeful sign was the splendid cooperation between the constabulary and the police in quelling the Yosu rebellion of October 1948. (24)

Border Incidents

From time to time, South Korean police in areas close to the 38th Parallel became involved with North Korean security forces. Border incidents between the two were common occurences, with the underlying reason their conflicting political ideologies. (25)

Perhaps the most serious incident was one of 18 March 1947, which resulted in the deaths of two Soviet soldiers. This was precipitated by the unauthorized entry of the two, both of them armed, into the village of Ok Sim Dong, just below the Parallel. There they seized and carried away seven small mal of rice, the property of villagers, to a point north of the parallel.

Later that day, the same soldiers again entered South Korea, this time

at Sak Jik Dong, where they were met by four South Korean police, who had been ordered to investigate the seizure and removal of the rice from Ok Sim Bong. A controversy soon arose as to the location of the 38th Parallel and whether San Jik Dong was in North or South Korea. The South Korean police insisted it was in South Korea, because the residents paid taxes and delivered their rice collection quotas to South Korean agencies, and received from them their commodity distribution. Moreover, markers and sign posts indicated that the 38th Parallel was beyond the northerly boundary of the village.

Thus, the South Korean police naturally resisted the orders of the two Soviet soldiers to remove their uniforms, surrender their arms, and enter an area north of the 38th Parallel for questioning. One of the soldiers then opened fire upon the South Korean police, who returned the fire, killing both Russians. (26)

In a letter to Lt. General G. P. Korotkov, Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in North Korea, General Hodge refused to agree to General Korotkov's demand for appointment of a joint commission to investigate the matter. He reiterated the findings of the USAMGIK special investigation, namely, that "the incident was caused by the unauthorized entry of the two Soviet Army soldiers into an area south of the 38th Parallel-line where they seized and carried away rice, the property of South Korean civilians."

General Hodge emphasized, however, that he was "firmly convinced that a definite determination of the 38th parallel-line should be made for the betterment of Soviet Army and American Army relations in Korea." He added: "When this line is established, plainly marked, and recognized, strict instructions should be issued to all concerned that under no circumstances

will it be violated.(27)

Rice Collection and Police

The police continued in 1947 to assist with the Rice Collection Program. In a directive issued by the National Police Director, Division Police Chiefs were instructed to cooperate in every way with the National Food Administration and the Provisional Governors to assure the successful execution of the Rice Collection Program.

When so requested, they were required to furnish adequate guards for all rice collection warehouses. They were ordered to use every means at their command to discourage the illegal transportation of rice, and to seize such rice and deliver to the nearest provincial food service collection point. Furthermore, they were required to make frequent inspections of markets and merchants for violations of National Food Regulations.(28)

Their efforts in this connection were not without much difficulty. Communists would gather on hills surrounding small towns and stage anti-grain collection demonstrations. At the signal of bonfires from atop a high hill, assembled groups would start shouting slogans in defiance of the grain collection program. A group would start with a particular program, which would be passed along to other groups. Typical slogans were: "Those who pay the grain collection program first will be killed;" The officers who struggle to collect the grain will be killed;" and "Destroy the police."(29)

Demonstrations against the grain collection program at times often led to mob attacks on police boxes and assaults upon policemen. In Yuncho Myun, Kyongsang Nam, a crowd of a thousand farmers had gathered to hear government

officials and the police speak on behalf of the program. They soon became hostile and started stoning the speakers. In their efforts to escape, the police were forced to fire into the mob. They stopped long enough in their retreat to secure additional rifles and ammunition at a nearby police box. The mob soon overran the police box, seized many documents, and demolished the box completely. They then split into two groups, one to erect a road block, and the other to destroy telephone communications. They were finally forced into the hills by police reinforcements from Changsunpo Ri, Tongyong, and Masan. (30)

Police box attacks by anti-grain collection demonstrators occurred, too, at Yongsoro, Cholla Nam, where 300 farmers attacked the police box and severely beat four policeman, who were attempting to enforce grain collections. (31) Again, in Baum Buk Myun, Kyongsang Nam, a mob attacked a grain collection team of county officials and police. The police were forced to fire into the mob and retreat to the police box in Tong Dong Myun, where they put in a call for reinforcements, and managed to hide documents and weapons. The mob soon entered the box, made another attack, and got away with fourteen rounds of ammunition and several uniforms. They were dispersed only after reinforcements of U.S. troops and police patrols had arrived. (32)

Four members of a mob of a thousand anti-grain collection demonstrators were killed when the Yunho police on Koji Island were forced to fire into the mob as they advanced on their police box. (33) Another mob attacked the police box in Daeson, Kyongsang Nam, and seized five rifles and 28 rounds of ammunition before the police were able to disperse them. They resisted the police and myun officials as they attempted to enforce grain collections. (34) A mob of 1,800 irate farmers attacked the police box in

Taesong, Kyongsang Nam, using spears, clubs, and farm implements. The police fired into the mob, killing ten and wounding a like number. Six policemen were injured. (35)

Besides police box attacks and assaults upon policemen, the police had to contend with other tactics employed by the mobs in their opposition to the grain collection program. They would set up road blocks against the grain trucks; cut telephone lines; steal grain collection records; and continually interfere with officials attempting to collect the grains. The summer months of 1947 were tense with activity for the police assisting in collecting the rice assessments. (36)

Counterfeiting

During February 1948, the police were recipients of commendations for good work in another channel. Major General W. F. Dean, Military Governor, sent a letter to the National Police Director Chough Pyung Ok commending four members of the National Police Department for their excellent work in apprehending the principal members of a group engaged in counterfeiting and distributing notes of the Bank of Chosen and United States currency. Their period of investigation carried them through the months of December 1947 and January 1948. The arrests were made during 8-10 February.

In accomplishing this task, the police arrested twelve persons in the widely separated areas of Yonan (Kyonggi) and Seoul. They also confiscated evidences of their illegal operations in the form of counterfeit money and the instruments and tools of their trade. (37)

February 1948 Riots

With the advent of the year 1948 the police were again the victims of

Communist-inspired onslaughts. The month of February witnessed a series of disorders throughout South Korea as a "protest" against the presence of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). There were a number of attacks on police boxes, and many police were killed and wounded. Riots were heaviest in the early and latter parts of the month.

During early February most of the Communist attacks occurred in Kyongsang Nam and Kyongsang Puk. Later in the month they became more widespread.

In Kyongsang Nam, on 1 February, the police of Chinju dispersed a crowd of approximately two hundred students demonstrating against UNTCOK. Three arrests were made. The day before similar demonstrations were broken up in outlying districts and in the nearby towns of Masan and Pasong. Toward the end of the week, on 7 February, the demonstrations became more violent. Presumably, they were timed to correspond with the second anniversary celebration, 8 February, of the North Korea People's Committee.

In the Miryang area, a mob killed one policeman, wounded two others, and departed with their rifles, leaving behind one of their own dead. Five roadblocks were set up around Samnangjin by another Communist-led mob. They stormed the local police box and killed one of the policemen, withdrawing only when police reinforcements had arrived. They took along with them two U.S. Army carbines, three Japanese rifles, and thirty rounds of ammunition.

A Pusan policeman shot a South Korea Labor Party member who tried to escape apprehension for distributing Communist handbills. A few days later, in Chirpo, a policeman shot and killed a leftist, who had attempted to seize his carbine. (38)

In Kyongsang Puk, long a center of extreme leftism, mobs took possession

of fourteen police boxes during the fighting, and got away with at least seven rifles and fifty rounds of ammunition. A mob of 500 destroyed the highway bridge between Yoolkok and Hypchan, in the early hours of 7 February, then attacked local police boxes. Rioters in the Andong area killed four policemen; six Communists were also slain. On 9 February, there were only scattered and minor incidents. One policeman was killed and two injured when twenty prisoners attempted to overpower the interrogating police. Two prisoners were killed, and one injured, during the attempt.(39)

During early February, 6,867 persons were arrested. Of these, some 3,000 were released within a few hours, approximately 1,800 had been turned over to the courts, and the remainder were held for further investigation.(40)

Disorders died down during the third week of February. However, some incidents occurred. Mobs attacked police boxes in Oson and Chodon, in Kyongsang Nam, killing one policeman and two members of the United Young Men's Party. This organization had assisted the police in both places. Their organization headquarters were attacked in Muan by a mob which had also attacked the local police box. Villagers demonstrated against UNTCOK and attacked a police box in Pyongyang, Cholla Nam.(41)

An upsurge of riots came at the end of the month, commencing the night of 25-26 February. Mobs attacked police stations, and cut telephone lines. In Cholla Puk, police reported thirty-four attacks. Isolated incidents occurred in Cholla Nam, Kyongsang Puk, and Chungchong Puk. Five police and 22 rioters were reported killed.(42)

February disturbances continued on into March, but with less frequency and intensity. Even on 1 March, (Sam Il Day), there was serious rioting

only in Cholla Nam, where one policeman, a rightist, and ten rioters were killed in attacks on police and rightists.(43)

Comparative statistics of casualties for the period of heaviest attacks give the following figures:(44)

	7-10 Feb.	25 Feb.-5 March	Total
Police Boxes Attacked	35	52	87
Police Killed	12	6	18
Police Wounded	18	19	37
Rioters Wounded	12	78	90
Rioters Killed	31	39	70
Non-rioters Killed	6	6	12
Non-rioters Wounded	20	29	49

Disorders in Chejudo

The most serious disorders of any during 1948 under the Occupation were those in the island province of Chejudo, which continued over a period of several months. In the early stages, especially, the police bore the brunt of combatting them. The situation, however, passed from one of rioting and mob activity to a state of guerrilla warfare, requiring military as well as police action. Therefore, Constabulary forces from the mainland were brought in, so that both Constabulary and police had a part.*

The initial outbreaks in Chejudo began on 3 April 1948, with a series of attacks against established government which, in varying degrees of intensity, continued through the year. Unlike the earlier, single disorders on the island during February, these gave indications of a guiding hand behind them rather than of "potluck" Communist instigation. The purpose apparently, was to discredit as much as possible the forthcoming May

*Constabulary activities as such are beyond the scope of this chapter, discussion of them is omitted.

elections. During the first week of their operations four policemen were killed, ten police boxes were attacked, and one police installation was destroyed by arsonists. Before the month was over, eight police were killed in more than twenty attacks, and even members of their families suffered death at the hands of the Communists.(45)

During the same period, the police killed twenty-five members of these bands. And toward the end of the month there was a slackening in number of raids, as the South Korean Constabulary had then begun patrol operations against the Communist guerrillas hidden in the Cheju-do mountains. Their efforts in this regard were of major importance in ferreting out the attackers. They searched and destroyed the many caves which had served as hiding places for the raiders of the island.(46)

The attacks were made mostly by guerrilla forces. The island's mountainous areas afforded excellent concealment and bases for launching attacks on villages. Personnel for the guerrilla units were drawn from the villages and towns as the occasion demanded, and upon completion of their assignment they were returned to their homes. Kim Chung Ho, Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety, in a press interview on 28 April, described the rioters as "farmers by day and fighters by night."(47) The guerrilla's several headquarters were not stationary, but moved frequently to avoid police action.(48)

The raiders' equipment was reported to comprise twelve American carbines and 25 U. S. M1 rifles obtained by raids on the police or through deserters from the constabulary. In addition, they were represented as possessing a considerable number of Japanese swords and 44 and 99 rifles, as well as some Japanese hand grenades and machine guns. Various types of explosives, picks, shovels, and bamboo spears were also used.(49)

As election day (10 May) drew near, Communist attacks increased in frequency. During the week immediately preceding the elections, one attack was made on a police wire-repair crew and five on police boxes. One of the police was killed, as were also twenty-one members of rightists and police families.(50)

During election week, there were fifty assorted demonstration, disorders, arson cases, and attacks on rightist offices and homes. Sixty-three towns were attacked in addition to three government buildings. An equal number of Communist and rightists, fourteen, were also killed, as well as twenty members of rightist and police families.(51)

A police force of more than 800 was specially selected and sent to Cheju to help put down the Communist forces, whose attacks were many in number, and brutal in their severity.(52) Stories of their atrocities were shocking. Tales were told of villages utterly wiped out, and of raided villages where bodies of men were found hung up, and those of women and children run through with spears. Kidnapped police were said to have been either hung or beheaded.(53)

Following the elections, Communist-inspired violence abated. Save for only a few scattered incidents, there was a lull during June and July. Success of the elections was no doubt a factor. Too, the monsoon rains of June helped dampen the ardor of the raids.(54)

Nevertheless, Communist-inspired disturbances were a continuous affair. Commenting in July on the Cheju situation, National Police Director Chough declared: "It will continue as long as the Communist Party exists."(55)

Renewed raider activity was first reported again in late August, when two police were killed and five wounded. Mainland police reserves were withdrawn from Chejudo in early September. The constabulary was then

primarily engaged in recruiting, reorganizing, and training, and hence was unable to give the police much assistance against the guerrillas. The Communists thus decided to take advantage of this decrease in police strength.(56)

In Mid-September, fifteen persons were killed by raider groups in various localities on the island. A police box was also fired upon. In two instances, villagers were abducted and intimidated in a Communist effort to regain lost prestige and demonstrate that they still had power at their command.(57)

On 1 October, guerrillas attacked the police in two towns, killing seven police, wounding several others, and abducting two of their number. A police box was burned. Further clashes between police and guerrillas occurred on 6 October, at which time constabulary resumed operations, in a renewed effort to disrupt and disperse the guerrilla activities.(58)

Causes and Effects of Cheju Outbreak

An investigation was made in Chejudo by Colonel Rothwell H. Brown of the 6th Division. By screening 5,000 inhabitants, it was learned that the Communist-front South Korea Labor Party had started its work on the island in 1946. Organization proceeded slowly in early 1947, but when it became evident that there was going to be a separate election for South Korea its activities were intensified and special organizers were sent in from the mainland. These were first given intensive training in Communist infiltration tactics.

During the pre-election period Communist cells were organized in every village and town throughout the island. Each cell comprised a leader and propaganda and supply agents. In the larger towns, there were personnel

to assume civil government functions upon the breakdown of the existing government.

In addition to the cells, the People's Democratic Army for the island of Chejudo was formed. This consisted of two regiments and the usual complement of battalions. Officer personnel was assigned, and recruiting was vigorous. At the height of the rioting this army was estimated to have a strength of approximately 4,000 officers and men. Less than 10 percent of this force was armed with rifles, the balance with Japanese swords and native-made spears.

Only six trained agitators and organizers were sent in from the mainland to establish the South Korea Labor Party, but they were soon joined by some five to seven hundred sympathizers. An estimated sixty to seventy thousand people of the island joined the South Korea Labor Party. They were mainly ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and post-war difficulties, and hance were easily persuaded that the South Korea Labor Party offered them increased economic security.

Colonel Brown attributed the success of their organizing activities to "an ineffective organization of Island police units, especially with respect to the establishment of efficient police intelligence units." Their riot successes during the election period he laid to the failure on the part of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the 59th Military Government Company to take prompt and determined action to control the island police, and effectively to employ the police reserves as they arrived on the island. He found the latter guilty of excessive brutality and terrorism. (59)

Lester Chorpening, American Police Advisor sent to Chejudo, explained

that the police reserves came to the island determined to avenge the killing of their fellow police and members of their families. Hence, they certainly did mete out brutal punishment to those taken in raids.(60) Reporting on the island police, Chorpening stated:

> "There has been very little effort on the part of the police and the South Korea Interim Government officials to inform the people on Cheju Do on what is being done to establish a government in Korea. Police Chief Kim Young Bai has never visited any of the Police Boxes since being in Cheju Do for one year. He is very reluctant to accept any advice from the Americans. The morale of the police in the outlying districts is very low, and they appeared very nervous and jittery in some boxes."

In deference to Captain Robert Burns, the Public Safety Officer, he said: "Captain Robert Burns is very capable of handling the police job, but is handicapped by having many other assignements with the 59th Military Government Group, which is caused by the lack of army personnel."

Chorpening recommended that a new chief of police of equal or higher rank than the incumbent be immediately appointed to take charge in Chejudo until after the election, and that a new permanent chief be named at some future time; or else, that Cheju Do be placed under Division "H" (Cholla Nam) as before. Accordingly, a new police chief was brought in from Inchon: he was soon succeeded by a native Chejuan, then serving as Assistant Chief of Police in Cholla Nam. There were still more changes in the office. The incumbent in November 1948 was Hong Son Bong, formerly Vice-Chief of the Uniform Police Bureau, National Police Headquarters.(61)

Corruption and laxity in government, the poor economic condition of inhabitants, lack of information to the island people on efforts of the South Korean Interim Government to establish a government in Korea, constabulary-police friction, and police brutality, in general, made Chejuans an easy prey for Communist agitators inciting them to riot.

In their purpose of disrupting the national elections of 10 May, the Communists achieved a partial success. Because of the lack of free atmosphere, voting was light and partial only, with less than half the ballot boxes received in two of the three electoral districts. Results in those two were therefore rejected and invalidated.(62)

As suggested above, and as will be noted later, the Communists were determined to disrupt the general elections of 10 May, and the policy of the United States government with respect to Korea. They did succeed, partially, in their election efforts. The voting in two of the three electoral districts had to be invalidated; less than half the ballot boxes were received.

Casualty statistics, even those of official nature, vary widely. Dr. Chough Pyung Ok, Director of National Police, on his return from an inspection trip to the island at the end of May, was quoted as reporting 64 policemen and 400 civilians on both sides as having been killed. On 29 May the Moderate Seoul Sin Mun gave the number of casualties and kidnappings on Chejudo as 600 since the outbreak of disturbances.(63)

More detailed statistical data on casualties and destruction were compiled by the Police Administrative Section of Inspection Command No.1 (Chejudo) in July. These, however, were presumably incomplete, but nevertheless indicative. According to them, in the initial three months of disturbances (3 April-5 July), there were 174 attacks on police by dissidents; five police boxes and 204 homes were burned. Police arrests in the period were noted as 795. Casualties were given as 27 police, 165 raiders, and 108 civilians killed, and 34, 15, and 82, respectively, wounded. Eight police and 322 civilians were kidnapped. As of July 216 persons had been tried and sentenced, and 115 were being held.(64) None of these figures

took into consideration constabulary action. Moreover, the totals for killed and wounded raiders may be presumed to have fallen well short of actual totals, since undoubtedly many escaped even though wounded and at least some bodies were carried off.

Elections and the Police

Of importance to South Koreans generally, and to the police particularly, were the 1948 general elections. On 10 May 1948, elections were held in South Korea to choose representatives to a National Assembly which was to establish the National Government of Korea. The elections were conducted by the South Korean Interim Government. They were held under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, and the terms of reference as embodied in the United Nations Resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 27 February 1948. (65)

The police were the subject of rigid scrutiny on the part of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. In a letter to the Commanding General, USAFIK, dated 12 March 1948, the Commission recalled to the General that its resolution to observe the elections were based on the premise that the Commission would have first ascertained that the "election will be held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press, and assembly would be recognized and respected." The Commission then informed the General that it was genuinely concerned about the possible role the police might play during the elections, and stated that "It will make it its task to watch the attitude of the police very closely and that the results of its observations (of the police) will be an important factor in determining whether it is able to report to the General Assembly that the elections were held in a free atmosphere." (66)

The Commission felt that changes in the Police Department might be desirable in order to assure "a free atmosphere for elections." It had come to that conclusion as a result of divergent views among the Koreans about the manner in which the Police Department executed its duty, despite the fact that the American military authorities, taking into consideration the then existing circumstances, appeared to be satisfied with the performance of the Police Department. In addition, the Commission requested that action be taken to "bring about a re-orientation of the police force as to their attitude toward a free atmosphere for elections." (67)

The rightist press was quite wrought-up about the Commission's attitude on the police. In the politically Moderate Seoul Shin Mun of 8 February, a Hankook Democratic Party spokesman defended the police. "A statement by a delegate of the U.N. Commission of the reformation of the National Police System," he said, was due to lack of knowledge of Korea and ignorance of the great achievements of the police in the last years. "The National Police have tried to maintain public peace at the sacrifice of a 100 policemen," he continued, and added: "We call for grave reflection on the part of the camp which does not admire ... the police and who intentionally ... wrong and slander them." The rightist Dai Dong Sim Moon quoted the Australian delegate as having said that the police system must be reformed radically and that authority to carry out the reform must be give to the U.N. Commission.

The extreme rightist Hyun Dai Ilbo (10 February) could see nothing wrong whatsoever with the police organization. It called the National Police "a patriotic advance guard for Korean independence," and declared:

> "Despite the merits of the National Police, some political brokers and communist elements suggested to the U.N. Commission that the National Police are betraying the people and must be destroyed. A member of

the Commission called for police reform, not knowing that the proposers are reactionaries and Russia's apostles... . If they reform the police system, what system will be substituted?" (68)

General Hodge, on his part, felt that UNTCOK's letter contained a strong inference that if drastic changes in the police force were not made the Commission would automatically say that there was no free atmosphere for elections. Nevertheless, in view of the continuing strong Communist activity with subversive attacks and acts of violence, he stood firm in his decision that there would be no drastic changes in the organization and structure of the police force. (69)

In his reply to UNTCOK's letter, General Hodge assured the Commission that every effort would be made to exercise proper control over the police, and that all their activities would be directed toward free elections everywhere. However, under the then conditions, he saw no other course than to continue the police force as a strong centralized element of government, and to use it under careful guidance without disrupting it, since it was the one effective agency he had for law enforcement, and for the maintenance of that law and order "so essential to keep any vestige of a free atmosphere for elections." (70)

The General was not unmindful of police responsibility in the elections. He made it incumbent upon all agencies who dealt with the police to make every effort to orient and guide them as to what was expected of them before and during the elections in the way of maintaining a free atmosphere. However, he did not want this carried to the extent of giving police the idea that the effectiveness of the police in maintaining law and order was in any way to be lessened during the period of the elections. His criterion was that law and order had to be maintained everywhere at all times, regardless of special events. Thus, in order that there be no

misunderstanding on the part of the police, General Hodge ordered that a special directive to the police be prepared covering their specific duties pertaining to the conduct of elections. (71)

General Hodge called the Commission's attention to his meeting with police chiefs on 12 March, where he impressed upon them the importance of a free atmosphere, explaining at the time that this included free speech, free press, free assembly, and freedom of candidates to campaign for election regardless of their political beliefs. He also then emphasized that no Korean man or woman could be arrested merely for a political belief. (72)

Chough to Police

The police had been properly instructed regarding their position in the forthcoming elections. The National Director, Chough, issued special instructions to all police chiefs reminding them of the government's policy with respect to observance of democratic rights. These instructions provided for the granting of applications for all public meetings, and for non-interference with the distribution of newspaper articles, handbills and posters, unless they actually incited to riot or sedition.

When immediate arrests appeared necessary at any particular time, but no incriminating evidence was soon forthcoming, the persons arrested were to be released at once. Police were further reminded that as members of the National Police they had no right to engage in political activities, except as voters in an election. (73)

Dr. Chough delivered two radio addresses on the police and the elections. In both broadcasts he emphasized the importance of neutrality on the part of the police. In this connection, he said:

There is one thing a policeman ought to know in creating an atmosphere of freedom, and that is taking a strict neutral standpoint. As an individual, he can uphold the political view of a certain political party and oppose that of another party, but as a policeman, he should not take such an attitude. The police are the police of our entire country and not of any one political party or clique. A policeman ought to have the reliance of all parties and organizations, and at the same time he should equally restrain all their illegalities, giving preference to no one, since all are equal in the eyes of the law. A policeman ought to place himself on the legal side and suppress the illegal side.

Therefore, a policeman in an individualistic capacity, can cast a vote for the party he favors, but in police capacity, he must strictly take the neutral attitude. For instance, when there are two candidates of opposite factions in a certain police district, the place and time when and where an opinion can be expressed for or against the candidates is only when he casts his vote at the poll. If he, in the capacity of a policeman, should praise one of them in public and attack the other, he degrades the strict neutrality of a policeman. If this should occur, the people will lose confidence in the police, and, consequently, it will debase the dignity of the law and that will be detrimental to the country. For this reason, the policeman should cultivate the virtue of drawing the line between public and private matters. The duty of the police is to create the atmosphere of freedom so that the people could vote at their own free will, and not to make the people vote for or against a certain political party. The criterion for execution of the duties of a policeman is the law and not private opinion or views. The right of judging which of two parties is right is in the hands of the people, and not in the hands of the police. Maintaining peace and order and creating the atmosphere of freedom for the people so that they can vote freely is the unique and sacred duty of a patriotic and democratic police. (74)

Youth Organizations

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea had also expressed concern over the activities of youth organizations as adversely affecting free elections. The Commission recommended that the police warn the groups against unlawful interference and that their activities be kept under strict control. (75)

General Hodge reassured the Commission in regard to the youth organizations, informing it that the head of the police department had already

held meetings with various youth group leaders and had received pledges from them concerning their activities during the election period. He also informed the Commission that the police would be required to keep youth organizations from congregating in the vicinity of the polling places.(76)

On 8 March 1948, Police Director Chough met with forty youth group leaders, representing sixteen youth organizations. He pointed out to the leaders the historic importance of the general election, and further emphasized the fact that the election must be carried out "as a free and unfettered one in a state of peace and order." All present concurred with Director Chough's views, and pledged themselves to full cooperation toward creating a free environment under which a fair election might be held.(77)

At another youth leader's conference in Seoul on 25 March, specific instructions for youth groups were issued. These required public registration of all youth organizations; forbade assembling at polling places; prohibited interference with voters, candidates, election officials, and campaigns; and urged the exercise of reserve and discipline at all times during the election period.(78)

Police chiefs were required to hold round table conferences with youth leaders, in order that they might keep them fully apprised of regulations, and continue warning them throughout the election period against attempting to violate any of them.(79)

Leftist Complaints to UNTCOK

Prior to the elections, there were many complainst against the police. These concerned mostly their efforts toward increasing registrations; others involved interferences with election campaigns. Threats of arrest,

physical punishment, and stoppage of food allocations, were alleged to have been made by the police. They were also charged with making speeches for certain candidates, and having handbills distributed in their behalf. Too, they were accused of refusing permission to put up election posters as well as destroying some already posted.(80)

These complaints, addressed to UNTCOK, usually came from Communist-front organizations. General Weckerling, the United States liaison officer with the Commission, pointed out to the Commission that it was anticipated that "Communists would resort to complaints to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of 'forced' registrations and later, of 'fraudulent' elections." He continued: "This is standard Communist practice when they are being fairly defeated at the election polls." And in speaking of the registration complaints, he commented: "Personally I am delighted to see that civic-minded individuals in South Korea are zealously urging others to register and to vote. I do not condone threats, coercion, and compulsion, of course, but I doubt seriously whether these elements were present illegally in the cases cited by the complaint."(81)

At a later date, reporting on investigations of the complaints, the General said: "From the facts at hand it would appear that the complaints were not only exaggerated but were made in furtherance of the efforts of the Democratic People's Front to disrupt and interfere with the recent election."(82)

UNTCOK Investigation

UNTCOK made extensive field observations in various key districts in South Korea and concluded therefrom that there did exist in South Korea "a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights

of freedom of speech, press and assembly are recognized and respected." Consequently, the Commission adopted a resolution favoring its official observance of the elections announced by the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea to be held on 10 May 1948. (83)

Election Day

The elections were carried out very smoothly. Observers were completely surprised at their quietude and efficiency. Everywhere it was felt that they were conducted fairly, freely, and honestly. (84)

In this connection, it is worthy of note that the three members of Historical Section, G-2, XXIV Corps, who observed elections (in Chungchong Puk, Kyongsang Puk, and the Seoul area) gave at best casual attention to police activities on election day. One commented on the police being apparently well-prepared in case of trouble, another quotes a local police chief as being admittedly nervous and afraid of a sudden Leftist demonstration; none observed any police activity beyond the proprieties. (85)

Statistically speaking, 7,837,504 registered of an estimated population of 19,947,000 as of 1 April 1948. Of this latter figure, an estimated 9,834,000 were eligible to vote. Hence, of those eligible to vote 79.7 percent had registered. A total of 7,036,750, or 92.5 percent of the registered voters, actually went to the polls, and cast their ballots on election day. (86)

Disorders

Some disorders did occur but the police came through each time to make possible the continuance of the election. Reports from the provinces varied as to the incidents, depending on how active Communists had been.

As early as 7 February, the Communists had already embarked upon an

intensive, comprehensive campaign to disrupt and prevent the 10 May elections. That campaign included murder, arson, violence, strikes, demonstrations, bribery, incitement to riot and revolution, intimidation and propaganda. One hundred and thirty-four election offices had been attacked.(87)

During the election weekend of 8-10 May, there were fifty-seven attacks on voting booths, and seven policemen and five election officials were killed. Besides, there were numerous other killings and incidents involving sabotage of industry and communications, strikes, etc. The total casualties for the entire election period, 7 February through 14 May, were as follows:(88)

	Killed	Wounded
Police	49	128
Members of Police Families	7	14
Election Officials and Candidates	17	65
Communists and Rioters	261	123
Total	334	330

Mainland Provinces

On the whole, reports from the provinces were very favorable as regards the police on election day. In fact, their conduct gained for them the approbation of all connected with the elections.

In the northern provinces of Kyonggi and Kangwon only a few incidents were reported. The police usually kept beyond 100 yards of the polling place. When any closer, or within the polling place, they were there at the request of the election committee. There was no evidence of the police attempting to exert pressure; they merely acted as guards.(89)

The city of Seoul suffered twelve attacks on polling places; most of the attackers were apprehended by the police. In the Mapo district, the second of the admittedly leftist areas of the city, the police were nervous and on a constant alert. Several arrests were made in various districts on election day, but on the whole registration and voting were carried out with minimum disturbance and disorders. (90)

In Chungchong Nam, a voting place in Sochon Gun was attacked before the opening hour. The police on guard killed one attacker, wounded another, and captured two more. (91) An election observation committee consisting of Lt. Col. Robert A. Larson and Mr. Phillip L. Heaton commented that: "Noticeably absent from anywhere in the vicinity of the polling places, the police were seen only at regular police boxes during the entire period of voting. This is to be commended in view of the heretofore opinion that they must be actively involved in all important functions." (92)

Likewise, in Chungchong Puk, the plan for the election was well executed. Only one instance of a policeman entering the polling place was reported, and he was politely told "to go out to his proper distance." (93)

In Cholla Puk, the only attempt at serious disorders were instigated by Communist agitators. In practically all cases, the latter did not progress beyond the attempt stage due to the prompt action of the police, and they were in no case able to interfere seriously. (94)

In Cholla Nam, the police were sometimes too much in evidence in or near the voting booths, but there was no report of any attempt to instruct or influence the voters. Organized youth groups were inactive on election day. (95)

In Kyongsang Puk, only a very few instances of armed police being inside the voting places were observed. In practically all cases, American observers

indicated that all Korean election officials were sincere in their efforts to conduct a free election.(96)

In Kyongsang-Nam, the elections as a whole were carried out in comparative calm. Commenting on police activity, Colonel F. E. Gillette, Chief Civil Affairs Officer for the province, reported: "It is believed that the police made a genuine attempt to carry out the intent of the election law. They carried on a Province-wide education campaign, but on investigation it was found that this was purely for the purpose of inducing the people to vote, and was not directed toward the support of any one candidate. The Chief of Police investigated throughout the Province to supervise this assistance on the part of the police to the election committees and government officials, and reported that great progress had been made."(97)

The day before the election, 500 persons attacked and destroyed part of the police box at Pak Sang, killing one of the policemen. And the preceding day at In Chun, also in Koochang Gun, 400 persons attacked the police box with rifles and shotguns. They burned the building and records, and later assaulted the election committee chairman. Five ballot boxes were seized and destroyed. These were soon replaced. Fifty arrests followed.(98)

Cheju

On the island of Cheju, the Communists apparently made their greatest effort to disrupt the election. Trained agitators and specially armed groups had been sent there from other provinces to interfere with, and halt if possible, the registrations and balloting.

There was considerable intimidation of both election officials and voters, and in some cases complete destruction of ballot places, particularly

in North Cheju. In a few places, almost the entire village populations either left voluntarily or by force on election day.(99)

In two electoral districts of North Cheju the voting was invalidated by the Military Governor on recommendation of the National Election Committee.(100) Less than half of the ballot boxes of the two districts had been received.

Casualties on the island were considerable. For the entire period of the Communist subversive election efforts, 7 February to 14 May, the figures were as follows:(101)

	Killed	Wounded
Police	12	25
Members of Police Families	6	3
Election Officials	4	3

Manet on Elections

Mr. Olivier Manet, French delegate on UNTCOK, observed the elections in Kyongsang Puk. He was pleased that the police were keeping close watch on polling places, declaring that such was necessary in view of pre-election disturbances to protect the voters. He went so far as to state that the policy of the Commission had changed from not wanting the police around to wanting their protection for voters.

In one village, rioters in the mountains had scared the villagers from the polls so that no one had voted until the police restored order in the early afternoon. Mr. Manet was pleased to note when he arrived shortly after the police that a long queue of voters was already busily occupied with casting ballots.(102)

Hyang Boh Dan

A quieting influence on the election was the organization of the Hyang Boh Dan (Community Cooperative Corps), comprising male citizens

deputized to assist the police in the maintenance of law and order during the preparation for the election and throughout the day of the election. Persons so deputized served without pay, but were not prevented from voting by reason of such service. Members of youth organizations or political groups were not eligible for this duty.

The organization was dissolved on 22 May by Ahn Chai Hong, Civil Administrator of the South Korea Interim Government, with the approval of the Military Governor. Their efforts, indeed, contributed to the success of the election, and official appreciation was expressed for their services. (103)

In speaking of the police work during the elections, General Hodge said: "The National Police and Peace Preservation Volunteers did an outstanding job in protecting the people from communist violence in order that they could cast their ballots. (104)

August "New Government" Celebrations

The elections were followed by the organization of the National Assembly on 31 May and the subsequent establishment of the Republic of Korea, on 15 August 1948. General MacArthur came from Tokyo to participate in the celebration at Seoul. The event was celebrated by Koreans throughout the provinces.

Precautions

Special precautions had to be taken to safeguard against possible communist attacks that might mar the country's happy celebrations. Trouble was expected from North Korean sympathizers.

At a meeting of Division Intelligence Chiefs, held 5 August, it seemed certain that the South Korea Labor Party was promoting plans for rioting

on a large scale. Precautionary measures were thus required. National Police Director Chough Pyung Ok issued a special directive to Division Chiefs, calling upon them to take all precautions for the maintenance of law and order. They were required to issue proclamations informing the people of the possible internal and international complexities attendant upon the establishment of the new government, and to warn subversive elements that peace and order would be maintained and that unlawful acts would be punished.

Detailed reports covering activities of the police stations in each Division were required to be made by radio daily at 1200, 1800, and 2400 hours. Constant checks were made of the telephone and wireless systems, and emergency repairs were specially expedited.

As a further safeguard, the month of August was divided into three periods, during which the police were subjected to special mobilization orders, as follows:

7 - 12 August - Period immediately following formation of the government: one-half of entire police personnel mobilized.

13 - 19 August - The so-called Liberation Period: all police personnel mobilized.

20 - 26 August - North Korea Election Period (purported national election was held on 25 August): one-half the police mobilized from 20-23 August; all personnel from 24 to 26 August.

During these periods, the regular 24 hour-work a day-off a day police schedule was set aside, and the police were made subject to continuous 24 hour duty every day. (105)

Many arrests were made. In a concerted drive carried on on cooperation with CIC, the police engaged in a series of arrests to take all persons

suspected as possible trouble makers out of circulation during the 15 August celebrations. In all, 993 persons were arrested throughout the provinces, of whom 637 were released and 237 turned over to the Public Prosecutor for arraingment. Practically all of these last were in Kyongsang Nam, where 709 had been arrested. Arrests in Kangwon totalled 137, in Chungchong Nam 66, and in Cholla Nam 56. (106)

Intelligence work by the police was emphasized during the entire period, and information was required to be transmitted at all levels as expeditiously as possible. Special emphasis was placed on the following:

1. Security of leading members of the government and their staff.
2. Possible riots, and meetings and movements of special elements.
3. Cell organizations of the South Korea Labor Party within the National Police; also, their expansion into the field of business.
4. Underground movements of proponents of the North Korea election.
5. Activities of Democratic Students Union members during their summer vacation.
6. Friction between the Minjok and Dai Dong youth organizations and the Constabulary over the approaching organization of National Armed Forces.
7. Invasion from the sea coasts by secretly dispatched subversive elements. (107)

Possible danger areas in each division were checked, and reinforcements supplied where needed. Large cities, border police boxes, and mountain areas, were considered trouble spots. Eighteen hundred police in Chejudo pursued a policy of occupying all villages; in Cholla Nam approximately 400 reinforcements were supplied for a clean-up campaign in the city of Kwanju, Wando and other islands, and the mountain areas throughout the province. In Kangwon, 200 police reinforcements operated in the Kangnung, Ulchin, and Chuminjin areas, along with many plain-clothes men. (108)

Extent of Disorders

The precautions taken proved fruitful. There were no civil disturbances of any significance on 15 August (New Government Day), or 25 August (North Korea Election Day). In fact, the entire month was quite peaceful. In addition to the abovementioned arrests and other precautions, another contributing factor to the peacefulness of the month might very well have been the South Korea Labor Party directive instructing all South Korea cell leaders to arrive in North Korea on or about 25 August. Presumably, the leaders eagerly gave precedence to such directive over the one requiring them to confront the police.(109) A near-riot was forestalled by the police in Kyongsang Puk, when thirty armed persons tried to prevent a group of farmers from attending the 15 August celebration at Panghyung-ri.(110) Their lives were threatened while en route to the celebration.

North Korea "Elections"

On 25 August, the North Korea People's Republic held what purported to be an "All Korean" election. Approximately 120 persons were arrested in South Korea for collecting ballots and signatures in connection with the election. They were apprehended either en route to North Korea, or while obtaining signatures.

It was reported that close to a million ballots, with signatures or handmarks thereon, had been confiscated by the police. Substantiating reports of forgeries therein, was a confiscated directive of the South Korea Labor Party, communist front organization, which approved the signing of ballots on behalf of voters in areas where "extreme police suppression" prevailed.(111)

Windup

One of the main objectives of Military Government had been to require Koreans to assume progressively the responsibility of supervision in order that full management of the police by Koreans could be accomplished in the shortest possible time. That had finally come to pass.(112)

As of noon 3 September 1948, Military Government turned over to the Republic of Korea the full operation of the Korean police system. Growing from 15,000 policemen in November 1945, its strength at the time totaled 34,000 out of an authorized 35,000, as follows: Uniform Police 24,055; Detectives 5,100; Officers 2,242; Railway Police 2,058; Women Police 545.(113)

Problem of Transfer

During the National Assembly debates of the Government Organization Law, there was much discussion on whether the National Police should continue as a separate department or be absorbed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. At one point, it was reported that President Rhee had called the Organization Committee to his home and advised them to continue the police as an independent agency. However, on 16 July 1948, when the Government Organization Law was passed, the National Police was incorporated into the Ministry of Home Affairs. As a result, police morale was quite low. Dr. Chough had to make a special plea with his fellow police to be faithful both in their work and to the new government. He also issued a public statement denying rumors of uncertainty and restlessness.(114)

Apparently, Koreans in general were well pleased with the police organization set up by Military Government, and with the personnel employed by it. At a meeting held in the offices of the President of the Republic, it was agreed that the plan of organization of the Department of Police, as

established by Military Government, could be adopted by the Republic when it took over the police department, and that there would be no sweeping change in police personnel.(115) Beside President Rhee Syng Man, there were also present at this meeting the following high-ranking government officials: Yun Tchi Yong, Minister of Home Affairs, and formerly personal secretary to President Rhee; Lee In, Minister of Justice; and Chough Pyung Ok, Director of National Police, and his assistant, Han Kun Cho. Their decision was made public in a joint statement to the press by Mr. Yun and Dr. Chough.(116)

Following this meeting, in conformity with a directive by the Military Governor, on 9 August the Minister of Home Affairs and the Director of National Police met with the American Chief Police Advisor to make the necessary arrangements for an orderly and progressive transfer of the Department of Police to the Minister of Home Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Korea, ~~on 10 August~~.(117) On 1 September, they reported that the necessary arrangement had been completed.(118) The next day, in a joint press release, the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, USAFIK, announced that direction of the Department of Police would pass to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Korea, as of noon 3 September 1948.

The release also included the interesting note that the transfer of the Police Department marked the first take over by the new Korean Government of a large governmental agency. Since 15 August there has been continuous consideration of the technical details involved in the transfer of the numerous government functions. The first one to be completed has been the National Police.

President Rhee and General Coulter declared:

In taking this significant step we desire to reiterate

> our belief in a democratic police force dedicated to the preservation of order and of human rights. We are confident that the police organization of the Republic of Korea will continue to maintain the public peace and at the same time safeguard the individual rights of the Korean people.(119)

Accordingly, General Coulter directed Dr. Chough to turn over to the Minister of Home Affairs the custody of all property, equipment, and funds, and to transfer to him all personnel functions and responsibilities of the Department of Police. All property then in the hands of the National Police issued to the American Police Advisors on memorandum receipt was to continue under their control until final settlement was made with the Government of the Republic of Korea. However, pending such settlement, the Ministry of Home Affairs was permitted to use all such property theretofore used by the National Police.(120)

In another letter to Dr. Chough, accepting his resignation as Director of the Department of Police, effective 1201, 3 September 1948, General Coulter expressed his personal and official appreciation for his patriotic and effictive services.(121) A letter from the Minister of Home Affairs to Major Millard Shaw, the American Advisor to the National Police Director, likewise gave thanks for services rendered to the National Police.(122)

Following inauguration of the new Republic, Hwang Hi Chan, Vice-Minister of Home Affairs, became Acting Director of the National Police. Kim Tai Sun, formerly Chief of Detectives at National Police Headquarters, succeeded Chang Taik Sang as head of Division "M", the Seoul branch of the National Police. President Rhee appointed Dr. Chough his personal representative to the Paris meetings of the United Nations General Assembly and Mr. Chang Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Role of U. S. Personnel

When American forces landed in South Korea in September 1945, the maintenance of law and order was a problem of prime importance. It was apparent at once that an entirely new police force would have to be organized. The problem was faced, and by October the National Police were in operation with no less than 85 percent of the men new and untrained, and with uniforms, weapons, transportation, and all other items of police equipment, yet a thought for the future.

Since then, the reorganization of the police had been pursued with unrelenting alacrity, and despensable functions and bureaus of the Japanese system eliminated, until the force as a whole conformed with democratic ideologies pertaining to public protection and law enforcement. (123)

In all, 63 persons served as American Advisors in the Korean Police Department under Military Government, 39 of them military and 24 civilians. On the average, there were twenty advisors serving at any one time; at the peak, the number reached as high as forty. (124)

The caliber of civilian personnel recruited to assist the military in the establishment of the Korean police system were men picked for their proven ability in the field. A cursory review of their backgrounds disclosed that all had police experience in the United States, that they came from different sections of the mainland, and that their experiences were varied. Some served with state police systems, others with city police departments; their experience included work as detectives, uniformed police, crime laboratory technicians, and experts in police administration. (125)

The authority exercised by the American Advisors was considerable. For example, they had the pwer to disapprove any contemplated police action and plans which they considered unsound, undemocratic, or detrimental to USAMGIK,

or the people of Korea. However, they were continuously admonished against abusing this power. Instead, they were cautioned to look upon it as an added responsibility to be used wisely and judiciously. And, also, to at all times maintain efficient and cordial relations with the Korean chiefs of their respective Divisions, despite language barriers. (126)

Democratization of Korea's police force was an ideal toward which American police advisors worked throughout their stay with the Korean police. In this connection, there was some strong objection to a "national" police system, as against a locally based one in the American tradition. The general theory was that the police department of any locality should be under the control and jurisdiction of local public officials elected and answerable to the people of the community. It was argued that crime was local and, hence, should be handled locally, that a national organization handling so important a function possessed despotic potentials. Nevertheless, conditions in Korea were so different from what was generally considered normal, that a National Police was deemed essential, as offering the following advantages:

1. During emergencies and disasters any number of policemen could be mobilized and moved to the scene without delay.
2. Jurisdictional disputes and petty quarrels between police were thus avoided.
3. Political influence was eliminated.
4. Uniform training and impartial law enforcement was guaranteed.
5. The possibility of police, either individually or collectively, joining any group was lessened.
6. Maximum protection for many communities was made available.
7. Intelligence information on subversive movements was not lost in the files of a local organization, but was evaluated and passed along. (127)

As to how well the American Advisors succeeded in achieving this goal

of democracy, there is the following excerpt from a report by Lieutenant Colonel Erickson, the American Advisor to the National Police Director, in which he said:

> In recent months the National Police has proven itself, as an organization, to be truly democratic. Despite opinions to the contrary, arrest ratios of extremists indicate that neither the "Rights" or the "Lefts" are favored and that either group is answerable to the law for violations of acts of violence. This change has been gradual but consistent, and the time is now here when the slight-left, slight-right, or even mild-pink, understands that he can go about his business, regardless of what it is, without fear of molestation from the police. (128)

It was worthy of note that of all individual groups the so-called political groups were more surprised, some pleasantly and some unpleasantly, with such "middle of the road" policy of the police than were any others. Only the extremists needed to fear the police, and even they had nothing to fear unless they violated existing laws and attempted to force their principles on the rest of the citizens. By and large, the police understood that their duty was not concerned with the political dogmas of any individual or group, but the protection of the people against unlawful acts of others. (129)

Police Brutality

Another objective toward which the American advisors worked was elimination of police brutality. (130) By 1948 this was definitely on the wane. Positive action was taken in all cases brought to the attention of even minor supervisory and administrative officers. Public prosecutions were instituted in serious cases. Complaints from the public, other departments, and even political parties, were decreasing monthly, despite the fact that as time passed it was more generally realized that such complaints would be filed without fear of retaliation. (131)

Helpful in this connection was a directive issued on 8 June 1948, authorizing Public Safety Officers assigned as Advisors to the various divisions of the National Police to "suspend from duty" any officer of member of the Korean National Police who might, either directly or indirectly, be suspected of: (a) engaging in acts of brutality against persons in their custody or control; (b) withholding information relative to such acts; or (c) committing any act not in accord with accepted police practice. The directive emphasized that police brutality in every form had to be eliminated, and even encouraged local press releases on the subject. (132)

Some police brutality still existed in 1948, Even though, relatively, there had been a considerable decline. In the period May-July 1948 inclusive, 17 brutality cases came to the attention of the national department, four of them in Chejudo, where conditions were definitely abnormal, and four in Chungchong Puk, with none at all in Kangwon. All four Chejudo cases related to shooting of prisoners. In at least one of these, three policemen were tried in Provost Court and convicted of murder. (133)

Friction Within the Police Department

In the last months of Military Government, some serious friction developed within the Police Department. The outstanding instance was that between National Police Director Chough Pyung Ok and Metropolitan Police Chief Chang Taik Sang. Continuing friction between them during July and early August had a definite political flavor. Both had been affiliated with the strongly conservative Hankook party, but their connections were with different factions. Statements, charges, and recriminations appeared daily in the press. These were generally tainted with the views and opinions of their supporters.

Detectives of National Headquarters under the leadership of Chief Cho Byung Sol and Vice-Chief Lee Man Chong centered their efforts on the Division "M" police. As a result, some were dismissed and others resigned. Their final investigation was against the head of the Division "M" detective section, Roh Duk Sol, and caused his immediate resignation. This was followed by charges that Roh and others close to Chang had killed a prisoner and disposed of the body in the river. The prisoner was alleged to have been involved in an attempt to assassinate Chief Chang. The matter went to the Procurator at the end of July, but by then Roh Duk Sol, the main suspect, had disappeared and the case died.

Finally, on 11 August, Cho Byung Sol and Lee Man Chong, the men responsible for the investigation, submitted their resignations, claiming the Korean government was not interested in seeing justice done. Their newspaper statements were so scathing that Dr. Dhough made a personal apology to President Rhee on the very same day. (134)

Continuation of Skeleton U. S. Personnel

American Police Advisors, except at Divisions "M", were withdrawn from the various Divisions during September 1948. Only one military and three civilian advisors were attached to the National Police from then until 1 November. These included Major Millard Shaw, Advisor to the National Police Director, James H. Berrean, Uniform Police Bureau Advisor, and Lester Chorpening, Detective Bureau Advisor, all of whom continued on at the National Police Headquarter. Roy Cooley, formerly at Cholla Nam, carried on at Division "M". Their services during this period consisted mostly of liaison work with other governmental agencies. (135)

Changed Conditions

With the establishment of the Republic of Korea as an independent

state, Americans became subject to the laws of the land, and liable to arrest by Korean police for violations thereof. On 30 August, the Commanding General, USAFIK, issued a directive requiring American military and civilian personnel, and their dependents, to submit to such arrest without resistance, regardless of alleged offender's feelings as to whether he had committed the wrong or not, and further, to conduct themselves with proper courtesy toward the Korean authorities while in their custody.

By agreement with the Korean authorities, such offenders were not to be brought to trial in a Korean court, but instead turned over to American authorities for action by them. In turn, U. S. Army law enforcement agencies were permitted to arrest Korean apprehended in acts detrimental to the security of persons or property under jurisdiction of the U. S. Army, but in such cases the Korean national so arrested was to be immediately turned over to the Korean police with all available information. (136)

Thus, in taking leave of the National Police, Military Government had turned over to the newly-created Republic of Korea a police system under which the people were no longer subservient to the police, as had been the case under Japanese rule. Instead, the police themselves were fully cognizant that their functions were that of protecting the people against the unlawful acts of other people.

The general attitude of the Korean people toward the police had also changed. It improved considerably. Lieutenant Colonel Erickson, Advisor to the National Police Director, declared that the pace of this improvement in the future would be determined largely "by the continuation of good work on the part of the police, proper publicity and education programs, and gradual elimination of the so-called 'oriental custom' of

corruption in the form of bribes, graft, and gifts."(137)

An interesting change in attitude toward the police is noted in a letter from thirteen representatives of a village in Chungchang Nam, to the Chief of the Police Department's General Affairs Section, Military Government. It read in part: "We hereby ask you as representatives of the people in this village, to promote the police sergeant who is working in the office here to a higher grade. He has done a great many meritorious services during the past year as a policeman." The letter continued to point out the many things the sergeant had done, and portrayed him as a model policeman.(138)

FOOTNOTES

1. G-2 Weekly Summary No 77, 23 Feb - 2 March 47, p 5; also, Incl # 1, pp 2-3
2. Ibid., p 2; No 80, 16-23 March 47, Incl # 1, p 2
3. Ibid., No 80, Incl No 1, p 2; No 77, Incl # 1, p 2
4. Ibid., No 80, pp 4-5; Incl # 2, pp 1-8
5. Ibid., No 102, 17-24 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p 2
6. Ibid., No 103, 24-31 Aug 47, Incl # 1, pp 2-3
7. Ibid., No 101, 10-17 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p 2
8. Ibid., No 102, Incl # 1, p 5
9. Ibid., Incl # 1, p 2
10. Ibid., Incl # 1, pp 3-4
11. Ibid., No 101, Incl # 1, p 2
12. Ibid., No 102, Incl # 1, p 3
13. Ibid., Incl # 1, p 4
14. Ibid., No 103, Incl # 1, p3
15. Ibid., No 104, 31 Aug - 7 Sept 47, Incl # 1, p 4
16. Ibid., No 101, pp 8-9

17. Ibid., No 110, 12-19 Oct 47, pp 6-8

18. Rept, Edward H. Wismer, Division "H" Police Advisor, to National Police Director, subj "Incident at Shin Buk Sub-station," 6 June 47 (in Historical Police File, hereinafter referred to as H P File)

19. Rept, Edward H. Wismer, Division "H" Police Advisor, to National Police Director, subj "Attack of Yongam Police Station by Korean Constabulary," 12 June 47, pp 1-3 (in H P File)

20. Police Department Daily Activities Reports, 1947-48, passim

21. Rept, Col James A. Casteel, Special Investigator, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Animosity between the Korean National Police and the Korean Constabulary," 30 April 47, Exhibit E, Question 29

22. Ibid., Ex F, Q 9

23. Ibid., Ex I, Q 15

24. XXIV Corps Historical Journal, Staff Conference, 12 Nov 48; Interview Harvey L. Horwich (writer of police chapter) with Majors Millard Shaw, National Police Director Advisor, 12 Oct 48; G-2 Weekly Summaries: No 162, 15-22 Oct 48, pp 5-6; No 163, 22-29 Oct 48, pp 4-6; History of Korean Department of National Police for Period from 1 July 1948, 28 Oct 48, p 6 (in H P File)

25. Police Department Daily Acti ities Reports, 1947-48, passim; G-2 Weekly Summaries 1947-48, passim

26. Rept, Col James A. Casteel, USAMGIK Special Investigator, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Killing of Two Soviet Soldiers," 19 April 47 (in H P File); G-2 Weekly Summaries: No 80, 16-23 March 47, pp 6-7; No 81, 23-30 March 47, p 6; No 82, 30 March - 6 April 47, p 6

27. Letr, Commanding General, XXIV Corps, to Lt Gen G F Korotkow, Pyongyang, Korea, subj "Killing of Two Soviet Soldiers," 2 May 47, Casteel Rept, op. cit., pp 1-3

28. Police Directive, Lieutenant Colonel Erickson to Police Advisors, subj "Police Activities in Rice Collection Program," 18 Oct 47 (in H P File)

29. G-2 Weekly Summary No 104, 31 Aug - 7 Sept, Incl # 1, p 3

30. Ibid., No 113, 24-31 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p 4

31. Ibid., No 99, 27 July - 3 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p 4

32. Ibid., No 101, 10-17 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p 4

33. Ibid., No 102, 17-24 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p5

34. Ibid., No 101, Incl # 1, p 6

35. Ibid., No 100, 3-10 Aug 47, Incl # 1, p 4

36. Ibid., No 99, Incl # 1, pp 2-5

37. Letr, Maj Gen W F Dean to Dr Chough Pyung Ok, subj "Letter of Commendation," Feb 48 (in H P File); SKIG ACTIVITIES No 29, Feb 48, p 182

38. G-2 Weekly Summary No 126, 6-13 Feb 48, pp 11-12

39. ~~Ibidem~~ Loc. cit.

40. Ibid., No 128, 20-27 Feb 48, p 6

41. Ibid., No 127, 13-20 Feb 48, p 9

42. Ibid., No 128, p 6

43. Ibid., No 129, 27 Feb - 5 March 48, p 6; SKIG ACTIVITIES No 30, March 48, pp 164-166.

44. G-2 Weekly Summary No 129, pp 6-7

45. Ibid., No 134, 2-9 April 48, pp 5-6

46. Ibid., No 137, 23-30 April 48, p 7; No 139, 7-14 May 48, p 4

47. SKIG Activities No 31, April 48, p 179

48. G-2 Weekly Summaries: No 137, 23-30 April 48, p 7; No 153, 13-20 Aug 48, p 10

49. Ibid., No 153, p 10; Rept, Lester Chorpening, Detective Bureau Advisor, to National Police Director Advisor, subj "Police Situation on Cheju Do," 14 April 48 (in H P File); Rept, Col Rothwell H. Brown to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Activities on Cheju Do from 22 May 1948 to 30 June ~~1948~~ 1948," 1 July 48

50. G-2 Weekly Summary No 138, 30 April - 7 May 48, p 9

51. Ibid., No 139, p 7; No 140, 14-21 May 48, p 7

52. SKIG ACTIVITIES No 33, June 48, p 159

53. Ibid., No 32, May 48, p 156

54. Ibid., No 33, p 160; G-2 Weekly Summary No 140, p 6

55. Rept, Chough Pyung Ok, National Police Director, subj "Opinion on the Settlement of the Cheju Situation," 23 July 48 (in H P File)

56. G-2 Weekly Summaries: No 153, p 10; No 154, 21-27 Aug 48, p 8; No 158, 17-24 Sept 48, p 9

57. Ibid., No 159, 24 Sept - 1 Oct 48, p 7; No 160, 1-8 Oct 48, p 7

58. Ibid., No 160, p 7

59. Rept, Col Rothwell H. Brown to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Activities on Cheju Do Island from 22 May 1948 to 30 June 1948," 1 July 48

60. Interview with Mr. Lester Chorpening, Detective Bureau Advisor, at Headquarters, U S Advisors to the National Police, 20 Oct 48

61. Rept, Detective Bureau Advisor Lester Chorpening to National Police Director Advisor, subj "Police Situation on Cheju Do," 19 April 48, (in H P File)

62. G-2 Weekly Summary No 140, 14-21 May 48, p 6; "Report of the Military Governor of the holding of elections in South Korea on 10 May 1948, leading to the establishment of a Korean National Assembly and Government under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. (UNTCOK)," p 43A (hereinafter referred to as M G Rept)

63. SKIG ACTIVITIES No 32, May 48, p 156

64. Statistics of the Cheju Disturbances from 3 April - 5 July 48, Inspection Command No 1 - Police Administrative Section (in H P File)

65. Rept, Brig Gen John Weckerling, U S Liaison Officer with UNTCOK, to Commanding General, USAFIK, subj "UNTCOK OBSERVATION OF ELECTION IN SOUTH KOREA OF KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES WHICH SHALL CONSTITUTE A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT OF KOREA UNDER RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 14 NOVEMBER 1947 AND PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA THEREIN 14 NOVEMBER 1947 to 1948," 7 June - 26 Aug 48, Book No 2, Incls # 1 and 41 (hereinafter this report will be cited as Weckerling Rept)

66. Ltr, K. P. S. Menon, UNTCOK Chairman, to Commanding General, USAFIK, subj "Recommendations for the Attainment of a Free Atmosphere for Elections," 17 March 48, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 2, Incl # 71, pp 1, 3

67. Ibid., p 3

68. SKIG ACTIVITIES No 29, Feb 48, p 212

69. Ltr, Commanding General, USAFIK, to Military Governor, USAMGIK, subj "UNTCOK Letter Concerning Freedom of Elections in South Korea," 24 Marc 48, M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 13

70. Ltr, Commanding General, USAFIK, to UNTCOK Chairman, subj "Free Atmosphere for Elections," 24 March 48. Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 2, Incl # 72, p 2

71. Ltr, Commanding General, USAFIK, to Military Governor, USAMGIK, loc. cit.

72. Statement made by Lt Gen John R. Hodge before combined meeting of Provincial Governors and Police Chiefs at Seoul, 12 March 48, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 2, Incl # 76, p 2

73. Ltr, Maj Gen William F. Dean, Military Governor, to Provincial Governors and Mayor of Seoul, subj "Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly," 27 Jan 48, M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 14

74. Address by National Police Director Chough Pyung Ok, delivered through the Seoul Broadcasting Station at 2115, 2 April 48, subj "The Atmosphere of Freedom and the Police," Weckerling Rept, op. cit., B k 2, Incl # 30, pp 5-6

75. Ltr, UNTCOK Chairman to Commanding General, USAFIK, op. cit., p 3

76. Ltr, Commanding General, USAFIK, to UNTCOK Chairman, op. cit., p 2

77. Round Table Conference with Youth Leaders, Press Release by Police Department P R O, 9 March 48, WECKERLING Rept, op. cit., B k 2, Incl # 83

78. Instructions issued by Dr. Chough Pyung Ok, National Police Director, at Youth Leaders Conference in Seoul, 25 March 48, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 2, Incl # 84

79. Police Directive, National Police Director Chough Pyung Ok to All Chiefs of National Police, subj "Creating a Free Atmosphere During the Election Period and Controlling the Activities of Youth Groups," 17 April 48 (in H P File)

80. Complaints Concerning Conduct of Elections, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 3, Incls # 124-27

81. Memo, Brig Gen John Weckerling to Ian F G Milner, UNTCOK, subj "Complaints Received Concerning Conduct of the Elections," 10 May 48, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 3, Incl # 124 (4), pp 3-4

82. Memo, Brig Gen John Weckerling to Ian F. G. Milner, UNTCOK, subj "Complaints Received by UN Concerning Conduct of the Elections," 4 June 48, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 3, Incl # 127

83. UNTCOK Resolution to Observe Elections on 10 May 1948, adopted at 33rd Meeting, 28 April 48, Weckerling Rept, op. cit., Bk 3, Incl # 132

84. On this, see Lewis W. Bealer, "Election Day in Seoul - Inchon;" B. Stockton, "Report on election procedure and the election in the Unisong Electoral District, 10 May 1948;" Dana W. Russell, "10 May Elections in South Korea," in Historical Journal.

85. M G Rept, op. cit., p 38

86. Ibid., p 51

87. Ibid., p 44

88. Ibid., p 46

89. Ltr, F J Connaughton, Kyonggi Do Home Affairs Advisor, to Lt Col C G Duffy, Office of Civil Administration, subj "Observation of Korean Election," 14 June 48, M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 38; Ltr, Lt Col Earl Sutton, Kangwon Do Chief Civil Affairs Officer, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Election of Korean National Assembly Representatives, Kangwon Province," 1 June 48, M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 39

90. Rept, Lt Col James A Wilson, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, 40th Military Government Company, City of Seoul, M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 37

91. M G Rept, op. cit., p 39

92. Consolidated Report of Election Observation Teams, Chungchong Nam Province, M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 41, pp 3-4

93. Ltr, Lt Col Marcus Tague, Commanding Officer, 104th Hq and Hq Detachment, Military Government Group, Chungchong Puk, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Election Observation Logs," 28 May 48. M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 40

94. M G Rept, op. cit., p 40

95. Rept, Col Timothy H Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Cholla N am, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Korean National Election in Cholla Nam Province," 24 May 48. M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 43, p 3

96. Ltr, Col Alexander Adair, Commanding Officer, 99th Military Government Group (Kyongsang Puk), to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "American Observation of National Election," 18 May 48. M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 44, pp 4, 5

97. M G Rept, op. cit., p 42

98. Ltr, Col F E Gillette, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Kyongsang Nam, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Report on Election," 14 May 48. M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 45E

99. M G Rept, op. cit., pp 43 and 43 A

100. Ibid., p 43A; G-2 Weekly Summary No 140, 14-21 May 48, p 6

101. M G Rept, op. cit., p 43

102. Ltr, Col Alexander Adair, Commanding Officer, 99th Military Government Group (Kyongsang Puk), to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "American Observation of National Elections," 18 May 48. M G Rept, op. cit., Incl # 44, pp 3-4

103. M G Rept, op. cit., pp 46-47; Directives, Ahn Chai Hong, SKIG Civil Administrator, to Provincial Governors, Mayor of Seoul, and the National Police Director, subj "Preservation of Law and Order," 20 April 48 and 22 May 48, respectively (in H P File)

104. Statement by Lt Gen John R Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK, Commanding General's Statements and Speeches (P I O), 12 May 48

105. Police Directive, Police Department Director to All Division Chiefs, subj "Special Police Precautions during August 1948," 7 Aug 48, pp 1-2 (in H P File)

106. Police Communication Bureau Radiograms, 31 Aug - 6 Sept 48 (in H P File)

107. Directive, "Special Police Precautions, etc.," op. cit., pp 2-3

108. Rept, Police Department to C I C, subj "Possible Danger Areas As Seen By National Police," n.d. (Aug 48), in H P File

109. G-2 Weekly Summary No 153, 13-20 Aug 48, p 10; Police Department Weekly Activities Reports, 31 July - 27 Aug 48

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118. Memo, Major Millard Shaw, National Police Director Advisor, Yoon Chi Yung, Minister of Home Affairs, and Chough Pyung Ok, National Police Director, to Commanding General, USAFIK, subj "Transfer of Department of Police," 1 Sept 48 (in H P File)

~~119.~~

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120. Letr, Maj Gen John B Coulter, Commanding General, USAFIK, to Dr P O Chough, National Police Director, subj "Transfer of National Police from South Korean Interim Government to the Department of Home Affairs," Republic of Korea," 2 Sept 48 (in H P File)

121. Letr, Maj Gen John B Coulter, Commanding General, USAFIK, to Dr P O Chough, National Police Director, subj "Resignation of Dr. Chough as National Police Director," 2 Sept 48 (in H P File)

122. Letr, T Y Yun to Major M Shaw, op. cit., p 2

123. Rept, Lt Col H E Erickson, National Police Director Advisor, to Commanding General, USAMGIK, subj "Administration of Justice in South Korea," 7 Jan 48, p 4 (in H P File)

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125. Police Directive, Col W H Maglin, National Police Director Advisor, to Police Division Public Safety Officers," 13 Dec 46 (in H P File); Interview Harvey L. Horwich with Mr James H. Berrean, Uniform Police Bureau Advisor, at National Police Headquarters, Seoul, Korea, 29 Oct 48

126. Police Directive, Lt Col H E Erickson, National Police Director Advisor, to All Division Police Advisors, subj "Relationship of Police Advisors to Division and Bureau Chiefs of Police," 5 Sept 48 (in H P File)

127. Rept, "Administration of Justice in South Korea," op. cit., pp 4-5

128. Ibid., p 5

129. Ibid., pp 7-8

130. See above, Part I, p

131. Rept, "Administration of Justice in South Korea," op. cit., p 5

132. Police Directive, National Police Director P O Chough to All Zone Commanders, Di ision Chiefs, and Public Safety Officers, subj "Beatings by National Police," 6 June 48 (in H P File)

133. Rept, Uniform Police Bureau Advisor to National Police Director Advisor, subj "Beating and Torture Cases," 3 Aug 48 (in H P File)

134. History of the Korean Department of National Police For Period From 1 July 1948 , 26 Oct 48, p 3 (in H P File); G-2 Weekly Summary No 149, 16-23 July 48, pp 1-2

135. Ibid., p 5

136. USAFIK Hqs Directive by Commanding General [redacted] Coulter, subj "Cooperation with Korean Law Enforcement Agencies," 30 Aug 48 (in H P File)

137. Rept, Lt Col H E Erickson, National Police Director Advisor, to Commanding General, USAFIK, subj "Administration of Justice in South Korea," 7 Jan 48, pp 7-8 (in H P File)

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PART III

Chapter IV

Police and Public Security

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL POLICE IN KOREA

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ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL POLICE IN KOREA

Japanese Police in Korea

The Japanese police in Korea possessed a breadth of function and an extent of power equalled in few countries in the modern world. Their activities penetrated into all aspects of Korean life, including industrial relations, morals, and even thought, whether political or otherwise. They were empowered to imprison without trial, and to make precautionary and summary arrests. Japanese, Koreans, and foreigners, all came within their perview. By 1929 the number of cases tried by police officers each year had risen to more than 100,000. Such arrests usually resulted in a flogging or a fine. Similar offenses were penalized much more severely in Korea than in Japan. Violation of an administrative ordinance in Korea resulted in imprisonment up to three months and a fine up to one hundred yen. The same offense in Japan resulted in imprisonment not to exceed one month or the fine of twenty yen. Not only was this an example of unfair discrimination, but it was an unreasonably harsh punishment in Korea, where the daily wage was quite often less than one yen. These heavy fines were readily used as a method of dispossessing Koreans so that their properties could be taken over by the Japanese. Another feature of the Japanese police system was the large number of convictions. For example, in 1921 ninety-eight out of a hundred defendants were found guilty; in the other two instances the accused was pardoned instead of being declared innocent. All the other higher police officials were Japanese and training in the Police Academy was given only to Japanese. (1)

The higher police officers were usually university graduates who had specialized in police fields. Under the Japanese the police force was a well-trained

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and efficient organiztion. Although the pay of the policeman was very low, there were other sources of income, some legal, some otherwise. Bribes were paid to higher police and department heads, trickling down to officials of lesser importance. Police received discounts on various goods purchased wholesale by the Department and were paid bonuses for many reasons, as long service, extra service, size of family, and so on. Informers were paid on the basis of the value of the information supplied. Police heads were not held accountable for funds used, and a large highly-secret fund was available to top officials for the purchase of especially important information.(2) When the Americans discovered this fund in September 1945, they found no notes lower than 100 yen in the several million yen in various police safes.

The Japanese police organization was on a national basis, with headquarters in Seoul and thirteen main divisions, one for each province. Within the provinces were local stations in each municipality, county, or island, and as many substations in towns or townships as were necessary.(3)

In the Japanese system there was an ill-defined and overlapping connection between the military and the civil police. During the war a new section called "Military Affairs" was established, to enforce draft laws and otherwise copperate with the military forces. Through it the military police gained a great deal of power over civilians.

The Central Police Office in Seoul and the provincial police bureaus consisted of six sections: (1) Police Affairs; (2) Defense; (3) Economic Control; (4) Censorship; (5) Public Health; (6) Peace Preservation. Under the Police Affairs Section were the usual administrative and organizational matters; regulation of personnel; supplies of clothing, arms, and transportation; maintenance of liaison between military

and police forces; police welfare and retirement.

The Defense Section was charged with appropriate measures against air attack, fire, and flood, with numerous volunteer fire companies being operated under its supervision. Later, however, under American reorganization an effort was made to sever this connection. The Economic Section enforced the various regulations concerning economy in Korea. Its jurisdiction extended over rice collection and the enforcement of various government monopolies such as xxx salt, tobacco, and kerosene. The Censorship Section censored publications, radio broadcasts, films, phonograph records, and library books. The Public Health Section enforced an annual housecleaning in every home, inspected cafes, dance halls, houses of prostitution, barber shops, abbatoirs, and similar establishments. It also had jurisdiction over doctors, dentists, druggists, xx nurses, hospitals, burials, cremations, supervision of veterinaries, and enforcement of quarantines. Under the Peace Preservation Section there was a division of secret police which undertook "thought" control". It had the supervision of public meetings and so-called Foreign Affairs,, which related to the Korean revolutionaries who managed to cross over into Korea from Manchuria. Another of its functions was the inspection of homes to see that the Japanese emperor's picture occupied a place of honor. A simple chart of the police organization under the Japanese is as follows:

CENTRAL POLICE BUREAU

Departments (also found in provincial bureaus)

1. Police Affairs
2. Defense
3. Economic Control
4. Censorship
5. Public Health
6. Peace Preservation

Bureaus

1. Seoul Metropolitan Police Bureau
2. Provincial Police Bureaus (13 in number)

Offices

One in each municipality, county, or island

Boxes

One in each town or township

The Japanese police force consisted of about 23,000 of whom eight or nine thousand were Koreans in subordinate positions.(4)

The Japanese appear to have been stunned by the Emperor's proclamation of surrender on 15 August 1945. A few hours after the announcement the Koreans began to hold mass meetings and parades. These soon developed into rowdyism and robbery, particulary in robbery of food warehouses where the Japanese had stored food previously collected by the Economic Police, which was intended to be rationed to the people or sent to Japan. Shinto shrines were burned and some policemen were beaten. Adding to the confusion, a radio station, operating on the frequency of [redacted] JODK (Radio Tokyo), announced that the Russians would arrive in Seoul the next day to take over. When the Russian arrival appeared

inevitable
inevitable, Mr. Endo Ryusaku, vice-governor general, invited Lyuh Woon Hyung to form an association for the maintenance of the government. Fearing trouble from the student group, the Japanese chose Lyuh because he was a liberal and was popular with the student organizations. The name of the group at first was called the Korean Committee for the Preparation for the Reestablishment of the State. The name was changed several times thereafter, but finally became known as the People's Republic of Korea.

It was thought that this group would be quite acceptable to the Russians, as some of Lyuh's followers had communistic leanings. Lyuh organized three groups of Korean youths, some of whom had just been discharged from the Japanese army; and others of whom were students; these groups were to act as a special police force. It was taken for granted that Korean independence was henceforth an accomplished fact. The Cairo Declaration, as translated by the Japanese, stated that independence would be granted "in a few days" rather than the correct "in due course."

One of Lyuh's first steps was to release all political prisoners and these criminals who had served at least two-thirds of their sentences. In the attempt to maintain their authority on the day of surrender, the Japanese had made many precautionary arrests, especially of Koreans who were particularly suspect because of foreign residence. The number of political prisoners and criminals released totalled approximately ten thousand. Release of these prisoners increased the probability of turbulence in an already restless city.

Lyuh's organization did its best to maintain order, but achieved little success with violence increasing throughout. Lyuh's rule was short-lived, lasting only three days, 14, 15, and 16 August. However, not giving up hope, the People's Republic expected to have its power restored by the Americans. This expectation

was the basis for much of the later conflict between the Koreans and the Americans.

When the Russians failed to appear and the disorders continued, the Japanese stated that it was not their intention to give up their power entirely, but had hired Lyuh solely to help maintain order. The police were assisted by the army in vigorous repressive measures. For two weeks neither the Japanese nor the Koreans knew what the Allied powers were going to do. During this interval the Japanese distributed prison funds, sold goods belonging to the prisons, and destroyed portions of the fingerprint files and the records of two prisons in Seoul. Members of the Japanese Military Police, having some authority over civilians, began to stir up trouble among the Koreans, with a view to creating friction between them and the incoming Allied forces. To further this they had money, arms, and opium. About 15,000 Koreans were discharged from the Japanese army.* At the time of American arrival about 70 percent of the police force were Japanese.

The Americans Take Over

The Japanese complied with such alacrity to General Hodge's request that demonstrations be kept to a minimum, that the day prior to the American landing at Inchon they broke up a Korean demonstration of welcome by killing two Koreans and wounding several others.(6) The following day in Seoul, 9 September 1945, the people were allowed to demonstrate. The situation rapidly got out of hand. One major conflict was between the Japanese and the Koreans. Korean bands resumed looting and mistreating Japanese nationals. Some of these bands belonged to Lyuh's Peace

*These were the first Koreans to be utilized by the Americans as policemen.

Preservation Groups; others were merely thieves capitalizing on an opportunity. The Japanese reported that in one case Lyuh's band had disarmed twelve policemen and driven them from their posts. Also, the Koreans were divided among themselves. Rightists charged that Lyuh was a Communist and that he was also pro-Japanese, having been delegated some authority by the Japanese.(7) Finally, all Koreans were shocked and disappointed when independence was not given to them immediately. As an illustration of the confusion that reigned throughout, the following incident was reported: Between 16 August and 13 September, members of Lyuh's group arrested twenty persons on various criminal charges, such as theft, embezzlement, and manslaughter. When the United States Army arrived, Lyuh's followers tried to turn their prisoners over to the local Japanese authorities. They refused, however, to accept them on the ground that they had nothing to do with criminal matters. The Koreans were unable to locate the headquarters of the Military Police, whereupon a rival political party notified the Americans that the leaders of the Peace Preservation group were holding twenty prisoners illegally. American Military Police arrested the leaders of Lyuh's group and released the alleged criminals. The volunteer police officers were kept in jail three nights before released.(8)

With the aid of American soldiers the Koreans were able to disarm the Japanese police. Many of the American soldiers gave way to the urge for "souveniers" and joined in the looting, failing to make any distinction between Koreans and Japanese. For example, an American MP, allegedly, held up a university professor at the college gate and took his money, watch, and pen. As a result, complaints poured in from all sides. General Schick reported at the XXIV Corps staff meeting on 13 September that the police were "at present in a state of suspension with increasing lawlessness against which the police are almost powerless." One of the first steps in the restoration

of law and order was to forbid American soldiers to disarm Japanese police. The Japanese were also informed that the Koreans had not been given the power to take over property belonging to the Japanese. Americans came to the rescue of Japahese police who were being besieged in Seidaim Prison in Seoul, and helped the recover rice looted from a government warehouse by a huge mob of Koreans.' (9)

During this emergency the control of the Korean Police xxx Bureau was added to the military duties of Brig. Gen. Lawrence E. Schick, Provost Marshal. Upon taking over, General Schick had the supervision of all the police in Korea, with Colonel R. W. Argo in charge of the civilian police in Seoul. General Schick remarked that the displaced Japanese Director of Police, Tadeo Nishihiro, "had no stomach for the job," and that he xx himself felt the same way because conditions were next to hopeless. (10) General Schick began by interviewing Japanese section chiefs and concluded that all Japanese officials would have to be replaced immediately. Especially urgent was replacement of patrolmen who were continually out where they could be seen and who were being attacked. Office workers, who were much harder to replace, were to be kept a while longer. This entailed abandonment of Military Government's original plan to keep Japanese personnel in office until Koreans could be trained to take over the positions. (11) In his weekly report (25 September 1945) to the Civil Administrator, General Schick gave the outlined organization of the Political Affairs Department, as it was then called, consisting of the following sections: Administration, Finance, Criminal Investigation, Clothing and Supply, as well as a training school. By early October all the higher Japanese officials had been removed. (12)

A minor Korean official was put in charge of recruiting Koreans for the police force. At first only those Koreans who had been in the Japanese Army were

employed as they at least were accustomed to discipline, formations, and obedience to orders. Immediately the Koreans began to complain that these were "collaborators" and were inefficient.

Early Difficulties

The fact that approximately 85 percent of the new men had had no previous police experience, made it impossible for them to be anything but inefficient in the beginning.(13) Recruits were processed, given whatever instructions there was time for, and sent to their posts as quickly as possible. This at least helped to curtail the most violent disorder. On 27 September 1945 it was reported in the XXIV Corps staff conference that no police boxes had been raided for ten days and that the police force of Seoul was almost up to authorized strength. However, the policy organization was lacking in nearly everything, including uniforms, arms, rice, coal for the coming winter, a communication system with the provinces, and a national organization, except on paper.(14)

The Japanese police academy, which was closed, had accommodations for about 500 men. As only the buildings were left, Major Daniel De Salvo, who had been put in charge, began to collect supplies and started a course which gave a month's training to each recruit. One of the great difficulties was the absence of any Korean laws. To counteract this deficiency the men were taught American military law and proclamations, as well as whatever Japanese law seemed suitable to the instructors.(15)

Due to the initial haste in recruitment it soon became necessary to weed out great numbers of undesirables. This was done by fingerprinting all the police. Those only one having a non-political criminal record was immediately dismissed. In one group alone in the police academy, 260 out of 450 had to be dismissed because of criminal

background, illiteracy, or physical disqualifications.(16)

Americans began the immense task of persuading the police, who knew only Japanese methods of punishment, to give up brutality in dealing with suspects or criminals. Japanese procedure was based on the assumption that an accused person was guilty until proven innocent. In Korea, as in other Oriental countries, no rights were inviolable and human beings came at the bottom of the value scale. An example of this appeared in the police report on a flood in Seoul. Livestock lost was carefully listed; following ~~this~~ that it was noted that "a number of human beings were drowned." When questioned by the Americans, the Koreans replied that the persons listed were just women, children, and old men who were unable to work anyway.(17) The face-saving element of Korean life is another remarkable difference between the Koreans and the Americans. As a typical example, the chief of police in Seoul proposed to promote and transfer an incompetent officer in order to get rid of him.

An extreme basic feature of the Korean police organization was the large amount of graft. This fact was so widely accepted that Americans had little hope of doing much about it. As mentioned before, under the Japanese system graft was paid to the head of the department and trickled down to lower levels. When the Americans took over National Police Headquarters they found several million yen which had been donated to the chief of police by various businessmen, and for which the chief was not accountable. This money was supposedly used to pay for information and to pay bonuses to policemen. As late as mid-June 1947 the Korean police were reported to be constantly petitioning for the restoration of the "bonus" system.(18)

The Oriental family system ran counter to the American desire for efficiency.

Americans complained that it seemed absolutely impossible to get a person hired for competence instead of his social standing. The same factor blocked the firing of incompetents. On the occasion of rioting and other troubles, substitution of a night stick for a sword was a symbol of authority. The people called the policemen "washerwomen" because the sticks resembled those used by laundresses. Eventually the helmets had to be given up because young Koreans associated them with "clown hats." It was an Oriental practice to keep policemen on duty 24 hours a day, having the policemen stay in their boxes so that they could be easily located in case of trouble. In April 1946 the Americans announced that the patrol system was to start within two or three weeks. At first patrolmen had little respect for the newly-trained officers, who had no experience, but in time grounds for this complaint vanished.

The task of organization and recruitment was made harder by constant bitter criticism in the native press. Theoretically, the Japanese had a national organization, but by November 1945 the police were on a local basis. The provincial police headquarters and local stations maintained a minimum of contact with higher headquarters. On 17 December 1945 an attempt was made by the Mayor of Seoul to gain control of the metropolitan police but nothing resulted from it. Both the Koreans and Americans agreed on the desireability of establishing a national organization. On 27 December 1945 a Military Government directive set forth the policies of a national police force, stating that the provincial governors were to call on the police to keep order but were to have nothing to do with matters of recruiting, promotions, or other administrative police matters. (19) It was necessary to have such a national body since the disordered state of the country demanded a large flexible force which could be moved quickly wherever it was needed. Such a force was more economical as it provided uniformity in procedure and administration, and the breaking of local ties would minimize the joining of

resistance groups, as well as help in dealing with graft and allowing the transfer of a man who had become too deeply rooted in one community. It was hoped that the national organization would tend toward a more impartial enforcement of the law.

The Koreans wanted as large a police force as had been maintained under the Japanese regime, that is, a ratio of about eight policemen to every thousand of population. The Americans contended that one to every thousand was sufficient. The matter was merely one of who should exercise authority in Korea, as in the absence of an army, the police were the only instrument of power. This was behind the intense interest in the policemen's political views.(20)

The police were unwilling to give up any of their original power. Although the Thought Control and Economic Police were abolished, time and time again directives had to be issued instructing the police to use their energies on other activities of criminals instead of collecting political information with absolutely no cause, by seizing books of merchants and professional men and holding these men until the books were thoroughly examined.(21) When experienced American advisors recommended a Central Licensing Bureau which would require approval of the respective bureaus, such as the fire department and public health authorities, the police opposed it so bitterly that Military Government allowed the proposal to be set aside. The police said privately that not only would it cut down their power considerably, but that "there would be nothing in it for anybody."(22) In addition, the police were bitterly jealous of the Americans and [redacted] of the Constabulary.(23)

Early Organization

During the first months of the occupation it was necessary to follow the Japanese structure rather closely, with a few but important changes. The Military

Affairs Section of the Japanese police organization lost its functions when the Japanese army withdrew. The Thought Control Police were abolished at once by dissolution of the Bureau of Peace Preservation on 29 September 1945. Matters pertaining to public health were allocated to the newly created Department of Public Health and Welfare.(24) This change was made in the hope that many opportunities for petty graft and persecution would be eliminated. With the dissolution of the Economic Police(25) came cessation of rice collection and rationing. Abandonment of censorship (which included films, plays, and public assemblies) on 22 September 1945 allowed newspapers to print everything and anything they so desired, and the irresponsibility of some of the editors proved to be a sore vexation to Military Government.(26) Some time later the fire fighting element of the Defense Section was established on a local basis.(27) One of the unexpected consequences of this was that when the police were directed not to beat prisoners, their former collaborators in the fire department did it for them.(28) During this reorganization, the police gained control of the fingerprinting section from the Department of Justice. This was incorporated in the newly created Criminal Investigation Department.(29)

Separation of Civil from Military Police

On 13 November 1945, General Lawrence E. Schick, who had been in charge of both military and civil police, was appointed Director of the newly created Department of National Defense, which included all defense and public safety organizations.(30) The police organization was renamed the Police Bureau in place of the Japanese Department of Police Affairs. Colonel Argo, who was also transferred to the Department of National Defense, was succeeded in the Police Bureau by Colonel Arthur S. Champeny. In a little over a month, Colonel William

H. Maglin took over the bureau and remained until the summer of 1947. Dr. Chough Pyung Ok became Korean Chief of Police on 20 October 1945.(31) Separation of the police from the Department of National Defense was effected on 29 March 1946, with the transformation of the bureau into a full-fledged department.(32)

Reorganizations

The first reorganization plan of the police, drawn up chiefly by Colonel A. E. Brandstatter, was published on 26 November 1945. It clarified the duties and responsibilities of each bureau head. The Director was responsible for police and fire protection, assisted by a staff composed of an executive officer, an officer in charge of special studies, and the heads of the seven bureaus (police affairs, fire, criminal investigation, personnel, communications, finance, and supply).(33) The second plan of reorganization, which cut the seven bureaus to four, became effective on 15 April 1946 and is shown in the chart below:

NATIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN SEOUL

Advisor to Director — Director

BUREAUS

Communication | Detective | Uniform | Administration

DIVISIONS

Metropolitan "M" Seoul only

Provincial Division: "A" to "H" (inclusive) Eight provinces

DISTRICTS

Local Subdivisions

The national organization was broken into eight main divisions designated by letters from "A" to "H". A ninth, for the City of Seoul, became Division "M". A tenth was added when the Railway Police were incorporated as part of the regular force.(34) The divisions were in turn subdivided into ~~one hundred and fifty-two~~ 152 districts. The strength of each division varied with the population and the needs of each province. National Headquarters were located in Seoul with division headquarters in the provincial capitals.(35) For the purpose of inspection five or more districts were grouped together. The chief duty of the Assistant Director was to conduct necessary inspections and to investigate all cases of police irregularity.

A definite chain of command was established within the entire organization. Under it, the director of the department of national police dealt directly with the chiefs of the ten divisions. Regulation of personnel, supply, and administrative procedure were under his jurisdiction. ~~The chief of a~~ a division (chief of the provincial police) was responsible to the governor of the province only for the maintenance of order.(36) The governor had no power over appointments, control of police finances, or authority to dismiss policemen. In case the governor was dissatisfied with police performance, he could complain to the Director of National Police through the public safety officer. Directly below the division chiefs were district commanders with rank of captains, followed by lieutenants, sergeants, and non-ranking policemen. Division of the four bureaus of national police headquarters, including the Korean heads and American advisors, June 1947, was as follows:(37)

Communications	Detective	Uniformed police	Administration
	BUREAU		
Lt. J.C. Vance (ADVISOR) Dr. E.T. Cho (Head)	Mr. Chorpening (Advisor) Kim Tai Sun (Head)	Maj.P.L.Rackley (Advisor) Han Chong Kun (Head)	Maj. T.S. MacFarland (Advisor) Cho (Head)
	SECTION		
I. Radio II.Telephone	I. Crime Laboratory II. Fingerprinting III. Central Office Staff IV. Criminal Information Section V. Special Services	I. Police Academy II. Police Services & Inspection III. Organization & Planning IV. Policewomen	I. Personnel Section II. Finance Section III. Supply Section
	SUBSECTIONS		
Under Radio (I) 1. Engineering 2. Transmission 3. Operation			Under Personnel(I) 1. Division Employees 2. National Employees
Under Telephone(II) 1. Engineering 2. Operation		Under Police(II) Service & Inspect. 1. Vice Squad 2. Traffic	
	(Under III Central Office Staff) 1. Administrative 2. Education and Training 3. Provincial		Under III Supply Section 1. Purchasing & contracting 2. Warehouse & factory
	(Under IV Crime. Information Section) 1. Individual Criminal Records 2. Organization Records 3. Industrial, Commercial, Maritime		

Fire Prevention

As previously noted, the Japanese Defense Section of the police had controlled the fire department, maintenance of the police communications, and air raid precautions during the war. In the American reorganization fire protection was turned over to other agencies, and the Bureau of Communications became a separate organization.

Under the Japanese there were some paid firemen in Seoul, Kaesong, and Inchon, but the bulk of the fire companies were volunteers who worked under police direction. In Seoul the chiefs of the three fire departments functioned as separate entities without liaison and without attempting to help one another in case of fire. There was not even a ladder in the whole department. Americans concluded that the Japanese system was merely to keep a fire from spreading and that nothing was done to quench the blaze in the structure that was actually burning. (38)

The first American officer to be placed in charge of fire fighting and police communications was Captain H. A. Clayton. He set to work locating Japanese bombs (for which he requested removal by the Army). He had the Japanese munitions trains moved from the siderails in Seoul to the outskirts of the city. He collected fire maps and determined what equipment was available. Initially his staff consisted of an interpreter and various Korean employees, until 3 October when an officer and an enlisted man were assigned to him. Over half of the mobile fire apparatus in Seoul was out of order at this time. Some of it dated back to 1920 and the latest model of Japanese pumper was made in 1939. Only poor grade Japanese gasoline was available. Water pressure was low, the water mains were in bad shape, the hose was rotten, and the city had no fire alarm system. Fires were reported to the nearest police station or were detected from lookout stations, of which Seoul had only four. In anticipation of air raids the Japanese had cut several fire breaks through the city and had placed thousands of two hundred gallon concrete water cylinders along the streets. Little by little large amounts of concealed Japanese fire fighting equipment came to light. A Korean was assigned the task of recruiting firemen; late in September 1945 training schools were opened, in which the first instructors were Japanese. The three main stations

gave a two-weeks course to classes of twenty-five men each. By October Captain Clayton was able to turn responsibility of fire control over to provincial and metropolitan teams.(39)

Provincial fire departments (under the authority of public safety officers) were ordered to map cities, repair equipment, both public and privately owned, establish fire stations for each three square miles of city, and organize a paid fire department. In planning the station a seven-man company was employed for each piece of apparatus. A fire district was the area covered by about five companies. At the head of each district was a district chief and a chief engineer in charge of the entire department. In addition, depending upon the size of a city, there was established an arson bureau, a machine shop of from two to five men each, and a building inspection, or fire prevention bureau, of from five to ten men. The alarm system was to be improved by fire watchers or the installation of an efficient telephone system.

For Seoul, with an area of about 85 square miles and over a million inhabitants, the plan was to obtain about forty pieces of pumping apparatus located in thirty-five fire stations, 560 firemen, one chief engineer, six district chiefs, five mechanics, five men on the arson bureau, and ten men on the fire prevention bureau.(40) It was agreed that fire control in Seoul should be a municipal function.(41) Regulations were drawn up with a view to preventing fires and increasing the efficiency of the fire departments.(42) A National Fire Commission was created. On 10 April 1946 operation of the fire departments by the police ceased, and the departments were placed under local supervision.(43)

Communication Bureau

The one division of the department which was retained under the new plan was the police communication section, as it was renamed by the Americans. Soon after the Provost Marshal, (General Schick) took over, the civilian police announced that its communication system was extensive and in good condition.(44) This evaluation was over-optimistic because later it was found very difficult to use the long toll lines. At first it was believed that the system consisted only of telephone and telegraph facilities, but Captain Clayton discovered on 13 September that there was a police radio station in working condition. Before he could make use of it, however, United States troops moved into the building. They stayed there less than a week, but nevertheless long enough for them completely to strip and ruin the station.(45) Orders were given that no more police property could be taken in this fashion. At first only two provincial capitals were in telephone contact with Seoul, but by 26 December all provinces except one could be reached by telephone.(46) By "scrounging, threatening, pleading, and appropriating", enough radio and telephone equipment was secured by 21 December 1945 to establish contact with three capitals. By 6 February 1946 daily radio messages could be sent out to all provincial capitals.(47) A press release of 5 April 1946 announced that two-way radio communication had been established with eight provincial capitals. Radio communication was especially needed in a country where riots were commonplace and the first thing the rioters did was to cut the telephone lines. All telephone lines which ran north of the thirty-eighth parallel had been cut by the Russians. Consequently, until 20 April 1946, all messages to Kangwon-Do had to be sent by radio.

At first, for lack of trained personnel, messages between Seoul and Pusan were in Japanese. Another difficulty lay in the lack of trained technicians and maintenance men. National headquarters were responsible for all the new

communication installations and for major repairs, utilizing local repairmen for minor jobs. Other departments of Military Government were allowed to use police lines for reaching provincial capitals. No code or cipher was used. By the middle of 1946 there was a communications network of thirty-nine radio stations and 14,000 miles of telephone lines.(48)

DETECTIVE BUREAU

Section Crime Laboratory

The Japanese allowed only the Kyonggi provincial police to use the laboratory at headquarters in Seoul. It was used chiefly for autopsies.(49) Americans found some of its equipment had been wrecked and much of it had been stolen. A number of criminal records had been removed, though many of them were recovered later. At first the laboratory was reconstructed largely by salvaging. A compound microscope was made from old German microscopes, and various other ingenious improvisations were similarly worked out. The laboratory was officially launched 4 February 1946 under Dr. Lieu Young Ho, a graduate of Severance Medical College in Seoul, with Mr. H. G. Creytes as American advisor. Later it obtained spectroscopes, ultraviolet ray, and microphoto equipment, as well as other apparatus for the analysis of evidence. The staff included specialists in photography, ballistics, chemical analysis, and handwriting experts. In addition to its usual police duties the laboratory rendered services to the general public.(50) Thus, the purchaser of a pearl was able to have it examined to determine it genuineness or to discover flaws. Merchants could check on the quality of silk or the adulteration of some commodity. Patients could be assure that the powdered snake prescribed by their physicians was really the reptile which the doctor ordered. As a result of one such test, a peddler charged with selling narcotics had the charge changed to fraud when his opium proved to be cornstarch.(51) The staff refused

credit for solving a big counterfeiting case, saying that the bogus money was so much better than the real that anybody could detect the difference. (52)

Fingerprinting and Criminal Information Sections

Recovery of the stolen fingerprint files and personal records led to the dismissal of a number of criminals who had rushed to join the police force. It was discovered that the Japanese system of fingerprinting was much simpler and much faster than the Western system. The criminal identification files had a complete system of cross-indexing under such headings as types of crimes, weapons used, place, habitual techniques, and innovations. These files offered an excellent chance for study and comparison. There was also a full photographic file as well as a file of industrial, commercial, and maritime records. Except for fingerprint files, all data were turned over to the Criminal Information Section. Later compilation showed that the fingerprint section had over 900,000 sets of prints on file, dating back to 1910. (53)

Central Office Staff and Special Service Sections

The subsections of the Central Office Staff were divided into administrative, education and training, and the provincial subsections. The duties of this staff were correspondence, payrolls, files, translating, training manuals, technical research, and liaison with the commandant of the National Police Academy. The Special Service Section conducted such investigations as were assigned by the Director of Police. These included counterfeiting, narcotic cases, illegal use of explosives, forgery, conspiracy on a national scale, investigation of employees of the national government on the demand of the proper authority, investigation of economic and political organizations, and investigation of other matters not within the scope of provincial or local police detective units. (54)

Candidates for detective training were picked men, chosen from the uniformed police. Their numbers were not to exceed 15 percent of the authorized strength of the national police force. Each province had an assigned quota.

Detectives received higher pay than ordinary policemen. Provincial detectives were under the provincial chiefs of police, but maintained direct communication with national headquarters in Seoul. A school offering advanced work for detectives was established in Seoul on 1 March 1946. Agents were sent from each province to study for one month. The course of study consisted of investigation, identification, preparation of reports, and fingerprinting. (55)

The first Korean head of the detective force was Daniel Ne Choy (Choy Heung Chin, better known as ~~who~~), who very early in the occupation made the acquaintance of United States Military authorities. The American officer in charge was Lt. Col. John H. Flynn. In the course of time a feud developed between Mr. Choy and the Korean head of the National Police, Dr. P. O Chough, culminating in the requested resignation of Mr. Choy. Charges and countercharges were aired in the various Korean papers. Apparently both believed that attack was the best form of defense. (56)

Early Difficulties

One of the earliest difficulties encountered was the negligence ~~of the~~ or unwillingness of provincial police chiefs to send in duplicates of their fingerprint files. (57) Again and again letters were sent out to the provinces demanding weekly reports and copies of fingerprints taken. In the attempt to change over from the Japanese procedure, detectives were warned not to conduct independent investigations, and not to seize the books of business firms unless they had direct orders to do so, based on reasonable suspicion of some definite offense. (58) A hint of their activities came from Cholla Namdo when a recommendation for appointment to the "Subversive Sub-Section" came to headquarters for approval. It was pointed out that no such subsection existed and if one had been organized in that locality it should be discontinued immediately. (59) Too ~~much of the time~~ often, the detectives' concern was with a person's political beliefs rather than in criminal activities.

Considering all the official efforts to abolish the Japanese system of espionage and all the directives forbidding such activities, it is illuminating to read the description of their organization handed out by the Metropolitan Police on 26 August 1947, entitled "Chronological History of the Metropolitan Police Department Territory." A significant paragraph follows:

> ——The Observation section, which is a branch of the Detective Bureau, though its activities are more civil than criminal, is responsible for all the political activities, news, magazines, public morality, strikes, foreign affairs, and religious activities. From this brief description you can readily understand the importance of this important bureau during the troubled and turbulent times that this country of Korea is at present passing through. This bureau has been invaluable to the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of peace during the past year.

It appeared as though ~~the~~ abolition of the Thought Control police had been a wasted effort. Investigations ~~of the police~~ brought out the fact that some police thought that the main interest of Military Government was the suppression of Leftists, in spite of numerous directives that went out to the provincial chiefs. The chiefs apparently did not pass the American ~~advisor's~~ instructions on ~~to~~ their subordinates. In an effort to get at the bottom of the troubles that caused the riots in October and November 1946, a Joint Korean-American Conference was held in Seoul in which the fact of the prevalence of the foregoing activities was established. (60)

Uniformed Police Bureau

The Uniformed Police Bureau was divided into four sections: the Police Academy (later changed to a college), Police Services and Inspection, Organization and Planning, and Policewomen.

When the Americans arrived in Seoul they found the former Japanese Police Academy closed and much of its equipment stolen. As has been noted previously, Major Daniel De Salvo was the first officer to be placed in charge of the school. The institution had a capacity of 500 and was at first used as a recruiting station. Major De Salvo meanwhile hunted around for much-needed supplies.

In three former Japanese schools he found Japanese police and firemen's emergency supplies of canned food, clothing, and blankets. Two truck loads of these supplies went to the police warehouse and some coal was obtained.(61) The police school equipment was in quite rundown condition as the Japanese heads had been stealing the money give them for maintenance. The school was opened on 15 October 1945. A four weeks course was planned. Japanese instructors were utilized at first but were replaced as rapidly as possible with Koreans, seventeen of whom were tentatively appointed as teachers.(62) Chou Bo Yun, chief of the training section, was made the acting director of the police academy.(63)

The re-named Police Academy of Korea was, for the first time, opened to to provinces. Fifty trainees from Pusan were in the initial class of 442 which began work on 16 October 1945. The course of study consisted police service, judo, fencing, military training, elementary law, Korean language and history, police organization, hygiene, United States military law and government, public safety economics, sketching, geography, first aid, current events, and kinds of evidence.(64) Major De Salvo pointed out that there was no Korean law to be taught, so the men were instructed in Military Government directives. The report of an inspection made in December 1945 brought out that the academy was making maximum use of Korean personnel, that the premises were only fairly clean, and that the school lacked policy, manuals, and materials.(65)

The minimum requirements for police recruits were established by 19 December 1945. These were: age, 22-35 inclusive; height, not under 5'3"; appearance, prepossessing; education, 3 years middle school; physical condition, , no disabilities, medical examination for venereal, skin, and other contagious diseases; criminal record, must never have been convicted of any non-political crime; nationality, Korean only; references, previous employers, (and others). Minimum service, 3 years. Previous police employment might be substituted for the above only with the approval of the Provincial Chief of Police.(66)

Graduation of the first class was marked by a rather elaborate ceremony in the XXIV Corps Theatre, with 414 out of the original 442 actually finishing.

In spite of the standards which were set up, and in spite of repeated directives on the topic, hundreds of undesirables were sent to Seoul from the provinces as students in the Police Academy. In one group, 260 out of 450 were denied entrance because of criminal background, illiteracy, or physical disqualification.(67) Even mental defectives showed up among the candidates. On 6 April 1946 the Seoul Police Academy was redesignated the National Police College. Thereafter, only advanced police work was given, as police administration, finance, supply, communications, and supervision for the various ranks. On 19 July 1946 the first class of one hundred commissioned officers completed the course.(68) To enter the college candidates (with the exception of detectives) were required to have at least the rank of lieutenant. Policewomen were also trained in the Police College, as there was no provision for them in the provincial academies.(69) Provincial academies were established as soon as possible.(70) One of the first efforts to start these schools was a four-day course (19-23 November 1945) given to a group comprising one policeman from each town and one from each county. By the middle of 1946 these provincial academies could turn out 1,459 students every five weeks. Basic instruction in the division academies was as given in police schools in the United States. In an effort to supplement the instruction given in the provincial academies, visiting teams of instructors from the Police College were sent out to the provinces. An example of this was the group sent out to teach First Aid.(71)

Police Service and Inspection

The Police Service and Inspection Section of the Uniformed Police Bureau was divided into three sub-sections: Vice Squad, Traffic Squad, and Office

Staff. Under Japanese rule a father was able to sell his daughter to the keeper of a house of prostitution. Since the girl was charged exorbitant sums for her keep and her clothes, she had little chance of freedom even after the sum paid to her father had been repaid. These women escaped when the Japanese were driven out. When an American ordinance prohibited the selling of women, many Koreans were most pleased at what they thought was an ending of the whole prostitution system. One of the main talking points of the Communists was that the Soviets had forbidden this business. Bills designed to do the same for South Korea were introduced into the Korean legislature.

On 1 April ~~it was announced that~~ traffic would change from the Japanese system of driving on the left to the former Korean custom of keeping to the right. The Americans were much gratified that there were no traffic accidents the first day. Taking this as a matter of course, the Koreans probably followed the rest of the driving public, that is, driving according to the holes in the road rather than according to any regulations. The Korean policemen seemed to enjoy directing traffic, signified by fancy steps and the blowing of their whistles continuously. "All the concerted efforts of his advisors have failed to stop him by one tweet". The Korean traffic policeman was unexpectedly patient, with the oxcarts, rickshaws, dilapidated vehicles, and pedestrians who would not use sidewalks. ~~would ordinarily driven an American into a frenzy.~~ (72)

Another subdivision of the Uniformed Polide Bureau was the Organization and Planning Section. Two major reorganizations took place in the police force in Korea. The first change was in November 1945, when the police were reestablished as a national instead of a regional force. The second was the American reorganization of 15 April 1946, with minor changes and improvements made to better the organization. Recommendations for changes and improvement included such matters as the mounting of a suitable number of

police for the handling of crowds, or for use in districts where there were no usable roads, the incorporation of railway police guards into the regular force, and the substitution of Korean billet guards for United States soldiers. Later these guards took over a number of posts previously handled by American troops.(73)

Policewomen

On 20 April 1946 a women's division of the police, with a personnel of 500, was authorized.(74) In May 1946 Miss Gladys Koh (Koh Pong Kyung), who had attended Wesleyan College in (Macon, Georgia) and had later done some work in the University of Michigan, was named head of the Women's Police Section. The division's function was to deal with cases involving women and children. The first step taken was to segregate men and women prisoners. Plans were made to add street patrol and supervision of places of amusement, work as jail matrons, and eventually to establish a clinic for the treatment of diseased women prisoners. It was also the duty of the Women's Division to attempt to locate lost children. Due to the great numbers of displaced persons and refugees, many children had become separated from their families. A training school was set up in the Seoul National Police Academy and the first class of 55 policewomen graduated on 12 July 1946 after one month's training.(75) The course of study consisted of Korean history, language, penology, criminal investigation, fingerprinting, and training with juvenile offenders.(76) The entrance requirements for women police trainees were; sound physical condition, at least three years of middle school, height at least 4'7", age 24 to 45 inclusive, and permission of a woman's husband if she was married. Single women and widows were preferred. The second class of policewomen included fifty students from three provinces. Later this force numbered about 400 policewomen on the regular force and 50 more in the railway police force. The latter, however, had their own school.

At first the Korean policemen resented the presence of the women and

attempted to relegate them to cooking and other menial work around the station, but soon their minds were changed. In November 1946 the first United States civilian advisors were sent to the police department in Korea. Miss Ida Lippman arrived 15 November and Miss Alice E. Parrish on 20 December, and they were immediately assigned to the Policewomen's section.(77) Mrs. Kim Poon Ok, formerly of the Child Welfare Section of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, became head of the Section when Miss Gladys Koh resigned. The women's police station was the old prison used by the Japanese for political criminals. The buildings were in such a bad state that over 900,000 won had to be spent for repairs. The grounds afforded a chance for the women to get some exercise. There was also a small dispensary and examination room, but serious cases of disease were sent to the hospital.

A woman captain was in charge of the station, which had the usual departments of investigation, patrol, administration, and staff in charge of prisoners. A procurator visited the station twice a week to conduct hearings so that no prisoner had to wait longer than a week to be formally charged or to be released if the evidence was insufficient to detain her. A bad feature of the system was that the woman who was being tried was taken in charge by the Department of Justice and lodged in the West Gate Prison. Even though she was later adjudged innocent, a sojourn in prison appeared on her record. The Women's Police Station took justifiable pride in the fact that its cases were disposed of promptly, and the number of women in detention averaged about twenty-five against a previous fifty.

Only Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, and Taegu had separate prisons for women. Elsewhere the small number of women prisoners did not justify more than a cell in the regular jail.(78)

Miss Lippman, American advisor to the women police, said that more had been accomplished than she had initially anticipated. The women police were

eager to learn and liked to ask advice. At first they lacked self reliance but they gained that quality, and above all they were willing to study and learn. Miss Lippman was inclined to believe that authority was taken away from the American counterparts in military government too soon. However, she was of the opinion that Koreans did not hold Military Government advisors responsible for the way things went, and that they realized that the Koreans were on their own.(78)

Administrative Bureau

Under the Administrative Bureau were personnel, finance, and supply sections. At first police personnel had to be taken with almost no screening. A private army which proposed to come in as a unit was told that its members would have to enlist as individuals.(79) The first orders for recruitment specified that only men who had received some training (military or police) from the Japanese were to be accepted.(80) Later this order, of necessity, had to be modified. When a radio recruiting broadcast suggested that these trained men would be especially useful to the police department, it stirred up a storm of protest from many persons including Kim Kyu Sik,(81) leading figures among the nationalistic political groups. The police were fingerprinted and those who had non-political criminal records were discharged. Recruits were trained rather than merely give a few general instructions. Pending the setting up of a civil service plan of promotion, it was decided that officers above the rank of lieutenant should be chosen on the recommendation of the provincial chief and the public safety officer. When these two disagreed the public safety officer notified the provincial military governor.(82) The governor's advisory council then rendered a decision. American public safety officers were instructed to remember that Koreans would eventually control the police and that the desire for efficient police must be balanced against the opinions of the Koreans, lest the Koreans totally destroy the system when the United States withdrew.

Personnel

A plan of awards for various meritorious services was established. In an effort to offset the low salaries offered, efforts were made to give other rewards such as the sale of various goods to policemen and their families at wholesale prices from the Materials Control Association, as it was then called. This had been done under the Japanese and was a real benefit for the police, who could not buy these goods on the open market. (83) The police organized a Welfare Fund which was chiefly a revolving loan fund. Soon, however, contributions were demanded from the public. The police authorities themselves ordered the cessation of this racketeering organization, but from time to time new instances came to light.

Finance

At first, as under the Japanese, the provincial chief of police made little accounting of the money secured from headquarters. An inspection team recommended that financial control be tightened but that a very simple financial scheme be worked out which would be easily and cheerfully adopted by the Koreans. The pay of policemen, about 140 won a month, was absurd under the conditions of inflation and the increased cost of living. A cost-of-living differential of about 1,510 won was added but it, too, was inadequate. The police set up their own wage scales and the department was removed from civil service status in December 1948. Police pay varied according to cost of living which was much greater, for example, in Seoul, than in provincial capitals and rural localities.

Supply

At first the Korean police had almost no arms or ammunition. Colonel Champeny asked that Japanese army equipment which was in course of being destroyed be turned over to the police department. (84) It was decided to issue one rifle for every three policemen, since not all police were on duty at the

same time.(85) Later the police were adequately armed. Japanese uniforms were used at first and the police were distinguished only by arm bands. A f factory was taken over for the manufacture of uniforms but it had been so nearly stripped that its inital turnout was only a few uniforms per day. It was reported as a notable achievement that the production reached 55 uniforms daily by 3 December 1945.(86) Night sticks were manufactured locally. As more Japanese supplies were located and more supplies were imported, the police came to be properly clothed. An inspection report of 21 January 1946 noted that transportation, firearms, fire fighting equipment, and communication supplies were still short.

Police Changes in Provinces

In Seoul the sweeping personnel changes in the police department had been carried out by 13 September 1945. In some places within the provinces the Japanese officials kept at least the shadow of an organization until American Public Safety officials arrived; in others police power had been turned over intimely to local law enforcement groups. The first Military Government groups dealt with the situations in whatever manner seemed suitable. Not until 27 December 1945 was the uniform organization of the police prescribed by the National Bureau of Police. After 27 December 1945 provincial chiefs of police were chosen by the Director of the National Bureau of Police upon the advice of the provincial governor and his advisory council.(87)

The Americans had planned to work through the Japanese police organization until competent Koreans could take over. However, no training in the management of Korean affairs had been given to Military Government teams — only directions about how to deal with the Japanese. In Cholla Namdo Americans ordered the Japanese provincial chief of police (25 September 1945) to recruit untrained men more slowly. He was assured that United States troops would be sent to his assistance. When the troops arrived in October they found that nothing had been done. In this case the Koreans had simply

refused to cooperate in any way. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the Japanese made no particular efforts to carry out American orders.(88)

In many places Korean agencies continued to usurp police powers. Late in September General Schick wrote to all provincial police chiefs pointing out that the police had assumed a passive attitude toward disorder, and directed that they not submit to the demands of the Koreans. Actually the police had little choice in the matter. Generally the organization which seized the police stations and attacked the Japanese police and drove them out was some arm or affiliate of the "People's Republic".(89) The exceptions to this were criminals who seized police power in order to rob.

The People's Republic was under the leadership of Lyuh Woon Hyung, who had been entrusted for a time by the Japanese with the preservation of order. In Seoul Lyuh's actual period of power was about three days, from 14 to 16 August, after which the Japanese police, alarmed by the increase of violence, repudiated their agreement with him and claimed that they had no idea of giving up their authority. In the provinces, however, the Korean groups kept their hold. According to local conditions and their own judgment, American public safety officials tried to work through this group or to replace it. An instance of the first mentioned policy was found in what happened in Posong (Cholla Namdo province). There, on 11 October 1945, the army found a volunteer police force of 101 men belonging to the "Peace Preservation Party," affiliated with Lyuh. This force was put under the supervision of a technical sergeant and worked smoothly for a while. Then the Peace Preservation Party became involved in a contest between landlords and tenant farmers. When reports came in that the police were working against Military Government, the American public safety officer ordered the party disbanded and jailed its leader on charges of extortion on 24 November 1945. The volunteer police

were replaced by police sent from Kwangju, the provincial capital. In Kwangju American troops ousted Kim Suk, known as "Captain Kim," who, with 6,000 followers had held the city. In a third town in Cholla Namdo (Changchung) American troops arrived on 16 October 1945 and found that there, too, the Peace Preservation Party had supplanted the regular police. Its organization was dissolved on 24 October. The party then elected a chief of police and made an "apparent" attempt to seize weapons from the United States arsenal. The leader was subsequently sentenced to a year in prison. From a fourth town, Polgyo, the report came that the People's Committee police were kept in power until a disturbance occurred on 19 November, after which, although there was no evidence against him, the chief of police was arrested and replaced. The American officer in charge of Kwasun, the fifth town reporting, said that he had kept an unsatisfactory police chief for political reasons. (90)

In another Cholla Namdo town (Naju) Military Government had appointed one Pak Heung Pai as chief of police. On the surface things ran smoothly and it was not until 1 February 1946 that the Kwangju police department learned that the police were a gang of criminals who attacked and robbed the people, amused themselves by torturing prisoners, and had a store of unreported weapons in the police station. Subsequently, the chief and six of his accomplices were jailed. The reign of terror was due to the Americans' lack of information, but they were held responsible nonetheless. Americans were keenly aware of the deficiencies of their interpreters, and were usually undertain as to whether or not an interpreter was being slandered when charges were brought against him.

These small incidents summarize the situation in which the American forces found themselves in the beginning of the occupation. Public safety officers were army men, not police officers. They came into conflict with a force which, Communist-inspired or not, was determined to keep the rule of the country. The army's task was to establish a Military Government. Consequently, Americans

found themselves using whatever tools came to hand. The cases cited above were written up by Military Government officials. They point out that in two towns, Posong and Polgyo, there "was no evidence" against the arrested police chiefs. The account of the attempt to seize the American arsenal is qualified by the word "apparent" and as will be noted, the Kwasun chief was "Unsatisfactory" except politically. On the other hand, it must also be taken into consideration that in addition to wishing to rule themselves, the People's Party members were motivated by greed for Japanese property which they wished to seize for themselves.

In the adjoining province of Cholla Puk-to police organization was established by the end of September 1945, but policemen had so little authority at first that public safety officers had to go around with them. As in Cholla Nam-do, the People's Republic had taken charge of the government and had seized a large amount of Japanese property. In the town of Namwon, after the order disbanding private armies had been issued (November 1945) the Republic army continued its drills in the streets. The police would not or could not do anything. United States soldiers were sent to arrest the defiant leaders on 6 November 1945. Incidentally, the leaders were held only five hours. In pursuance of the People's Party orders, Koreans tried to boycott the sale of Japanese property, which they wanted to keep for their party members, tore down posters advertising sales, and threatened prospective buyers. This time the police arrested five of the leaders and sent them to Chonju, the provincial capital. The chief of police was ambushed and beaten by a mob in the presence of an American officer who was also threatened, but not actually attacked. A second Namwon mob which planned to rescue the five prisoners taken on 17 November, was broken up by American soldiers. (91) Military action against them slowed up the Leftists for a while.

Pusan, in Kyongsang Namdo, was one of the two provincial capitals which still possessed telephone connections with Seoul when the Americans arrived. The first report on Pusan, covering the period 24-29 September 1945, stated that the people were quiet and that MP's were working with the police. Civilian arms were collected and the curfew was obeyed. Training of the 800 policemen needed began on 8 October at the rate of 125 men per week. At that time only six of the sixteen engines were working, but fortunately there were no fires.(92) Seemingly, the first report was too optimistic, or else conditions became worse, for later reports had it that banks, stores, and schools had been closed. From 15 August to 19 November no courts functioned. Trade was at a standstill and much looting went on. Most of the Japanese police had left their posts. The People's Republic organized in Pusan on 5 October 1945. This group had already usurped power in various other nearby places, among them Tongyong, Changwon, Kumhae, Hadong, Yangsan, and Kyopchon. In all these localities People's Republic office-holders were deposed, and officials appointed by Military Government took their places with the assistance of troops. Conditions in Kyongsang Namdo were complicated by the presence of great numbers of displaced persons. During September ~~the average number of~~ Korean ~~refugees~~ repatriates entering the country ~~was~~ were estimated at from 6,000 to 10,000 daily, ~~while the number of~~ departing Japanese ~~leaving was~~ from 3,000 to 4,000.(93) Sanitary conditions were unspeakably low. One of the first things the Americans demanded was a ~~clean-up of these conditions under police supervision~~ police-supervised. Two months later the police force reached 75 percent of its authorized strength and the Military Police were withdrawn from the police boxes.(94) Apparently, however, this was premature, for according to a report of 3 December, "looting continued at an abnormal rate."(95)

Military Government began to function in Taegu, ~~provincial~~ capital of Kyongsang Pukdo, on 6 October 1945. The Japanese officials were retained for a month, according to plan, but the Thought Control, the economic sections,

and the secret police were immediately abolished. Police morale was at a very low ebb. Korean police who had worked for the Japanese had received no pay for three months and were despised by the people as collaborators. It was estimated that by the beginning of November fourteen private armies were operating in Korea. In this province a great number of police boxes had been taken by various local groups. A rather non-committal report of Military Government activities, dated 19 December 1945, stated, "Political activities in Kyongsang Pukto are continuing and investigations into the same are being pressed." No reliable interpreters were readily available. Only wealthy and well-educated Koreans knew English and they would not even consider acting as interpreters. Not until 1 December did American officals get interpreters whom they could trust, Korean-Americans from Hawaii. On 2 December Major Edmund A. Maher, CMP, an officer with long experience in police work, was sent from Seoul to help reorganize the police. The force was furnished with new uniforms and its number was increased from 2,200 to 3,100, administrative improvements were made, and a police school was scheduled for opening on 24 January 1946. The police recaptured all of their stations and were forbidden to take part in any political activities. (96) But, on his restoration to power the chief disregarded this directive. In April 1946 he was dismissed for being too active politically, making his appointments on a political basis only, and packing his department with high ranking civilians who could not do the work. (97)

Letters from Chungchong Namdo, dated 24 August and 8 October, described rioting, disorder, and resistance to Military Government. The American public safety officer was told on 24 October that the arrival of more troops would help in restoring order and was directed to notify the nearest American troops where the rioting was to be expected. In Yesan, in northwest Chungchong Namdo, Chio Yung Kil, with a band of about 300, had appointed himself chief of police,

and headed a group engaged in extensive robberies. The band had spies in the offices of Military Government and any individual who complained to Military Government was later beaten and robbed. Three such reports came in the last two weeks of October.(98) In other places Leftist groups had seized power and had installed their own governments. Another cause of conflict was the seizure of Japanese property by political parties. Even such non-political matters as forester's orders not to cut down trees, indiscriminately resulted in defiance by the Young Men's Association and the People's Committee. Police were called in and the leaders were arrested for illegal collection of taxes. A 19 December report of Military Government laconically credits the police with "doing better." As in Pusan, Taejon was a center through which 10,000 refugees passed daily.

Establishment of Police in Provinces

The report from Chungchong Puk[illegible] of 18 November through 24 November 1945 pointed out that efficient functioning of the police was dependent on the organization of courts. Only minor criminal offenses were tried there, as no District Court was functioning at the time.(99) A little later the court was then opened and great numbers of prisoners were cleared out. A public safety officer called for speedy action in reorganization. As for the police, recruits were being trained, with 40 being sent to Seoul for a four weeks instruction course. The local police academy in Chonju was not opened until 26 January 1946. The matter of delayed pay was settled, and nightsticks were manufactured locally.(100)

In his weekly report to the Civil Administrator on 22 September 1945, the provost marshal said that all provincial department heads in Kangwon had been removed by the occupying troops with the exception of the head of the Sanitary Section. The ex-chief of police remained as advisor to the newly appointed chief. Up to that date order had been fairly well maintained by the Peace

Preservation Society.[101] A later report stated that the police had been reorganized in accordance with the 27 December 1945 directive outlining the organization of provincial police.[102]

In Kyonggi (which then included the city of Seoul) military police stayed with the civil police in their boxes for a while until the latter could get the situation under control. In order to keep such an arrangement from causing confusion, a directive was issued that only rioters and persons violating military laws would be tried in provost courts. All civilians arrested for violation of civil laws were handed over to civil courts.[103] This military protection was especially necessary in such places as Inchon, where opportunities for stealing supplies were excellent, but apparently organization in smaller places was carried out rather slowly. On 16 October a report came in that at Osan, a little south of Suwon, the Japanese chief of police had left and that the president of the Public Peace Organization was acting as chief. The society had set up a police box in a former bank and kept all confiscated arms locked in its safe. It was recommended that Captain E. A. Sterling visit the station and organize the police on a more regular basis.[104] In Suwon members of the People's Republic came into conflict with Military Government because of their attempts to dictate to the head man on the matter of appointing district chiefs. On 20 October fifteen members of the National Youth's Alliance attempted to murder a Military Government interpreter. Even in Kyonggi the Korean chief of provincial police was so little informed about Americans that he believed a rumor that the United States was planning to withdraw its troops on 10 November 1945, and issued orders to block chiefs of households to organize guards to prepare for the Americans' departure.[105] Late in the autumn Lyuh Woon Hyung, leader of the People's Republic, toured the provinces to get the cooperation of the people with Military Government.[106]

Early Difficulties in the Provinces

The Japanese had employed about 23,000 police of whom about 9,000 were Koreans. By the middle of November 1945 more than 15,000 Koreans were enlisted. A little more than a month later (23 December 1945) provincial governors were made responsible for the preservation of law and order in their territories.(107) Military police were gradually withdrawn from the civil police boxes and troops were called on only in case of emergency. It was hoped that looting and rioting, which had characterized the first days of occupation, were things of the past. Drawing a line between plain thievery and political confiscation of property, and between extortion and legitimate solicitation of party funds was very difficult. Much was said about the seizure of great estates but the property actually taken was that of Japanese. Especially in the South, police power was taken over by the People's Party. Japanese property was sold to party members only and Japanese houses allocated to leaders.(108) Both Rightists and Leftists engaged in extortion. Proceeds were for the benefit of the parties equally, with the leaders being the best administrators of same. From the extreme right to the far left Communists the practice was the same. In Taegu the group accused of extortion on 8 November 1945 was the "Love Your Neighbor Society." From both sides charges came that the police, when they did not actually take part in the collection of party funds, protected those of their own affiliation in this practice. The first thing that was done in the effort to overcome these difficulties was to forbid recruiting by any private army or peace preservation organization.(109) Next, all political parties and their affiliate strong-arm squads were required to register.(110) From time to time, organizations guilty of terrorism were ordered to disband. This proved futile, for the group merely reorganized under a new name. Police were ordered to keep out of politics except as private citizens. From time to time martial law had to be declared temporarily in order to put an end to rioting. Political agitation and riotous

outbreaks continued, first by the Leftists and then by the Rightists. Both attempted to seize the government, both were unremitting in their efforts to secure the police for their own parties. The political activities of the police will be taken up at more length in the discussion of the part the police played in national events.

Americans were handicapped by ignorance of the language and customs of the people. Dishonest interpreters had a field day at the expense of both the Americans and the Koreans. In Taegu Military Government officials recognized the incompetence and dishonesty of their interpreters, but as has been noted there were no reliable interpreters available until 1 December 1945. Since part of the Communist tactics was to complain all the time, Americans were hesitant to believe any charge against their interpreters. A year later lack of competent interpreters was admittedly a serious weakness. One of the factors in the Taegu riots of October 1946 was the public's distrust of interpreters. This point was discussed by the Joint Korean-American Conference (111) which investigated the disturbances.

Even when the interpreters were competent and honest, Americans were still puzzled at their actions and reasoning. The first Military Government teams had been trained for work with Japanese, not Koreans. Confucianism, basic to all Korean thinking, was virtually unknown to most Americans, only as "Confucius says." The complicated system of inequalities, propriety, saving of face, responsibility of top officials only, the duty of looking after one's relatives before anyone or anything, the low value placed on human life, and the accepted system of presents to officials, were mysteries to most Americans. A Korean peasant police recruit, living in an exeart economy, knew only Japanese police methods. He was brought up in the belief that there was no government without terror, that a prisoner was guilty until proved innocent, and that torture should

precede the examination of witnesses to insure that only the truth would be told. He failed utterly to realize that under this torture even the innocent would confess to a crime in order to stop the torture. To him police were necessarily brutal, they had the right to lord it over the populace, mete out punishment on the spot, take advantage of their position to graft, and have the privilege of looking into people's private affairs. The Anglo-Saxon concept of an individual's rights and his idea of uniform and impartial justice were incomprehensible. It would take a long time and much vigorous training, backed by prompt punishment, to change this system of Oriental thinking.

Americans found that orders could readily be issued but whether they were carried out was quite another matter. The assurances of the Korean heads meant little or nothing at all. Directives simply were not passed on to their subordinates and further investigation revealed that nothing had been done. The directive that all police be fingerprinted furnished information enough to weed out former non-political criminals, except for those whose fingerprints had been among the files destroyed in the first few days of occupation. (112) Collecting of fingerprints was a slow process, hampered by the difficulty of communication and seemingly by police reluctance to comply with directives. Repeated calls had to be sent out to the provinces to send duplicates of all fingerprints taken.

At first criminals rushed into the police force. The system had to be set up with almost no trained Korean personnel. Those who had seen service under the Japanese were suspected by Koreans as being "pro-Japanese" and this was soon one of their most audible complaints. Unless a person was notorious, American police officials adopted the policy of judging a Korean formerly employed by the Japanese on his present performance. Colonel Maglin pointed out

in his testimony before the Joint Korean-American Conference that the police themselves respected only the efficiency of their superiors. In an attempt to meet the criticism of the practice of hiring those who had worked under the Japanese, Colonel Maglin trained a number of men for officers. They had education far beyond that needed for patrolmen, but because they lacked experience their subordinates would not obey them. Because of the difficulty of untangling actual charges of past misconduct from present political excitement, Americans ceased to pay attention to pro-Japanese charges. (113)

The shortage of all supplies has been mentioned from time to time. Even before the Japanese surrender, supplies were stolen or the money for their purchase was divided among Japanese police heads. Prior to American occupation, the sums allocated for payment of the police for the next five months (to 1 February 1946) had been divided among the forces as bonuses. Koreans continually objected to wearing former Japanese uniforms in lieu of readily available new ones. As has been indicated, the force also lacked coal, food, arms, transportation, and communication supplies. Finances, too, had to be changed from the Japanese system of allowing lump sums to be spent by the police chief without accounting for them. A simple form of listing expenditures was required. (114)

As might have been expected of any excessively nationalistic and suspicious group, police were not only secretive about their activities, but also disregarded instructions. In the early history of Kyongsang Nam officers complained of the unwillingness of Korean police to obey orders and cited specifically the case of the nine hundred lepers. The police were told to collect the lepers who were to be transpoted to a leper colony on an island. By the time the shipping vessel arrived only one hundred of the lepers had been collected. In January 1946 rice rationing was again reestablished because the free system had proved unsuccessful. Rice was being hoarded by

profiteers, was being used for the manufacture of saki and candy, and was being exported for the purchase of luxuries. Military Government reports varied as to the amount of cooperation received from local police in rice collection, but eventually control tightened up enough to get police fired promptly when collections fell too far behind.(115) The Korean policeman, even when he did not actually sympathize with the lawbreaker, was apt to sidestep unpleasantness as far as possible. From a monetary standpoint, the policeman did not have a job worth fighting for. An honest man who refused to take advantage of his position found himself living much more poorly than his dishonest colleagues.

In the attempt to establish a modern democratic police system the police were early shorn of their right to try criminal cases. A directive pointed out that the function of the police was merely to apprehend the criminal and that trial and punishment were judicial functions.(116) This was a great blow to police authority and the power was not given up willingly. Police were forbidden to torture suspects and prisoners, or to hold a person indefinitely without preferring charges.(117)

The reluctance of the police to lose power is indicated by the caution with which the matter of holding prisoners without charges was approached. The first Military Government directive merely allowed any person, who had been confined 30 days without charges being preferred against him, to file a written complaint with the Director of the Bureau of Justice. Unless charges were filed within the next ten days the prisoner was released. Considering facts brought out later in various investigations, it seem improbable that this directive could have had much effect. Nine months later, July 1946, prisoners were still being held in jail without being allowed to communicate with anyone. In one place the jail had unlighted and unventilated cells which were reached by crawling through a tunnel. The question came up as to

how any prisoner could possible get writing materials and get his letter out to the Bureau of Justice, or just who would enforce his release after the forty days of imprisonment. A directive in March 1946 ordered that a suspect be released or charged within 48 hours unless he had no fixed dwelling, might destroy evidence if released, or might run away. In the latter cases he was to be kept ten days. Drunken persons, the insane, and prospective suicides might be kept three days without trial.(118) A week later another communication to the police repeated that reports were still coming in that people were being jailed without cause, that suspects were arrested previous to investigation, that in case of fires all the occupants of owners of a building were seized and their goods left at the mercy of thieves, and that all the people in the immediate vicinity of a skirmish were arrested, allowing the possessions of shopkeepers to be snatched by anybody.(119)

Complaints of police brutality and inefficiency were frequent and bitter. Some, certainly, were justified, but it must be borne in mind that many such charges were political. Thus, Communists were under orders to stir up trouble without regard to truth. On this subject Colonel William H. Maglin, Advisor to the Police Department, testified before the Joint Korean-American Conference:

> We know that there are some police who are abusive when they make arrests after an attack on them. We are trying to combat a general indictment of all the police for the abuses or delinquencies of the few. We have found that many of the reports of police cruelties are exaggerated. We know that many are instructed to say that they were abused when they were not. I have before me a translation of instructions found on many when they were arrested in recent weeks. One instruction - "When being questioned by the police, always avoid the issue. Give false addresses when possible. The police are restricted in the handling of you, so if necessary cry and scream out as if you were being persecuted." So, our efforts are to find the truth without demoralizing the policemen who are trying to be fair and doing their duty.
>
> The police have experienced some fierce attacks and mutilation of their persons by a certain element. The leaders of the police are trying to keep down their human desire to retaliate. We have issued many instructions pointing out the fact that the police in themselves have

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no punitive powers. We have stated, regardless of the offense the police have no punitive powers, the courts give punishment in all cases. We stated that in a free country even the courts cannot prescribe any form of bodily punishment. Therefore, when a member of the police strikes, beats, or otherwise tortures the person arrested he is violating the law and is guilty of a grave offense. We stated that any police found abusing his authority will be dismissed from the police and charged before a court when circumstances warrant. We also stated that police should exhibit no sign of personal interest or satisfaction in making an arrest. That was issued on the 14th of March and has been repeated. It has been used in our National Police College and in all division police schools. It has resulted in the elimination of a great deal of abuse, not entirely though. But, it has succeeded to the extent that it causes this particular group to recognize their responsibility in the handling of arrests.(120A)

On the other hand, Colonel Maglin pointed out, many stories which received wide credence were made of whole cloth, as was shown when they were run down. An American Officer sent to investigate specific allegations of police brutality in the Taegu area, in a formal report to Colonel Maglin, related his experiences:

> "It was reported that a certain Korean had been an eye-witness to the killing of three prisoners by the police. Upon being interviewed, the man stated that he had only heard a rumor to that effect. It was reported that another Korean knew of the killing of ten prisoners by the police and where they were buried. It was discovered on interviewing him that his son had been shot and wounded in the leg by the police when he attempted to make a prison break. The location of the graves was found and upon checking further it was determined that these graves contained the bodies of the policemen killed during the riots and awaiting community burial service. The number of graves checked with the number of police reported buried there." (120B)

Other instances were highly exaggerated. In this connection, Colonel Maglin recounted to the Conference another case he personally had investigated:

> There was an article in one of the papers which stated that the police brutally tortured two boys, 8 and 9 years old, and a young girl, 11 years old. The newspaper article was so alarming that I investigated the case myself. I made a preliminary investigation by questioning the children involved. I then had the children and their parents, the newspaper reporter, and the detectives from the station where the torture was alleged to have taken place, all present in my office. I questioned the boy who was alleged to have stolen a very valuable ring. The boy said that when he did not answer questions and was squirming in the chair that the policeman slapped his face. I asked if it hurt, and he said "no" but he was frightened. He then told what he did with the ring. I then asked the newspaper reporter if it had been his ring that was

stolen would he have objected to the policeman having slapped the boy. I then asked what had happened to the little girl. He said that he had seen the girl's parents after the police released her and she told them that she was frightened so much that she wet her panties. I then asked him if any steps were taken to torture or frighten that young girl since she came into my office. He said they had not, so I had the little girl stand up and her panties were wet. The reporter admitted that parents would slap a child's face when he was unruly and so would teachers. Yet he had written it up as vicious torture.(120C)

A directive from Chief Chough, 3 September 1946, was illuminating both as to the economic powers of the police and as to the lack of change in their methods. Chough declared that it was customary for the police to seize records during investigation, hold them an unwarrented length of time, and meanwhile keep the managers of the business in jail. The new orders directed that there should be a reason for such an investigations and that the examining should be done on the premises. The reason given for the adoption of the new policy was not abstract justice, but the fact that Korea needed to get on her feet economically, and that the previous procedure was bad for business.(123)

Relations With Constabulary, Coast Guard, and Firemen

The police, very jealous of their rights, came into minor conflict with various non-political groups, which were in some measure responsible for maintaining peace. These were the Constabulary, Coast Guard, firemen, and railway police. In reality there should have been no friction between the police and the constabulary, as in theory the constabulary was a sort of permanent national guard to be called on in case of emergency. The police claimed that it exceeded its authority by trying to be a law enforcing agency also. The friction aggravated situation was embittered by the fact that the preponderantly Rightist police accused the constabulary of leaning much too far to the Left. Orders to the police forbade them to seize and punish members of the constabulary. Any such offender was to be turned over to his commanding officer for punishment.(124) The constabulary were forbidden to make arrests.(125) Americans tried various schemes to promote a better feeling between the groups but brawls continued.(126)

On the other hand, efforts were made to break the ties between the firemen and the police. Police were forbidden to turn over political enemies to the firemen for torture.(127) The railway police were at first merely railroad guards. As early as 23 December 1945 conflicts between the regular police and the railway police guards led to the decision to incorporate guards into the police as soon as possible.(128) This union was finally effectuated on 5 March 1947.(129)

Railroad Police

The railway guards inherited from the Japanese system were organized under the Department of Transportation in January 1946, with 10 detectives borrowed from National Police. A school was established for their training with the course lasting four weeks and included law, first aid, fire prevention, methods of investigation, and physical training. By General Order #2 the railway guards became the Railroad Police Division. By May 1946 the force consisted of 473 detectives and police. In cooperation with the national police and the American military police, the force by June 1947 had collected 1,000,000 won in unpaid fares, captured numerous smugglers, and had aided in the improvement of sanitary conditions in trains and station areas. In May 1946 it was decided that twenty policewomen were to take a four weeks course at the Railroad Police Academy. Their duties were to act as guides for passengers, supervise stations from a standpoint of cleanliness, and deal with crime prevention involving women and children.(130) A report of 25 June 1946 noted that there were 900 railway policemen and detectives who had replaced American guards. The claim was made that since the organization of the railway police in January, 90 percent of the goods stolen on the railroad had been recovered and that no robberies had been reported for six weeks.(131) In the middle of December 1946 the ninth class of railway police graduated, including 15 women.(132) A new class of 200 enrolled on 16 December.

POLICE PART IN NATIONAL EVENTS (1946)

RIGHTIST ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE POWER

The activities of the police in the early days of the American occupation have been largely narrated in the account of the early organization. Politically, in 1945 the greatest difficulty at first was with the various forms of the People's Republic. The activities of the People's Republic were most marked in the southern provinces, where in many cases there had been no government for nine weeks except for the local organizations. The struggle to replace these self-appointed officials with Military Government officials, and to curb the seizure of Japanese property, have also been touched upon. The inexperienced Koreans were prone to believe the stories that the Americans would withdraw shortly and the Russians take over. The police, who wished to avoid trouble, had before them the example of the Japanese police who had assumed a passive attitude after the surrender, so they were given to "resigning" when the going got bad. The police improved with additional training, procurement of supplies, the improvement of organization, regular pay, and time enough to develop a feeling of pride in their work.

In November, with the return to Korea of Rhee Syng Man, Kim Koo, and others of the "Provisional Government" group, political pressure from the Right began to be felt.(133) The Moscow Decision (27 November 1945), with its unfortunate use of the term "Trusteeship", threw Koreans of all political shades, Rightists especially, into a frenzy of opposition. Kim Koo attempted to capitalize on this indignation and to seize power for his group by calling a general strike of all Korean government employees. With a few exceptions, the police stood firm. In Kangwon province the police of Chun Chong gun were disarmed for a few days and a new police chief appointed, but the weapons were returned within a short time.(134) In Kangnung gun of the same province (on the east coast), eight persons were arrested on the charges of

attacking a police box.(135) The Kangnung chief of police was removed and the force reorganized. In Taejon (Chungchong Nam) the newspaper "Chungang Shinpo" reported, 4 January 1946, that the provincial police had withdrawn from Military Government and had been set up under the Home Department of the Korean Provisional Government with the designation of the "Sweeping Public Peace Army."(136) With the failure of the coup d'etat nothing more was heard of this incident. In Seoul the revolt of the Korean Provisional Army seemed to have simmered down to an attack on the Chung No and Bun Chung police stations. The identity of the group was tactfully reported as "unknown." These attacks were easily repulsed after only ten minutes firing.(137) When Kim Koo was persuaded by General Hodge to call off the attempt to overthrow Military Government all striking employees returned to work without loss of face as it was customary to take a three day holiday at that season, and the strike coincided with the holidays. Colonel Maglin was happy to commend the firmness of the police during the "disturbing events" from 29 December to 1 January.(138) The fact that the police as a whole were loyal to Military Government ~~must not be forgotten~~ was significant.

One indirect result of the effort to overthrow Military Government was that the power of the police was strengthened. As a precaution against any such future attempts all private military organizations in Korea were again forbidden. Special attention was directed toward the so-called Boy Scouts, sixty-five percent of whom were over eighteen years old. This organization was merely a "strong arm" squad.(139) One extreme Rightist group, the Kwang Bok Army Officers' School, defied the order and in February 1946, twenty of its members this group were arrested.(140) On 2 March the officials ~~XXXXXXX~~ of the organizations of the Kwang Boks (the "Chosun Saved Country Establishing League) were arrested for beating and intimidating a Korean director of a Military Government-operated firm. The head of this Kwang Bok group was tried for

violation of disbandment orders.(141) Meanwhile, the same sort of arrests and seizures of arms from the Leftists continued. Both groups kept on with their attempts to secure possession of arms and training recruits, but activities were carried on to a lesser degree for a long time.

Further strengthening of police power came with a regulation requiring police approval of permits to hold meetings or parades. Such permits were forwarded to the Military Governor for his approval and did not pass through the hands of the commander of the tactical troops.(142) This ruling against unauthorized meetings and parades was later amplified in Military Government Ordinance No. 72, 4 May 1946. The police used it as a political weapon to prevent meetings, parades, publications, and even theatrical performances by the Leftists.(143) They even precensored moving pictures. Five days later orders came out that all unauthorized firearms must be sent to headquarters in Seoul.(144) Entirely too much dynamite was being used in terroristic activities so the police regained another bit of their former authority when, in addition to a permit from the Bureau of Commerce, a purchaser of dynamite was required to have the approval of the provincial chief of police.(145)

RICE COLLECTION

Whether or not the police welcomed the assignment, another step in the reassumption of their former powers came with the reestablishment of rice collection enforcement by that organization. After the Koreans drove the Japanese police out they took over the rice collection machinery and were operating it successfully when the Americans arrived. The Americans, however, abolished this program.(146) The effects of this step were disastrous. A declaration of emergency with regard to rice failed to halt black market activities, so a second step was taken. This was in the form of a Military Government Ordinance calling for a declaration of surplus rice and threatening

confiscation of undeclared surplus.[147] This, too, was entirely ineffectual, and, therefore, a third attempt was made, virtually reestablishing the Japanese system.[148]

The police part in rice collection was this: Quotas were assigned farmers and if these amounts were not turned in or, if the rice collection official had reason to believe he would have difficulty, police were directed to go with him. Two detective from each station were assigned as a Rice Detail. Road blocks were set up by the police in an attempt to check illegal transportation of rice.[149]

For a number of reasons the plan of rice collection was doomed to failure. The people had gained a taste of black market profits and felt that the removal of Japanese rule allowed them to do what they pleased without regard to the rights of others. This attitude was utilized by various malcontents, even for personal spite, as in the case of the former chief of police in Kangnung. Having been removed for his part in Kim Koo's attempt to overturn Military Government (29 December to 1 January 1946), he organized a group of men to beat farmers who were complying with rice collection orders. His band was broken up by United States troops.[150]

People complained that they had no access to Military Government officials, that interpreters kept Americans from knowing what went on. Rightist and Leftist parties extorted rice from farmers. Military Government could not give the farmers goods. There was universal suspicion of graft and stealing by officials, particularly by the police. The police, in turn, accused the Korean Commodity Corporation. Fantastic stories of what the Americans did with the collected rice were believed by the ignorant and gullible populace.

Testifying before the Joint Korean-American Conference in November 1946, Choy Mung Chin, then chief of the Detective Bureau, declared that at Taegu,

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Testifying before the Joint Korean-American Conference in November 1946, Choy Mung Chin, then ahead of the Detective Bureau, declared that at Taegu,

"when the names of policemen and government officials were raided, at least one or two bags of rice were found in each place." Choy ascribed police ineptitude and extortion in rice collection to three factors, lack of adequate supervision by their supervisors, presence of too many veterans of Japanese police service, and low wages. In his opinion, the essential blame was on Military Government officials (Koreans). (151) (*)149A)

The stories of extortion by political parties were frequently true. The Communists were charged with compelling farmers to sell them grain at half the price paid by Military Government, and shipping the rice to North Korea. It was alleged that these Communist raiders were accompanied by Communist members of the police force. While it is true that some of the police were Communist agents, it is also true that the stealing of police uniforms was a frequent popular objective of both professional thieves and of Communist bands. Another use the Communists made of the rice collection program was to try to stir up political chaos. In Chungchong Puk, where political extortion (in this case at first nearly entirely Leftist) and opposition to rice collection were rampant, the police feared that the procurator had been unduly influenced by the head of the Farmers' Association. The police called in the head of the Farmers' Association, who was the leading Communist in the district. It must not be understood, however, that by any means all the heads of Farmers' Associations so accused were really Communists. In some cases the police merely retained

(*) fn 149A - Joint Korean American Conference Minutes, 15 sess., 15 Nov.46. Choy, better known to American occupation personnel as Danny Choy, was quite a stormy petrel in Korean political and police affairs. Owing to long-standing differences with his superiors, he was removed as detective chief early in December. This gave rise to charges that he was being punished for damaging testimony he had given. Cf. Jt. Korean-American Conference Minutes 26 session, 9 Dec.46. In 1948 he tried to run against Rhee Syng Man in the May elections but was disqualified on technical grounds after a widely publicised struggle to have his name on the ballot.

the Japanese police idea that all farmers' and laborers' organizations were Communists. In this particular instance the Military Government officials agreed with the police opinion and asserted that if the Korean courts failed to inflict sufficient punishment, the cases would be submitted to the Provost Court. (152) As the police, for the most part, were Rightists, less was reported on the extortion activities of this group. "Contribution" was the term used by Kim Koo's and Rhee Syng Man's supporters, for these contributions were supposedly voluntary. (153)

At first, reports came in week after week that the rice collection was lagging saying, "The police still show lack of enthusiasm and zeal towards the collection of rice." Eventually regulations were tightened and those police who neglected the onerous task were dismissed from the service. A report from Kyongsang Nam gave information that many Koreans had been tried for failure to carry out orders. Due to this and to the reassignment of Military Government officials rice collections were up. (154)

The task of the police was made harder by the difficulties in getting goods promised in payment for the rice. Early in the spring of 1946 the prestige of Military Government in Kyongsang Nam reached "a new low because of the failure to carry out certain commitments made to the Korean people. Many commodities that had been offered to those who turned in rice were cancelled from the list, prices on others had been raised and distribution generally was very slow. Offhand promises that rice would not be moved out of collections areas were countermanded by orders to transfer rice to Pusan." (155)

As to the charges of police corruption in rice collection it is hard to tell what particular accounts were true but not hard to arrive at the conclusion that various evil practices were widespread. Police were directed to accompany only authorized collectors but they went by themselves and collected

grain on their own initiative with no idea of the quotas assigned. Some of this may have stemmed form the distrust that the police felt for the Korean Commodity Company. A directive of 14 February 1946 said, "If you are convinced that the Korean Commodity Company will hamper your efforts you are authorized to utilize the old Japanese plan of rice collection." Frequently the amount of rice demanded was unreasonable and there was very good basis for believing that some of the grain thus collected was not turned over to the proper authorities. Farmers who refused to give up their rice were taken to police headquarters and kept in jail with no food except that bought from the police at exorbitant prices. People complained that the rice was taken away much in the same manner as under the Japanese, but that treatment received was much worse as no ordinary patrolman under the Japanese would have dared do such things.

Roberts-Robinson Investigation, July 1946

Late in July 1946 an informal investigation was made of conditions in the three East Coast provinces (Kangwon, Kyongsang Puk, and Kyongsang Nam). The occasion was a tour of that coast from the 38th parallel south to Pusan by a group of American press correspondents, under the guidance of Lieutenant Colonel Rankin Roberts, XXIV Corps Public Relations officer, and Captain Richard D. Robinson, Assistant Head of Military Government's Bureau of Public Opinion. Their investigation was not limited to police conditions, but Colonel Roberts subsequent report to the Commanding General was largely devoted to abuses of power by the police, while Captain Robinson's supplementary one was entirely so. (156)

Along the Leftist-inclined east Coast, police intimidation of the populace was such that people were afraid to talk to Americans. Ordinance No. 72, which required proper permits for meetings, was being misused, and fearing

for their personal safety, leftist leaders allegedly had gone underground temporarily. Police methods in effecting rice collections were extremely harsh."

Captain Robinson's report included not only those localities made on the inspection trip, but also other "various localities." His investigation took up injustices in rice collection, jail conditions, treatment of prisoners, and police censorship. His primary interest, however, was in the political activity of the police. He reported that in Kongju (Chungchong Namdo), before the arrival of the American forces in 1945, the People's Committee had collected funds in the form of rentals for seized Japanese lands, and issued Japanese rations to government employees. About 1 June 1946, the Korean police jailed a number of these leftists on the charge of usurping governmental authority, misuse of public funds and rations, and intimidation of the people. There was no malfeasance in office proved. The police were trying to find some reason for keeping these people in jail regardless of the lack of evidence on hand. The Myun chief was arrested because it was alleged that he had a "tendency to control the Myun similar to the People's Committee." No charges had been made during the two months the man was held in jail. The police were not attempting to get any case against him. The third point of attack by the police was against the Farmers' Union. The police accused this Union of collecting funds from the farmers to buy fertilizer and then putting the money to private use. The police admitted, however, that the money had been sent to Seoul. The Union officials said that it was sent to the central organization there so that the fertilizer could be bought when some came on the market. Police officials were convinced that leftists "should be restrained whether there is reason for it or not."

In Kangnung (on the east coast of Kangwon province some twenty miles below the 38th Parallel) a number of Leftist leaders were arrested for illegal possession of Japanese property. Those who made the arrests were guilty of the same

offense. The Leftists claimed they were unable to obtain permits for meetings and that only Rightists could assemble. Whenever the Leftists appealed to Military Government their cases were referred back to the police.

At Samchok, a little farther to the south, all union and farmers organizations headquarters were searched, and twenty-six officials were arrested. Finding no evidence against any leader or any organization, the police charged the prisoners with having met without police permission, for the purpose of planning a May Day celebration. However, they were released shortly thereafter. The Rightists said that labor unions should be neither economic nor political in nature. In fact, according to some of them there should be no such things as labor unions. Other Rightists took Ordinance No. 72 as a blanket endorsement for oppression of Leftists. At Pohang nearly all the top officials were former Japanese police employees. The head of the Patrolman Section conceded that he wanted to arrest all Leftist leaders. It was frankly admitted that "so far as the police knew, these leaders have done nothing against the law." One policeman had been assigned to keep in close contact with each Leftist leader. The section head denied that any such assignments had been made until he was confronted with the statements of his subordinates.

A prisoner in the Pohang (Kyongsang Puk) jail was a primary school teacher who had struck his school principal. The principal notified the police that the teacher was a Leftist. At the time of the interview he had been in jail nine days and no charges had been brought.

At Pohang, too, Captain Robinson was given an unsavory picture of police abuses in connection with rice collection. Grain collection quotas had been set months before and bore no relation to the amount of grain actually raised. The police there denied the possibility that any mistakes could have been made. Farmers claimed that they were jailed and beaten for protesting the rice col-

lections. Being put in jail in itself was severe punishment, for the jail was dark, damp, badly ventilated, and mosquito-infested. No washing facilities were available, the blanket had never been cleaned, and the latrine was nothing but a hole in the floor.* Prisoners were not allowed to lie down during the day, to write letters, or to communicate with anybody in any way. The police denied the charge of beatings and then contradicted themselves by saying that it was very difficult to operate a police station without beatings. Prisoners alleged that they had been held in jail a month with no charges against them. This, too, was denied by the police. Except for a check for cholera, no medical attention was given prisoners.

The Pohang police had raided the Farmers's Association and assertedly found documents calling for resistance to grain collection. The Association was able to prove that this resistance referred to unfair demands only. Any complaint by the Farmers' Association merely caused that organizations' officers to be arrested and beaten. The same thing was true of individuals. At the time of the investigation, local police were in communication with the provincial police to decide whether or not the Associations' leaders could be held for having any documents whatsoever. Asked what he would do if the Association made an official protest requesting that some of the quotas be reinvestigated, the police chief replied that he would restrain the Farmers' Association, and added, "The Farmers' Association has no right to represent the farmers." Investigators claimed that there were reported from that area, numerous cases of beatings administered by the police for failure to turn in the required amount of grain. Whether these cases were true or untrue, they aroused public opinion, nevertheless.

*In fairness it must be pointed out that Korean housing standards are far below American standards. The Korean goal for jails is something a little lower than that to which the Korean is accustomed.

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At Pusan, the two officers and two of the correspondents witnessed one incident of police brutality.

> A suspected pickpocket was apprehended in front of the Pusan Railroad Station in the presence of Colonel Roberts, at which time the suspect was knocked down, beaten, and kicked while offering no resistance. One interpreter with the party was present and followed the police with the prisoner into the Railroad Police Branch Station. When he saw the police begin to torture the prisoner, he called Captain Robinson, who entered the branch station unnoticed by the police. At this juncture, the policeman in charge was administering the "water treatment" in order to get the man to confess to his crimes. The policeman was arrested on the spot, turned over to the MP's, charges preferred and jailed. Before Captain Robinson had arrived, the prisoner had been beaten and then his arms forced back by means of a stock inserted behind his back and through the crooks of his elbows. It was quite evident the policeman was unaware that he had done anything out of line until informed otherwise. This would indicate a general defect in the police training. The policeman was arrested by Captain Robinson and charges preferred.

The Korean official responsible for this cruelty was astonished when he was brought into the Provost Marshal's office. Chief Chough answered the charge of police brutality by pointing out that the torturer was a member of the railway police, not a member of the national police. Inasmuch as ~~the railway police were a subordinate branch of the national police, this was beside the point.~~ The railway police are a division of the national police, ~~so~~ Chough's statement was not only beside the point but ~~it was~~ a deliberate attempt to create a false impression.

Captain Robinson, in presenting his conclusions, specifically blamed Military Government for the evils of the police system. Military Government officials, he asserted, had neglected to correct police misuse of power, pleading it was inexpedient. The police, he felt, were guilty on several scores, however. They were using Ordinance No.72 as a means of oppression. Their handling of rice collection was "open to question," and they were endeavoring to stamp out farmers' and laborers' associations. Their oppression of these last and of People's Party members was driving political moderates into the Communist ranks. He charged, too, that Japanese methods of dealing

with prisoners were widespread, and noted finally that "Reports are common that the former Japanese police are taking revenge on those who displaced them in August 1945." To correct these conditions, Robinson recommended removal of high ranking police who had served under the Japanese, training of police personnel, improvement of jail conditions, and better protection of civil rights. Military Government, he felt, and not the police, should control the right of assembly. At least one inspector who was not a member of the police department should travel all the time, reporting direct to the Military Governor.

Colonel Roberts, on his part, was briefer and less specific, but likewise stressed the need of independent investigation. "It is recommended," he wrote, "that a field team of thoroughly qualified officers, preferably not from the Department of Police, be assigned to the investigation of abuses, illegal practices, and misrepresentation which appear to be rife within the present policing establishment. Such an impartial group would also be in a position to refute many unfair criticisms and allegations which have been leveled against the police authorities."

A police directive of 22 March pointed out that police had no right to try cases, that the function of trying minor cases was reserved to special judicial officers.(157)

In addition to formal directives there were constant letters, appeals, and personal interviews on the matter of police behavior. American public safety officers were reminded that it was their duty to see that torture was not used.(158) Directives concerning jails took up the matter of cleanliness, latrines, water, delousing, food, crowding. The idea was to have no more than six prisoners in a cell 12 x 12, two blankets for each prisoner, light in the cells, and medical care.(159) A letter from Director P.O. Chough called on

members of the National Police to refrain from political activities, forbade their holding other offices, refrain from harassing political parties other than their own, and not to arrest or make investigations on political grounds. He pointed out that exemplary behavior was especially needed while the USSR Joint Commission was in session. (160)

In August Colonel William H. Maglin wrote to the Division Officers and warned them of the unpopularity of the police, pointing out that they should not be "autocratic, intolerant, abusive, and repressive," that too much torture was still being practiced by the police, that Japanese trained men must be watched, that no confessions were to be extorted from the innocent, and that the police should not meddle with the "prevalent campaign to discourage Korean girls from associating with American personnel." (161)

In September Director [redacted] Chough brought up the matter of the seizure of business records for investigation. This has previously been mentioned in connection with graft charges against the police. These records were seized with no apparent reason and were kept an unwarranted length of time while the businessmen were held in jail. Meanwhile, unless relatives or friends were present at the time of arrest, their stores or offices were open to any thief who came along. As in the case of warning against political persecution, Chough gives a practical reason instead of an abstract appeal for justice. He pointed out that in Korea's economic crisis, business should not be hampered. (162) In October the police were directed to explain to the people why rationing was necessary, to emphasize the fact that Koreans overestimated the amount of rice produced in the country, and to make it perfectly clear that no rice was exported. (163)

The public's ill-feeling toward the police, which police abuse of power had engendered, became a potent factor in the riots and quasi-revolt which swept South Korea in October 1946.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

1. Grajdanzev, Andrew. Modern Korea (New York: John Day Co., 1944) p. 255

2. Broom, Major C. E. Korean National Police. Mss, 1946, p. 2 (in Historical Police File, hereinafter referred to as H P File)

3. Nomenclature used herein is that established by the Americans. It should be noted, however, that despite directives on the subject, informal American practice included the use of other terms, as "chief of province" for "chief of a division," "chief of police for "district commander," and "boxes" for substations."

4. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, p. 257

5. Material in this section is based on History, USAFIK, Part I, Ch. III, "Intermezzo: August 1945."

6. XXIV Corps Historical Journal, Staff Conference, 8 Sep 45

7. USAFIK History, pp. 5-8; Rept, National Police Director P. O. Chough to Maj Gen Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor, subj "The Subversive Activities in South Korea; An Analysis Treating of the Inimical Power that the Korean National Police Encounters, and Proposing Some Stern Measures for Controlling It," 14 April 47 (in H P File)

8. Interview of Colonel Todd with K. S. Sohn (one of the men arrested), 18 Sept 45 (Notes, H P File)

9. XXIV Corps Historizal Journal, Staff Conference, 13 Sept 45

10. Ibid., 12 Sept 45

11. Mss, National Police Headquarters, subj "The National Police in South Korea 1945-1946," p. 3

12. Interview with General Stewart, Seoul, 27 Sept 45 (Notes, H P File)

13. Broom, Major C. E. Korean National Police. Mss 1946, p. 1 (in H P File)

14. XXIV Corps Historical Journal, Staff Conference, 23 Sept 45

15. Loc. cit.

16. Broom, op. cit., p. 3

17. Interview with Col. Wm. H. Maglin, Advisor to Police Department Director, 20 June 47 (Notes, H P File)

18. Loc. cit.

19. Directive, Police Bureau to All Public Safety Officers and Police Chiefs, subj "Organization of National Police of Korea," 27 Dec 47. Police Department File No. 040, Doc. # 49a, 230.01 - MGPOL (Hereinafter when parties involved are the same, citation will read: Police Directive, "subj;" also, Police Department File will be cited as P D File).

20. Interview with Major Arthur E. Brandstatter, 7 Dec 45 (Nots, H P File)

21. Police Directive, "Seizure of Business Records," 3 Sept 46. P D File 314.4, MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

22. Interview with Major C. E. Broom, Police Department, 21 June 47 (Notes, H P File)

23. Broom, loc. cit.; Police Directive, "Relations Between Personnel of the Police and Personnel of National Defense Units," 10 April 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 49a (323.361, MGPOL-1)

24. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 1, "Establishment of the Bureau of Public Health," 24 Sept 46 (in H P File)

25. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 17, "Dissolution of Police Bureau's Economic Police Department," 24 Oct 45 (in H P File)

26. USAMGIK Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, p. 195

27. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 66, "Creation of Fire Departments and Boards," 10 April 46 (in H P File)

28. Interview with Col. Wm H. Maglin, Advisor to Police Department Director, 20 June 47 (Notes, H P File)

29. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 20, "Criminal Investigation, Department of, Established," 30 Oct 45 (in H P File)

30. USAMGIK Appointment No. 31, "Brigadier General Schick as MG National Defense Director," 14 Nov 45 (in H P File); USAMGIK Ordinance No. 28, "National Defense, Bureau of Armed Forces, Etc.," 13 Nov 45 (in H P File).

31. USAMGIK Appointment No. 22, " Dr. Chough Pyung-Ok as Chief of Police Bureau's Police Affairs Department," 20 Dec 45 (in H P File)

32. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 63, "Bureau of Police, Removal from Office of National Defense," 29 March 46 (in H P File)

33. Police Directive, "Organization, Bureau of Police with Duties of Staff Officers," 26 Nov 45. P D File, 210.4-MGPOL (in H P File)

34. Police Directive, "Letter and Number Designations of Units of National Police," 11 April 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 1 A (322-MGPOL); Broom, Major C. E. Korean National Police, Mss. 1946, p. 1 (in H P File)

35. Police Directive, "Letter and Number Designations of Units of National Police," loc. cit.

36. Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes 10 Sess. 5 Nov 46 p. 2 (in Historical Files)

37. This chart is adapted from that prepared by Col. Wm. H. Maglin,"National Police, 1945-1946,"ca. June 46

38. Interview 3 Feb 46 with Lt Col Earle L. Miller, Kyonggi Do Police Chief 15 Nov-29 Dec 45 (Notes, H P File)

39. Interview with Captain H. A. Clayton, 6 Oct 45 (Notes H P File)

40. Police Directive, "A Study of Provincial Fire Departments to be Made by Provinces," 30 Nov 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 31b (413.2-MGPOL).

41. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 66(1),"Operation of Fire Departments and Boards," 10 April 46 (in H P File)

42. Police Bureau, Fire Section, "Plan for Fire Protection," 24 Jan 46. P D File No. 040, Doc.# 16 B (MGPOL-5)

43. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 66, "Creation of Fire Departments and Boards," 10 April 46 (in H P File)

44. XXIV Corps Historical Journal, Staff Conference, 8 Sept 45

45. Weekly Report, Police Bureau to Office of Civil Administrator, 29 Sept 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 1A

46. Broom, Major C. E. Korean National Police, Mss. 1946, p. 3 (in H P File)

47. Police Directive, Daily Reports of Provincial Police Activities," 6 Feb 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 26B (319.1, MGPOL-2)

48. Broom, loc. cit.

49. Loc. cit.; USAMGIK Ordinance No. 20, "Criminal Investigation, Department of, Established," 30 Oct 45 (in H P File)

50. Broom, loc. cit; Police Directive, "Letter and Number Designations of Units of National Police," 11 April 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 1A (322, MGPOL-1)

51. Broom, loc. cit.

52. Interview with Major J. C. Plezia, 13 June 47 (Notes, H P File)

53. Broom, loc. cit.

54. Police Directive, "Establishment of Detective Division of the National Police," 11 Jan 46. P D File 231.4-MGPOL (in H P File)

55. Police Directive, "Investigation Course for Detectives, National Police Academy," 28 Jan 46. P D File 333, MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

56. Korean Press Summary, digest of 06 Dec 46 editions of all Seoul newspapers, XXIV Corps Publ Rel Office

57. Police Directives, "Reports," 12 Oct 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 4A (MGPOL); "Fingerprint Records," 17 Jan 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 10D (200.2-MGPOL)

58. Police Bulletin No. 6,"Relationship of Detectives To The Public," 2 April 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 40B; Police Directive, "Seizure of Business Records," 3 Sept 46. P D File 314.4, MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

59. Police Directive to Cholla Namdo Public Safety Officer, "Subversive Sub-Section," 8 April 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 47A

60. Cf., especially, Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, 10th and 11th sessions, 5 Nov 46, 7 Nov 46 (in Historical Files).

This Conference, under chairmanship of Maj. Gen. Albert W. Brown, held 27 meetings between 23 October and 10 December 1946. More than 80 % of its time was devoted to testimony on and discussion of police relationship to the Taegu and subsequent disturbances. The Minutes contain considerable valuable information.

61. Weekly Report to Office of Civil Administrator, 5 Oct 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 2A, p. 3

62. Ibid., 29 Sept 45, Doc. # 1A, p. 3

63. USAMGIK Appointment No. 21, "Chou Bo Yun, Training Section Chief, Acting Director Police Academy," 20 Oct 45 (in H P File)

64. Mss, National Police Headquarters, subj "The National Police in South Korea 1945-1946," p. 23 (in H P File); Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, 11th sess., 7 Nov 46, p. 9 (in Historical Files)

65. Rept, "Inspection Bureau of Police," 21 Nov 45 - 19 Jan 46. MG 333.5 (Notes, H P File)

66. Police Directive, "Provincial Police Recruiting Program," 19 Dec 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 45A

67. Broom, Major C. E. Korean National Police, Mss. 1946, p. 2 (in H P File)

68. USAMGIK Summation No. 10, July 46, p. 19

69. Mss, The National Police, etc.," loc. cit.

70. Police Directive, "Short Course at National Police Academy," 7 Nov 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 21B (231.4-MGPOL)

71. Police Directive, "Duties of Policemen," 16 Sept 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 78 (2)

WAR DEPARTMENT

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FILE No.	SUBJECT	
	History of the Department of Justice	

TO Historical Section,
G-2, XXIV Corps

FROM Justice,
Civil Affairs
XXIV Corps

DATE 25 October 1948 COMMENT No. 1

1. I have completed my examination of the draft history of the Dept. of Justice during the Military occupation of Korea, and from my personal knowledge gained by service in various executive capacities within the Department since November 1945 and as Advisor to Director since May, 1948, I can state that the draft presents a true chronology of events and developments of legal trends during the period covered. The history is adequate in scope and places proper emphasis upon the various facets on the re-establishment of administration of justice in Korea. The writer of the draft has shown a complete grasp of the subject matter and has done a remarkable job. Minor suggestions have been discussed with the author this date.

(Signed) Denny F. Scott

Denny F. Scott
Advisor
Department of
Justice

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Part III

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Footnotes

72. Mss, "The National Police, etc.," op. cit., p. 8; History of USAMGIK, Part II, p. 23

73. Police Directive, "Organization of Department of Police," 5 Aug 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 40b, p. 3

74. Mss, "The National Police etc.," op. cit., p. 23

75. USAMGIK Summation No. 10, loc. cit.

76. XXIV Corps Publ Rel Off Press Release, 27 May 46; USAMGIK Publ Inf Dept Press Release, 10 July 46

77. USAMGIK Summation No. 14, Nov 46, p. 26

78. Interview with Miss Ida Lippman, Hqs. Policewomens Bureau, Seoul, 5 March 47. XXIV Corps Historical Journal

79. Memo, 15 Sept 45 (Notes, H P File)

80. Provost Marshal Schick's Directive, "Current Police Matters," 27 Sept 47 (231.4)

81. Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, 10th sess., 5 Nov 46, pp. 12-13 (in Historical Files)

82. Police Directive, "Selection and Appointment of Police Officials above the Rank of Lieutenant," 14 Jan 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 8E (231.4-MGPOL)

83. Police Directive, "Group Purchases for Police Bureau," 14 Dec 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 42A (400.13-MGPOL)

84. Memo, Police Bureau to XXIV Corps Commanding General, "Arming Korean Police Departments," 7 Dec 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 36C (470-MGPOL)

85. Corresp, 40th Infantry Division Chief of Staff to Military Governor, Seoul, subj "Arming of Civilian Personnel," 14 Dec 45. AG 014.12 (GA)

86. Weekly Activities Report, Police Bureau to Office of Civil Administrator, 7 Dec 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 32B

87. Police Directive, "Organization of National Police of Korea," 27 Dec 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 49A (230.01-MGPOL)

88. Ltr, Provost Marshal (General Schick) to Cholla Namdo Police Chief Sakamoto, 25 Sept 45 (231.4)

89. USAMGIK Summation No 1, Sept-Oct 45, p. 186

90. 61st Military Government Company History, 23 Feb 46, pp. 3-5

91. USAMGIK History, Part III, Sept45-June 46, pp. 241-42.

92. Rept, "Military Government Activities in Kyongsang Namdo (Pusan)," 24-29 Sept 45 (Notes, H P File)

93. XXIV Corps Historical Journal, Staff Conference, 12 Sept 45

94. USAMGIK Planning Section, "Report of Military Government Activities," 28 Nov 45. File No. 319.1, Doc. # 4, p. 5

95. USAMGIK History, op. cit., p. 152

96. Ibid., pp. 132-34

97. Ibid., p. 134; Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, 11th sess., 7 Nov 46

98. Rept, Police Bureau to Kyonggi Province Police Chief, subj "Terrorization in Vicinity Yesan," 2 Nov 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 16a (MGPOL)

99. 35th Military Government Hq and Hq Co "Weekly Military Occupational Activities Report, 18-24 Nov 1945" Chung chong Puk Province, p. 3

100. Weekly Report, Chungchong Pukto, 10 Nov 46 (Notes H P File)

101. Kangwon Province Weekly Rept to Civil Administrator, 22 Sept 45 (Notes, H P File)

102. Ibid., 19 Jan 46

103. Letr to Commanding General 7th Infantry Division, subj "Arrest and Prosecution of Civilians by Military Personnel," 18 Sept 45 (Notes, H P File)

104. Report to the Civil Police, 16 Oct 45, 310.1 (Notes, H P File)

105. Memo, Police Affairs Department Chief to Kyonggi Police Chief, subj "Instructions Issued by Chang No Station," 31 Oct 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 16a (MGPOL)

106. G-2 Weekly Summary No. 10, 11-18 Nov 45, p. 3

107. Hqs USAFIK Field Order No 1, 23 Dec 45

108. Cholla Namdo Rept to Civil Administrator, 31 Mar 46 (Notes, H P File)

109. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 28, "National Defense, Bureau of Armed Forces, etc.," 13 Nov 45 (in H P File)

110. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 55, "Regulation of Political Parties," 23 Feb 46 (in H P File)

111. Joint Korean-American Conference, Minutes, 15 sess. 15 Nov 46 (in Historical File)

112. Police Directives, "Recommendations as to Procedure to be followed by Provincial Police in Regard to Fingerprinting Records," 8 Dec 45. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 37a (MGPOL); "Fingerprinting of Police Officers," 9 Jan 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 6C (200.2-MGPOL)

113. Cf., especially, Jt. Kor. Amer. Conf. Minutes. 11 sess. 11 Nov 46

114. Rept, "Inspection of Bureau of Police," 21 Dec 45 - 19 Jan 46," MG 333.5 (Notes, H P File)

115. Kyongsang Namdo Rept to Civil Administrator, 15-31 March 46 (Notes, H P File)

116. USAMGIK Ordinance No. 11, "Discriminatory Laws, Repealed," 9 Oct 45 (in H P File)

117. Police Directive, "Detention of Suspects and Accused Persons," 11 March 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 26C (014.5, MGPOL-2)

118. Loc. cit.

119. Police Directive, "Arrests and Detention of Persons," 18 March 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 30 C (250.3, MGPOL-2)

120. Jt. Kor. Amer. Conf. Minutes 10 sess. 5 Nov 46 (in Historical Files)

121. Ibid., 11 sess. (7 Nov 46)

122. Ibid., 10 sess. (5 Nov 46)

123. Police Directive, "Seizure of Business Records," 3 Sept 46. P D File 314.4, MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

124. Police Directive, "Procedure when Korean Constabulary are Arrested," 16 Dec 46. P D File TF 250.3-PGL (in H P File)

125. Police Directive, "Relationship Between Personnel of the Police and Personnel of National Defense Units," 10 April 46 (323.361, MGPOL-

126. Police Directive, "Procedure when Korean Constabulary Are Arrested," loc. cit.

127. Jt. Kor. Amer. Conf., Minutes 17 sess., 19 Nov 46 (in Historical File: interview with Col. Wm. H. Maglin, 20 June 47 (Notes, H P File)

128. Staff Meeting, Police Headquarters, 23 Dec 46 (Notes, H P File)

129. Broom, Major C. E. Korean National Police, Mss. 1946, p. 1 (in H P Fil

130. USAMGIK Summation No. 8, May 46, pp. 28-29

131. Ibid., No. 9, June 46, p. 21

132. Ibid., No. 15, Dec 46, p. 22

133. For political developments, see Chapter, "Korean Politics and People, The First Year,"

134. Kangwon Province Weekly Rept to Civil Administrator, 12 Jan 46 (Notes, H P File)

135. Loc. cit.

136. Letr to Chungchong Namdo Police Chief regarding newspaper article, 16 Jan 46 (Notes, H P File)

137. Letr to Police Bureau advising of planned police station attacks, 14 Jan 46 (Notes, H P File)

138. Letr, Pol Bur Director Col Wm H Maglin to all members of the Korean Police, subj "Commendation," 9 Jan 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 6B, 201.22-MGPOL (in H P File)

139. USAMGIK Directive, "Dissolving Military Organizations, including Boy Scouts," 14 Jan 46. MGDEF-324.5

140. Daily Report of Provincial Police Activities, Kyonggi Do, 18 Feb 46. Rpx P D File No. 040, Doc. # 8A

141. Daily Report of Provincial Police Activities, Kyonggi Province, Sec. b(2). 2 March 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 19b (MGPOL)

142. USAMGIK Directive, "Permits for Parades and Public Assemblies," 20 Feb 46. File P-Police (001-MGTMG); USAMGIK Ordinance No. 72(34), "Offenses Against the Military Government," 4 May 46

143. Daily Report of Police Division Activities, showing confiscation of film by Chella Pukto police, 6 May 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 26I (MGPOL-1)

144. Police Directive, "Turn-in of Firearms," 26 Feb 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 16a (300.8, MGPOL-2)

145. Department of Commerce Memo No. 22, "Use of Explosives," 24 May 46; Police Directive, "Use of Explosives Permit," 3 June 46.

146. USAMGIK General Notice No. 1, "Free Market in Rice," 5 Oct 45 (in H P File)

147. USAMGIK General Notice No. 6, "Rice, Control of," 19 Dec 45; USAMGIK Ordinance No. 45, "National Rice Collection," 25 Jan 46 (in H P File)

148. National Food Regulation No. 2, "Collection of Rice," 12 Aug 46 (in H P File)

149. Police Directive, "Detective Division Activities in the Rice Situation," 19 Jan 46. P D File 433, MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

150. Daily Report of Provincial Police Activities, Kangwon Do, 29 Jan 46. P D File No. 040, Doc. # 20 A (MGPOL-1)

151. Jt. Kor. Amer. Conf. Minutes 15 sess. 15 Nov 46

152. 35th Military Government History, Hq and Hq Company, 15-31 March 46. History File No. 314.7, Doc. # 7A, p. 1

153. See Jt. Kor. Amer. Conf. Minutes 7 sess (29 Oct 46) and 10 sess (5 Nov 46) for discussion of some specific accusations.

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154. Report to Civil Administrator on Kyongsang Namdo, 15-31 March 46 (Notes, H P File)

155. 70th Military Government Historical Record, 24 April 46 (314.7)

156. The material which follows is based on Rpt., Lt. Col. Rankin Roberts (Publ. Rel. Off., Hq. XXIV Corps), Subj. "Investigation of the Police," 30 July 1946; Rpt., Capt. R. D. Robinson (Ass't. Head Bur, of Publ. Op., USAMGIK), subj. "Report on Trip Through the Provinces with American Correspondents," 1 Aug 1946 (in H P File). Lt. Col. Roberts and Capt. Robinson went together, and the factual data given is essentially the same. As a War Department civilian, Capt. Robinson subsequently held a position as historian with 1st Information and Historical Section, Hq, XXIV Corps, and its successor, Historical Section, G-2, Hq. XXIV Corps.

157. Cf., Police Bulletins No. 1, loc. cit., and No. 3, "Punishment by Police Prohibited," 14 March 46; Police Directive, "A System of Special Judicial Officers," 22 March 46. 210.454, MGPOL-2 (in H P File

158. Memo, Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch to all Public Safety Officers, subj "Brutal Methods in Handling Prisoners," 12 March 46 (in H P File)

159. USAMGIK Public Health and Welfare Bureau Directive, "Sanitary Inspection of Jails an d Prisons," 18 March 46 (in H P File)

160. Ltr, P. O. Chough to all members of the National Police, subj "Police Engaging in Political Activities," 24 April 46. 230.77, MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

161. Police Directive, "Police Prestige and Relations with the Public," 12 Aug 46. 231.4 MGPOL-1 (in H P File)

162. Police Directive, "Seizure of Business Records," 3 Sept 46, 314.4 MGPOL-3 (in H P File)

163. Police Directive, "Police Action in Rice Collection and Control," 25 Oct 46 (MGPOL-1)

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THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

I - OCCUPATION PLANS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER

The force of legal authority and the administration of justice under the United States Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) derive from military operations prior to cessation of hostilities with Japan. Enforcement of law together with establishment of justice had its inception in the preliminary plan contemplating occupation of Korea and the simultaneous shift from Japanese domination to American control pursuant to "Operation Blacklist" of 8 August 1945.(1) Operations outlined in "Blacklist" were designated "Baker Series"; the part covering the occupation of Korea was designated "Baker-Forty".(2)

On 15 August, the day the Japanese Emperor's formal Rescript ordering his subjects to lay down their arms, General Douglas MacArthur informed Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, XXIV Corps: "The United States Army Forces Pacific, by joint overseas operations in conjunction with the United States Pacific Fleet will occupy Japan proper (exclusive of Karafuto) and Korea (South of 38° North Latitude), establish Military Government, and impose surrender".(3) Thus, Occupation and Military Government by United States Army Forces in Korea South of the 38th parallel were definitely stated.

General Hodge was next appointed Commanding General, USAFIK, to receive the surrender of Japanese forces in South Korea.(4) On 21 August 1945 he went to Manila for conference with Headquarters AFPAC.(5)

In the meanwhile, he had obtained the services of Colonel Brainard E. Prescott from the 10th Army, who with Major Wayne Estes, Executive Officer of the 10th Army, continued Military Government planning for Korea already underway. Colonel Prescott flew to Manila, where he conferred with Brigadier General William E. Crist on clarification of government policy for Korea. His examination of GHQ AFPAC, Tentative Annex 8 to Operating Instructions No. 4 (Military Occupation), of 18 August 1945, led to the conclusion that it "had been written exclusively for Japan; it furnished the scantiest kind of framework around which the Corps could build its own policies".(6) General Hodge and Brig. Gen. Charles S. Harris joined the conference. Colonel Prescott was given one specific answer to his inquiries, "The Koreans were to be treated as liberated people, yet the liberation was to be accomplished gradually".(7) Advised to let circumstances and common sense guide and rule in matters of disarmament and removal of police officials, Colonel Prescott and three Military Government officers returned to Okinawa, where they worked on the Military Government Annex to Corps Field Order 55.(8) On 18 August, General Hodge requested that a State Department representative be attached to his Staff. Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff, designated Liaison Officer and Political Advisor, reached Corps Headquarters 3 September.(9)

Headquarters USAFIK was formally activated 27 August 1945 under the command of General John R. Hodge.(10) The following day, by General Order No. 2, Military Government was established as an integral part of the Command, under a "Deputy for Military Government" responsible

to the Commanding General.(11)

Authority of the military arm of the United States carried with it the necessary legal power clearly set forth by General MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP), on 27 August when he declared that the terms of the surrender would provide "that all civil, military, and naval officials will obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate the surrender and issued by him or under his authority and that all such officials will remain at their posts and continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority".(12)

General Hodge proceeded to initiate the execution of his mission through Field Order 55 on 28 August, which outlined three phases of occupation and specifically laid the foundations for post-war government. The order admonished Division Commanders: "Be prepared to assist in the establishment of a separate post-war government and Army of Occupation in Korea and to transfer responsibilities to these agencies when established and as subsequently directed".(13) That same order provided for taking over Japanese forces, military equipment, communications, government buildings, records, key officials, police, post offices, banks, stock exchanges, utilities, and other critical installations and facilities, the enforcement of the terms of surrender, and the suppression of activities of individuals and organizations inimical to operations. Commanders in occupation were to "insure that law and order be maintained among the civilian population". Various annexes

tp Field Order 55 followed in rapid succession with the Administration of Justice in the American zone of occupation stemming from Annex 7 of 29 August 1945.

Subordinate commanders were instructed to "disseminate and enforce proclamations and orders issued by the Commanding General USAFIK" (14) and to "issue within their zones of responsibility or cause to be issued such local laws or ordinances as are necessary to carry out the objectives and problems." (15) Law enforcement policy contemplated utilization of existing Japanese governmental machinery: "So far as practicable the Supreme Commander will exercise authority through the existing or reorganized government of Korea and such governmental machinery as is permitted by him to function." (16)

Though retention of certain Japanese and Korean civil office holders was viewed as necessary to expedite the transition, those who had been flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression were barred from public affairs. The prohibition extented to and included those engaged in private enterprise: "No persons will be allowed to hold public office or any other position of responsibility or influence in public or private enterprise who have been flagrant exponents of militant Japanese Nationalism and aggression." (17) The order specifically pointed out, however, that "other incumbent policy-making officials will be removed when such removal will not jeopardize the efficiency of present government controls and administration." For public safety, Military Government was instructed to retain the existing police organization and personnel to maintain law and order, but to take steps to replace Japanese police with Koreans and to disarm civilians. (18) Counter Intelligence

operations included "investigating and clearing civilian officials appointed by Military Government agencies."(19) Provision was made in Annex 7 to Field Order 55 for the apprehension of "designated and suspected war criminals."(20)

The Annex set forth that:

> The immediate objective of the Military Occupation of Korea is the abolition of militarism; the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment; the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan; the abolition of discriminations on grounds of race, nationality, creed, political opinions; the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes; the encouragement of liberal political, economic and social institutions; and the creation of conditions in Korea which will facilitate the emergence of a responsible Korean government capable of administering internal affairs and maintaining peaceful relations with other nations and with which the United Nations can deal.(21)

Several other provisions of the Annex involved legal or military power for enforcement. Thus it prohibited dissemination of Japanese materialistic, Nation Shintoistic, and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form, and ordered political parties, organizations, and societies placed under control. Those groups inconsistent with the requirements and objectives of Military Government were to be abolished, and those whose activities were consistent encouraged.(22) Counter Intelligence operations were to include safeguarding state papers and captured documents and investigating and recommending steps to be taken to insure the security of government offices.(23)

Plans in advance of occupation called for retaining the ordinary criminal courts then functioning under the Japanese system, subject, however, to such regulations, supervision, and control as might be

imposed within the discretion of the Military Government. Judges and other court personnel who had been flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression and who continued actively to oppose the military occupation were ordered removed "as rapidly as possible".(24)

II - COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENT GENERAL IN KOREA

On 15 August 1945, when the Emperor of Japan proclaimed cessation of hostilities and called upon Japanese soldiers to lay down their arms, the position of the Japanese Government General of Chosen (Korea) became precarious and its political control untenable. Factions long suppressed became articulate and openly aggressive. Unconditional surrender of Japan meant liberation of Korea. Japanese officials ceased to command respect. Authority behind the imperial facade lost effect and the government itself was reduced to a phantom. First, disquiet possessed officials; then panic set in. Political instability preceded administrative disintegration. Law and order were in jeopardy. The period from the Imperial Rescript of 15 August to the arrival of General Hodge was confused and critical to a point at least verging on anarchy.(25)

Underground groups in Korea, never completely extirpated by Japan, had been animated to increasing acts of boldness in July as news of allied naval and military successes sifted in. Seditious writings were widely circulated and plans were fomented by some groups to stage an armed uprising simultaneous with the arrival of Allied troops. The content of the Cairo Declaration was known but the pledge of freedom and independence to Korea was misunderstood. The promise that independence would come after liberation "in due course" was translated and generally understood in Korea as "very soon" or "in a few days". Organizations and groups of various political shades became vociferous in their demands for immediate independence. Among these, the Lyuh Woon Hyung faction, aided and abetted by the Japanese

Government General, originally to enlist pro-Japanese sympathy, formed the "Korean Committee for the Preparation of the Reestablishment of the State" (also known as the "Korean Reconstruction Commission" and still later as the "Korean People's Republic") about the time of the surrender proclamation "to cooperate with the Government General to maintain peace."(26) Among provisions in the agreement between Lyuh and the Government General were those for the release of political prisoners and the mobilization of students to maintain order. The agreement, by stipulating that the Japanese would not interfere with the committee's activities, which were broad, was almost tantamount to an abdication of the Government General in favor of a political faction. Lyuh, who had possession of press and radio, broadcast that his organization would be responsible for maintenance of law and order and the principal functions of government. Meanwhile, police embezzled, abandoned their posts, or apathetically stood by doing nothing. Students organized, and receiving arms, tried to maintain order while Koreans led by Lyuh began to take over firms, factories, railways, and street car lines. Prisoners by the thousands, both criminal and political, were released. Japanese soldiers were being disarmed and disbanded to roam at large. The army delivered weapons to citizens; smoldering grievances and animosities burst into disorder. Violence mounted. Government warehouses were thrown open and property seized and distributed and carried away. Conflicts occurred between Koreans and pro-Japanese Koreans. Embezzlement of public funds, distribution of bonuses, and destruction or alteration of public documents occurred. Police ineptitude made it

difficult for Japanese officials remaining on their jobs to maintain the tenuous sovereignty still residing in the Government General.[27] A grave situation had arisen. Anarchy loomed.

The situation was further aggravated by Ahn Chai Hong, then associated with Lyuh. On 17 August he broadcast aims of the party, which were in fact functions of government itself, and declared that the party would get sovereign power shortly.[28] The widespread unrest and sporadic violence together with the actions and objectives of the Lyuh faction alarmed Japanese officials. They recalled former police from the army and set about to reassert their characteristic rigid police methods. The appearance of police in Army uniforms to preserve order and of troops armed with machine guns outraged those who considered Japanese rule and show of force at an end and intensified radical Koreans to greater opposition. Feeling the need of Lyuh's support, yet confronted by the party's intolerable ambition to rule as a government, authorities changed the name of the Committee to "Public Safety Committee" as a face-saving device and thereby kept sovereign power within the established Government General.[29] ~~effects~~ efforts were made to nollify and pacify truculent Koreans. On 20 August, Major General Nagaya warned that freedom would not come through sabotage, disorder, and violence.[30] Governor General Nobuyuki Abe had made an appeal at the time of the announcement of the Imperial edict bringing an end to hostilities. Vice Governor Ryusaka Endo amplified the Governor General's statement in Keijo Nippo of 20 August, warning that "the Japanese sovereign

power in Korea still majestically exists" and that "the Korean Government General still retains its sovereign responsibility for all institutions." He bluntly stated: "You people have lost presence of mind by the great shock resulting from the extraordinary turn of events," then added, "if there are some who purposely disturb the peace, the Government General, of course must take strong action."(31) On 24 August, Keijo Nippo asserted that "the sovereign power in Korea still exists" and that "without a doubt the Japanese judicial powers will exist in Korea until the details of the conference between Japan and the Allied countries are concluded."(32)

Alarmed by the situation, a radio appeal was dispatched to General MacArthur on 29 August: "The local Japanese eagerly await the early arrival of the Allied forces which are to take (over) the maintanance of peace and order from the Japanese forces in southern Korea."(33) The same message expressed fear of the spread of disorder in North Korea to South Korea, exposing Japanese lives and property to "imminent danger," and "forcing the local Japanese authorities into an extremely awkward polition with regard to the maintanance of peace and order."(34) The message was transmitted to General Hodge, who had been trying to establish radio contact in Korea, with instructions to act as future events might justify. Following contact with Lt. Gen. Yoshio Kozuki, Supreme Commander of Japanese Forces in Korea, on 29 August, messages relative to occupation and surrender passed between General Hodge and him. Indicating attempts to carry out the orders emanating from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Pacific, Kozuki radioed General Hodge that "there are communist and independence agitators among Koreans who are plotting to take advantage of this situation to disturb peace and order here."(35)

To clarify the situation and quiet unrest, leaflets were prepared in Okinawa, flown to Korea, and dropped over Pusan, Seoul, and Inchon on 4 and 5 September. The messages announced the approaching arrival of United States Forces and appealed to

Koreans to avoid disorder. The second leaflet explained that the purpose of Americans was to maintain order and prepare Korea for democratic government. It pointed out the necessity for a gradual transition in the operation of government machinery to avoid lawlessness. It called upon Koreans to assist by obeying the proclamation and orders of the Supreme Commander, warned that violations must be punished, and that normal pursuits of production and trade, utilities and transportation must continue. The leaflet urged peaceful and orderly conduct and avoidance of foolish actions. (36)

Before the first leaflet was dropped, mobs had become active and there were attacks upon the police, thefts of munitions, and strikes. Transportation and communications had been delayed. The first message had a salutary effect upon Koreans generally. However, General Hodge authorized General Kozuki to maintain order and preserve the machinery of government until relieved. The Japanese General at his own request was permitted to publish some Corps messages authorizing Japanese control until Americans arrived. (37) Vice Governor Ryusaka Endo ~~had truly~~ declared: "In a sense only hostilities have ceased, adding the Korean Government General still retains its sovereign responsibility for all institutions." (38) Nevertheless, factions distributed handbills and posters on conditions and made political prognostications. One leaflet, attributed to communists, announced congratulations on the independence of ~~Chosen~~ Korea and named a president, a premier, and several cabinet ministers, including Lyuh Woon Hyung as Foreign

Minister.(39)

Koreans were confused about Russian occupation troops in the North. Communists in South Korea passed out leaflets that Soviet forces would arrive in Seoul.(40) The situation became delicate when General MacArthur was ~~advised~~ informed by Japanese sources that USSR forces had advanced south and severed communications between Keijo (Seoul) and Tokyo. General MacArthur sent supplementary instructions to General Hodge on 29 August pointing out the quadripartite occupation of Korea (American, British, Chinese, and Soviet), agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference, but noting that the United States would receive surrender south of the 38th parallel pursuant to the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved by the President. He stated that "a clear definition of the areas to be occupied by the four powers" had not been communicated to him. However, he instructed General Hodge to proceed with landing "even though Russian forces are already present," but "to act with caution". Continuing, the Supreme Commander warned: "Should events indicate that international complications will result, it is desired that the landing be delayed and that you communicate directly with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Tokyo giving a full statement of facts."(41) The Soviet forces did not advance to Seoul.

The Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, preceding the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Government, required Japan to remove obstacles to advancement of democratic tendencies and provided for

establishment of freedom of speech, of religion, of thought, and "respect for the fundamental human rights."(42) The Instrument of Surrender, signed 2 September 1945, contained the following paragraph for the maintenance of law and order:

> We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives, deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority, and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their noncombatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority. (43)

Subordination of the Emperor and the Japanese Government was effected in the surrender as follows: "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."(44) On 7 September 1945, General MacArthur issued Proclamations 1 and 2 announcing and establishing Allied Control and ordering obedience to the surrender proclamations, orders, directives, and regulations, and punishment for disobedience and violations. General Hodge arrived at Inchon on 8 September and the Japanese Commander of the Imperial Army in South Korea signed terms of the surrender in Seoul the following day.(45)

III - ESTABLISHMENT OF LAW AND ORDER

Immediately after the Instrument of Surrender was executed, the Japanese flag was lowered and that of the United States raised. General Hodge explained to the press the American mission. He pointed out the temporary retention of Japanese officials to facilitate an orderly transition to Americans, who would first replace them and themselves later be replaced by Koreans. The retention of Japanese dismayed Koreans and their resentment put American occupation in an unsatisfactory light.(46) General MacArthur radioed General Hodge on 11 September 1945 that, "as rapidly as possible consistent with safety of operation" he should "replace all Japanese in government positions."(47) General Hodge replied that he "had already reached" the same conclusion and had drafted a "request for authority to act." The immediate and sweeping removal of Japanese officials, not contemplated in the original plans, would have resulted in chaos because of the widespread operation and control by Japan through Japanese personnel in Korea. General Hodge himself reported, "My Military Government setup is entirely inadequate to cope with (the) situation."(48)

On 12 September he relieved the Japanese Governor General of Chosen and the Director of the Police Bureau of the Government General.(49) On the same day Major General Archibald V. Arnold, Commanding General of the 7th Division, was appointed Military Governor of Korea south of the 38th parallel.(50) The Provost Marshal General,

Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick, was named Director of the Police Bureau ~~on 12 September~~.(51) Then, on 14 September, Vice Governor Ryusaka Endo and the remaining Japanese bureau directors, including the Director of the Bureau of Justice, Mr. Fukuzo Soda, were relieved. Major Emery J. Woodall was appointed Chief (Director) of the Bureau of Justice. The title Government General was changed to Military Government to remove the connotation of "colonial status" for Korea. In the meanwhile, removal of the Japanese Governor General halted Korean criticism of the American policy.(52)

Before General Hodge's arrival in Korea it had become increasingly clear that Korea could not be governed by a policy similar to that envisaged for Japan. Proclamations prepared for Japan were originally contemplated for Korea as well, but on 3 September, the Supreme Commander directed that no proclamation for Japan be used in Korea; instead, special proclamations would be furnished the XXIV Corps. These announced military occupation of South Korea by American forces and stated it was being done to maintain law and order and to enforce the terms of the surrender. Independence "in due course" was the objective. English was proclaimed the official language. Certain restrictions were enforced in reference to property and currency.(53) The proclamations were posted in prominent places together with the leaflets dropped prior to arrival and other leaflets disseminated after arrival which admonished obedience to Military Government and set forth basic purposes of occupation: maintenance of law and order, enforcement of surrender

terms, and improvement of conditions in Korea.(54)

Although American occupation occurred without resistance and the soldiers were received with enthusiasm, ~~the~~ division of Korea ~~by~~ at the 38th parallel and ~~the~~ misunderstanding about the achievement of freedom and independence caused puzzlement and unrest, and gave factions and parties grievances to bolster their aims and add further confusion.(55) The Koreans' enthusiasm for independence exceeded their capacity to govern after nearly forty years of subordination and servitude. Distorted statements appeared in the press and the difficulties of making clear the American position were increased by the language barrier.(56) ~~The~~ USAFIK immediately took up such problems as release of Allied prisoners of war, occupation of the provinces, evacuation and demilitarization of the Japanese military forces, repatriation of Japanese civilians and other foreign nationals, and repatriation of Korean nationals.(57)

IV - JUDICIAL SYSTEM UNDER JAPAN PRIOR TO SURRENDER

Under Japanese rule, three bureaus were directly connected with the administration of justice -- General Affairs (which handled all legal matters and performed functions of general counsel), Justice, and Police. The most important activities of the Bureau of Justice were handled by civil, criminal, and administrative sections. Penal and correctional institutions occupied a subordinate position as a sub-section. Police chiefs had summary judicial jurisdiction in petty cases and tried more than 100,000 cases annually.(58)

Japanese personnel dominated all high positions. Where Koreans were appointed, their status was of minor importance.(59) Discrimination against Koreans had long been practiced by the Japanese, and with the imposition of the Japanese language, the inadequate educational facilities provided, and the methods of tyranny employed, bureaus like that of Justice particularly, which required a specialized and technically trained personnel reinforced by experience in judicial administration, were in a state of disorganization and collapse when Americans arrived.(60)

The judicial system as Americans found it embraced three types of courts: local or District Courts in the provinces, Courts of Review, and the Supreme Court. The District Courts,

presided over by a single judge, had jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases in the first instance. When a civil suit involved ¥1,000 or more and other cases were of importance, three judges sat. There was no jury system. The Court of Appeal (sometimes translated as Court of Review) consisted of three judges and considered appeals from District Court judgments. Five judges sat on the Supreme Court, which had appellate jurisdiction over a judgment rendered by a court of review. If three judges sat on a case, one judge was always Japanese. He presided and had absolute veto power. Korean judges were in the minority. In September 1940, there was no Korean judge on the Supreme Court. Out of 35 judges on the Courts of Appeal, only four were Koreans. About 10% of the judges on local courts were Koreans. Grajdanzev has stated that at that time no Korean was listed among the procurators.(61) In 1939, only 46 of the 235 judges and eight of 120 procurators were Koreans.(62) The requirement of the Japanese language in the courts imposed a severe hardship upon Koreans. As Grajdanzev put it, "Korean courts in the laws they use, in the nationality of their procurators and judges, and in the official language of legal procedure reveal the same features that characterize Japanese rule in Korea - complete neglect of the interests of the natives."(63)

Because of poverty, the Koreans did not resort to civil suits in large number. However, criminal cases were numerous. From 1911, when 9,622 criminal cases were tried and decided, the number

steadily mounted through the years to 44,400 in 1938. Prisoners increased from 5,300 in 1909 to 19,328 in 1942. (64)

There was no legislative body in Korea. Consequently, no statutory law for Korea derivative of a law-making body existed as such within the peninsula. The sources of law in force in Korea at the time of surrender were: Japanese laws, Japanese codes, and Imperial Ordinances of the Japanese Government specifically directed to Korean affairs. There were ordinances, orders, regulations, and other laws promulgated by the Japanese Government General in Korea, and regulations by provincial governors. In addition, some branches of Korean customary law dealing with family relationships, property, descent, marriage, divorce, and related matters, with modification and exception, were in force, but a qualified application of the Japanese constitution applied. The constitution of Japan established the sovereignty of the Japanese Emperor but civil liberties did not extend to Koreans as they did to Japanese in Korea. (65)

Grajdanzev classified the general sources of law in Korea into three groups: special Japanese laws published in Korea, laws of Japan applied in Korea, and decrees, statutes, and regulations issued by the Government General. Special Japanese laws in Korea embraced such laws as the Korean Banking Law, the law concerning subsidies to Korean private railways, and General Provisions. Laws of Japan applying in Korea included Patent Law, Financial Law,

and Postal Law, and Peace Regulations. Decrees, statutes, and regulations promulgated by the Government General embraced the Korean Government, General's Court Law, Civil Procedure Law, and Criminal Procedure Law.(66) The codes were copied from Japanese codes. In short, laws enforced in Korea were Japanese laws.

The system of law in force in Korea, thus derived from Japan, had its origin in the Civil Law of Continental Europe, and therefore differed from the "Common Law" of England and that Law transplanted in the United States as Anglo-American law. The absence of the jury system and of stare decisis under the common law system are outstanding differences between the two systems.(67)

Through the police, the Koreans met the impact of Japanese tyranny personally. Though police constitute a separate treatment in the history, nevertheless, a discussion of law, the courts, and the administration of justice would be wanting if some allusion were not made to that formidable institution which provoked irrepressible fear, hatred, and odium among Koreans. The police were centralized in a department under the Government General with a police bureau in each of the 13 provinces, and police officers in each municipality, county, and island. Under Japanese control the police were independent of local authority. The summary judicial power possessed by chiefs of police afforded wide scope for abuse. Highest ranking police officers were Japanese. Each section or department of the Police Bureau had special jurisdiction.(68) In the enforcement of arbitrary, oppressive, and tyrannical laws and regulations within the jurisdiction of those departments, Japanese police indulged in vicious practices.(69)

V - FORCE OF LAW UNDER UNITED STATES MILITARY OCCUPATION

The United States Army Forces entered Korea as a victorious ally over Japan, who since 1910 had ruled the peninsula as an integral part of its empire. Occupation was effected in accordance with planned military operations and diplomatic commitments. The Japanese instrument of surrender severed Japanese sovereignty over Korea. The American Army arrived as a military force of liberation. Though the machinery of the Government General and the courts were to continue to function and existing laws were to be binding until otherwise modified or rejected by the Commanding General subject to higher authority, the administration and enforcement of law and the source of law shifted from Japan and the Japanese Government General of Chosen to the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) and its instrumentality of governmental authority, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).(70)

USAFIK, through its subordinate USAMGIK, performed functions which had the force of law. It exercised sovereign power as the exclusive government in South Korea; it had the authority of military occupant as an instrumentality of the United States; it exercised the functions of government; finally, it acted as trustee of ~~(70a)~~ Japanese property for the benefit of the Korean people.(71)

Victory of the Allied Powers had terminated Japanese Government in Korea; then American and Russian armies enforced terms of surrender in their respective zones and were bound by the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, to establish "in due course" a free and independent Korea. This Declaration was later subscribed to by USSR in the Potsdam Conference. General Hodge stated to the Korean people the position of USAFIK:

> Military Government is the only government in South Korea. It operates through the established agencies of the Government General, the Provinces, the counties, and the cities. The sole interest of the Military Government is the welfare of Korea and the establishing of basis for a sound government and a sound economy for Korea. (72)

At the same time, because of confusion in the minds of many Koreans, he defined Military Government as:

> A Provisional Government established by the United States Army, under direction of the Supreme Commander, by which the Allied Powers will govern, guide, and control Korea South of 38 Degrees North Latitude during the transition period between a state of Japanese domination and the establishment of a democratic government of the people, for the people, and by the people.

These objectives were strengthened by the Moscow Agreement, 27 December 1945, which provided for the US-USSR Joint Commission to work toward Korean freedom and independence. However, initial law of USAFIK, based on international law, appeared in USAFPAC proclamations at the end of hostilities. (73) Since no sovereign government existed in Korea at the time of American occupation, the United States Commanding General assumed authority of a sovereign government pursuant to higher directives and proceeded

forthwith to govern South Korea. He delegated certain powers, functions, and responsibilities to a Military Governor, who first established office on 14 September 1945 as part of Headquarters, USAFIK, and later headed USAMGIK in January 1946, following reorganization of the Military Government.(74) The Military Governor initially utilized the existing framework of government, enforcing the body of law in existence, but repealing discriminatory and oppressive laws.(75) Civilians were disarmed,(76) courts reorganized, Korean law and custom retained, and international law observed.(77) Legislative power was exercised directly by the Military Governor in the form of ordinances, removals, appointments, and orders of one kind and another. He assumed, subject to directives of higher American authority, any and all authority formerly exercised by the Japanese Governor General.(78) The Military Governor further delegated authority to the Civil Administrator and bureau directors subordinate to him. Modifications of Military Government without disturbing the supreme authority of the Commanding General and that delegated to the Military Governor occurred under a policy of Koreanization when Americans ceased to administer offices directly and became advisors to Koreans who took over the responsible duties,(79) when the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was established,(80) and when the South Korean Interim Government came into being.(81)

In the meanwhile, the stalemate of the US-USSR Joint Commission resulted in the jurisdiction of the United Nations being involved

and the subsequent popular election of a National Assembly, 10 May 1948, to enact legislation for the establishment of a Korean government.

An act of American Military Government of considerable legal significance was the vesting of legal title to and assumption of trusteeship over all Japanese property located in South Korea, under Ordinance No.33, 6 December 1945.(82) This was preceded by Ordinance No. 2, 25 September 1945, which prohibited transfer of property owned or controlled by Japane and other enemy countries.(83) In the meanwhile, a Property Custody Section had been established 1 October. USAMGIK became trustee of a great part of the wealth of South Korea. On 31 August 1946, the Property Claims Commission had been established to ascertain and determine ownership of property affected by Ordinances 2 and 33.(84) To facilitate handling the problems involved and to bring about closer cooperation, a Joint Korean-American Advisory Board on Vested Property was created 31 March 1947. This board advised the Property Custodian on policies and measures affecting vested property as well as other agencies entrusted with the management of vested property.(85) Legal questions arising in the administration of vested property were handled by the Legal Opinions Section of the Department of Justice.

In short, when the Korean Constituent Assembly convened 31 May 1948, the law in force consisted of : (1) Proclamation issued

by CINCPAC; (2) directives and orders issued by General Hodge as Commanding General; (3) customary law unmodified by Japanese administration; (4) statutory law in force on 9 August 1945, except laws specifically repealed by USAMGIK; (5) ordinances and orders and other regulatory measures issued by or through the Military Governor; and (6) Public Acts passed by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

VI. TRANSITION FROM JAPANESE TO AMERICAN CONTROL AND AUTHORITY

The United States Military Government utilized the existing administrative machinery of the Government General. Then American executive and administrative personnel organized parallel to that framework and initially assumed the same official functions therein. (86) Authority descended from the Military Governor, through the Civil Administrator, to seven sections at top level, which constituted the Secretariat. Among these sections, General Affairs was closely allied to the Department of Justice and its subordinate bureaus of Civil Affairs, Criminal Affairs, and Penal Institutions. *

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* The major units of Military Government were initially denominated "bureaus." Their subordinate components at the national level and major units of provincial government were called "departments." This nomenclature derived from the official Japanese translation into English, but was in contradiction to the practice in the United States Government, where top level units are called "departments" and those immediately subordinate to them "bureaus." Consequently, Ordinance No. 64 of 29 March 1946 ordered a change in nomenclature whereby the former "bureaus" became "departments" and vice versa. This system continued thereafter as long as Military Government existed.

To avoid confusion in the present chapter, all textual references hereinafter, other than those in direct quotations, have arbitrarily been made to conform with the Ordinance No. 64 system, even though the event or events referred to antedated the ordinance. Footnote citations remain unaltered.

Major Emery J. Woodall, Secretary and General Counsel, headed the General Affairs Section. Almost immediately upon his arrived in Seoul, he undertook (10 September 1945) to resolve some of the problems of Justice, particularly in relation to maintenance of law and order and organization of courts.(87) On 29 September he became Director of Justice in addition to his other duties;(88) he held this position until relieved by Major Matt Taylor on 20 November.(89) When the General Affairs Section was abolished (2 April 1946) and its functions consolidated with those of Justice, he resumed the directorship, serving until late May when he was readjusted.(90) Lieutenant Colonel (later Major) John W. Connelley, Jr. succeeded him.(91)

Major Woodall had the initial responsibility of salvaging the judicial structure from the disintegration and collapse which had begun immediately after 15 August 1945.(92) The chaotic conditions throughout South Korea had been aggravated particularly by the collapse of the ~~Bureau~~ Department of Justice itself as a law enforcement agency. Dr. Y. H. Kim as eyewitness to passing events prior to American control stated:

> "Prison doors were flung open to relieve political and economic criminals. Prison walls were thronged by the families of other criminals. Guards were threatened and they opened the doors and the criminals flooded out... Glass windows were broken...Japanese soldiers were put in front of big buildings with bayonets on their guns. But those who once seemed so powerful showed no authority. Trucks and trucks of the Japanese army were carrying things away...Streets were flooded with people...shouting and yelling filled the air...Commodities which had been hidden in factories were given to Japanese who sold them to Koreans...There was neither law nor order."

Continuing his description of the situation confronting the Director of the Department of Justice, Dr. Kim declared:

> This situation lasted more than two weeks. Many self-appointed peace-preservation associations organized. Yet they themselves violated law and order. They robbed every big factory. They assumed the authority of taking over Army goods. Political parties grew up like mushrooms. Governments were formed and cabinet members were announced. Police were powerless. Some Japanese policemen were still on duty with cotton bands around their arms with letters of "M.G." thereon. Some arrests of notorious criminals were made, but these Japanese police did not turn over to the court, but shortly released them. ... In this confused situation, we began the work of our Bureau. Colonel Woodall and I went around nine police stations warning police chiefs that they would be jailed if they did not do their duties. So police began to send criminals to court. (93)

The American Director discovered that important official records of the Department of Justice had been destroyed, including part of the national fingerprint file.(94) The former Japanese director, Mr. Fukuzo Soda, was immediately arrested.(95) Japanese officials of the Department were removed from their jobs by verbal orders and an accounting of funds and investigation of embezzlements were launched. By 15 October 1945, approximately 4,000,000 yen had been recovered. Some important records were restored from fractional ones in other departments.(96)

Staffing the Department with qualified Koreans presented a serious difficulty. Under the Japanese Government General, Koreans had been suppressed professionally and reduced to positions of minor importance.(97) The Director conferred with the Korean president and officers of the National Bar association, who submitted lists of possible appointees from among whom the nucleus of the organization under American authority was selected.(98) Difficulties increased when Korean parties

criticized and held under suspicion those Koreans retained by Americans who had served under Japan. Koreans who had been employed by Japan were stigmatized as Japanese collaborators.(97) In spite of that criticism, some young Koreans were retained in minor positions and some Japanese who were essential to proper operations. Reorganization of the police continued at the same time.(98) 100

At the direction of the Military Governor, ~~Major General A. V. Arnold,~~ the Civil Administrator, Colonel B. E. Prescott, on 20 September 1945, issued a statement on "Organization of Military Government, Government General," accompanied by a chart. The General Affairs Section, part of the Secretariat, acted as Legal Counsel to the Government General (now changed to Military Government), and served as the office of record for the government, maintained the Official Gazette and central files, was Keeper of the Seal of the Military Governor, and made official all documents requiring the Governor's Seal. General Affairs tied in closely with the Department of Justice, both of which were headed by Major Woodall until 20 November. The chart had listed under the Department of Justice: Civil Affairs, Criminal Affairs, and Penal Institutions. No mention of the courts was made nor anything about other functions of the Department.(99) 101 However, matters concerning ~~with~~ legal drafting, translating and amending laws, research on the codes, rejuvenating the courts, and organizing the bar came under the jurisdiction of the Department and the General Counsel.(~~100~~) 102

As of December 1945, the administrative organization was headed by the Director (Major Taylor) with an American Executive Officer and a Korean Executive Assistant. The Director worked closely with a Korean Advisory Council on the administration of Justice and the Supervisors of Provincial and City Administration of Justice, as well as with the General Affairs Section, which was in its turn closely linked with the Special Criminal Investigating Committee. The Department itself was subdivided into five units: one embraced the National Law Library, Korean Code Drafting, Customary Law, and Court Reports; others covered Criminal Affairs, Civil Affairs, Penal, and, finally, the Bar Association and Admissions. Each major unit was broken into specialized divisions and sections.(103)

Liaison between the Military Government at top level and local governments had been established through Military Government teams attached to the tactical units and maintained under the Local Affairs section of the Secretariat. Though the Local Affairs Section was abolished 1 October 1945, the Department of Justice maintained for a few months a Supervisor of Provincial and City Administration.(104) American Legal Officers supervised the provincial courts directly from the Department at top level. No Korean at any time ever served as a Legal Officer.(105)

The Korean Advisory Council was created 5 October 1945 and consisted of eleven members who were educators, lawyers, business men, and political leaders of various leanings, appointed to advise the Military Government. They were called upon to assist in the

organization of Military Government and in making appointments. Announcement of the creation of the Council was given a lukewarm reception by Koreans, eager for immediate independence.(106) In the meantime, in line with General Hodge's policy, efforts were made to get representative expressions from the various political parties.(107) Later, 16 November 1945, to ascertain the political beliefs and actions of Koreans holding or applying for office, the Military Governor created the Personnel Review Board, consisting of seven members appointed by the Civil Administrator. Acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the Board was authorized to hold closed hearings, subpoena witnesses, probe into Japanese and pro-Japanese and enemy activities of Koreans, and submit its findings and report to the Military Governor.(108)

On 9 October, six important posts in the Department were filled by appointment of Koreans. The highest was that of Executive Assistant filled by Dr. Kim Yung Heui, a Yale University Ph.D. in Political Science and History. Appointment of a Korean to a seventh post, that of Supervisor of Special Property Courts, was made on 18 October. As his legal advisor, the Director retained Mr. Suh Kwang Sul, who served also as justice of the Supreme Court.(109)

The appointments were temporary, pending the establishment of a new civil service for the Government of Korea. The Military Governor at the same time authorized the Justice Department Director to "employ temporarily such other unofficial Korean personnel as is required to perform the work of the Bureau and agencies regulated

by the Bureau," and to "remove and dismiss all Japanese personnel of all ranks as soon as their services are no longer needed for the efficient performance of the work of the Bureau or agencies regulated by the Bureau." (110 ~~100~~)

On 13 December 1945, the Department of Justice had a personnel of twenty-six American army officers and three enlisted men.(111 ~~109~~) As rapidly as possible Koreans were set up as counterparts to the Americans. On 30 October, a Criminal Investigation section had been created in the Police Department. The establishment of a fingerprint record was among its functions; the Fingerprint Section at the same time was transferred from the Department of Justice's Criminal Section to the Department of Police.(112 ~~110~~) The Historical Research Division and the Modern Korean Code Drafting Division were transferred from the Justice Department to the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat on 18 January 1946.(113 ~~111~~)

Simultaneous with reorganizing and staffing the Department, lawyers and translators scanned the law books for sources of discrimination and oppression deliberately enacted and promulgated by Japan against Korea. The individual Korean citizen was the first concern of Military Government. As an initial step in fulfillment of the declared policy of liberation, ~~the~~ Military Government on 18 September 1945 issued the first sweeping decree emancipating the Korean people from humiliating legal subjugation and establishing for them equal justice under ~~the~~ law. General Order No. 5 repealed six specific laws "in order to eliminate from the laws applicable

to the people of Korea and the administration thereof, within the territory occupied south of North Latitude 38 degrees, the policies and doctrines which discriminate against and are oppressive to the Korean people, and to restore to the Korean people the rule of Justice and Equality before the law." (~~112~~ 114)

The same General Order then decreed a "General Repealing Clause" of profound legal significance: "All other laws, decrees, or orders having the force of law are hereby repealed, the Judicial or Administrative enforcement of which would cause discriminations on grounds of race, nationality, creed, or political opinions." (115)

The Japanese practice of detaining Koreans in custody was repudiated: "The detention of any person not charged with a specific crime or offense and the punishment of any person without lawful trial and conviction are repudiated." (116) Prohibition against unlawful detention was specifically reinforced by the order that no charge was to be preferred, sentence imposed, or punishment inflicted "against any person" for an act unless expressly made punishable by law in force at the time of its commission. (~~115~~ 117)

These repeals and prohibitions cut squarely across the notorious Japanese police and judicial tyranny so odious to Koreans. The summary judicial power of police chiefs was repealed by Ordinance No. 11, (9 October ~~1945~~). (116) This practice had been widely abused and was detested by the Korean people.

On 30 October ~~1945~~, Ordinance No. 19 declared a National Emergency provoked by Japanese tyranny in the exploitation of Korean

land, resources, industry, and economy due to the imposition of military and political despotism which had reduced Korea to servitude. Reiterating the reasons for the presence of American forces, the Military Governor explained:

> They came for the avowed purpose of requiring the complete and permanent eviction of all Japanese Military forces from Korea and eliminating all Japanese Militaristic and Nationalistic ideology.
>
> In addition to that objective, the Military Government was instructed to take steps to effect complete political and administrative separation of Korea from Japanese social, economic, and financial control; to facilitate development of a sound Korean economy and to work towards the restoration of a free, independent, and responsible Korea. (119)

The Declaration recited measures the Military Government had taken to bring economic relief, such as taking over Japanese property for the benefit of the Korean people, returning to the farmers land wrested from them, restoring principles of a free market, feeding the starving, and bringing about the establishment of law and order. The critical situation created by Japan led the Military Governor to assert:

> Such conditions have created within Korea an emergency which for the sole protection of the people can only be met by extraordinary measures which will inure to their benefit... Rigid emergency controls are hereby established, in order to prevent such conditions from existing which will harm the people. Such temporary measures will be withdrawn as quickly as the emergency ceases.

The same ordinance contained specific provisions in reference to the protection of labor, (which guaranteed the right to work and established the Labor Mediation Board), protection against profiteering, protection of the public against acts prejudicial to the people's welfare, and registration of newspapers and other public actions.

To protect the people against acts prejudicial to their welfare, several acts were declared unlawful: knowingly making false statements to anyone acting under the authority of USAFIK or USAMGIK in matters of official concern or attempting to defraud Military Government; obstructing, attempting to obstruct, or contravening orders of the Military Government; prejudicing the people's welfare by threats, coercion, intimidation, or victimization against any person cooperating with USAFIK or USAMGIK. Then, "in order that freedom of speech and freedom of the press may be preserved and safeguarded without being perverted to unlawful or subversive purposes," registration of publishers and organizations engaged in printing reading material was ordered within ten days.(~~118~~ 120)

On 2 November 1945, the legal authority and law enforcement methods under which the Military Government operated were promulgated in Ordinance No. 21:

> "Until further ordered, and except as previously repealed or abolished, all laws which were in force, regulations, orders, notices or other documents issued by any former government of Korea having the force of law on 9 August 1945 will continue in full force and effect until repealed by express order of the Military Government of Korea. All local laws and customs will continue in force until repealed by competent authority. The provisions of law with respect to the organization of the Government General of Korea; the Provincial Governments, the cities, towns, and villages, including the directors of bureaus, the secretaries of sections of the secretariat, the mayor, county head, police station chief, tax office chief, head of town and village, and their subordinates are continued in force until abolished by competent authority, except as they have been modified or repealed by the orders of the Military Governor. Subject to directives of higher authority, any and all authority heretofore exercised by the Governor-General of Korea may be exercised by the Military Governor."(~~119~~ 121)

In the same Ordinance, enforcement of all laws, all AFPAC proclamations, and all orders and ordinances of the Military Governor was ~~or more~~ placed within the jurisdiction of all courts of South Korea. Those courts were constituted Military Occupation Courts.

VII. REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO KOREANIZATION

The theory of Koreanization as an early objective of the Military Government became a guiding principle in the Department of Justice. The Military Governor, Major General A.V. Arnold, clearly explained the policy on 12 November 1945: "In order to avoid confusion, financial collapse and abuse of privilege by misguided persons, there will be a gradual and carefully guided transition from the old type of Japanese Imperial Government to a truly Korean Government."(122)

He then took occasion to inform Koreans why the program had suffered some delay:

> Japanese in government positions must be removed rapidly - but not until they have imparted to their Korean successors all the procedures and functions of their offices, and have accounted for their funds and duties. Because Koreans were largely excluded from government positions during the Jap occupation, it is now difficult to find enough experienced men to fill the thousands of government positions.(123)

This situation was ominously true in the Department of Justice and the courts. There were an estimated one hundred forty qualified Korean lawyers available in all South Korea when the United States took over the Department of Justice. There were less than two hundred lawyers to choose from the first year. The Department was compelled to reduce standards. Japan had imposed severe restrictions on Koreans desiring to practice law; in consequence, many law school graduates had not been admitted to the Bar.(124) Koreans who were available hesitated; they raised questions of caste, rank, and social status, and thereby embarrassed the Director of the Department. General Arnold explained the

policy unequivocally
~~situation clearly~~ by pointing out ~~that~~ "When the Korean assistants to Military Government officers prove to be sufficiently trained and competent, they will be appointed to the official positions now held by the Americans. The present American officers will then become Advisors to the Koreans." (~~121~~ 126) In the meanwhile, every effort was made to determine who were to be considered active collaborators and who ~~were~~ traitors. The Department wished to avoid putting such persons in office. Critical Koreans had to be warned that collaboration in some cases was a matter of degree. Some collaboration with the Japanese had been a necessity, hence had to be so judged.(~~125~~ 127) Once American officers in the various subdivisions of the Department obtained qualified Koreans, they encouraged them to assume more responsibility.(~~126~~ 128) An inspection of the Department (3-6 December 1945) revealed that Korean officials were given "considerable responsibility" while supervision was "careful without being restrictive." (129)

However, at that time there was little written material available explaining the formation and functioning of the Department's various elements. Personnel had an inadequate knowledge of their activities and responsibilities. Titles and duties in some instances were not clearly defined. Confusion was found to exist because of loose terminology and inaccurate functional descriptions used by both military and civilian personnel. The Department lacked reports and statistical information. These weaknesses were pointed out in the Inspection Report.(~~128~~ 130) The importance of

obtaining qualified Korean personnel and of putting more responsibility on them was stressed. Nevertheless, the Director who had served since November was commended as having done a good job considering the lack of personnel and of essential office equipment.(~~129~~ 131)

The Director of the Department remedied the defects pointed out in the Inspection Report, redefined titles and duties of officers, issued instructions to Provincial Legal Officers, dispatched Liaison Officers to each province, ordered periodic reports, and tightened high level administrative control to achieve maximum efficiency of operation. (~~130~~ 132)

On 17 December a Justice Department order of sweeping significance made all military government officers of the Department observers and advisors. This action was a public confirmation of a statement made by General Hodge on 16 October that Americans were training Koreans for governmental positions "to the end that they can establish Koreans in all official positions at all levels." (~~131~~ 133) It fulfilled the Military Governor's Korean replacement plan already mentioned and made the ~~Bureau~~ Department of Justice the first executive and administrative agency of USAMGIK to put Koreans in all positions of responsibility except that of Director.(~~132~~ 134)

Provincial observers and advisors were then authorized to act as Department representatives to establish liaison with Military Government Teams within the provinces. They surveyed and maintained contact with all institutions of the Department of Justice.(~~133~~ 135) The Director on 18 December declared: "This is the first step in

eventually giving Koreans full control of the Bureau of Justice, and I feel freely confident that these men are able to carry on their new responsibilities and duties in a most efficient and orderly manner."(136) On 21 December 1945, the Director explained the significance of the Koreanization order:

> As Director of the Bureau of Justice, I retain full control and responsibility; however, the other Military Government officers of the Bureau have stepped aside and will henceforth act as observers and advisors. In the courts, prisons, and in all the departments of the Bureau of Justice, Koreans have stepped to the front. In this way I feel that the Bureau will grow, and as time passes, the people of Korea will develop protective law and protective law enforcement agencies, which will make them safer and happier. This is the primary objective of the Bureau of Justice.
>
> Whereas Koreans in the Bureau will not normally receive orders from Military Government officers, the Association Directors (Associate Director) Dr. Kim Yung Heui, will continue to receive orders from me and will transmit them to the Koreans under him. I hope that the day will soon come when a qualified Korean, recommended to me by proper advisors, will replace me as Director; however, in this choice, much care and consideration is required. (137)

Dr. Y. H. Kim, who had been Executive Assistant to the Director, was appointed Associate Director, and Korean channels of authority were thereby established separately within the Department.(138) Earlier, the Seoul Bar Association had opposed Dr. Kim's admission to the Korean Bar in a "Memorial" on 1 December 1945.(139) His appointment as Associate Director provoked opposition among judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. He was criticized because he was not a lawyer and was alleged to lack judicial experience. At an indignation meeting a document ("Opposition to Appointment, Dr. Kim Young H., Acting Director, Bureau of Justice) was drafted in the name of all

judicial officials and lawyers of Seoul, signed by the Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, and a Korean purporting to be President of the Bar Association of Seoul. It was addressed to the Commanding General of the XXIV Corps, the Military Governor, and the Director of the Department of Justice on 22 December.

Acting for the Director, Major George A. Anderson, Executive Officer, rejected the ~~memorial~~ "opposition" document, pointing out that it contained elements of a threat, resulted from a meeting illegally convened, and that the Korean signing as president of the Seoul Bar Association was not its president. Criticism of the Associate Director was declared premature. Regardless of legal background, Dr. Kim possessed executive ability needed by the Director of the Department.(~~130~~ 140) The Executive Officer ~~pointed out~~ asserted that Dr. Kim would attend the Law Refresher Course, that the Department Director would work with the Advisory Council in reference to all appointments made, and that later the Advisory Council would be called upon to submit names of three persons for consideration as Korean Director of the Bureau. On 17 May 1946, Dr. Kim was relieved as the Korean Director of the Department of Justice and appointed Deputy Director of Justice for Institutional Management.(~~139~~ 141)

Meanwhile, on 1 February 1946, the Director of the Department reconstituted the Advisory Council, assuming chairmanship himself. The other members were: the Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judges and Chief Prosecutor of the

Courts of Review, the Chief Wardens of Seoul and Taegu prisons, the Chief of the Administrative Bureau of the Department served as secretary.(142 ~~110~~)

The next step taken in placing more responsibility on the Korean personnel of the Department ~~occurred~~ into the initiation, on 15 February 1946, ~~when~~ a two-week test period ~~was initiated~~ during which American advisors withdrew and Koreans took charge and operated the Department alone. This was done to give Koreans opportunity to demonstrate their ability to function without American supervision.(143 ~~111~~) After the experiment, the Executive Officer announced: "Results were so gratifying to the Director, Major Matt Taylor, that several American officers were assigned other duties and Koreans ordered to assume permanent responsibility for the administration of their agencies." In the same announcement, he declared: "I wish to commend the Korean people generally and the Korean personnel of the Bureau of Justice in particular for the fine progress they have made toward self-government. This step in the Bureau of Justice is the first of many similar transfers of responsibility which will come." (144 ~~112~~)

The nomenclature of the Bureau of Justice was changed on 29 March 1946 to Department of Justice by Ordinance No. 64. The subsections formerly designated "departments" became "bureaus." The change applied to all bureaus of USAMGIK.(145 ~~113~~) Though the functions in the Department were unchanged, reorganization

occurred on 2 April when the Office of General Affairs was abolished by Ordinance No. 67 and all legal functions transferred to and consolidated at national level under the Director of the Department of Justice.(~~111~~ 146) Those functions embraced the work of government counsel, legal research, legal drafting, legal investigating, translating, documentation, subdivision of the Official Gazette, and activities of the Capitol library.(~~115~~ 147)

In transferring legal activities to the Department of Justice, Ordinance No. 67 redefined the duties, functions, etc., of the Director:

> The Director of the Department of Justice is the legal advisor of the Military Governor in Korea. He shall advise the Military Governor on policies affecting the National Law establishment and regarding the best qualified persons for appointment by the Military Governor as Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of Courts of Review, and concerning the legality of governmental policies, and proposed laws, ordinances, and regulatory measures. He shall supervise the administration of law and legal institutions. He shall pass upon the language, form, and legal authority for the issuance and legal effectiveness of all official documents of the government that are sealed and documented, except orders and decisions of the courts. He shall represent the government in all cases before the courts.

The Director appointed, subject to approval by the Military Governor, judges of courts other than the Supreme Court and Courts of Review, and all prosecutors, ~~until~~ as of 30 September 1947, ~~when~~ however, that power was withdrawn and placed entirely in the hands of the Military Governor.(~~110~~ 148) He appointed the chief wardens and administrative officers of penal and juvenile institutions, members

of parole and probation boards, the librarian of the National Law Library, the Editor-in-Chief of Court Reports, and staff lawyers engaged in the Department's work; finally, he supervised the training and disciplining of lawyers, and certified the admission of applicants to practice law.(149)

The merger of all legal functions under the Department of Justice was effected in order to improve efficiency and prepare for the eventual interim government by placing Koreans in every department post except that of Director.(150) More and more Koreans were appointed to high positions, including four new deputy directorships. On 16 May 1946, in announcing further appointments and administrative changes, the Director explained that these were steps toward "the eventual establishment of Provisional Government" and added, "All American personnel other than those in the office of the Director are attached to the Department of Justice as advisors." To forestall precipitate criticism, he was especially careful to explain that "the appointments represent the combined judgment of many officials and leaders."(151) In spite of the official publicity given these appointments at the time, creation of the offices of Deputy Director were never approved by the Military Governor. The American Director of the Department of Justice made the appointments without consultation with proper authorities, particularly Civil Service, and no salaries had been provided. However, the Koreans appointed served on a per diem basis.(152)

On 29 May, the Director of the Department redefined executive responsibility with attention to review and processing of legal documents under the Department prior to publication. Provincial military governors were authorized to issue local ordinances to execute national ordinances, orders, instructions, and regulations. Those local ordinances were subject to approval of legal officers as to form, and had the force of law. They were published in a provincial gazette. (153)

A revised "Manual of Military Government Organization and Function" as of 20 June 1946 listed and explained the function of the thirteen bureaus and the Office of Provost Court Administration, within the Justice Department. At top level, an American Army officer was Director, with supervision and responsibility for the administration of justice throughout South Korea. He formulated policy and served as general counsel to the Military Governor. Paralleling him in functions was a Korean Director serving as co-director whose decisions were subject to approval of the American Director. Next were the Korean deputy directors and bureau chiefs, who conducted the actual operation of the Department. American officers were attached in an advisory capacity only. The declared aim was to turn entire control of administration over to Koreans.

There were deputy directors for government, legal counsel, court administration, administration, and institutional management. Under legal counsel came the legal drafting, legal opinions, legal research, government trial counsel, and the claims bureaus. Under court administration were the courts, bureaus, the prosecution, bar

associations, and juvenile bureaus. Under administration were the administration, inspection, and the national law library bureaus. The Penal Bureau reported directly to the Department Director, and was responsible for maintenance and operation of all prisons and associated activities in Korea, including farm prisons, penal industries, and workshops. That bureau was responsible for the supervision of probation as well as for the formulation and operation of rehabilitation and readjustment programs for the benefit of prisoners. The Office of Provost Court Administration functioned immediately under the Director. It issued instructions to and coordinated the activities of provost courts.(154)

Koreanization throughout the structure of government was further emphasized by General Hodge on 31 August 1946 when he felt the stage had been reached where Americans should "in so far as possible, cease to administer Korean affairs directly." He informed the Military Governor:

> In summary, it is my desire that your command make every effort to cut down direct and visible operation by American officials, and go further and further into the field of allowing Koreans to handle everything possible, with our control visible to the public rapidly disappearing.(155)

The theme of Koreanization was stressed by the Military Governor in a message to a meeting of Korean Directors and their American counterparts at the Capitol on 11 September 1946: "The time has come when Korean Directors must take full charge of their respective departments and the Americans must function only in advisory capacities. ... Military Government will henceforth be

exercised so far as is practicable by the Koreans themselves." He then continued, "I want the Korean officials to make the decisions. I want business carried on in the Korean language. I want interpreters only to the extent necessary to keep Americans informed of what the Koreans are doing." Withdrawal of "at least 10%" of the Americans monthly was suggested by him.(156) A week earlier, on 4 September, the Military Governor had created an Appointment Board, whose membership included a representative of the Department of Justice "to study and recommend removal of factors" which interfered with integration of efforts of the American personnel in USAMGIK.(157) After September 1946, the American Director of the Department of Justice was known officially as the "Chief Advisor", while the term "Director" was reserved to the Korean counterpart.(158)

In the meanwhile, plans were under way to establish a Korean legislative body. On 8 September 1946, General Hodge declared in a radio broadcast commemorating the landing of American troops in Korea: "We are concerned now with the structure of a representative legislature as a preliminary organ to increase Korean participation in the policies of their temporary government.(159)

These plans had taken shape during the summer, and provisions for election and nomination of a "Korean Interim Legislative Assembly" (KILA) were promulgated in Ordinance No. 118, 28 August 1946. KILA had power "to enact ordinances on matters affecting general welfare and interest and on such matters as may be referred to it by the Military Governor." Ordinances became Public Acts when concurred in by the Military Governor and signed by him, and were sealed and published in the Official Gazette. The Military Governor had veto power. The Legislature had power to review all past appointments to Military Government above civil

service status class 4 and to confirm and consent to all future appointments. Nominations as well as ordinances were to be submitted by the Military Governor with the prefatory statement: "Pending action the subject matter hereof by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and the enactment of an ordinance pursuant thereto, the following shall govern." KILA had convened at Seoul on 12 December 1946. For the first time in Korean history a legislative body was created. It was another step in the direction of self-government. The existence of KILA, however, neither abolished nor curtailed the Military Governor's power to issue ordinances. In a terse memorandum to the Department of Justice on 19 January 1947, General Lerch asserted: "We can't stop issuing ordinances because of the fact that the legislative assembly is in session." (160) Power of appointments was next extended the Korean officials by Ordinance No. 135, 15 March 1947. Although the Military Governor retained direct appointive power of the Civil Administrator, appointments of department directors, provincial governors, and the mayor of Seoul were made by him upon recommendation of the Civil Administrator, concurred in by a majority of the Korean department directors. Governors were granted provincial appointment power as were department directors, subject to approval of the Office of Civil Service where such approval was required by law. Confirmation continued a function of KILA. (161)

Ahn Chai Hong, the first Korean Civil Administrator, was appointed 6 February 1947. Confirmation of his appointment by KILA

on 7 February made him the highest ranking Korean official in the Executive Branch of the Government. He had been a member of KILA by appointment, had remained in Korea throughout Japanese domination, suffered imprisonment nine times at the hands of the Japanese, and later after American occupation represented the Korean Independence Party on the Representative Democratic Council. He was a graduate of Waseda University, and in private life a trader and newspaper editor.[162] (~~159~~)

After taking oath of office on 10 February 1947, Mr. Ahn declared it the duty of Koreans under Military Government to demonstrate their ability and rely upon Americans. Koreans, he said, were obligated to foster "the spirit" of the people "by strengthening the functions of the Interim Legislature and regulating the organs of Justice and Administration." Acknowledging fulfillment of General Hodge's pledge to transfer functions to Koreans, he appealed to Korean officials for just and patriotic performance.[163] (~~158~~) The occasion marked the passing of American civil administration with the placing of high executive authority into the hands of Koreans. The Military Governor gave assurances on 12 March 1947 that he would not interfere except in extraordinary cases involving the direct interest of the United States.[164] (~~159~~)

On 15 February 1947, on verbal orders of the Commanding General, Major Connelly stepped aside as responsible Director of the Department of Justice, thus placing highest authority in the hands of Kim Byung Ro. Major Connelly, thereupon became Advisor to the Director.(165 ~~160~~) His formal removal together with that of other American department directors, administrators, provincial governors, and the Mayor of Seoul, effective 15 February, was officially announced on 28 March 1948.(166 ~~161~~) Koreans who had been co-directors serving as counterparts in high positions since 15 February were formally appointed 29 March 1947 by Appointment No. 118. Kim Byung Ro then became the first Korean Director of the Department of Justice in full authority and responsibility.

When appointive power was extended to Korean officials, the Military Governor declared: "It is my desire that Americans do not interfere with the Korean officials in the exercise of this function. More and more I desire that the Americans withdraw to positions which are purely advisory and inspectoral."(167 ~~162~~) At the same time he reasserted the American policy of Koreanization:

> "We have two objectives here - one is to establish a free, independent and united Korea administered by Koreans; the second is the rehabilitation of Korea from an economic, educational, and cultural standpoint... It has been our objective from the beginning to get the Korean Government organized so that it could run itself in exactly the same manner, subject only to limited controls to be exercised by the Americans. It is planned to exercise those controls eventually only to avert governmental disaster, and not for the purpose of imposing American ideas or American methods in matters which are relatively unimportant."

The practice of Korean-American "opposite numbers" on the job was to be abandoned gradually except in certain technical and fiscal fields, and in matters involving vested property. Provincial reorganization contemplated the same American withdrawal from active participation. Problems involving graft, corruption, nepotism, and undemocratic practices were reserved by the Military Governor for special attention.(~~163~~ 168)

VIII - REORGANIZATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SKIG ESTABLISHED

The assumption of direct control by Koreans in the administration of the government of South Korea resulted in the formation of the Korean Directorate, headed by Civil Administrator Ahn Chai Hong and the Korean department directors. Thereafter, alarming rumors in respect to reorganization of the government were spread among the Koreans. To quiet those rumors, the Military Governor announced 12 March 1947 that there ~~will~~ would be no changes in the South Korean Interim Government without opportunity to be heard by all concerned." (169) (~~164~~) He said the matter of reorganization had been referred to the Civil Administrator. The public was assured by the Military Governor that no changes would occur without approval of a majority of the members of the Directorate, unless KILA should enact laws providing for such changes. At the same time he stated American policy as follows:

> The Korean Directorate as a policy-making body and the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly as a law-making body have been charged by me with most of the functions of government. I do not expect to interfere except in those extraordinary cases in which the direct interests of the United States Government are involved. Those interests are not involved in any reorganization of the several departments of the government.

A plan for reorganization prepared by a committee representing the various departments was approved by the Military Governor on 17 May. (~~165~~)(170) In March, Advisor Connelly studied plans of the

Governmental Reorganization Board as they affected the Department of Justice. He approved maintenance of the Department as one of the basic units of the executive branch, and endorsed the separation of the courts from the Justice Department so they would occupy the same level of dignity and independence in the structure as the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch. He approved appointment of all judges by the Military Governor and none by the Department Director. The Korean Director, Kim Byong Ro, likewise favored these proposals. The American Advisor thought the Juvenile Court judges should be controlled, if not actually appointed, by district court judges. He recommended creation of an Investigation Section, changing of the "Prosecution Bureau" to "Administration of Justice Bureau," addition of a "Courts Section" and a "Bar Association Section," including a Juvenile Section in the Penal Bureau, and creation or establishment of the position of Prosecutor General in the Department immediately below the Director in rank and salary, but not as a bureau head. He thought administrative control of the courts should continue in the Department until transfer plans were fully studied.(171) Though the plans were submitted with approval of the Military Governor to KILA as part of a proposed over-all reorganization of various departments, no action was taken by that body.(172)

The next important step toward self-government was the formal designation, on 17 May 1947, of "The Korean elements of United States Army Military Government in Korea concerned with governing

Korea south of 38° north latitude, including the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary branches" as the "South Korean Interim Government" (usually abbreviated to and better known as "SKIG"). ~~(160)~~ (173)

This legally significant innovation in Korean political history integrated Korean personnel and coordinated Korean executive and administrative department heads into a distinct governmental unit which functioned as an integral part of Military Government as a whole. Although its autonomy as an instrument of government was subject to exclusive authority of USAMGIK, the considered policy of the Military Governor was to refrain from interference and to have Americans do no more than inspect and advise. With KILA and SKIG now functioning, the Military Governor then pushed suffrage legislation so that a truly democratic assembly could be elected to supplant the Interim Legislature and enact organic laws for the establishment of an independent government by Koreans themselves. On 31 March 1947, he requested the Korean Director of the Department of Justice to draft an ordinance providing for universal suffrage in Korea in the event KILA did not act on the proposal before adjournment. ~~(169)~~ (174)

The most important function of Americans in the Department of Justice now was to render legal advice. This cut squarely across the whole governmental structure and operation. In June 1947 ~~the~~ American personnel consisted of 7 officers, 21 professional civilians, one enlisted man, and 9 civilian clerks, making a total of 38. ~~Almost a year earlier~~, as of August 1946, there had been 9 officers,

12 professional civilians, 7 enlisted men, and 3 civilian clerks. Between June and December 1947 the staff was reduced from 38 to 30, and on 19 January 1948, only 29 were employed in the organization whose structure called for 47.(175) Army officers were gradually relieved.

The American advisory personnel of the Justice Department and SKIG functioned in the following offices and capacities: executive, drafting bureau, opinions bureau, penal bureau, research bureau, claims bureau, provost court administrative office, code revision bureau, advisor on administration, courts and penal examining juvenile bureau, and military commission trials. In addition special assignments were made from time to time.(176) Americans within the Department also served as court liaison officers and special project officer.(177)

Outstanding achievements in the administration of justice through the Department under USAMGIK and with SKIG by officers and lawyers connected with it before and after reorganization may be summarized briefly: (1) restoration and rejuvenation of legal processes which had collapsed at the time of American occupation; (2) fulfillment of the theory of Koreanization within the Courts and the Department; and (3) establishment of civil rights in Korea. Beginning with the first proclamation of the Supreme Commander, clearly establishing protection of personal rights under American occupation, the Military Government progressively extended civil rights to Koreans throughout

the period of occupation. Oppressive Japanese laws were repealed, unlawful detention of persons prohibited, and discriminations on account of race, religion, sex, and caste abolished. Freedom of speech and of the press were guaranteed. Aid to education and revival of the Korean language and its official establishment in the South Korean Interim Government encouraged democratic tendencies. Finally, provision for popular election of representatives to a constituent assembly to set up a government culminated in the Proclamation of the Commanding General on the Rights of the Korean People which was in fact a Bill of Rights for Korea. Meanwhile, changes in criminal procedures introduced what was tantamount to a system of habeas corpus. (178)

MISCELLANEOUS FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGAL STAFF

Among the many legal responsibilities of the staff in the former General Affairs Section and in the Department of Justice were those affecting corporations established in Japan. The Japanese Government General had used a device of control corporations as agencies of a semi-governmental nature in many fields of governmental activity in finance, agriculture, commerce, mining and industry. Among these agencies were the Bank of Chosen, Korean Commodity Corporation, Korean Import Materials Corporation, Oriental Development Company, Chosen Fisheries Corporation, ~~Oriental Development Company~~, Chosen Coal Distribution Company, Chosen Petroleum Distributing Company, Ltd., Chosen Stock Exchange, and the Finance Control Corporation of Chosen. The legal staff studied

these juridical persons and advised the Military Government on legal aspects involved under plans for reorganization or USAMGIK control. Policy, however, emanated from the Military Governor, not from the legal advisors. Legal methods of dealing with these agencies varied from continuance of some without substantial modification to dissolution and liquidation of others. (~~174~~)(179)

The Bank of Chosen was continued under laws and amendments except for registration requirements on currency and foreign financial transactions made by USAFPAC Proclamation No. 3, of 7 September 1945. The Korean Commodity Corporation was given control of Japanese rice by General Notice No. 1 (5 October 1945). (~~175~~)(180) It was utilized as an agency for buying non-Japanese rice under General Notice No. 6 (19 December 1945), (~~176~~)(181) and for rice collection under Ordinance No. 45 (26 January 1946). (~~177~~)(182) The Korean Import Materials Corporation, renamed the Materials Control Corporation, was continued as a body corporate and a government instrumentality by Ordinance No. 24 (5 November 1945). (~~178~~)(183) The Oriental Development Company and all its property in Korea were transferred to the newly created New Korea Company, Ltd., by Ordinance No. 52 (21 February 1946). (~~179~~)(184) The Chosen Fisheries Corporation, continued as a body corporate and government instrumentality, became the Korean Fisheries Corporation under General Notice No. 4 (24 November 1945). (~~180~~)(185) The Chosen Coal Distribution Company was designated sole controlling agency for coal

by General Notice No. 3 (5 November 1945).(186)

Military Government dissolved the Petroleum Distributing Company, Ltd., and all its duties, functions, records, property, and civil personnel were transferred to the Petroleum Distributing Agency by General Notice No.5 (15 December 1945).(187) Finally, the Finance Control Corporation of Chosen and the Chosen Stock Exchange were dissolved and their liquidation directed by Ordinance No. 37 (19 December 1945) and Ordinance No. 43 (16 January 1946)(188), respectively.

Through its Claims Bureau, the Department processed and made recommendations for settlement of claims of Koreans against the Government of Korea. It had an added function of receiving, filing, classifying, and processing claims of Koreans against the Property Custodian in challenging his determination of property as Japanese-owned as of 9 August 1945. The American advisory staff heard this latter type of claim as trial examiner for the Property Claims Commission.* The Department was also advised on policies and procedures for processing claims of Korean nationals and corporations against the Japanese Government. It advised the Property Custodian on the legality of his operations and directives concerning property vested under Ordinance No. 33.

Furthermore, the Department lawyers as observers supervised the operation of all courts, prisons, and juvenile reformatories and assisted Korean officials in administering justice and in the reform of judicial organization. The Department acted as a security force for SKIG in that

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* For Property Claims, see page 121

it segregated over 21,000 anti-social individuals in the prisons.

Members of the legal staff, in addition the their regular duties, were assigned from time to time on "Special Projects." For example, several served on the committee to devise policies and procedures for holding elections preliminary to the establishment of an independent Korean Government. In that capancity, two advisors (Dr. Charles Pergler and Dr. Ernst Fraenkel) were members of the United Nations Liaison and Election Committee. Dr. Pergler, Chief of Opinions Bureau, also was political advisor to the Military Governor. Dr. Fraenkel, Chief of Legal Reasarch Bureau, was a member of the advisory staff to the US-USSR Joint Commission and a member of the committee drafting the land reform law. These and other legal advisors of the Department served on various boards and commissions and were assigned to other specialized tasks.(189)

Other aspects of legal advice to the Military Government included questions on financial and tax matters. Many of these required formal legal opinion. Among them were queries involving legal obligations to pay preliberation public and private debts and taxes imposed under Japanese laws, obligations under Ordinances 21 (Retention of Law) and 40 (Sale of Property for Taxes), income taxes, property taxes, tax liens, and revenue from vested property. Also affected were matters related to enemy property other than Japanese, property of friendly nationals, of neutrals, abandoned property, and property of unknown ownership.

A series of legal opinions of the General Counsel resulted from the many inquiries posed on these and other matters.(190) Early legal opinions were prepared and issued as "Opinions of General Counsel." After reorganization,

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* See Section XI, Penal Institutions.

the Legal Opinions Bureau, first headed by Dr. Charles Pergler for one and one-half years, then by Mr. Denny F. Scott (formerly Lieutenant Colonel), handed down over 1,600 opinions between March 1946 and August 1948. The bureau compiled and published two volumes of selected legal opinions rendered during that period in the role of legal advisor to USAMGIK.(191)

Research into old Korean common law, particularly family law, and the drafting of Korean codes were among early Military Government objectives. Those tasks were delegated to the legal research and code drafting subdivisions of the Department of Justice, except for a brief period (from January to April 1946) when they were under General Affairs Section.(192) Ordinance No. 67 on 2 April returned those functions to Justice, where, after departmental reorganization, the Korean Code Drafting Bureau was established. Judge Charles S. Lobingier, codification advisor, took a leading part in Korean code drafting. Aided by ten Korean lawyers and Chinese scholars, members of court and bar, the drafting of modern Korean codes was undertaken.(193)

The codes and law in force in Korea at the time of American occupation were written by Japanese. The codes themselves were based upon the German Code with Japanese modifications and were, therefore, alien in origin. They were written in the Japanese language and translation had been forbidden by Japan under heavy penalty, hence their content was scarcely known to the overwhelming majority of Koreans, who could neither read nor speak Japanese.(194)

The Japanese-inspired Korean code was studied and translated into English, and its good features incorporated into a proposed civil code drafted for Korean approval. Progress was slow the first year. The drafting bureau was handicapped by a lack of clerical personnel, translators, and necessary

library resources.[195] Meanwhile, work on the criminal code was started, and the first provisional amendments were translated into Korean in May 1947.[196]

On 30 June 1947, the Acting Military Governor by Executive Order No. 3 established the Code Drafting Commission to "insure the development of a modern democratic system of administering justice which is purely Korean in origin." The commission initially consisted of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Director of the Department of Justice, and the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court. It subdivided the research into specialized fields among various committees it appointed. The Code Drafting Commission was directed to "consolidate, coordinate, and expedite the work of drafting basic codes" already in progress in the Justice Department. The revised codes were to substitute for codes then in force regulating civil rights, property rights, family relations, commercial relations, punishment of crimes and minor offenses, and prescribing procedure to be followed in the enforcement of law and administration of justice. The commission was directed to prepare the drafts "in such forms as to reflect democratic principles and sound modern trends with due regard to the customary law and traditions of Korea."[197] In a report to the Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps, 21 February 1948, the Personnel Utilization Board commended the progress made on code drafting by the Justice Department codification advisors. At the same time the Code Drafting Commission was criticized adversely for its lack of coordination with the Department. Eight months after establishment, the Commission had held "only one brief and unproductive meeting" and had not submitted one report.[198]

The proposed civil code was completed early in 1948 and its translation into Korean began in March. It included the good features of the Japanese code and those of a dozen modern civil codes, with the modern Chinese civil

code as one of the chief sources. Judge Lobingier utilized the Chinese code because China "exercised a controlling influence over Korea and was the source of its culture and civilization, not only in law, but in all other respects" for more than 500 years. Hence, he declared, it was "fitting if not indispensable" to use the "latest legal product of Korea's oldest and longest mentor."(199)

On 8 April 1948, Ordinance No. 183 repealed six obsolete laws promulgated by Japan: the Military Criminal Code (1908), the Naval Criminal Code (1908), Act Prohibiting Political Meeting (1910), Inflammatory Document Controlling Ordinance (1936), Korean Temporary Peace Order (1941), and Public Peace Law No. 2 (1907). In addition, Ordinance No. 72 of USAMGIK, 4 May 1946, Offenses Against Military Government, was also repealed.(200) Effective 14 April 1948, special war time Japanese legal procedure ordinances were repealed and others amended "to return the Judicial system to normal procedures," by Ordinance 181.(201)

Problems of International Law introduced additional legal burdens such as the legal position of a vanquised and occupied territory, problems of nationality in respect to natural persons and juridicial persons, and international problems arising under Military Government. Though the administration of foreign affairs by the Military Government was limited in scope, certain important legal matters arose in connection with problems of repatriation, foreign residents and property, and illegal foreign trade.(202)

IX - THE COURTS

Under the Japanese domination, the Korean court system comprised a Supreme Court, three Courts of Review (sometimes translated "Courts of Appeal"), and District Courts in each province. The Supreme Court and one Court of Review sat at Seoul, the other Courts of Review at Taegu and Pyongyang, respectively. The latter place was in the Russian zone and together with similarly located District Courts north of the 38th parallel did not fall under American jurisdiction. Something has already been said about the courts, their jurisdiction, and the enforcement of law, existing under the Government General prior to surrender.[203] (187)

For all Korea in 1943, court personnel comprised 246 judges, 135 prosecutors, 20 chief clerks, 870 clerks, and 4 interpreters.[204] (188) Mention has been made of there being only 8 Koreans among the 120 prosecutors and 46 among the 235 judges in 1939.[205] (189) The small number of Koreans in the court system was even more deplorable in 1940: of 35 judges in the Courts of Review, only 4 were Koreans, and of those on the District Courts about 10%. No Korean in 1940 was listed among the prosecutors.[206] (190) No Korean became Chief Judge or Examining Judge under the Japanese.[207] (191) That practice of exclusion left the courts with scanty potential to meet the impact of personnel dissolution and change at the termination of hostilities. Consequently, one of the chief problems faced by the Military Governor and the Director of the Department of Justice was manning the courts with qualified judges and personnel.

The summary judicial power of chiefs of police under the Japanese regime was a potent factor in the administration of justice in Korea, for it put the Japanese-controlled police in a powerful position. In 1937, police chiefs in summary trials imposed fines of 20 yen or less on 85,869 persons and 180 yen or less on 20,744. Though Koreans had the right of appeal, less than a thousand resorted to it because of the slight chance of reversal.(208) The Department of Police in a summary of the Administration of Justice under the Japanese with particular reference to the police system (November 1947) declared:

> The Japanese ruled the people through their police. The police dominated every phase of the daily activities of the individual through terror, intimidation, and practices inconceivable to an American. The result was a people subservient to the police. Under the Japanese the police system in Korea was the machinery designed and employed by the Governor-General to mould and control the economic, cultural, and political lives of the citizens of the country. The authority of the police was almost unlimited and many of their fields of operation were entirely outside the limits of what normally is considered to be police work. Among these fields they controlled religious and educational endeavors, exercised the powers of life and death over private enterprises and businesses, censored as they pleased, directed public health and welfare activities, and even attempted to control thoughts of the individual people through the notorious "Thought Control Section" of the police.
>
> ...It is sufficient to say that anyone undesirable in the eyes of the police could be arrested and detained for indefinite periods under their own regulations without any possible interference from the courts.(209)

To enforce obedience, physical castigation, imprisonment, and torture were used. As a result, the police were generally dreaded by the Koreans. Out of fear, they developed an obsequious attitude.(210) One of the first important steps taken by the American Military Government through its legal counsel was to abolish (18 September 1945) the Japanese-imposed oppressive

laws under which the pernicious system thrived. Subsequently the summary judicial powers exercised by chiefs of police were abolished. These acts of the Military Government, already discussed, were initial steps taken paralleling the reorganization of the structure as a whole and the administration of justice therein. (211)

Japan had made an effort to cope with the problem of juvenile delinquency through law and courts on a basis of practices prevailing in the United States, but her administration was faulty and inadequate. At the outset of American occupation there were but one juvenile court and one judge in the whole of Korea, and a single House of Correction. (212) Juveniles were crowded into adult prisons, detained for long periods of time, and given scanty opportunity for rehabilitation because the law was improperly enforced.

Court Situation at the Time of American Occupation

From 15 August to 10 September 1945, the judicial machinery of Korea was at a virtual stop. Occupation plans to maintain law and order provided for utilization of the court system already in operation. These plans have been explained, but it was Annex 7 to Field Order 55, issued 29 August 1945, which specifically laid down policy in respect to the courts:

> Ordinary criminal and civil courts in Korea will be permitted to continue to function subject to such regulations, supervision, and control as are imposed by the Military Government. Cases involving prosecution or other matters inimical to the interests of any of the United Nations shall be suspended

and stayed pending full investigation and further instructions. Any other case in any such court may be stayed by order of the Military Government. Full power to review and veto will be retained. Persons unjustly held in custody will be released.(213)

This order, retained the court system subject to regulation, control, and reorganization by USAMGIK. It provided for absolute control of the judiciary through veto by USAMGIK. Release of persons unjustly held in custody was the first positive legal step toward the liberation of a persecuted people subjugated and incarcerated under oppressive Japanese laws.

Annex 7 further directed:

> As rapidly as possible, judges and other court personnel who have been flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression or who continue actively to oppose the purposes of the Military occupation will be removed. Reliable and professionally qualified successors will be appointed as required. Lower commanders may temporarily suspend such persons and report such cases to this headquarters for final action.(214)

Maintenance of the courts was so vital to law enforcement that wholesale removal of Japanese judges at the outset was not contemplated. Retention of judges and prosecutors during the period of transition was necessary because selection of successors involved considerable canvassing, investigation, and inquiry into professional fitness.

The situation of the courts in Korea upon arrival of U. S. Army Forces has been summarized as follows:

> With the disintegration of Japanese control in Korea in August 1945, the Administration of Justice, like the rest of the Government General, fell into a state of chaos. The courts ceased to function. The few Korean judges and prosecutors in office were unwilling to assume any responsibility while Japanese officials were concerned with their own immediate problems and their future welfare.

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> In view of the situation which was found to exist, the directive that courts be permitted to continue functioning had little relevance. ... Here as elsewhere the Japanese had held all the key positions; they remained for the moment but they were mainly occupied in getting packed to go home and many did not even make a pretense of reporting to their courts for duty. The few Koreans employed held minor posts and whether through lack of ability, indifference, or a natural uncertainty as to their own status, they did little or nothing to alleviate the situation.(~~199~~ 215)

Dr. Y. H. Kim declared later that "the most difficult thing was how to get proper judges and prosecutors".(~~200~~ 216) The Justice ~~Bureau~~ Department Director conferred with the president and officers of the Bar Association and had them submit lists of names of possible candidates to serve as judges.(~~201~~ 217) After appointment, many refused to serve. It was difficult to find the right man for the right place. "Newspapers ridiculed us for appointing so many disappointing judges and prosecutors", said Dr. Kim. The problem of staffing both courts and the Department of Justice was aggravated by personal jealousy, politics, "face", and ~~inbred~~ traditional oriental system of rank.(~~202~~ 218) However, "extensive interviewing of Korean judges, former judicial officials, and lawyers proceeded".(~~203~~ 219) Some judges and prosecutors were displeased because their recommendations were not followed. They showed their resentment by not reporting for duty themselves. Many said they could not serve on account of "saving face".(~~204~~ 220) In Dr. Kim's opinion, "The court really returned to the Koreans after a century. Yet the court did not show any vital activity. Japanese judges did not report to their courts. The few Korean judges and prosecutors in office did not fully realize their duties".(~~205~~ 221)

Restoration and Reorganization of the Judiciary

The Director of the Department, when he learned that no justices or prosecutors remained in office on Cheju Island, which had a population of 250,000, flew there accompanied by Dr. Kim on 30 September 1945. He interviewed lawyers, appointed a district court judge and two prosecutors, delegated to them subordinate appointive power, started the operation of the legal procedure, and returned to Seoul on the same day.(222)

On 11, October, a wholesale removal of Japanese judges and prosecutors was begun. In a single day 105 specified individuals were formally relieved of their posts. These included the Chief Judge, two division head judges, and eight associates of the Supreme Court, together with the chief prosecutor and three associate prosecutors, and judges and prosecutors attached to six lesser courts.(223) Only 11 immediate replacements were made.(224) At the same time several changes in court status were directed.

Four days later the Military Governer announced in a press release, "Less than six weeks after the American Forces began the occupation of Korea, the administration of courts of law has been restored completely to the Korean people." Continuing he noted that, "It marks the first time in nearly half a century that Koreans have been allowed authority in the judicial branch of the government." In the opinion of the Governor, "Nothing has been done by the Military Government which speaks more eloquently of confidence in the ability of Koreans to administer progressively an ever larger share in the government of

Korea.(225) This observation denoted greater optimism than was justified by events. Although the SCAP Summation, for September-October 1945, declared that "The courts have continued to function,"(226) this was correct to a very limited degree only, and "The provincial district and branch courts were still almost wholly inoperative."(227) So difficult was it to find the qualified Koreans to accept and assume judicial responsibilities in the provinces that "there were still many areas, as late as December, when courts had still not reopened."(228) But by 15 January 1946, the Military Government had staffed with Koreans and put into operation 41 courts and 19 prisons in South Korea.(229)

Korean appreciation of judicial freedom, and realization of the responsibility placed upon the courts, was expressed by the Chief Justice in early December 1945 in a letter to judges in which he declared, "The whole responsibility to maintain the independence of judicature and its dignity rests on our shoulders." Citing oppression of Korea under Japan and the loss of legal protection and the consequent "State of Slavery," he exhorted Judges to be informed and fulfill their responsibilities.(230)

Prior to 20 November 1945, in order to expedite rehabilitation and implement policy affecting the Supreme Court, the Court of Review, and the District Court of Seoul, there was created the Office of Liaison Officer at the Court Building in Seoul. Major Frank B. Banzet was appointed to the post, with Mr. Kim Yung Sik as his Korean counterpart. Since "Seoul courts constitute the nub of the Korean judicial system," the Department recognized the necessity of extending liaison to all courts in Korea.(231) In due course eight liaison officers, one to each district court, were appointed.(232)

On 23 November the liaison officer was sent to Kwangju, Taegu, and Taejon, under the auspices of the Planning Section, to establish three-way relation between the Department of Justice at national level and the courts and the legal officers of Military Government teams stationed throughout South Korea. His duties required him to contact previously and newly appointed officials, to establish friendly relations with

Korean judges and prosecutors, to approve appointment of court personnel other than judges and prosecutors whom he would recommend. He was also to ascertain if court buildings were available and their physical condition satisfactory, to report if a court was functioning or ready to function, contact legal officers of the Military Government teams, and to report on availability of the courts to try cases. The liaison officer saw to it that cases arising from substantial embezzlement or misappropriation of funds or property were forwarded to the Department of Justice for processing through the Special Criminal Investigating Committee. Through him problems confronting the District Courts were brought to attention of the Department. Other responsibility involved inquiry into court finances and submission of periodic reports.(233) The directive granted him certain discretionary power in that he was authorized to take "all other action to the best interest of the Bureau." It was his duty to investigate and consider the desirability of placing powers of a police magistrate with police chiefs.

On 26 November, Captain Frank Fisher was dispatched to the provinces to make liaison with Major Banzet under similar instructions with variations requiring explanation and distribution of report forms to prosecutors, copies of the Gazette to legal officers and prosecutors, settlement of appointment difficulties, and submission of reports on findings.(234)

Throughout November and December, representatives of the Department in liaison capacity executed their difficult mission. The variety of problems before them was revealed in their reports to the Director of the Department. When Japanese had failed to remain at their posts until properly relieved, as at Chongju, Koreans were appointed and guided in assuming responsibility and starting the operation of the judicial machinery. Where Japanese judges, prosecutors, and minor personnel lingered overlong, as in Taejon, they were

ordered to turn over their records and to vacate the office in favor of Korean appointees.

Liaison officers were confronted with problems of communication and transportation which delayed speedy operation of legal and judicial procedure. They were obstructed locally at times by petty jealousies, political suspicions and Korean considerations of rank and ambition for more important appointments; their program was impeded by oriental expediencies in saving face. Finally, they were hindered by the vague and incomplete undertanding on the part of Koreans of court functions and operation. In spite of these obstacles, the court system was slowly developed step by step through direct contact, instruction, and liaison. The procedure involved conferences with provincial military governors, representatives of the Department of Justice, legal officers, chief judges, and prosecutors. A survey of court personnel was made. Judges, prosecutors, and legal officers were drawn into closer cooperative effort. The process of judicial reorganization further involved organizing unorganized or feebly functioning courts, and scrutinizing qualifications of judges and prospective judges, prosecutors and prospective prosecutors.

It was not until 30 November 1945, that the Court of Review and the District Court at Taegu were "capable of operating", according to Major Banzet, who at the same time reported that the five branch

courts were not functioning. By 14 December the judges and the prosecutors of the two higher courts assumed office, according to Captain Frank Fisher in his report of that date. The Japanese officials, (235) however, still remained in the Taegu Court of Review clerk's office. Throughout South Korea surveys were made of case backlog, the needs of various courts for additional judges and prosecutors, and requirements for more branch courts.

Liaison officers in their examination of the physical condition of court buildings and facilities for efficient operation and preservation of records reported one instance of damages caused by American troops. Commenting on the court buildings at Taejon, Major Banzet reported: "The enlisted men using it committed deplorable acts of vandalism." According to him furniture and fittings were stolen and destroyed, telephones ripped from the walls, records scattered and destroyed, and other acts of violence committed aggregating an estimated damage of 1,000,000 yen. (236)

Inspection of the Department of Justice 3-6 December 1945 disclosed some administrative defects which were immediately removed by the Director. There had been confusion within the Department as to the proper title of liaison officer, sometimes called "Supervisor of Provincial and City Administration of Justice." The duty of liaison officer to act as direct agent of the Department had not been established. It was found that only one liaison officer was functioning when the inspection was made although others had been contemplated. Moreover, the liaison officer had not been informed that he was expected to have liaison with penal institutions. Another weakness pointed out was failure of the Department to require legal officers stationed in the provinces to make

reports. (220) (237) In reply to these criticisms, the Executive Officer of the Department on 19 January 1946 informed the Civil Administrator that title and duties of Liaison Officer had now been clearly defined, a Liaison Officer had been sent to each province, and that reports would be made by the provincial Legal Officers. He cited Department Orders 7 and 8 of 17 December 1945, which had been put into operation by selected representatives of the Department sent to the provinces as observers and advisors. (~~221~~) (238)

Liaison officers were relieved of their assignments after they accomplished the following objectives: (1) Visiting all institutions of the Department in the provinces; (2) submitting reports on each institution since 7 September 1945; (3) establishing trial of criminal cases in all courts on a current basis; (4) seeing that Special Judicial Officers were installed and functioning; (5) observing civil cases in trial; (6) sampling specified cases completed; (7) putting into efficient operation the court reporting system; and (8) seeing that Legal Officers of ~~American~~ Military Government teams were prepared to take over that system. It was made clear that the Department of Justice must have complete knowledge of the administration of justice within each province and must have an established system of reporting on all affairs ~~of under the Department~~ its jurisdiction. (~~222~~) (239)

The officer in charge of Courts Liaison Bureau in the Department was a member of the Director's staff. He reported on all matters of policy and furnished the Director information on the operation of the courts. Within the Department he worked with other bureau chiefs on judicial questions ~~arising in the courts which~~ related to technical matters under their respective jurisdictions. (223) (242) The title "Supervisor of

Provincial and City Administration of Justice" was changed to Court Liaison Officer, 6 February 1946.(224) (241) On 19 February the Court Liaison Office was renamed the Court and Prison Liaison Office.(225) (242)

A typical District Court, such as that at Taejon, consisted of five sections: General Affairs, Accounts, Trial, Land Registration Office, and Census. The trial section subdivided into criminal and civil cases. At the head of six offices in his own department, the Prosecutor was responsible for General Affairs (the executive branch), cases, records and files, statistics, and collection of fines. A chief clerk handled administrative matters under General Affairs and supervised the other sections of the prosecutor's office. The executive branch transferred prisoners to penal institutions and collected fines as an alternative to confinement. The collection division collected all fines not under the executive branch.(226) (243) Among its other duties, the District Court supervised the Land Register Office recorded all transfer of title to real estate. Work of the Land Registrar required such technical training that ~~each~~ they District Court maintained strict supervision over him. The Chief Judge recommended the candidate to the Justice Department Director who then made the appointment. In making these Land Registrar appointments, the Director put the full weight of the Department behind the Chief Judge's choice, as was exemplified by his refusal to yield to local criticism of the incumbent at Kimpo in January 1946.(227) (244) In this same office all types of business were also registered. In addition to these functions of District Courts, each supervised family regis-

trations made in a myun office throughout South Korea except in Seoul, where a district office was established. Such matters as birth, death, divorce, adoption, and any addition or change in family relationship were recorded. ~~(228)~~ 245

At national level, the Civil Affairs Bureau in the Justice Department was the operating agency charged with seeing that the courts were staffed with qualified personnel. It inspected the courts, recommended appointments, ~~supervised~~ and exercised supervision over family registration, land and commercial registration, bailiffs, notaries, and scriveners' associations. The 1,568 family registration offices in South Korea were staffed entirely by Koreans. There were 141 land offices. ~~(229)~~ (246)

On 2 November 1945, Ordinance No. 21 directed that "all courts" within the American-occupied zone "take cognizance of and enforce all laws of Korea, the provisions of the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, and all orders and ordinances of the Military Governor of Korea". For this purpose all such courts were constituted "Military Occupation Courts", with the provision, however, that: "Nothing herein contained shall confer upon such courts jurisdiction over any military personnel or official of the United States or any of the United Nations, or deprive Military Commissions, Provost Courts, or other military courts established by the United States Army Forces in Korea of the Jurisdiction conferred upon them." ~~(230)~~ (247)

On 19 November 1945 the services of all judges, prosecutors, and personnel of all courts and penal institutions were requisitioned by

the Military Government as personnel of Military Occupation Courts or of Military Occupation Penal Institutions.(248) Military Courts, as distinguished from Korean courts or occupation courts, tried offenses involving the security and prestige of USAFIK, the personnel of the United Nations, and property of the United Nations, but did not try civil cases.(249) Military Occupation Courts consisted of Korean civil courts and Military Provost Courts. Provost courts had jurisdiction over all persons in South Korea except those subject to the Military or Naval laws of the Allied powers, those having diplomatic immunity, and prisoners of war. It was, however, the policy of the Military Governor to have violators of ordinances, proclamations, regulations, or orders of the Military Government brought to trial in Korean civil courts except for the types of cases mentioned.(250) But, lack of jail space in some areas and the slowness and inability of Korean courts to handle cases precluded exclusive use of civil court facilities. To expedite trial it was found necessary to utilize Military Provost Courts.(251)

Special duties devolved upon judges in connection with Military Occupation cases. The Director of the Department of Justice issued "Instructions to Judges," 19 November 1945, outlining their regular duties, as well as special duties he might assign through the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice had general supervision and control of the work of all judges of all courts. Under his direction, the Chief Judge of the Court of Review assigned cases to the judges of his court to be heard in any court, although assignment was expected to be limited to serious or difficult civil matters.(252)

Similar assignments of Judges of District Courts, including Branch and Juvenile Courts, were made by the Chief Judge of the District Court under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. At the same time, District Circuit Courts were provided. The Chief Judge of a District Court was authorized to arrange a regular circuit and set days for court hearings in the principal cities and towns of the district. Those arrangements were subject through the Chief Justice to approval of the Director of the Bureau. The Chief Judge of a District Court could appoint special prosecutors for the trial of criminal cases. (286) (253)

To establish uniformity and to expedite police action at the time an arrest was made, the Department Director on 18 October 1945 instructed prosecutors to have each policeman submit a report containing information pertinent to the arrest within the day for simple offenses. Those instructions also reiterated the abolition of summary trial by police chiefs. (287) (254) They recognized increased work due to Military Occupation cases and added special duties for prosecutors. The Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court supervised and controlled the work of all prosecutors of all courts. Court of Review prosecutors could be assigned by the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court to any case in any court. It was expected that assignment to District Court cases would be limited to serious or difficult cases. The Chief Prosecutor of the District Court made assignments under the direction of the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court. A prosecutor could be assigned to any criminal case, including those prepared by the staff of the Special Investigation Committee of the ~~Bureau of Justice~~ Department.

Chief prosecutors in the lower level courts supervised the prosecutors of their courts, and reported to the chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court, who was in turn responsible to the Criminal Department of the Justice Department for the efficient performance of duty by all prosecutors.(255) The Director of the Department felt compelled late in December to emphasize the primary functions of prosecutors in order to expedite prosecution of cases. It appeared that prosecutors were assuming detailed police functions. They were instructed to cooperate with the police, not to engage in the details of investigation but rather to point out deficiencies of evidence and confine themselves to legal analysis.(256) The Deputy Military Governor issued a "Directive Regarding Procedure for Arrest and Prosecution" on 22 January 1946, requiring that courts of Korea "be staffed with qualified successors to former Japanese of Korean collaborator incumbents" and "function under the control of the Military Government of Korea, including its full power to review and veto decisions" inconsistent with the purposes of Military Government.(257)

On 13 March 1946 the Director issued instructions to prosecutors defining seven types of criminal cases. Cases arising from criminal offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces of the United States and those committed by persons serving with the occupying forces, subject to United States Military and Naval law, in contravention of such laws or criminal laws in force in Korea, and cases arising from criminal offenses by persons in contravention of criminal laws in force in Korea where such persons claimed diplomatic immunity were to be reported to the Director and not tried in Korean courts.

Criminal offenses committed by personnel of nations allied with the United States and by civilian personnel of the Axis nations in contravention of criminal laws in force in Korea were reported to the Provost Courts. Military Government policy was to limit cases brought before Provost Courts to those involving personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States as witnesses and those in which property of the United States was involved. They could take jurisdiction in other cases, particularly those where the prestige or security of the United States Armed Forces was concerned. Criminal offenses committed by Koreans in contravention of the criminal laws in force in Korea, including AFPAC Proclamations pertaining to Korea and all Ordinances, Orders, and Notices of USAMGIK, were prosecuted in Korean courts through the Prosecutors' Office.

Those instructions declared it to be the stated policy of USAMGIK "to place the greatest amount of responsibility possible with Koreans at the earliest practicable time." Americans might advise personnel or observe the courts on occasion, "but in all cases the responsibility for decisions pertaining to the operations of the courts is retained by the Director of the Bureau of Justice." (241) (258) In February, Military Governor Lerch called attention to the fact that Military Government officers and tactical officers were frequently tempted to make direct appeals to judges and prosecutors "to correct imagined defects in the conduct of the court business." He expressed the desire that Korean courts perform their functions without Military Government interference so that they could gain "confidence and momentum." (257) (243) In a special

press release on 17 May 1946, the Director announced that "every position in the courts and every position in the Department of Justice, except the Director, will be held by Koreans." He anticipated ultimate separation of the courts from the executive branch of the government as an independent organ of State. At the same time he declared, "Weaknesses in administration and in the work of the court, particularly in the work of certain prosecutors, have been studied. Activities tending toward slander and libel of officials have been investigated. The Department of Justice is prepared to take all necessary action should any such activities be renewed by anyone." In this same connection, he warned that the Department was prepared to meet opposition by "Koreans who oppose self-government which the courts represent." He declared that "petty internal differences, which have injured the prestige of the court in Seoul, will not continue." (260)(243) Some months earlier (20 December 1945) the Director had been so displeased with the operation of the Seoul courts that he issued an administrative order rebuking them, particularly the District Courts: "The Director is displeased because three valuable days have been wasted this week in courts of Seoul. Many cases wait trial. Hundreds of prisoners remain in prison charged but not convicted." He ordered the District Courts in Seoul to sit every day from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. with an hour and a half for lunch until the court calender became current. (244)(261) A new Chief Justice and Associate Justice together with a Chief Prosecutor and assistants were appointed to the Supreme Court on 16 May, and a judge on the Seoul Court of Review. (245)(262)

Trials, together with the work of the judges and prosecutors, and the operation of the courts throughout South Korea were scrutinized and current judicial problems studied by the Department of Justice during the remainder of 1946. Unqualified personnel were relieved of office and successors appointed. Courts were expanded, new judges added, and more branch courts created to meet needs.

The first formal meeting of chief judges and prosecutors after liberation was held in Seoul between 24 and 26 May 1946, at which time reports were submitted, problems discussed, and instructions given by the Chief Justice to elevate judicial standards.(263) The Military Governor expressed his confidence in the courts when he declared on 12 May 1947, "The courts of Korea are doing a thorough job."(264) By October 1947, the Department controlled 44 courts throughout South Korea. Nine district courts, one in each provincial capital, with 28 branch courts, and four juvenile courts were functioning.(265) Five more branch courts were established thereafter, making a total of 33 by 15 August 1948, when the Korean Republic came into being.(266)

In 1946, a total of 42,150 cases came before all the courts, of which 36,373 were tried, leaving 5,777 pending at the end of the year.(267) Of 145 civil cases before the Supreme Court that year, 119 were settled including 22 which were reversed, leaving 26 for hearing at the end of the year; in 1947, of 451 civil cases before it, showing a three-fold increase, 201 were settled, including 38 which were reversed, leaving 250 unsettled at the end of the year. There was also a significant increase in civil cases before the Courts of Review in 1947. In 1946, of 186 civil cases before the two courts, 97 were settled, including 16 which were reversed, leaving 89 for hearing at the end of the year;

in 1947, of 458 civil cases, or a 2.46% increase, 334 were settled, including 68 which were reversed, leaving 124 for hearing at the end of the year.

The Supreme Court and the two Courts of Review had a total of 956 criminal cases before them in 1946. Appeal complaints were abandoned in 456 cases and defendants were acquitted in 35. The high courts disposed of 705 criminal cases, leaving 231 for hearing at the end of the year. In 1947, a total of 1,114 criminal cases were before these appellate courts. Appeal complaints were abandoned in 483 cases and the defendants were found not guilty in 47. These courts settled 792 cases, leaving 322 for hearing at the end of the year.

The greatest volume of cases, obviously, came before the district or trial courts. Civil cases were grouped into two classes at the end of the year: litigated and non-litigated cases. In 1946, of 12,062 civil cases pending during the year, 8,506 were settled one way or another, two interrupted, and 399 suspended, leaving 3,155 for hearing at the end of the year: in 1947, of 19,013 pending, 15,018 were settled, two interrupted, and 487 suspended, leaving 3,506 for hearing at the end of the year. In 1946, of the 24,629 non-litigated civil cases pending, 23,948 were settled and 681 left unsettled: in 1947, of 38,137 pending, 36,593 were settled, and 1,544 left unsettled at the end of the year.

During 1946 29,203 criminal cases involving 44,020 persons were on the dockets of these trial courts. Of these, 27,325 cases involving 40,335 persons were settled, leaving unsettled at the end of the year 1,878 cases involving 3,685 persons. These same courts had 30,937 criminal cases involving 42,543 persons on their dockets in 1947. Of

these, 28,504 involving 42,543 persons were settled, leaving unsettled 2,435 cases involving 4,347 persons.(268)

From the outset of American occupation five justices sat on the Supreme Court. There were 116 judges on the Courts of Review and District Courts after liberation. The number increased to 157 by the end of 1946 and remained at that figure throughout 1947. By 15 August 1948, the number had increased to 180. Nine judges on these latter courts resigned and left the bench in 1946 and 11 in 1947. Judges on other occasions resigned or threatened to resign as a result of criticism or political pressure, but after some persuasion or a lapse of time to "save face" they resumed their judicial duties.(269)

Competence of the courts and popular acquiescence to judgment and sentence were revealed in a "TIP" review of the administration of justice in South Korea in an October 1947 issue. During a three-month period of inspection prior to October of that year, over 1,600 cases formerly under the jurisdiction of Provost Courts, were tried in Korean courts. Less than 50 were called to the attention of the American Advisor to the Korean Director of the Department of Justice. The small number of cases brought before him for review indicated that trial in Korean courts was satisfactory according to American standards.(270)

spare

Juvenile Courts and Institutions

Adolescent delinquents and their handling constituted a serious problem for the Military Government. Juvenile prisons, detention homes, and other institutions for ~~their~~ confinement of juveniles were in deplorable condition upon arrival of American forces in Korea. Boys were crowded into small, dirty, dilapidated cells amid repulsive surroundings and held, pending disposition of their cases, for indefinite periods. Conditions at the Seoul Home of Detention were described as "simply terrible" by an American surveying the situation. Juveniles were confined in adult prisons. Facilities were inadequate. The building needed repair. Adolescents were without security and guidance and were not afforded ~~any~~ means of rehabilitation. The institutions (~~252~~)(271) themselves lacked equipment.

There was but one juvenile court in Korea, in Seoul, established under Imperial Ordinance No. 188, 25 March 1942. In 1945, it was composed of one judge, 6 probation officers, and 7 clerks. Juvenile cases were administered under Korean Act No. 6, 25 March 1942. Delinquents were turned over to the prosecutor's bureau for trial, to a guardian under probational conditions, to a religious institution, (~~253~~)(272) or to a house of correction.

The system under Japan, an imitation of American practise with modifications, provided for trial in the juvenile court of only a limited number of offenders, hence most of those arraigned after American occupation appeared before criminal or Provost Courts.

many were sentenced to adult penal institutions.(273) An American, after a survey of Japanese law, declared: "I find the system good on paper, and about equal to similar American laws. The fault lies in lack of proper administration in Korea. Additional legislation on the subject is not necessary."(274)

Early in 1946 the Department of Justice tackled the problem. A program, drafted by Judge Kim Young Wui, chief under the old Japanese system, and a Department of Justice representative, envisaged nine juvenile courts, one for each judicial district, a system of paroling offenders to churches, parents, temples, hospitals, or institutions of correction, and the establishment of a juvenile rehabilitation school in Seoul to accomodate 300 for training.(275) Although nothing was done at the time to put the recommendations into effect,(276) it was the desire of the Americans to keep juveniles out of adult prisons by providing the protective measure already existing by law.(277)

The juvenile courts had mandatory jurisdiction over juveniles up to 14 years of age and discretionary jurisdiction over those from 14 through 20. Cases involving the latter went first before a District Court and at the prosecutor's discretion might be remanded thereafter to a juvenile court. Juvenile delinquents were committed by the juvenile courts to houses of correction and welfare institutions, including "reformatories" operated by the Department of Public Health.

and Welfare. Juvenile courts could not commit children to juvenile prisons, ~~which~~ that was a function of District Courts. District Courts could not commit them to houses of correction. Sentence could not ~~(259)~~ (278) be for a term longer than the juvenile offender's 25th birthday. Throughout 1946 and 1947 efforts were made by American representatives of the Department of Justice to change the law so that the public prosecutor would not have unlimited power over juveniles in deciding their disposition, to transfer that power to juvenile courts, and to ~~(260)~~(279) channel all juvenile cases through those courts.

The problems faced by the Department of Justice were, first, to supply essential living needs to those in confinement, next to repair and improve the physical plants, then to develop cooperative endeavor among welfare institutions and social agencies. The Seoul Juvenile Judge, officials of juvenile institutions, departments of Military Government, and public and private agencies were interviewed ~~(261)~~(280) and their advice and cooperation secured. Although emphasis was placed upon transferring juveniles from adult prisons, on 21 November 1946 there were only 20 in the Seoul Prison, 139 in Pusan, 59 in Anyang, and 50 at Kwangju. At the same time, there were 400 in the Seoul Juvenile Reformatory, 826 in the Kaesong Juvenile Prison, and ~~(262)~~ (281) approximately ~~1,000~~ a thousand in the Kumchon Juvenile Prison. On 16 December 1946, there were 311 confined in the Seoul Juvenile House of Correction, 112 transients in the Seoul Juvenile House of Detention, and 52 in the ~~(263)~~ (282) Anyung branch of the Seoul House of Correction. Over two-thirds

of those apprehended were put on probation and remanded to homes under supervision of probation officers.(283) USAMGIK directed that juveniles sentenced by Provost Courts be sent to the Kaesong or Kumchon juvenile prisons or the Seoul prison.(284)

By 21 May 1947 USAMGIK had expanded the system from the one juvenile court, one judge, and one house of correction functioning when the American forces arrived in September 1945, to 4 juvenile courts, 7 judges, and 8 houses of correction. In addition to the one juvenile court in Seoul, others were established at Taegu, Pusan, and Kwangju. There were three houses of correction in the Seoul area, two each at Pusan and Taegu, and one each at Kwangju and Kaesong. Reformatories were operated by the Department of Health and Welfare to care for homeless and beggar children together with minor delinquents from the juvenile court system. By October 1947, there were 12 houses of correction operating. District Courts committed persons 17 years and older to juvenile prisons at Kaesong or Kumchon.(285) In addition to hearing cases in the cities where the juvenile courts were located, the judges traveled circuits and tried cases in adjacent cities and areas.(286)

Efforts were made in 1947 to have the Director of Justice press juvenile legislation to eliminate to a large extent the juvenile prison system and to channel cases through the juvenile courts rather than have them come before the district court prosecutor

for determination. Also, American advisors still urged that juvenile courts and houses of correction be established in every province. When the Korean Director of Justice procrastinated, "a gentlemen's agreement" was worked out between the juvenile court judges and local prosecutors whereby the juvenile courts took over most of the sorting of the cases for disposition. (268) (287)

In May 1947, approximately 900 juveniles were in the Kaesong juvenile prison and 950 in the Kumchon juvenile prison. Of those confined 60% were for theft, 15% for trespassing, 5% for fraud, 5% for violation of Military Government orders, 10% as street Arabs, and 5% for miscellaneous violations. There were confined in the Houses of Correction in May 1947, 450 juveniles in Seoul, 275 in Pusan, 175 in Taegu, and 75 in Kwangju. (269) (288) In each juvenile court area, there was attached to the court a Detention Home for juveniles awaiting investigation by police and trial later. Detention of children for unduly long periods of time before trial was investigated by the American Advisor and their cases expedited. Constant spot checks were made with the result that no juvenile was held for more than ten days prior to trial, and in time the period of detention was reduced to an average of five days. Prior to American inspections juveniles had been held from four to eight weeks. (270) (289)

In mid-1947 the Rt. Rev. Edward Joseph Flanagan, famed founder of "Boys' Town, USA", spent a week (29 May-4 June) surveying South

Korean juvenile and welfare institutions. In his report, he sharply criticized some aspects of the juvenile system. Without identifying by name or place, Father Flanagan denounced the practice of having girls in the same areas as boys. Conditions were "deplorable" in places, with girls and 250 boys "living in dirt and filth of the most archaic type of prison." Exception was ~~also~~ taken to a "barbed wire enclosure" at one place. "Sanitation was deplorable." Half the boys were awaiting trial for something of which they "might not even be guilty." Living conditions, he compared to "the lowest type of slavery," ~~as he~~ and bluntly charged, "There was no desire on the part of the officials to treat these unfortunate victims as human beings." He pleaded for more religious instruction. (~~271~~)(290)

In rebuttal, the Department of Justice declared, "The report of Father Flanagan regarding the Department of Justice Juvenile institutions is entirely unjustified," and added, "Father Flanagan has greatly misconstrued the situation." The priest had visited but three institutions, two in Seoul and one in Pusan. The system, in the light of what it had been upon American arrival, and what had been done to improve conditions, was defended. Because of his inexperience, the Chief of the Pusan Juvenile House of Correction had already been slated for removal, and was ordered removed on 11 October 1947. (~~272~~)(291) The Pusan Military Government team and the American Legal Officer had inspected the institution at Pusan. The "barbed wire enclosure" at the Seoul Juvenile Detention Home,

the American advisor explained, had been erected to afford a yard for recreation. Boys were detained from one to ten days and were visited daily by Welfare Department officials. The few girls held were amply segregated from the boys. It was ~~freely~~ admitted that conditions could be improved and were being improved, but they were not as described by Father Flanagan. (~~273~~)(292) Much later, one Department of Justice advisor, caustically commenting on Father Flanagan's inspection, asserted: "He contributed nothing to what we already knew. His survey was very superficial, and he spent practically all his time posing for news pictures, and pretending to be engaged in playing volley ball and baseball with the youngsters, and patting little ones on the head." (~~274~~)(293)

Efforts were made to enlist the services of women as probation officers. Americans found it difficult to persuade the Korean Department of Justice to appoint women, who assertedly were not sufficiently educated for and adapted to government work. Nevertheless, at the end of June 1947, six were employed. Two of them were at the Taegu Home of Correction, and one each in the Seoul Juvenile Court, Seoul House of Correction, the Seoul Detention Home, and the Pusan House of Correction. Establishment of a juvenile section within the Department was pressed. Finally, the creation of a board consisting of representatives of the Departments of Public Health and Welfare, Justice and Police, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Seoul, and the Seoul City Department of Public Welfare to formulate a policy for handling

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vagrants was recommended by the Department of Justice 12 September 1947. Because of a lack of Department of Public Health and Welfare facilities, homeless and beggar children were picked up by and cared for by institutions within the juvenile system.

A Report of Special Investigation, referring to the juvenile system, was studied by the appropriate American advisor in the Department of Justice. Many of its recommendations had already been urged within the Department. Change in the basic law was needed but Koreans neglected on one excuse or another to submit the proposal to the legislature. Better procedure in handling juveniles held for investigation, removal of homeless to Welfare orphanages, improvement of facilities in houses of correction, separation of girls from boys, the establishment of a juvenile section in the Department, expansion of religious training, and relief of crowded conditions were admittedly advantageous and desirable but funds and facilities, it was pointed out, were necessary to carry out most of the recommendations. The practice of charging visitors an admission fee by the Pusan prison chief as a means of getting funds for maintenance was regarded as improper, though no graft intent was

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evident. That practice was prohibited by memorandum order to the Korean Director of the Department of Justice on 13 October 1947. At the same time all juvenile courts and juvenile houses of correction were ordered to release juveniles unless a specific charge was placed against them, to transfer homeless and destitute juveniles to welfare institutions, to separate girl

inmates from boys, and to provide religious instruction but not to attempt to induce a change in the delinquents' faith. (277) (276)

The Military Governor directed that no juvenile be accepted in any detention home unless accompanied at the time of admission by a charge sheet from the arresting authority, and that all homeless and destitute be removed to orphanages immediately. Thereafter the Department of Public Health and Welfare was to receive them instead of the Juvenile Detention Homes and Juvenile Courts. (278) (277)

In December 1946 a series of "children's roundups" was inaugurated to clear the streets of homeless children. This was started initially by the Seoul Juvenile Court, then continued by the Juvenile Section, in cooperation with provincial and city police and welfare agencies, with satisfactory results, but later, when American prodding ceased, it languished. (279) (278)

In November and December 1947, the Department of Justice changed the Kumchon Boy's Prison to an adult prison, transferring the juvenile prisoners to the Inchon Boys' Prison and to the Uijongbu Boys' Prison Farm. (280) (279)

Though American advisors tried to improve the situation and did make progress in the improvement of facilities, equipment, recreation, and rehabilitation both in the homes and on the farms, lack of funds handicapped their program, and insufficiency of American personnel prevented greater supervision. Too, there was an ever-present necessity for "constant prodding" by American advisors to eliminate

the practice of adult courts exercising jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. At the end of October 1947, 1,595 boys and 21 girls were in the South Korean prisons. By April 1948, the Department of Justice pointed with pride to the Kaesong Boys' Reformatory as one of the cleanest and best managed juvenile institutions in Korea, with standards closely approximating those in the United States. Its 1,100 boys were housed adequately in buildings of "excellent condition" consisting of a cell-house, a hospital, a school, a chapel, and an administration building. Juveniles had bath facilities and medical care after initial physical examination. They were provided with recreation and given religious and educational instruction, including six years primary school. The prison taught several useful trades, such as printing, shoe-making, woodworking, and straw-weaving. Inmates of good deportment became trustees, took over drilling their associates, and were eligible for parole for good behavior. Adult prisoners were utilized from time to time to improve juvenile housing facilities. Visits of welfare workers assigned to the Department of Public Health and Welfare, as at the Seoul Detention Home, together with an annual conference of the Chiefs of the Juvenile Courts and Houses of Correction, provided for an exchange of views and introduced discussion for improvements. A considerable portion of the American advisor's time was taken up with obtaining clothing and equipment and in looking after the immediate physical and cultural needs of the inmates.

Although little cooperation came from the Korean Director of the Department of Justice, who did not submit to KLAA in 1947 and 1948 proposed juvenile legislation prepared by American legal advisors because the bill was in his opinion "too advanced for Korea," Americans nevertheless inserted provisions for juvenile courts in Court Ordinance No. 192, effective 1 June 1948.(303) The ordinance provided for the establishment of juvenile divisions by the Council of Justices under district courts and district branch courts. The chief judge of a juvenile division had the rank of Division Chief Judge of the District Court. The juvenile court judge was assisted by probation officers appointed by the District Court judge. The juvenile courts of Seoul, Taegu, Pusan, and Kwangju were made branches of the district courts in those cities. Appointment of juvenile court judges was put in the hands of the Military Governor, to be exercised by the Chief Executive succeeding him.(304)

Ordinance No. 192 expanded the juvenile court system to over 40 courts by providing for a juvenile court wherever there was a District Court or a District Court Branch. It elevated juvenile courts "to the same social level as the District Courts." Previously, Juvenile Courts had been on "a lower social plane" and consequently were held in low esteem by prosecutors as "poor relations" to whom they gave scanty support.(305)

Admission to Bar and Bar Examinations

Reconstruction of the framework of the legal profession itself was an important objective of the Director of the Department of Justice,

and efforts to that end were made concurrently with those for the reorganization of the judiciary. Strict regulations imposed by Japanese rule had placed stringent limitations upon admission to the bar. For many years Korean candidates had been required to go to Tokyo for all examinations, but later the Government General was permitted to give preliminary examinations. After passing preliminary examinations, candidates served apprenticeships in Bureau-approved law offices, then took the final examination. For many years this was given in Tokyo, but in the last years of Japanese occupation it was permitted (306) to be held in Korea.

In November 1945, certain officers of the United States Army "within the analogy of the principle of reciprocity between States" in performing legal functions were "admitted to the Bar of Korea to practice law, to appear as attorneys-at-law before any court of Korea, and to hold any position in Korea eligible to be held by members of the Bar of Korea." At the same time the Director provided for utilization of available Korean legal talent. "To meet the emergency scarcity of qualified lawyers caused by the restrictive and discriminatory administration of admission to the bar by the Japanese-controlled Bureau of Justice," he laid down five requirements which had to be met for admission to practice law: An applicant must be of Korean nationality, 24 years or more of age, and a student of law with ample education and experience to practice law; he must have appeared before a board of examiners appointed by the Justice Department Director and upon examination have satisfied the examiners of his

qualifications as to education and morals; finally, he must have no criminal, bankruptcy, or insanity record prohibiting admission.(307)

The first Koreans under American occupation to be admitted to the Bar were Dr. Kim Yung Heui, Executive Assistant to the Bureau Director, Dr. Chun Kyu Hong, Secretary of the Special Criminal Investigating Committee, and Mr. Pak Young Kyun, Supervisor of Special Property Courts.(308) Opposition to their admission, especially that of Dr. Kim, appeared in a Seoul Bar Association "memorial" (1 December 1945) which asserted that those officials failed to meet the qualifications required. The Bureau explained publicly that two of the officials, especially Dr. Kim, were admitted under extraordinary circumstances as an honor and added prestige to the important positions held and that for that reason their cases were exceptional.(309)

On 10 December, the Chief of the Department's Bar Association section announced a policy of written examinations for admission to be prepared by a committee of Korean law school representatives and prominent Korean law court judges.(310) Oral examinations to cover various aspects of law and procedure were set for 6 January 1946.(311) In the meanwhile, 33 qualified Koreans were admitted to the Bar on 26 December. On 24 January 1946, Koreans who had passed the required examinations were admitted. This procedure was followed until March 1, 1947, when the Department put into effect "temporary provisions" governing bar examinations and admission to practice law.(312)

On 29 March 1947, Department Order No. 3 authorized a Law Examination Committee, with the Director of the Department as ex officio chairman. Members, one-third of whom had to be practitioners or teachers of the law, were appointed by the Director for terms of one year. The Department furnished clerical and administrative personnel for operation. The committee laid down rules and conducted and held the examinations. Qualifications were prescribed in Section V of the Order: "The applicant must be of good moral character, and, at the time of the examination of the age of twenty full years or over." In legal matters, age was reckoned according to Western standards. A preliminary and a main examination were prescribed. Failure to pass the preliminary examination barred the applicant from the main one. Graduates of a university prepatory school, college, or other school recognized by the committee as of equivalent grade were not required to take the preliminary examination. The legal scope of the main examination, written and oral, was prescribed. Exemptions from examinations extended to any applicant who had successfully passed the written examination to the Law Refresher Course given in 1946.

Attention was again given to admission to the Bar on 1 April 1948 when Department Order No. 3 was amended. Examinations, prepared and conducted by the committee according to its rules, were to be held once each year in Seoul and fee of 500 won was required. If a candidate passed the written examination and failed the oral, on a

second try he was exempt from the written one. In addition to the exemptions from the admission examinations already prescribed, a further exemption extended to those who had passed the written unit of the main examination of 1948. (294) (313)

A system of legal apprenticeship was revived and introduced on 12 February 1948 under Department Order No. 7. The purpose was to provide for training of successful bar examination candidates. A candidate was required to serve six full months as an apprentice in the office of a practising attorney. He first reported to the Director of the Justice Department in writing with the consent of the lawyer with whom he served his apprenticeship. He was required to keep an indexed diary of his training and submit it to the Director at the completion of his apprenticeship. The lawyer under whom the apprentice served was required to submit to the Director a report on his diligence, behavior, performance, and ~~other~~ qualifications for moral character was stressed as a prerequisite to fitness. When his training was approved, the apprentice was ~~then~~ eligible for examination for admission to the Bar. The examining committee received applications, gave written and oral examinations, and then certified the successful candidate. The successful candidate was then eligible to practice law. An unsuccessful candidate, after an interval of three months, could apply for another examination. (295) (314)

Eligibility to practice law in Korea was again changed 1 July 1948 by Ordinance No. 207. The age limit of 20 years (Western reckoning) or older was continued. A person who had met one of the following

requirements, some of which had already been in force, was admitted to practice law: had qualified to practice in accordance with laws in effect as of 15 August 1945; had passed the bar examination after legal or probationary apprenticeship; had served as an attorney or research specialist in the Department of Justice for two years after having qualified as a legal apprentice or probationer; had been a judge or a public prosecutor prior to 1 July 1948; or had taught law for more than seven years as full-time professor in a recognized law school. Each lawyer, before starting to practice, was required to apply to the Justice Department Director through his Bar Association to have his name entered on the Registry of Practicing Lawyers. International reciprocity for admission of foreign lawyers ~~were~~ may recognized. A person was disqualified who had been declared incompetent or quasi-incompetent by a court, had been sentenced to imprisonment or penal servitude, or who as a public official had been discharged for disciplinary reasons, though in the latter case he was eligible for admission two years after removal. (~~296~~)(315)

The difficulty of Koreans to measure up ~~to measure up~~ to standards required to pass bar examination was revealed in figures released for October 1947. Of 700 candidates who took that month's examination, only 54 passed and were admitted as probationers in the practice of law. (~~297~~)(316) Prior to 12 February 1948, candidates required to take and who passed bar examinations had to serve thereafter an

eighteen-month apprenticeship. That long apprenticeship delayed their eligibility for admission to practice, hence in 1946, 1947, and 1948, admissions to the bar were confined principally to those persons eligible under alternative qualifying standards of legal and professional experience. As mentioned, Justice Order No. 7 reduced legal apprenticeship to six months. That modification eliminated a year's delay and made available more rapidly legal talent under apprenticeship.

The United States Military Government had been hampered at the outset by a woeful lack of Korean lawyers. Out of a population of approximately 20,000,000 in South Korea, there were only 195 Korean lawyers at the time of American occupation, of whom it was estimated 140 were technically qualified to serve the Department of Justice. Other departments likewise required the services of lawyers. The increase in the number of Korean lawyers from 1945 to 1948 was appallingly meagre. On 31 December 1945 there were 233 and at the end of December 1946 only 309. By 31 December 1947 the number had increased to but 320. On 15 August 1948, for all of South Korea there were but 344 Korean lawyers. The gradual withdrawal of Americans from actual operation of the government left a [redacted] gap in the legal structure. The Korean Republic at its inception was confronted by a serious legal dilemma. It was hoped, however, that through the liberalization of apprenticeship requirements under Justice Order No. 7 there would be a progressively

increasing flow of law-school graduates to apprenticeship, thence to practice and availability for government service. ~~(298)~~ (317)

In Korea, as elsewhere, lawyers organized into bar associations. Those established under Japanese control were abolished on 19 November 1945, and all laws and regulations concerning them repealed. ~~(299)~~ (318) At the same time the National Bar Association of Korea was created. It was closely tied to the Department of Justice and the courts. With its principal office at the Department of Justice itself, the Association consisted of lawyers eligible to practice before the courts after admission to the bar by order of the Department Director. A member, other than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, became inactive while holding judicial office. District chapters were established within the territorial jurisdiction of each district court. A Central Committee composed of ~~one~~ a representative from each district chapter was elected for one year, and it was required to convene four times annually. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was President. From among its own membership the ~~Central~~ Central Committee elected a vice-president but was required to choose the secretary and treasurer from membership at large. The Director of the Department of Justice prescribed rules of legal ethics and made regulations for the association whose activities were subject to his approval. All recognized ~~lawyers~~ lawyers automatically became members. On 27 February 1946, membership was extended to law teachers with five years teaching service in accredited colleges and universities

who upon application to and permission of the Director were entitled to practice law without being required to take the Bar Examination. ~~(300)~~ (319)

Opposition to the Chief Justice serving as President of the National Bar Association was expressed among several complaints in a "Memorial" from the Seoul Bar Association on 1 December 1945. The presence of the Chief Justice, it was felt, mixed the court with the Bar and curtailed the latter's independence. The "Memorial," pointing out that the Japanese had not denied the Korean Bar Association its own self-government after 1938 (though it was consolidated with the Japanese Bar), asserted: "Our association was the only self-governing institution even under Japanese imperialism." ~~(301)~~ (320)

In a public statement on 7 December 1945, evidently issued to quiet the opposition, the Chief of the Bar Association's section, Judicial Department ~~chief~~, Wayne T. Geissinger, declared:

> The lawyers in Korea will be offered a democratic medium for expression through the Central Council. This Council will have a major role in the formation of these vital policies which will determine the true future of the Bar of Korea ... The Director of the Bureau of Justice will be guided by the suggestions of the Central Council thereby giving the lawyers a voice in the formation of the policies that will affect their future. ~~(302)~~ (321)

In a meeting held by the Central Council of the National Bar Association, 12-14 December 1946, the role lawyers were to play in the establishment of democratic government and the judicial system of the United States and Korean practices were discussed. ~~(303)~~ (322)

Because of the paucity of qualified lawyers in South Korea, the Department had to develop, encourage, and guide the Korean Bar. According to Dr. Y. H. Kim, there were but 65 members of the Seoul Korean Bar Association in the Seoul area on 1 December 1945, and only 164 in all South Korea. There were, however, 195 lawyers in the eight provinces. (~~304~~)(323) To stimulate interest in the law, a law refresher course was planned and the Korean-American Legal Academy founded.

Independence of organized Korean lawyers, consistent with the separation of the courts from the executive branch of the government, was achieved 1 July 1948 under Ordinance No. 207 which created the Korean Federal Bar Association as a juridical person to supersede the National Bar Association. (~~305~~)(324) District Bar Associations were provided for each court district "to uphold the honor and dignity of practicing lawyers, the maintenance of a law library, the exchange of professional information, and to improve the services of practicing lawyers to clients and to the public." Each association was autonomous in drafting by-laws, conducting its affairs, and electing officers, subject to supervision of the Director of the Department of Justice, but had to hold a general meeting at least once a year. Election of judges as honorary members was permissive. (325)(306)

The Korean Federal Bar Association was composed of the District associations. Its purpose was "to advance the science of jurisprudence, promote the administration of justice, uphold the honor of the legal profession, and further international friendship among

lawyers." A Central Council, composed of representatives elected from each district bar association by ration, was created and given autonomy in choosing officers and conducting its business. The Director of the Justice Department supervised the Council which was required to convene at least once each year. All rights and duties, functions, funds, and equipment of the former National Bar Association were transferred to the Korean Federal Bar Association.

To train Korean legal personnel for the responsible functions in the Administration of Justice, the Department of Justice planned a law refresher course in 1946. As early as 29 September 1945, Major Emery J. Woodall, the then Director, initiated action for a law refresher cours through three different groups.(326) Little progress was made until the plans were announced to SCAP in January 1946.(327) A one-year course with enrollment limited to one hundred, to be held at the National Law Library Building, was planned for those who had passed a higher civil service examination for judicial administration, those who had passed the Korean bar examinations, those who had studied law in an accredited college or university for at least three years, and anyone who had graduated from the middle school and passed the preliminary examination prescribed before the start of the law refresher course. Approved applicants took the preliminary examination 23 February 1946 and the written one on 1 March.(328) Although sixty-one persons qualified, no course was ever given. The Department explained that Koreans were

"not temperamentally suited" for the course and that for that reason the plan had been abandoned. (310)(329)

To stimulate further interest in the legal profession and broaden legal knowledge, the Korean-American Legal Academy was founded. The Military Government announced the opening of the Academy on 9 November 1946, pointing out that it would constitute a forum for the exchange of information among Korean and American members of the legal profession. Korean and American lawyers alternated in lecturing. Dr. Kim Byung Ro, Director of the Department of Justice, sponsored the organization with the assistance of Chief Judge Chang Kyung Keun of the Seoul District Court and Dr. Ernst Fraenkel, American Chief Advisor of the Department of Justice Legal Research Bureau, who scheduled the lectures. Meetings were held throughout the winter of 1946-1947. (311)(330) Prominent American and Korean legal scholars lectured on various aspects of the law, comparing Anglo-American law and the American judicial system with Korean civil law and the operation of Korean courts. Mock trials were held by Americans under the sponsorship of the Academy for Korean study of American court procedure. (312)(331) As a result of the interest created by the Korean-American Legal Academy, five jurists and attorneys were sent to Washington in May 1947 to survey the American judicial system. (313)(332)

Under Japanese control, probationary judicial officers were

appointed to serve in the capacity of apprentices to judges and prosecutors. Vacancies on the bench and in the prosecution offices were filled by appointment of the probationary officers. On 24 November 1945, the Korean heads of the criminal, civil, and penal sections petitioned the Director of the Department of Justice to revive the practice.(333) In consequence, a Probationer's Committee of the Department of Justice was established, 4 December 1945, to examine and recommend appointment of probationers to serve in the courts. The committee consisted of the Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court and the chief secretaries of the civil, criminal, and penal sections. In addition, there were four ex officio members: the Director of the Department, the Executive Officer, the Executive Assistant to the Director, and the officer in charge of Bar Associations section.(334)

With approval of General MacArthur and General Hodge, a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union, Mr. Roger Baldwin, came to Korea in May 1947 to organize a similar union in Korea. The Military Governor (General Lerch) requested American lawyers to interest the Korean legal profession in the undertaking. Thereafter, the advisory personnel of the Department of Justice sponsored a meeting of judges, court and police officials, lawyers, and prominent citizens to organize a Korean union. Though Americans in the Department joined, they did not take an active part. Mr. Baldwin was reported to have spent "considerable time in conferences with Communists." At the meeting which organized the Korean Civil Liberties Union (22 May 1947), two Communists and several leftists were elected officers. In appraising

the union more than a year later, an American Justic Department legal advisor declared that the organization had conducted its activities with dignity and had worked with success on a few cases involving police torture. (335)

To coordinate and facilitate legal practices, the National Law Library was established as a subordinate unit of the Department of Justice on 19 November 1945. Its purpose was to:

> ...organize, develop, and administer the law library for the Courts, Bar Association, penal institutions, law colleges, and departments, law and other agencies of the administration of Justice, serving the judges, prosecutors, lawyers, officials of the Bureau of Justice, the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat, and of other governmental bureaus, sections and agencies, and as far as facilities permit the general public. Divisions for the continuation of the historical research into the customary law of Korea, and drafting of a modern Korean Code, and amendments and additions to the existing laws and for the publication of court reports of decided cases are established within the Department. (336)

The Library maintained liaison with the Bureau of Culture in the Department of Education for coordination of policy and activity with the National Law Library. It furnished the Legal Research Bureau information on the codes and statutory law. (337)

Special Criminal Investigating Committee

Immediately after news of Japan's surrender reached Korea, Japanese personnel began "a systematic and all extensive looting of government funds" in "every bureau and section of the government, every province, city, national institution, control society, industrial and commercial firms supervised by governmental agencies." Several hundred million yen were involved. "Fictitious transfers were made of physical and intangible government property" and the discovery of embezzlement within the Department of Justice "alerted every government section to similar discoveries." (338)

To relieve the courts of this additional burden and to expedite investigation, the Military Governor on 11 October 1945 created a Special Criminal Investigating Committee, composed of nine judges, three from the Supreme Court and three each from the Court of Appeals and District Court of Seoul. The Director of the Department of Justice organized and supervised branches of the national committee. He appointed a secretary and other personnel to conduct investigations. The committee held hearings and exercised

powers of a court in subpoenaing witnesses and in sequestering property. However, the Committee did not convict of sentence. When a bureau or section uncovered presumptive embezzlement, the General Counsel reviewed the charges and decided whether arrest was justified. Investigative agencies pursued the inquiry while the Department of Justice made an accounting analysis. When the investigation was completed, the evidence was submitted to the secretary of the Committee, who reviewed and classified available charges for indictment. A trial brief was then prepared for review by the Director of the Department of Justice, who by order placed the case on the Committee's docket. The Committee acting as a trial court heard the evidence, examined witnesses, and found the facts. The secretary certified the case to the chief prosecutor of the district. The District Court entered verdict and sentence. (339)

There were 30 cases pending investigation on 5 December 1945. (340) These involved embezzlement, bribery, and destruction of records by Japanese officials. Cases investigated in addition to that of the former Japanese Director of the Justice Department (already referred to*) included a justice the the Supreme Court accused of embezzlement and destruction of court records; the Director of the Department of Finance for bribery amounting to ¥ 20,000,000 (which was recovered); a provincial governor for recovery of over ¥ 500,000; and the Director of the Relief Association for irregularities. (341)

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* See page 29, 106

Upon completion of the task assigned it, the Special Criminal Investigating Committee was abolished on 7 February 1946 by Ordinance No. 46 and Administrative Order No. 13. All pending cases were transferred to the prosecutor's office of the District Court of Seoul for prosecution and trial according to regular practice.

Special Judicial Officers

The problem of clearing the dockets as speedily as possible led the Director of the Department of Justice to investigate through liaison officers in the provinces the desirability of placing police magistrate powers with police chiefs.(342) Abolition of the judicial powers of police chiefs resulted in a large number of minor cases being brought into the District Courts. The liaison officer initially favored, with approval of provincial legal officers, granting chiefs of police jurisdiction in minor breaches of the peace to relieve congestion in District Branch Courts.(343) At Taegu, it was found that chiefs of police were "not competent to exercise summary jurisdiction of petty offenses," but a system of mayors' courts of limited jurisdiction was suggested as an alternative.(344) At Taejon, the legal officers disfavored even limited jurisdiction of chiefs of police.(345) After surveying the situation, the liaison officer on 2 December 1945 recommended that "chiefs of police be not granted court jurisdiction," for many were not qualified, and even if qualified such summary power lacked public confidence and was regarded inimical to the public interest. Alternative recommendations

were submitted, suggesting that mayors of large towns be granted police court jurisdiction with power to impose fines of less than 100 won.(346) The orientation officer reported from Chonju that the provincial legal officer did not consider it necessary or advisable to place powers of a police magistrate in the hands of police chiefs.(347)

After weighing the various alternatives, the Military Governor, on 10 January 1946, created the position of special judicial officer with original jurisdiction in cases in which the punishment did not exceed imprisonment for 30 days or a fine of 300 won or both. The number of such officers could not exceed the number of distric and branch courts in a province. Proceedings were summary. Right of appeal obtained. The chief judge recommended to the Department Director the appointment of the special judicial officers to such places and for such periods of time he deemed necessary to try cases within their jurisdiction.(348)

Korean reaction was both favorable and unfavorable. A favorable view was held by those who recognized special judicial officers as the necessary and expeditious means of clearing the jails of petty offenders still incarcerated after the abolition of police chiefs' judicial powers. Opponents regarded these officers as a "needless appendage" to the judicial system. The regular judges were jealous of their prerogatives and loath to relinquish any part of their jurisdiction. Few special judicial officers had legal training, hence they tended to lower the prestige of the bench.(349) Creation of this summary trial

system had an unexpected salutary effect, however. Judges of District Courts exerted greater zeal in the trial of cases so as to eliminate the necessity of appointing special judicial officers.(350) Ordinance No. 51 (20 February 1946) increased each monetary fine five times and advanced the maximum fine special judicial officers could impose to ¥ 750.

Effective 1 April 1948, special judicial officers could issue warrants of arrest and search in areas not having a court, if so authorized by the chief judge of a District Court.(351)

In the Court Organization Law, Ordinance No. 192, effective 1 June 1948, the Supreme Court was empowered to establish summary courts to take over the duties of special judicial officers. Located where there was a police station, they had authority to issue warrants of arrest and warrants of search, as provided in Ordinance No. 176, dated 20 March 1948.(352) On 24 June 1948, the Supreme Court issued regulations for special examination for appointment of summary court judges.(353)

Provost Courts

To improve court procedure and expedite trials, General Hodge placed provost courts under the jurisdiction of the Military Government by General Order No. 5 on 14 January 1946. Existing provost courts, which had been appointed by the Commanding Generals of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Divisions and Army Service Command 24, were retained temporarily pending establishment of courts appointed by the Military Governor. ~~(333)~~(354) These latter began to function at the end of January.

Because of "great discrepancy among sentences imposed by Provost Courts", General Hodge on 14 January laid down principles to establish uniformity of sentence and uniform procedure throughout all commands. Provost courts had jurisdiction over all persons in South Korea except those subject to military or naval laws of the Allied Powers, persons having diplomatic immunity, and prisoners of war. Usually only one judge sat on those courts. Procedure was similar to that of Army summary courts martial. Judges could impose fines up to $5,000 or its equivalent in won, or sentences to imprisonment up to five years. A table of maximum punishments listed offenses generally hostile to the United States, breaches of the peace, and such crimes as larceny, embezzlement, and bribery. A board of review at USAFIK reviewed the proceedings of all provost courts. On 6 February 1946, creation of the Provost Court Administrative Office within the Department of Justice was announced. ~~(334)~~(355) By 1 July 1946, eleven such courts were in operation with a total of 25 planned by September. ~~(335)~~(356) They were utilized to clear dockets clogged with a backlog of cases.

The courts did not function satisfactorily at the start. On 22 April 1946, General Hodge issued a circular ordering "elimination of unauthorized delays and careless processing" because "an analysis of records of trial of Provost Court Cases in this Command discloses deficiencies and unnecessary delays which have frequently resulted in a miscarriage of justice." These delays, the circular declared, originated with courts, governors, and other authorized agencies, and were especially in connection with forwarding of records of cases. Charges lacked factual data on charge sheets, pertinent information in reference to evidence, and reasons for suspension of sentences. The circular then cited carelessness of provost courts in the preparation of trial records in general, and criticized them for ommissions and ambiguities. Improper form and use of language were listed among other deficiencies, and attention called to "incorrect and incomplete action" of the reviewing authority. At the same time, the Commanding General felt compelled to submit for the information of provost courts types of charges and specification with instructions and samples. (357)

Thereafter, the provost courts under the Military Government functioned regularly until 11 April 1947, when the Military Governor ordered that no Korean should be tried in a provost court without prior permission of Military Government. (358) This order was improperly translated by the Korean press to read that provost courts had been aboiished. That misinterpretation, accepted by Koreans in judicial circles, caused considerable alarm among the American military personnel handling provost court cases. General

Hodge expressed dissatisfaction with the new policy. At once the Military Governor ordered the Department of Justice to investigate the competence of Korean courts to try cases formerly handled by the provost courts. Then the Commanding General put the Military Governor's policy on trial for two months. The results satisfied the Military Government. Only minor criticism emanated from Army officers, although some agencies subordinating to the Provost Marshal had been building up a collective complaint against the competence of Korean courts without referring individual cases to the Military Government agency criticized. Some Army officers at the outset had opposed a shift of provost cases to Korean courts and early in August General Hodge himself expressed a desire to restore to provost courts their former jurisdiction. (~~338~~) (359)

On 8 August 1947, the Military Governor instituted a vigorous program to correct laxness in Korean courts so as to avoid what his advisors felt would be "a backward step" if provost court jurisdiction were restored. A liaison officer had been dispatched to the provinces on 22 July to inspect, advise, and prod the courts. Following his inspection tour, the American advisors prepared a report requested by ~~XXIV Corps~~ USAFIK on Korean court handling of former provost cases. (~~339~~) (360) The Department reprimanded judges and prosecutors and issued instructions that they were to try cases impartially and mete out justice without fear or favor. On 18 August, a provost court was reestablished at Kwangju because the Korean court trials there were unsatisfactory to Military Government. However, in broad perspective, the liaison

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officer's reports were favorable to Korean handling of the cases.

In two types of cases Korean courts showed weakness: those involving trial and punishment of rioters and those involving embezzlement and fraud of Korean officials connected with vested companies. In riot cases, judges and prosecutors were subject to political pressures by both rightists and leftists. The Court and Prison Liaison Officer in a Report of Inspection on 5 August 1947, cited five riot cases pending before the chief judge of the Taegu District Court since 1 May, as an example of the difficulties confronting the courts due to political pressure. Leftists and rightists were involved in the cases. Efforts were being made by interested parties to have the chief judge transferred. No irregularity in his conduct of the case was discovered. Hostile accusations that he was sympathetic toward the leftists were branded as "lies" by the American investigator.

In trying cases of embezzlement and fraud of vested company officials, Korean prosecutors appeared reluctant to prosecute and Korean judges reluctant to impose stiff penalties upon the accused because they were usually important men in the community. American advisors urged impartial and fearless trial and sentence. Aside from the weaknesses in the two types of cases mentioned, the over-all picture led an American advisor to declare, "The facts are that Korean courts have in the main handled American cases very well."

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The American Advisor to the Director of the Department of Justice informed the Military Governor on 13 August 1947, "Justice in these courts has not been perfect, but it is consistently improving and it compares most favorably with justice administered in many countries. In my opinion the administration of the courts of Korea comes closer to the necessary

standard of performance than any other function of government here."(363) The Military Governor approved recommendations for the temporary installation of provost courts at weak spots. He instructed provincial legal officers and court personnel to maintain closer liaison in trying cases. The Department encouraged publicity about the Korean system of law and the importance of impartial trials. On 16 August 1947, General Hodge verbally informed the Military Governor that he was satisfied with Military Government solution of the provost court case problem.(364) Inspection of Korean court trial of former provost court cases continued for three months during which 1600 cases were tried and less than 50 were brought to the attention of the American Advisor to the Justice Department Director.(365)

Observation and Supervision

American legal personnel continued to observe the courts up to 15 August 1948, when the Republic of Korea came into being. During this period the American advisors did not attempt to influence court decisions, but stood by ready to assist the Korean Director of the Department of Justice to improve court operation. For example, in August 1947, reports of 22 cases tried in Korean courts with unsatisfactory results were discussed with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who then toured several provinces to confer with court officials to improve handling of cases of interest to American agencies.(366) Following riots in Chung Chong Puk during July and August 1947, a liaison officer was dispatched to investigate and give instructions.(367) Another example of court liaison was the investigation of the finance section of the Court of Appeal at Taegu, which revealed that the chief of the sec-

tion and others were guilty of bribe-taking and embezzlement. Arrests and indictment followed. (368) In December 1947, Korean officials and American advisors of the Justice and Police Departments held a conference to discuss revision of existing directives on arrest and confinement of individuals, with a view to protect their rights without hampering police operations. Although no definitive solution was reached, the two departments agreed to submit separate

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report to the Military Governor, ~~since no agreement was reached.~~

At times the Department of Justice had to intervene actively in Korean court cases, and in some instances use of military courts became necessary in the interests of justice. The most notable of these were the "Counterfeit Trial" in 1946, the Boo Chang Whan case, originating in December of that year, and -- above all -- the trial of fifteen members of the Dai Han Min Chung (Great Korean Democratic Young Men's Association) for terroristic activities. This last originated in April 1947 and continued prominent for nearly a year.

The Counterfeit Trial, in mid-1946, was closely watched by the American advisory staff of the Department of Justice. Under Japanese control, Chung Pan Sa, a printing company, had a contract to print Bank of Chosen notes. At the time of Korean liberation, one employee confiscated some of the plates and plotted with Communists to print currency to finance the Communist Party. When the plot was exposed, considerable agitation developed. The Communists asserted that the police were deliberately "framing" the party. H. Y. Pak, a Communist party representative, wrote an appeal to General Hodge on 22 July 1946 in defense of the party and denied its complicity. He also requested dismissal of the prosecutors working on the case. American authorities, after investigation, were satisfied with the evidence and the way the Koreans were handling the case. On 29 July 1946, the day set for the trial in the Seoul District Court, a large mob stormed the courthouse, broke up the trial, and attempted to get possession of the evidence. Fifty-five members of the mob were seized, arraigned before a provost court, tried, and sentenced to varying

terms of imprisonment. The trial was then resumed, without further incident. Judge Yong Won Il conducted the trial impartially and creditably. Evidence clearly showed that 12,000,000 yen had been given to the Communist party. After conviction on October 1946, an appeal was immediately taken to the Supreme Court. Communists then attacked the Chief Justice in the press for having allegedly said at a party, while on tour some months earlier, that courts could not be impartial when the question of communism came before them. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court judgment. (370) Within a year, nine counterfeit rings were smashed by law enforcement agencies, 25 persons found guilty in five cases and sentenced. (371)

The case of Boo Chang Whan, while void of partisan political considerations, involved serious potential miscarriage of justice. In December 1946, Boo, assistant manager of the Chosun Tannery and Leather Company, a vested enterprise, was charged with having sold approximately 200 tons of tannic acid, obtained from Materials Control Corporation (a military government agency), at an excessive profit of 1,500,000 won, in violation of the anti-profiteering provisions of Ordinance No.19. A second charge was that he had imported from Japan 5,000,000 yen Japanese currency and sold it in violation of Ordinance No.93. Actually, it developed, the purchase and sale of the tannic acid had been approved verbally by an American army officer attached to Material Control Corporation. As a result of the Department's investigation, Boo was ordered released on bail, the prosecutor censured for arresting him prior to investigation, the American army officer criticized for failing to put his authorization in writing, the charge of selling Japanese currency found to be false and ordered dropped, and finally a verdict of not guilty practically di-

rected by the Department of Justice. The Korean press was critical of the case but not of Americans. (372)

On another occasion, the resignation of Lee Ho Chong, Chief Judge of the Court of Review at Taegu, was accepted by the Military Governor following a dispute between him and Ham Sung Ho, Chief Judge of Taegu District Court, which originated in December 1947. Lee had accused Ham of being a Communist, but investigation revealed that the charge was made of malice. (373)

The most notable instance of American intervention in Korean legal processes was the transfer, in November 1947, of the Dai Han Min Chung case to a military court. The case involved kidnapping and murder of political opponents by members of the extreme Rightist Dai Han Min Chung on 20 April 1947. Because of the especially shocking circumstances of the crime, the Military Governor (General Lerch), with the active concurrence of Civil Administrator Ahn and Police Director Chough, ordered the Association dissolved (22 April 1947). Kim Doo Whan, the admitted leader, and fifteen others were arrested and eventually tried for their part in the crime.

The Seoul District Court sentenced one defendant to seven years imprisonment, another to five years, and a third to two years. The others, including Kim Doo Whan, were given light fines. Not satisfied with the light sentences, the Military Governor ordered the case appealed to the Seoul Court of Review. New evidence was received. However, the court in recognition of the interest of the Military Governor,* informed him that the evidence was still insufficient and requested him to trust the opinion of the Court of Review based upon evidence already on record,

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*Maj.Gen. William F. Dean, who had succeeded on 30 October 1947 the late Maj. Gen. Archibald L. Lerch(deceased 11 September 1947).

or if not to transfer the case to a Military Court. The Military Governor was of the opinion no new evidence was necessary, and on 22 November 1947 ordered the case transferred to a Military Court for trial rather than yield to the Seoul Court of Review's intention to affirm the judgement of the Seoul District Court. Considerable excitement resulted. Press and political parties opposed the Military Governor's act as American "interference in Korean courts." Communist threats were openly made. One American advisor to the Department of Justice was threatened. The judges of the court at once submitted their resignations.

The Military Governor issued a special press release explaining publicly the reason for ordering the transfer. American legal advisors conferred with the judges, whose resignations were not accepted. Political opponents of the Chief Judge, who favored the transfer, tried to force his resignation. So tense was the situation that the Korean interpreter-translator employed to translate the trial record into English, through fear of violence at the hands of the terrorists, resigned after working a few days. The case was transferred to the Judge Advocate, USAFIK, for trial by a military court. (348) 354 (374)

The American attitude toward Korean self-government and the courts particularly was clearly and firmly stated by the Military Governor in a special press release on 1 December 1947 explaining his action:

> As Military Governor, I have been charged with the duty of supervising all activities of all branches of the South Korean Interim Government, including the courts, which are all Military Occupation Courts. My policy as Military Governor is to delegate to the Korean Officials of all the branches of the government authority to handle government affairs, whenever possible. However, in the present case I am of the opinion that a gross mis-

> carriage of Justice would result if I permitted the sentences imposed by the Seoul District Court to be affirmed without a careful review of all of the evidence in a Military Court. I regret that my views conflict with the views of the judiciary, but I feel that any other course would be an encouragement to repeated acts of such political terrorism as shown by the evidence in this case.

In commenting on the judges, the Military Governor concluded: "Although the judges have filed their resignations in protest against this action, it is hoped they will reconsider their decision, since the reasons for transferring the case were not under their control and the transfer does not reflect upon them."(375) The judges reconsidered and remained on the bench.

Trial of Kim Doo Whan and co-defendants by a Military Commission on 22 January 1948 resulted in their conviction. Kim and thirteen others were sentenced to be hanged, the other two to life imprisonment. The Commanding General, after reviewing the sentences which had been imposed 12 February, commuted all but Kim Doo Whan in Military Commission Order No. 2, 15 March 1948. Because he approved the death sentence of Kim, that sentence was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East (General MacArthur), the next higher authority, and commuted to life imprisonment 17 May. Final sentences were: life imprisonment, five; thirty years, nine; twenty years, two.(376) All included hard labor.

X - PROPERTY TRANSFERS AND CLAIMS

Claims arising from property transfers loomed large in importance almost throughout the occupation. Transfer without Military Government permission of property in South Korea owned or controlled by Japan and other enemy governments, any agencies thereof, or by any of their nationals, corporations, societies, associations or any organization of such governments incorporated or regulated by them, on or after 9 August 1945, was prohibited under Ordinance No. 2 on 25 September 1945. To act upon applications for proposed transfer or sale of such property, establishment of Special Property Courts was provided for on 19 November 1945.(377) Their purpose was to prevent the clogging of district courts with judicial problems arising from the blocking of transfers of Japanese and other enemy property, investigation and settlement of fraudulent transfers, and legal determination of ownership of property and related matters. A Supervisor of Special Property Courts within the Department of Justice was placed in control of these courts. The national office itself functioned for a period, although the Special Property Courts themselves were never actually set up.(378) Major John W. Connally, Jr. was the American Supervisor and Mr. Pak Young Kyun his Korean counterpart, who drafted the early plans of operation.(379)

Meanwhile, on 6 December 1945, all Japanese owned, controlled, or regulated property in Korea was vested in Military Government by Ordinance No. 33. The vesting ordinance introduced new considerations and changed the complexion of the transfer problem.

The Office of the Supervisor of Special Property Courts began as an investigative and recommending agency. Its findings were used by the

Property Custodian for his decisions. In December the office was criticized as not properly belonging to the Justice Department, and its transfer to the Property Custodian was recommended. (380)

The Executive Officer of the Department of Justice announced on 19 January that transfer of the Office of Supervisor of Special Property Courts to the Property Custodian was under consideration and action was expected. (381) In the meantime, a directive was issued freezing all sales of enemy property temporarily, thus raising a bar to final action by the Office of Supervisor of Special Property Courts on any of some ten thousand applications for transfer which had been filed with it. A series of possible "test cases" was then studied by the Office. (382)

Koreans were sensitive about vested property. They openly expressed suspicions of American intentions after Property Custody Order No. 8, 31 December 1946, delegated to American officials responsibility for handling such property. Military Government felt compelled to issue, on 28 February, a statement clarifying the American position because "a great deal of misunderstanding arose among the Korean people as a whole." Taking cognizance of the fact that Koreans regarded the order "as a violation of the confidence they have placed in Military Government and feel that they are being exploited", Military Government declared, "There is no justification whatever for these misgivings and apprehensions." The American position was restated: "The United States, under International Law, is obligated to conserve former Japanese property in Korea, to put it to the best possible use and to hold it for accounting until it is finally disposed of." (383) Korean directors, the statement explained, were aware of the problems involved and had "no doubt" that vested property would revert to the Korean people.

A short time before the statement was issued, the Deputy Military Governor had appointed a six-member Korean-American Committee, including a member of KILA and an American legal advisor in the Department of Justice, to review the Order.(384) On 21 February 1946, the creation of a joint Korean-American Advisory Board to advise the Property Custodian was approved. With the Department of Justice represented, it was composed of a majority of Koreans, including three members of KILA.(385) On 31 March, Property Custody Order No.9 revised Order No. 8 and provided for appointment of Koreans as managers of vested business organizations.(386)

On 23 January 1946, the Military Governor, through Administrative Order No. 7, instructed the chief judges of district courts to cause the land registrars of their respective districts "to cancel of record all recorded transfers made on or since 9 August 1945 affecting properties owned or controlled directly or indirectly, in whole or part by the government of Japan, or any agency thereof or by any of its Nationals, Corporation, societies, associations or any other organizations of such government or incorporated or regulated by it."(387)

In spite of the plans outlined for them and their actual authorization, Special Property Courts themselves never functioned. The Commanding General refused to give them the final jurisdiction which Korean judges demanded as within the scope of an independent judiciary.(388) The importance of the Special Property Court project lay rather in the activities initiated at national level in connection with it.

Applications of claimants continued to be filed with the Claims Subdivision of General Affairs Section, which later in 1946 became

identified as the Bureau of Claims, even though it was never legally established as such. That bureau in the Justice Department was created by the first Director of Justice, who for a short period served simultaneously as Secretary of General Affairs and General Counsel. It was originally set up to handle claims of Korean nationals against the Korean government.(389)

Until the General Affairs Section's functions were absorbed into the Department of Justice, claims were handled under its "Claims Subdivision." On 5 January 1946, General Counsel ruled: "Pending policy decisions by higher authority, claims against such property (vested property under Ordinance No. 33) will be forwarded by the General Affairs Section, Claims Subdivision, to the Property Custodian of the Military Government for notation and filing, but no such claims will be recognized as valid or payable at this time." To render advisory assistance to Korean nationals having claims against the Japanese Government, local Military Government claims officers were provided for in a directive of the Military Governor, 17 January 1946, and authorized to investigate such claims and report to General Affairs Claims Subdivision.(390) No assurance was given claimants that compensation would or would not be made, or that their claims were or were not valid against the Japanese Government.

Legal problems in connection with property tend to be intricate at any time; and, where the property is vested in Military Government over a friendly people liberated from former subjugation and held by it as a trustee for their future independent government, they are complex indeed. Over and above legal problems concerning vested property, there were claims against the United States caused by or incidental to the activities

of United States forces in Kora and against Japan, and claims against Japan caused by or incidental to activities of the Japanese government or Japanese forces in Korea prior to American occupation. (391)

Likewise, claims against Military Government and the South Korean Interim Government arose in the normal administration of government, as did personal claims of Koreans against Koreans. Personal claims of one kind and another arising in the normal administration of government against departments and offices were settled through budgetary allotments following a pattern established under Japanese rule. That system persisted until 19 June 1948 when awards, refunds, and indemnities in budgets of department, offices, and agencies of SKIG were abolished and the payment of claims of that character became a Department of Finance function. (392) Few personal claims were filed by Koreans against each other. Property claims made up the great bulk of those filed with the Claims Bureau. (393) The basic policy was first to investigate these last pending establishment of procedure for determining and paying them. Various plans were considered by SCAP to handle those of international character, especially those against the Japanese government. (394)

To formulate policy in reference to claims against the Japanese Government, the Military Governor created the Claims Advisory Board by letter directive on 6 September 1947. This five-man beard consisted of the advisors to the Departments of Justice, Communications, and Finance, the Property Custodian, and the chairman of the National Economic Board, all of whom were Americans. (395) Later the Office of Foreign Affairs and Claims Bureau advisors were added. The Board investigated policy and precedure for the preparation and presentation of claims of the Korean Government or it nationals against the Japanese government

or its nationals. It studied types of claims and classified them according to proposed treatment under different procedures, and evaluated Japanese counterclaims against Korean nationals or the Korean government. The Claims Advisory Board on 15 May 1948 issued a report which analyzed the legal problems introduced by claims arising from the liquidation of an enemy government and projected into an entirely new legal atmosphere. Among the problems discussed was that of claims against Japan on the one hand and the position of Military Government in a liberated Korea on the other. Division of Korea at the 38th parallel further complicated the procedure and treatment of Korean government claims. A settlement of Korean claims arising from Japanese exploitation as far back as 1910, was contingent upon the peace treaty of the Allies with Japan. The report also discussed claims which would not ordinarily come within an international category subject to treaty, as those growing out of normal financial and trade relations. The Claims Advisory Board recommended creation of a Central Japanese Claims Commission in Korea and a Joint Japanese-Korean Claims Commission under SCAP to consider the problem. (396)

Ordinance No. 33 gave Military Government controlling interest in farms, residences, factories, mines, bank securities, and other property owned by Japanese individuals and corporation chartered in Japan. In South Korea, Japanese had controlled ninety percent of Korean corporations, and, through them or directly, and estimated 1,000,000 acres of land, 85,000 residences, financial institutions, transportation facilities, various plants, factories and commercial establishments. In its custodial capacity, Military Government was obligated to keep the vested enterprises functioning as part of the national economy. (397)

In many cases, property held by or registered in the names of nationals of Japan of Japanese companies located in Korea, which had been taken over by the Property Custodian under Ordinance No. 33, was actually owned by Koreans. Thus Koreans had some equitable interest in the property. (398) To systematize filing, processing, and classifying of factual data, and to arrive at a final determination of claims, the Property Claims Commission was created by a directive of Military Government on 31 August 1946. It purpose was to ascertain and determine ownership of property affected or claimed to be affected by Ordinance No. 2 and Ordinance No. 33. The Commission was composed originally of seven members, four of whom were appointed by the Director of the Department of Justice from among its legal personnel. Later it was reduced in number to five qualified lawyers appointed by the Military Governor pursuant to amending Ordinance No. 125 dated 1 November 1946. That amendment was significant in that it was silent as to nationality of the qualified lawyers. Functions and authority of the Property Claims Commission were: to conduct investigations, hold hearing, and make interlocutory and final determinations with respect to property within the scope of the two early Ordinances; to make, issue, and publish judgments and orders which would be final and binding as the determination of a court of last resort and carry the full force and effect of law; to stay and remove cases in respect to such property pending in any court in Korea. Further important powers and functions were:

> To direct matters to be referred to or brought before the Commission by any Property Custodian or other official, political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government of Korea, or any individual, for adjudication or other disposition, and to direct any court in Korea, any Register, and any Property Custo-

dian or other official, political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government of Korea and any individual to proceed in such a manner not inconsistent with the decision, judgment or order of the Commission.

The Commission was empowered to entertain at its discretion applications for declaratory judgments, and to act as an arbitration or conciliation board in matters involving property. It proceeded as a court in compelling attendance and receiving evidence and enforcing its process and determinations through comtempt proceedings. It was not bound by existing rules of evidence and procedure but might apply existing substantive law of Korea unless considered contrary to public policy. (399)

Claims by Koreans against the Government of Korea were filed direct with the Claims Bureau in the Justice Department. Claims filed with the Property Claims Commission were also file with the Claims Bureau, and in January 1948 there were 5,000 such claims on file awaiting processing and decision. (400)

The Property Claims Commission issued rules of procedure 21 November 1946, at which time the Claims Bureau was formally designated as agent for receiving claims to property affected by Ordinances 2 and 33. All claims were referred to a trial examiner, who conducted pre-trials and delivered records of each case to the Commission. (401) On the American side, the advisor to the Claims Bureau was designated Chief Trial Examiner for the Property Claims Commission. His subordinates were also trial examiners. Practically all of the Claims Bureau's time was taken up by property claims of the Property Claims Commission. After investigation and hearings by the trial examiners, it made findings and recommendations to the Commission, which reviewed and wrote the judgment. (402) In mid-May 1947, the Claims Bureau prepared procedural rules for the

Property Claims Commission and trial examiners, and defined the jurisdictional functions of each.(403) At the end of September 1947, the Claims Bureau reported 4,489 cases on hand, of which 4,356 concerned vested property.(404)

As claims increased, it became abundantly clear that many of those pending revealed prima facie proof of Korean ownership in the property claimed. For various reasons, many Korean owners had failed to register in their names the sale or transfer of property made to them prior to 9 August 1945. Consequently, such property had been considered Japanese property and was vested by the Military Government. The Property Claims Commission concurred in a recommendation of the American Advisor to the Director of the Department of Justice to transfer to the Property Custodian such claims for administrative determination. It was contemplated that a majority of cases in which Korean claimants were suffering hardship would be speedily settled.(405) By letter directive, the Deputy Military Governor on 17 April 1948 authorized the transfer of these claims to the Office of Property Custody for administrative determination in which the documentary evidence of claimants' right to the property was not in dispute on the face of the record.(406) From than to July 31, 1948, the trail examiners of the Property Claims Commission screened a total of 1,009 cases, 129 of which were held for judicial determination and 880 forwarded to the Property Custodian for administrative determination.(407)

Korean courts were given limited jurisdiction over vested property, movable or immovable, affected or claimed to be affected by Ordinances 2 and 33. Claims which could be referred to Korean courts were those which the Property Claims Commission determined under Ordinance No. 103

and which could not be determined administratively under the letter directive of 17 April 1948. The transfer of such a claim to a Korean court had the same effect as the filing of suit in a Korean court by claimant as plaintiff against the Office of Property Custody.(408) Thus 129 cases held for judicial determination at the end of July were transferred to Korean courts for decision. Between 1 August and 15 August 1948, when the Republic of Korea was inaugurated and Military Government terminated, 485 more such cases were screened. Twenty-four of these were held for judicial decision and 44 sent to the Office of Property Custody for administrative determination. A total of 1,370 cases was screened under the letter directive of 17 April, 1,355 being sent to the Office of Property Custody and 115 held for judicial determination.

As of 15 August, 5,721 claims involving vested property had been filed. All but 613 had been disposed of, including 3,608 farm land cases forwarded to the courts.(409) These last presumably involved the National Land Administration (formerly the New Korea Company) more directly than the Office of Property Custody. Suits filed against the former under Ordinance No. 173 (22 March 1948) were defended by its own legal staff. Following conferences between Department of Justice and National Land Administration officials in May, the Department instructed courts to postpone trial dates on such cases until after 1 July 1948, and meanwhile to investigate them thoroughly.(410)

The Property Custodian was affected by each claim examined by the Property Claims Commission, since each Korean claimant claimed the Property Custodian erred in vesting the property as Japanese-owned. A representative of the Property Custodian was always present at hearings.

Prior to final decision by the Commission, the Property Custodian was informed of the recommendations and could appear to introduce new evidence or argument before a final decision was handed down. Relations between the Claims Bureau, the Property Claims Commission, and Property Custody were harmonious throughout. Korean complaints about the handling of their claims were directed mainly at the slowness of the process.(411) Delay was caused by many procedural technicalities.

On 16 July 1948 the Military Governor extended Korean court jurisdiction to include litigation involving corporations in which the Property Custodian held an interest.(412)

XI - PENAL INSTITUTIONS

During the Japanese occupation, penal institutions came under the Governor General of Chosen. Control and supervision were exercised at national level through the Penal Institution subsection of the Bureau of Justice, and in each province by the chief prosecutor of the Court of Review. (413)

As a result of the oppressive laws and the stringent policy toward Koreans, thousands were jailed annually, many for so-called political and economic offenses. The government assumed no responsibility for rehabilitation of criminals. (414)

Between 15 August 1945 and the arrival of American forces on 8 September, Japanese prison personnel fled their posts or were threatened or intimidated by relatives and friends of prisoners in their delirium of freedom following the surrender. In consequence, prison doors were thrown open; prisoners by the thousands were turned loose. (415) The population in the Seoul Prison during that period dropped from 2,000 to 305. The warden was found with his "bags packed" ready to leave. The American Military Government at once set out to fill vacancies and replace Japanese with Koreans. Koreans in the Seoul Prison were found to be "inefficient" and "insufficient in number." Korean guards were reluctant to obey orders. (416)

Looting and embezzlement by Japanese personnel were soon disclosed by an investigation which "revealed that all the Japanese officials of the prisons in Seoul, namely the old Seoul Prison and the modern Westgate prison, were involved in illegally destroying prison records, destributing prison funds and selling prison goods and pocketing the proceeds." All were promptly arrested and imprisoned and replaced by

Koreans. The two prisons were merged into one, Westgate Prison, to which all prisoners were transferred.(417)

At the outset of American occupation, all war criminals were rounded up and sent to Japan for trial. Many held in Korean prisons were transferred. Judges in Korean criminal courts were directed to dispose of all cases involving Japanese Nationals by 31 March 1946.(418)

In reorganizing the Department of Justice, Military Government made the penal subsection a separate bureau (called a "department" at the time) thus giving weight and dignity to the administration and supervision of penal institutions which thereafter were under the control of the Director of Justice.(419) Immediate investigation of all other penal institutions was undertaken after the disclosure of illegalities in Seoul. Captain M.R. Blowitz checked funds, records, industries, and budgetary matters.(420) He took charge of the prisons for the director and "established morale throughout the whole system."(421) The Penal Bureau supervised and administered all prisons and correctional institutions, prison farms, workshops, and prison industries.

The Japanese had neglected prisoners and let the building fall into a serious state of disrepair. Treatment was abusive and harsh. Lack of sanitation was shocking in the overcrowded prisons. Prisoners were fed poor quality food and most of them were undernourished. Although the Department of Justice took remedial measures in Seoul at the outset, reorganization of the prisons throughout South Korea was a slow process. In December 1946, a "deplorable situation" existed at Taegu Prison. An American civilian inspector found all rpisoners undernourished. One hundred and one were in the hospital. Four died shortly thereafter. Bathing facilities were inadequate and there was an epidemic of scabies.

Food and clothes were the most important needs. When the seriousness of conditions was brought to the attention of the American Army officer in charge, he corrected the situation. The warden was put on probation for 30 days and his dismissal recommended in the inspection report.(422)

Military Government set about to improve physical plants, utilizing existing facilities, and to give special attention to rehabilitation of the prisoners through educational and vocational training. Following American practices, useful trades were taught. Chaplains attended to spiritual and educational needs. They operated under the supervision of the National Central Council, conprising eight representatives of various religious organizations.(423) Sunday religious services, first introduced in the Seoul Prison, were received so enthusiastically by prisoners that on 16 December 1945, similar services were initiated in Taegu and Taejon prisons under plans which ultimately embraced all prisons in South Korea.(424) On 21 November, Westgate Prison was formally redesignated "Seoul Prison." The older institution which had previously borne that name was continued as a branch until 28 March 1946, when it was officially denominated Mapo Prison, and made an independent institution. Similarly six other branch prisons became independent at that time.(425)

To expedite trial, police were ordered to submit a report to the Prosecutor within one day after an offender was apprehended in a simple case, and "as soon as possible" in other cases.(426) This order was reinforced on 19 November 1945 with provisions that any persons held in a police station or prison longer than 30 days pending investigation or trial without specific charges being filed by a prosecutor was to be permitted to petition the Justice Director for release. Unless there

existed a valid basis for prosecution with charges filed within 10 days after receipt of the petition, the prisoner's release was ordered.(427) A short time before, the Director had felt compelled to remind the Department of Justice and the Penal Bureau that they were not apprehending agencies except in respect to recapture of escaped prisoners. It appeared that prison officials were arresting and detaining persons. The Director specifically ordered that no person be detained without trial in any prison institution unless he was delivered with proper papers.(428) Failure of prison officials to obey these orders led the Director on 7 January 1946 to reveal concern of the Military Governor over detention of persons for excessive periods of time awaiting trial. Citing as an example an alleged murderer held for more than a year in the Kumchon Prison pending location of an essential witness, the Director ordered trial or release.(429)

In December 1945, according to an inspection report, the Penal Bureau controlled 17 prisons and 23 minor institutions, including branch prisons and various correctional institutions. Japanese personnel operated eight or nine major institutions which at the time had not been inspected. The Seoul Prison was "operating systematically and with good control." The Koreans were found to have great latitude in the administration of the Justice Department and its institutions. The American court liaison officer did not have liaison with the Penal Bureau or its institutions at that time, but thereafter it was an added function. Outside of Seoul, operation proceeded on less than 25% capacity. No attempt had been made to predict future needs. Factory facilities in prisons were idle due to lack of labor and direction. The relation of the Department of Justice to the National Legislature was hazy. Though the prisons were independent

and operated on a month to month budget approved by the Penal Bureau, the inspection asserted that no reports were received or requested as to actual expenditure of funds or activities carried on. (430)

However, the Department Executive Officer, in a reply to the report made on 19 January 1946, stated that "every prison submits" a monthly report on expenditures and of activities, the larger institutions weekly and bi-weekly reports. Though from the rate of arrests and convictions at that time no stable average of future needs could be estimated, all available space, the answer declared, would be needed. It was anticipated that all facilities would be utilized by 1 July 1946. Though the Leprosarium was under the Department of Health and Welfare, the leper prison on Sorong-ni Island was under the jurisdiction of the Penal Bureau. (431)

The predictions of an increased prison population were borned out by statistics for the period 24 December 1945 and 1 February 1946, when there was an increase of 58%, due to disposition of a large backlog of cases accumulated before the reorganization of the court system. (432) Prison population increased from over 4,700 at the end of December 1945 to nearly 11,000 at the end of March 1946. As of July 1946, 17,375 persons were confined in the major prisons in South Korea. Of these 2,893 were being held pending trial and 14,482 were serving sentences. (433) On the first anniversary of the liberation of Korea, 15 August 1946, in accordance with the Oriental custom of extending clemency to deserving prisoners upon occasions of special significance, 1,499 prisoners were released from confinement. Most were first offenders with excellent prison records. Of those released, 124 had been sentened by the Mili-

tary Government provost courts, the remainder by Korean courts.(434) On 14 June 1947, Justice Department Director Kim Byong Ho announced the release and commutation of sentences of 669 more prisoners who had been sentenced by provost courts, to imprisonment terms varying from 90 days to five years. By that action, 1,065 or one-third of the total sentenced by provost courts had been released and their sentences commuted. The South Korean Interim Government regarded them as political prisoners, and their release as an act of amnesty by the government. Military Government conception of a political prisoner differed from that of Korean officials as was indicated by General Helmick, Deputy Military Governor, when on 17 January he denied the charge that overcrowded prisons held a majority of political prisoners. To the press he declared, "There are no political prisoners as such being hald in the jails of South Korea."(435)

From August 1945, after the release of "almost all of the prisoners in South Korea," prison population steadily increased to the maximum facility capacity of 18,500 in September 1946, and thereafter presented the problem of overcrowding, with 20,718 confined at the end of December 1947 as the table below indicates:(436)

PRISON POPULATION IN SOUTH KOREA AUGUST 1945-DECEMBER 1947

Period	1945	1946	1947
Jan.		6,725	19,998
Feb.		8,313	20,379
Mar.		10,932	19,848
Apr.		12,428	20,282
May		14,170	20,555
June		15,805	19,833
July		17,324	19,777
Aug.	1,618	17,452	19,263
Sept.	1,544	18,940	20,652
Oct.	2,261	19,720	21,458
Nov.	3,357	19,718	21,372
Dec.	4,792	20,016	20,718

In the closing years of the Japanese period there had been "over 30,000" prisoners in all Korea, approximately 46% of them in North Korean prisons. The 1947 totals therefore compared unfavorably with the earlier figures. The increase in prison population was attributed to the economic situation in South Korea. The large number of repatriates and refugees, most of whom were poverty stricken, was given as the chief cause of crime increase, especially among juveniles. Theft in its various forms accounted for the majority of all convictions. Slight downward fluctuations on occasion were due to releases at expiration of sentences and paroles issued on special holidays. (437)

National prisons were expanded to 19 to meet the increasing demands. On July 31, 1948, prison population totaled 22,321, of whom 20,137 were men, 218 women, and 1,966 Juveniles. Of these, 17,879 (16,038 men, 160 women, and 1,681 juveniles) had been convicted; the balance were awaiting trial. Theft was the leading offense for confinement, with 7,463 prisoners, and burglary next with 2,759, fraud 503, embezzlement 272, burglary resulting in injury 220, acts concerning stolen goods 206, and attempted burglary 20. In short, theft and crimes associated with it accounted for fractionally over 50% of the total. For violations of Proclamation 2, 2,137 were held, and for violations of Military Government orders, 1087. There were 406 confined for murder, 132 for riot, and 218 for injury. (438)

Korean police were reluctant to arrest women or apprehend girls for juvenile delinquency. In June 1947 there were but some 181 women confined in the prisons of all South Korea. They were tried in provost courts for violations against the Military Government by special permission. The mis-interpretation by the press of the Military Governor's order to have provost court cases tried in Korean courts led the Korean

Director of the Police Department to announce on 13 May 1947 that a judicial court officer would try women detained for violations against the Military Government. Although the extent to which that policy was carried out was unknown to American legal advisors when questioned in 1948, nevertheless, women continued to be tried in provost courts. The small number of women, 113 convicted prisoners and 53 held pending trial at the end of July 1948, and 43 incarcerated juvenile female offenders, represented a surprisingly small number compared with the population of South Korea. Military Government pressure was brought to bear upon the police to apprehend women, especially those soliciting prostitution among American soldier personnel.(439)

An analysis of information on 17,783 prisoners as of 31 May 1948 disclosed that 140 were college graduates, 915 high school graduates, 6,041 primary school graduates. Of the remainder 6,250 had an understanding of the national language, while 4,437 were illiterate.(440)

All institutions in December 1946 suffered from a lack of facilities. There was an insufficient number of teachers to fulfill the educational program of rehabilitation. Nevertheless, sixteen prisons in 1946 aggregated 2,842 school days with an attendance of 240,595. Courses within the prisons included the Korean language, citizenship, history, geography, mathematics, music, natural science, and sports. Most institutions, however, limited instruction in language, history, citizenship, and mathematics.(441) Illiterate prisoners were given nine hours instruction per week until they could read and write the Korean language.(442) Educational plans to decrease illiteracy among prison inmates and to cope with the rehabilitation problem were given impetus at a conference of chief wardens and chaplains of the prisons held at Seoul on 6 and 7 May 1946.(443)

Turnover of guards in the prisons presented a problem. During 1946, a total of 1,206 guards vacated their positions. Of these, 154 were discharged for administrative reasons, 328 for cause, principally for violation of orders, neglect of duty, and inefficiency; the remaining 724 were transferred, accepted other appointments, or resigned. (444)

To raise standards among prison guards and to increase their efficiency and morale, a prison guard academy (sometimes referred to as a "training school") was established in the fall of 1945. Those qualifying physically and passing a preliminary written examination were admitted to a two-month curs, which was later shortened. Subjects taught included criminal law, Military Government ordinances, the Korean language, history, modern penology, fingerprinting, self-defense, and use of weapons. Classes were conducted at Seoul Prison. From 23 October 1945 to 18 January 1946, sixty-five were graduated. By 20 August 1946 when 95 guards finished the fourth training class of the school, 400 had been trained. (445) During 1946 there were 3,843 applicants for training. Of the 3,751 examined, 1,472 were rejected for physical reasons, and 1,425 eliminated for failure to pass the preliminary written examination; 807 were graduated and assigned duties in the prisons. (446) Between 20 February 1946 and 4 September 1948, a total of 22 classes were held and 3,133 guards graduated, making a grand total of 3,198 during the period of American occupation. (447)

As of 31 May 1948, administrative personnel in the national prisons aggregated 4,165, including 19 wardens, 4 vice-wardens, 145 chief guards, 552 assistant chief guards, 2,848 male and 52 female guards, 14 doctors, and 6 assistant doctors. Chaplains, industrial engineers, work-shop and farm instructors, and other vocational teachers comprised the remainder. (448)

In order to improve operation of the penal institutions a Prison Operating Manual was prepared in July 1947.(449) Brig. Gen. C.S. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor, could on 12 September 1947 declare, "Modern methods of penology are being instituted in Korean prisons."(450) To reduce the large turnover of guard personnel, the Korean Director of Justice authorized the transfer of supervision and control of the Guards Training School to the Penal Bureau proper in June 1948, and at the same time sought increase in their salaries and proposed increases in benefits.(451) Efforts were made to maintain good morale among prisoners through sanitary inspections by the Department of Public Health and Welfare. Proper diet was likewise a matter of concern. The question of prison food came under scrutiny in May and June 1946, when there was a critical shortage at Pusan, Taegu, Kaesong, Andong, Kumchon, and Taejon prisons. The Director of the Department of Justice worked closely with the Food Administration to increase prison rations. A food strike in Seoul Prison resulted in an over-all inspection which brought a more liberal rationing of rice throughout the prisons and improvement in the quality of the food.(452)

From time to time, as a result of prison breaks, studies were made of the physical condition of various prisons. A major break occurred at Westgate Prison the night of 25 October 1945. Other serious breaks were at Mapo on 13 February 1946, at Chonju on 11 November 1946, at Seoul on 24 April 1947, and at Kongju on 30 August 1947.(453) Within a year two breaks each at Chonju, Kongju, and Kwangju prisons resulted in the escape of 600 prisoners. On 11 November 1946, in execution of a carefully prepared plan, a number of prisoners overpowered six guards, one at a time, and incited a prison riot, which led to the escape of 417 of 854 inmates

of the Chonju Prison. The prison lacked proper communication, was without a siren and placed too many prisoners under a single guard. At the outset of the disturbance, guards were inept and did not command obedience. Investigation exposed dereliction and the chief guard was relieved. (454)

At Kongju Prison on 31 August 1947, prisoners seized rifles, overpowered the guards, and 172 escaped. Investigation by the Penal Bureau disclosed "inexcusable carelessness" of the guards who had left their posts. Four were arrested for complicity and 13 investigated. Earlier, (3 March 1946) seven prisoners in the same prison had drilled and sawed their way to freedom. (455)

Inspection revealed lack of prison boxes to cover areas, lack of floodlights, inadequate lighting due to precarious electric supply from outside, and no auxiliary source within for emergency, weak and insecure gates, lack of gate traps, insecure wooden cells and cell-houses with flimsy bars anchored in wood, wooden cell-doors, and insufficient locks. Among other weaknesses in 1946 were low caliber and inexperienced prison guards. Koreans were new on the job, unable to discipline or command respect, and otherwise inefficient. Prisoners were hard to handle and in the early days of the occupation took advantage of Korean mildness contrasted with Japanese severity. Wardens were able to exercise control only by show or arms and constant vigilance. (456)

Fifty prisoners in the Seoul Prison, serving sentences for mobbing the Seoul District Court at the Counterfeit Trial (29 July 1946) rioted on 24 and 25 April 1947 just before the Department of Justice started an investigation of their condition in response to a petition purporting to have come from their families. Although the petition had also been

published in newspapers, it origin remained obscure. Unrest among the prisoners started with a hunger strike, which lasted for a few days, and was followed by loud and riotous singing and shouting. Their behavior showed Communist party ideology and tactics. They yelled loudly for destruction of the "pro-Japanese warden" and "pro-Japanese guards," as they described them. The prison chief guard disciplined them by beating some "lightly" and several "severely." Investigation revealed that the prison was well-managed, corporal punishment employed at the time of the riot to prevent a prison break not excessive under the circumstances, and their grievances in general exaggerated. Recommendations called for a study to improve food, an increase in medical supplies, betterment of hospital facilities, and elimination of brutality on the part of the guards.(457) Inspections continued and special precautions were taken prior to anniversary celebrations or events of national significance when rioting might have been incited. For example, ten large prisons were inspected in February 1948 to prevent possible "breaks" planned to coincide with the 1 March national celebration.(458) Control was tightened and special vigilance exercised for May Dey, National election day, and the inauguration of the Korean Republic (15 August 1948).

Criticism of harsh treatment of prisoners by Korean guards led the Deputy Military Governor to declare at a press conference on 17 January 1947 that "reports of cruel treatment by jailers was much exaggerated," and that "Except for crowded conditions, prisoners are treated very well."(459) Yet, as Americans relinquished more and more of the functions of administration and transferred actual operation to Koreans, prison guards developed a harshness repugnant to Department of Justice legal advisors. One advisor, after many inspection trips from December 1946

to August 1948, observed: "The practice of brutality and cruelty by guards toward prisoners is a Korean habit." The Military Governor ordered American advisors in the Department of Justice not to interfere. Although Americans did not interfere, they felt that Korean treatment of prisoners was unduly harsh." There seemed to be a tendency to imitate the methods of Japanese police and soldiers once Koreans were clothed with authority and enjoyed the exercise of power without interference. Some members of the Korean press thought there was more cruelty by Korean jailers than by Japanese.(460) American observation did not diminish however. In February 1948 a Justice Department advisor reported the use of physical violence by a prosecutor against a prisoner held for trial. When a Korean investigator comfirmed the charge, Korean officials declared that such beatings by prosecutors "never had been and never would be tolerated."(461) Thereupon, the prosecutor was removed from participation in the case.

The guard training school system brought improvement in prison conditions during 1946 and 1947. Conferences of wardens, chaplains, and of guards, together with liaison officer inspections, had a salutary effect. Use of prison labor, establishment of more prison farms, and improvement in vocational training likewise contributed benefits. By 15 October 1947, there were 6 prison farms. A prison educational program had been instituted in each prison, and parole boards established. Road camps were organized in 1947 to relieve overcrowded prisons.(462) Prison industries included tailoring, cloth-weaving, dyeing, knitting, spinning, silk processing, shoe-making, basket-making, paper production, ceramics, woodworking, carpentry, printing, ironworking, stone cutting, and blacksmithing.(463)

On 25 November 1947, Director Kim Byung Ro commended the Seoul Westgate Prison for the excellent output of its workshop and prison industries. This prison, largest and most complete in South Korea, with a population of 4,800, supplied other Korean prisons with clothing and manufactured articles and maintenance services. It operated farms, maintained a stone quarry, and had two prison camps, one at Ascom City with 800 prisoners and one at Suwon with 500. (464)

In January 1948, the prison situation was appraised in an over-all report:

> The prison system of South Korea has been improved constantly in small details from day to day. Lack of building materials and modern facilities discourage bringing the living standards and custody practices up to modern American standards. Yet, under present conditions the Korean prisons compare surprisingly well with many American prisons, and in some instances, actually surpass American institutions. (465)

XII - REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY - SEPARATION OF COURTS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

The intention of Military Government to establish the judiciary as an independent branch of government of equal dignity with the Executive and Legislative branches was a corollary of judicial reorganization. (466) Military Government policy was to reorganize the judicial machinery so it would be independent of executive interference and to make the courts responsible for law enforcement even during the American occupation; to develop a fearless prosecution organization under executive supervision; to establish a well-trained Korean Bar through stronger legal training, bolstered by a National Bar Association with district branches and central council and given expression through the publication of a law journal, together with a stronger national law library and an expeditious court reporting system; to strengthen the democratic law enforcement organization through established rules of court, rules of legal ethics, and rules of penal administration; and finally to coordinate the legal work in the government under one policy of executive control. (467) An office of Attorney General was contemplated to centralize all legal advisory, research, drafting, investigating and similar functions, and to establish within that office the legal representation of the government in the courts.

A committee of 16 Judges, appointed by the Chief Justice, began a study of court reorganization and completed a draft in September 1947 of proposed law to make the courts an independent branch of government. For the next several months conferences between the committee and the American advisor were held to consider the draft. (468) The proposed court reorganization ordinance came before the Legal Drafting Bureau at the end

of April 1948 and was approved and sent to the printer as Ordinance No. 192, 4 May 1948.(469)

Ordinance No. 192, which went into effect on 1 Jne 1948, transferred court administration from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court and reorganized the court system.(470) The Ordinance itself comprised 120 sections grouped into five "books" covering organization of the courts; court officials, conduct of trials, judicial administration, and court budget. Under it the courts had jurisdiction over civil, criminal, administrative, and election cases, and all legal disputes. They controlled non-litigious cases and other matters covered by statute.(471)

Four levels of courts were provided: a Supreme Court, High Courts, District Courts, and the Summary Courts. In addition, juvenile divisions were created. The Supreme Court was empowered to establish up to 40 branch district courts. Justices (dai bop kwon) sat on the Supreme Court and judges (pansa) on other courts. The number of Supreme Court justices was to be fixed by the Statute but not to exceed eleven. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could assign upon resolution of the Council of Justices a judge of a High Court to act temporarily as a justice of the Supreme Court.(472) Likewise judges could be appointed temporarily to a High Court and to District Courts by the Chief Justice.

The Supreme Court was the highest court, presided over by a Chief Justice, who controlled the general affairs of that court and directed and supervised the judicial administration of all courts. As a court of last resort, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the following cases: Sang go appeals* from judgments rendered in the first instance

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* Appeals and other terms herein italicized are Korean technical legal expressions which cannot be translated readily into brief Anglo-American legal terminology.

by a collegiate court of a District Court when the parties to civil cases agreed to waive Kong so appeal, Sang go appeals from judgments rendered by a High Court as a court of first instance or as a court of second instance, and Hang go appeals which were within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by statute.(473) In handing down judgment, the Supreme Court consisted of five justices, except when a Grand Bench judgment was required, at which time all justices exercised the power of the court. The Grand Bench rendered judgments on previous Supreme Court decisions considered improper, and sat on especially important cases.(474) The court operated through civil, criminal, and special divisions. The Council of Justices of the Supreme Court made regulations concerning the appointment, training and education of court officials, and the general affairs of the court. An office of judicial administration in the Supreme Court controlled the administrative affairs of all Korean Courts. Through its judicial training institution, under the supervision of the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court was responsible for the education and training of court officials.(475)

The High Court, similar in rank to the former Court of Review or Court of Appeals, was headed by a chief judge. Judgments were reached by a bench of three judges. The High Court had jurisdiction over the following cases: Sang go appeals from judgments rendered in the first instance by a single judge of a District Court or by a Summary Court, Kong so appeals from judgments rendered by a collegiate court of a District Court, Hang go appeals cases which belonged to it by statute, and other cases alloted by statute. The Seoul High Court had exclusive original jurisdiction of all administrative litigation concerning orders and actions of the executive branch of the national government.

That court also had three divisions similar to the Supreme Court under the supervision of division chiefs, but the chief judge controlled and supervised the administrative affairs of the courts under his jurisdiction. (476)

A chief judge presided over each District Court. Judgment of a District Court or a Branch Court was exercised by a single judge except when collegiate judgement of three judges was required. Nine types of cases required collegiate court judgment: (a) Kong so appeals from judgments rendered by a single judge of a District Court who could not participate in the collegiate court trying a case he had sat on; (b) Kong so appeals from Summary Court judgments; (c) civil cases involving more than ₩500,000; (d) litigation involving personal matters (In sa); (e) cases in which the maximum penalty was death or in which the minimum penalty was imprisonment of penal servitude for life or for not less than one year; (f) cases of accomplices in connection with cases described in (e) when tried at the same time with such cases; (g) administrative litigation except that reserved for other courts; (h) such election litigation placed by statute under the jurisdiction of the District Court; and (i) cases which the council of judges ordered tried before a collegiate court. This court also subdivided into civil, criminal, and special divisions. (477)

The Military Governor (later, the President) appointed all justices and judges. Appointments to the Supreme Court were made from recommendations of a committee consisting of the Chief Justice and his associates, the chief judges of the High Courts, the chief judge of the District Courts, the director and deputy directors of the Department of Justice, the chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court, the chief prosecutors of the

High Courts and District Courts, and the chairmen of bar associations. The council of justices recommended to the Military Governor the appointment of other judges.(478) Tenure of justices and judges was during good behavior or until retirement ages of 70 and 65 respectively.(479)

To maintain a high standard of judicial qualification, Ordinance No. 192 made eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court and of chief judges of the High Courts persons who had been justices, judges or prosecutors for 10 years or more, those who had been lawyers or professors or assistant professors of law for 15 years or more, or those who had a combination of the above experience for 15 years or more.(480) Qualification for judges in the High Courts, chief judges of District Courts, division chief judges of District Courts, and chief judge of juvenile divisions were lowered somewhat under a similar pattern: justices, judges, or prosecutors for 5 years, lawyers or professors or assistant law professors for 8 years, or those who had a combination of the above experience for 8 years. Judges of the District Court and branches including juvenile division and summary court judges to qualify for appointment were required to serve as judicial apprentices for two years or more and had passed a final examination, had been prosecutors, lawyers, professors, or assistant professors of law for two years, or had a combination of the above experience for three years. After they had passed an examination prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court judicial apprentices were appointed by the Chief Justice upon resolution of the Council of Justices. The Supreme Court controlled judicial apprentices.(481)

The court organization Ordinance outlined the conduct of trial in accordance with modern democratic practice which had been developed under

the American occupation. Judicial administration was placed under the Chief Justice with supervision descending to the chief judges in the lower courts.

The Council of Justices, consisting of the Chief Justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court, functioned as the highest deliberative organ of judicial administration. That body recommended appointment, transfer, and retirement of Justices and Judges. It was responsible for the establishment of branch courts, including juvenile divisions, and prescribed regulations of procedure and administration in all courts. Among other functions, the Council appointed technical and clerical personnel. Its over-all control of judicial administration, including responsibility for accounts, budgets, and fiscal matters, was administered by the Office of Judicial Administration under the direction of the Chief Justice. For purposes of decentralization, a council of judges comprising members of the High Courts and District Courts respectively, exercised subordinate administrative control within their jurisdictions. (482)

The court organization of 1 June 1948 retained the Korean Judicial Disciplinary Committee, pending appointment of a new one by the Supreme Court. This Committee to punish prosecutors for dereliction of duty and for conduct detrimental to official dignity had been established (24 January 1948) by Ordinance No. 166. The Committee consisted of the Justice Department Director (as ex-officio chairman), prosecutors, and justice bureau chiefs appointed by the Military Governor. Punishment of practicing lawyers for violations of rules and regulations and for unethical conduct was provided for in Ordinance No. 207 (Law Relating to the Legal Profession), 1 July 1948. The Department of Justice Director appointed the Committee from practicing lawyers and high ranking depart-

(483)
ment officials.

Immediately after the establishment of an independent judiciary, attention was directed toward the prosecution system. An independent judiciary had been the goal of Military Government during the three years of occupation, and every effort was made to develop in the Koreans themselves capacity for the responsibility. From the outset of occupation, critical attention was directed by Americans to expediting trials without infringing due process. Liaison reports and the daily and weekly activities reports of the American legal staff in the Department of Justice revealed constant vigilance in that respect. Instructions to judges and prosecutors disclosed the details involved in the development of the legal processes inextricably linked with prosecutor, judge, and trial. Changes in criminal procedure had been introduced to secure more adequately the right of the people from unlawful arrest and detention. American legal advisors incorporated in Ordinance No. 176, (effective 1 April 1948) a provision analogous to habeas corpus, whereby a person restrained in his body could apply to a court for determination of the legality of this restraint. On 28 March judges and prosecutors met and discussed the enforcement of the changes introduced by the Ordinance. At the same time they discussed the election law which governed the election of representatives to the
(484)
National Assembly set for 10 May.

Establishment of a clearly defined position of the prosecutor culminated in Ordinance No. 213, issued by the Military Governor on 2 August 1948. The purpose was to reorganize the prosecuting system. Mention has been made of the conference in December 1947 between the American department advisors and Korean officials of Justice and Po-

lice Departments concerning revision of directives covering arrests and confinement of individuals.(485)

Three classes of public prosecutor's offices were provided in the Ordinance No. of 2 August 1948, one for each of the three higher level courts. Public prosecutors of all classes were appointed and removed by the Military Governor. Their tenure continued until a specified age of retirement unless guilty of improper conduct of convicted of crime and sentenced to imprisonment or penal servitude.(486) The Director of the Department of Justice had supreme authority in the supervision and control of public prosecutors.(487) According to rank, there were eight prosecutor positions: public prosecutor general, chief public prosecutor, deputy public prosecutor general or deputy chief public prosecutor, division chief public prosecutors, chiefs of each branch of district public prosecutor's offices, chiefs of summary prosecutor's offices, prosecutors, and assistant prosecutors. In criminal cases, a public prosecutor performed four important functions: He investigated the offence and instituted and maintained the indictment; He directed and supervised the police in the investigation of offences; He cited the law to the court, then supervised the execution of judgment. In civil and other cases the public prosecutor exercised such powers and functions as were prescribed by law.(488)

The public prosecutor general directed, supervised, and coordinated the work of public prosecution throughout the country. The functions of other prosecutors descended from him to their jurisdictions within the court system, each prosecutor being subject to his superior in rank.(489) Qualifications for appointment were carefully laid down according to position. Disqualification included persons barred from holding public

office pursuant to law, those sentenced to imprisonment, penal servitude, or heavier penalty, and those discharged from any Korean National Government office by disciplinary action.(490) Apprentice prosecutors and judicial apprentices were potential candidates for future appointment as vacancies arose in the courts.(491)

The lowest level of personnel associated with the courts were the judicial scriveners, persisting from Japanese control, who drew up documents upon request of a party at bar for submission to the court, a public prosecutor's office, or other judicial agency. Jurisdiction over judicial scriveners was transferred from the courts to the Department of Justice by Ordinance No. 195, 18 May 1948, and regulated thereunder.

In retrospect, from August 1948, the courts had been reorganized, the judiciary made independent, work on the codes advanced, and the entire legal structure so organized that it was functioning satisfactorily under Korean jurisdiction. Political development in parallel directions had reached the stage of self-government. After the national election on 10 May 1948, the National Assembly had convened, written a constitution, approved it as the organic law of the Republic of Korea, elected a President, established itself as the interim government, and received approval of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.(492)

The preamble to the constitution of the Republic of Korea, promulgated 12 July 1948, laid down broad principles of justice and humanity, in the name of "We the people:"

> "To consolidate national unite by justice, humanity, brotherly love, and the elimination of all kinds of social evils; to offer equal opportunities to every person; to provide for the fullest development of the equality of each

> individual in all fields of political, economic, social and cultural life; and to permit every person to discharge his duties and responsibilities through labor and exertion and, under the banner of Justice, Humanity and Fraternity, are resolved: to promote the welfare of the people, to maintain permanent international peace, to eliminate all aggressions, despotism and poverty, and thereby assure Security, Liberty and Happiness of ourselves and our posterity. (493)

The constitution established Korea as a Democratic Republic and placed sovereignty in the people from whom all authority emanated. Chapter V dealt with judicial power and the courts whose organization and the qualifications of judges were to be determined by law. An independent judiciary was established with tenure of judges for ten years though they were subject to reappointment according to law. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed by the President subject to confirmation of the National Assembly. The constitutionality of a statute could be questioned and determined by a Constitution Committee, presided over by the Vice President, and composed of five justices of the Supreme Court and five members of the National Assembly who served as associate judges. A two-thirds majority of the Constitution Committee was required to invalidate a statute. (494)

President Rhee Syng Man, shortly after he assumed office, appointed the Director of the Department of Justice, Mr. Kim Byung Ro, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The National Assembly overwhelmingly confirmed the nomination by a vote of 117 to 31. (495) Thus, the Korean who had served consistently as Director of the Department of Justice under United States Military Government was further honored in recognition of his services. Lee In, Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, was then appointed Minister of the Department of Justice.

The third anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese domination, 15 August 1948, was selected as the time for the inauguration of the Korean Republic and the termination of the United States Military Government in Korea. In anticipation of the transfer of government functions from SKIG to the Republic, the Military Governor in a memorandum to the Directorate on 10 August 1948 outlined the policy to be pursued. Prior to transfer, certain agreements were required between USAFIK and the Government of the Republic of Korea, involving transfer of funds, property, facilities, personnel, responsibilities of SKIG, and future American aid and assistance. These negotiations were initiated on 16 August 1948. Provision was made for agreements in respect to the establishment of security forces and the withdrawal of American Military forces in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Korea as of 14 November 1947. In his communication, the Military Governor declared: "The Government of the Republic of Korea will take over a government in full operation with its property, equipment, funds, personnel, functions, and responsibilities. All of its activities and functions must go on without interruption."(496) Ministers of the Republic were invited to confer with the respective directors of the department and offices of SKIG to arrange for the transfer of property, equipment, authority, functions, and responsibility. When the necessary arrangements were consummated, the Military Governor reported to the Commanding General, USAFIK, who announced the specific time at which the authority and functions of the department or office affected were to be transferred to the Republic of Korea.(497)

On 30 August 1948, the American occupation forces and civilian personnel and dependents, were directed to cooperate with Korean law enforcement agencies since they were subject to arrest by those Korean agencies for violations of Korean law. Arrangements were made whereby Korean authorities would not try American offenders in Korean courts but would deliver them to United States Army authorities as quickly as possible. Likewise, American authorities arranged to deliver to Korean law enforcement agencies Koreans taken into American custody for offenses against persons and property of the United States. (498)

The American advisory personnel of Military Government in the Department of Justice were transferred to and functioned under the Civil Affairs Section, USAFIK, beginning 16 August, after USAMGIK ceased to exist. The courts were transferred from SKIG to the Republic of Korea on 11 September 1948, and the Department of Justice thereafter on 13 September, after having been salvaged from collapse, reorganized, Koreanized, and made independently responsible institutions during the space of three years. (499) American legal officers of the former USAMGIK Department of Justice ceased to function on 25 October 1948 when they were relieved of their duties under Civil Affairs Section.

offender I

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Bureau of Justice
Seoul, Korea

BUREAU ORDER
NUMBER 7

17 December 1945

CHANNELS OF AUTHORITY

1. Effective this date greater responsibility will be placed upon the Korean officials and employees of this Bureau and the national institutions directed and supervised by it.

2. Military Government and Korean channels of authority will henceforth be maintained as separate channels.

3. Other than orders issued by the Director through the Associate Director, no orders will be issued by Military Government officers to Korean officials or employees of the Bureau or of the national institutions directed and supervised by it, unless expressly authorized by the Director.

4. Military Government officers of the Bureau will immediately assume the role of observers and advisors. Their duties will be:

a. To keep the Director advised of all developments within the scope of their assignment.

b. When their advice is sought in special situations or when they deem that the interests of Military Government require it, they will advise with the responsible officials of the national institutions. They will not substitute their opinions for the judgment of the responsible officials nor will they interrupt the normal established channels of authority.

c. To expedite the affairs of the Bureau in its relation with other Bureaus which remain under direct Military Government control.

5. The Associate Director will cause all officials and employees (other then Military personnel) through regular channels of authority to comply with the orders of the Director.

6. Orders issued by the Associate Director constitute orders of the Director. Korean officials and employees of the Bureau will promptly comply with all orders of the Associate Director.

BY DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

MATT TAYLOR
Major FA
Director

在朝鮮美國陸軍司令部軍政廳

法務局令第七號

一　本日（一九四五年十二月七日）ヨリ軍大ナル責任ヲ法務局又ハ法務局ノ指揮監督スル國家機關ノ朝鮮人官吏及職員ニ附與ス

二　軍政廳ト朝鮮人ノ命令系統ハ關係ナル系統ヲ取ルモノトス

三　法務局長ガ局長代理ヲ職ジ發令セル命令及法務局長ガ特ニ權限ヲ附與シタル時竝ヲ除外シ如何ナル命令モ軍政廳將校ハ法務局或ハ其ノ指揮監督ノトニアル國家機關ノ官吏及職員ニ發スルヲ得ズ

四　法務局ノ軍政廳將校ハ即時職務及助力者ノ任命ヲ指當ス、其ノ職務ハ左ノ如シ

（イ）各自ノ擔當機構内ニテ聽訴ニ關スル助言ヲ局長ニ指言スル事

（ロ）特別ナル事態ニ關シテ助言ヲ要スル場合又ハ助言ガ軍政廳ノ利益ト認定スル場合ハ國家機關ノ責任官吏ニ助言スル事

（軍政廳將校ハ自己ノ意見ヲ以テ責任官吏ノ判斷ニ代フルヲ得ズ、且ヲ正式ナル命令系統ヲ指藏スルヲ得ズ

（ハ）軍政廳責任下ノ法務局ノ其ノ他ノ局ト關係アル事務ヲ處理セシムル事

五　法務局長代理ハ正式ナル命令系統ヲ經ジ一般軍人ヲ除外シ全官吏、職員ヲシテ法務局長ノ命令ニ服從セシムル事

六　法務局長代理ガ發令シタル命令ハ法務局長ノ命令ヲ構成ス、法務局ノ朝鮮人官吏、職員ハ法務局長代理ノ命令ヲ總ニ服從スル事

一九四五年十二月十七日

軍政廳官ノ指令ニ依リ

法務局長

野砲兵少佐　マツト・テイラー

在朝鮮美國陸軍司令部軍政廳

法務局令第七號

一 本日（一九四五年十二月七日）以後一切軍政廳ニ關スル法務局ニ對スル指揮監督ハ國務機關ノ朝鮮人官吏及職員ニ附集中ス

二 軍政廳ハ朝鮮人ノ命令系統ヲ廢止シ別ニ系統ヲ取ラス

三 法務局長ノ局長代理ヲ置キ又ハ發令セラルル命令及法務局長ノ特ニ權限ヲ附與セラレタル事項ヲ除外スル外如何ナル命令モ軍政廳將校ニシテ法務局ニ屬スル其ノ指揮監督下ニアリ又ハ國家機關ノ官吏又ハ職員ニ發令スルコトヲ得

四 法務局ノ軍政廳將校ハ即時顧問及助力者ノ任務ヲ遂行シ其職務ヲ左ノ如ク行フ

（イ）各自ノ擔當機構內ニ於ケル諮問ニ關シ助言ヲ局長ニ進言スル事

（ロ）特別ナル事態ニ關シ助言ヲ要スル時又ハ助言ノ軍政廳ノ利益ニ於ケル國家機關ノ責任官吏ニ助言ヲ與ヘ軍政廳將校ノ意見ハ責任官吏ノ判斷ヲ代ラシメサル事、且正式ノ命令系統ヲ經由スル事

（ハ）軍政廳直轄下ニアル法務局ノ其他局ニ關係スル事務ヲ促進スル事

五 法務局長代理ヲ正式ノ命令系統ヲ經テ一般軍人ヲ除外スル外一切ノ官吏、職員ヲシテ法務局長命令ニ服從セシムル事

六 法務局長代理ヲ發令セラルル命令ヲ法務局長ノ命令ヲ構成シ、法務局ノ朝鮮人官吏、職員ヲ法務局長代理ノ命令ニ遵守服從セシムル事

一九四五年十二月十七日

軍政長官指令ニ依リ

法務局長

陸軍少佐 ●●●・●●●●

APPENDIX I / CHANNELS OF AUTHORITY

~~Department~~ Bureau of Justice ~~Bureau~~

Bureau Order No. 7, 17 December 1945

1. Effective this date greater responsibility will be placed upon the Korean officials and employees of this Bureau and the national institutions directed and supervised by it.

2. Military Government and Korean channels of authority will henceforth be maintained as separate channels.

3. Other than orders issued by the Director through the Associate Director, no orders will be issued by Military Government officers to Korean officials or employees of the Bureau or of the national institutions directed and supervised by it, unless expressly authorized by the Director.

4. Military Government officers of the Bureau will immediately assume the role of observers and advisors. Their duties will be:

a. To keep the Director advised of all developments within the scope of their assignment.

b. When their advice is sought in special situations or when they deem that the interests of Military government require it, they will advise with the responsible officials of the national institutions. They will not substitute their opinions for the judgment of the responsible officials nor will they interrupt the normal established channels of authority.

c. To expedite the affairs of the Bureau in its relation with other Bureaus which remain under direct Military Government control.


5. The Associate Director will cause all officials and employees (other than Military personnel) through regular channels of authority to comply with the orders of the Director.

6. Orders issued by the Associate Director constitute orders of the Director. Korean officials and employees of the Bureau will promptly comply with all orders of the Associate Director.

APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

20 June 1946




Above Chart taken from USAMGIK Manual of Military Government, Organization, and Function, page 52, revised as of 20 June 1946.

APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

20 June 1946

(USAMGIK, MANUAL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS)



above chart taken from USAMGIK Manual of Military Government Organization and Function, p 52, revised as of 20 June 46.

APPENDIX III

ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS

IN KOREA

1. The protection of personal rights under occupation established in SCAP Proclamation No. 1, 7 September 1945.

2. Detention of individuals without specific criminal charges prior to trial and punishment without lawful trial and conviction prohibited by USAFIK OMG General Order No. 5, Section III, 18 September 1945; Ordinance No. 11, 9 October 1945.

3. Repeal of oppressive and discriminatory laws by USAFIK OMG General Order No. 5, 18 September 1945 and Ordinance No. 11, 9 October 1945.

4. Protection against racial or religious discrimination in Ordinance No. 6, Section III, 29 September 1945.

5. Protection of education in the interest of Korea by Ordinance No. 6, Section V, 29 September 1945.

6. Freedom under Military Government stated by the Commanding General, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, 16 October 1945.

7. Protection of general welfare by Ordinance No. 19, 30 October 1945.

8. Registration of publishers to preserve freedom of the press by Ordinance No. 19, Section VI, 30 October 1945.

9. National defense of the rights of the people against civil disorder in the maintenance of freedom of religion, of speech, and of property by Ordinance No. 28, 13 November 1945.

10. Honor to patriots in reference to liberty and human rights, 1 March 1946, in Holiday Declaration No. 2, 21 February 1946.

11. Regulation of political parties by Ordinance No. 55, 25 February 1946.

12. Licensing of newspapers specifying cause for revocation, but not for freedom of expression of views, by Ordinance No. 88, 29 May 1946.

13. Establishment of Seoul University and prohibition of discriminations for admission on account of race, nationality, religion, sex, caste or economic position, by Ordinance No. 102, 22 August 1946.

14. Establishment of KILA - members not to be questioned for utterances during debate in any other place - election and selection of membership - Ordinance No. 118, 24 August 1946.

15. Establishment of SKIG and consequent shift of government responsibilities to Koreans preparatory to achievement of independent government, by Ordinance 141, 17 May 1947.

16. Establishment of Korean as official language of SKIG, 1 July 1947, by Executive Order No. 4, 28 June 1947.

17. Law for the Election of Members of the Korean Interim Assembly, Public Act No. 5, 3 September 1947; Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People (rules, regulations, and procedure), Ordinance No.175, 17 March 1948, and Regulations for Implementing the Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, Election By Law, 22 March 1948.

18. Changes in the criminal procedure provided to secure more adequately the right of the people to freedom from unlawful arrest and detention, and a form of habeas corpus established by Ordinance 176, 20 March 1948, supplemented by Ordinance No. 180, 31 March 1948.

19. Special War Time Legal Procedure Ordinance repealed by Ordinance No. 181, 1 April 1948, and the judicial system returned to normal procedure.

20. Proclamation of Commanding General on the Rights of the Korean People, 5 April 1948, for establishment of a National Government of Korea - a Korean Bill of Rights.

21. Repeal of certain obsolete laws, including Act Prohibiting Political Meeting, Inflammatory Document Controlling Ordinance, Korean Temporary Peace Order(Japanese), and Offenses Against United States Military Government, by Ordinance No. 183, 8 April 1948.

22. Proclamation of Commanding General on the National Assembly, 25 May 1948.

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9. National defense of the rights of the people against civil disorder in the maintenance of freedom of religion, of speech, and of property by Ordinance No. 28, 13 November 1945.

10. Regulation of political parties by Ordinance No. 55, 23 February 1946.

11. Licensing of newspapers specifying cause for revocation, but not for freedom of expression of views, by Ordinance No. 88, 29 May 1946.

12. Establishment of Seoul University and prohibition of discriminations for admission on account of race, nationaltiy, religion, sex, caste or economic position, by Ordinance No. 102, 22 August 1946.

Insert:

Under #17, Appendix III, add the following:

; Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People (rules, regulations, and procedure), Ordinance No. 175, 17 March 1948, and Regulations for Implementing the Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, Election By-Law, 22 March 1948.

APPENDIX IV

PROCLAMATION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

Official Gazette, USAMGIK Proclamation 5 April 1948

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

PROCLAMATION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

TO THE PEOPLE OF KOREA:

In view of the forthcoming historic elections to be held under observance of THE UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA to choose representatives of the Korean people with whom the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of freedom and independence of the Korean people, which representatives, constituting a national assembly, may establish a national government of Korea, it is deemed appropriate, in order to assure a free atmosphere, to enumerate the inherent liberties of the Korean people who will take part in such elections.

1. All persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection under the law, and no privileges of sex, birth, occupation or creed are recognized, the only exceptions admissible being those recognized by international law.

2. Personal liberty is inviolable, and any limitations upon it are not permissible, except by virtue of law duly enacted and promulgated.

3. Dwellings are inviolable, and the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure shall not be violated, and such seizures and search may take place only be virtue of provisions of the law.

4. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and without procedure prescribed by law.

5. No punishment may be imposed, except by virtue of the law in force at the time the act in question was committed.

6. Persons who had been arrested for the commission of any offense or otherwise deprived of their liberty, have the legal right to be promptly informed on what grounds such deprivation has been committed and by what authority, and they are entitled to the services of counsel.

7. All persons accused of crime shall be placed on trial without

APPENDIX IV

PROCLAMATION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

unreasonable delay and entitled to bail as provided by law. Cruel and unusual punishment may not be inflicted, and confessions induced by torture and duress of any kind are inadmissible in trial of offenders or legal proceedings of any kind.

8. Freedom of assembly and association, as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are recognized, including the use of all types of campaign handbills and wall posters; provided they are not inflammatory to the extent of inciting disorders or overthrow of government.

9. The rights of meeting and forming associations shall be regulated by law. All citizens and groups of citizens have the right to petition the government and all organs thereof for a redress of grievances.

10. All religions are equal before the law and there is freedom of religious practice not contrary to public order or morality. There is no state church, and the principle of separation of church and state is established.

11. Property rights are recognized, and any restrictions placed upon them may result only from law; expropriation for public use may take place only on payment of reasonable compensation adjudicated by an appropriate tribunal determined by law.

12. The rights hereinbefore enumerated may be suspended, but only temporarily and if necessary, only for reasons of grave national emergency or public safety.

Given under my hand at Seoul, Korea, on 5 April 1948.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commanding

S E A L

14. Establishment of KILA - members not to be questioned for utterances during debate in any other place - election and selection of membership - Ordinance No. 118, 24 August 1946.

~~11~~. Honor to patriots in reference to liberty and human rights, 1 March 1946, in Holiday Declaration No. 2, 21 February 1946.

15. Establishment of SKIG and consequent shift of government responsibilities to Koreans preparatory to achievement of independent government, by Ordinance 141, 17 May 1947.

16. Establishment of Korean as official language of SKIG, 1 July 1947, by Executive Order No. 4, 28 June 1947.

17. Law for the Election of Members of the Korean Interim Assembly, Public Act No. 5, 3 September 1947.

18. Changes in the criminal procedure were provided to secure more adequately the right of the people to freedom from unlawful arrest and detention, and a form of habeas corpus was established by Ordinance 176, 20 March 1948, supplemented by Ordinance No. 180, 31 March 1948.

19. Special War Time Legal Procedure Ordinance was repealed by Ordinance No. 181, 1 April 1948, and returned the judicial system to normal procedures.

20. Proclamation of Commanding General on the Rights of the Korean People, 5 April 1948, for establishment of a National Government of Korea - a Korean Bill of Rights.

21. Repeal of certain obsolete laws, including Act Prohibiting Political Meeting, Inflammatory Document Controlling Ordinance, and Korean Temporary Peace Order, by Ordinance No. 183, 8 April 1948.

22. Proclamation of Commanding General on the National Assembly, 25 May 1948.

APPENDIX V

STATISTICS ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE KOREAN COURTS, 1946 AND 1947*

attached tables I - X

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* MGJUS, Hq USAMGIK Dept Justice, to National Economic Board, 21 July 48, sub: Monthly Report of Activities, Department of Justice, July 1948, e(4) Court Liaison Activities, Charts I-X. See fn 268.

APPENDIX V

STATISTICS ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE KOREAN COURTS, 1946 AND 1947*

Attached Tables I - X

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* MGJUS, HQ USAMGIK Dept Justice, to National Economic Board, 21 July 48, sub: Monthly Report of Activities, Department of Justice, July 1948, e(4) Court Liaison Activities, Charts I-X. See fn 268.

Chart I- Civil Cases Heard in Appellate Courts of Korea

1946	PENDING		TOTAL	SETTLED						UNSETTLED	
	At start of yr.	Started During yr.		Judgment			With-drawn	Aban-doned	TOTAL	Awaiting Hearing	TOTAL
				Dismissed	Reversed	Others					
Supreme Court	29	116	145	85	22	10	1	1	119	26	26
Seoul Appeal Ct.	3	49	52	16	12	5	4	4	38	14	14
Taegu Appeal Ct.	14	120	134	14	4	33	8		59	75	75
TOTAL	46	285	331	115	38	48	10	5	216	115	115

CHART II

1947											
Supreme Court	26	425	451	107	38	52	4		201	249	250
Seoul Appeal Ct.	14	77	91	55	13	11	1	4	84	7	7
Taegu Appeal Ct	75	292	367	104	55	79	12		250	117	117
TOTAL	115	794	909	266	106	142	17	4	535	373	374

①

Supreme Court																			
	Cases	7	138	145	7			2		1	6	2	90	5	113	32			
	Persons	7	261	268	16			2		4	14	2	164	10	213	55			
Seoul Appeal Court																			
	Cases	33	437	470	45	28	7	23	1	1	5		229	47	386	84			
	Persons	53	639	692	64	42	8	35	1	2	5		333	75	565	127			
Taegu Appeal Court																			
	Cases	6	335	341	12	17	3	10	1	2	17		137	27	206	115			
	Persons	6	477	483	13	26	3	17	1	2	21		190	34	307	176			
Total																			
	Cases	46	910	956	64	45	10	35	2	4	28	2	456	79	[illegible]	231			
	Persons	66	1377	1443	93	68	11	55	2	8	40	2	687	119	1085	358			

CHART IV

Courts – 1947

Supreme Court																			
	CASES	32	191	223	10	4		2		2	11	4	118	4	155	68			
	PERSONS	55	499	554	19	11		3		2	35	4	265	8	347	207			
SEOUL																			
Seoul Appeal Court																			
	Cases	84	438	522	38	52	7	15			2	1	212	41	368	154			
	Persons	127	627	754	57	69	8	24			8	15	307	53	541	213			
Taegu Appeal Court																			
	cases	115	254	369	14	21	18	30		2	16		153	15	269	100			
	Persons	176	355	531	16	33	24	55		2	24		226	20	400	131			
Total																			
	cases	231	883	1114	62	77	25	47		4	29	5	483	60	792	322			
	Persons	358	1481	1839	92	113	32	82		4	67	19	798	81	1288	551			

60

+ Justice Dept covered in a total of 725.

Litigated Cases in All Trial Courts - Civil Cases

Chart V	Pending At Beginning of Yr.	Started During Yr.	Total	Settled Judgment: Contested	Default	With Our Pleading	Withdrawn	Abandoned	Others	Total	Unsettled: Awaiting Hearing	Interrupted	Suspended	Total
1946	1002	11,060	12,062	1,202	2,801	31	2,805	1,378	289	8,506	3,155	✓	399	3,556
Chart VI														
1947	3556	15,457	19,013	2,662	4,558	51	4,771	~~654~~ 2922	654	15,018	3,506	✓	487	3,995

Von. Litigated Cases Heard in all Trial Courts

CHART VII	Pending At Beginning Yr.	Started During Yr.	Total	Settled	Unsettled
1946	403	24,226	24629	23,948	681
Chart VIII					
1947	716	37,421	38,137	36,593	1,544

Criminal Cases — Tried in ALL TRIAL COURTS

Violation of the Criminal Law

Chart IX 1946	Pending At Beginning of Yr.	Pending Started During Yr.	Total	Settled	Unsettled
No. Cases	836	19,468	20,304	18,969	1,335
No. Persons	1,309	30,619	31,928	29,290	2,638
				Violation of Special Order	
No. Cases	63	8,836	8,899	8,356	543
No. Persons	248	11,844	12,092	11,045	1,047
Total Cases	899	28,304	29,203	27,325	1,878
Persons	1557	42,463	44,020	40,335	3,685

← FIRST + CRIMINAL CASES — TRIED IN ALL TRIAL COURTS
← VIOLATION of CRIMINAL LAW

Chart X 1947	PENDING At Beginning of Yr	PENDING started During yr.	TOTAL	SETTLED ↑	UNSETTLED ↑
No. Cases	1,335	16,227	17,562	15,815	1,747
No. Persons	2,638	24,300	26,938	24,083	2,855
	VIOLATION of SPECIAL ORDER				
No. Cases	543	12,834	13,377	12,689	688
No. Persons	1047	18,905	19,952	18,460	1,492
TOTAL CASES	1,878	29,061	30,939	28,504	2,435
PERSONS	3,685	43,205	46,890	42,543	4,347

Abbreviations

SEAP

CINCFE

CINC USAFPAC

CRS

OFT

USAFIK

USAMGIK

SKIC

KIKIT

etc

Consider as additions to
[redacted] in chronological
arrangement:

(1) The United Nations Temporary Committee on Korea -

(a) appointed elections, when?

(b) appointed Nat'l Assembly + Government

when?

(2) When General Hodge was relieved by USAFIK CG + Maj Gen John Coulter was appt'd CG?

(3) Query - when did KILA dissolve?

May —?

Cross Ref in footnotes re pages to be watched when renumbered

fn	Refers to:
125.	pp 69, 70
145.	Text fn, p 27
203.	pp 17-20
206.	p. 18
211	p. 34
212.	p 83
432.	p 137
466.	pp 45, 54

59
p~~21~~ - Text fn to p 121 - Typ Claims

407 - " " p 29, 106

Queries - FA

FA #65 - - July 48, Intell of Talk ? (Say)

#492 - (For info in FA)

① When (day) was KLA dissolved?

② When did UNTCOK offer Korean govt Amnesty after election?

③ When was Gen Hodge relieved? ? Aug 48

Gen Coulter appt'd CG? ? Aug

Tactical Sept 45 - June 46

FOOTNOTES
CHAP Z

1. CHQ AFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea After Surrender or Collapse, edition 3, 8 Aug 45; M/S Hist USAPIK, Part I, ch I, Mission and Movement to Objective, pp 3,4 (ch I cited hereafter as Mis and Mvt to Obj).

2. M/S Hist USAPIK, Part I, ch I, Mis and Mvt to Obj, n 9 therein.

3. CHQ USAPPAC Operations Instructions No. 4, 2-a, 15 Aug 45.

4. Rad SCAP to CG XXIV Corps, 191045/Z; see also, m/s Hist USAPIK, op cit, ch I, Mis and Mvt to Obj, p 25.

5. M/S Hist USAPIK, op cit, Ch I, p 25.

6. M/S The Machinery of Military Government (hereafter cited as m/s Mach Mil Govt), ch VI, pp 10-15, citing interv with Major Wayne Estes, former 10th Army Ex Off, 10 Oct 45, and interv with Col B.E. Prescott, 30 Nov 45.

7. Ibid, p 11.

8. Ibid, p 15.

9. M/S Hist USAPIK, Part I, ch I, Mis and Mvt to Obj, p 64.

10. HQ USAPIK General Order No. 1, 27 Aug 45 (General Orders cited hereafter as GO).

11. Ibid, GO No. 2, par 2, 3, 28 Aug 45.

12. HQ USAPPAC Annex No. 10 to Operations Instructions No. 4, par 2c, 27 Aug 45.

13. Field Order 55 XXIV Corps, 2a(9), 28 Aug 45 (Field Order cited hereafter as FO).

14. Annex 7 to FO 55, XXIV Corps, 1b(3), 29 Aug 45 (cited hereafter and Annex 7 to FO 55).

15. Ibid, 1b(4).

16. Ibid, 1d.

17. Ibid, 3c.

18. Ibid, 12.

19. Appendix 3 to Annex 4 to FO 55, Sec II, 4f, 29 Aug 45.

20. Annex 7 to FO 55, 6, 29 Aug 45.

21. M/S Mach Mil Govt, loc cit, p 15; Annex 7 to FO 55.

22. M/ S Mach Mil Govt, loc cit, p 16.

23. Appendix 3 to Annex 4 to FO 55, sec II, 4d, 29 Aug 45.

24. Annex 7 to FO 55, 4a,4b, 29 Aug 45.

25. M/S Hist USAFIK, op cit, ch III, Intermezzo, summarizes the situation with documentary and other citations and references.

26. Ibid, p 29 for quote; see also pp 5-8,28-32 for sources to this paragraph.

27. Ibid, pp 6-8.

28. Ibid, pp 28,29.

29. Ibid, p 13.

30. Ibid, pp 13,14.

31. Ibid, p 16.

32. Ibid, p 16.

33. M/S Hist USAFIK, op cit, ch I, Mis and Mvt to Obj, p 51.

34. Ibid, pp 51,52.

35. Ibid, p 58.

36. Ibid, pp 68-70.

37. Ibid, p 71.

38. M/S Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch III, Intermezzo, pp 15,16.

39. Ibid, pp 10,11.

40. Ibid, pp 9,11.

41. Letr, CINCAFPAC to CG XXIV Corps, Occupation of Korea, 29 Aug 45, quoted in M/s Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch I, Mis and Mvt to Obj, pp 60,61; the Cairo Declaration, 1 Dec 43; the Potsdam Declaration, par 8: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out," 26 July 45.

42. Potsdam Declaration, par 10, 26 July 45.

43. The Surrender Instrument, par 5, 2 Sept 45.

44. Ibid, par 8.

45. M/S Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch IV, The Surrender and the Beginning of Occupation, p 9 et seq. For procedure and manner of effecting surrender in Korea, see ibid, ch I, Mis and Mvt to Obj.

46. M/S Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch IV, p 17.

47. Ibid, ch IV, p 16 referring to Rad CINCAFPAC Adv to CG XXIV Corps, 111641/I Sept 45.

48. Ibid, ch Iv, pp 17,18, citing Rad CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC Adv 120955 Sept 45.

49. Hq USAFIK GO No. 7, sec I, II, 12 Sept 45.

50. Ibid, sec III; see also, m/s Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch IV, p 19; m/s Mach Mil Govt, p 23; Hq USAFIK GO No. 2, 14 Sept 45.

51. Hq USAFIK GO No. 7, sec IV, 12 Sept 45.

52. Hq USAFIK OMG, GO No. 8, 14 Sept 45; ibid, GO No. 2, 14 Sept 45; m/s Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch IV, p 19, citing radio CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, I41057/Z Sept 45.

53. M/S Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch IV, pp 20,21; Proclamations, GHQ USAFPAC, No. 1, 7 Sept 45; No. 2, 7 Sept 45; No. 3, 7 Sept 45.

54. M/S Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch Iv, pp 21, 22.

55. Ibid, ch IV, pp 41-46.

56. Ibid, ch IV, pp 41,44,33 et seq.

57. Ibid, ch V, Release of Allied Prisoners of War; ch VI, The Occupation of the Provinces; ch VII, Evacuation and Demilitarization of Japanese Military Forces. Other activities appear under appropriate titles in the History of USAMGIK.

58. M/S Hist USAFIK, Part I, op cit, ch II, Korea Prior to Japanese Surrender, pp 24-27; A.J. Grajdanzev: Modern Korea (1944), ch XIV, Courts, Prisons, Police (cited hereafter as Grajdanzev).

59. Interv, Hist Sec Representative, M/Sgt Wilbur L. Knickmeyer, with Capt John P. Gardner, formerly Off in charge Civil Affairs Dept, 12 Mar 46 (

fn 59 continued next page

59 (continued).

(filed in Hist Sec G-2, Hq XXIV Corps); interv, same with Maj George A. Anderson, Bu Justice Ex Off, 25 Mar 46 (filed in Hist Sec G-2, cited); letr, Hq USAFIK, OMG, Dir Bu Justice to Provincial Legal Officers, 7 Dec 45, re trained personnel for courts (filed, USAMGIK Dept Justice). Other citations appear hereafter.

60. Ibid; see mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, Assoc Dir Bu Justice, before Provincial Legal Officers' Conference, Seoul, 7 Mar 46 (hereafter ~~to be referred to~~ as mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim); m/s Hist USAMGIK, Part II, Sept 45-June 46, p 128 summarizes M/Sgt Wilbur L. Knickmeyer, First Information & Hist Serv, rough draft on "Justice", based on interviews cited therein; SCAP Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 3,6,11 (Hereafter referred to as SCAP Summation, according to No.)

61. Grajdanzev: pp 250, 251.

62. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 37.

63. Grajdanzev: p 252.

64. Ibid, 252, 254.

65. Based on information made available at USAMGIK Dept Justice in process of compilation: Japanese body of law at time of Instrument of Surrender, to be used in historical account of legal processes at time of American occupation - interv, Mr. B. Stockton, G-2 Hist Sec, XXIV Corps, with Mr. Kurt M. Falk, USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Off July 48 (Interviews of Mr. Stockton hereafter referred to as interv, Stockton).

66. Grajdanzev: p 250.

67. Mimeo address: Dr. Ernst Fraenkel, USAMGIK Dept Justice Chief of Legal Research Bureau, "Civil Law and Codes" before Natl Legal Conf, Seoul, 8 Mar 46.

68. SKIG Activities No. 26, Nov 47, sec V, par 2,b; Grajdanzev: ch XIV, Courts, Prisons, Police. The Police Affairs Department had charge of organization, administration, regulation, and disposition of police personnel, supplies and liaison between police and military forces. The Peace Preservation Department had jurisdiction over secret police, labor, and "thought control", concerned chiefly with political matters to detect, suppress, and obliterate "dangerous thoughts". The Defense Department handled matters concerned with air attack, fire, and flood. The Economic Department enforced governmental decrees affecting arbitrary licensing powers with corresponding suspensions and revocations. The Censorship Department scrutinized printed publications, phonograph records, films, and controlled the radio. The Health Department of the police had jurisdiction over public sanitation from inspection of cafes to houses of prostitution, from

68 (continued).

barberships to abbatoirs, and licensed doctors, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, with jurisdiction over hospitals, veterinarians, quarantines, and burials.

69. See chapter on Police Department in History of USAMGIK.

70. This observation on the Force of Law under U.S. Military Occupation has been abstracted principally from a m/s study prepared by Dr. Ernst Fraenkel, Chief of USAMGIK Dept Justice Legal Research Bureau and Special Advisor to the US-USSR Joint Commission and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea; "Structure of U.S. Military Government in Korea", transmitted [redacted] to Hq XXIV Corps, G-2 Hist Sec by Brig Gen John Weckerling, 22 May 48. When citation of ordinances, orders, and other sources are not made, the information is generally known or documentary sources either appear previously or will appear subsequently in the narrative.

71. Radio, Incoming Message from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff), W92156 (170832) True too 152059Z, to CINCAFPAC (MacArthur), CG XXIV Corps, received 19 Feb 47, 3a: "However, it is the position of the United States that in general Japanese property in Korea should inure to the benefit of the Korean people."

72. MG Press Release, item 1, Lt Gen John R. Hodge statement, 16 Oct 45.

73. GHQ USAFPAC Proclamation No. 1, 7 Sept 45; ibid, Proclamation No. 2, 7 Sept 45.

74. Hq USAFIK, G-0 No. 1, 4 Jan 46 (refers Radio, GHQ USAFPAC CAX 56407, DTG: 270631/Z Dec 45).

75. [redacted] Ordinance No. 11, 9 Oct 45.

76. Ordinance No. 3, 29 Sept 45, and Ordinance No. 5, 29 Sept 45.

77. Ordinance No. 21, 2 Nov 45.

78. Ibid, sec I, Retention of Laws,

79. USAMGIK Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 7, 17 Dec 45, in which Americans in Bu Justice became advisors and observers; Bureau Order No. 8, 17 Dec 45; USAMGIK Removal Order No. 101, 28 Mar 47, retroactive 15 Feb 47.

80. Ordinance No. 118, 24 Aug 46. KILA convened 12 Dec 46.

81. Ordinance No. 141, 17 May 47.

82. Ordinance No. 8, 1 Oct 45 (Property Custody Section established); Ordinance No. 33, 6 Dec 45 (Title of Japanese property vested in military Government).

83. Ordinance No. 2, 25 Sept 45.

84. Ordinance No. 103, 31 Aug 46, amended by Ordinance No. 125, 1 Nov 46.

85. Letr Directive, Hq USAMGIK OMG, 31 Mar 47, sub: Creation of Advisory Board on vested Property.

86. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 8,9.

87. Mimeo address; Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit; Maj Emery J. Woodall: m/s History of Reorganization of Administration of Justice, undated, but circ Nov 45 (hereafter ~~referred to~~ as Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice). Filed in G-2 Hist Sec, Hq XXIV Corps. — cited

88. Hq USAFIK, OMG, Appointment No. 3, 29 Sept 45.

89. Ibid, Appointment No. 37, 21 Nov 45 (effective 20 Nov).

90. Hq USAMGIK, OMG, Appointment No. 83, 2 Apr 46; Removal No. 88, par 8, 8 June 46; m/s Hist USAMGIK, Part II, period Sept 45-June 46, ch IV, L, Departments - Justice, par 4, also ch VII, Office and Department Heads, p 233.

91. OMG, Appointment No. 99, 8 June 46 (effective 23 May 46); m/s Hist USAMGIK, Part II, op cit, [redacted] ch IV.

92. Mimeo address; Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit; m/s "Justice", rough copy by M/Sgt W.L. Knickmeyer and footnotes; letr, Hq USAFIK OMG, Civil Administrator to Dir all Bureaus, Secys of Secretariat, Provinicial Governors, & CO MG Teams, Nov 45, sub: Investigation and Punishment of Criminal Acts by Japanese officials.

93. Mimeo address; Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit, p 1.

94. USAFIK, XXIV Corps, Press Release, 15 Oct 45; SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 38.

95. Letr, Hq USAFIK, Dir Bu Justice to Lt Col Seddon, [redacted] 29 Sept 45, sub: Report of Work for Week ending 29 Sept 45, par 2 (filed Central Files "Dept Justice, 18 Oct-29 Dec 45" in spite of report date); SCAP Summation No. 1, op cit, part V, sec 1, par 38.

96. Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice, pp 1,2; interv, M/Sgt W.L. Knickmeyer, Hist Sec, with Capt John B. McKeel, Bu Justice Ex Off, 17 Oct 45 (filed XXIV Corp G-2 Hist Sec); SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 38.

97. SCAP Summation No. 1, op cit, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 2,3,11,37.

98. Mimeo address; Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit; Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice.

99. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 6,9,10,11,38.

100. Ibid, par 50,51.

101 Mimeo letr 322 (MG TMG) Hq USAFIK OMG, Organization of Military Government, Government General, 29 Sept 45.

102. Letr, Bu Justice Historian, Capt Charles W. Runyan, to Dir Bu Justice, sub: History of Bureau of Justice, Government of Korea, under American Military Government, 20 Nov 45 to 13 Dec 45, with accompanying chart (hereafter referred to as Runyan; letr, Hist Bu Justice).

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid, par 8; Ordinance No. 7, 1 Oct 45.

105. Interv, Stockton with Mr. Kurt M. Falk, USAFIK, CAS Dept Justice (formerly USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Off), 5 Oct 48.

106. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 12.

107. Ibid, par 18, 22.

108. Ordinance No. 29, 16 Nov 45.

109. Hq USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice Bar Admission Order No. 1, 14 Nov 45; Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice; M/Sgt Knickmeyer, rough draft "Justice", op cit; Hq USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice Bureau Notice No. 1, 1 Nov 45; ibid, [redacted] OMG Appointment No. 9, sec I, Bu Justice Appointment, 9 Oct 45.

110. Hq USAFIK OMG, Appointment No. 9, sec II, Concerning other Employment and Dismissals.

111. Runyan; letr, Hist Bu Justice, see personnel list.

112. Ordinance No. 20, 30 Oct 45.

113. Ordinance No. 42, sec II, 14 Jan 46 (effective 18 Jan).

114. Hq USAFIK OMG, GO No. 5, sec I, par 1, 18 Sept 45. The laws repealed were: (1) The Act of Punishing Political Convicts enacted 15 April 1919 to prevent Koreans from attempting any political change; (2) the Preliminary Imprisonment Act, 15 May 1941, for supervision and subsequent imprisonment of a political convict whose term of penal servitude had expired; (3) Act of Preserving Public Order, 8 May 1925, to sustain Japanese Monarchy, prohibit secret communist organizations, and prevent Koreans from making any attempt of independent movement; - so applied, together with the Preliminary Imprisonment Act, to keep Koreans, held for political activity, in prison even after punishment was over; (4) Act of Publication, February 1910, requiring every Korean wishing to publish a book or magazine to submit a written manuscript to the Governor General through the Provincial Governor in order to obtain a permit, the same being required of a revised edition of slight change; (5) the Decree for the Protection of Political Convicts, 12 December 1936, which applied to convicts who, while violating the Act of Preserving Public Order, were watched in suspicion for two years or more, and in the application of which Koreans were kept in prison under the suspicion

114 (continued).

of political movement for independence; and (6) the Act of the Shrine which attempted to impose Shintoism, require semi-compulsory attendance, and make Koreans submit to the spirit of Japan. See Hq USAFIK OMG, GO No. 5, sec I, a-f, 18 Sept 45, and Hq USAFIK OMG, Mmeo: Explanation of Laws Enumerated in General Order No. 5, etc., 17 Sept 45.

115. Hq USAFIK OMG, GO No. 5, [redacted], sec II.

116. Ibid, sec III, par 2. This paragraph was amended by Ordinance No. 50, 16 Feb 46, to read: "The punishment of any person without lawful trial and conviction is prohibited."

117. GO No. 5, [redacted], sec III, par 1.

118. Ordinance No. 11, 9 Oct 45, reproduced GO No, 5 in its entirety with the added abolition of summary judicial power of police chiefs.

119. Ordinance No. 19, sec I, Declaration of National Emergency, 30 Oct 45.

120. Ibid, secs II, III, IV, V.

121. Ordinance No. 21, 2 Nov 45.

122. OMG, "Your Military Government - Present and Future", 1, General Principles and Policies, 12 Nov 45.

123. Ibid, 2, General Problems.

124. Interv, Stockton with Mr. Albert Lyman, [redacted] USAMGIK Dept Justice Legal Advisor, 17 Aug 48; USAMGIK Dept Justice, [redacted] Liaison Officer, Maj Frank B. Banzet, m/s Functions of Court and Prison Liaison Office Bureau of Justice (summary of remarks) before National Conf of [redacted] Provincial Legal Officers, Seoul, 7-9 Mar 46. ~~(filed USAMGIK Dept Justice)~~

125. See hereinafter under Courts, liaison officers, pp 69-70.

126. OMG, "Your Military Government - Present and Future", 3, The Government-General Replacement Plan, 12 Nov 45.

127. Ibid.

128. Runyan: letr, Hist Bu Justice.

129. Letr, OMG Planning Sec, Chief Inspector, Maj Harold E. Keller, to Mil Governor, 14 Dec 45, sub: Report of Inspection of Bureau of Justice, sec VI, par 23.

130. Ibid, secs I-IV.

131. Ibid, sec VI.

132. Letr, USAMGIK OMG, Bu Justice Ex Off (Maj George A. Anderson), to Off of Civil Administrator, dtd 19 Jan 46, sub: Report of Inspection of Bureau of Justice.

133. MG Press Release, item 1, 16 Oct45; Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 7, 17 Dec 45.

134. SCAP Summation No. 4, Jan 46, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 21; HQ USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 7, 17 Dec 45. See Appendix I.

135. Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 8, 17 Dec 45.

136. [redacted] MG Press Release, item 3, 18 Dec 45.

137. MG Press Release, item 4, 21 Dec 45.

138. Hq USAFIK OMG, Appointment No. 56, par 2, 24 Dec 45 (effective 10 Dec); see also Mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit.

139. Memorial from Seoul Bar Association to Bureau of Justice, 1 Dec 45, signed Lee Hong Chong, Pres (filed in Central Files folder, "Dept Justice, 18 Oct-29 Dec 45").

140. Letr, from Chief Justice, Chief Prosecutor, & Pres, Bar Association of Seoul, to CG XXIV Corps, Mil Governor, & Dir Bu Justice, 22 Dec 45, sub: Opposition to Appointment, Dr. Kim Young H., Acting Director Bureau of Justice (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice); letr, USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice Ex Off, 28 Dec 45, sub: Comments of Bureau of Justice re: Recommendation for Appointment of Acting Director of Bureau of Justice (filed, USAMGIK Dept Justice).

141. Hq USAMGIK Dept Pub Info, Special Press Release, 17 May 46. Deputy Directors appointed at the time were never confirmed by the Military Governor, but served on a per diem basis (interv, Stockton with Mr. K.M. Falk, USAFIK CAS Dept Justice, formerly USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Off), 5 Oct 46. Dr. Kim was relieved as Deputy Dir for Institutional Management by Removal Order 89, 24 June 46, effective 31 May 46.

142. USAMGIK Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 9, 1 Feb 46.

143. SCAP Summation No. 5, Feb 46, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 33; CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No. 6, Mar 46, sec 2 par 9.

144. MG Press Release, item 5, 25 Mar 46.

145. Ordinance No. 64, 29 Mar 46. See textual note on p 27.

146. Ordinance No. 67, 2 Apr 46.

147. Mimeo letr, HQ USAMGIK OMG, Secy Gen Affairs, 21 Jan 46, sub: Organization and Functions of General Affairs Section of the Secretariat; Relationship with Legal Officers (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice).

148. Ordinance No. 67, sec II, 2 Apr 46; Ordinance No. 151, 30 Sept 47.

149. Ordinance No. 67, sec II, 2 Apr 46, amended by Ordinance No. 85, 16 May 46.

150. CIC USAFPAC, Korea No. 8, May 46, part II, sec 2, par 1.

151. MG Special Press Release, 17 May 46; HQ USAMGIK Dept Justice, Department Appointment No. 2, 24 May 46; CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No. 8, May 46, part II, sec 2, par 2.

152. Ibid in re publicity. Failure of approval, etc, interv, Stockton with Mr. Robert Wiley (formerly Captain) USAMGIK Civil Serv, formerly 1 Sept 48; same with Mr. Kurt M. Falk, former USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Offr 1 Sept 48, 5 Oct 48. The four Deputy Directors were for: Government Legal Counsel, Court Administration, Administration, and Institutional Management.

153. Directive, HQ USAMGIK OMG, 29 May 46, sub: Determination of Executive Responsibility.

154. This functional analysis of the operation of the Department of Justice is taken from Mimeo: USAMGIK Manual of Military Government, Organization, and Function, "Justice", p 49, 20 June 46, and Chart. See Appendix II.

155. Letr, CG USAFIK, to Mil Governor, 31 Aug 46.

156. MG Special Press Release, 12 Sept 46; memo, HQ USAMGIK to all members of Mil Govt, 13 Sept 46, sub: Message from General Lerch Regarding Korean Control of Military Government, at a meeting of American and Korean Directors, 11 Sept 46; also CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No. 12, Sept 46, part II, sec 1, par 2.

157. Memo, HQ USAMGIK OMG, 4 Sept 46, sub: Appointment Board.

158. USAFIK, Selected Opinions of the Department of Justice, United States Army Military Government in Korea. Opinions rendered in the role of legal advisor to the Military Government of Korea, and covering a period from March 1946, to August 1948. 2 vols, Seoul, 1948 (hereafter cited as Selected Legal Opinions), vol I, Preface.

159. HQ XXIV Corps Press Release: Lt Gen John R. Hodge, radio address, In Commemoration of American Landing, 8 September, dtd 8 Sept 46.

160. Memo (long hand), OMG, Maj Gen Lerch to Dept Justice, 19 Jan 47, with attached typed copies of the one sentence made by Dept Justice (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice "Folder 12, Directives of Military Governor").

161. Ordinance No. 135, 15 Mar 47; MG Press Release, item 5, 22 Mar 47.

162. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 17, Feb 47, part II, sec 1, par 1; appointment and biography, MG Special Press Release, 6 Feb 47; confirmation by KILA, 7 Feb, MG Press Release, item 9, 18 Feb 47; acceptance statement, MG Special Press Release, 10 Feb 47. Detailed biographic information on Ahn Chai Hong (An Chae-Hong) is to be found in XXIV Corps, Headquarters, Political Advisory Group, Who's Who in South Korea Interim Government; Biographic Data on Prominent National and Provincial Government Officials in Southern Korea, Vol I (An-Chu), Seoul, Jan 1948.

[redacted]

163. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 17, Feb 47, part II, sec 1, par 2; MG Special Press Release, 10 Feb 47.

164. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 18, Mar 47, part II, sec 1, par 1.

165. Hq USAMGIK GO No. 6, 7 Mar 47.

166. Hq USAMGIK OMG, Removal No. 101, 28 Mar 47; for termination of other American officials in top level positions, see Hq USAMGIK OMG, Appointment No. 117, 31 Mar 47.

167. Memo, Hq USAMGIK OMG, to all Am personnel in Mil Govt, 25 Mar 47, sub: Function of Advisors (Statement of Policy); for latter statement, see also CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 19, Apr 47, part II, sec 1, par 1.

168. Ibid.

169. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 18, Mar 47, part II, sec 1, par 1.

170. The Military Governor restated the American position in a MG Press Release, item 5, on 12 May 47, and in a Hq XXIV Corps Press Release, item 2, same date, in answering a 9 May 47 story in the Dok Lib Shindo newspaper which declared that all Directors were to be replaced but one. The Military Governor praised Korean officials and concluded: "If it will help to reassure the Korean people, I may say that no public official will ever be removed from office without due notice to him and without full opportunity of the Korean people to express themselves with reference to such removal."

170. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 20, May 47, part II, sec 1, par 1.

SUBSTITUTE FOOTNOTE [illegible]

174.

169. CIC FE Summation No. 18, Mar 47, part II, sec 2, par 3. Delay by KILA in expediting consideration and passage of the bill led the Military Governor to dispatch a letter 19 March to the Assembly Chairman urging that it be given top priority (MG Press Release, item 3, 19 Mar 47). Again in May he appealed to the Chairman for legislative action, reminding that General Hodge had declared at the inauguration of KILA on 12 December 1946 that the enactment of a suffrage law was its most important ~~project~~, an objective repeatedly urged by both the Military Governor and the Deputy Military Governor ~~since~~. He rejected the view of those who held that the writing of a constitution and the disposition of ~~of~~ pro-Japanese should be resolved first. Injecting international significance to [illegible] the Military Governor declared: "I do not want it possible to have objections raised to aid to Korea on the ground that its legislature is not elective." (Press Release, Hq XXIV Corps, item 1, 14 May 47). Delay continued into summer and upon his return from Washington about the middle of August, General Lerch again appealed to KILA, then considering some features of a bill questioned by the Acting Military Governor. Although General Lerch agreed as to the importance of matters referred by the Deputy Military Governor, asserted: "I feel that it is more important at the present time that we get the law into operation and hold the election as soon as possible." (Press Release, Hq XXIV Corps, item 4, 15 Aug 47). The proposed suffrage law finally reached the Military Governor's Office and was signed by the Deputy Military Governor on 3 September 1947 as KILA Public Act No. 5. (Press Release, Hq XXIV Corps, 4 Sept 47; ~~Official Gazette, USAMGIK~~, Public Act No. 5, 3 Sept 47; SKIC Activities No. 24, Sept 47, part V, sec 2, par 1).

178.
179. For chronological establishment of Civil Rights in Korea under USAMGIK, see Appendix III. Korean was made the official language of SKIC, 1 July 47, by Executive Order No. [illegible] of which amended par 5 of Proclamation #1, issued by General Mac Arthur, 7 Sept 45, established English at that time as the official language. Ordinance No. 176, Sec XVII, 20 Mar 48, provide the procedure for arrest & habeas corpus.

171. Letr, HQ USAMGIK Dept Justice Advisor to Director, to Chief Advisor Govt of Korea, attn Governmental Reorganization Board, 11 Mar 47, sub: Reorganization Plan.

172. Interv, Stockton with Mr. Kurt M. Falk, USAFIK CAS Dept Justice (formerly USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Off), 5 Oct 48.

173. Ordinance No. 141, 17 May 47.

174. (copy from substitute attached)

175. Report USAMGIK, Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 20 Jan 48, sub: Personnel Inventory and Appraisal Form in Accordance with Request of the Personnel Utilization Board (filed 310.1, Organization and Office Admin, USAMGIK Dept Justice).

176. Ibid.

177. M/S USAMGIK, Dir Dept Justice, 20 Jan 48, sub: Personnel Utilization Study for Department of Justice at Request of the Personnel Utilization Board (filed 310.1, Organization and Office Admin, USAMGIK Dept Justice).

178. For chronological establishment of Civil Rights in Korea under USAMGIK, see Appendix III. Korean was made the official language of SKIG, 1 July 47, by Executive Order No. 4, which amended paragraph 5 of Proclamation No. 1, issued by General MacArthur, 7 Sept 45, establishing English at that time as the official language. Ordinance No. 176, sec XVII, 20 Mar 48, provided procedure tantamount to habeas corpus.

179. The generalization in respect to corporate bodies, governmental instrumentalities, and juridical persons follows the mimeo outline of address on "Governmental Corporations in Korea", by 1st Lt Richard B. Appleton, USAMGIK General Affairs Sec, before National Legal Conf, Seoul, 7 Mar 46.

180. USAMGIK General Notice (hereafter cited as General Notice) No. 1 (Free Market in Rice), 5 Oct 45.

181. General Notice No. 6 (Control of Rice), 19 Dec 45.

182. Ordinance No. 45 (National Rice Collection), 25 Jan 46.

183. Ordinance No. 24 (Materials Control Corporation, Charter), 5 Nov 45.

184. Ordinance No. 52 (New Korea Co,), 21 Feb 46.

185. General Notice No. 4 (Korean Fisheries Corp.), 24 Nov 45.

186. General Notice No. 3 (Chosen Coal Distributing Co.),5 Nov 45.

187. General Notice No. 5 (Petroleum Distributing Agency),15 Dec 45.

188. Ordinance No. 37 (Finance Control Corporation Dissolved), 19 Dec45; Ordinance No. 43 (Chosen Stock Exchange Dissolved), 16 Jan 46.

189. M/S Personnel Utilization Study, see fn 177; Selected Legal Opinions, vol I, preface.

190. Mimeo outline of address: " Legal Aspects of Financial and Tax Matters under the Military Government," by Capt John B. Kramer, USAMGIK Gen Affairs, before National Legal Conf, Seoul, 9 Mar 46. See also, Selected Legal Opinions, 2 vols.

191. Selected Legal Opinions, vol I, preface, for history of personnel; MG Press Release, Item 4, 21 Feb 47 and Hq XXIV Corps Press Release, item 1, 24 Feb 47.

192. Ordinance No. 42, 14 Jan 46.

193. Mimeo outline [redacted] of address: "Korean Legal Research and Drafting", by Capt Edwin D. Lasker, USAMGIK Gen Affairs Sec, before National Legal Conf, Seoul, 8 Mar 46; [redacted] USAFIK Personnel Utilization Board, through Asst Chief of Staff [redacted] G-1, Hq XXIV Corps, to Chief of Staff XXIV Corps, 21 Feb 48, sub: Personnel Survey of Department of Justice, "Code Revision Bureau", pp 51-54.

194. SKIC Activities No. 31, Apr 48, part V, sec 4, par 17,18; Grajdanzev, pp 250-258.

195. USAMGIK Dept Justice, Weekly Reports of Judge Charles S. Lobingier, Codification Advisor, to Dir Dept Justice, 1946; interv, Stockton with Judge Logingier, 14 Oct 48, 9 Nov 48.

196. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 20, May 47, part II, sec 2, par 2.

197. USAMGIK Executive Order No. 3, 30 June 47.

198. Personnel Utilization Board Survey, cited fn 193, pp 51-e, 52 f. On 26 December 1947 the Code Revision Commission convened at the Supreme Court chambers, according to Department of Justice Daily Activities Report cited in its Personnel Utilization Study for the Department of Justice at Request of Personnel Utilization Board (op cit, 20 Jan 48.

199. SKIC Activities no. 31, Apr 48, part V, sec 4, par 17, 18; MCJUS, Weekly Activities Report, Dept Justice (hereafter cited as Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report), 8 Mar to 13 Mar 48, c, Codification Bureau, dtd 16 Mar 48. This report stated that translation was completed, but that was incorrect according to interv, Stockton with Judge Lobingier, 25 Nov 48.

200. Ordinance No. 183, 8 Apr 48.

201. Ordinance No. 181, 1 Apr 48 (effective 14 Apr).

202. Mimeo outline address: "International Law", by Stanley N. Ohlbaum and Dr. Ernst Fraenkel, Gen Affairs Sec, USAMGIK, before National Legal Conf, Seoul, 9 Mar 46; address: "Legal Aspects of Foreign Affairs under Military Government" by Capt Arthur R. Murphy, Gen Affairs Sec, before same conf, 9 Mar 46.

203. See pp ~~15-16~~ 17-20 of present narrative.

204. Memo, USAMGIK to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 2 June 47, sub: Requested Report (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice under "Court Statistics").

205. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 37.

206. See p ~~17~~ 18 of present narrative.

207. Letr, Chief Justice Supreme Court (undated), attached to translation with memo from Dr. Y.H. Kim, to Dir Bu Justice, 14 Dec 45 (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice under "Personnel - Courts").

208. Grajdanzev, op cit, pp 255,256.

209. SKIC Activities No. 26, Nov 47, sec V, par 2, pp 201-203.

210. Ibid, sec V, par 2, I, B, 3, p 203.

211. Hq USAMGIK GO No. 5, 18 Sept 45; Ordinance No. 11, 9 Oct 45. See p ~~28 herein.~~ 34 of present narrative.

212. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice, Advisor to Juvenile Sec (Mr. A. Lyman), to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 21 May 47, sub: Review of Juvenile Courts and Institutions in Korea. See p 83 ~~herein.~~ of present narrative.

213. Annex 7 (Military Government) to XXIV Corps FO 55, par 4a, 29 Aug 45.

214. Ibid, 4b.

215. M/S Hist USAMGIK, Part II, Sept 45-June 46, ch IV L, Justice, 3, Activities p 128. This generalization in quotes from the M/S Hist USAMGIK cited is based in part on information in rough draft of m/s "Justice" by M/Sgt W.L. Knickmeyer, subsequently documented, in files of Hq XXIV Corps G-2 Hist Sec, and summarized the situation.

216. Mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit.

217. Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice, sec 2.

218. M/S Hist USAMGIK, Part II, op cit, ch IV L, See fn ~~32~~ 235.

219. Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice, sec 2.

220. Mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit, p 2.

221. Ibid.

222. Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice, sec 3; m/s Hist USAMGIK, Part II, op cit,, ch Iv L, sec III, p 130.

223. Hq USAMGIK OMG, Removal No. 14, 11 Oct 45.

224. Ibid, Appointment No. 12, 11 Oct 45.

225. MG Press Release, 15 Oct 45; also quoted in m/s Hist USAMGIK, Part II, op cit, ch IV L, sec III, Activities.

226. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part I, sec 4, Korea, par 4.

227. M/S Hist USAMGIK, Part II, op cit, ch IV L, sec III.

228. Ibid; letr, Bu Justice Liaison Officer, 30 Nov 45, sub: Report III, Organization of Courts. See fn 235.

229. Ibid; see also, mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit, p 5; MG Press Release, 14 Jan 46.

230. Letr, Chief Justice, Supreme Court, undated, with attached translation (long hand), and memo from Dr. Y.H. Kim, Assoc Director Bu Justice, to Director, 14 Dec 45 (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice under "Personnel - Courts").

231. Runyan: letr, Hist Justice, op cit.

232. Mimeo outline address: "Function of Court and Prison Liaison Office", by Maj Frank B. Banzet, Bu Justice Liaison Officer, before Conf Provincial Legal Officers, Seoul, 7-9 Mar 46.

233. Letr, Hq USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice, to Court Liaison Officer, 23 Nov 45, sub: Organization of District and Branch Courts. See a lso letr, USAMGIK Ex Off for Dir Bu Justice, to CO 97 Hq Group, Seoul, 28 Dec 45.

234. Letr, Dir Bu Justice to Capt Frank Fisher, Jr, 26 Nov 45, sub: Instructions to Representatives Visiting Provincial Capitols.

235. Letrs, USAMGIK Bu Justice Court Liaison Officer (Maj Frank B. Banzet), to Dir Bu Justice, sub: Organization of Courts: Report I, 23 Nov 45; Report II, 26 Nov 45; Report III, 30 Nov 45; Report IV, 2 Dec 45. Letrs, Dept Justice Orientation Officer (Maj Frank Fisher, Jr.), to Dir Bu Justice, sub: Report Orientation Inspection, Report 1, 30 Nov 45; Report 2,

235 (continued).

3 Dec 45; Report III, 6 Dec 45; Report IV, 9 Dec 45; Report V, 12 Dec 45; Report VI, 14 Dec 45. See also Runyan; letr, Hist Bu Justice.

236. Letr, Bu Justice Liaison Officer (Maj Frank B. Banzet) to Dir Bu Justice, 2 Dec 45, sub: Organization of the Courts, Report IV, par 3.

237. Letr, USAPIK OMG Planning Section, Chief Inspector of Subsection, Maj Harold E. Keller, to Mil Governor, 14 Dec 45, Report of Inspection of Bureau of Justice, II, 6.

238. Letr, Bu Justice Ex Off, Maj George A. Anderson, to Civil Administrator, 19 Jan 46, sub: Report of Inspection of Bu Justice, section on "Courts' Liaison". See also fn 132-135, and Appendix I.

239. Letr, [redacted] USAMGIK Dir Bu Justice to Liaison Officers, 8 Jan 46, sub: Performance of Mission.

240. Address (Summary Remarks): m/s "Functions of Court and Prison Liaison Office", by Maj Frank B. Banzet, Dept Justice Liaison Officer, before Conf of Provincial Legal Officers, Seoul, Mar 46.

241. Hq USAMGIK, Bu Justice Administrative Order No. 12, 6 Feb 46.

242. Ibid, Administrative Order No. 15, 19 Feb 46.

243. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Orientation Off (Capt Frank Fisher, Jr.), to Dir Bu Justice, 3 Dec 45, sub: Orientation Inspection - Taejon - Report No. 2.

244. Letr, 3rd Ind, Bu Justice Ex Off for Dir, to Provincial Military Governor, Kyunggi Do, 3 Jan 46, in re Land Registrar.

245. Interv, Stockton with Asst Legal Advisor USAF Cas Dept Justice (formerly Legal Advisor USAMGIK Dept Justice), Mr. Richard D. Gillaim, Jr., 6 Oct 48.

246. Interv, M/Sgt Wilbur L. Knickmeyer, Hist Sec, with Capt John P. Gardner, formerly Officer in Charge Civil Affairs, 12 Mar 46.

247. Ordinance No. 21, sec II, 2 Nov 45.

248. Hq USAPIK OMG, Appointment No. 36, par 5, Appointment of Court Officials, 19 Nov 45.

249. Letr, Hq USAPIK OMG, Deputy Mil Governor to Dir all Bureaus, Secy all Secretariat Secs, & all Provincial Governors, 15 Dec 45, sub: Jurisdiction of Military Courts and Korean Courts as Occupation Courts; TWX OMG to CINC USAFPAC, dtd 15 Dec 45, sub: Establishment of Military Occupation Courts by Ordinance 21, 2 Nov 45, and refers to Directive 18 Sept 45, GHQ USAFPAC AG 014.1.

250. Letr, Hq USAFIK OMG, to all Military Governors re "Occupation Courts", 23 Dec 45; AG 250.4 (TFYJA), Hq XXIV Corps to Mil Governor and Commanding Generals of 6th, 7th, 40th Inf Divs, and of ASC, 14 Jan 46, sub: Proceedings of Provost Courts, par 2.

251. Letr, CG Hq 39th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co, APO 901, to Provincial Mil Governor, Kyunggi-Do, re "Military Occupation Courts", 23 Dec 45.

252. Hq USAFIK OMG, Instructions to Judges No. 1, par 1-4, 19 Nov 45.

253. Ibid, par 5.

254. Hq USAFIK OMG, Instructions to Prosecutors No. 1, 18 Oct 45.

255. Ibid, Instructions to Prosecutors No. 2, 19 Nov 45.

256. Ibid, Instructions to Prosecutors No. 3, 29 Dec 45.

257. 000.5 (MGDMG) Hq USAFIK, Office of Deputy Mil Governor, to Dir all Bureaus, Secys all Secretariat Secs, & all Provincial Governors, 22 Jan 46, sub: Directive Regarding Procedure for Arrest and Prosecution, 3.

258. Hq USAMGIK, Bu Justice Instructions to Prosecutors No. 4, 13 Mar 46.

259. Letr, Hq USAMGIK OMG, 12 Feb 46, sub: Korean Courts.

260. MG Special Press Release, 17 May 46.

261. Hq USAMGIK OMG, Bu Justice Administrative Order No. 2, 20 Dec 45.

262. MG Special Press Release, 17 May 46.

263. CIC USAPPAC Summation, Korea No. 9, June 46, part II, sec 2, par 1.

264. MG Press Release, item 5, 12 May 47.

265. TIP Justice in Korea for the Record, vol 2, No. 13, 15 Oct 47.

266. Interv, Stockton with former USAMGIK Dept Justice Legal Advisor, Mr. Albert Lyman, USAFIK CAS, 28 Aug 48.

267. TIP Justice in Korea for the Record, op cit.

268. MGJUS, Hq USAMGIK Dept Justice, to Natl Economic Board, 21 July 48, sub: Monthly Report of Activities, Dept Justice, July 48, e(4), Court Liaison Activities, Charts I-X. See Appendix ~~IV~~ V.

269. Inter-office memo, USAFIK Civil Affairs Sec, Dept Justice Asst Advisor (Mr. Richard D. Gilliam, Jr.) to Hq XXIV

269 (continued).

Corps, G-2 Hist Sec Historian, Mr. B. Stockton, in re statistics on Judges, Prosecutors, Lawyers, 28 Sept 48; interv, Stockton with Gilliam re same, 5 Oct 48.

270. TIP Justice in Korea for the Record, op cit; interv, Stockton with former USAMGIK Dept Justice Advisor to Dir, Mr. Denny F. Scott, USAFIK CAS, and former Dept Justice Ex Off, Mr. Kurt M. Falk, CAS, in re the 1600 cases tried in Korean courts (formerly [redacted] Provost Court), 25 Oct 48.

271. Interv, Stockton with former USAMGIK Dept Justice Juvenile Sec Advisor, Mr. Albert Lyman (CAS), 28 Aug 48 (hereafter references to Mr. Lyman will be abbreviated to Lyman without further identifying his official ststus); letr, Lyman to Dir Dept Justice, 22 Oct 46, sub: Preliminary Report of Juvenile Courts and Institutions - Recommendations.

272. M/S, Asst OIC Crim Dept, Capt Charles W. Runyan, undated, sub: Juvenile Court. Interview, Stockton-Lyman, latter said there was but one juvenile judge in 1945 at time of American occupation.

273. Interv, Stockton with Lyman, fn 271.

274. Letr, Lyman to Dir Dept Justice, fn 271.

275. Hq XXIV Corps, Press Release, 3 Apr 46.

276. Memo, USAFIK CAS, Dept Justice Legal Advisor, Mr. Albert Lyman, to XXIV Corps G-2 Hist Sec Historian, Mr. B. Stockton, 9 Oct 48, sub: Comments on Juvenile Courts, par 1 (cited hereafter as Memo, Lyman: "Comments on Juvenile Courts").

277. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Juvenile Sec, Capt Harold D. Eastman, to Dir Dept Justice, 27 Mar 46, sub: The Juvenile Delinquent Program.

278. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 20, May 47, part II, sec 2, par 14-16; interv, Stockton with Lyman, fn 271.

279. Letr, Capt Eastman, fn 277, par 2(b); USAMGIK Dept Justice Juvenile Court Advisor (Lyman), Reports on Juvenile Courts and Institutions to Dir Dept Justice, 1946.

280. Lyman, letr, Lyman, Preliminary Report etc, fn 271.

281. Statement, USAMGIK Dept Justice: Population of Juvenile Reformatories and Juvenile Prisons (inter-office information, unsigned), 21 Nov 46 (USAMGIK Dept Justice files on juvenile courts).

282. Letr memo, USAMGIK Dept Justice, Juvenile Courts and Institutions, to Advisor to Dept, 16 Jan 46, sub: Figures on Juvenile Institutions and Delinquency.

283. Letr, Lyman, Preliminary Report, fn 271.

284. TFYMG 627, Off Civil Administrator for Mil Governor, 22 May 46, sub: Prisons Suitable for Juvenile Detention.

285. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice (Lyman), to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 21 May 47, sub: Review of Juvenile Courts and Institutions in Korea, par 1-5. See also letr, (Lyman) to Dir, 20 June 47, sub: Functions and Jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts; SKIG Press Release, 15 Oct 47, re Juvenile Court System.

286. CIC PE Summation, Korea No. 20, May 47, part II, sec 2, par 19.

287. Interv, Stockton with Lyman, 28 Aug 48.

288. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Juvenile Sec (Lyman), to Advisor to Dept Justice, 21 May 47, sub: Review of Juvenile Courts and Institutions in Korea, par 8; Reports, Am Advisor Juvenile Sec Dept Justice (Lyman) "Activity Reports", May 47, especially 13 May 47.

289. Memo, Lyman: "Comments on Juvenile Courts", par 3.

290. Rt Rev Msgr Edward Joseph Flanagan: Child Welfare Report (undated, but he left Seoul 5 June 47 after inspection trip).

291. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Juvenile Court Sec Advisor (Lyman), to Dept Justice Ex Off, 21 July 47, sub: Father Flanagan's Report on Department of Justice Institutions; see also, letr, ibid, 5 June 47, sub: Father Flanagan's Adverse Comment on One Juvenile Reformatory; letr, SKIG Dept Justice Advisor to Dir, 11 Oct 47, sub: Removal of Pusan Juvenile House of Correction Chief Officer.

292. [redacted] Ibid.

293. Memo, Lyman: "Comments on Juvenile Courts", par 4.

294. USAMGIK Dept Justice, Juvenile Sec Weekly Activities Reports, May-Aug 47; Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 23 June to 29 June 47, sec 7, dtd 1 July 47, in re employment of women; letr, Hq USAMGIK, to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 30 Sept 47, sub: Report of Special Investigation as of 12 Sept 47, VI, par 35, re interdepartmental board for vagrant problem.

295. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Juvenile Sec Advisor (Lyman), 22 Sept 47, [redacted]

295 (continued).

sub: Comments of Juvenile Section Advisor on Report of Special Investigator. Sections 31-43 of Report referred to juvenile delinquency and administration.

296. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice with instructions to SKIG Dept Justice for signature of Korean Director to be sent to all juvenile courts and juvenile houses of correction, 13 Oct 47.

297. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Advisor (to Dept Dir), to Advisor Natl Dept Public Health, 11 Oct 47, sub: Transfer of Juveniles.

298. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 28 Apr to 4 May 47, dtd 6 May 47; interv, Stockton with Lyman, fn 271; Memo, Lyman: "Comments on Juvenile Courts," par 6.

299. SKIG Activities No. 26, Nov 47, part V, sec 4, par 17; SKIG Activities No. 27, Dec 47, part V, sec 4, par 8.

300. SKIG Activities No. 28, Jan 48, part V, sec 4, par 24,17.

301. SKIG Activities No. 31, Apr 48, part V, sec 4, par 8-14.

302. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 6 July to 12 July 47, sec 8, dtd 15 July 47; ibid, 22 Dec to 27 Dec, sec 7, dtd 30 Dec 47.

303. Interv, Stockton with Lyman, fn 271.

304. Ordinance No. 192, secs 33-37, sec 115d, 4 May 48 (effective 1 June 48).

305. Memo, Lyman: "Comments on Juvenile Courts," par 8,9.

306. HQ USAMGIK Dept Justice Statement, inter-office data (undated).

307. HQ USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice Bar Admission Order No. 1, 14 Nov 45.

308. Ibid.

309. Memorial from Seoul Bar Association to Bureau of Justice, par 2, 1 Dec 45 (filed Central Files under "Department of Justice 18 Oct to 20 Dec 1945"); see also, "Miscellaneous" inter-office memoranda between Dir Bu Justice and Dr. Y.H. Kim re "Memorial" (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice).

310. MG Press Release, item 8, 10 Dec 45.

311. Ibid, item 2, 26 Dec 45.

312. HQ USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice, Bar Admission Order No. 4, 26 Dec 45;

312 (continued).

ibid, Bar Admission Order No. 7, 24 Jan 46; Justice Department Order No. 3, 29 Mar 47.

313. USAMGIK Justice Department Order No. 8, 1 Apr 48.

314. Ibid, Justice Department Order No. 7, 12 Feb 48.

315. Ordinance No. 207, 1 July 48.

316. [redacted] Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 12 Oct to 18 Oct 47, 4e USKIG Activities No. 25, Oct 47, part V, sec 7, par 13.

317. Inter-office Memo, USAFIK CAS Dept Justice Asst Advisor (Mr. Richard D. Gilliam, Jr.), to Hq XXIV Corps G-2 Hist Sec Historian, Mr. B. Stockton, in re statistics on Judges, Prosecutors, and Lawyers, 28 Sept 48; interv, Stockton with Gilliam re same, 5 Oct 48.

318. Hq USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice Bureau Order No. 4, 19 Nov 45; see also, SCAP SUMMATION No. 3, Dec 45, part V, sec 1, par 41. (Kort A)

319. USAMGIK Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 11, 27 Feb 46.

320. Memorial from Seoul Bar Association to Bureau of Justice, 1 Dec 45 (see fn 309).

321. MG Press Release, item 1, 7 Dec 45.

322. CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No. 15, Dec 46, part II, sec 2, par 2.

323. Notes of Dr. Y.H. Kim in re "Petition of Seoul Bar Association" to Bu Justice, 1 Dec 45, ltr, Hq USAMGIK Bu Justice Ex Off to Gen Counsel, 24 Jan 46, sub: Korean Bar (filed 013.2 "Legal Bar Association, Legal Academy", USAMGIK Dept Justice files). This letter states that there were 9 district chapters of the National Bar Association and that 123 members of that Association were duly graduates in South Korea. (Filed Central Files, Dept Justice, HQ AMG - 29 Dec 45)

324. Ordinance No. 207, secs IX, X, 1 July 48.

325. Ibid, sec VIII.

326. Ltr, Hq USAFIK, Dir Bu Justice, to Lt Col Seddon, 29 Sept 45, sub: Report of Work for Week ending 29 Sept 45.

327. Radio, CG USAFIK to SCAP, TFYMG 795, 310857/I Jan 46.

328. MG Press Release, item 3, 29 Jan 46; SCAP Summation No. 5, Feb 46, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 34.

329. Hq USAMGIK Dept Justice, Department Order No. 1, 25 Apr 46; interv, Stockton, former Ex Off Dept Justice, Mr. Kurt M. Falk (CAS), 2 Sept 48, for reason course was abandoned. Although CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No. 6, Mar 46, sec 2, par 11, stated that 100 judges and prosecutors after

329 (continued).

examination were selected for special training by the Department of Justice, no further information was available at the Department concering the training, if ever given; interv, Stockton with members of legal staff, USAFIK CAS Dept Justice, 28 Aug 48 and 9 Sept 48.

330. CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No. 14, Nov 46, part II, sec 2, par 1; MG Press Release, 15 Nov 46.

331. Interv, Stockton with former USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Off (K. M. Falk, cited), 25 Oct 48; CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 19, Apr 47, part II, sec 2, par 1.

332. CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 20, May 47, part II, sec 2, par 1; Hq XXIV Corps Press Release, item 7, 7 May 47.

333. Letr, Heads (Koreans) of Criminal Dept, Civil Dept, Penal Dept, 24 Nov 45, sub: Petition from the Korean Heads of the Bureau of Justice to Director Bureau of Justice. Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 5, 4 Dec 45;

334. Hq USAFIK OMG, Appointment No. 36, par 7, National Law Library, 19 Nov 45; Runyan, Hist Bu Justice, op cit. Twenty-nine law probationers were appointed judges and prosecutors in July 1947 (CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 22, July 47, part II, sec 2, par 2).

335. Interv, Stockton with former USAMGIK Dept Justice Asst Advisor, Mr. Richard D. Gilliam Jr. (CAS Dept Justice), 6 Oct 48, in re organization of Korean Civil Liberties Union, attitude of Dept Justice legal staff, Mr. Baldwin's reported conferences with communists, and political complexion of officers elected. See, CIC FE Summation, Korea No. 20, May 47, part II, sec 2, par 3, re announcement of organization. The appraisal was made by Gilliam.

336. Hq USAFIK OMG, Appointment No. 36, par 7, National Law Library, 19 Nov 45.

337. Memo, USAMGIK, Dept Justice Natl Law Library Advisor, to Dir Dept Justice, sub: Weekly Activities Report, Week ending 13 June 1946, par 3,4.

338. Woodall: Hist Reorg Justice, sec 3; SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 41.

339. Hq USAFIK OMG Appointment No. 12, sec 9, 11 Oct 45; ibid, sec 1, par 41, 42; Woodall, fn 338.

340. MG Press Release, item 1, 5 Dec 45.

341. Letr, Hq USAMGIK SCIC to Dir Bu Justice, sub: Cases Pending 25 Jan 46 (filed [redacted] Central Files under "Bu Justice, 7 Jan-23 Feb 46").

342. Letr, USAMGIK Dir Bu Justice to Mil Governor in re Police Magistrates, 24 Nov 45 (The Department of Justice Director felt at the time that "such powers (to police chiefs) should not be granted unless absolutely necessary." Letr, Dir Bu Justice to Court Liaison Officer, 23 Nov 45, sub: Organization and District Branch Courts.

343. Letr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Court Liaison Off (Maj Frank B. Banzet), to Dir Bu Justice, 26 Nov, 45, sub: Organization of Courts - Report II, Kwangju, par 6.

344. Ibid, 30 Nov 45, Report III, par 6.

345. Ibid, 2 Dec 45, Report IV, par 4.

346. Ibid, 2 Dec 45, Report IV, par 5.

347. Letr, USAMGIK Bu Justice Orientation Officer, to Dir Bu Justice, 30 Nov 45, sub: Report of Orientation - Inspection Chonju. For Liaison and orientation officer perspective of court operation, see fn 235.

Footnotes continue next page et seq

348. Ordinance No. 41, 10 Jan 46.

349. Letr, Hq USAMGIK Bu Justice, 22 Jan 46, sub: Weekly Report, Period Ending 19 Jan 46 (filed Central Files under "Bu Justice, 7 Jan to 23 Feb 46").

350. Ibid, par c.

351. Ordinance No. 180, sec VI, 31 Mar 48.

352. Ordinance No. 192, secs 105,108,109, 4 May 48.

353. Supreme Court Order No. 1, 24 June 48.

354. Hq USAFIK G-0 No. 5, 14 Jan 46; SCAP Summation No. 5, Feb 46, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 32; mimeo letr, USAMGIK Bu Justice to Provincial Military Governor, 16 Jan 46, sub: Provost Courts - Instructions No. 1 (filed Central Files under "Bu Justice from 7 Jan to 23 Feb 46").

355. AG 250.4 (TFYJA) Hq XXIV Corps, 14 Jan 46; Hq USAMGIK Bu Justice Administrative Order No. 12, 6 Feb 46.

356. Letr, TFYMG 250.53, Hq USAMGIK to CG USAFIK, 3 Aug 46, sub: Provost Courts (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice "Personnel - Courts").

357. Hq XXIV Corps, Directive, Circular No. 18, 22 Apr 46, re Provost Courts and refers to Hq XXIV Corps AG 250.4 (TFYJA), 14 Jan 46, discrepancy in Army sentences.

358. Radiogram MGSJA 250 to Mil Govt re discontinuance of trials in provost courts, 11 Apr 47.

359. USAMGIK Dept Justice, "Provost Court Cases", especially the following: MGJUS 250.5, Hq USAMGIK Dept Justice Court and Prison Liaison Officer (Thomas E. Campbell), to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 7 Aug 47, sub: Report on Trials in Korean Courts, accompanied by "Report of Inspection of Courts" (5 Aug 47), covering inspection made 22 July - 4 Aug 47; inter-office memo, Dept Justice Asst Advisor (Richard D. Gilliam, Jr.) to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 9 Aug 47, sub: Korean Courts, accompanied by Tabs A-H; ibid, to Military Governor re Provost Court cases, 26 Sept 47; inter-office memo, USAMGIK Advisor to Dir Dept Justice (Maj John W. Connelly, Jr.), to MG, 13 Aug 47, sub: Korean Courts Handling Provost Court Cases; interv, Stockton with Gilliam, 9 Oct 48.

360. [redacted], Weekly Activities Report, Dept Justice, 21-27 July 47, sec 7, Court Liaison, dtd 29 July 47; ibid, 4-10 Aug 47, sec 5, par c, dtd 12 Aug 47.

361. See fn 359.

362. Inter-office memo, USAMGIK Dept Justice, Asst Advisor (Mr. Richard D. Gilliam, Jr.) to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 9 Aug 47, sub: Korean Courts.

363. Inter-office memo, USAMGIK Advisor to Dir Dept Justice (Maj John W. Connelly, Jr.), to MG, 13 Aug 47, sub: Korean Courts Handling Provost Court Cases.

364. USAMGIK Dept Justice, "Provost Court Cases". See Gilliam inter-office memos cited fn 359.

365. See p 82, fn 270.

366. [redacted], Weekly Activities Report, Dept Justice, 11-17 Aug 47, sec 5, par c, dtd 18/19 Aug 47.

367. Ibid, for 18-25 Aug 47, sec 4, par b, dtd 26 Aug 47.

368. Ibid, for 25-30 Aug 47, sec 4, par c, dtd 2 Sept 47.

369. Ibid, for 22-27 Dec 47, sec 6, par a, dtd 30 Dec 47.

370. USAMGIK Dept Justice documents filed under "Counterfeit Trial"; interv, Stockton with Gilliam, 6 Oct 48; CIC USAFPAC Summation No. 10, Korea, part II, sec 2, par 4. July 46,

371. CIC USAFPAC [redacted] Summation, Korea, No. 11, Aug 46, part II, sec 2, par 10.

372. USAMGIK Dept Justice documents filed under "Boo Chang Whan Case", especially memo, USAMGIK Dept Justice Advisor to Dir, to Deputy Mil Gov, 12 May 47, sub: Boo Chang Whan Case; letr, MGSPI-333, USAMGIK, Office of Special Investigator, [redacted] to CG, 21 Mar 47, sub: Report of Special Investigation, [redacted] by Richard D. Gilliam, Asst Advisor, Dept Justice; interv, Stockton with Gilliam, 6 Oct 48.

374. Personnel Utilization Study for Dept Justice at Request of Personnel Utilization Board, USAFIK, Excerpts from Daily Activities Reports, Dept Justice, 1 Dec 31 Dec 47 (see excerpts for 2 Dec, 4 Dec, 6 Dec, 20 Dec), dtd 20 Jan 48. See also Weekly Activities Reports, Dept Justice, 24 Nov to 29 Nov 47, sec 4, par c; ibid, 1 Dec to 6 Dec 47; SKIG Activities No. 27, Dec 47, part V, sec 4, par 11; SKIG Special Press Release, 1 Dec 47; interv, Stockton with Gilliam (who described terrorist activity and was himself threatened), 5 Oct 48. [redacted] op cit; 13 July to 20 July 47.

373. Weekly Activities Report, Dept Justice, [redacted], 15 Mar to 20 Mar 48, sec b, dtd 23 Mar.

375. SKIG Special Press Release, 1 Dec 47.

376. Hq XXIV Corps, Military Commission Order No. 2, 15 Mar 48. Military Commission appointed by Hq XXIV Corps Special Order No. 320, par 1, 16 Dec 47. Judgment handed down on 12 Feb 48. For sentence of Kim Doo Whan (spelled Kim Doo Han

(Cont'd)

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in Judge Advocate files) published separately, see Hq XXIV Corps Military Commission Order No. 5, 17 May 48. USAMGIK Dept Justice daily and weekly activity reports refer to trial as "Dai Han Min Chung Case (Kim Doo Whan and 14 Others", although 16 defendants were tried.

377. Hq USAPIK, OMG, Appointment No. 36, par 3, Special Property Courts, 19 Nov 45.

378. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 43.

379. Letr USAMGIK Bu Justice, Officer in Charge of Office of Supervisor of Special Property Courts from 19 Nov 45 to Date, 21 Feb 46, sub: Personal History Stories, Major John W. Connelly, Jr., to Dir Bu Justice.

380. Letr, OMG, Planning Sec, Chief, Inspection, Subsection, Major Harold E. Keller
Report of Inspection of Bureau of Justice to Military Governor, sec 8, ~~from Major Harold E. Keller, Chief, Inspector Sub-section OMG Planning Section, dtd 14 Dec 45.~~

14 Dec 45 to 5 Jan 46

381. Letr, USAMGIK Ex Off, Bu Justice, Maj George A. Anderson, to Off Civil Administrator, 19 Jan 46, sub: Report of Inspection Bureau of Justice.

382. See fn 379, [redacted] op cit, sec 2.

383. MG Special Press Release, 28 Feb 47; USAMGIK Office of Property Custody Order No. 8, 31 Dec 46.

384. Ibid.

385. MG Press Release, item 4, 22 Mar 47.

386. USAMGIK,
Property Custody Order No. 9, 31 Mar 47; m/s History of the Office of Property Custody, 1 Oct 45-30 June 48, par 33f (filed G-2 Hist Sec, XXIV Corps)

387. USAMGIK OMG, Administrative Order No. 7, 23 Jan 46.

388. Interv, Stockton with Mr. K.M. Falk, former Ex officer, USAMGIK Dept Justice, at CAS 13 Sept 48.

389. Same interv, fn 388.

390. Opinions of General Counsel, Opinion 10 (Claims by Koreans Against the Japanese Government), 5 Mar 46, cites Military Governor Directive 150 (MGGEN), dtd 17 Jan 46, sub: Claims.

391. Mimeo outline address: "Claims under Military Government" by 1st Lt R.B. Appleton, USAMGIK Gen Affairs Sec, before Natl Legal Conf, Seoul, 9 Mar 46.

392. Interv, Stockton with Falk, fn 388. See also Directive MGNEB 110, Mil Governor, 19 June 48, sub: Awards, Refunds, and Indemnities in Budgets of Administrative Departments, Offices, and Agencies of SKIG.

393. Interv, Stockton with Falk, fn 388.

394. Mimeo Outline Address: Lt Appleton, op cit, fn391.

395. Ltr Directive, MG XAG334, Hq USAMGIK, 6 Sept 47, sub: Creation of Board in re Korean Claims Against Japan; mimeo ltr, MGJUS, Hq USAMGIK, 25 Oct 47, sub: Information Regarding Claims Against Japanese Nationals and the Government of Japan.

396. Report of Claims Advisory Board: Claims of Korean Government, Government Departments, Bureaus and Agencies, Korean Individuals and Judicial Persons against the Japanese Government, Japanese Individuals and Judicial Persons, 15 May 48.

397. Mimeo outlipe address: "Financial Aspects of Property Blocking and Unfreezing," by Allen Loren, U.S. Treasury Dept, before Natl Legal Conf, Seoul, 7 Mar 46.

398. Personnel Utilization Study for Dept Justice at Request of Personnel Utilization Board, USAFIK, section on "Property Claims Commission" (functional analysis), op cit, 20 Jan 48.

399. Ordinance No. 103, 31 Aug 46, as amended by Ordinance No. 125, 1 Nov 46; see also CIC USAFPAC Summation Korea No. 11, Aug 46, part II, sec 2, par 2.

400. Personnel Utilization Study for Dept Justice, op cit, "Digest of Log", Dept Justice Dec 47, dtd 20 Jan 48.

401. USAMGIK, Property Claims Commission Rules of Procedure, 21 Nov 46.

402. Interv, Stockton with Mr. K.M. Falk, CAS, former USAMGIK [redacted] Dept Justice Ex Off, 13 Sept 48.

403. ~~MGCA 310.1, Hq USAMGIK,~~ Weekly Activities Report, ~~Dept Justice~~, Dept Justice, ~~13~~ 8 May to ~~19~~ 15 May 47, dtd ~~20~~ 19 May 47.

404. ~~[redacted]~~ Weekly Activities Report, Dept Justice, 29 Sept to 4 Oct 47, dtd 7 Oct 47.

405. ~~[redacted]~~ Weekly Activities Report, Dept Justice, 11 Apr to ~~17~~ 16 Apr 48, dtd 20 Apr 48; SKIG Press Release, item 2, 10 June 48.

406. MG Justice 040.2 letr Directive, USAMGIK OMG, 17 Apr 48, sub: Simplified Procedure in Dispensing of Claims for Vested Property; SKIG Activities No. 32, May 48, part V, sec 3, par 15.

407. MGJUS, Hq USAMGIK, Dept Justice, 21 Aug 48, sub: Monthly Report of Activities, Dept Justice, July 1948, sec d, Miscellaneous Legal Activities. (On 21 June 1948 the Weekly Activities Report of the Department of Justice was discontinued by letter Directive, Hq USAMGIK, Deputy Mil Governor, 21 June 48, sub: Standard Operating Procedure for Preparation of Daily Activity Reports. A monthly Activities Report supplanted the Weekly Activities Report).

408. Ltr Directive MGJUS, USAMGIK OMG, 28 July 48, sub: Limited Jurisdiction of Korean Courts in Cases Involving Movable and Immovable Property Affected or Claimed to be Affected by Ordinance No. 2 and Ordinance No. 33.

409. CAJUS, Hq USAFIK, Civil Affairs Section, Dept Justice, to Natl Ec Board, Sept 48, sub: Final Activities Report, Dept Justice, 1-15 Aug 48.

410. Ordinance No. 173, sec XII, 22 Mar 48; SKIG Activities No. 32, May 48, part V, sec 3, par 12.

411. Interv, Stockton with Mr. K.M. Falk, former [redacted] USAMGIK [redacted] Dept Justice Ex Off, 13 Sept 48.

412. USAMGIK OMG Administrative Order No. 7, 23 Jan 46; ltr Directive, MG Jus, Mil Governor, 16 July 48, sub: Jurisdiction of Korean Courts over Litigation Involving Corporations in which the Property Custodian has an Interest.

413. Memo, USAMGIK Dept Justice Penal Dept, 2 Oct 45, sub: The Official Organization of a Prison of the Government General of Korea (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice under "Penal Department's Reports").

414. Mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit, p 2.

415. Ibid.

416. Periodic Report: S-2 32nd Inf, Inclosure #1, Investigation of Seoul Prison by Lt Washburn, Co B, 18 Sept 45.

417. SCAP Summation No. 1, Sept-Oct 45, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 45. See also notes from interv by M/Sgt Wilbur L. Knickmeyer, Hist Sec, with Maj George A. Anderson, Bu Justice Ex Off, 25 Mar 46; same with Capt John B. McKeel, 17 Oct 45; Woodall; [redacted] Hist Reorg Justice, sec 2.

418. Interv, Stockton with Gilliam (USAMGIK Dept Justice, cited), 5 Oct 48; CIC USAFPAC Summation, Korea No 6, Mar 46, sec 2, par 11; GHQ, SCAP, Special Proclamation, 19 Jan 46, established an International Military Tribunal for the Far East for trial of persons charged with offenses, including crimes against peace.

419. SCAP Summation No. 1, op cit, part V, sec 1, par 44.

420. Runyan; letr Hist Bu Justice, op cit.

421. Notes of interv, M/Sgt W.L. Knickmeyer, [redacted] Hist Sec, with Maj George A. Anderson, Bu Justice Exec Off, 25 Mar 46.

422. Interv, Stockton with Gilliam, (USAFIK CAS, (formerly USAMGIK Dept Justice Legal Advisor, cited), 6 Oct 48. Mr. Gilliam made the inspection at Taegu and the quotes are from him; letr, Hq USAMGIK Dept Justice Legal Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 26 Dec 46, sub: Investigation of Conditions in Taegu Prison.

423. Mimeo address: Dr. Y.H. Kim, op cit, p 3.

424. Hq XXIV Corps, Press Release, item 3, 14 Dec 45.

425. USAFIK Bu Justice Order No. 2, 21 Nov 45; Bu Justice Order No. 12, 28 Mar 46.

426. Hq USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice Instructions to Prosecutors No. 1, 13 Oct 45.

427. Hq USAFIK OMG, [redacted] Appointment No. 36, par 8, 19 Nov 45.

428. Hq USAFIK OMG, Bu Justice, Bureau Order No. 1, 3 Nov 45.

429. Letr, Dir Bu Justice to CO 96th Mil Governor, APO 6, [redacted] 7 Jan 46, sub: Excessive Confinement (filed USAMGIK Dept Justice under "Courts, Miscellaneous").

430. Hq USAFIK OMG, Planning Sec, Maj Harold E. Keller, Chief Inspector Subsection, to Mil Governor, 14 Dec 45, sub: Report of Inspection Bureau of Justice, sec III 6 (4),11.

431. Hq USAMGIK, Bu Justice Ex Off, Maj George A. Anderson, to Off Civil Administrator, 19 Jan 46, sub: Report of Inspection Bureau Justice (Penal Department [redacted]).

432. Radio, CGUSAFIK to SCAP, TFYMG 943, 141620/I Feb 46 (states 58%). See also SCAP Summation No. 5, Feb 46, part V, Korea, sec 1, par 36 (states 54%). Figures in table [redacted] on p/37 show greater [redacted] increase and wider variation.

433. CIC USAFPAC Summation Korea No.11, Aug 46, part II, sec 2, par 22.

434. Ibid, part II, sec 2, par 20.

435. SKIG Press Release, item 1, 14 June 47; MG Press Release, Brig Gen C.G. Helmick Press Conference, 17 Jan 47, in re political prisoners.

436. SKIG Activities No. 27, Dec 47, part V, sec 4, Table 1 before par 11 (Dept Justice Penal Bureau, source); ibid, [redacted] 7,11.

437. Ibid, par 7.

438. CAJUS, Hq USAFIK Civil Affairs Sec, Dept Justice, to Natl Ec Board, USAFIK, 2 Sept 48, sub: Final Activities Report, Dept Justice, 1-15 Aug 48, sec e. (hereafter referred to as Dept Justice final activities report).

439. CICFE Summation No. 22, July 47, part II, sec 2, par 16 (statistics); interv, Stockton with Gilliam, 6 Oct 48 (1948 statistics and American prodding); interv, Stockton with Mr. Albert Lyman, Dept Justice Legal Advisor, 20 Oct 48 (Korean reluctance to apprehend women and girls); MG Press Release, item 2, 13 May 47 (women trials under judicial court officer); interv, Stockton with Advisor to Dir Dept Justice under USAMGIK, Mr. Denny F. Scott (formerly Lt Col), and Stockton with Lyman, 20 Oct 48 (trials of women by judicial court officer, extent unknown to Am advisors but provost court trials continued).

440. [redacted], Hq USAFIK Civil Affairs Sec, Dept Justice, [redacted], Monthly Activities Report, Dept Justice, June 48, sec G, Penal Activities, dtd 19 July 48.

441. CICFE Summation-Korea-No. 16, Jan 47, part II, sec 2, par 16; interv, Stockton with Gilliam, [redacted] cited fn 439.

442. Dept Justice Monthly [redacted] Activities Report, June 48, sec G, Penal Activities, p 18, (dtd 19 July 48).

443. CIC USAFPAC Summation-Korea-No. 8, May 46, part II, sec 2, par 31.

444. CICFE Summation-Korea-No. 16, Jan 47, part II, sec 2, par 12.

445. CIC USAFPAC Summation-Korea-No. 10, July 46, part II, sec 2, par 57; ibid, No. 11, Aug 46, part II, sec 2, par 21.

446. CICFE Summation-Korea-No. 16, Jan 47, part II, sec 2, par 13.

447. Hq USAFIK Civil Affairs Sec, Dept Justice, statistical table submitted upon request of Mr. B. Stockton, G-2 Hist Sec, XXIV Corps, 7 Sept 48, sub: Number of Persons Graduated Guard Training School, Korean Department of Justice (with English translation).

448. Dept Justice Monthly Activities Report, June 48, sec G, p 14 (dtd 19 July 48).

449. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 21 July to 27 July 47, sec 8 b, dtd 29 July 47.

450. SKIG [redacted] Activities No. 24, Sept 47, part V, sec 1, par 4, p 112.

451. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 7 June to 12 June 48, dtd 15 June 48.

452. Ltr, USAMGIK Dept Justice Chief Advisor to Administration Bu, to Dir Dept Justice, 22 May 46, sub: Food Rations in National Prisons 27 May 46; ltr, ibid, 30 May 46, sub: Hunger Strike Seoul Prison; re allocation set up by Dir Dept Justice to Natl Food Administrator, June 46; ltrs, Natl Food Administrator ordering Provinicial Mil Governors to issue food to natl prisons according to table submitted, especially ltr to Provincial Governors, 17 June 46, sub: Allotment of Rice to Institutions, Agencies, and other Organizations, par 2; ltr, USAMGIK, Administration Bu, Dept Justice, 13 June 46, Weekly Activities Report re Investigation of Food Strike Seoul Prison; ltr, Natl Food Administrator to Dept Justice re allocation of food to natl prisons, 13 July 46 [redacted] (papers filed USAMGIK Dept Justice under "Food for Prisons, Allocation").

453. R/S, Dir Bu Justice to Bu Police, PMG, Planning Sec, OCA, 26 Oct 45, sub: Entry of Penal Institutions or Police Stations; ltr, Lt Freeman to Dir Bu Justice, 15 Feb 46, sub: Report of Prison Break, Mappo Branch of Seoul Prison; Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 25 Aug to 30 Aug 47, dtd 2 Sept 47.

454. Ltr, Investigation Off to Provincial Mil Governor, 15 Nov 46, sub: Investigation of Prison Break at Chonju, Korea, (filed under "Chonju Prison Reports", USAMGIK Dept Justice).

455. Ltr, Chief Advisor, Penal Bureau and Asst Advisor, to Advisor to Dir Dept Justice, 4 Sept 47, sub: Report of Investigation of Kongju Prison Break; ltr, Asst Advisor Dept Justice, to Advisor to Dir, 29 Oct 47, sub: Kongju Prison; ltr, Dept Justice Court and Prison Liaison Off, to Dir Bu Justice, 5 Mar 46, sub: Report of Escape, Kongju Prison (filed under "Kongju Prison", USAMGIK Dept Justice); SKIC Activities No. 23, Aug 47, part IV, sec 5, par 7.

458. SKIC Activities No. 29, Feb 48, part V, sec 4, par 5.

[redacted]

456. Ltr, Bu Justice Penal Dept, to Dir Bu Justice, 4 Feb 46, sub: Report of Security Needs, Korean Prisons.

457. USAMGIK Dept Justice Court and Prison Liaison Report to Dept Dir, 26 May 47, sub: Investigation of Riot in Seoul Prison. The Report and recommendations were approved. See also MG Press Release, item 5, 12 May 47. Interv, Stockton with Gilliam (who had investigated the riot), 6 Oct 48.

459. MG Press Release, 17 Jan 47, sub: Press Conference of Brig Gen Charles G. Helmick, Deputy Mil Governor.

fn 466. ~~See p. 45, fn 151 on page~~, narrative.
See pp 45, 54 in present narrative, fn 151, 171.

In explaining the reorganization of the Department of Justice which had been in progress during the spring of 1946, the directive announced on 16 May: ~~"~~ "When the legislative phase of Government is established, there will be three great Organs of State — Judicial, Legislative, and Executive."

(NY Times release, 17 May 46, par 3)

460. Interv, Stockton with Gilliam, 6 Oct 48. Korean press view brought out in Press Conf of Brig Gen C.G. Harris, fn 459.

461. SKIG Activities No. 29, Feb 48, part V, sec 4, par 9.

462. TIP, "Justice in South Korea for the Record", vol 2, No. 13, 15 Oct 47; SKIG Activities No. 28, Jan 48, part V, sec 4, par 18.

463. CIC USAPPAC Summation, Korea No. 10, July 46, part II, sec 2, par 58-62, chart re prison industries, p 21.

464. SKIG Press Release, 25 Nov 47.

465. SKIG Activities No. 28, Jan 48, part V, sec 4, par 19.

466. See section on Courts herein, p 45, fn 151 Also Institutes fn 177

467. Mimeo outline address: "Objectives of Military Government Legal Plan - Future Development of Law and Legal Institutions," by Lt Col E.J. Woodall, Gen Counsel and Secy General Affairs Sec, before National Legal Conference, Seoul, 9 Mar 46.

468. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, [redacted] 14 Sept-20 Sept 47, sec 4a; ibid, 21 Sept-27 Sept 47, sec 4; ibid, 29 Sept-4 Oct 47; ibid, 5 Oct-11 Oct 47, sec 4; SKIG Activities No. 26, Nov 47, part V, sec 4, par 19; ibid, No. 32, May 48, part V, sec 3, par 13.

469. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 25 Apr-1 May 48, sec I; ibid, 3 May-8 May 48, sec I, par 5.

470. Ordinance No. 192, Court Organization Law, 4 May 48 (effective 1 June 48).

471. Ibid, sec 2.

472. Ibid, secs 3,5,6,7.

473. Ibid, secs 14,16,17.

474. Ibid, secs 8,19.

475. Ibid, secs 21,22,23.

476. Ibid, secs 25,8, ~~30, 31,32~~ 26,27,28.

477. Ibid, secs 29,8,30,31,32.

478. Ibid, secs 47,48.

479. Ibid, secs ~~45,44~~ 49,51.

480. Ibid, secs 43,44.

481. Ibid, secs 45,46,55.

482. Ibid, Book 3, Conduct of Trial; Book IV, Judicial Administration, secs 83-87, 91-93, 99,100,89.

483. Ordinance No. 192, op cit, sec 110; Ordinance No. 166, 24 Jan 48; Ordinance No. 207, sec VII, 1 July 48.

484. Ordinance No. 176, sec XVII, 20 Mar 48, supplemented by Ordinance No. 180, 31 Mar 48; interv, Stockton with Gilliam and Falk (cited), 6 Oct 48 re American insertion of habeas corpus analogy as sec XVII of the Ordinance. See Appendix III. For conference see Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 22 Mar to 28 Mar 48, sec II, dtd 30 Mar 48. The Chief Justice and two associate justices appointed by the Military Governor, with two members designated by the National Assembly, constituted the Election Review Board established by USAMGIK Executive Order No. 23, 22 June 1948.

485. Dept Justice Weekly Activities Report, 22 Dec to 27 Dec 47, sec 6, par a, dtd 30 Dec 47.

486. Ordinance No. 213, Public Prosecution System Reorganized, secs II, XV, XVIII, 2 Aug 48.

487. Ibid, sec XIV.

488. Ibid, sec VI.

489. Ibid, secs VII-XII.

490. Ibid, secs XVI-XVIII.

491. Ibid, secs XXIII,XXXI, d.

492. For Military Government ordinances, South Korean Interim Government public acts, and proclamations of the Commanding General leading to the election and convening of the National Assembly, see Appendix III, Establishment of Civil Rights in Korea. After the general election, 10 May 1948, outstanding events in the establishment of the Republic of Korea were: KILA dissolved May; National Assembly convened 31 May, organized, and began writing a constitution thereafter; constitution of the Republic of Korea was adopted 12 July, and signed 17 July; Rhee Syng Man was elected President and Lee Si Yung, Vice President, by the National Assembly, 20 July; the President and Vice President were inaugurated 24 July; the Government of the Republic was formed 5 August; President Rhee noti-

Proclamation 7 the Commanding General of National Assembly, dated 25 May;

492 (continued).

fied General Hodge, 9 August, that the Korean Government was ready to take over the administrative affairs of South Korea; the Military Governor on 10 August outlined policy to be pursued in the transfer of functions and responsibilities of SKIG to the Republic of Korea; General Hodge on 11 August designated representatives to confer with the President of Korea in respect to the transfer of the administration of affairs of South Korea to the Republic; Major General William F. Dean was relieved of assignment as Military Governor 15 August; celebration of formation of Republic of Korea in ceremonies attended by General Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, 15 August; Civil Affairs Section, USAFIK, was established as of 2400, 15 August, and Major General Charles G. Helmick, former Deputy Military Governor, was designated Chief of Civil Affairs Section; Mr. John Muccio, Special Representative of the President of the United States, with Ambassadorial rank, arrived 23 August to head the American Diplomatic Mission to Korea; General Hodge and President Rhee signed agreement, 24 August, for progressive transfer to Korean Government jurisdiction over and command of all Korean security forces as rapidly as possible; ~~elections held in USSR-dominated North Korea 25 August;~~ General [redacted] relieved of assignment as Commanding General USAFIK on ____ and Major General John Coulter succeeded him ____; General Hodge departed Korea 27 August 1948 for Japan and the United States for reassignment.

493. Mimeo; Unofficial Translation of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Korea, Preamble, 12 July 48.

494. Ibid, Chapter I, General Provisions, art 1, 2; chapter V, Courts, art 76-83 (art 81 provides for Constitution Committee).

495. XXIV Corps, G-2, W/S # 151, part I, p 5, 6 Aug 48; CAJUS, Hq USAFIK CAS, Dept Justice, 1 Sept 48, sub: Final Activities Report, Dept Justice, 1-15 Aug 48, sec c,4.

496. Memo, HQUSAMGIK, Mil Governor, to Directorate SKIG, 10 Aug 48, sub: Transfer of Government Functions from SKIG to Government of Republic of Korea, par 2,e.

497. Ibid.

498. Memo, TFYJA 014.13, USAPIK, 30 Aug 48, sub: Cooperation with Korean Law Enforcement Agencies.

499. Interv, Stockton with Mr. K.M. Falk, former USAMGIK Dept Justice Ex Off (under Civil Affairs Section after 15 Aug 48), 13 Sept 48. Interv, Stockton with Falk, 25 Oct 48 when CAS Dept Justice legal staff terminated official duties.

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Chapters VI thru XIV

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Headquarters, Far East Command

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1. The inclosed historical manuscript, History of the Occupation of Korea Chapters I through V (Confidential), is submitted herewith for review for possible regrading to UNCLASSIFIED.

2. This action is taken at the suggestion of the Book and Magazine Branch, Public Information Division, in order that a portion of this manuscript may be made available for unofficial research. The specific portion under inquiry is the Chapter entitled "The Quasi-Revolt of October 1946" (See tab B)

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PART III

Chapter VI

Agriculture



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The attached Chapter VI (Part III) of the USAFIK History, entitled "Agriculture in South Korea," was prepared in the spring and summer of 1947 under my direction and editorial supervision by Miss Frances Juanita Wahl of the G-2 Historical Section, XXIV Corps, in Seoul, Korea. Miss Wahl, a former WAC, had no previous historical training but had some journalistic experience. Her work was based upon extensive use of the files of the USAMGIK Department of Agriculture and many interviews with key personnel in agricultural activities in South Korea, who also read and criticized the manuscript.

After clearing the text with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and with General Hodge (who commented favorably upon it), I handcarried this chapter, in duplicate, to the G-2 Historical Section, FEC, in Tokyo, completing delivery on 27 October 1947.

Harold Larson

4 October 1948

HAROLD LARSON
(formerly Chief Historian, XXIV Corps, USAFIK)

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REVIEWED
By Benson
Date 8 Sept 48

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A G R I C U L T U R E

I. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

South Korea is predominantly an agricultural area, whether judged by value of output, value of exports, invested capital, workers employed, distribution of population, national interest, or nature of resources. The natural resources of the Korean peninsula are so distributed that the principal agricultural areas lie in the South, while nearly all the known economically workable metallic ore, coal and hydro-electric resources and most of the marketable timber lie in the North. It is because of this distribution that the extractive and heavy manufacturing industries were developed in the North while agriculture and the light industries predominate in the South.[1]

The climate of South Korea is similar to that part of Virginia lying east of the Blue Ridge, and with the exception of rice, hay and pasture, much the same crops are grown. Rainfall is generally ample for all crops and is well distributed during the growing season for rice, though the rains are sometimes excessive for upland crops during the summer.[2]

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Agriculture in South Korea is characterized by a cereal economy, rice being the principal item of production. The land tilled per farm household is small, averaging about 2.7 acres, slightly less than half of which is irrigated rice land. There were 2,065,477 farm households in South Korea in 1946. Farm housing, tools, equipment and cultural methods are primitive. Production per worker is low and the level of living meager. Intensive methods of hand culture are generally practiced, only the relatively wealthy farmer owning his own draft animal.[3]

While previous to the Japanese annexation in 1910, Korea had been beset by recurrent famine and pestilence which seriously checked population growth, during the past 35 years the number of persons in all Korea has doubled. In 1947 the population of South Korea alone was estimated at 19.3 million, distributed occupationally as follows: farming, 64 percent; part-time farming, 13 percent; and non-farming, 23 percent.[4]

Korea's population increased annually at the rate of 1.7 percent between 1940 and 1944. Programs to insure better and more adequate diet and improved facilities for medical care, sanitation, and hospitalization, if successful, may raise the current annual rate of

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natural increase over deaths. If a rate of 2 percent increase is assumed annually, with no migration, South Korea would have a population of 25 million in 1960 and 37 million in 1980. Even though the rate of natural increase should be considerably less than the one assumed, it would still be necessary for South Korea to increase agricultural production substantially in order to become self-sufficient in food. There is also a need to increase rice production to a level where previous exports may be resumed without adversely affecting the domestic diet.[5]

B. Japanese Rule

During the period of Japanese annexation, progress was made in increasing the production of rice, wheat, barley, soybeans, cotton and fruits, by improving existing irrigation works and extending such projects to include new areas. Improvements were also made in seed varieties and in disease and insect control. Systems of transportation, communication, warehousing and distribution were renovated, as well as methods of disseminating scientific findings in agriculture. These beneficent activities were accompanied by the development of adverse conditions in land tenure and in indebtedness of agriculture as an industry. While crop yields

increased, the farmers' standard of living dropped, and the number of tenants increased from one-third to one-half until non-owners made up 80 percent of Korea's total farming population.[6]

During the early thirties, the Japanese eased up on the rice expansion program in Korea and substituted campaigns to expand cotton and sheep production in order to reduce Japan's dependence on Australia for wool, and on the United States and India for cotton. The cotton programs, which concerned South Korea, met with considerable success, acreage in that area increasing from an average of 364,000 acres for the years 1930, '34, '36 to 582,000 for 1940-44. The sericulture industry was vigorously promoted during the Japanese regime; however during war years emphasis was again centered on increased rice production. Because of war needs for chemicals, the rice program was augmented by a five-year program beginning in 1941, to expand the production of farm-made fertilizer.[7]

Korean agriculture was tightly controlled by the Japanese, particularly during the war years, by a large army of Japanese agricultural administrators, technicians, and policeman who were spread throughout the country to plan, direct, and supervise the activities

of every farmer. Prices of commodities were rigidly restricted and surplus agricultural production was collected and either rationed to non-suppliers or exported to Japan and Manchuria.[8]

Judging from agricultural export figures available for the years 1930-40, there seems to have been a net export of cereals and pulses of over a million metric tons annually from the whole of Korea, including principally brown rice, soybeans, millet, and wheat. While exports increased, per capita consumption of rice declined 41 percent from the period 1916-1920 to 1920-36, or from 226 pounds a year per person, to 134 pounds.[9]

C. American Occupation

Upon entry of the United States Army into South Korea on 8 September 1945, all control over prices, distribution, rationing, and farm activities was lifted and a free market declared on all commodities, followed precipitately by skyrocketing inflation. Within a year, the price of polished rice rose from ¥ 9.4 per bushel to ¥ 2,800 in Seoul, and as of March 1947, the price had fallen only to ¥ 2,000 per bushel.*

*Yen: When Americans first entered Korea, the value of the Korean yen was set at 15 yen to one American dollar. This value was purely theoretical, since one American dollar brought anywhere from three to five hundred, and sometimes more, yen in value, or in illegal exchange on the black market. During March 1947, the legal exchange rate was revised to 50 yen to one American dollar, but the exchange was still highly unrealistic. In view of these facts, no attempt has been made to change yen prices into comparable American sums.

Inflation was inevitably accompanied by great hardship to wage earners in the cities whose wages rose much less than prices. Moreover, in the early months of the occupation, great quantities of rice were eaten by farmers and others financially able to pay the exorbitant prices, and this increased the rate of consumption to such a point that large imports of cereals from the United States were necessary during the latter part of 1946.[10]

For forty years Korean farmers had been subjected to strict control over their production activities, and when restrictions were suddenly lifted, farmers took a holiday from the arduous tasks imposed upon them by the Japanese. It seemed that to Koreans "Freedom" as brought by the Americans meant "Freedom from work," with the result that production diminished and the planted area of fall grains declined from 2,372,713 acres (average for 1940-44) to only 1,747,193 acres* in the fall of 1945.[11]

With the swift repatriation of all Japanese to their homeland, confusion reigned throughout agriculture, as in all other Korean industries and activities. Many records were destroyed or removed. An entirely new army of Korean administrators, technicians and policemen was recruited, sketchily trained and planted in vacant positions so that the wheels of

---

*The Korean term most commonly used to denote extent of land is chungbo, or 2.47 acres. For purposes of ease in comprehension while reading, all chungbo figures have been translated into acres. Similar approximations have been made for other Korean terms of measure throughout the chapter, translating "kwan" into pounds, "suk" into bushels, and so forth.

Korean agriculture might resume their revolutions, albeit creakily and slowly. The entire governmental service to agriculture had to be reorganized, staffed, trained and directed. Meanwhile, precautionary measures were taken to save the primary and secondary seed stocks for the 1946 spring rice planting. The area of the 1946 rice planting exceeded the average for the years 1940-44 by 7 percent, or 176,162 acres; however lack of fertilizer caused yields to drop 18 percent below the 1940-44 average during a year of abundant rainfall when a bumper crop might otherwise have been expected. During the last years of the war, Korean farmers had received less and less chemical fertilizer, as the result of heavy chemical demands of the Japanese armed forces. Japanese administrators foresaw this contingency when the United States entered the war, and instituted in Korea a subsidized program to increase the production of farm supplied fertilizer, which reached its height in 1944-45 when 41.3 pounds of nitrogen were reported to have been produced for each acre of planted land. In the following year, with the subsidy removed and all controls lifted, the production of farm supplied fertilizer dropped to an all time low of only 18.3 pounds of nitrogen per acre, with a resultant low rice yield.[12]

Following liberation, Korean farmers expected greatly increased supplies of chemical fertilizer for the 1945 fall and spring planting; this hope was not realized, and crops were planted with no chemical fertilizer except a negligible amount which was smuggled down from the ammonium sulphate plants of North Korea.

During the period of Japanese rule, landlordism had been encouraged as a means of grain collection. Tenancy had increased and rents generally absorbed 50 percent or more of the principal crops raised. Under American Military Government, Ordinance No. 9, 5 October 1945, oppressive farm rental rates were reduced to a level not to exceed one-third of the crop, and Ordinance No. 33, 6 December 1945, decreed that title to all Japanese-owned property, whether owned individually or by corporations, was vested in the United States Army Military Government in Korea. The cultivated farm lands thus vested amounted to some 700,000 acres, or about 12.5 percent of the total cultivated area of 5.6 million acres.

It was the intention of Military Government that this land be sold, in economically sized units, to tenant farmers, and in March 1946 an ordinance was proposed to dispose of former Japanese owned lands, but was not acted upon at that time. In the fall of 1947 Military Government contended

that disposal of the Japanese lands whould be resolved by the Korean government, and the problem was under study, together with a land reform program, by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.[13]

D. Military Government Administrative Set-up

Originally established as the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce in September 1945 when American troops entered South Korea and set up the United States Army Military Government in Korea, the bureaus were separated on 13 February 1946,[14] and on 29 March 1946 the name was changed from Bureau to Department, with successively subordinate divisions in each department being termed Bureaus, Sections, and Sub-sections.[15] Throughout its divorce from Commerce, its change in nomenclature, and minor revisions in the Table of Organization, the Military Government Department of Agriculture maintained approximately the same administrative table of organization.[16]

Headed by an advisor to the Korean director of agriculture, and a deputy advisor, the department in 1947 was divided into five bureaus; Agricultural Production, Agricultural Economics, Forestry, Fisheries, and the Korean Agricultural Association. Under the Bureau of Agricultural Production came Sections:

Production, Livestock, Sericulture, Cotton and Fiber, Farm Supply, Irrigation and Land Reclamation, and the Central and Branch Agricultural Experiment Stations, which in turn were divided into Sub-sections. The Korean Agricultural Association, not strictly speaking a bureau but placed in that category for administrative purposes, was comprised of the Agriculture Enterprise Department, the Education and Training Department, and the General Affairs Department. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics had two sections: Statistical and Land policy, while the Forestry Bureau also had two divisions; Production and Forest Research. Fisheries struggled along with no Sections.[17]

Heads of the various departments, bureaus and sections were originally termed directors, chiefs, and heads, but in line with the Koreanization policy, these were gradually changed and reclassified "Advisor to the Director," "Advisor to the Chief," etc.

Agricultural Economics: --The various bureaus of the Department of Agriculture are generally covered extensively elsewhere in this chapter; but as the primary functions of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics were the collecting, compiling, filing and/or publishing of facts and figures relating to the activities of other Department of Agriculture bureaus, a lengthy report of the bureau's activities is not deemed necessary.

Under the Japanese, there had been no bureau, section or office devoted entirely to agricultural economics but under Military Government such a bureau was set up in the Department of Agriculture. The organization of the bureau, as described on 1 August 1946 and applying to the bureau from the first days of the occupation until August 1947, contained four sections: General Affairs, Agricultural Policy, Grain Grading and Inspection, and Statistical. The General Affairs Section dealt with personnel matters, records and accounts, supplies and budgets. The Policy Section studied and recommended policy procedure and contained four subsections. The Grain Grading and Inspection Section with three subsections, established standards, rules and regulations for the grading of grain for the market, and supervised and

instructed grain inspectors in the technical aspects of their work. In addition, it operated a cereal research laboratory where studies and recommendations were made with reference to grain and vegetable oil storage, drying, manufacture, and use of substitutes and machinery. The Statistical Section collected, compiled, evaluated, analyzed, published and distributed agricultural statistics, both Korean and other, and was divided into four sub-sections. Under the new 1947 table of organization, which was put into effect in August 1947, there were also four sections: Agricultural Policy, Rural Guidance, Grain Grading and Inspections, and Agricultural Statistics.

The primary function of the Agricultural Economics Bureau was to collect statistics having to do with agriculture in South Korea. The bureau also handled financial and personnel matters for the Department of Agriculture, and managed in other activities such as the supervision of a Cereal Research Laboratory, the inspection of grains for the market, and the fostering of infant and adult education in agriculture throughout the provinces.

As noted in the Department of Agriculture's June 1947 report to the Military Governor, outlining

"Department Accomplishments" for the preceding year, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics succeeded in establishing a central Statistical Section. By means of a widespread web of employees scattered throughout South Korea, but controlled by the national Statistical Section under the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, this section for the first time set up a competent system for collecting agricultural statistics which were both comprehensive and accurate. Since its creation the Bureau of Agricultural Economics furnished figures for various publications, such as: "Selected Economic Statistics for South Korea" published in January 1947, with a second edition in February, by the National Economic Board; and "Present Agricultural Position of South Korea," published by USAMGIK in April 1947.

II. PRODUCTION

Introduction: --In 1946 the 24,975,239 acres in South Korea were classified as follows: 24.2 percent cultivated, 73.6 percent, forested; 0.1 percent, wasteland, and 2.1 percent, other.

In 1946, 75.6 percent of the cultivated area of South Korea was devoted to cereals, 10 percent to pulses (leguminous crops), 3.6 percent to vegetables, 2.7 percent to potatoes, 0.5 percent to fruits, 6.5 percent to fiber crops, food crops accounting for 92.7 percent of the total. Only two significant changes within the seven main categories of crops appeared in recent years: during the years 1930,34,36, leguminous crops occupied 14 percent of the planted area, while by 1946 this figure had dropped to 10 percent. Fiber crops had risen to 9.6 percent in the 1940-44 average but dropped back to 6.5 percent in 1946. During the early war years, the Japanese encouraged the expansion of cotton production, and planted acreage in this crop rose from 4.7 percent for the 1930,34,36 average, to 7.2 in 1940-44, dropped to 6.2 in 1945 and declined again to 4.8 in 1946. Lack of chemical fertilizer had much to do with this decrease.

During recent years, as a result of the low yields produced without the aid of sufficient amounts of commercial fertilizer, the area of cultivated land in South Korea declined from 8,255,433 acres in 1930-34-36, to 6,146,758 acres in 1946.[18]

A. Food Crops

1. Rice, wheat, and other cereals

Introduction:- Cereals are the chief items of the Korean diet, and rice is the principal food. In recent years rice has occupied from 32 to 42 percent of the planted area, depending upon the percentages of double cropping in any one year. For example, in 1946 rice occupied 41.4 percent of the entire planted area, while if the usual double cropping had taken place, the percentage would have been lower, perhaps no more than 32 percent. The yield and production of rice in 1946 were 82 percent and 87.8 percent, respectively, of the yields and production in 1940-44. The area planted to rice in 1946 exceeded the 1940-44 average by 6.9 percent. Climatic conditions and rainfall in 1946 were exceptionally favorable to rice production except for a few fields that were washed out by the early summer floods. The limiting factor to a bumper crop in 1946 was the absence of chemical fertilizer and the low production in 1945-46 of farm-supplied manure.

Summer grains, including common barley, naked barley, wheat and rye, comprised 26.7 percent of the planted area in 1946, as against 34.9 percent in

the 1940-44 average. The two barleys combined occupied 22.4 percent as against 31.3 percent in 1940-44. For the same period a slight decrease occurred in wheat and a considerable increase in rye. In the 1940-44 average, 2,458,042 acres were planted in barleys, whereas in 1946 the planted area had dropped to only 1,471,769 acres. This marked decline, of 40 percent, can be attributed to a shortage of farm supplied manure, absence of chemical fertilizer, and failure of farmers to plant.

Other cereals (millet, buckwheat, corn, sorghum and oats) occupied collectively 9.8 percent of the planted area in 1946 as against 8.7 percent in 1940-44. However the decrease in actual planted area is more significant than those percentages seem to indicate because the total planted area was much larger in 1940-44. The actual decline in planted area was 27.4 percent, while the yield in 1946 was 105.3 percent of normal (1940-44 average) and the production 76.4 percent. Buckwheat is generally grown following grain or potatoes, which are heavily fertilized.

From 1930 to 1946, the total area planted in cereals gradually decreased from 6,269,483 acres to 5,069,328 acres, with rice decreasing from 3,066,155 to 2,766,678 acres.

Summer grains decreased from 2,532,985 acres to 1,782,123 acres while other cereals declined from 670,343 acres to 620,528 acres. The low production of summer grains in 1945 was caused by unfavorable climatic conditions, shortage of chemical fertilizer, and a large decline in planted area. The yield and production of summer grains for 1945 were only 50.2 and 36.1 percent, respectively, of the 1940-44 averages, and in 1946 the corresponding percentages were 99.4 and 61.5. Limiting factors in 1946 were again absence of chemical fertilizer and further reduction in planted area. Climatic conditions were favorable for a large yield, except for floods which occurred after the grains had ripened. Production of rice declined from 67,932,695 bushels in 1930-34-36 to 60,235,615 bushels in 1946. Summer grain production decreased from 42,913,915 bushels in 1930-34-36 to 29,049,855 bushels in 1946, while other cereals declined from 7,209,455 to 4,738,760 bushels in 1946.[19]

Summary of the Rice Problem

History of the rice problem confronting the United States Military Government in Korea was summarized by the Military Governor, Major General Archer L. Lerch, at a press conference on 15 October 1946 as follows.

When the United States Army came into Korea, the people demanded that all Japanese be removed from responsible positions and deported. This demand was met, and as a result the rice collection program collapsed and was replaced by the free market. Under this plan very little rice came in and finally none at all. Farmers refused to sell their rice, and by February 1946, city dwellers were going hungry. In an attempt to rectify the situation, a rice collection plan was put into operation, but already more than half of the 1945 rice crop had been consumed, and collection, hampered by flood, railroad strikes and non-cooperation, fell short of the required 22,500,000 bushels, resulting in the issue of five ounces per person a day instead of the anticipated ten ounces. Collection of summer grain helped some, but without American aid at the rate of 32,000 tons of grain each month, Koreans would have gone

hungry.

The collection program of 1946-7 differed from its predecessor in that it required only a specified quota from each farmer, who was allowed to retain and eventually dispose of the remainder as he saw fit, whereas under the first collection plan of spring 1946, all rice in excess of 2.25 bushels per person was demanded.

By March 1947, after eighteen months of grappling with the rice problem, Military Government had discovered two important facts: first, Korea is not a rice surplus country, and second, if given a free hand, Koreans would consume the entire rice crop in a few months and face famine and starvation until the next harvest. Accordingly, a strict rice collection program was imperative until Koreans realized the need of voluntary self-rationing.

Significance of Rice in Korea

In treating the rice problem of Korea during the U.S. occupation, it should be kept in mind that: Korea is predominantly an agricultural country, 75 percent of its population being engaged in farming; rice consistently forms more than 50 percent of the total annual agricultural yield; and finally, Korea is

in effect on the rice instead of the gold standard.[20]

For centuries rice has played an important role in the economy of Korea. In 710 B.C., the year of the first great recorded rice famine, the Korean King Kwul, of the Ki-Ja dynasty, selected a number of his subjects who were well versed in the Chinese language and customs, attired them appropriately and dispatched them and a great fleet of ships, loaded with fish, salt and copper, across the Yellow Sea, where they bartered successfully with the Chinese and returned, their ships laden with rice.

Mention of famine occurs frequently in Korean annals, although in 661 A.D. rice was so plentiful in Sil-la (one of the three currently existing Korean kingdoms) that it required thirty bags to purchase a single bolt of grass cloth. In 984 A.D., the king of Sil-la erected large warehouses in various parts of the country for the storage of rice to be used in time of want, and as an emergency measure, during years of poor production, all or part of the required revenues were remitted to the farmer.

China continued to play fairy godmother to Korea during her lean years. In 1273 A.D., she sent 20,000 bags of rice to Korea, and repeated the procedure

in 1280; but in 1289 A.D. the tables were turned and the Chinese emperor demanded 100,000 bags from Korea, which was able to supply only 60,000.

Throughout their four thousand year old civilization, the Koreans invoked the protection of their spirits against drought, floods, and blight, and the aid of their Chinese neighbor to the west when prayers proved futile and the rice crop failed.[21]

Japanese Policy

Under the rule of their Japanese neighbor to the east, however, Koreans underwent a number of bewildering changes in agricultural policy. Gradually, under the yoke of Japan, they came to use rice as a luxury food, depending for the bulk of their diet on millet, barley, and other coarser grains imported for them from China and Manchuria.

Briefly, from the formal annexation of Korea in 1910 to the Japanese rice shortage in 1918, the policy of Japan was to "make haste slowly." In Korea the Japanese objectives were: gradual advance, avoidance of encouraging too many things at once, encouragement first of what was easy to realize, and finally, practical leadership.

Feeling the pinch of famine, however, in 1918, Japan abandoned her initial tactics and embarked upon an all-out program of increased rice production, inaugurating a 30-year plan toward that end. By 1933 she had spent more than a hundred million yen on this program and had succeeded in extorting 85 percent of the quota assigned to Korea; but by 1930 an oversupply of rice had developed and the Korean farmer, who for years had been ordered to rely upon other grains for his table, suddenly was advised of the desirability of rice as a food product. The rice production program was discontinued, and a plan of increased industrial production substituted, with the slogan "Cotton in the south; sheep in the north."

This plan for the "intensification and diversification" of Korean agriculture lasted till 1938, when war with China caused the Japanese to reverse their policy and to institute a new rice production program based upon a five-year followed by a seven-year plan, while the Korean farmer was again told to cut down on his rice consumption and to return to millet, barley, maize, and other grains.[22] An average 43 percent of each year's rice yield for the years 1936-40 was exported to Japan, and in 1944 as a war expedient, this figure

reached 75 percent. Although the rice collection program under the Japanese was rigidly enforced and violations were severely punished, the low prices paid by the Japanese drove the people to the flourishing black market, where they received ¥ 300 per bushel for their rice. Consequently the most stringent efforts of the Japanese to stamp out this illegal traffic proved unsuccessful.[23] Immediately prior to the American occupation of South Korea, on 1 September 1945, the Japanese provincial governors were ordered to ship 5,000,000 bags of rice each to Japan; however, because of lack of shipping, no significant amount of rice left the country as a result of this order.[24]

American Arrival

When American troops landed in Korea on 8 September 1945, the existence of a rice shortage was the most unexpected of the many problems they encountered. Korea was known as a rice exporting country, and predictions in the fall of 1945 pointed toward a comfortable surplus. It was therefore an upsetting shock for Military Government to discover that "Korea had never produced sufficient rice for her own needs and probably never would."[25]

Before the bulk of the U.S. occupation forces had landed, the shape of things to come cast its shadow before. On 8 September 1945, a self-styled Provisional Korean Committee boarded the CATOCTIN, presented itself to XXIV Corps officers, reported that the food situation in Korea was "very bad" and that the food crop of 1944 had been "only fair."[26]

When Americans discovered that a food shortage did exist, that warehouses were almost empty and the new rice crop had not yet reached the market, Military Government took the following steps. Exports were forbidden. Grain and vegetables were ordered to the cities where need was most pressing. Warehouses were seized, inventory taken, and as a result, a rice ration exceeding by 25 percent the Japanese quota of about 10 ounces per person was issued, which it was hoped could be continued until October, when the 1945 harvest would reach trade channels.[27]

When, on 3 October 1945 during General Hodge's staff conference, it was announced that Military Government was having trouble buying rice on the market, the shortage was attributed largely to lack of transportation. Accordingly both United States and Japanese army trucks were employed to augment inadequate Korean facilities

in an effort to bring food from the provinces.

Although the shortage was considered temporary, the lack of rice led to "incidents." First shots of the occupation were fired by U.S. troops on 17 September 1945, when a mob of from twenty-five to thirty thousand Koreans, who had heard there was to be a rice distribution, gathered at a warehouse southeast of Seoul. Discovering their error, they became unruly and set fire to the building. The fire was put out immediately, and by firing into the air, U.S. troops succeeded in breaking up the mob without casualties. However, the Koreans reassembled on the following day and during the ensuing fracas three Koreans were killed before the crowd was dispersed by American soldiers.[28]

The rice problem was expected to resolve itself when the new crop was harvested, for all predictions pointed toward an unusually good year. The Korean head of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce, Dr. Lee Hoon Koo, predicted a yield of 23,000,000 bags for all of Korea, including 17,000,000 for the American occupied area. Since the population south of the 38th parallel was only 62 percent of the total for the entire country, the fact that 73 percent of the 1945 rice crop would be available augured an exportable surplus of at least

1,000,000 bags, although cabbage and radish yields for the year were disappointing.[29]

This official optimism was reflected on 27 September 1945 in the KEIJO NIPPO (SEOUL DAILY), which reported happily: "Fortunately this year's harvest has been very good...in this vicinity even if the rations are doubled, only about [70,000,000 bushels] will be used. Therefore there will be [20,000,000 bushels] of rice unused and left over."

A Free Market in Rice.

In the early fall of 1945 all signs pointed toward establishment of a free market in rice. There would be no Korean rice exported to Japan, whereas previously that nation had absorbed a large proportion of each annual yield. The 1945 Korean rice crop promised to be the largest in years. It would be difficult under "democratic" procedures to maintain the strict control practiced by the Japanese on rice collection, especially since Military Government was hampered by lack of personnel; moreover, such a continuance of restrictions, which connoted to every Korean the hated rule of the Japanese, was bound to affect adversely the popularity of the Americans and the cooperation

which they could expect from the Koreans. If the market were thrown wide open, it was expected that farmers and business men who were hoarding rice in anticipation of higher prices would be encouraged to bring their hidden stores to market, and finally, since the Japanese were being repatriated from Korea as fast as shipping facilities would permit, the number of rice consumers in Korea was decreasing daily. Under these circumstances, a free market in rice was strongly indicated.

Consequently on 5 October 1945, by order of the Military Governor, General Notice No. 1, "Free Market in Rice," went into effect which, with one exception, abolished all restrictions on the rice market. The single exception was certain to have Korean support, since it provided that all rice owned by Japanese nationals or produced on Japanese-owned property should be sold to the Korean Commodity Company and held in reserve. To put a floor under the market price, which was expected to drop drastically when controls were removed, that company was empowered to buy any and all rice offered at ¥ 32 per bag weighing 54 kilograms.

This notice was followed two weeks later by General Notice No. 2, dated 20 October 1945, "Free

Commodity Market," which similarly removed restrictions from the sale of all commodities except those normally monopolized by the government; namely, tobacco, salt, opium, ginseng, sugar, medicines, and pharmaceuticals. These two notices had as their primary aims; to stimulate trade, to increase production, to lower prices, and to bring hoarded goods into trade channels.

The only official dissenting opinion recorded at this time was voiced by the Seoul City Hall General Affairs Supervisor, Captain Ford M. Milam, who stated; "Had this office been given an opportunity to express an opinion, it would have recommended strongly against 'complete and unrestrained freedom in trade'."[30]

Military Government now sat back watchfully to await a fall in the market price, an influx of hoarded rice, and an eventual stabilization of the market by virtue of the familiar law of supply and demand.[31] Actually there was a slight drop in the price of rice immediately after General Notice No. 1 went into effect, but instead of remaining in the lower level or falling still further, the reverse occurred. The Korean Commodity Company's minimum price of ₩ 32, intended to insure the farmer a fair price for his market, became the rock bottom figure, and few farmers brought their

rice to the company for sale. At the time of the establishment of the free market, rice was ¥ 70 a bag in Seoul. On 23 October 1945, the Korean Commodity Company raised its price to ¥ 50 but by 22 November, the free market figure was ¥ 84 and in the following week it had risen to ¥ 100. The company again raised the minimum price to ¥ 80 and by 4 December 1945 it was authorized pay "any reasonable price," but by 8 January 1946 it had succeeded in buying only 184,740 bags (230,920 bushels) of rice, as the prevailing market price kept skipping provocatively ahead of the legal figures.[32]

The failure of the Korean Commodity Company to obtain any considerable reserve of rice defeated a prime purpose of the free market: to create a backlog in its warehouses which, combined with rice from the acreage controlled by the New Korea Company, could be used to stabilize the rice market in future emergencies. It was believed that, "If the company has the ability to throw sufficient quantities of rice into retail market to satisfy consumer demands not supplied at reasonable cost, this necessarily will determine the market price by the consumer."[33]

But farmers distrusted the newly named Korean Commodity Company because the practices of its antecedent, the Chosen Food Company, had been "dedicated to pinching the Korean farmer and sending his rice to Japan."[34] Moreover, he could get much more for his rice elsewhere, should he choose to sell it, and therein lay the basic reason for the rice shortage. There simply were not enough commodities available on the market to induce the farmer to part with his rice. Although industry was being revitalized throughout South Korea, the results were not to become apparent for many months. Meanwhile, finding nothing of value on the market, the farmer held on to his rice since "a farmer with rice feels his security but a farmer with just money is a poor man indeed."[35] This led to a vicious circle. The farmer held his rice, causing the price to rise. Since rice is the key commodity in Korean economy, other necessities rose in proportion; the purchasing power of yen dropped, and the farmer clung to his rice more tightly than ever.

Dr. Lee Hoon Koo, Director of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce, sought to explain away the current shortage in a statement to the press on 19 October 1945. He blamed the difference in price (¥ 40 in the provinces, ¥ 50 in Seoul) on lack of transportation,

explained that the farmer did not wish to bring his produce to market because of the recently abolished compulsory rice contribution system, the expectation that prices would rise in the near future, and the aforementioned lack of transportation. He added that although warehouses were currently almost empty, the new rice crop was expected soon and its arrival should normalize the market price.

When neither the arrival of the bulk of the 1945 rice crop, nor the normalization in market price came about, numerous individuals, groups and organizations flooded Military Government with suggestions designed to bring rice to the market. The Kyonggi-Do Department of Agriculture advocated either of two courses; that the Korean Commodity Company buy at high prices, with the additional incentive of government-held commodities at pre-liberation prices being made available to farmers selling to the company, and to re-sell on ration at ₩ 300, the government absorbing the loss; or that Military Government establish a maximum price and require producers to turn over their excess to the Korean Commodity Company. The second plan was the method used by the Japanese, but it was felt that the "sting" could be taken out by selling

consumer goods at pre-liberation prices.[36]

On 6 December 1945, Military Government adopted the "incentive" plan to induce the farmer to bring his rice to market. Among the commodities seized from the Japanese and stored in Materials Control Corporation warehouses, were socks, pants, blankets, rubber boots, cloth, gasoline, and other necessities. Originally such commodities were intended for use as a stabilizing backlog to be thrown on the market when prices became unreasonable, and in one instance a single issue of white socks in Seoul caused the prevailing market price to fall from ¥ 60 to ¥ 6. However, this plan was changed when the Korean Commodity Company began issuing certificates of priority to farmers who sold their rice to it. These certificates, valid for sixty days, entitled the farmer to buy available commodities from Materials Control Corporation at reasonable prices. But this scheme also failed, for by 15 January 1946 it had reaped a harvest of only 864,798 bags of rice, and the plan was discontinued on 15 January 1946.[37]

Another attempt was made to loosen up the market by a volunteer group known variously as The Patriots' Committee and The Korean Rice Committee. At a press conference on 11 December 1945, General Arnold announced

that fifty business men in Seoul had approached Dr. Rhee Syng Man and offered to contribute their services in an effort to persuade farmers of the advisability of selling their rice to the Korean Commodity Company. Doctor Rhee referred the committee to General Arnold, who accepted their services.

Their plan was to select 150 representatives who would go out into the provinces and talk with the farmers. Such representatives, and members of the committee itself, would have no financial interest in the program, as their motives were presumably purely patriotic. They were to help the farmer realize he must sell his rice so that city dwellers might eat and continue to produce the industrial commodities needed by the farmer. The campaign was aimed at a total collection of 10 million bushels of rice but achieved only a small fraction of this amount.

When General Arnold submitted the committee's proposal to Korean newspapermen, they received the idea coldly and objected to the committee not as individuals but as a whole. It seemed the "tone" of its composition did not augur for success. When General Arnold asked if there were any objections to the chairman and vice-chairman, there were none. However, the general reaction

was pessimistic, and subsequent events proved that this attitude was justified.[38]

In December 1945 Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff, State Department advisor to General Hodge, reported to Washington that the growing rice shortage was due to abnormal "flush of freedom" consumption, with much rice being used in sake, candy, and as feed for pigs and chickens; reluctance of farmers to sell because of scarcity of consumer goods and low money value, together with the mistaken belief that their rice would be shipped to Japan, and deliberate withholding from the market with the hope of increased prices later; an increased population in Korea arising from the arrival of refugees from Japan and Soviet-occupied areas; and lack of transportation. Mr. Benninghoff did not mention smuggling of rice into Japan, which undoubtedly helped deplete Korea's rice supply.

Subsequently, several governmental decrees were issued in an effort to relieve the shortage. For example, on 30 October 1945, Military Government published an ordinance prohibiting among other things "the hoarding of essential commodities and/or their sale at excessive price, which would result in profiteering at the expense of the people,"[39] but the effectiveness

of this ordinance was considerably reduced by the absence of any definition of the terms "hoarding...essential... excessive...profiteering" and amounted to no more than an admonitory finger wagging. By an order effective 28 December 1945, rice was declared to be in critical demand, and the establishment of retail ceiling prices (averaging ¥ 38 per small mal) effective 1 January 1946, was authorized. But far from driving hoarded rice into trade channels, this had the opposite effect, and "as the ceiling price on rice went into effect...the product...disappeared from the open market."[40]

The people spoke up through the medium of their newspapermen and demanded immediate action by Military Government, but when scouting teams went into the country to ferret out stores of illegally hoarded rice, they discovered that the bulk of the product was held in small amounts by scattered farmers and land-owners. Some people accused the farmers of hoarding; the farmers blamed the "greedy merchants"; and the merchants claimed that in the high cost of transportation lay the basic difficulty.[41]

Why Free Market Failed

In retrospect it is easy to see why the free

market was doomed to failure. In deciding upon this course, although the reasons in its favor were many and strong, several contingencies and circumstances were overlooked.

True it was that no rice was to be exported to Japan, but Military Government was unaware that Koreans had come to consider rice a luxury grain and had depended for the bulk of their diet on other grains which were imported from China and Manchuria, and that these imports exceeded in quantity the exports of Korean rice. It was also true that repatriation of Japanese nationals would apparently reduce the total consuming public in Korea, but no account was taken of the thousands of Korean repatriates from Japan and the Soviet occupied areas of North Korea and Manchuria, whose arrival more than offset departure of the Japanese. While continuance of strict market controls might have affected adversely the popularity of Military Government, the subsequent food shortage produced the same effect.

The year 1945 brought a bumper crop of rice, but unpredictable, of course, was the unprecedented rate of consumption by Koreans. Normally consuming about 10 ounces per day of rice per person, during the winter months of 1945-46, Koreans consumed or otherwise

disposed of 28 ounces per day, and by the end of January 1946, more than 40 percent of the year's rice crop had disappeared.[42]

It had been reasonable to assume that a free market would encourage farmers to bring out their hoarded rice, but glossed over in making the original decision was the basic root of the problem; the lack of reasonably priced commodities on the market which would induce the farmer to give up his rice. Another fact not brought to light in the early days of the occupation was that many of the 200,000 Japanese troops occupying Korea had been engaged in agricultural pursuits.[43]

The sad fact emerged that Korea was simply not a food surplus country. Even if no rice had been smuggled to Japan, and if all hoarded supplies had been brought to the market, there still would have been barely enough rice for Korean needs. A contributing factor to this situation was that the population of Korea had doubled within the preceding thirty-five years, while the area of arable land had increased only slightly.[44]

Attitude of the Koreans

The attitude of the people of South Korea toward the rice problem typified their reaction to the occupation

as a whole: "Let Military Government do it." As indicated by their press, they strongly advocated removal of market controls until they had attained their objective and found it wouldn't work. They then asked Military Government to take firm steps toward regulating the supply and distribution of rice, specifically by forcing hoarders to disgorge through use of military police, and by sending army trucks to bring rice to the market.[45] After "firm steps" were taken and a rice collection plan instituted, they again reversed their stand and advised that the program be abandoned and a free market reinstated.

Either the free market or the first rice collection program could have succeeded without too much difficulty had it received the support of the Korean people. Yet despite appeals to his patriotism and common sense, the individual Korean continued plotting his course in paths that brought the most yen into his own pocket, and when all official attempts to solve the rice problem broke down, he bitterly blamed the Military Government. As one observer put it, "The instinct of the Korean when faced by a difficult problem is 'the government should solve this for me'...The Korean in practically all walks of life thinks an economic

fact or problem can be legislated out of existence."[46]

This refusal by the Koreans to shoulder any responsibility for solving their own difficulties was evidenced again in the recorded reactions of the XXIV Corps Information and Historical Officer, after attending a press meeting during which the Koreans were asked to aid in discouraging unidentified persons from distributing leaflets intimidating Japanese nationals still in Korea; and in keeping the local trolleys in running condition. He observed; "Even when a constructive criticism is suggested, they seem to prefer to make excuses and throw the ball to us...in any case they [Koreans] seem unwilling to accept the responsibility of taking action themselves in anything which carries an implication or criticism of a group of Koreans or all Koreans."[47]

The same frame of mind was apparent in the toleration by Koreans as a whole of actions by individuals and groups obviously working against the welfare of the people. Although there was strong public opinion against the legal movement of rice from areas where it was grown to locales where there was greater need, large-scale smuggling went on at a reported rate of 300 bags of rice per day from the eastern coast of

Korea to Japan, where smugglers received ¥ 1,200 per bushel on the black market. "Informers" were promised 25 percent of the value of all rice discovered and an additional bonus of 10 percent of any fines levied as the result of information leading to apprehension of these criminals. But informers were few, and while the rice shortage continued these same cognizant Koreans who kept silent about smuggling activities within their knowledge, loudly demanded action by Military Government to relieve the lack of food.[48]

At the 38th parallel an organization of the People's Republic, purporting to represent the farmer's union, bought rice at half the current market price and shipped it north into the Russian zone. Members of the same political party intimidated farmers, warned them not to sell to Military Government, interfered directly with legal shipments of rice, and spread the rumor that Korean rice was being exported to Japan by the Americans.[49]

Provincial officials who at joint American-Korean meetings professed strong lip-support of the rice collection program actually entered the black market as heads of local committees to procure rice for their own bailiwicks, and a group known as the People's Secret

Society, or Secret Fraternity, had as its raison d'etre the encouragement of the farmer to hide his rice, to sell it on the black market, and in general employed all available means to hamper the collection program.[50]

Deciding Upon Rice Procurement

When the South Korean Provincial Military Governors met in Seoul on 23-25 January 1946, the main topic of discussion was the proposed Rice Procurement Plan. Behind this meeting lay the alarming discrepancy between the estimated and the actual consumption of rice in South Korea. According to figures subsequently released by Military Government, although normal rice consumption had been estimated at 12 ounces per day per person, during the winter months of 1945-46, rice had disappeared at the rate of 28 ounces per person. Under these circumstances it was obvious that if the free market continued, there would be no rice for anyone during the months of July, August, and September 1946.[51]

The procurement plan proposed and agreed upon by the provincial governors aimed at the collection of 25,000,000 bushels of rice, 5,000,000 of which would be transported to deficit areas while the remainder would

be held in the provinces where it was collected.[52] The estimated rice yield for 1945 was based on available figures from 1936-38 and 1940-41, all good rice years. A population estimate was made on the basis of the Japanese figure of April 1945, plus natural increase, and refugee influx. Under the procurement plan, each person in a farming family was allowed to retain 2.25 bushels of rice, which was deemed adequate till summer grains became available on 1 July 1946. It was hoped that an issue to non-farming individuals of 10 ounces per day would be possible by mid-March; but this was a goal, not a promise, and if other grains were available, this quota would be lessened.

All collected rice was to be stored in Korean Commodity Company owned or leased warehouses, from whence there would be monthly shipments to deficit areas in accordance with orders from the Military Governor. Movements within a province would take place at the discretion of each provincial military governor. Quotas assigned to each province would depend on local conditions; for instance, Kangwon-Do, which is not predominantly a rice producing province, was required to furnish much less rice than Cholla-Namdo, which yielded an average 861,000,000 pounds annually during the

period 1933-36.[53]

Principal deficit areas were Seoul, Inchon, Kangwon-Do, and Kyonggi-Do. The deficiency in Kyonggi-Do indicated a large rate of consumption during the free market months, for that province stood second only to Cholla-Namdo in annual rice production.[54]

Rice Procurement Program

On 25 January 1946, USAMGIK published Ordinance No. 45, "National Rice Collection", the announced purpose of which was "to insure against wide scale starvation, malnutrition, disease and civil unrest." Effective at 2400 hours 31 January 1946, this ordinance required all farmers and rice-owners to surrender to the proper local officials all excess rice in their possession, but permitted them to retain 2.25 bushels per person regularly residing in each rice producing household. Payment was to be in cash or by written certificate payble when the rice was delivered to Korean Commodity Company warehouses.

Heads of blocks, villages, towns, cities, and counties were enjoined to gather the following information: (1) the amount of rice and other grains harvested on each farm; (2) number of persons in each family unit;

(3) quantity of rice in possession of each person; and (4) amount of rice required for planting of the following season's crop. Heads of each block were responsible for collection of the foregoing information, to be submitted to their superior officers, and for collection and delivery of all excess rice in their bailiwicks. Failure to comply with this ordinance was punishable, for officials, by discharge, and for rice-owners, by decision of a Military Occupation Court.

Results of National Rice Collection

When the rice collection plan went into effect, even the most conservative estimate put the rate of consumption during the preceding free market months at 35 percent of the available rice, while more accurate assumptions put the figure at from 40 to 50 percent. There should have been from 45 to 50 million bushels of rice still left in the farm-houses and storage bins of South Korea so the goal of 25 million bushels to be collected did not seem too lofty an aim. However, as seizures began, it soon became evident that only a fraction of the 25 million bushels would ever reach Korean Commodity Company warehouses, and actually final figures on the 1945-46 rice collection showed that only

3,909,210 bushels or 13.6 percent of the proposed total, had been procured as a result of the campaign.[55]

Main reason for the failure of the first rice collection under the U.S. Military Government, was undoubtedly its unfavorable reception by Koreans. Military Government made every effort to publicize the hard facts which made national collection a necessity, but because of its similarity to previous programs of the Japanese, of the fact that the Communists worked vigorously against it, of the lack of commodities on the market which would make the farmer's conversion of his rice into yen desirable, and of the unabated activities of smugglers and black marketeers, some farmers even went so far as to bury their rice instead of selling it to Military Government.[56]

Writing to a newspaper in Pusan, one Korean expressed the opinion of many: "Though the war has ended, they continue to collect rice. I believe that the United States Military Government is adopting the policies of Japanese Imperialism."[57]

There was widespread lack of cooperation on the part of administering officials and rice-owners. At Uisong trucks moving rice to Yongyang were stoned by a crowd of one thousand Koreans. In Chechon it was reported

that the town's leading officials had personally acted as a committee to go into the black market and purchase rice for their bailiwicks, while in Seoul "pink-cheeked" women staged fainting spells on the street in order to appear undernourished.[58]

On 28 March 1946 SEOUL SHINMUN (SEOUL DAILY NEWS) reported that approximately 44 percent of the 20,000 travelers taxing Seoul railroad station facilities were enroute to the provinces in search of rice for their families, and that "hungry crowds" waited along the Han River at Mokpo for rice being brought in by profiteers. The same newspaper carried the story of a Korean man, Tch'Ei Tch'an Kwang at Kang San Chung, who, unable to afford rice at ₩ 2,500 a sack, killed his wife, child and himself; and the account of the woman, Kim Chung Cha, who, after her husband had gone in search of rice and failed to return, sought to throw herself into the Han River but was saved by an alert policeman.

Korean newspapermen at the Military Governor's press conference of 2 February 1946, complained that 30 percent of South Korea's school children were going without lunch. On 2 April 1946, they relayed the grievance of a number of rice-seeking citizens who had

been "bucked" without success from the Capitol Building to Seoul City Hall, and at the same time hold of a "Fighting Committee for Rice," which consisted of a number of Korean workingmen allegedly "ready to die" for their aims. Eight "starvation" cases were reported during April 1946, but medical investigation revealed that only two of the eight deaths could have been caused by starvation, the other six being attributed to tuberculosis and other diseases.[59]

Meanwhile rice continued to disappear even from the black market, which supplied a good proportion of the people,[60] yet the majority believed that rice still existed somewhere in South Korea. Politicians debated as to where it could be; the Leftists saw it in the bins of the land-owners; the Rightists saw it in the households of the small farms. Military Government, which had the fullest picture, did not see it in all of Korea.[61]

Scarce commodities again were used to stimulate rice collection (as in the ill-fated "incentive plan" which terminated 15 January 1946) when a 10 May 1946 press release announced that "consumer goods" would be bartered in exchange for rice. Under auspices of the National Food Administration, the Department of Commerce allocated portions of available commodities to

the provinces, where they were distributed by the Korean Agricultural Association through its local branches. Farmers selling their rice to these offices received not cash but cotton and hemp cloth, shoes, matches, soap, candles, salt, clothing, kerosene, pots and pans, socks, and tools, which were manufactured by government-controlled industries or held by the Materials Control Corporation.

On 26 February 1946 a press release gave the total amount of rice in Military Government warehouses as 848,299 bags (this amount included both rice bought on the free market and that turned in by farmers for rent), in addition to 39,450 bags enroute to Kangwon-Do. It is interesting to note that throughout both the 1945-46 and the 1946-47 rice collection programs, Kangwon-Do was the only southern province which exceeded her quota. This was possibly due to the fact that, being a normally low rice producer, Kangwon-Do was assigned a small quota, yet Cheju-Do, although also not a rice producing area, fell far short of her equally modest allotment.[62]

On 12 March 1946 General Lerch revealed that the announced goal of 10 ounces per day ration to be issued beginning 15 March could not be realized since not

enough rice had been collected. Yet, despite the critical shortage of rice in Korea, "the abundance of tangerines and oranges" on the market indicated that Koreans were still smuggling the scarce commodity to Japan. By 27 March 1946 there were 118,729 bags of rice on hand as a result of the collection program, or enough for an issue of 4,300 bags a week for the next 28 weeks, and Military Government hoped to raise the figure to 500,000. On the following day it was announced that after six weeks the collection was "proceeding satisfactorily", and that a regular distribution of 5,000 bags a week until October 1946 was assured. Though restoration of rationing in April 1946 resulted in a sharp drop in market prices, the press continued to campaign for reinstatement of the free market and reported that Koreans were paying ¥ 1,200 per bushel for rice instead of the government price of ¥ 152. Forty-two days after the collection started, there was only a twenty-two days supply of rice in Military Government coffers.[63]

On 4 April 1946, 15,000 bags of rice were distributed to 600,000 ration book holders by their city district leaders, and at the same time it was announced that the ration of 35 ounces per week per person would continue as long as the rice supply lasted. On 29 May

1946, 41,000 bags of rice were in Military Government's possession, and the 5 ounce per day ration was still being issued.[64]

In response to public demand, and after consideration of many plans submitted by Korean individuals, groups, and organizations, on 16 April 1946 a press release outlined the regulations under which Koreans were permitted to go into the provinces and bring back what rice they were able to purchase, this amount not to exceed a total of 10 ounces per day from the time of permission to 15 October 1946. The regular ration at this time was still 5 ounces a day.

Those wishing to avail themselves of this privilege submitted applications which, after due processing, allowed them to move specified amounts of rice. Those bringing in rice from the country were removed from rations for a period of time corresponding to the amount of rice secured. This plan went into effect on 18 April 1946, and, combined with the newly inaugurated distribution of rice rations, helped force the black market price down from ¥ 1,320 to ¥ 880 per bushel.[65]

To relieve families in Seoul whose diet required supplementation, the 5 August 1946 press release announced that 52,000 units of army Ten-in-One rations

would be distributed to 104,000 Seoul households during the period from 6 to 16 August 1946, through the Provincial Food Services, at a cost of ¥ 100 per family. Two contributing sources kept Koreans from going hungry during the lean months of spring, summer and fall of 1946: the summer grain collection of wheat, barley, and rice; and imports of grain from the United States.

Initiated on 25 May 1946, by the National Food Administration Food Regulation No. 1, the summer grain collection program aimed at a possible, 6,445,000 bushels and by 1 December 1946 had collected 3,075,875 bushels.[66] Under this plan, which was designed to meet the needs of 4,054,935 non-self-suppliers and 2,760,081 partial self-suppliers, no Korean grain was to be exported or utilized by United States Army personnel. In cooperation with the Korean Farmers' Association, the Provincial Food Services, and other government agencies, the National Food Administration sought to fill quotas established on the basis of production statistics supplied by the Department of Agriculture. Landlords were allowed to retain 1½ bushels per person for the year, and farmers turning in their summer grain before 20 September 1946 received from forty to seventy yen more per bag than those who delayed beyond that date..

Though by 13 February 1946, no UNNRA food had been sent to Korea, despite frequent surveys toward this end, relief supplies had arrived from the United States at an average of 32,000 metric tons of grain a month, according to General Lerch at his 5 October 1946 press conference. At the XXIV Corps staff meeting of 1 October 1946, General Hodge reported plenty of food in Korea but a shortage of rice. The Department of Agriculture estimate of the 1946 rice crop was set at 65,000,000 bushels for the 18,000,000 people of South Korea, or 20 million bushels less than the preceding year. This decrease in production was due largely to the farmer's lack of fertilizer for the five war years, and to damage done by the spring and summer floods of 1946. An estimated 5 million bushels of summer grain would relieve the situation only slightly. In summary, the people of Korea needed a minimum of 6 bushels per capita a year, wanted 12.25 bushels per year, and had produced only half of their normal demand.

As time for the 1946 harvest drew near, shortage of food drove the black market price of rice to ₩ 14,000 per bushel, and food stocks were sufficient for only forty days. Korean strikers demanded 20 ounces of rice per day for workers and 15 ounces for

each member of a worker's family.[67]

Rice Situation North of 38°

Always of vital interest to South Koreans during the food shortage was the lot of their countrymen north of the 38th parallel.[67] (For the part rice played in the breakdown of Soviet-American negotiations in January 1946, see Part II, Chap. III, "American-Soviet Relations," pp. 100-120) (footnote 67). In the early days of the occupation, reports from the Soviet zone indicated that: Russian soldiers consumed so much rice that there was little left for the Koreans; they demanded exorbitant rice levies which forced many landowners to sell their fields; they utilized a peace preservation society, the Boon Dai, in collecting the levy; and regardless of the shortage of food in North Korea, the Russians had exported rice from Hamhung to the Soviet Union.[68]

In normal times, there had been 1/50 of a bushel more per person for Koreans living north of the 38th parallel, but since the Russians were living off the land, the exact situation in 1946 was not known.[69] Members of the South Korea People's Republic bought

rice below the demarcation line at half the current market price and sent it north of the parallel, while Communists seized on the shortage in South Korea as a potent weapon against American Military Government popularity and urged a free market long after it had been proved impractical.[70] Radio broadcasts from North Korea during October 1946 reported rice rations of 21½ ounces for workers producing 100 percent; more for those exceeding that percentage; 16 2/3 ounces for white collar workers; and a minimum ration of 12½ ounces per day. However, since there were no rations issued to unemployed persons between the ages 14 to 60, and since there was known to be large scale unemployment in the Russian zone, these rations may have been possible at the expense of the idle population, and it was believed that the food situation actually was worse in North Korea than in the American zone.[71] This theory grained credence when radio intercepts from the north in December 1946 reported existence of an acute rice shortage, and that the Russians had handed the problem to their puppet Korean government, saying in effect, "It's your baby."[72]

Second Rice Collection Program

After a meeting of the Joint Korean-American Conference, General Hodge announced on 26 December 1946 that "...weight of the testimony convinced conference members of the necessity for a close-knit rice collection and distribution program... without such a program, all non-producers would be dependent on an uncertain and extremely high black market price for procurement of grain required to maintain their welfare and life." However, as the rice collection program for 1946-47 had been in effect since 12 August 1946, this amounted to no more than a reaffirmation of the original regulation and a setting forth of the compelling reasons which led to the second collection program. A contributing factor to its continuation was that grain production in South Korea had to be augmented by foreign imports, which would not be forthcoming were the distribution of food in Korea not under government control.

In order to facilitate operation of the program, arrangements were made to supplement Korean transportation facilities. The National Food Administration was directed not to announce any proposed ration or

distribution without first having full assurance that such announcements would be carried out. The retail distribution systems in Seoul and other centers of population were studied with view to increasing their number and adequacy. The people of South Korea were promised full information as to progress of the program and future distributions, and finally, General Hodge directed that the National Economic Board review the entire food collection and distribution program, submitting recommendations which might make the program more efficient and effective.[73]

Estimating the yield of the 1946 rice crop, Dr. Lee Hoon Koo, director of the Department of Agriculture, stated on 21 November 1946 that 20 percent of the total planted rice area of South Korea had been damaged by the severe rains of 27 and 28 June 1946, with Kyonggi-Do province suffering heaviest loss. Therefore the rice yield for 1946 was estimated at 82 percent of the 1940-44 annual average, or between 60,000,000 and 65,000,000 bushels.[74] Since American and Korean advisors estimated the total needs of South Korea, including luxury uses such as production of sake and candy, at 125,000,000 bushels, it was obvious that a free market was out of the question and that

continuation of the rice collection was necessary in order to prevent another and possibly more severe food shortage in 1947.[75] As a conservation measure, curtailment of alcoholic beverage production was ordered on 31 October 1946 by the Department of Commerce, and the production of industrial alcohol was placed under government supervision.[76]

Overlapping the 1945-46 rice collection program, whose final results were recorded on 31 December 1946, the 1946-47 "Collection of Rice" was put into effect on 12 August 1946 by the publication of National Food Regulation No. 2, Hqs USAMGIK, Office of the National Food Administrator, Seoul, Korea. This regulation differed from its predecessor (Ordinance No. 45, 25 January 1946) in only one significant particular. During the first collection program, farmers had to surrender all rice in excess of 2.25 bushels per person regularly residing in each rice-producing household. Under National Food Regulation No. 2, the farmer was assigned a definite quota, which left him a base minimum of 3 bushels per person in his household, and if there were an excess of rice over his quota plus that amount, he was free to dispose of it as he willed. Also it was emphasized that the collection

program would not continue all year but would terminate on 15 February 1947, and that no rice collected in Korea would either be exported or utilized in Korea by U.S. Army personnel. Though no deadline was set for the surrender of rice by individual farmers, it was suggested that military governors designate such a date for their respective provinces.[77]

Results of the Second Rice Collection

Briefly, the 1946-47 rice program aimed at a total of 21,790,000 bushels of rice, and by 10 March 1947, Military Government had acquired 16,931,060 bushels or 83.1 percent of that quota. However, it should be pointed out that on 20 February 1947, the quotas for Kyonggi-Do province and Cheju-Do island were reduced from the original 3,875,000 and 25,000 bushels to 3,675,000 and 12,500 bushels respectively, and that the announced result of 83 percent collected by 10 March was based on the revised total quota of 21,575,000 bushels.

By 15 February 1947, the scheduled date of termination, only 78 percent of the total had been collected, consequently the program was extended until 31 March 1947.

Yet according to the 10 March 1947 collection report, only Kangwon-Do province, a non-rice producing area which was assigned a modest quota of 300,000 bushels, had surrendered over 100 percent of that amount, reaching 175 percent in its rice collection, while Kyonggi-Do (97.8 percent), KyongSang-Namdo (93.6 percent) and ChungChong-Namdo (91 percent)followed in that order. Cheju-Do, whose original 25,000 bushels quota had been cut in half when it became apparent that the island could not meet its assignment, trailed with a collection of only 44 percent, or 5,500 bushels.[78]

Cheju-Do was cited as an example for the Korean people in a 29 October 1946 Military Government press release which urged Koreans to use supplementary grains in their diet. Cheju-Do, it said, which formerly produced 100,000 bushels of rice annually, now yielded only 35,000 bushels a year due to the extended lack of fertilizer, yet its population maintained its health and seemingly suffered no ill effects from the substitution of fish and other grains in place of rice.

American imports kept the population of South Korea from going hungry during the lean months of the

post-war period. A summation of United States grain imports in an 8 November 1946 Military Government press release disclosed that 114,464 metric tons, or 4,275,000 bushels of U.S. wheat had been imported and sold for ¥ 320 a bushel, and that six more shiploads of wheat and flour were expected to arrive in the near future. Some 15,655 tons of corn and 8,200 tons of flour had also found its way through rationing channels to Korean tables during the food shortage, while thousands of tons of U.S. army surplus goods had been distributed through the civilian food program.

It was announced in General Lerch's press conference on 6 March 1947 that the American Military Government had requested 400,000 tons of grain from the United States for the coming year and had already received 82,549 tons. In addition, on 16 December 1946, it was reported that 700,000 bags of vitally needed fertilizer had arrived from the United States and had been distributed through the Korean Agricultural Association, while 3,062,000 more tons were expected during the coming year for the civilian supply program.

Additional American aid in the form of 7,733,776.5 pounds of American candy, equal in caloric content to 85,210 bushels of rice, was received and sold

at ₩ 20 a pound to Koreans, while 1,000,000 pounds of the shipment was distributed free to schools and orphanages by the Department of Education and the Department of Public Health and Welfare.[79] Distribution of even this innocent appearing commodity by American Military Government was grist for the Communists' mill. Utilizing the Korean's reluctance to substitute other foods for rice, together with his ignorance and gullibility, and connecting it with the current cholera epidemic, the active underground Communist party started a whispering campaign to the effect that the candy distributed by the Military Government had been infected with cholera bacteria. Reason for this duplicity was given as the intent to kill many Koreans so that the country could be more easily colonized by the United States.

It was also reported to the consuming public that this same candy had been refused by both the Japanese and the Chinese and so had been finally "foisted upon the poor simple unsuspecting Koreans," with the addition of the aforementioned cholera bacteria, and posters appeared on telephone posts in Chonju warning Koreans not to eat the infected candy.[80]

Situations were reversed in February 1947,

when the U.S. Army Quartermaster, short on flour as a result of shipping strikes in the states, asked for and received a loan of 1,000,000 pounds of U.S. flour which had been imported for Korean use. In announcing this fact via the 13 February 1947 MG Press Release, the Korean National Food Administrator repeated that this was a temporary loan, to be repaid as soon as possible, and that it would in no way affect the current flour ration to Koreans.

On 29 September 1946, General Hodge announced that small amounts of the 1945 rice crop might be purchased and transported for personal use during October 1946. Smuggling continued unabated, and the announced reward of one bag out of each ten recovered, to be given for information leading to the apprehension of smugglers, brought insignificant results, On 27 December 1946, rice was selling at ₩ 880 a bushel, and army trucks were pressed into use as Korean transportation facilities continued unadequate. On 6 January 1947 a rice ration of 10 ounces per person per day was started. As a result black market prices dropped and the Communists, lacking other weapons at the moment, circulated the rumor that Military Government had shipped 20,000,000 bushels of Korean rice

to Japan and had been thanked by the Japanese prime minister.[81] On 30 January 1947, at the MG Press Conference, it was announced that 25 percent of the total rice collections to date, or 4,100,000 bushels, had been distributed through rations.

In March 1947 Korean newspapermen asked for an account of penalties levied as a result of non-compliance during the rice collection program and General Lerch replied on 20 March 1947 during his press conference with the following information. A total of 8,631 Koreans had been detained; 367 were sentenced to prison; 6,339 had been acquitted; 18 were being held for trial and investigation; and 1,907 were fined.[82]

Resistance to Rice Collection

Throughout both the 1945-46 and 1946-47 rice collections, the Communists did much to hamper the success of the program and were instrumental in instigating the bloody riots of Taegu in October 1946, as well as other similar attacks on policemen shortly after the Taegu massacre and numerous "incidents" during the rice collection. Playing skillfully upon the general feeling of dissatisfaction during these hungry months, they agitated many anti-rice collection

demonstrations, and though these were engineered so as to appear spontaneous and thus not attributable to Soviet influence, secret documents uncovered by XXIV Corps G-2 operatives pointed an unerring finger at the true culprits. The influence of their campaign was strong and widespread. They did not stop with advising against compliance with the program but threatened farmers and their families with death should they surrender their rice to Military Government.

Korean newspapers, both controlled and those supposedly unbiased, came out against the program. CHOSUN ILBO (KOREAN DAILY NEWS) reported: "We cannot help but scorn at the policy of MG, which has so often changed within the last year... MG has lost public confidence and we fear /It/ will have difficulty in carrying out its policy," while DOK LIB SHINBO (INDEPENDENCE NEWS) editorialized: "To their /Koreans/ disappointment, Indian corn and wheat flour are being distributed, and the old and weak are starving to death in their beds from eating such food."

Surveys conducted by XXIV Corps G-2 during the period 17-24 November 1946, revealed the opinion of some 240 Koreans in Sunchon, Namwon, Yousu, and Posang to be evenly divided as to the rice collection program.

Those in favor of collection said its success was assured because quotas were lower than under the Japanese and because commodities, in lieu of yen, were being offered in exchange for rice, while the opponents of rice collection were confident of its failure, basing their opinion on the program's late start, the government's failure to stop profiteering, and the Leftists' strong agitation against the program.

Learning through this, and other sources, of the vigorous campaign the Communists were carrying on to influence Koreans against the rice collection, Military Government instituted a counter propaganda drive, distributing millions of leaflets and handbills to the Korean farmers, which did much to counteract the bad effects of Red intimidation.

Out-and-out lies were printed in Communist controlled papers which, though denied by Military Government, had great effect on the Koreans, who were inclined to accept as gospel truth all that appeared in print. One fanciful but damaging account stated that Americans were exporting rice from Korea secretly, loading their planes and ships at night after curfew so that the Koreans would not detect them in these activities. A Korean reporter claimed to have been

present when an American truck supposedly loaded with gasoline dropped one of its cargo drums. This, he said, burst and revealed its contents to be not fuel but "rice, cleaned rice, polished rice!" These reports were so widely believed that Military Government, taking the bull by the horns, conducted a tour of twenty-two Korean newspapermen on 24 January 1947 to witness the unloading of a cargo ship, the U.S.A.T. BOWLINE REEFER, during which they revealed that a similar vessel, laden with 2,000,000 pounds of refrigerated food for American personnel in South Korea, arrived once every three weeks so that Koreans would not be deprived of their precious food stocks to feed U.S. personnel. Movies were taken of the tour and distributed through Korean movie circuits. The Korean journalists were greatly impressed with both the quantity and quality of the food, and even Communist papers gave the tour favorable coverage.

Also emanating from Communist circles were numerous stories of farmers being imprisoned for not surrendering their rice quota, and of killings by American soldiers when farmers did not produce the required amount of rice. Actually, though local police and U.S. troops were utilized in the later days of the

second rice collection, only three shootings occurred during the 1946-7 program; one farmer was shot and killed when he attacked an MG officer with a stick; another was fatally wounded when a bullet, fired after him as he tried to run away, ricochetted; and in the third instance, a woman in a nearby village was hit in the knee by a spent bullet fired into the air.[83]

Wheat, Barley, Millet, Rye and Minor Grains

Wheat in Korea was not as important as either barley or millet but competed unsuccessfully with barley as a second crop on rice fields, for the longer growing period of wheat brought its harvesting into the rainy season of early summer and injured the quality of the crop. Moreover, the longer growing period of wheat as compared with barley, shortened the interval between the rice harvest in the fall and the sowing of winter grain, and also the interval between the grain harvest in the spring and the rice transplanting in early summer. In 1936 Korea's wheat represented 7 to 8 percent of her total cultivated area and was unevenly distributed, being grown for the most part in North Korea.[84] Although the output of about 9 to 10 million bushels annually did not take care of domestic require-

ments, under the Japanese about 46,422 metric tons of wheat were exported from Korea each year during the period 1930 to 1940. The area planted in wheat decreased from 340,150 acres (the 1930,35,36 yearly average) to 206,493 acres in 1946, or 3 percent of the total area cultivated in South Korea during that year.[85]

The barley acreage of Korea was unevenly distributed thoughout the country, being largest in the south where it could be cultivated as a second crop, smaller in the central part and smallest in the north. In 1936 barley acreage accounted for almost 24 percent of the total cultivated area of all Korea, with 53 percent being produced in the three most southern and southeastern provinces.[86] For the years 1930,34,36, 26 percent of the total cultivated area of South Korea was planted in barley, or 2,184,937 acres. In the years 1940-44, the acreage of barley increased to 30.3 percent, but fell in 1945 to 24.8 percent. By 1946 there were only 22.6 percent of the total cultivated area of South Korea planted in barley, or 1,501,193 acres.[87]

Millet was perhaps even a more important food grain than barley, although the acreage under this grain was smaller than that under barley. Because many Korean farmers under Japanese rule could not afford to

eat the rice they produced, millet became to them what rice was to the Japanese. Nearly a fifth, or 19 percent, of the cultivated area in 1936 was under millet, but it was grown mostly in the northern part of the country, where it occupied from 26 to 35 percent of the cultivated land. Almost 2/3 of the acreage and production of millet was found in five northern and northeastern provinces.[88] During the years 1930,34, 36, an average of 484,690 acres, or 5.8 percent, was planted in millet. This increased in 194044 to 205, 264 acres or 6.2 percent, decreased in 1945/6 to percent, then fell still further to 5.3 percent in 1946, or only 371,862 acres.[89]

Rye occupied only 0.1 percent of the total cultivated area of South Korea during the years 1930, 34,36, with 7,943 acres. It increased somewhat in 1940-44 to 0.8 percent, continued to rise in 1945 to 1.2 percent, then fell back to 1.1 percent in 1946 with 53,748 acres.[90]

Oats, buckwheat, grain sorghum, and corn are the four minor grains of Korea, with most of the acreage and output in the northern provinces, especially of oats. One northern province in 1936 planted

77 percent of the total oat acreage for all Korea.[91]

In South Korea alone, buckwheat varied from 1.1 percent of the total cultivated area (average for years 1930,34,36) to 1.5 in 1940-44, dropped to 1 percent in 1945, and rose slightly to 1.2 percent in 1940-44, increased to 1.5 percent in 1945, then dropped back to 0.8 percent in 1946, or 51,148 acres. Sorghum occupied only 0.5 percent of the total cultivated area during the years 1930,34,36, fell to 0.4 in 1940-44, remained at that figure in 1945, then rose slightly to 0.5 percent in 1946, with 32,990 acres. Oats fell from their 0.2 percentage in 1930,34,36 to less than that figure in 1940-44, increased to 0.1 percent in 1945, and then regressed to less than no percent, or 2,660 acres, in 1946.[92-3]

On 29 May 1946, National Food Regulation No. 1 was put into effect, announcing the proposed collection of summer grain in the amount of 10,474,150 bushels, which was to be rationed through government controlled channels. The National Food

Administration was charged with responsibility for "overall coordination and direction"; provincial military governors with the "successful execution of the program" within their provinces; while the Korean Agricultural Association, Controller of Commodities, Provincial Food Service, and all other political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities of Military Government were enjoined to "assist and cooperate" in the collection of these grains; wheat, rye, barley, and naked barley.

It was the duty of the National Food Administration to establish quotas for each province and to direct the movement of summer grains and their release for retail distribution. Provincial governors were to break down the provincial quotas into county, city, town and village allocations, and to supervise the collection and delivery of the grain, as well as to inspect those grains turned in to them. Provincial Food Services and other agencies designated were responsible for paying the farmers, transporting grain to warehouses, for processing, storing, moving, and releasing summer grain collections for retail distribution. At the

conclusion of the program, results revealed that it had fallen short of its reduced goal, 6,445,000 bushels, and had collected only 3,083,390 bushels.[94]

The summer grain collection program (see also p. 61, this chapter) failed for two reasons. Foremost of course was the resistance of Korean Farmers to this and all other collection programs, which they considered a continuance of oppressive Japanese tyranny. This attitude was maintained regardless of the fact that summer grains, though collected by USAMGIK, were consumed entirely by Koreans, whereas the Japanese had collected rice and exported it to Japan, Manchuria, and other satellite countries, substituting inferior grains in Korea. Reason number two was the fact that less acreage was planted during 1946 and 1947 than in former years, both from the widespread "flush of freedom" lack of work, and from fear of just such collections. In many cases farmers substituted vegetable plots for their summer grain fields, since no accurate records were kept of vegetable production, and no collection of them was attempted.

On 31 March 1947, the Military Governor announced in a press release that the Korean Interim

Legislative Assembly should consider a proposed public law providing for a second summer grain collection in 1947. He further warned that if this subject was not covered by appropriate legislation, "We shall use the regulation as written." However, on 19 April 1947, the assembly passed Public Act No. 2, which was issued simultaneously with National Food Regulation No. 5, on 8 May 1947, entitled "Collection of Summer Grains." Quotas assigned for collection during 1947 were limited to 20 percent or less of total production in the areas concerned, and all grain was to be collected and delivered prior to 1 September 1947.

II. Production

A. Food Crops

2. Fruit, vegetables, and other minor food crops

The cultivation of fruit, vegetables, and other minor food crops was practiced widely in Korea, but usually in small gardens on individual farms, with no accurate records being kept of production. However, small commercial truck farms near the large cities were prevalent. Military Government aided

the industry by procuring seed, plants, fertilizer, and other essential materials.

Fruit in South Korea

Fruit has been valued highly for centuries among the Koreans. Apples, pears, jujube (Korean date) grapes, peaches, plums, apricots, walnuts, chestnuts, Korean cherries, berries and pinenuts were grown largely by letting nature take its course. Cultivation methods prevalent in Western countries were relied upon very little in Korea until about fifty years ago, when foriegn missionaries introduced new methods of culture. Improved varieties of fruit trees, notably the apple, were imported from America and formed the basis for a prosperous fruit industry.

Korean soil was well adapted to the raising of fruit which in the quality excelled both the Japanese and Chinese products. Because of this fact, horticulture was at first encouraged by the Japanese, and model orchards were established by the government. As was the case in all other fields of agricultural promotion, the greater percentage of increased yields was exported to Japan.

Though Japan fostered the cultivation of fruit in Korea for many years, when the pinch of famine made itself felt in Japan, Korea was ordered to destroy many of her thriving fruit orchards and to replant the land thus cleared to rice or other grains. The price of fruit was fixed to discourage production. Because of the universal commandering of fertilizer and chemicals, the five years preceding the Japanese surrender in 1945 proved a disastrous period for the Korean fruit industry. Even following the surrender, the industry, sadly in need of aid in the form of trained personnel and of chemical supplies with which to combat numerous diseases, fungi and insects, was more or less overlooked due to the emphasis being placed on rice and cereals. According to a Korean advisor of the New Korea Company, this neglect was regrettable, for Koreans did not consider fruit a luxury item but a necessity and a valuable addition to their diet. He pointed out that when rice, the favorite food of Korea, was selling for 38 yen a mal, Koreans paid as much as 30 yen for a single pear.

The same Korean advisor recommended in spring 1947 to the American horticultural specialist with Military Government that American trees be imported

for replacements and additional planting of orchards for although American trees planted 50 years before were still bearing in 1947,[95] young trees were needed to take their place.

Fruit Associations

The outstanding association in South Korea concerned with the raising of fruit was the Korean Fruit Association. This organization, founded in 1939, consisted of a national office, industrial and trade offices. Three types of members were admitted: ordinary, including industrial societies, cooperative societies, and all orchard managers, who paid regular dues of 30 yen a year, while patron members contributed the regular amount plus a sum significant enough to entitle them to the title of "patron." Honorary members were admitted on the basis of technical skill, knowledge, and education. At the time of American entry into South Korea, the organization had a net favorable balance of ¥ 579,899.85, and in February 1946, the Department of Agriculture approved a loan to the association of two million yen from the Chosun Industrial Bank to the extent of guaranteeing its repayment. Since the Korean Fruit Association

was well organized, could operate with minor revisions in its constitution and by-laws, and had a definite place in the agricultural program of Korea, the Department of Agriculture investigating committee recommended on 24 April 1946 that the organization be allowed to continue its activities, with some control by Military Government to insure payment of the government quaranteed loan. According to the committee report, "This organization can definitely contribute to the progress of Korean fruit growers. The association made up of growers is in a position to control or assist in marketing, (local and export) in advocating improved methods of pruning and modern orchard care. The industrial...and trade associations...can assist in financing and in general improvement of the entire fruit industry of Korea."[96]

Though plans were made for the export of apples and pears in 1946, the tie-up of foreign trade from Korea prevented any exports of fruit for that year, but the Korean Fruit Association hoped in 1947 to export 14,886,000 pounds of apples and 248,100 pounds of pears in return for either credit in foreign countries, or scarce materials such as

chemicals, sprayers, waste paper, and nursery stocks of apple and pear trees. The first shipment of 20,000 boxes of applies was made from Pusan on 3 August 1947.

Due to the delay in resumption of foreign trade, the Korean Fruit Association reported to USAMGIK that their fruit was not being entirely consumed and that large amounts were spoiling. On 11 August 1947 therefore, an USAFIK letter, (TFVQM 432, Subj: Disinfection of Locally Produced Applies) stated that "during the period 1 October 1947 to 1 January 1948 applies will be procured from local sources for ration issues and may be sold in Army QM Sales Commissaries, "And listed disinfectant precautions that should be taken before consuming the Korean fruit."

This was a drastic departure from established procedure, since USAMGIK had leaned over beckward in order to avoid Korean complaints that American troops were consuming scarce Korean food. (See rice section, this chapter, page 65) However, in view of the local situation wherein locally produced fruit was going to waste and since it was difficult to preserve in good condition fresh fruit sent from the United States, the step was deemed justifiable.

At the present time most temperate climate fruits are grown in Korea and some citrus species are cultivated in Cheju Do, but no commercial industry exists there. The number of fruit trees growing in 1946 was approximately: 2,097,000 apple; 905,000 pear; 270,000 peach; and 925,000 persimmon trees.[98]

The fruit industry, in common with all other industries in Korea, suffered from lack of supplies. Instead of spraying their fruit trees, Koreans were forced to the tedious task of enclosing in paper bags each individual fruit to partially protect it from disease, fungi and insects. The American horticulture specialist's inspection of southern provincial orchards in late 1946 and early 1947 revealed that Korean fruit growers badly needed spraying materials, and that their products were being destroyed by attacks of numberous parasitical growths and injurious insects. Second, most critical need was for trained fruit men, for the majority of the orchards inspected suffered both from too close planting, and too extensive pruning.[99]

Vegetables and Potatoes

While official statistics show that the average Korean diet after liberation was approximately from 1,000 to 1,800 calories per day, (see pp. 89, this chapter, "Livestock") actually the Koreans made up the deficit with

vegetables on which accurate figures of cultivation and production were lacking.

Among vegetables grown in Korea were radish, Chinese cabbage, stone leek (or Welsh onion) onion, garlic, tomato, watermelon, cucumber, and most of the kinds commonly grown in the United States.

The most important organization which dealt with vegetables was the Chosen Seed Federation, organized in 1941 and consisting of a national organization, plus a number of district organizations. In September 1945 the federation had assets exceeding liabilities, in the sum of ¥ 411,782.61, With some changes it was allowed to remain in existence after being investigated by Military Government. Its functions were to improve seed stocks; maintain original seed; investigate, study and introduce new varieties; regulate the price of seed; import seed for resale and distribution to members; offer prizes for outstanding production; sponsor fairs and seed shows; and furnish information and technical service to members and seed producers.[100]

The total area of potatoes and vegetables in 1936 was 782,000 acres, or 5.3 percent of the total crop area. The greater portion of this area (353,000 acres) was planted to potatoes. Of this area, 288,000 acres were planted to Irish potatoes and the rest to sweet potatoes. Irish

potatoes were produced predominantly in North Korea, while South Korea specialized in the sweet potato. After the entry of United States forces, frequent imports were made of vegetable seed and seed potatoes. When 480 tons of disease-free potatoes arrived from the United States on 27 April 1946, Military Government, through the Korean Agricultural Association, (usually called the KAA) sponsored a contest, awarding prizes to farmers who produced the largest amount of potatoes from the allotments given them by the association. The contest was announced on 5 June 1946 and prizes were offered totaling ₩ 30,000, plus a gun (district within a township) award of ₩ 135. This first large shipment of potatoes from the States was distributed by KAA to farmers with the agreement that each farmer should return after harvest 16.50 pounds of potatoes for each 8.25 pounds received as seed crop from that organization. However, the method proved impractical as the KAA failed to collect the promised amount and subsequent potato imports were distributed on a different basis.[101] Incidentally, two carloads of imported American seed potatoes were lost to Korean farmers when they were unloaded on 4 May 1946 by American troops and mistakenly consumed as army rations.[102]

Leguminous Crops

The principal legume crop of Korea was soybeans, with peas and peanuts occupying a small percent of the planted acreage. Soybeans were by far the most important item and ranked next to rice in importance as an item of export. Acreage under legumes in 1936 represented 18 percent of the total crop area of all Korea, and that of soybeans alone 13 percent.

Because of poor methods of drying and sorting, Korean soybeans were at one time unable to gain any extensive foreign market. However, the picture changed with improvement in the quality of the bean. Barring the year 1937, exports ranged from a minimum 19 percent to a meximum 30 percent of the entire annual crop, going principally to Japan.

In addition to the popular soybean, Korea had in 1936 564,000 acres under such types of beans as adzuki (red beans) and mung (green beans) with an output of 3.8 million bushels, while other legume crops covered an area of 139,000 acres, yielding 1.2 million bushels.

All leguminous crops occupied 14 percent of South Korea's total cultivated area during the period

1930,34,36, but this amount decreased steadily till in 1946 only 10 percent of the total area was planted in legumes.[103]

II. PRODUCTION

A. FOOD CROPS

3. Livestock

Background

In order to understand the present status of livestock production in South Korea, it is necessary to backtrack and take a brief look at the history of the industry. Earliest English mention of Korean livestock is made by Homer Hulbert who records that Koreans before the time of Christ raised a Japanese breed of poultry boasting a tail 95 inches long, that later Koreans kept horses "so small that mounted men could ride under the branches of fruit trees without difficulty," and even dabbled in the camel trade. In 942 A.D., says Hulbert, "Kitan [A Korean king at that time] sent 30 camels to Wang-gon [a rival ruler]." This reference to the exotic animal is not elaborated upon, and it is safe to assume that the camels were

imported. Other more prosaic beasts populating the country in its greener years were pigs, horses, cattle, donkeys, and a few sheep.[104]

In 1936 livestock raised in Korea included: horses, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, mules, donkeys, dogs, poultry, bees, and fish raised in inundated rice paddies. Though Hulbert states that in 36 B.C. "fine horses were raised,"[105] Dr. Lee Hoon Koo, nineteen centuries later, in 1936, characterized the only existing native Korean horse as "very small, believed descendants of Mongolian horses, wild and rough," but hard workers and adapted to coarse feeding. During the early years of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910 A.D.) horse breeding was a thriving government business, and ten State Horse Breeding Grounds were established but fell idle during the decadent latter days of the Yi reign. Cheju-Do especially was noted for its horse breeding. Horses were used principally for riding but no specialized saddle breed was developed although foreign breeds (Anglo-Norman, Arab, and Orloff trotters) were imported, and racing was recognized legally as a means to stimulate horse breeding. Mules and donkeys were not well developed and were used mostly for riding purposes although donkeys were also utilized as beasts of burden.[106]

All other phases of Korean husbandry were and are overshadowed by the raising of draft cattle, which serve as

a means of transportation, of farm labor, and as a food supply. Dairy farming was formerly unknown, and the use of milk and dairy products is still very rare among the peasants. At its peak in prewar years, the per capita milk consumption among Koreans was only from one-third to one-half pound a year.[107] Native Korean cattle average about 4½ feet in height, 1,000 pounds in weight, and are gentle and "amazingly enduring." Used chiefly for labor and meat, their hides are strong and of good quality for leather. Their feed consists mostly of by-products of farming...rice straw, millet stocks, bran, and soy beans.[108]

Sheep never occupied a significant place in Korean animal husbandry and were kept by the Yi dynasty only for experimental purposes. Under the Japanese regime, foreign breeds (Merino) were introduced, and from time to time sheep raising was promoted when world conditions resulted in a scarcity of meat and textiles. The fact that 75 percent of the sheep annually imported by the Japanese died of paralysis,[109] and that sheep required extensive grazing lands, served to keep them from ever becoming popular with the farmers. Goats were advocated by both Japanese and Americans as more practical than cows for the small farm, but though goats have been kept by Korean farmers for centuries, they have been neither widespread nor numerous.[110]

Swine have abounded since the earliest days of Korean agriculture, and in 1947 the raising of hogs was being encouraged on Korean farms, despite their heavy consumption of grain, in order to utilize waste products.[111] The native Korean hog is black, short, and weighs about 50 pounds. Though there is little fat, the pigs were "extremely healthy and the pork is very palatable." Under the Japanese, Berkshire and Yorkshire breeds were imported but were not welcomed since they required a greater amount of feed than the native variety, and since the amount of fat was considered excessive. The demand for these improved breeds, however, increased gradually toward the end of the Japanese rule.[112]

Formerly dogs "of Mongolian breed and large as goats" were kept extensively by farmers. They served not only as watch animals but also as a meat supply, while the hides were exported. However, in 1935, the Japanese carried out a policy of extermination, preserving only good hunting dogs, in order to prevent the spread of rabies.[113]

Poultry was the first phase of animal husbandry to receive popular attention, and it is recorded that about three thousand years ago, chickens of a fighting strain were imported from China. When the cock fighting fad ran its course, farmers took over and developed poultry for eggs and meat. As a result, "the poultry industry was developed

much farther than any of the other livestock enterprises."[114] The native Korean chicken was strong and active but small, and laid only 70 eggs a year. Imports of White Leghorn, Nagoya Cochin, Plymouth Rock and Rhode Island Red were absorbed into the domestic feathered population, and by 1930 one-third of the poultry in Korea had benefited from improved breeding.[115]

Farmers often raised fish, carp usually, in their rice paddies, and kept bee colonies for honey, consumed in Korea, and wax, which was exported. Rabbits were introduced only during the previous two decades and were kept more for pleasure than income.[116]

Missionaries played an important part in the development of the livestock industry in Korea and were instrumental in importing improved breeds, including Holstein, Ayrshire, Brown Swiss and Jersey cattle; Poland China, Tamsworth and Berkshire hogs; milk goats; and White Leghorn, Barred Rock, and Rhode Island Red chickens.[117] The Japanese encouraged the production of Holstein cattle, Berkshire hogs, and White Leghorn chickens to the exclusion of other breeds.

At its peak in 1938, the total production of livestock amounted to only 6.5 percent of annual agricultural production, and in 1947 this figure had shrunk to 3 percent (prewar consumption of meat by Koreans averaged only six pounds

a year, as compared with an average 379 pounds of grain consumed a year per capita);[118] yet the importance of cattle in Korea was emphasized by Dr. Lee Hoon Koo who said,"... power derived from cattle...is the largest source of farm labor except the human."[119]

Post-Surrender Picture

It is interesting to note that the United States Military Government of South Korea in one instance at least followed closely the lead of its Japanese predecessor. Grajdanzev cites numerically the principles which guided Japanese agricultural policy in Korea as follows:

(1) Gradual advance;

(2) Avoidance of encouraging too many things at once;

(3) Encouragement first of what was easy to realize;

(4) Giving practical leadership.[120]

And among the Department of Agriculture's recommendations on livestock production, under American Military Government, appeared these suggestions:

(13) Give practical leadership

(14) Encourage first what is easy to realize

(15) Develop gradually and avoid starting too many changes at one time for the Korean farmer to accept willingly.[121]

Possible explanation for this almost verbatim repetition in policies could be that both governments studied

the psychology of the Korean farmer, with identical results.

In summarizing the overall picture of livestock under the American Military Government, several significant facts emerge. One, since 1938 the number of livestock in South Korea declined at least 50 percent, and other official estimates place this figure as high as 80 percent.[122] Two, this abnormal decrease was due principally to the heavy demands of the Japanese army for meat during the war years, to the shortage of feed, and to the uncontrolled slaughtering of dairy and work cattle by Koreans following the removal of strict Japanese controls.[123] Three, the need for an increase in caloric content of the Korean diet demanded immediate attention. The Korean's prewar caloric intake was approximately 2077 a day, little more than a slow starvation diet, and by May 1946, even this had declined to between 1000 and 1800 calories a day.[124] Four, since nearly all available land capable of being utilized for the raising of grain was being exploited to the utmost, promotion of livestock production was the logical solution to the need for increased protein and caloric content in the Korean national diet. And five, the only lands which could be turned, without detriment to the grain production program, toward the raising of livestock feed were the thousands of acres of waste hillsides which

were neither suitable for farming nor planted in commercial timber. Planting these areas in leguminous plants and other edible grasses would not only provide a vast grazing territory for livestock but would in part halt the extensive soil erosion which every year was, and still is, eating away fertility of the land and decreasing Korea's chances of reestablishing a sound economy based on her principal occupation, agriculture. 125

Disposition of Japanese Army Horses

First major activities conducted by American occupation forces in the field of livestock came in October 1945, less than a month after the Japanese surrender of South Korea, when Military Government's Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce took over 6,305 Japanese army horses, to be auctioned off to farmers in regions where there was most critical need of farm labor. Due to neglect and lack of feed since news of the first surrender in August, a number of horses had died and others were in such poor condition that their recovery was hopeless. Many more were in a greatly weakened condition, and it was obvious that if the horses were sold singly, farmers would buy the soundest animals and leave the weaker ones on Military Government's hands. Consequently, tactics were revised, and the horses were sold for the most part in blocks to the Chosen and Chohsung Banks, the Farmers Association, and other organi-

zations who could afford to invest in the poor animals, pay for their feed and care, then sell them two or three months later to the farmers. By 12 November 1945, the last Japanese army horse was taken from Military Government's custody, and a final payment of ¥ 450,000 collected, which brought total receipts on this deal to ¥ 2,007,301.50.[126]

A more detailed account of the transaction is as follows. On 1 October 1945, the Japanese supervisor of the veterinary department, 17th Japanese Army Group, wrote the Commanding Officer, Liaison Detachment No. 4 at Taejon, asking him to take over the Japanese army horses as soon as possible, since feed was scarce and the care of so many animals required approximately one man for every two horses.[127]

In response to this, and to a telegram from the Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, on 2 October 1945 the Director of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce informed the Civil Administrator, USAFIK, that the Japanese horses should be sold by auction, not more than two animals to one buyer, to farmers and representatives of transportation companies, and that since farmers would not have cash until the crops were harvested, credit notes should be honored.[128]

Two days later the Secretary of the Military Government Planning Section outlined the plan for disposition

of the horses as follows. The estimated 6,400 head (1,500 at Tenan; 700 at Taegu; 500 at Taejon; 500 at Seiyu*; 2,500 at Iri; and 700 at Kongju) were to be turned over to XXIV Corps G-4 Section for transfer to the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce and sale by auction through the Chosen Horse Association. The animals were to be distributed to various provinces on a percentage basis according to need, and the governor of each province was to designate the auction site. Teams consisting of one Military Government officer, one interpreter, and necessary enlisted men were to be dispatched to each locale to supervise the sale of the horses, and cash receipts were to be turned over to the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce for deposit with the Bureau of Finance. For its work in handling the transportation, care and feeding of horses, and conducting sales, as well as handling money transactions, the Chosen Horse Association was to receive 10 percent of the gross receipts or $5 per head, whichever was less. Though individual farmers were authorized to buy only two horses each, any transportation company wishing to buy in excess of that amount could be permitted to do so by consent of the Chosen Horse Association.[129]

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* The correct spelling and Korean name of Seiyu and Hwahaktong could not be determined. All other names mentioned in this chapter are given the correct Korean spelling. In the footnotes names are spelled as in the original reports, with correct spelling in parenthesis.

On 7 October 1945 the Planning Section secretary directed that a Military Government officer and an interpreter be dispatched to each of the following places; Kongju, Taejon, Pusan and Taeju, Iri and Seiyu, and Cheju Do Island, for the purpose of contacting representatives of the Choheung Bank (which had indicated a desire to buy all military horses being offered for sale) and other prospective buyers, and to contract for bids, selling on the spot to the highest bidder. 130

On 5 October 1945, 1st Lt. Parker H.Stough, who had been directed to take over control and disposition of the 1,500 horses at Tenan, had proceeded to Taejon and decided that the Japanese army should surrender its horses to him, after which he sold them to the Provincial Governor, who then made the horses available at auction to the farmers. This procedure was considered advisable due to the following facts: The horses were in deplorable physical condition. Korean farmers would not have cash to pay for such purchases until at best January 1946. Communists had discouraged buying of the horses, telling the people that since the animals were Japanese, they should be given to the Koreans; and the horses were dying at such a rapid rate, due to lack of feed and care, that it was best to get them off Military Government's hands as soon as possible. The Provincial

Government was in a position to care for and ready the horses for market after three or four months, a course which was not feasible for Military Government.

On 6 October 1945, Lieutenant Stough, with the officer in charge of Japanese transportation in Korea and the veterinary supervisor for the Japanese army in Korea (both Japanese) inspected the 717 horses at Taejon and found them in "deplorable shape" but agreed on the price of 250 yen per horse. He then contacted the Chosen Food Company and secured its cooperation with the Provincial Director of Agriculture in alloting necessary feed for the horses. On the same day, Lieutenant Stough proceeded to Tenan, inspected the 1,686 horses held there by the Japanese Army and found them to be in even worse shape than the Taejon herd. "In fact, as we trooped the line, two horses fell dead of malnutrition. Six other horses were being suspended by means of a tripod and a belly band in order to stay on their feet." A price of 235 yen per horse was agreed upon, less 10 percent for those expected to die within the coming week. (The prevailing price for horses in good condition at this time was 500 yen per head.) The final sales price total arranged between the Provincial Director of Agriculture and Lieutenant Stough was ¥ 508,207.59, and the officer received a down payment in cash of ¥ 50,000 and a note on

the remainder collectible in half on October 10 and in full on October 20. The Japanese officers agreed to provide 55 men for every 100 horses to care for them until the Provincial Government could take physical charge, and Lieutenant Stough issued an order directing that all attendant paraphernalia such as saddles, bridles, curry combs, carts, etc., be itemized and turned over for safe keeping to the Agricultural Director of Chun Chong Pukto until further instructions were received.

Lieutenant Stough ascertained that Japanese General Shigai had requested and received permission for General Hodge on 8 September 1945 to sell such horses as were necessary to expedite the moving of the 120th Division and the Keijo Division from Seoul to their temporary garrison at Tenan and Taejon. The 120th Division sold 492 horses at 225 yen a head, a total of ¥ 110,700 which Lieutenant Stough received and receipted. The Keijo Division sold 101 horses for ¥ 30,300, which amount Lieutenant Stough also received. In moving from Seoul to Tenan, eight horses died, and 301 were turned over the the XXIV Corps at Seoul. A gift of 100 horses was made to the Japanese police officials at Kyong Sen police station in Seoul. The Song Dong police station in Seoul received 15 horses, and the officials of Kyunggi

province received 25 horses. Though there were no receipts covering these transactions, Japanese officers cooperated in providing the latest official information on location of the animals in Korea. In addition to the horses, on 20 September 1945, the United States Army received from the Japanese Army 3,100 pigeons and 265 war dogs, and on 8 October Lieutenant Stough turned over receipts from the horse sales to the Finance Department, Property Control Section, amounting to ¥ 171,070 and the note for ¥ 478,207.[131]

Having successfully concluded the first horse transaction, Lieutenant Stough was next dispatched to Cheju Do Island, accompanied by a Korean representative from the Chosen Bank and his horse expert. Arriving on 11 October, he found there had been approximately 2,500 horses on the island. The Japanese 58th Army owned 2,510 horses on 23 September and by 2 October had sold to island natives 254 of this number. Forty-two were shot because of their emaciated condition, and 374 died of undernourishment, so at the time of his arrival, there actually were only 1840 horses for sale. Inspecting the stock on 12 October, and acting upon advice of the Japanese veterinarian and the Chosen Bank horse expert, Lieutenant Stough ordered 260 more shot since recovery was hopeless and keeping them alive would have been a waste of already scarce feed. The receipt of ¥ 102,731 for the sale

of horses by the Japanese army was turned over to Lieutenant Stough, who surrendered it to the Military Government Finance Section in Seoul as war booty. Lieutenant Stough again secured an inventoried list of equipment which remained temporarily for safe keeping with the Japanese army. Pending the buyer's physical possession of the horses, Lieutenant Stough authorized the 58th Army to continue its use of 280 horses for the maintenance of vital communications and recommended to M.G. that some alternative means of transportation be provided when the horses were removed. The Japanese officers agreed to provide one soldier per horse to protect and care for them until they were taken from Japanese custody. Also nominally turned over to Lieutenant Stough were 242 pigeons and 54 army dogs. The 1580 horses, which, after one or two months of care and special diet, could be readied for market, were sold to Mr. Lee of the Chosen Bank for 265 yen each, or a total of ¥ 418,700. Also held by the 58th Army and not bid for by Mr. Lee, were 207 ponies which were sold to Mr. Naushir Chiwyu, vice president of the Party for Rebuilding Korea (strongest political group among the farmers) who paid 200 yen a head, or ¥ 41,400 for the entire lot. Lieutenant Stough made arrangements for Mr. Chiwyu to tour the island and explain to the farmers that the horses now belonged to Korea, not to the Japanese Army, and to ask them to release their feed, which they had refused to sell to the Japanese after news of the surrender.

Lieutenant B.M. Kirk, USNR, who was to dispose of the horses assembled at Iri, reported that 359 animals were collected by the Japanese Army at that point, and on 10 October this group was moved by rail to Kunsan, fifteen miles west of Iri. On 11 October 1945, under the supervision of Lieutenant Kirk, who had contacted officials of the Farmers Association and the Chosen Siksan Bank and informed them of the coming sale, the first bids were rejected as too low. Conditions of sale were: cash payment, immediate assumption of care of the horses, and sale of the whole herd as a unit to the highest bidder. Each horse had a halter, bridle, and light pulling harness. Second bids resulted in the sale at 250 yen a head to the Farmers Association, and the sum of ¥ 89,750 was turned over to Lieutenant Kirk in return for a transfer of ownership and receipt form. In addition, the Japanese 160th Division Headquarters delivered to him ¥ 102,920, which had been received for the sale of 115 horses during the period of 23-27 August 1945.[133]

Lieutenant Kirk then proceeded to Seiyu where 533 horses had been collected by the Japanese Army. There he solicited bids from the Chosen Siksan Bank, the Farmers Association, and the agent for the Choheung Bank, and requested the local police chief to publish information of

the sale. Terms of the sale were similar to previous conditions...immediate payment and assumption of care, plus temporary permission for the Japanese Army to use a number of the horses for transportation. Each horse was equipped with a halter, and 529 of the 533 also had a light pulling harness. Three bids were submitted for the lot, and sale was made for 205 yen a head to the Gun Farmers Association, by check on the Chosen Siksan Bank. Funds for horses sold by the Japanese Army had already been delivered to United States Army representatives.[134]

At Kongju the disposition of 287 horses was given into the hands of 1st Lt. Isom Deshotels, QMC, who arrived in that city on 10 October 1945 and announced the coming sale by radio, newspaper publicity being deemed impractical. On 9 October, the horse census at Kongju was 295, but during the night one had died, one had been stolen, and six were allocated for use to a Lt. Col. Henderson.* On the day of the sale, only one prospective buyer expressed a desire to purchase the whole herd, while the bulk of those in attendance wanted only one or two of the animals. These horses, too, were in poor physical shape. Final sale was made in bulk to the chairman of the Farmers Organization and leader of the Youth Organization at 375 yen a head.[135]

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* Not further identified in Lt. Deshotels report.

Lieutenant Louis V. Reece, USNR, arrived at Taegu on 10 October 1945 and found 640 horses available for sale; however, a recheck showed two head unaccounted for, and these were presumed lost, strayed, or stolen. As usual, the horses showed signs of malnutrition and neglect, and seven had to be shot. First bids were rejected as too low; moreover, each of the bidders asked the privilege of selecting the horses wanted. Since no buyer bid for the whole herd, arrangements were made for an auction to be held on 11 October 1945 at the racetrack where the horses were quartered. Here sales were made in lots of one, five, and ten horses to the highest bidder, who paid cash and received a receipt signed by Lieutenant Reece. A crowd of from four to five thousand Koreans made the auction highly competitive, and the herd was sold for an average of 556.72 yen a head, bringing a total of ¥ 351,290 for the 631 horses. Of this amount ¥ 332,810 was deposited in the Industrial Bank of Chosen in the account of Military Government. There was ¥ 18,480 (Bank of Japan currency) collected at the sale which the Bank was not authorized to accept for deposit, and this amount was given to the Military Government Finance Officer.

Each horse was sold with a rope halter and lead line. Other miscellaneous equipment such as saddles, bridles, harness, carts, hay, etc., remained under guard of Japanese and American sentries, and Lieutenant Reece recommended that an auction be

made of these materials, or that they be assembled with similar items from other areas for disposal.[136]

Lieutenant Merrill W. Abbey, (jg) USNR, flew to southern Korea on 9 October 1945 and sold 200 horses, 11 swine, and an unspecified amount of grain which had been collected at Puaan, Masan, and Hwahaktong--all former Japanese Army property--for a cash total of ¥ 138,074. The horses sold in lots of 123, 55, and 12, for 300, 375, and 300 yen ahead respectively. Saddles and bridles, etc., were inventoried and stored at the garrisons pending further instructions. As elsewhere, the horses were in poor condition, and Lieutenant Abbey reported that "grain was rotting from exposure."[137]

A follow-up trip was made by the Military Government Department of Agriculture advisor, 1st Lt. J.P. Choplin, on 9 November 1945, to collect the balance of ¥ 478,207.50 due on 717 horses sold to the Governor of ChungChong Pukto at Taejon, and a check for this amount was received. Lieutenant Choplin also investigated the feed supply situation at Taejon and found that the 17th Japanese Infantry Divison had moved, leaving considerable amounts of feed. The Chosen Food Company, however, had begun making an inventory of these food stocks, which were to be sent to National Headquarters of the Korean Commodity Company in Seoul.[138]

Uncontrolled Livestock Slaughter

On 19 April 1947, General Lerch signed Ordinance 140, "Limiting the Slaughter of Cattle" in South Korea. Though this was the first official action taken to solve the most serious problem faced by Military Government in the field of livestock, reports of indiscriminate slaughtering had appeared during September 1945, the first month of American occupation, and had increased in number and gravity during the subsequent year and a half. By the time Ordinance 140 became effective, terrific inroads had been made upon the ranks of Korean livestock, and according to one provincial agricultural officer, twenty years must elapse before work cattle alone could regain its level at the time of the Japanese surrender.[139]

On 21 September 1945, it was reported that only 50 percent of the 1943 total of hogs in South Korea remained alive[140] and on the same day the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce asked the Public Relations Office to publicize the fact that slaughtering of dairy cattle should stop, for because of black market prices on beef, the dairy industry was "dangerously close to being wiped out."[141] An inspection of the Bullri Dairy and other stock farms in December revealed that all cattle were in poor physical condition,[142] and in January 1946 the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce livestock advisor recommended that "drastic measures" be taken to curb illegal slaughering of

cattle in order to avoid a serious shortage of farm labor.[143]

On 5 April 1946, the livestock situation in South Korea was "critical" due to lack of feed, high meat and poultry prices, high cost of feed, and lack of local resources to support livestock. Forty percent of South Korea's work cattle had been slaughtered since 15 August 1945; dairy cattle were undernourished and owners were slaughtering rather than letting their stock starve. Already milk production had declined two thirds; fifty percent of South Korea's poultry had disappeared and though there had been an increase of 4,000 horses (a result of the sale of Japanese Army horses to Koreans) these animals were in grave need of food. Supplies of captured Japanese feed were almost exhausted, and the Korean Commodity Company, the Chosen Livestock Company, and the office of Commodity Control reported only small amounts of reserve feed on hand.[144]

On 13 April 1946, the Farmer's Weekly suggested the substitution of six men for one work cow when it became apparent that there were not enough work animals left in South Korea to perform agricultural chores. By February 1947, the number of dairy cattle in South Korea had decreased 50 percent; a shortage of meat in future years was inevitable; and 7,000 head of cattle were still being slaughtered each month.[145]

Though during this period the Farmer's Weekly, Military Government press releases, radio programs and other forms of publicity were utilized in appealing to Korean farmers to curb the slaughtering of livestock, it is obvious that these unenforced warnings were universally ignored. During the eighteen months following the surrender and ending with the signing of Ordinance 140, the only positive check on slaughter was instituted by the Kyunggi-Do Province Department of Agriculture, which on 18 February 1947 put into effect the provisions of Agricultural Bulletin No. 335, limiting the killing of cattle in that province. Ordinance 140 had been under discussion many months prior to its approval on April 1947. It aimed at the maintenance of a minimum number of draft cattle, breeding cattle and swine, and the killing of all livestock only in regularly established slaughter houses under government inspection. To insure these goals it prohibited the killing of healthy female cattle under ten years of age, healthy males under seven, pregnant cows and females still suitable for breeding, of pigs under six months, and of pregnant sows and sows still suitable for breeding. All animals were to be killed at public slaughter houses, inspected by authorized veterinarians, and both meat and hides were to be officially stamped. Responsibility for controlling the slaughter of cattle as outlined rested with local authorized

livestock technicians, and the number of cattle and swine to be slaughtered annually was to be determined by national and local governments.[146]

Though it was apparent that grave harm had been done to the livestock industry in South Korea, the putting into effect of Ordinance 140 resulted in the decrease of slaughtering and drew national attention to the problem.

Korean Horse Association

The phase of livestock activities in South Korea which attracted most interest and participation was horse-racing, started in 1907 and fostered by Korean and Japanese governments as a stimulant to the improved breeding of horses. Legalized and organized in April 1922 as the Korean Horse-racing Club, the association first erected temporary tracks for its racing seasons but later moved to its permanent location outside East Gate, Seoul, where a permanent track was constructed.

Following the organization of the Korean Horse-racing Club in 1922, many other groups banded together for the purpose of promoting horse racing, but only six of these were recognized by the government; Korean Horse Club, Seoul, established 5 April 1922; Pyung Nam Horse Club, Pyung Yang,

5 July 1924; Taejon Horse Club, 14 May 1926; Kuk-Kyung Horse Club, Shin-i-chu, 4 May 1927; Pusan Horse Club, 13 July 1927, and the Koon San Horse Club, 22 May 1928.

Since races held by these clubs were not conducted for the good of the people but for private profit, the Japanese in 1932 issued the Korean Horse Racing Ordinances, and with the admittance to legal existence in 1937 of three more clubs(at Chung Jin, Hamheung, and OongoGi) racing was sponsored officially in nine different Korean cities. In 1937 the first Korean Horse Association was activated, with the nod of the Japanese government, to control the scattered Korean horse clubs. Revised and reorganized with extended powers on 1 March 1942, the present Korean Horse Association came into being, while all other horse organizations were dissolved, surrendering their activities to the new association. In 1943, there were one horse breeding station, one horse training station, and nine legally authorized race tracks in Korea. On 15 August 1945, when the Japanese surrendered, Mr. Ra Myung Kyun, manager of the Seoul Riding Club, and other Korean volunteers, organized a committee and took over the association, which usurpation was completedy effected and approved by Military Government by 24 September 1945.[147] On 3 October 1945, Mr. Ra was appointed president.

It is interesting to note that at the time of confirmation of Ra's appointment as president, a number of his colleagues objected, saying: "Mr. Ra has dishonored association with quarrels; Mr. Ra not a gentleman, and Mr. Ra no experience with horse racing." However the objectors, who were few in proportion to the association's membership, were informed that: "Mr. Ra was appointed and that was final."[148]

On 26 October 1945, slightly over a month after the American occupation of South Korea, Lt. (jg) Merrill W. Abbey reported on his six-day tour of duty at the local race track. He had obtained ¥ 500,000 from the Chosun Industrial Bank so that the association could pay early bets and exchanges; and he had supervised the stationing of forty Military Police who were to keep an eye on the patrons and see that track enthusiasts did not get out of hand; Lt. Abbey reported that: "Generals started visiting the races" and he set up a schedule for such visits, one general per day being the allotted quota. The average daily betting, he said, approximated ¥ 1,000,000. He located the Horse Association bank books and turned them in to the Finance Department of Military Government; furthermore, he secured translations of the horse-racing laws and ordinances and discovered therein that the government should receive approximately twelve percent

of admissions, ten percent of winning money, and all other funds after operating expenses, salaries of officials and horse breeding expenses had been paid. He also found that within twenty days after termination of the races, all such bills, including taxes, should be paid to the proper authorities; and that the police had been lax in enforcing the regulations with respect to licensed concessions.[149]

The adventures of one P. W. Park, Korean Horse Association employee, were reported by the Department of Agriculture on 15 December 1945, in a request for cooperation from the Department of Justice. On 31 October Mr. Park was appointed director of the Horse Breeding Department by Mr. Ra Myung Kyun, president of the Korean Horse Association. On 5 November, Mr. Park under false pretenses collected ₩ 174,360 belonging to the Association. For this, Mr. Ra escorted him to the East Gate police station where a charge of theft was entered against him. However, the police took no action, and on 13 November Mr. Park appeared at the Changno police station and accused Mr. Ra of collaboration with the former Japanese director in acquiring funds illegally. As a result of this charge, many employees of the Horse Association were investigated, and Korean police

made one arrest...plaintiff Park, who was incarcerated on 14 November, and released on the following day. On 18 November, at the request of the Department of Agriculture, Military Police returned Mr. Park to jail, from which he escaped that afternoon. Two days later, Military Police requested Korean police to apprehend and confine the gentleman, and Mr. Park again resided briefly behind bars, for as long as it took him to bribe the guard and take a second "French leave" from jail. At last report, Mr. Park was still at liberty, as were also the Korean Horse Association's ¥ 174,360.[150]

On 15 November 1946, Mr. Ra Myung Kyun asked that the balance of the ¥ 2,811,441.54, which had been deposited prior to the surrender in Japan to the account of the Korean Horse Association, be made available to the Association for use in buying horses in Japan for import to Korea. However, this balance, amounting to ¥ 724,161.53, the use of which was requested by the Department of Agriculture, was refused since at that time all foreign accounts in Japan were frozen.

Garbage as Hog Feed

An extensive survey was conducted by XXIV Corps and Military Government concerning the practicability of using army garbage as food for hogs, since tons of such garbage from

billets and army messes were being discarded. According to the Livestock Section American advisor, one ton of garbage could feed approximately fifty to sixty hogs a day, with an expected gain of one pound per day; thus one ton of garbage could be utilized to produce about 60 pounds of pork daily. The main problem was distribution, and on 11 March 1947 the Department of Agriculture advised Military Governor that the Livestock Section and billeting officers were working out a system of collection and distribution.

On 26 March 1947, a comprehensive study was made by the XXIV Corps Conservation Officer on the subject of garbage disposal, which revealed that during the month of February there had been discarded an average of 4.5 pounds of edible waste per 100 men, from 45 messes serving 6,298 individuals. Since there were 117 messes in the Seoul area, serving 17,597 people, this resulted in an approximate total of 792 pounds of edible garbage per day in the Seoul area alone. At that time, garbage was being collected from some messes by Koreans on a no-sale basis, while other army messes hauled their waste to a disposal pit near the Han River bridge. The Department of Agriculture reported that there were eight hog farms in the Seoul district which needed feed, and Military Government requested that garbage be released to Korean

contractors for sale; however, the Conservation Officer advised that such release to Korean contractors for sale to hog farms and other using agencies was not practicable, and recommended that garbage and trash be collected by organizations and delivered to the Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry, Kyunggi-Do, for use of experimental 4-H farms. The study quoted Field Manual 21-10, Par. 70 which said that: "Unless there are at least 500 troops in a camp for a considerable time, this method of disposal is not practicable because each /hog/ requires about 50 pounds of garbage a day, of which 15 to 20 pounds are eaten..... Garbage alone does not produce a satisfactory grade of pork." The Department of Agriculture contributed its opinion: "... Garbage....would contribute more to the national welfare if used as animal feed than if used as fertilizer...."

This study was submitted to the Military Governor in March 1947 and in August garbage had been assigned to provincial agricultural officers for distribution to any applicants who raised hogs.[151]

Miscellaneous Activities of the Livestock Section, 1946

In 1946 a total of 2,441 rabbits was produced in provincial livestock stations of which 1,272 were distri-

buted to farmers. Some 414 pigs were produced, and 167 were distributed. 23,977 fowl were hatched, of which 17,454 were placed on Korean farms. Only 16 goats were raised, and six of them were distributed. Some 154 sheep were produced and 81 were given to farmers.

A horse breeding station was established at Kyungju, Kyong Sang Pukto province, by the Korean Horse Association, with a budget of 20,000,000 yen, and a yearly allowance for 1946 of 12,000,000 yen. With 1,250 acres under pasture, the station went into operation utilizing 10 stallions, 20 mares, 25 male and 20 female ponies. During the year, a pasture, road, and various buildings were added, including an office building, three stables, one storeroom, one medicine room and "shoeing factory," and one restroom at the station.

Other "shoeing factories" (blacksmith shops) were set up by the Livestock Sections in various provinces; 26 in Kyonggi Do, 10 in Chung Chong Pukto, 16 in Chung Chong Namdo, 18 in Cholla Pukto, 25 in Chila Namdo, 24 in Kyong Sang Pukto, 25 in Kyong Sang Namdo, and 8 in Kang Won Do, at a cost each of 70,000 yen.

In 1947 the continued salt shortage resulted in loss of newly farrowed pigs, poor growth of livestock, reduced

milk production from dairy cattle and goats, slow gain in weight, lack of "tone," and the loss of many hides for lack of salt in curing.

During 1946 four training courses were held under the direction of the national and provincial Livestock Sections, with Korean livestock officials and technicians instructing some 350 Korean technicians, farmers, and livestock workers. The Seoul Agriculture School, and all provincial agriculture schools each carried one livestock course. Publicity was prepared and distributed through the medium of radio, the Farmers' Weekly, the Chosun Agricultural Scientific Society, and a competitive exhibition of breeding cattle was held at Nam Won in Cholla Pukto.

About 150,000 tons of hay were produced in 1946, which was stored for winter feed, while 500 acres were planted in pasture hay and soiling crops at the Suwon Airport and at Sangwon Farm near Onjang. An additional thousand acres was to be planted in 1947, and fifteen livestock men were to be sent to the provinces to educate farmers on the cultivation of lower hillsides in grasses and other edible plants. On 16 April 1947 the National Food Administration allotted to the Department of Agriculture, Livestock Section, some 2,000 pounds of hard candy to be used by the Seoul Bee Association as "carry-over" food for honey bees.

Outlook for Korean Livestock Industry

The fact that livestock production will probably never play an important role quantitatively in Korean agriculture is regrettable, for increased livestock production could solve many problems confronting Korea today. She is not, and probably will not be for many years, a self-sufficient country in food stuffs. Her present diet is low in quantity, and in caloric and protein content. Grain and vegetable production is already being exploited to the utmost, with the result that livestock production is the only remaining solution to an improvement in the Korean national diet. Though Koreans now and always have consumed grains and vegetables to the almost complete exclusion of meat and dairy products, increased livestock production could supplement both the quantity and quality of their diet.

Other advantages to be derived from livestock promotion are: more manure for depleted soil on Korean farms; more farm labor; more wool to supplement scarce Korean textiles; and, most important, if the proposed plan for planting barren hillsides in leguminous plants and edible grasses is carried out, the resultant foliage will provide not only vast amounts of livestock feed but will retard disastrous soil erosion.

The indifference of Koreans to meat and dairy products has existed for the past 4,000 years, although immediately after the Japanese surrender in September 1945, Koreans went on a meat-eating spree which cut the amount of livestock in South Korea to 50 percent of its 1943 level. At its peak in 1938, livestock production totaled only 6.5 percent of Korea's annual agricultural yield, and by 1947 this figure had declined to 3 percent. There are few, if any, good meadow lands, for the press of dense population has caused nearly all available farm lands to be planted in rice and other foods which Koreans prefer to meat.

The present situation in Korea (summer 1947) augurs unfavorably for the future of the livestock industry, since the food shortage has caused all efforts to be turned toward increased grain production, to the detriment of the livestock industry. The only lands which could be turned to livestock feed production are the aforementioned waste hillsides, and a project of this nature would require vast amounts of seed, fertilizer, care, experimentation, and money.

By April 1947, livestock had declined 80 percent in South Korea since 1938, and 50 percent since 1943. In the future as in the past, the bulk of livestock feed must come from agricultural by-products---soy beans, rice straw,

etc. Aside from the feed shortage, other problems having to do with livestock production which must be met and overcome are: control of animal diseases, control of animal slaughter, and education of farmers in the care and breeding of livestock.[153]

II. Production

A. Food Crops

4. Fisheries

Introduction:--In July 1947, the current position of the South Korea fisheries industry was summarized: "Korea's fishing industry was largely dependent on imports of fishing supplies...from Japan. With this source cut off, operations are gradually decreasing, and unless materials are forthcoming soon, the industry will cease to function."[154]

Background:--Korea is located in areas exceedingly rich in marine life and is blessed with a coastline, including innumerable islands, inlets and bays, of approximately 11,000 miles. Due to the convergence of two currents, the warm Kuroshi from the southwest and the cold Oyashi from the northwest, its surrounding waters foster great aggregations of food organisms which are conducive to prolific fish and other marine life. The areas of oceans, seas and pelagic

regions accessible to Korean fishermen, and the marine life inhabiting these waters, are extensive and contributed much toward making Korea the sixth ranking fish producing nation of the world in 1940. There are some 75 kinds of edible fish in Korean waters, 20 kinds of shellfish, 15 algae, and 10 other kinds of sea animals and plants. Most important fish or sea-product was iwashi, a kind of sardine, the catch of which increased from 275,900 tons in 1932, or 23.6 percent of total fish production for the year, to 1,388,200 tons in 1937, or 65.5 percent of the total catch. This important industry has completely disappeared, decreasing steadily from 1937 to 1943, after which no sardines have been caught in Korean waters. Korean fishermen were mystified by the sudden disappearance of the iwashi, but ichthyologists have advanced the following explanation.[155]

The Japanese had amassed a great fleet of sardine purse seine craft directly across the current flow which contacted the Japanese coast at the extreme southeastern point of Hokkaido, then traversed the entire eastern coast of Japan, turning north at the southern point of Kyushu to make confluence with the warm current from the southeast Pacific Ocean in the Straits of Tsushima, running between

Korea and Japan. The greater percentage of the sardines followed this warm current directly across the straits, turning again northward with its flow as it progressed upwards along the eastern coast of Korea, finally reaching their spawning grounds in the Sea of Japan, along the northeastern coastline shoals of Korea. The number of these sardines that migrated from northern waters ran into millions annually. By forming a barrier of ships, operating across this flow and run, thousands of tons of sardines were caught before reaching their spawning grounds, and taken directly to Japan for canning and processing without being given the opportunity to reproduce and propagate. The continuation of this program by the Japanese, and the resultant depletion of stock, completely eliminated the Korean sardine industry.[156]

In the days of the Imperial Korean Government, little encouragement was offered to the fishing industry. Methods were antiquated and Koreans who engaged in fishing, never ventured far from the coast. In preparing aquatic products, salting and drying were done in a crude manner, as only the home market was served. Soon after the annexation by Japan, however, the fish industry came in for its share of promotion under the Japanese policy of exploiting

all Korean resources to the fullest extent. In 1911, 13,709 sailing vessels were engaged in fishing along the Korean coast, producing a total that year of 66,522 tons of fish and sea-products.[157]

The Japanese conducted thorough investigations of the outlying Korean waters, found that the convergence of the warm and cold currents was extremely favorable to the growth of marine life, and began employing purse seiners and drag net boats. In 1922 they established experiment stations at the main ports of Korea, for the purpose of increasing fisheries output, developing fresh and salt water fish, and the culture of shell fish, encouraging the development of marine products, their processing and storage, and pursuing the investigation and study of the waters adjacent to Korea so that fisheries might be properly developed and preserved. Later, in 1928, the Japanese set up inspection stations, to enforce regulations for the inspection of marine products, to study the proper manufacturing and processing of marine products, and to publicize accepted methods of handling and processing marine products. In 1932 all fishery associations, unions, societies, and guilds were organized under the Chosun

Fisheries Corporation, later called the Korean Fisheries Corporation. The Union of Fishery Guilds lent money to the Fishery Guilds, acted as trustee, sold the catch and processed marine products consiged to it by the guilds, acquired fishing rights and initiated inquiries on new practices and operations. Fishery Guilds collected their consignment of the catch, made consolidated purchases of equipment, served as a mutual aid agency for its members, and took all necessary measures for the development of gear and equipment. The Marine Products Association supervised the actual fishing, while the Chosen Marine Products Industry Association supervised processing of marine products.[158]

By 1937 the number of fishing craft operating in Korean waters totaled 51,519, thirteen percent being power operated. Production of marine products during 1937 amounted to 2,115,785 metric tons for all Korea, including 1,200,000 tons of iwashi, the popular sardine. The value of sea products caught in Korean waters increased from 8.5 million yen in 1912 to 87.1 million yen in 1938. Although statistics for 1912 were not wholly reliable, even comparing the 1919 figures with those of 1939, it was evident that the value of the catch had doubled and the

quantity approximately quadrupled during that time. In 1939 there were 1,596,000 tons of fish caught, in addition to 1,758,100 tons of seaweed and other marine products, amounting in total to 73 percent of that year's catch in Japan, which at that time led the world in marine production.

Despite the rapid development of the fishing industry in Korea, Koreans did not profit from the increase in production, for at least 75 percent of all fish caught were used for other than food purposes, while 91 percent of the catch of sardine were processed, chiefly into oil and iwashi cakes (used as fertilizer). Iwashi oil was utilized in production of hard oils, glycerine, fatty acids, gunpowder, medicine, soap, candles, and margarine.

The following figures illustrate the rapid expansion of the fishery industry in Korea: In 1919 the total catch was valued at 19.1 million yen; in 1923 at 29.6 million yen; in 1928 at 44.9 million yen; in 1933 at 35.6 million yen; in 1937, at 93.4 million yen; and in 1938 at 96.8 million yen. Korea imported from 11 to 21 thousand tons of marine products yearly from 1926 to 1938 while her exports for the same years increased from

103 to 510 thousand tons of fish products.

While a catch of almost two million tons of fish a year should augur a substantial supplement for the Korean diet (almost 220 pounds per person) the fact was that less than one-fourth of the fish caught, and less than half the manufactured and produced fish products were used directly as food products, while at least 62.5 percent of the sea products were exported each year.

In 1938 about half a million persons in all of Korea were engaged in fishing, and about 30,000 in fish processing, while the capital invested was estimated at 40,000,000 yen. The number of Japanese fishermen was 29,063 in 1915, and 15,931 in 1932, falling almost 50 percent within 17 years, while the number of Korean fishermen rose from 242,000 to about 450-480,000 in the same time. However, these figures are offset by others which show that in 1932 the value of catch per Korean fisherman was 102 yen a year, while Japanese fishermen netted 1,910 yen per person or 19 times as much. This was not due to superior skill on the part of Japanese fishermen so much as to the fact the Japanese had acquired the best equipment and lots. In 1932 the

value of equipment for an individual Korean fisherman was estimated at 15 yen, 20 sen, while Japanese fishermen struggled along with only 265 yen worth of equipment each, or seventeen times as much. There was one boat to every two Japanese fishermen, and one smaller, more primitively equipped vessel for each thirteen Koreans.[159]

In 1930 more than 16,000 acres of land in the interior of Korea were devoted to fish culture, with a production of more than 3,000,000 yen. Approximately 16,453 acres of land produced 6,728 thousand pounds of fish at a value of 3,328 yen, while in 1938, 6,400 tons of fresh-water fish were caught at a value of 5.9 million yen.[160]

The fish industry under the Japanese in Korea was profitable and diverse. In 1939 some 84,082.8 tons were exported at a value of 24,680,000 yen, going to Japan, Manchuria, China, the United States, England, and the Dutch East Indies, with Manchuria getting more than any other single country. In round numbers, fresh fish accounted for 16,000 tons; dried fish, 5,000 tons; salted fish, 27,000 tons; pollock eggs, 400 tons; salted sea urchin, 36 tons; salted medusa, 30 tons; sea cucumber, 100 tons; laver, 100 tons; boiled fish paste, 300 tons;

canned goods, 900 tons; fish oil, 800 tons; stiffened oil, 700 tons; fish meat, 18,000 tons; and fertilizer, 1,000 tons. In 1944, some 98,828 tons of fish and marine products, valued at 23,008,834 yen were exported from Korea. Production for the years 1939 and 1944 was set at 599,552 tons and 261,632 tons respectively, the last figure representing only South Korea. The craft engaged in fishing in 1939 comprised 45,528 sailing and 2,718 motor-powered vessels. Though figures were not available for 1944, in 1943 there were 63,729 sailing and 3,185 motored craft.[161]

Situation at Time of American Entry

Although the Korean fishing industry had expanded until at the beginning of the war she ranked sixth among fish producing nations of the world, during five years of conflict (1940-45) fish production dropped sharply because of the shortage of materials and manpower necessary to maintain the industry. By September 1945, fishing craft were in such poor condition and supplies were so short that production had fallen practically to zero. The main reasons for this drop in production were the appro-

priation of boats for war purposes, and the diversion of sardine schools in 1938 and 1939. Average monthly production had fallen from 44,000 metric tons in 1937 to only 14,000 tons in 1945, but in 1946 this average rose to about 43,041 tons per month. Marine products other than fish averaged monthly about 46,000 in 1937, 32,000 in 1941, and 20,000 in 1945 but climbed back to 38,000 tons a month in 1946. At the end of 1946 there were registered 2,346 motored craft and 35,339 sailing vessels, while the number of persons employed in fishing in 1946 was estimated at 340,000 in South Korea alone.[162]

When American troops entered South Korea in fall of 1945, there was ample evidence of Korea's former scientific research and experiment program. There still remained many volumes of annual reports and investigational reports in the library of the fisheries experiment station at Pusan, and all experiment stations visited by Americans gave evidence of equipment and buildings which indicated well-staffed and equipped scientific installations. Of eight sub-stations in Korea, four were south of the 38th parallel. As many as thirteen vessels were found equipped with scientific apparatus and in use as floating laboratories in connection with the experiment stations. The Japanese

had maintained a well-equipped fleet of patrolling craft which controlled the fishing grounds and prevented disputes over encroachments, and many of these vessels remained in Korea. The Fisheries Research Station at Pusan still stood, but its buildings needed repair and of the four boats attached, only one was large enough to conduct anything but local operations. Apparatus belonging to the station was in fair condition, but chemicals were in critical short supply. However, the Korean director of the station had been educated in Japan and could, with capable staff help, and chemical supplies, conduct valuable research. Branch offices of the research station were sought by other Military Government departments since the buildings were in very good condition. Americans discovered that the Japanese had also exercised control over the processing of fisheries products through twenty-seven inspection stations, which were equipped to conduct food analysis, although at the time of inspection, no stations had sufficient material to conduct such tests. All canneries and processing plants had been required to submit samples to the stations, which had to pass muster before they were allowed to be shipped out of the country. Apparently no inspection was made of fresh fish.

Fish hatcheries were not numerous but were well equipped. Insofar as was known, only three existed south of the 38th parallel. A hatchery at Pohang pumped sea water into troughs which were equipped with trays for hatching. Herring were carried two days after hatching and cod five days. The hatchery at Chung Pyung propagated only carp; its ponds were sod-bottomed and sided with rock, while a few were walled in cement. There were small hatching ponds for spawning operations and a glass-topped egg-picking building, with crude but fairly effective food preparation equipment. A large hatchery at Chinhai specialized in the raising of goldfish and maintained 163 ponds lined in cement with clay bottoms. Goldfish were reared to a length of three centimeters, then distributed to ponds in the area for a slight fee. Hatcheries had suffered along with other fishery establishments from a lack of funds and materials during the war years. There was some activity at ChungPyung, but many of the ponds were in need of repair, and the egg-picking house was practically destroyed. Some fish were being raised there, and the Chinhai goldfish hatchery had a small stock of wild goldfish as a nucleus for future production.

Americans found that South Korea was well supplied with canneries and processing plants, all principal ports having been well equipped. Many plants were small and crude but all had been under operation. The plants themselves resembled only slightly canneries in the United States, being dark, dirt-floored, and poorly arranged, while the products would not have met with American standards of tastiness since they were canned with highly seasoned sauces, all the natural juices being wasted. Most of the canneries either were closed for lack of materials or were stripped of so much equipment that it was impossible for them to operate, and by the end of 1946 only ten were operating. Many continued business until their stored empty cans were exhausted, and supplies of sugar, tin cans, and machinery were necessary before the canneries could return to operation.

Oil reduction plants had also played an important part in the fishery industry, but all modern equipment installed by the Japanese had been taken out or destroyed by them before they departed. At Chiminjin in KangWon Do province, there were many evidences of what

must have been a prosperous business. Though there were no modern machines, there were many hand presses and open vats for cooking the fish prior to oil extraction, and the local oil reduction union had possessed sufficient funds to erect the finest building in the village. Sardines had been used because they were rich in oil and not desired by the Koreans as food, while oil was stored in tanks similar to American petroleum storage tanks. The Mitsui Fat and Oil Company of Sam Chok used a considerable amount of this oil in soap manufacture.

Ice plants were not plentiful but those extant were strategically located. While the machinery was not the most modern, such equipment was all pre-war, and much of the machinery had been made in America.[163]

The condition of the Korean fishery industry when Americans entered South Korea was not auspicious. During the period from July 1937 to August 1945, most of the catch produced in Korean waters had been taken directly to Japan and China. The Japanese had utterly disregarded all maintenance and repairs, and as a result, boats and equipment had deteriorated seriously. During the war the Japanese had stripped the Korean fishing industry to

provide for their army and navy, and immediately following the surrender they had used a large number of the remaining motor-powered boats to take personnel and food to Japan. About 50 percent of the fishing fleet of Korea had been thus removed, and less than 10 percent of these vessels had been returned to Korea by the end of 1946.

Further difficulties arose since most of the key administrative positions in the fishing industry had been held by Japanese, and very few Koreans had sufficient experience, education or training to carry on when the occupying nationals returned to Japan. Records were confused and many important documents were either lost or destroyed. The smaller fishing craft which were available needed fishing gear, motor parts, fuel, navigation aids, and coordination of movements in order to resume effective operation.

In short, the fishing industry of South Korea was hanging on by a thread. Many of the fishing grounds had been known only to the Japanese, and due to the lack of essential equipment, Korean fishermen were unable to locate them. For want of fishing equipment and

repairs, many boats were unable to operate. Cold storage and ice manufacturing plants were closed because of the need of repairs and a shortage of ammonia. Marine product canneries were inoperative for lack of parts, repairs and tin plate. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the increasing population thrust many more fishermen into an already overcrowded, low-paying industry, hampered by the absence of a cooperative spirit among the individual fishermen. Korea's once flourishing export of marine products had fallen away to nothing.

Reports for 1946 showed that 295,711 tons of fish had been caught in South Korea, only half the total for 1939. Of the amount caught in 1946, 51,267 tons were processed products--dried fish, salted, boiled, and processed shellfish, seaweed and other marine items.[164]

Bureau of Fisheries Administrative Set-up

Under the new table of organization, effective in July 1947, the Bureau of Fisheries was set up along lines similar to those under which it had been functioning

since the initial phase of the American occupation. The national bureau, and bureaus in each of the eight provinces, were divided into five parts, the Food Products Institution, Fishing Control, Increasing, Community and General Affairs Sections. Directly under control of the national bureau came the Fishery Inspection Station, the Fishery Experiment Station, and Hayashikane Fishery Corporation, the Korean Fishery Corporation, and the Korean Fishery Development Company. Under the Korean Fishery Corporation came the Marine Association and the eight provincial fishery unions, which in turn were sub-divided into village guilds that worked directly with the fishermen. The Korean Fishery Development Company had charge of all Japanese factories, canneries and fish processing plants. The Hayashikane Fishery Corporation, the largest single vested fishery company, had numerous branches and companies under its control throughout the southern provinces. The Fishery Experiment Station at Pusan had charge of both the Chinhai and the ChongPyung Fish Hatcheries.

On 3 May 1946 there were 295 plants, associations, unions, guilds, and other organizations concerned with fisheries, which were under the control and supervision

of the National Bureau of Fisheries. By July 1947 these had been consolidated or liquidated until there were only 254 organizations remaining. During that same month, 43 men were assigned to the fishery inspections stations; 81 to the provincial fishery bureaus; and 29 to the national Bureau of Fisheries.[165]

Organizations Under Bureau of Fisheries

The principal fishery organizations in South Korea were the Korean Fishery Development Company, and the Hayashikane Fishery Corporation. In late 1946 the director of the national Bureau of Fisheries surveyed these organizations and found that the Korean Fishery Corporation was an organization founded under Korean Civil Law "for control, guidance, and fostering of the marine products industry." Included in its activities were the loaning of funds to fishing unions and the procurement and allocation of fishing equipment for distribution to such unions. At the time of survey, due to lack of funds and scarcity of materials, operating efficiency was not up to the standard of previous years; however, the agency played an important part in the fishery industry and the Korean Fishery Corporation was retained under Military

Government control.

Under the Japanese, the Korean Fishery Development Company had exercised close control and supervision over all aspects of the fishing industry. After the American occupation, the company proved valuable to Military Government in obtaining control of "difficult" industries, difficult in the sense that without this key company and its knowledge of fishery matters, no custodians of vested property could have been appointed, and materials valued at millions of yen might have been lost to Military Government. The Korean Fishery Development Company also was retained under United States Military Government control, to supervise all former Japanese fishery canneries, factories, and companies. It operated 63 former Japanese owned fishing boats, 4 ice plants, 5 cold storage buildings, and 13 salt storage plants.[166]

The Hayashikane Fishery Company had formerly been called the West Oceanic Fishery Company. On 10 June 1947, in a memorandum from the National Economic Board to the office of Property Custody it was reported that the Hayashikane Fishery Corporation held total assets of 35,700,000 yen, employed some 2,000 persons, had 14 branch offices, and operated 78 motor powered fishing vessels. Its total sales

grossed in excess of 163,000,000 yen during the last nine months of 1946, and it transacted from 15 to 20 percent of the entire fisheries business of South Korea. Despite its assets and large business, the company had requested a second sizable loan and as a result, its books were to be audited.

Early in February 1947, Mr. Hong Dai Kwon, President of the Hayashikane Fishery Corporation, was dismissed, effective 7 February, for cause, having failed to comply with instructions and orders issued by the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Fisheries. Auditors' reports indicated that a considerable sum in Military Government funds had been spent for receptions, a type of expenditure never authorized for such an agency. Mr. Hong had permitted his employees to form the Tai Yong Trading Company within the Hayashikane Fishery Corporation without authority, and he had not devoted his full time to the operation of the parent organization.[167]

Soon after the dismissal order was made known, a petition supposedly representing the 2,000 employees of the Hayashikane Fishery Company was received by "Sir General Lerch". The petitioneers alleged that the removal

of Hong "was deviced entirely by the vicious interpreter and bad profiteers", and warned that "the new manager, whoever it may be, will face everlasting resistance of 2,000 employees."[168]

On 17 February 1946 Major Clarence M. Weems Jr. reported that the petition in question did not represent the 2,000 employees as stated, that the accusations leading to Mr. Hong's dismissal had been substantiated, and that there was a discrepancy in funds borrowed from the Chosen bank, but that the Bureau of Fisheries was willing to permit the old president to resign in place of being discharged.[169] The last record of the affair, dated 24 February, summarized: On 7 February Mr. Hong Dai Kwon was dismissed. On 11 February a petition was submitted to General Lerch for reconsideration of the order. On 10 February an application was sent to the director of the Department of Agriculture to delay the installing of a new president until the old one could resign. On 24 February the Bureau of Fisheries had placed the matter in abeyance until auditors, who were then working in branch offices of the company, could report. It was concluded that "the whole situation is involved and complicated."[170]

Major complication arose from the fact that "the president was not guilty alone. The officers and branch members were nearly all officers and shareholders of the Tai Yong Trading Company." However, "it is true that if all of these men were to be deposed, it would be quite difficult to operate the large interests of the company." Additional complication in the affair resulted from the disappearance of the "vicious interpreter", whether through intimidation, violence, or self-elimination from the scene of conflict. By 15 July 1947, Mr. Jun Ha Boo, had been in office as president for five months, while the other guilty parties had been allowed to retain their positions. The 2,000 irate employees who had promised such "everlasting resistance" to Mr. Boo had apparently become reconciled to his leadership, and all was quiet on the Hayashikane front.[171]

Shortage of Fisheries Personnel

Under Japanese control, the Korean fishery industry had made rapid progress from 1930 to 1940, and in the latter year the yield of marine products had exceeded in value 200,000,000 yen. Since Korea was

totally lacking in the necessary trained and educated personnel, the Japanese decided to establish a fishery college at Pusan in 1940, or "the 2600th year after the accession of the Japanese Emperor Fimmu." In 1939 a preparatory association was set up in Seoul with funds amounting to 3,000,000 yen contributed by men engaged in the industry, and the president of the Chosen Fishery Corporation, Tani Takima, was appointed president of the newly founded association.

In February 1939 a second preparatory association was established in Pusan, which bought 38,168 (36 square feet equal 1 pyung) pyung of land and initiated construction of the school buildings and dormitory, and on 28 March 1940, the Pusan Fisheries College was authorized by the Chosen Government.

Three matriculations were held by the college before war caused its closing, the first in April 1941 which admitted 60 students, 45 Japanese and 15 Korean. In April 1942 a second enrollment was held which admitted 80 students, 70 Japanese and 10 Korean. The third and last matriculation, held in April 1943, comprised 120 students, of whom 111 were Japanese and only 9 Korean.

On an average, for 100 Japanese students admitted, 13 Korean students were allowed to study in the Pusan Fisheries College. After liberation, the college was reopened with American teachers.[172]

As a result of this restricted training, on 31 May 1946, under American Military Government, the Bureau of Fisheries pointed out (in a request for ¥ 800,000,000 to be used "for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and expansion" of the Korean fishing industry) that "Not one single individual scientifically and practically trained is to be found in Korea...No one with a full knowledge and experience of oceanic fisheries has been located...Korea has none of the following essential specialists in hydrography, oceanography (general aspects of the ocean), limnology, rhealogy (specifically currents), ichthyology, aquatic biology, fisheries scientists, and technicians..." and added that "Shipmasters, navigators, engineers and crew members must be trained in large numbers."[173]

In addition to the shortage of qualified Koreans in the Bureau of Fisheries, on 6 January 1947 the Department of Agriculture reported that the need

for American personnel was critical, since both American officers assigned to the bureau were being readjusted. The necessary requisitions, job descriptions and all other pertinent details had been furnished eleven months previous, yet by January 1947 not one qualified employee had been found in Korea or recruited in the States for the bureau.[174]

Shortages

The fishery industry suffered not only from a lack of trained American and Korean personnel, but was crippled by the absence of supplies and equipment of all descriptions. Exploited by the Japanese throughout the war, the Korean fishery industry needed essential supplies of all sorts when the Americans entered the country. More than a year later, at the end of 1946, these shortages remained unrelieved save for the importation of bamboo and some stocks of ammonia from Japan. All existing stocks of captured or abandoned fishery raw materials had been processed under the direction of Military Government, and a system of fishery guilds and organizations had been set up for the allocation

and distribution of necessary commodities to fishermen. Such supplies as were obtained were insufficient for complete utilization of the existing craft, and as a result many fishing vessels lay idle. Fishery operations were still decreasing at the end of 1946 and, according to the American Advisor, Bureau of Fisheries, would "come to a standstill" unless equipment was furnished soon. Submission of import requirements for the industry had been initiated in February 1946 when the first request for materials from Japan and the United States had been prepared and forwarded, yet by September of that year only 84,000 bundles of bamboo and approximately 300 cylinders of ammonia had been received. Items critically short at that time included; manila and sisal rope, cotton twine and nets; wire ropes, canvas, paints, floats, leads, nails, lumber and marine engine parts. No report as to the possibility of procuring these items had been received in South Korea. About 10 percent of the fish processing plants had been put into operation, while ice manufacturing and cold storage plants were running at half their normal capacity due to lack of ammonia, calcium chloride, light

lubricating oil, and machine parts. Maintenance and repair of the fishing fleet were at a minimum due to lack of lumber, paint, nails, canvas and engine parts, and no new ship construction had been accomplished. It was obvious that the rehabilitation of the Korean fishery industry, and in fact its very survival, could be effected only by supplying the materials needed, and by resuming the exportation of fishery products which would aid in the establishment of a favorable balance of trade. Under the conditions existing from 1945, into 1947, Korean fishermen could extract but a small percentage of the marine wealth which lay in the surrounding waters.[175]

Activities of the Bureau of Fisheries

In general, the steps taken by Military Government to restore the Korean fishing industry to its former status were as follows. All Korean waters were opened to free fishing during the period November 1945-March 1946 for the purpose of removing all barriers which might interfere with the movement and operation of the fishing fleet. Additional purpose of this free fishing policy was to put to work the maximum number of fishermen and

and every available piece of equipment and fishing craft capable of going to sea, with full freedom of operation, so as to assure the largest possible production of fish with which to augment the critical food supply. All types of fishing equipment previously owned by the Japanese were leased to the Korean fishing fleet. In addition, Military Government supervised all phases of the industry and urged Koreans, under appropriate controls, to use every means at their disposal to increase the production of fish. Efforts were made to increase the production of materials needed by the fishing industry, while Military Government re-established former Japanese procedures and methods for distribution and marketing of all fish and marine products. 176

In November 1945 a telegram from the leading South Korea fishing province, KyongSang Namdo, reported to Military Government that: "An acute shortage of all species of fishes exists in Seoul, especially fresh fish," and that "arrangements were made with the Hayashikane Fish Company to put ships to sea for the purpose of making a supply of fresh fish available to Pusan and Seoul." The company estimated that "within two weeks 75 tons a

month would be available for shipment to Seoul," and that by 1 December, 150 tons would be available to Seoul and Pusan on a 50-50 basis.

On 8 April 1946, a XXIV Corps press release reported that approximately 1,200 fishing craft carrying nearly 100,000 Korean fishermen and their families were assembling on the small islands in the Yellow Sea near Kyunggi-Do, in the northwest corner of the American zone, where they would operate for the three months, a major portion of the estimated 40,000 ton catch being slated for export. One encouraging note in the fishery scene was the removal of the dominating Japanese fleets, which had kept down the Korean catch of cod prior to 1946. By April of that year, the Korean catch of cod was exceeding records set during all previous years.

During April 1946 some 2,500,000 yen worth of equipment and salt valued at 4,800,000 yen were distributed throughout the southern Korean provinces, together with enough oil to supply all Korean fishermen. These materials were channeled through fishing guilds, local guilds acquiring the salt, oils and equipment from their unions for distribution to the individual fishermen.[177]

On 15 April 1946 Major General Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor of South Korea, advised the Director of the Department of Agriculture that: "For two days I have had a delegation of fishermen calling on me from KyongSang Namdo." (KyongSang Namdo was the major South Korea fishery province, largely due to the fact that Pusan, always the center of the fishery industry in Korea, was located within its boundaries.) General Lerch said that the fishermen had several complaints: They said that the chairman of the Fisheries Association (an American army officer) did not take time to hear their complaints, and General Lerch commented that the major in question had exhibited a "rather bombastic manner" toward the fishermen in his presence, that although sure the major "did not mean to offend...he certainly does not have their confidence." The delegation then said that the Military Government interpreter did not listen to them thoroughly and did not relay to American officers all that he was asked to convey. They complained that the two former Japanese companies, the Hayashikane and the NamSun Fishery Companies, had been given jurisdiction over Japanese boats other than those formerly controlled

by the two firms. The Fisheries Association chairman told them that the companies were merely employees of Military Government, but the fishermen replied that an employee of the NamSun company had told them he would receive 25 percent of all profits derived from his activities in the company. The principal sources of contention appeared to be first, control of some 200 formerly Japanese-owned, motor-powered boats, which the American major said had been turned over to the Southern Fisheries Company (NamSun Company) for operation. Second, the Korean fishermen did not want the fishing grounds opened to competitive bidding as "rich inexperienced men profit and experienced guilds lose out," under this system of disposal. Such action would approximate the Japanese method of running the fishery industry, namely in that the monied interests gained all profitable grounds and equipment, while the fishermen themselves got "only the scraps." The delegation concluded by stating that all fishermen at that time were "suffering from want of food."

General Lerch, after consideration of their complaints, recommended to the Department of Agriculture that it take steps to insure against monopoly; avoid

use of Japanese names of companies; employ only experienced men when possible (fishermen complained that one responsible Military Government fishery employee had been a clothing salesman); that granting of permanent fishing rights be postponed until the Korean government should decide as to their disposal, but that in the meantime temporary rights, not to exceed 2 years, be granted in both water and boats; and that all employment of persons who might have a personal interest should be closely checked.

By July 1946, 126 metric tons of fresh fish had been exported to Japan from Korea, and 42,000 bundles of bamboo received in return. On 18 July 1946 the Bureau of Fisheries reported that it had organized national and provincial fisheries, bureaus, unions, and guilds, and had organized the Korean Fisheries Corporation to handle production, sale and distribution of all marine products and equipment. Approximately 15,000,000 yen worth of materials had been allocated to the fishery unions; experimental and inspection stations had been set up to handle fish hatching, experimental and inspection work; all fishing rights and licenses had been or were in the

process of being allocated to fishermen under supervision of the Military Government; approximately 50,000 fishing boats had been registered with various guilds at ports of operation; plans for the importation of critically short materials for the fishery industry had been initiated, and a request for 25 fishing craft had been forwarded to the Korean Fisheries Corporation was being considered, which would give additional credit in the form of fishing equipment and materials to all fishery unions.[178]

On 27 August 1946 the Bureau of Fisheries requested and later received a loan of 100 million yen for the operation of the fishery industry. Twenty million yen of the amount were to be used to buy and store dried and salted fish for the accumulation of stockpiles under the direction of the National Food Administration. Thirty million yen were to be expended in the purchasing of fishing supplies and equipment by unions and guilds for re-sale to individual fishermen, and the remaining fifty million yen were to be set aside to the credit of the various guilds. Funds would also be utilized to aid fishermen in repairing their boats and equipment, for at that time many fishing boats were lying idle for lack

of essential supplies. The entire loan was to be repaid in three installments: twenty million in March 1947, thirty million in May, and the remaining fifty million yen in September 1947. The loan if granted would benefit some 143 fishing guilds, 8 fishery unions, and five marine associations, as well as thousands of individual fishermen.[179]

In July 1947 the American advisor to the Bureau of Fisheries stated that the bureau's main activities had been and would remain 1) the requisitioning of supplies, and 2) the attempting to obtain correct and complete statistics on the fishery industry of Korea. He added that in trying to build up Korea's fishery exports, only 13 million yen worth of laver, and 18 metric tons of agar-agar worth 15,000,000 yen had been exported to Japan.

Statistics on the Korean Fishery Industry

In view of the continuing food shortage, the Department of Agriculture recommended on 11 December 1946 (in a memorandum to the Office of Foreign Affairs) that only agar-agar, sea-slugs, dried shark fins, whale meat, and surplus fresh or frozen fish not suitable for salting, be approved for export from Korea unless some

arrangements were made for importing items critically needed by the Korean fishery industry. Earlier in the same year this principle had been exemplified in a XXIV Corps press release of 16 April 1946, announcing the barter of 385 tons of Korean fish to Japan, in return for 5,000 tons of salt. The first export of laver to Japan since the liberation was made in the spring of 1947, with the sale of 1,145,717 bundles to the Japanese market, the largest amount of agricultural products exported in 1947, according to a Military Government press release dated 12 July 1947. This transaction, which represented about one-third of the total laver production of South Korea for the season 1946-47, assisted materially in the establishment of a favorable balance of trade between South Korea and Japan. The Korean Fisheries Corporation received 113,425,983 yen for the bundles, or an average price of 99 yen per bundle, while 75 yen per bundle was paid to the fishermen, the difference covering packing, storage and transportation charges. The export goal for 1947-48 was set at 2,000,000 bundles, to be produced by some 150,000 South Koreans engaged exclusively in collecting laver.

During the period January through September 1946, some 169,464 metric tons of fresh fish were caught in South Korea, plus 28,951 tons of processed marine products, while an estimated 338,238 Koreans were engaged in the industry, utilizing approximately 37,685 vessels. On 10 May 1946 a XXIV Corps press release announced "one of the largest seasonal catches of cod in Korean history, more than 22,400,000 pounds in the 2½ month season," despite the fact that Korea's fishery industry was minus two-thirds of the necessary equipment. The record catch represented a value of 500 million yen.

In general the Bureau of Fisheries had devoted its activities to two main projects..the requisitioning of supplies, and the obtaining of accurate statistics which would aid in the rehabilitation of the industry. To illustrate the decline of the fishery industry in Korea, using the 1935-39 production figures as the norm of 100, marine production in Korea for the years 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 and 1946 totaled 105, 80, 88, 62, 65, 43, and 41 percent respectively, showing an alarming decrease in productivity--more than 60 percent--

within six years. The Korean fisheries fleet in July 1947 numbered 37,685 craft, of which 2,346 were power-driven while the remainder, 35,339, consisted of sailing vessels. Total gross tonnage was 113,112.43, with 37,095.43 of that total being in power-driven craft and 106,017 in sailing vessels. The value of motor-driven boats was 391,474,200 yen, that of sailing craft 424,068,000 yen, or a total of 815,542,200 yen. Also in July 1947 there were 134,367 families engaged in fishing, or a total of 338,238 workers. In 1946 a total of 51,266.8 metric tons of processed marine products had been produced in Korean waters with a value of 738,158,130 yen, while fresh fish production for the same year totaled 295,711 tons, or a value of 2,314,485 yen. There were 64 companies, factories and similar organizations controlled by the Korean Fisheries Development Company under the direction of the Bureau of Fisheries in July 1947.[181]

Regulations Imposed by Military Government

On 9 November 1945, Ordinance No. 27, published by Military Government, became effective, declaring all fishing rights to be null and void and throwing open all Korean waters to all fishermen. The immediate result

of this order was chaos in the already disorganized fishing industry, and by December 1945 the situation had become such that the Korean chief of the KyongSang Namdo Fishery Section, foremost fishery province in South Korea, wrote to the National Bureau of Fisheries in an attempt to secure revision or repeal of the ordinance. He said: "The most urgent problem is the question regarding the open-door policy in fishery," and stated that, "I felt greatly disappointed to see the ordinance." The letter following revealed this to be a masterpiece of Oriental understatement. On 9 August 1945 there were 1,790 purchased fishing rights in Korean waters, of which 1,310 belonged to Koreans, having been bought at prices often totaling hundreds of thousands of yen. The Korean chief of the Fishery Section argued: "In the first place, the ordinance denies the right of property...the fishery right being a real one, the provisions of the civil code can be applied. Other ownership, even mining rights, are now permitted, and only fishing right is unreasonably abolished." He stated further that since fish run in schools and follow currents, monopoly of one fishing point could destroy the value of

many subsequent fishing grounds. The proclamation of free fishing, he said, also would lead to violation of the prohibited season and the maximum legal catch, resulting in the depletion of fish in Korean waters. He further reported that: "Many petitions are proposed to the province...every day" in an attempt to bring order out of the confusion resulting from Ordinance 27, and he recommended that it be abolished, that large scale fishing grounds be managed by the government and small grounds leased to local fishing guilds, and that the entire Korean fishery set-up be reorganized. As previously noted, in April 1946 fishing rights were finally granted, extending until 15 April 1948.

Under General Notice No. 2, dated 24 November 1945, the Korean Fisheries Corporation was given complete control over all products used, produced, and distributed in the fishing industry. Ordinance No. 48, dated 13 February 1946, ordered the Bureau of Commerce to turn over to the Bureau of Agriculture all duties, functions, records and property pertaining to the processing of fish and marine products, to be controlled by the Bureau of Fisheries. The Korean Fisheries Association was delegated as the Military Government unit to supervise the

plants, canneries, and other fishery facilities.

On 3 January 1946 a system of registration was set up for all fishing boats, while Japanese fishing equipment was allocated to the guilds for sales distribution to fishermen.[182] On 1 March 1946 a number of fishing regulations were published, pursuant to the provisions of General Notice No. 4, dated 24 November 1945. All fishing craft and equipment were to be registered and licensed by the Korean Fisheries Corporation, through the local guild or union of their home port. Certificates of license were to be posted conspicuously, and all boats, buildings and equipment were to be marked in letters proportionate to their size.

At the same time a limitation was placed upon the amount of supplies and equipment carried on fishing craft, being no more "than are reasonably necessary for the successful completion of the fishing venture..." All fishermen were to deliver their catch of marine products to the guilds and unions for disposal solely by companies, agencies, or individuals holding permits issued and signed by the Korean Fisheries Corporation. The use of explosives, poisons, and other such devices for the taking of fish was prohibited, and fishermen were forbidden to discard all

or any portion of their catch except when so authorized by the Korean Fisheries Corporation. Only regular crew members were to be permitted aboard fishing craft without special permission from the Korean Fisheries Association, and all fish dealers and other handlers and processors of marine products were to submit monthly reports by messenger to the Korean Fisheries Corporation, showing the kind, quantity and price of products sold or processed. Conservation regulations then in existence were to remain effective, and violations of any of these regulations were punishable by such penalty "as the court shall determine."[183]

Effective 15 April 1946, all fishing activities were to be registered and licensed, and all vessels, buildings, gear, and fishing grounds plainly marked as directed. All former Japanese-owned fishing grounds and equipment could be licensed only through the National Bureau of Fisheries in Seoul, and all licenses were to expire on 15 April 1948, and were subject to revision or cancellation by the Bureau of Fisheries at any time.

All Koreans requesting to license grounds, boats, or other fishery equipment were to file claim and clearly show possession before 9 August 1946. Certain grounds were to be closed, with all fishery operations therein being prohibited except when specially authorized.[184]

Possibilities for Expansion

Although the Bureau of Fisheries was hard put to keep the fishery industry in operation, its staff made a survey of activities conducted by the South Korean fishery industry. As a result it was recommended that, when possible, an effective campaign be instituted for the expansion of certain phases of the industry. The gathering of sponges, for instance, could be expanded. A few sponges of inferior quality existed off the waters of ChejuDo, but since these grew at a depth of from 100 to 150 feet, diving was necessary to bring them to the surface. A program of culture in shallower water, using a better species of sponge, could lead to a profitable industry. Agar-agar, a kind of sea-weed, could be produced in much greater quantity, and arrangements were made in 1947 to market the product in the United States. It was estimated that 65 tons of agar-agar would be produced during 1947, although 170 tons had been harvested in 1944. However, due to the extreme scarcity of materials in the fisheries industry, no activities were conducted in any field of the industry directed toward expanding the scope of its operation.

In 1947 the existing oyster beds utilized only one-tenth of the potential oyster-growing areas. The production of whale meat and oil could be increased by the use of larger boats and better gear. The principal variety of whale being caught was rather small, and although the catch was limited by law to 200 per year, only 120 were landed during 1946. The production of vitamins and fish oils was practically non-existent, and the investigation of sharks and cod as sources offered potentially lucrative possibilities. The mother-of-pearl industry, in which buttons and inlay work were manufactured, flourished in Korea but was not pursued to its maximum capacity. Existing research facilities were not utilized to the fullest, and they required supplementation in the form of supplies and skilled technicians in order to contribute significantly to recovery of the fishery industry.[185]

The Bureau of Fisheries reported that the addition of 120 steel boats of between 50 and 100 tons, and six boats averaging 300 tons each, with suitable gear, could raise the total of fresh fish caught to 219,600 tons per year, and the amount of processed marine products, including shellfish, to 50,400 tons.

It was estimated that on the basis of additional fishing equipment, 160,000 tons of fresh fish, 500 tons of seaweed, 8,000 tons of canned goods, 5,000 tons of dried or processed goods, and 100 tons of agar-agar could be exported annually, which would substantially boost the foreign trade balance.

Requisitions for the year submitted by the Bureau of Fisheries had included requests for 3,501 tons of manila rope and 3,000 tons of squared boat lumber, 48 tons of seine twine, 10,560 tons of cotton yarn, 20 tons of manila mending twine, 15 tons of sisal rope, 4,800 tons of cork floats, 11 tons of glass floats, 25 tons of cement, 581 tons of bamboo and 140 tons of copper cleats--all of which were necessary for the period 1 July 1947 to 30 June 1948. However, by August 1947, with the exception of bamboo, none of these items had been received. 196

At the end of 1946, the Bureau of Fisheries at request of the NEB prepared a "Report of Estimated Overall Economic Potential" for the fishery industry, which described the current position and the probable or possible, position in 1951.

The fishing waters surrounding Korea were characterized by a rapidly shelving east coast north of

the Straits of Japan. Depths of two thousand meters were found within a few miles of the coast. The waters of the straits averaged 125 meters in depth and gradually shoaled to an average of 80 meters in the southern coastal area. The average depth of the Yellow Sea, which washed the western coast, was 75 meters. The bottom of the eastern coastal waters, being rocky, did not lend itself to drag netting, but was adapted to seine fishing for pelagic types of fish; abalone, seaweeds, and sea-urchins. The South Korean Sea was also rocky and supported the same types of fishing. The Yellow Sea had a sandy, muddy bottom, ideal for dragnet fishing, which was good for plaice flounders, and other bottom forms. The temperature of the surface water surrounding Korea ranged from 0° to 14° Centigrade in February, and from 18° to 24° Centigrade in July. The temperatures ranged from north to south on the east coast, and from the west coast toward the Yellow Sea. Salinity varied from 31 to 34 parts per thousand, the higher salinity being away from the coast. In general, salinity diminished in the fall and was at its lowest in September and October.

Fisheries of South Korea at the conclusion of the year 1946 were seriously handicapped by the lack of supplies

and equipment. However, with adequate fishing equipment and carefully planned production, the waters of the adjacent seas could be made to contribute much more to the welfare of the people. Measured in metric tons, the quantity of fish landed in South Korea was as follows: in 1941, 462,913; in 1942, 377,348; in 1943, 388,141; in 1944, 261,632; in 1945, 209,552; in 1946, 295,911. The number of persons employed in the industry, based on 1945 figures, was 342,919, with a total income of 2,093,582,860 yen, or approximately 9,000 yen per person each year while production per worker per year was approximately 2.5 tons. Living standards of fishermen were not as high as those of Korean farmers and a few monied interests owned a large proportion of the craft and equipment. The increase of the fishery population may be illustrated by the fact that, whereas in 1940, 296,243 persons were engaged in fishing in all Korea, by 1942 this figure had risen to 354,420, while in 1945 the total was 350,000 for South Korea alone. In 1946 there were 35,840 sailing vessels in South Korea with a total gross tonnage of 109,910 or an average of about 3 tons per boat. There were 2,281 power boats with a gross tonnage of 28,050, or 13 tons per craft, but the gear was in very bad condition and production had been materially affected. Domestic production of fishery supplies had been limited to 40 tons

of fishing nets and 50 tons of twisted thread, due to the lack of raw materials and manufacturing equipment. There were 44 canneries in South Korea, most of which had been closed for lack of equipment and capital. With existing equipment, should these plants be put into operation, it was estimated that they could produce 16 million cans per year. There were 54 ice plants and cold storage plants, which had only old equipment. The oil reduction plants in South Korea, had been destroyed by the Japanese and would have to be rebuilt. There were about 50 agar-agar plants, a few of which were operating in 1946, producing a total of 80 tons, although the equipment was antiquated and inefficient. There were 240 boats in the dragnet industry, 95 of which were idle from September to March because of lack of repair.

In conclusion, the report estimated funds and work necessary to rehabilitate the fishery processing facilities of South Korea. Repairs and equipment for the 44 canneries would cost approximately five million American dollars, and such renovation would benefit mainly the foreign trade balance, since Koreans do not consume much canned goods. The 50 agar-agar factories

could be modernized and enlarged at a cost of about four million dollars. Renovation of manufacturing plants for the production of fishery supplies would include the reopening of net-making factories, rope plants, cloth weaving mills, tackle manufacturing establishments, nail factories, and anchor factories. There were six boat nail factories, 13 anchor factories, 15 shipyards, 11 twisted thread factories, 11 fishing net factories, two line finishing thread factories, and one can manufacturing plant. Four million dollars was the amount estimated for the repair of these installations.

Training of technicians could be accomplished by the expansion of the Fisheries College at Pusan, which at that time was manned by American educators but which needed more instructors. Research facilities were available at the Pusan Experiment Station, but a logical program of research was badly needed, as well as a well-trained force to staff the station.

Fishery exports from Korea had increased from 18,749 metric tons in 1935 to an all-time high of 83,584 tons in 1939 but had decreased since that time to only 19,826 in 1944. The principal outlets for these exports were Japan, China, Manchuria, the United States, England,

and the Dutch East Indies. Plans were currently under way to export 500 tons of fresh frozen fish to Japan in 1947, the bulk of the export being whale meat. One million bundles of laver weighing 188.9 tons were to be exported to Japan in 1947, and agar-agar, a product not used as a food crop in Korea, could be shipped to the United States.

According to a Bureau of Fisheries report the pressing need of foreign capital to aid in the rehabilitation of the industry, should be met within the next two or three years, for "the deterioration of existing facilities is proceeding at a rate that will soon lead to the complete breakdown of the entire industry."[187] An estimated expenditure of 49 million dollars would be required for repairing fishing craft, buying new vessels, renovating processing plants, building new plants, repairing and building manufacturing plants, and subsidizing the Pusan College of Fisheries and the Fisheries Experiment Station.

II. PRODUCTION

B. INDUSTRIAL CROPS

Introduction: -

Since most of the land in South Korea was planted in food crops, very little acreage was available for industrial products. In 1936, for instance, the area under such crops in all Korea was 854,000 acres, or only 6 percent of the total crop area. Except for sericulture, there had been no increase in the acreage under industrial crops during the decade preceding the American entry in South Korea in September 1945. Crops included in this group are: silk, cotton, hemp, ramie, flax, wangle, tobacco, ginseng, peppermint, hops, sesame, castor bean, pyrethrum.

II. PRODUCTION

B. INDUSTRIAL CROPS

1. Sericulture

Silk in Korea

In Korea, though silk has been cultivated since seventeen centuries before the birth of Christ, prior to 1910 its production was strictly a home industry. It was

not until 1910 that the first commercial filature, with a capacity of 32 basins, was established in Seoul, jointly operated by a Japanese and a Korean. The industrialization of Korean silk production proceeded rapidly during the period 1919 to 1930, with the influx of Japanese capital and interests such as the Katakura, Kanebo and Kunsi companies. Peak years in production occurred in the middle 1930's, especially in 1934. During that year cocoon production in Korea exceeded 50,600,000 pounds, of which about five percent went to Japan. This figure dropped sharply during 1940 to 1945 from 50 million to 31½ million pounds, while raw silk production increased from 30,000 pounds in 1917 to 4,700,000 pounds in 1934. Raw silk production also underwent a sharp decrease from 1941 to 1945, dropping from 4,770,000 to 2,500,000 pounds, while Korean exports of raw silk to Japan fell from the peak in 1937 of 2,080,000 pounds to 400,000 pounds in 1942, after which no exports were made or recorded. Peak acreages of mulberry trees in the 1932 to 1937 period exceeded 171,970 acres, while the 1946 figure stood at 88,956 acres. Principal causes of this marked decrease in all

sericulture productivity were the war, lack of silk markets abroad, breakdown in collection systems, lack of fertilizer, and increased emphasis on food crops to the exclusion of sericulture.[188]

Sericulture is not only the most prevalent subsidiary business on Korean farms but it is also the largest source of income contributed by farm women to household economy. The Korean climate is ideal for the raising of silkworms apd the growing of mulberry trees; the humidity of the air during worm-caring season is not too damp (as in Japan) nor too dry (as in northern China). Sunshine and temperature are also entirely adequate for mulberry culture and worm-raising. Though the technique of producing silk was kept secret by the Chinese for many years, when Koreans finally discovered the key to the art, farmers took it up at once; however, during the latter years of the 19th century, sericulture in Korea was on the wane. Following Korea's occupation by Japan, every effort was made by the Japanese government to revive the industry. The influx of rayon products contributed to the lack of interest, causing the price of silk to fall. In 1929 and 1930

when the price of cocoons and raw silk material dropped, the industry was hard hit, producers claiming that the price of silk fell far short of the cost of production.[189]

The Japanese stimulated the industry through the introduction of superior varieties of silkworms, the distribution of mulberry seedlings, and an extensive educational program. By 1944 there were 921,997 families in all Korea engaged in sericulture, or nearly one-third of the agricultural population. Of that number it was estimated that 691,447 families lived south of the 38° N. Lat. In the same year, approximately 200,356 acres were devoted to the growing of mulberry trees, and of this total about 132,844 acres lay south of 38°. The most important silk producing provinces were KyongSang-Pukto, KyongSang-Namdo, and Kangwon-Do, which together accounted for 50 percent of Korea's total cocoon production. Since the peak silk production years of 1934-40, production of cocoons had dropped to less than one-half its highest total of 50,000,000 pounds (1936). It was estimated that on 20 November 1945 there were 15,425,262 pounds of cocoons stored in warehouses south of the 38th

parallel ready for reeling, and 305,900 pounds of raw silk south of 38° available for cloth weaving. Approximately two-thirds of this stockpile was produced in 1945 while the remaining third was left over from 1944 production.[190]

Under the Japanese, eggs were inspected carefully to eliminate disease; new varieties of silkworm and mulberry trees were developed by scientific selection and crossing, and an experimental station was set up to further these investigations. A number of training schools and classes were conducted, especially for girls and women, and an order governing sericulture in Korea was promulgated in April 1919, followed by a number of regulations concerning the industry, its produce and profit.[191] However, despite this acceleration, in 1938 only 1.3 percent of total Korean agricultural production could be attributed to sericulture, with a value of six million dollars. The Japanese left no stone unturned to encourage and aid sericulture in Korea, although practically all profit went to Japanese investors while cocoon producers, mulberry seedling growers, and others engaged in sericultural activities had to be subsidized

by the government.[192] Since the American occupation, every effort has been made to revitalize the industry and to insure a fair profit not only to investors but to all workers engaged in silk production.

Activities of the Sericulture Section

In order to promote sericulture in South Korea and to distribute profits more fairly, a Sericulture Section was set up in Military Government under the Bureau of Agricultural Production in the National Department of Agriculture, with branch sections in all provinces. The Section was divided into five sub-sections: (1) mulberry, (2) filature, (3) cocoon, (4) waste silk, and (5) silkworm egg.[193]

By 21 May 1947 the Sericulture Section reported that "some progress" had been made toward reviving the sericulture industry in South Korea since the American entry in September 1945.[194] A total of 4,731,500 seedlings had been planted at that time but owing to the unsettled political situation, and the low price of cocoons, many mulberry trees were being destroyed. To curtail this cutting, the Department

of Agriculture requested Provincial Governors to do what lay within their power to discontinue the practice. Sericulture experts were dispatched to each province with additional instructions toward that end, while pamphlets were dropped from airplanes flying over the sericultural areas.[195]

It was assumed that a number of silkworm eggs corresponding to that total utilized during the previous year (estimated at 387,600 egg sheets) would be required in 1946. There were on 31 October 1945, 260,000 sheets (10 grams; 18,000 to 20,000 eggs per sheet) on hand leaving a shortage of some 127,000 sheets. The majority of silkworm egg producers were Japanese, who owned and managed 41 plants as compared with only 13 under Korean management. Filatures also had been under almost exclusive Japanese management: 32 were operated by Japanese and only two by Koreans. Twelve waste silk factories were run by Japanese, and one by a Korean.[196]

Imports

On 1 October 1945 the Director of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce reported that it was necessary

to import silkworm eggs from Japan. "Korean silk industry normally requires an estimated egg supply of 300,000 sheets for its annual crop," he said. "The highest estimate of the amount which will be available this year is 180,000 sheets. Recent reports from Japan indicate that the mulberry trees are being replaced by grain fields and that the silk industry will be nearly wiped out. [Therefore] Since Japan has normally sent about 100,000 sheets a year to Korea, at least this much (and preferably twice this amount) should be sent to Korea to continue the production of Oriental silks."[197]

Twelve days later a radio message to Japan requested a shipment of 150,000 egg sheets to be sent to the Suwon Central Agricultural Experiment Station for storage until the cocoon rearing season. A second telegram was sent on 10 October asking that the sheets be delivered not later than 5 December 1945.[198]

A Military Government press release of 11 December 1945 carried the information that two cargo planes, carrying 150,000 sheets of silkworm eggs, had landed at Seoul Airport the preceding day. Since

each sheet contained approximately 20,000 eggs, the total shipment approximated two billion eggs, which had been stored, as planned, at Suwon prior to their spring distribution to sericulturists. However, though this release indicated that all 150,000 sheets had arrived on 10 December 1945, the Department of Agriculture's report on this import showed that the eggs arrived in two shipments, one on 10 December 1945 of 85,000 egg sheets and the remainder, 65,000 sheets, on 13 December. The planes landed at Kimpo Airfield outside Seoul, having taken off from Atsugi Airport, Japan, and the eggs were delivered to the Sericulture Section, Department of Agriculture, for final distribution to the provinces as follows: Kyonggi Do, 30,000 sheets; Chung Chong Pukto, 3,000 sheets; Chung Chong Namdo, 19,440 sheets; Cholla Pukto, 12,000 sheets; Cholla Namdo, 19,000 sheets; Kyong Sang Pukto, 38,000 sheets; Kyong Sang Namdo, 14,000 sheets; Kang Won Do, 6,823 sheets; and Suwon Experimental Station, 7,737 sheets.

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The contradiction in reported times of arrival was explained in a report by the Military Governor to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in which

he stated that two airplanes, No.'s X143 and X167, which were to have left Tachikawa the morning of 10 December 1945, were expected at Kimpo at approximately 1500 and 1530 that same day, and a press release had been prepared in advance reporting the arrival of the entire shipment. An officer was dispatched in a closed car to meet the planes, take charge of the eggs and transfer them immediately to Suwon for cold storage. At approximately 1530 plane X167 arrived; the eggs were removed and taken directly to Suwon, while the vehicle returned to await the second plane. When it became apparent that plane X143 would not arrive on that date, arrangements were made with Base Operations at Kimpo for immediate notification when the plane was expected. At approximately 1200 on 13 December this message came through, and an officer proceeded to the airfield with equipment and technicians and removed the eggs to Suwon. The plane crew stated that the eggs had been aboard for four days, that the plane had taken off on each of those days, from different fields in Japan, and though rising to a height of 14,000 feet had been unable to get through to Kimpo until 13 December. Since the

days of 10 to 13 December were very cold, and general weather conditions severe, there was reason to expect some damage to the silkworm eggs. Consequently, they were to be examined microscopically and some hatched to determine whether they had suffered serious deterioration or injury. If so, a further report was to be made to that effect, and in the absence of such a report, it was to be presumed that the eggs were found unharmed. 200

This shipment again entered the picture in June 1946, when the Suwon Sericulture Department of the Central Agricultural Experiment Station (where the eggs were stored until time for spring distribution) reported having in its possession 6,000 surplus eggs sheets which on inspection were found to have deteriorated somewhat. Whether this damage was a result of the four-day delay in shipment from Japan or of more recent deterioration was not stated. Permission was asked and granted on 27 June 1946 to burn the surplus eggs, which had been held at Suwon after distribution for shipment to North Korea in case the Russians let down the barrier or requested a shipment, as a reserve in case of spoilage in the provinces, and for use in the event of an unexpected egg sheet shortage. The Sericulture Section recommended

that the American Director of the Experiment Station (1st Lt. Harold Loden) personally supervise the burning of the egg sheets and make a report to the Office of Civilian Supply in order to forestall a possible future claim by that office for 6 yen per sheet. According to the 1 August 1946 report by Lieutenant Loden, the eggs were burned on 3 July 1946 by order of Mr. Shin, Military Government head of sericulture. It appears, however, that only 3,358 egg sheets actually were burned, this comprising the total number on hand at Suwon, and according to Lieutenant Loden's memorandum, the Experiment Station was being held accountable for the discrepancy between the number reported (6,000 sheets) and the number destroyed (3,358 sheets). The matter finally rested on 1 August 1946 with the final memorandum from Lieutenant Loden, in which he said: "The station destroyed 3,358 sheets of eggs, these being all that were on hand. Why the difference in the number (6,000) and those burned, I do not know. I feel sure that the number 3,358 was all left there after distribution to the provinces... the station acted only as the storage place for the eggs, all distribution and handling being done by the Sericulture

Section, USAMGIK. I do not feel that the experiment station should be held responsible for any loss since we did none of the handling, only allowing the use of the station vaults for storage. No one knows how many were received as they were not counted individually and only had the number listed on the package. The station has no record of how many went to the provinces as this was all handled by men from Seoul. It appears that the experiment station, by virtue of doing a favor to the Sericulture Section in allowing the storage, is to be the goat in the shortage of egg sheets. Care must be taken to see that this is not done and that the shortage is absorbed elsewhere."[201]

In December 1945 a telegram sent to CINCAFPAC requested a shipment of mulberry trees of different varieties, together with mulberry seeds, and stated that they should be sent to arrive in Korea not later than 5 March and 5 June 1946 respectively. A subsequent report from the Department of Agriculture stated that 910,000 mulberry seedlings in very poor condition (only 123,000 proved good) were received at Pusan on 10 April 1946 from Aichi Province, Japan, shipped from Hakata.

Upon delivery to the Department of Agriculture, they were turned over to the Department of Commerce for transfer to the Korean Agricultural Association. The good seedlings were distributed as follows: Kyong Sang Namdo, 89,600 seedlings, and Chung Chong Namdo, 33,400 seedlings.[202]

Lack of proper equipment and supplies hampered the sericulture industry in its operations, with requisitioned equipment either being turned down or approved yet not delivered. For example, in May 1946 enough silkworm eggs were stored in commercial and official egg producing and inspection stations to furnish all growers in Korea during the spring cocoon rearing season. The 57 commercial silkworm egg producers were expected to produce enough egg sheets for summer cocoon rearing and the 1948 spring cocoon rearing; consequently, no egg sheets were to be requisitioned from Japan except in the event of some unforeseen emergency.[203] However, in August 1946 the Department of Agriculture notified the provincial military governors that, although the Sericulture Congress had judged the supply of silkworm eggs in Korea adequate for the spring season and had

requested that all stations suspend their production for that season,[204] a shipment of 70 egg sheets, including seven varieties unobtainable in Korea, was to be requested from Japan in March 1947 for purposes of experimentation. The eggs were to be brought back to Korea from Japan by a War Department civilian employee of the Department of Agriculture, then on temporary duty in Tokyo.[205] However, permission for these egg sheets was refused by SCAP.[206]

On 20 March 1947 the Department of Agriculture requested permission to purchase 40 liquid sprayers for each of the 60 silkworm egg producing stations in South Korea, for the purpose of spraying disinfectant on sericulture equipment. The sprayers were believed to be available at Ascom City, left over from Chemical Warfare Service stocks, and at that time marked for the Office of Civilian Supply. If the Korean Agricultural Association and the Department of Commerce concurred, the Office of Civilian Supply was willing to release the sprayers for sale to the stations. However, the request was refused on grounds that the sprayers were not available.[207]

On 10 April 1947 the Department of Agriculture requested 600,000 sheets of varying grades of paper, of

about the same weight as the socalled "manila folder", for use by the Sericulture Section in the 1947 silkworm egg production, since previous civilian supply requisitions submitted in 1946 had not been filled. Silkworm eggs are deposited on these sheets at the rate of 18,000 to 20,000 eggs per sheet, and the request was made on the basis of an anticipated 600,000 sheet production, but it was refused because of unavailability of the paper specified.[208]

Extra-legal Activities

The 32 silk cloth manufacturing establishments owned by Japanese were seized in the fall of 1945 by Military Government as vested property and put into operation under the direction of a bonded Korean manager, hired by Military Government, while all profits went into the bank account of the company pending final disposition of the vested factories.[209] These managers were not consistently honest, and in July 1946 a case known later as "the cocoon deal" broke.

First intimation that something was amiss in the sale from the Kanebo filature to Gunshi filature

of 115,780 pounds of dry cocoons, which transaction was handled by a Military Government officer, came when a Mr. Chun Chong Ku, who misrepresented himself to Kanebo and Military Government as an agent of Gunshi, attempted to sell the cocoons to Gunshi at 54 yen a pound after contracting with Kanebo for the cocoons at a price of somewhere around 12 yen a pound. Major Leil O. Buchanan, then head of the Sericulture Section, advised the Department of Commerce on 11 July 1946: "I'm afraid some of your silk men are pulling the wool over your eyes."[210]

An investigation was immediately ordered. Pending its findings the Gunshi Silk Mill, located in Chong Ju, Chung Chong Pukto Province, was instructed to take possession of and to begin processing the cocoons, which were held at that time by Mr. Chun. No payment was to be made until the investigation was completed.[211] A cursory examination revealed that Mr. Chun Chong Ku had worked his way into the cocoon deal, hoping to act as a middleman, buying the cocoons from Military Government and selling at a fat profit to Gunshi, although Military Government policy prohibited any such intervention between it and the consumer.[212]

On 16 December 1946 the Department of Justice reported that a Military Government captain in April, acting on behalf of the Department of Commerce, Textile Section, had purchased 115,780 pounds of cocoons from the Kanebo Company, Seoul, for sale to the Gunshi filature at Chon Ju, at a price set somewhere between 10 and 15 yen a pound. Prior to delivery to Gunshi, Mr. Chun "insinuated himself into the deal" on 1 April 1946, contracted with Kanebo and obtained delivery at Chon Ju to himself and associates of 90,970 pounds of the cocoons. He succeeded by claiming to act as agent for Gunshi, a wilful misrepresentation. On 19 July 1946 Mr. Chun made a contract with Gunshi for sale to it of the 90,970 pounds of cocoons, and on 11 July 1946 he asked 54 yen a pound for the dry cocoons in his possession. However, Lt. Colonel Roland Murphy, the Military Governor of Chun Chong Pukto province reviewed the trasaction and on 30 July 1946, he advised Mr. Chun that the sale to him had been a mistake; that no middleman could be permitted to intercede between Military Government and the consumer; and that Mr. Chun was to be compensated by an amount equaling his expenses plus a possible 100,000 yen service fee. Mr. Chun was

to submit proof of all costs and charges to Colonel Murphy's office within 48 hours after receipt of the letter. On the same day, 30 July 1946, Colonel Murphy also sent a directive to the Gunshi silk mill to take over the cocoons in Chun's possession. By 19 August 1946, all the cocoons had been delivered to Gunshi.[213]

On 22 November 1946, pursuant to verbal instructions of the Director, Department of Agriculture, a committee composed of Colonel Murphy, his executive officer, and three Koreans from the National Department of Agriculture, met and submitted findings and recommendations relative to the status of the Chun contract and its disposition. It was agreed that: Chun had misrepresented himself as an agent of Gunshi; his contract with Gunshi was not valid; all who acted in the transaction did so on the assumption that Chun was the agent of Gunshi; such a contract between Chun and Gunshi was contrary to Military Government policy and to National Economic Board Regulation No. 2 because it called for delivery to an individual; and since Chun had represented himself as an agent of Gunshi, the original contract with Kanebo (for sale to Mr. Chun of the cocoons) was to be considered

a contract with Gunshi and not with Chun as middleman.[214]

The committee recommended concurrence in Provincial Governor Murphy's letter of 30 July and payment to Chun of 6 percent interest on "certified investments" from 30 July to 30 November 1946. Approval of the committee's findings was given by Colonel Murphy on 22 November.[215]

On 13 December 1946 the Director of the Department of Agriculture and his Korean sericulture advisor confirmed the conclusion that Chun had knowingly misrepresented himself in order to acquire Military Government property which he could not have obtained as an individual, and that expenditures involved were actually investments by Chun in law violation. However, settlement or liquidation of the matter on the basis proposed was advisable as a matter of policy though Military Government was under no legal obligation to reimburse Chun.[216] Further reasons for making the settlement were set forth by the Department of Agriculture director on 27 January 1947 when he said: "There were many extenuating circumstances, and MG is not entirely blameless...we should have known the score and issued proper instructions to vested

interests which would have prevented such deals. The fact that lack of qualified personnel and lack of information on the setup precluded this does not relieve MG of responsibility. The fact that MG got into the deal and prevented its consummation before the using concern actually paid an exorbitant price saved the day. It is believed by all concerned that proposed settlement will make the final cost to the processing agency comparable to what the cost would have been had the entire deal gone through legitimate channels. As a matter of fact, experience with losses in transit which were normal at the time indicates that the cost might have been even more."[217]

On 3 February 1947 Mr. Chun and his associates were offered a total settlement of ¥1,025,061.50, which included allowances for transportation, communication, salaries, traveling expenses, miscellaneous expenses, price of the cocoons (set at 7.2 yen a pound), interest at 5 percent per year on the money put out by Chun, and a special allowance, for risk and responsibility in handling the cocoons, of ¥100,000. If the settlement

were accepted by 17 February 1947, Chun would receive the entire stated amount. However, for each day of delay after that date, ¥5,000 would be deducted from the special allowance. By June 1947, Mr. Chun still had not indicated his willingness to accept the proposed settlement, and the matter was turned over to the Military Government Office of Special Investigation.[218]

A second major case involving sericulture was the apprehension and indictment of Mr. Ryang Hai Ryong, manager of the Sam Song Filature, ChongJu, Cholla Pukto province, after the January 1947 auditing of the filature books.[219] On 22 February the Sericulture Section reported that preliminary investigations conducted by the National Police Department supported the January findings of the Department of Agriculture auditors and summarized: Between 22 November and 2 December 1946 about ¥2,004,000 worth of raw silk was sold to six different weaving factories, mostly in Cholla Pukto, and this amount was not turned into filature accounts. In December Mr. Ryang borrowed 55,000 yen from the filature and replaced it with a bad check. On 7 December he borrowed 100,000 yen and failed to replace it.

On 5 August 1946 about 16,540 pounds of cocoons were sold for 410,000 yen, and on 24 September about 14,787 pounds of double cocoons were sold for 318,918 yen; neither sum was turned in to filature accounts. 220
On 20 December about 500,000 yen worth of raw silk was sold to Tai Reuk Mill and the yen was not turned in to the filature. Meanwhile, on 9 October 1946, about 500,000 yen was drawn by Mr. Ryang from the funds for the purpose of purchasing weaving looms; this was later deposited in the Chosun Commercial Bank under the name of Ryang's sister-in-law and spent by Mr. Ryang for personal purposes. A consignment of 19,418 pounds of cocoons, property of Mr. Tokko Hon in Seoul, was delivered to this filature, and the cost of reeling, amounting to 2,570,630 yen, was paid by Mr. Hon but only 1,090,000 yen was turned into filature accounts, the balance of 1,480,630 yen being unaccounted for. The total amount allegedly misappropriated totaled 2,353,309.40 yen. The police determined that this amount was personally used by Mr. Ryang as follows:

Purchased 40,000 pyongs of land	¥ 800,000.00
Purchased one house in Seoul	100,000.00
Purchased electric cooking pots	450,000.00
Purchased 10,000 straw bags	204,000.00
Loan to Mr. Kim Jai Hong	200,000.00
Other expenses	599,309.40
	¥ 2,353,309.40

221

On 14 April 1947 the Advisor of the National Department of Agriculture reported to the Property Custodian in Seoul that Mr. Ryang was being held in custody by the Justice Department pending his trial, which had been scheduled for 11 April 1947. The filature had been closed and was being safeguarded by the Agricultural Bureau of Cholla Pukto since 31 January 1947. Ryang's 60,000 yen bond, posted when he assumed managership of the filature in 1945, had been forfeited. Upon payment of the specified sum misappropriated by Mr. Ryang, the filature would have sufficient assets to declare a small profit.

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However, in April 1947 Mr. Ryang contracted a throat ailment, and the trial was indefinitely postponed until he should regain his voice.

223

The Suwon Central Agricultural Experiment Station's Sericulture Department had been conducting a school for girls, with the hope of training a number of

women who could then go into the provinces and teach other sericulture technicians. It was found, however, that the girls had--for this program--an unfortunate tendency to marry and to retire from public life. Accordingly, in 1946 boys were admitted for the first time.[224] This sericulture school brushed with the legal authorities upon one occasion, when Mr. Kim Ho Jik, newly appointed Korean director of the Korean agricultural experiment stations, reported, on 28 May 1946, that his predecessor had purchased black market rice for the students and that three vouchers for this rice were still unpaid. Mr. Kim added that unless a legal source of rice was made available, the school would be forced to close, since the quarterly budget allowed only ¥15,000 for rice. He added that 129 bushels of rice had been purchased by Dr. Keh Ung, the preceding director, for 58 Korean students, who had consumed 74 bushels since 1 April 1946 at a rate of 20 ounces per day per person. This amount was to be reduced on 28 May to 15 ounces per day as directed by Military Government.[225]

By first indorsement to this report by the Director of the Department of Agriculture ordered the

school to purchase rice through the local branch of the Kyonggi Provincial Food Service; stated that the department would not assume liability for the unpaid vouchers since the rice was bought illegally; and instructed that the station director turn over to the Suwon Provost Court all evidence of black market transactions and to assist in the prosecution of the ex-director and the three merchants involved. Mr. Kim interviewed the merchants concerned, who agreed to accept legal prices for the rice, and new vouchers were prepared to this effect. In conclusion, Mr. Kim wrote: "In view of the above facts and the willingness of the individuals to sell at the legal price [Mr. Kim does] not deem it necessary to take any legal action against these persons,"[226] and thus the matter was closed.

Waste Silk

Since waste silk, utilized for batting and wadding in clothing and blankets, accounted for a large part of Korea's silk consumption, in fall of 1945 the 12 Japanese-owned factories were put into operation

as vested properties utilized solely for processing waste silk.[227] Waste silk was not a controlled item, and its price was not fixed because the demand was lacking. Actually, the current supply exceeded demand, due to the absence of processing facilities in Korea. Approximately 10 percent of the raw cocoon harvest consisted of waste silk in the form of waste cocoons or varying grades of floss. By December 1946 about 446,580 pounds of waste silk were reported in South Korean filatures. Only one privately owned factory in the United States zone could process this waste silk, and it had a capacity of only 49,620 pounds per month. Accordingly it appeared that the waste silk processing facilities would have to be increased by the Department of Commerce, or the product would have to be sent to Japan for processing into yarn and then returned to South Korea for weaving.[228] In April 1946 there was a total of 4,348,000 pounds of waste silk in South Korea, valued at approximately ¥82,000,000, which in one year could be utilized to produce approximately 2,200,000 pounds of fabric, provided a waste silk processing factory was set up in South Korea to handle that amount. On 30 April 1946, the Director of the Department of Agri-

culture requisitioned the necessary equipment for such a factory from the National Economic Board, emphasizing that the whole silk industry in South Korea was undergoing a radical change, which was aimed at distributing profits equally all along the line of production instead of allowing a privileged few to retain the returns. In order to achieve this objective and to utilize the vast amounts of waste silk which was then lying idle in filatures and factories throughout South Korea, several groups of Koreans, working for the good of the industry, offered to invest ₩20,000,000 yen in waste silk factory equipment and stated they were willing to submit to control of profits in order to insure fair distribution of same. The equipment could be sent from Japan, and it was requested that two Japanese technicians be made available for the installation of such equipment upon its arrival in South Korea.[229] However, by June 1947 the requisition had not yet been filled.[230]

Sericulture Associations

Under the Japanese, sericulture had been strictly controlled by various laws such as the Sericulture

Law, Filature Operations Ordinance, and Silk Controlling Regulations. Most of these were voided in the fall of 1945, since they resulted in restraint of trade, but when Military Government General Notice No. 2 establishing a free market in commodities was put into effect on 20 October 1945, egg sheets, cocoons, and raw silk jumped in price from 30 to 100 times, and it was deemed necessary to begin translating and reviewing these laws with a view to revision,[231] and ultimate revival of controls.

Instrumental in keeping all phases of sericulture under control were the sericulture societies and associations, all of which were ruled by Japanese: Korean Sericulture Society, Korean Silk Controlling Company, Korean Filature Society, Korean Joint Filature Society, Korean Joint Mulberry Seedling Society, and Korean Joint Floss-Silk Manufacturing Society. It was possible under the Japanese for one man to hold a government job and in addition to occupy an official position in each of the above associations.[232] In May 1946 these bodies were scrutinzed with a view to liquidation, inactivation, or revision and

permission to continue operations. On that same month the Department of Agriculture observed that, "Our Korean staff follows this main pattern...: they are always maneuvering to get in control or be an official of the various companies." Accordingly, it was recommended that no Korean official, regardless of position or rank, be allowed to hold any post, honorary or otherwise, in the remaining association.[233] This ruling was deemed necessary in order to forestall the continuance of the former capitalistic system of silk production by the substitution of Korean investors for the deposed Japanese. This system, afforded huge profits to the capitalists at the expense of those actually producing the silk, and it contributed in large part to a decline in sericulture among the Koreans. It also made necessary governmental subsidies to the cocoon, silkworm egg and mulberry seedling producers, many of whom were forced by the Japanese authorities to continue in an unprofitable production.

On 24 April 1946, Report No. 1 on organizations formerly sponsored by the Japanese Government-General's

Department of Agriculture included data on two leading sericulture organizations; the Chosen Sericulture Association, and the Chosen Sericulture Silk Thread Controlling Stock Company. They were the two principal associations concerned with sericulture under the Japanese.[234]

The Chosen Sericulture Association consisted of a national organization and a branch association in each of the thirteen Korean provinces. In effect, everyone engaged in sericulture in Korea was a member of the association. At the time of the survey (April 1946), its assets totaled ¥466,072.29 and it had no liabilities.[235]

The same report concluded that some control and close coordination of the various phases of the sericulture industry would be necessary, and though the Sericulture Association as it then stood was not equipped for this job, it was probably the best available nucleus around which such an organization could be built. Any such society should have the approval of both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce.

As finally developed the new organization should devote its efforts toward spreading the profits of silk production equally. Such a program would not only promote greater interest and participation in the silk industry as it became more lucrative for the little man, but it would also obviate the necessity of governmental subsidies for the cocoon growers, mulberry seedling producers, and others, at the expense of the taxpayer. In its revised form the association should have as its members all organizations, associations and companies engaged in any phase of sericulture. The constitution and by-laws would have to be revised before it could cope with the tasks to be assigned to it.[236]

The Chosen Sericulture Silk Thread Controlling Stock Company had been used to channel all silk produced in Korea into Japanese industry. Under this company, from 1925 to 1945, 25 of the 47 filatures funneled their raw silk through two silk conditioning houses, located at Seoul and Taegu, wnere the silk was tested, packed for shipment and exported to Japan. Raw silk from the remaining 22 minor filatures was utilized in Korean

weaving mills for domestic use. The company sold 100,000 shares of stock issued in four types of certificates, valued respectively at 500, 2,500, 5,000, and 50,000 yen. The ownership of share certificates was limited to Japanese Nationals or to any organization which did not have a "foreign" (non-Japanese) membership amounting to more than 50 percent. At the time of the American entry into Korea, the company had a credit balance of ¥ 1,201,964.75. The report of the Department of Agriculture concluded that, since its functions benefited only a few people, those few being Japanese, this company was no longer needed in Korea; and that the proposed Chosen Sericulture Association in its reorganization should utilize as many as possible of the company's thirty Korean employees. Actually, the organization was inactivated but not liquidated, and in June 1947 it was still in existence as a dormant company.

In a Report No. 2, dated 3 May 1946, it was recommended that the five remaining sericulture organizations be dissolved.[237] Attention next was focused on

the organization of a new Sericulture Union, which was to combine all desirable functions of the former sericulture associations. A constitution and by-laws were drafted by the Sericulture Section, National Department of Agriculture, and copies were sent to all provinces on 20 June 1946 for approval and suggestions by the provincial sericulture stations. A Sericulture Congress was scheduled for 8 and 9 July 1946 to ratify the proposed constitution and activate the union.[238] Commended by Major General Archer Lerch, Military Governor, at its opening meeting on 8 July,[239] the Congress discussed the new constitution and by-laws, which with only a few minor revisions were adopted as proposed. Following final approval by the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, the Korea Sericulture Cooperative Union came into being in May 1946.[240]

Headquarters of the new organization were established in Seoul, with branch unions in each province and sub-branches in cities and districts--all with the avowed aim of improving sericulture in South Korea. To achieve this ambitious purpose, the

following activities were written into the constitution. The union was to investigate production costs and to fix prices as directed by Military Government, giving special consideration to the cocoon grower; make direct loans to the producers or assist them in obtaining loans; purchase and sell cooperatively any commodities connected with the industry; issue or give instructions for the improvement of sericulture products, in cooperation with Military Government; and to carry on research, inspections, advertising, recommendations and any other extension service in cooperative with Military Government.[241]

Two types of members were to be admitted: ordinary and honorary. Ordinary members included cocoon producers, mulberry seedling producers, silkworm egg producers, filatures, silk mills and waste silk mills. Membership fees were based upon the occupation of the individual member, each of whom had the privilege of voting and running for office. Honorary members were admitted through virtue of their knowledge of or experience in sericulture, and they included such persons as the Director of the Department of Agriculture, the Director of the Agricultural Experiment Stations,

and the head of the Sericulture Section.[242]

Filatures and Factories

Prior to 20 February 1946 all filatures and weaving mills were licensed by and under the direct supervision of the Department of Commerce; however, following that date, they were licensed by the Department of Agriculture. All filatures needed parts and supplies, but after making a survey of its machinery section in the spring of 1946, the Department of Commerce concluded that adequate parts and supplies could be manufactured in Korea and advised that none be requisitioned. There was a total of 95 weaving mills (6643 looms) in South Korea which could utilize raw silk; 47 mills (1949 looms) which wove silk only; 7 mills (1259 looms) which took only rayon; and 41 mills (3445 looms) which could weave both silk and rayon. In addition to these establishments which had power looms, there were 24 smaller mills which contained 1307 looms, all hand or foot operated. With a total of 119 weaving mills and 7,950 looms suitable for silk weaving, it appeared that

there was a sufficient loom capacity to weave all silk produced in Korea during 1946 and in the immediate foreseeable future. However, owing to the lack of trained technicians, the shortage of mill supplies, the fluctuating value of the yen, labor troubles, coal, power and the rice shortages, silk weaving mills were operating at only 15 percent capacity in May 1946. It was estimated that by the end of 1947 they would be running at 75 percent capacity.[243] In 1946 there was a total of 47 licensed filatures (36 vested) operating in South Korea with a total capacity of 3,358 basins. An average basin processed about 372 pounds of raw cocoons per month, yielding about 37 pounds of raw silk. Thus, with this capacity it was possible to process 12,496,791 pounds of raw cocoons on a ten-month operating schedule, provided all the filatures had sufficient fuel, skilled labor and raw materials.[244]

Silk Exports

Korea did not expect to compete with Japan and China in the production of silk before 1950 or

after, for the Japanese had held all skilled positions in the industry, and the great majority of such trained technicians had already been repatriated to Japan. Until Korean technicians could be trained for all phases of sericulture, progress in Korea would be slow. To keep the industry going, it appeared necessary that Military Government subsidize commercial egg producers, cocoon growers, and mulberry seedling producers, and make loans to the filatures and weaving mills. At that time, in the spring of 1946, the cost of silk production approximately equaled the market price.[245] On 16 August 1946 the Director of the Department of Agriculture informed the Department of Commerce that Korea then produced only two types of raw silk suitable for export, known as 14-and 21-denier, 14-denier being the quality type. Top quality silk, 7-denier, was not produced in South Korea at that time. The Director recommended that all raw silk of 21-denier type or better be reserved for export.[246]

On 19 September 1946 the Director of the Department of Agriculture requested that all autumn

special grade cocoons be allocated to filatures equipped with suitable machinery and qualified personnel to produce raw silk of 14-or 21-denier suitable for export, suggesting that the sericulture union be consulted on the filatures eligible for such allocation. This action was in keeping with the National Economic Board policy of promoting and the Department of Agriculture practice of producing the maximum amount of exportable raw silk.[247] In July 1946 samples of conditioned silk were received from eight filatures, only four of which produced 14-or 21-denier silk possibly suitable for export. In that month 40,000 pounds of raw silk were available for the American market provided they passed the silk conditioning test.[248]

The Silk Conditioning House in Seoul served as a government bureau of standards for the silk industry, inspecting and grading raw silk and enforcing the laws and regulations then in effect concerning raw silk. The two silk conditioning houses formerly located in Taegu and Seoul were combined into the one in Seoul. Results of inspection and grading in 1946 indicated

that the grades of silk produced were below par. Of the 14-and 21-denier exportable silk inspected, none exceeded Grade D, and roughly one-third failed to meet export requirements. Subsequently, and as a result of Sericulture Section recommendations, a Raw Silk Inspection Law was published as Ordinance No. 133. Dated 8 March 1947, it provided for the control and inspection of all raw silk produced in licensed filatures. As of June 1947 no silk had as yet been exported from South Korea.[249]

Silk Prices

On 31 August 1946 the Director of the Department of Agriculture informed the provincial agricultural officers that silkworm eggs produced by the experiment stations and sold to commercial producers should sell at 40 yen per sheet when disposed of within the province where they were produced, and 45 yen when sold outside that locale. The inspection fee of commercial eggs was set at 2 yen per sheet, and any subsequent inspections would be made at a charge of one yen per sheet.[250] On July 1946, the Director of the Department of Agriculture

notified the provincial agriculture and commerce officers that the prices for cocoons and egg sheets had been fixed as follows: Autumn cocoons, 30 yen per pound; autumn egg sheets, 75 yen per sheet, and spring egg sheets 1947, 75 yen per sheet.[251] The price of raw cocoons in 1947 was to be based upon the average price of rice* during the years 1937, 1939, 1943 and 1945, or approximately 54 yen a pound.[252] The price of mulberry seedlings in 1946 and 1947 was set at 2.5 yen per seedling but it was anticipated that seedlings to be produced in 1947 for sale in 1948 would cost about 8 yen each.[253]

On 29 March 1947, the Department of Agriculture recommended that the price of first grade autumn and second grade spring cocoons be established at 54 yen a pound, with the other grades priced proportionately. This price was based on a comparison with returns, at

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* Rice was commonly used as a basis for determining prices of other articles and commodities, since Korea was in effect on the rice instead of the gold standard, and with the fluctuation in the price of rice, the value of the yen dropped or rose accordingly.

official prices, received from other farm crops from the same type land, and the method used in determining this figure was consistent with the method used in determining the price of raw silk. Actually the price was 58 times the average price paid for cocoons in 1937, 1939, 1943 and 1945, while the official price of rice was 56 times the average price paid for rice in those same years. It was believed that the establishment of a price lower than 55 yen would result in either fewer cocoons being produced or a diversion of them into uncontrolled channels, which in turn would necessitate the closing of many filatures--for the most part vested property. It was further recommended that an incentive goods program be worked out in addition to the yen price, in order to stimulate production and to encourage the sale of cocoons produced to the government supervised filatures that could keep the products in controlled channels.[254]

Loans and Finance

On 8 June 1946 the Department of Agriculture recommended that the provincial cooperative sericulture

associations contact various specifically designated banks to purchase cocoons. This was done to prevent many filatures from applying for loans at the same bank.[255] On 22 August 1946 the Department of Agriculture notified its provincial agricultural officers that the Department of Finance required that full information be submitted concerning the financial condition of all filatures which had requested loans for the purchase of autumn silk cocoons. To assist in complying with this requirement ten sericulture technicians of the Bureau of Agricultural Production and the Korean Sericulture Cooperative Union were being sent to each province.[256] As a result of this survey, a total of 161,793,300 yen was credited to the 41 South Korean filatures inspected, in various banks of each province, to be used in buying autumn cocoons.[257]

On 22 April 1947 the Department of Agriculture requested a loan of 113,112,000 yen from the Chosen Bank for the purpose of financing mulberry seedlings and silkworm egg production in 1947 for use in 1948, stating that this sum would be used to buy 553,200 egg sheets

at 150 yen per sheet, and 3,770,000 mulberry seedlings at 8 yen per seedling. The loan was granted on 19 May 1947.[258] About 65,205,000 yen of this loan served to finance the production of 434,700 sheets of silkworm eggs in the spring of 1947. In the past, government guaranteed loans so granted had been retired in the following year, after the sales of egg sheets had been made to farmers during the fall and spring months. Such sales were made on a credit basis, and the payments were collected in yen during the summer and fall months when the cocoons were harvested. Some 52 filatures were in need of such loans. Granted in May 1947, these loans enabled the filatures to advance the necessary funds to the individual silkworm egg producers.[259]

On 14 May 1947 the Department of Agriculture requested that ¥ 26,920,400 of the reported ¥ 37,952,229 profit of 32 vested filatures be used to subsidize 40 percent of the cost of mulberry seedlings to farmers, at the rate of one yen per seedling. At that time, seedlings cost 2.50 yen each. For the 4,168,400 seedlings to be used in 1947, a sum of ¥ 4,168,400 would be required.

It was further planned to use such funds to subsidize 60 percent of the cost of silkworm eggs to the farmer at the rate of 60 yen per egg sheet. The price of egg sheets at that time was 100 yen each. About 367,200 egg sheets were to be used in 1947. The cost of 319,200 sheets at 60 yen each, plus 48,000 sheets at 75 yen per sheet (48,000 sheets were anticipated as surplus since mulberry acreages had decreased in 1947) amounted to ¥ 22,752,000. Upon approval of this plan, the required sums were to be allocated from the province filature profits. Only Kyonggi-Do, Chung Chong-Pukto, KyongSang Pukto and KangWon-Do (the principal silk producing provinces) were to be required to allocate part of their profits to other provinces. By June 1947 this plan was still being considered, though its expected approval, had been delayed by legal technicalities.[260]

Production Figures and Miscellaneous Activities

By 31 December 1946, cocoon production for the year was reported to be 12,915,069 pounds, as compared with the 1945 figure of 15,635,841. However, at this time

only one-third of the 1946 crop had been collected. Average production during 1946 was 3,588 pounds per 2.51 acres, compared with 3,549 pounds in 1945. The 1940-1944 average was 4,812 pounds per 2.51 acres.[261] Production of grafted mulberry seedlings in 1946 was reported at 5,000,000, which were to be used largely for replacement of trees on present acreages. Very little new acreage resulted in 1946, and the 1947 seedling production was estimated at 7,000,000.[262] A July 1946 report on the number of mulberry seedlings planted in the spring of 1946 estimated a total of 4,311,179 seedlings. This figure was 1,548,821 short of the goal of 5,860,000 as a result of poor imported seedlings and less than expected domestic production. Filatures were gradually increasing their production, but until the bottleneck of spare parts from Japan could be broken, progress would continue only slowly.[263]

In May 1947 the production of 1946 raw silk was reported at 641,850 pounds, while the price of raw silk produced in the latter part of 1946 was fixed at 750 yen a pound. During 1946 the filatures were not able to keep up with the weaving mills due to lack of

raw materials, skilled labor, fuel, and adequate management. Over 75 commercial egg producing stations (55 vested) were licensed in 1946, having a capacity of more than 600,000 egg sheets, sufficient to produce more than was required in South Korea and capable of being increased by 50 percent if the demand warranted so doing. About 150,000 egg sheets were imported from Japan in December 1945, but by the conclusion of 1945 that phase of the sericulture industry "had become independent" of foreign imports. The 1946 production of eggs was 501,000 sheets, and the estimated 1947 production was about 600,000 sheets.[264]

During January and February 1947 there was a partial shutting down of all filatures. This was standard operating procedure as most filatures ran on a ten-month operating schedule. The filatures resumed full production in March, and in April they had produced the following amount of raw silk: December 1946, 71,322 pounds; January 1947, 19,418 pounds; February 23,169 pounds, March, 61,726 pounds; April, 88,918 pounds. Anticipated production for May and June 1947 was 89,820 and 79,429 pounds respectively, the expected decrease in June production

being attributed to exhausted cocoon stocks in 30 filatures.[265]

Reports received by the Sericulture Section from the 47 South Korean filatures on 10 March 1947 indicated that there were 2,317,328 pounds of dry cocoons on hand in the silk mills, of which 1,835,940 were special grade cocoons. Most of this reserve had accumulated prior to 15 August 1946 and would be utilized by 31 July 1947. Estimated collection for spring 1947 was reported at 5,706,300 pounds of raw cocoons, while government officials estimated a 50 percent total collection of cocoons for 1947 as compared with a 30 percent collection in 1946.[266]

The area in mulberry trees reported in January 1947 was 95,435 acres, and very little increase was anticipated for 1947, while the mulberry seedlings available in the spring of 1947 numbered slightly more than four million. Approximately 580,000 egg sheets were distributed during the spring of 1947, each containing 10 grams of hybrid eggs, ranging in number from 18,000 to 20,000 eggs per sheet. The Sericulture

Section anticipated a surplus of 40,000 egg sheets due to the low mulberry acreage and the shortage of fertilizer which had resulted in a correspondingly low production of leaves.[267]

On 19 March 1947 the Director of the Department of Agriculture reported that cocoon rearing houses in South Korea were being variously administered, some by the New Korea Company and some by the Property Custodian. Former Japanese owned sericulture farms had these cocoon rearing houses either on the mulberry farms or located separately on another piece of property. In the case where this type of house was on the mulberry farm, the New Korea Company had appointed tenants, and when the house was situated on property other than the farm, the Property Custodian appointed tenants. In the latter case, the tenants were not using the house for the purpose intended, and instances resulted where the sericulture farmer was in possession of the mulberry farm and a disinterested party occupied the cocoon rearing house. Although cocoon rearing houses could be used jointly as dwellings and for cocoon rearing, their primary purpose was agricultural production, and the farm

and such a house should be devoted to sericulture. Therefore, in order to unify and simplify the procedure, it was recommended that the cocoon rearing houses as well as the former Japanese owned mulberry farms be administered by a single agency, the New Korea Company, or be delegated by that agency to the provincial agriculture bureau.[268]

The Sericulture Department of the Central Agricultural Experiment Station in Suwon conducted most of the sericulture experiments involving improving and testing strains of silkworms, domesticated and wild; cultivating and testing strains and varieties of mulberry trees; and reproducing and distributing primary silkworm eggs to provincial sericulture stations. There was one sericulture station in each province, controlled and operated by the Province Agriculture Bureau, whose main function was to reproduce and disseminate primary silkworm eggs to commercial egg producers.[269]

Summary

In summarizing the activities of the United States Army Military Government in the field of sericulture

in South Korea, the main facts emerge that, under the Japanese, a monied few received huge profits from the production of silk in Korea at the expense of those actually taking part in production. These farmers, cocoon, silkworm egg, and mulberry seedling producers, were compelled by the Japanese government to continue production and were subsidized at the expense of the Korean taxpayer to forestall bankruptcy and discontinuance of operations, while the few Japanese in control of the industry continued to amass huge fortunes. It was the aim of the United States Military Government to revive the industry so that all who participate in silk production could receive a just proportion of the profits. By thus making the industry self-supporting, further loans and subsidies could be reduced to a bare minimum or perhaps entirely eliminated.

II. Production

B. Industrial Crops

2. Cotton, Fiber, & Minor Industrial Crops

In 1946 fiber and industrial crops occupied 7.3 percent of the planted area of South Korea, with cotton and tobacco ranking first and second in importance.

The area planted to cotton had declined during the last seven years from 593,895 acres in 1940-44 to 298,063 acres in 1946. Tobacco decreased from 38,010 acres in 1940-44 to 20,630 acres in 1946. The total acreage in fiber crops declined from 570,045 acres in 1930,34,36 to 435,628 acres in 1946, while industrial crops decreased from 69,118 to 54,173 acres in 1946.

This decline in planted acreage was not confined to industrial crops but was prevalent throughout the agricultural industry. It sprang from shortages of fertilizer, seed, and chemicals for spraying, in addition to a reduction in planting on the part of Korean farmers who had just become free agents after forty years of farming under the strict control of the Japanese government.[270]

Cotton and Fiber

Cotton was easily Korea's most important industrial crop, its acreage representing about two-thirds of the total area under industrial crops in all Korea. Cotton had been cultivated in Korea for centuries, but until the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910,

production had been barely sufficient to satisfy relatively small domestic needs. While the soil of southern Korea was eminently suited for cotton growing, methods of farming remained primitive and the varieties grown were of a low grade.

Under Japanese rule, in 1912 a six-year program was introduced in order to enlarge the cotton area to 245,000 acres. This was followed, in 1919, by a ten-year program with a view to raising the total cotton area to 613,000 acres and the production to 230,000 bales. In 1933 the third and most ambitious plan to expand Korea's cotton yield was inaugurated, with a 20-year program aimed at cultivation of from 1,225,000 to 1,470,000 acres, for a yield of from 645,000 to 807,000 bales annually. This would have provided an exportable surplus of from 400,000 to 600,000 bales for Japan. Actually, the 450,000 yearly acreage planted in cotton increased to 603,000 by 1940 and hit its peak in 1941 when 800,000 acres were planted. However, considering the scarcity of land in Korea, it is doubtful if this increase could have been continued.[271]

In November 1945, under American Military Government, the Cotton and Fiber Section of the National

Department of Agriculture reported that acreage planted in cotton in South Korea had varied from 370,000 in 1920 to approximately 700,000 in 1945. Yields were low, from 130 to 187 pounds per acre, the average yield being 140 to 150 pounds. Production in bales had varied from 104,000 in 1920 to 200,000 in 1944, while estimates for 1945 production varied from 100,000 to 150,000 bales, all of this being grown south of the 38th parallel. Previous to 1945, 30 to 40 percent of all cotton grown in Korea had been utilized for home manufacture, and it was estimated that the entire 1945 yield would be consumed in South Korea.

Ginning was from 50 to 60 percent completed by 20 November 1945, yet not one bale had been ginned by commercial plants which would be earmarked for trade channels. The Bureau of Mining and Industry advised on 21 November that five or six cotton mills had been licensed and hoped to commence operations within ten to thirty days; by the end of November, ten mills in all had been licensed. All of the twelve cotton mills in Korea were located in the American occupied zone, and 25 of the commercial cotton gins were also situated in that portion of the country. Cotton mills at that time had a supply

of raw cotton on hand which would permit them to operate from two to six months, while all Japanese stocks of raw cotton were to be sold to licensed mills. Maximum consumption of the twelve mills had never exceeded 12,000 bales per month.

As long as the prices asked for finished cloth remained on an inflation basis, the Cotton and Fiber Section advised in November 1945, farmers would continue diverting their cotton to home use since the price they asked of the ginner was based upon what they could purchase in consumer goods. On this basis it would take from 35 to 40 cents a pound to purchase any cotton from farmers to be turned into trade channels. Thus arose the major problem which was to confront the Cotton and Fiber Section throughout its activities in South Korea---inducing the farmers to sell enough raw cotton to gins which would enable them to continue operation.[272]

Originally connected with Sericulture, the Cotton and Fiber Section was made a division by itself in late February 1946 when the Korean Civil Service was reorganized. Its first task was to assist in the har-

vesting of crops, and to aid the Textile Section of the Department of Commerce in obtaining fibers to keep the mills going. Surveys revealed that a total of 41 bales of cotton remained in storage in February 1946, and enough hemp (about 2,640,000 pounds) to operate the hemp and rope mills for two years. The supply of flax was very limited and lasted only a few months, since more than 90 percent of Korean flax was produced north of the 38th parallel. The 1945 crop of hemp disappeared into home manufacture, and on 1 January 1946, the Cotton and Fiber Section estimated that 70,000 of the available 120,000 bales had been diverted into this channel. Though numerous conferences were held in an effort to return the 25 South Korean cotton gins to operation, no cotton was purchased by ginning companies until January 1946. By April 1946, the price of seed cotton had been set at 9 yen per 1.32 pounds and 2,640,000 pounds of seed cotton had been purchased by the NamBuk Ginning Company.[273]

Preliminary surveys revealed that sufficient planting seed was on hand in April 1946 for all crops except hemp, and it was planned to plant as many acres in each crop during 1946 as had been planted in 1945; however,

cotton took a voluntary cut of from 10 to 25 percent and hemp acreage was reduced as a result of the seed shortage. Throughout 1946, hemp seed was produced only in KangWon Do. Since farmers in all provinces needed hemp for summer clothing, the KangWon Do Industrial Company planned to buy the existing supply of seed and to allocate it to other provinces in order to foster 1947 hemp production.[274]

On 4 March 1946, all Korean heads of Cotton and Fiber sections from the southern provinces, plus the directors of the Suwon, Soso, Mokpo and ChunJu experiment stations met in the Capitol building to discuss cotton planting plans for 1946; hemp and ramie planting plans; better methods of marketing cotton and fiber crops; and to report on local conditions relative to cotton and fibers. During this two-day meeting it was brought out that under the Japanese all Korean special crops had been cut to the bone since every possible acre was planted to cotton and vegetables. Consequently, Military Government had adopted as its policy the encouragement of acreage increase in special crops until Korea should be self-sufficient; however, some crops such as peppermint and

pyrethrum might well furnish some small exports within a few years.

In April 1946 the picture for exports was poor for all fiber, straw products and special crops*, as was the outlook for imports, and with the exception of fertilizer, the only items that were requisitioned by April 1946 were 100 bushels of cotton seed, 60 tons of ceresan, 675,000 pounds of hemp seed, and 330,000 pounds of peppermint root. It was necessary to import cotton seed for breeding purposes, and large amounts of hemp seed since hemp produced in Korea did not breed well except in KangWon Do province.[275]

By August 1946 it became apparent that cotton collection was a necessity in order to insure cotton gins and mills enough work to remain in operation, to bring cotton from the homes onto the open market, and to produce cotton cloth suitable for commercial sale. A goal of 91,080,000 pounds was proposed, which would result in 220,000 tam (40 yards = 1 tam) of cotton cloth. With this amount of raw cotton, the textile facilities of South Korea could run at approximately 50 percent capacity.[276]

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*Fiber includes cotton, hemp, wangle, ramie, and flax, while special crops refer to peppermint, hops, sesame, castor bean, mulberry, and pyrethrum.

In October 1946 a price of 18 yen per 1.32 pounds was tentatively set as the price to be paid farmers for their cotton under the collection program. Production for 1946 was estimated at 184,800,000 pounds, of which 91,080,000 pounds were to be collected for the mills but by August 1947, cotton collection had totaled only 5,292,000 pounds, 12,883,200 pounds less than the goal, which was never reached.[277] The mills, however, required a loan of 600,000,000 yen or more to finance the purchase and ginning of the cotton, repayable in six months.

While the price of seed cotton was determined on a basis of approximately 40 times pre-liberation values of 15 yen per 1.32 pounds for No. 1 grade, black market prices for this grade ran as high as 85 yen per 1.32 pounds, and incentive goods were not available in sufficient quantities to induce farmers to sell at the low legal price. Several factors kept the cotton collection program from attaining its goal: the aforementioned low price for raw cotton, and shortage of incentive goods; and the shortage of cotton for home use since the Japanese had

been collecting cotton by force for many years. Estimates placed home-used cotton at 50 percent, cotton brought to government vested mills at about 5 percent, and black market cotton at 30 to 40 percent of 1946 production. As a result, it was necessary to import 20 million pounds of cotton from the United States, to forestall some 100,000 Korean employees of the government vested cotton mills being thrown out of work.

In December 1946, the Department of Agriculture attempted to increase cotton collection returns by offering finished cotton cloth as incentive goods to farmers who sold to government vested gins. However, a shortage of cloth made this experiment impractical, and it was conducted only in Cholla Namdo province for a limited length of time.[278]

About 40 to 50 percent of Korea's cotton was Grade No. 1 or No. 2, suitable for weaving into cloth, while the remainder went into padding for clothing or quilts.[279] On 18 November 1946 the official prices for seed and ginned cotton were set: seed cotton, 15 yen

13.50 yen, 11.25 yen, and 7.50 yen for the No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 grade respectively; and ginned cotton, 45 yen, 40.50 yen, 33.75 yen, and 22.50 yen for the same grades. In December 1946 a price of 3.5 yen per 1.32 pounds of cotton seed was set, based on the average price of cotton seed for the years 1937, 1939, 1943, and 1945, or 7 yen per 1.32 pounds.[280]

In February 1947 the Kwangju Branch Agricultural Experiment Station, which planted 112.50 acres in seed cotton, reported that adjacent farms were planting other varieties of cotton, whose uncontrollable cross-breeding with the pure experiment station breeds resulted in seed unfit for further breeding and distribution to farmers. The Central Agricultural Experiment Station at Suwon suggested that either the Provincial Bureau of Agriculture encourage the private farmers to use their land for other crops than cotton, or permit the Kwangju station to furnish neighboring farmers with seed, free of charge, of the type planted by the station.[281]

Housing Shortage

With many gins standing totally or partially idle, and the population of Korea increasing daily with

resultant housing shortages, numerous organizations or individuals either requested or assumed the right to enter the vacant premises and put the property to their own uses. In Cholla Pukto, the NamWon Factory warehouse was renovated by the U.S. Army and utilized as a basketball court. Other properties of the NamWan Factory, Hanill Ginning Company, Cholla Pukto, were requested for use as a branch office by the Korean National Defense Corps. The Tongyong Ginning Factory near Pusan was used as a school, and the Mokpo factory of the Chosun Ginning Company became a branch office of the Chosun Steamship Company. The manager of the Chinju Ginning Company reported that a Korean organization was attempting to lease property under his control, and the Nambuk Ginning Company and the Naju Cotton Ginning Factory in Cholla Namdo housed war refugees and other illegal Korean residents until they were evicted in March 1947. The Nambuk Ginning Company in Chung Chong Pukto finally agreed to lease two buildings and a mess hall to the Korean Constabulary but reserved the remainder of the property for its originally intended uses.

Korean Fiber Union

Most important organization dealing with Cotton and Fiber in South Korea was the Korean Fiber Union, which had headquarters in Seoul, and branch offices in provinces, counties, cities, and districts. Its purpose was to encourage production of better fiber crops, cotton, hemp, flax, and ramie; to improve the quality of all fiber crops, to make Korea self-sufficient in all fiber crops both for home use and commercial manufacture. In order to carry out its objectives, the union offered prizes to growers in each district, which were awarded at annual exhibitions in Seoul and the provincial capitals. They loaned yen to producers for seed and assisted members to obtain loans, as well as publicizing the industry, the members, and their activities. No government employees were admitted, and there were only ordinary members. They included cotton, hemp, flax and ramie growers; cotton gins, waste oil mills, flax, hemp and rope mills. Membership could be obtained on request through the local chairman of the union, and fees were levied according to the

occupation of the member, each of whom could vote and run for office. One regular meeting was held each July. Other meetings could be called by the board of trustees who were elected by the general convention and who in turn elected from their members a chairman, two vice-chairman, and two inspectors.

Under the Japanese the Korean Fiber Union had been called the Korean Fiber Association. Operating funds were obtained by a percentage commission on fiber products and other goods exported, chiefly raw cotton to Japan. The money thus collected was used to promote the production and manufacture of fiber crops and the building up of a substantial operating fund. It was understood that fiber producers were not included in this organization. /American Military Government funds belonging to the Korean Association, (amounting to ¥ 2,800,000) were shunted through the Bank of Chosen, to the Chief of the Production Bureau (15 December 1945), to the Auditor of the Production Bureau, to the head of the Cotton and Fiber Section, who transferred them back to the Korean Fiber Union to hold in escrow. On 12 March 1947 the KFU had as members 5 cotton gins, 5 mills, 15 waste mills, 2 oil mills, and one hemp mill, or 28 establishments altogether.

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Tobacco

The soil and climate of Korea are in general well adapted to the growing of tobacco, which is usually cultivated in plots of about one-fourth acre. Until early in 1900 Korea produced only native types of tobacco; however, measures for the improvement of tobacco were taken on a number of model farms in 1905 through the experimental growing of Japanese and other foreign strains and successful results were published throughout the provinces. Recently Koreans produced an American type tobacco, two Japanese types, and several Turkish types in addition to the native Korean variety. Acreage planted in tobacco varied from 33,225 in 1937 to a peak of 69,339 acres in 1939, declining to 54,889 acres in 1940. Prior to 1940 Korea imported tobacco in amounts ranging for the previous ten years from one million to 17 million pounds annually. The industry was completely controlled by a Japanese governmental monopoly.

Other minor industrial crops included ginseng, sesame, pyrethrum, hops, mulberry, and castor beans.

Rice Straw Products

The role of rice straw products in South Korean economy is significant, in that the nation's number one commodity, rice, must be bagged for shipment in containers universally fashioned of rice straw, and tied with straw rope.

Other uses of rice straw products are numerous and include ropes, matting, raincoats, roof thatching, shoes and hats. As the Korean Rice Straw Products Association June 1947 report stated: "...it [rice straw] is indispensable for our daily life..." The same source pointed out that shortages of rice straw products would "hinder transportation of grains, commodities, and other important materials which consequently will threaten the lives of the public."

Formerly, "tens of millions of straw bags" were exported annually to China and Japan and formed a large source of income and of foreign credit for Korea. Despite possible Oriental exaggeration, available figures do show that the average annual exports of straw bags and rope for the years 1936-45 totaled 16,480,000 bags and approximately 4,453,550 pounds of rope.

Home consumption of rice straw products in South Korea for this same period of years amounted to approximately 44 million bags and 24.9 million pounds of rope annually.[285]

Under the Japanese, sometimes as many as 50,000,000 straw sacks were produced each year in Korea, in addition to large quantities of rope and mats. However, the Japanese, through the gunmaster, assigned a quota to each family, and the program was unpopular since only 50 sen were paid for a bag. The program was supplemented by an incentive goods campaign through which were distributed cotton sacks and cheap cotton cloth suitable for working clothes.[286]

The manufacture of rice straw products was considered eminently suitable for farmers, since they possessed the necessary raw material and during the winter months could thus utilize their time profitably. In fact, in the June 1947 report of the Korean Straw Products Association the comment was made that the manufacture of such products during the more leisure by winter season would also "prevent the farmers from indulging in gambling, drinking and other various vices."

The same report estimated that from the total water-rice-planting area of 3,000,000 acres in South Korea , at least 4,900,000,000 pounds of rice straw could be gathered, or an average of 412.5 pounds per acre. Some 50,000,000 pieces and bags made from rice straw were set as the minimum necessary for South Korea for one year. The production of such an amount, or even of 70,000,000 pieces and bags (allowing 20,000,000 items for export) would utilize only 12 percent of the total rice straw output, consequently there was no fear of a shortage in the raw rice straw supply. To illustrate the cash value of these products to Korea, the report estimated that at ¥ 40 yen each, the sum of ¥ 2,800,000,000 would be realized from the production and sale of the 70,000,000 pieces and bags.

According to a National Economic Board report, dated 27 November 1946, entitled "Straw Product Prices, Collection and Agency Responsibility," approximately 80 percent of the rice straw products manufactured in all Korea were produced south of the 38th parallel, such items being fashioned by farmers in their free months from November to April.

However, immediately following the surrender of Japan and removal of the compulsory Japanese system of rice straw bag production, the Korean farmers slacked off in their manufacture of these vital products. As a result, by the end of 1946 pre-surrender reserves were exhausted, and there were no adequate replacements. Consequently great difficulty was experienced in the 1946 fall harvesting of rice and other crops, since straw bags were at a premium, and since there had been no governmental collection of them during that year.

Military Government then decided upon a plan of straw bag collection beginning January 1947, aimed at a total of collection of 36 million bags and 116.2 million pounds of straw rope, the minimum estimated South Korean needs for the coming year. Whereas under the Japanese, all rice straw products had been collected by the Straw Products Handling Companies, operating in all provinces, under Military Government the Korean Agricultural Association was empowered to handle all straw products needed for use by the government, and the Handling Companies were to buy and sell only those products intended for private use by Korean individuals. 287

The Military Government alone needed some 17,000,000 straw bags, but by the end of March 1947 had collected only 4,000,000 and anticipated only an additional 400,000, the total being far less than the amount required. Excluding the quantity collected under the government program, Military Government had, in addition, bought outright some 1,000,000 bags, and it was estimated that there would be only about 1,100,000 straw bags ropes, and mats available for private use in 1947.[288]

The Korean Rice Straw Products Association gave several reasons for the failure of the winter and spring 1947 rice straw products collection, saying that the collection was untimely, having commenced in January 1947. Another major factor in the program's failure was the low price paid by the government. This price (11-19 yen per bag) had been set in September 1946 and no allowance had been made for the rise in price of other commodities since that time. The final reason, according to the association, was that little encouragement had been given the farmers to produce more straw products.

In order to forestall another failure of subsequent collection programs, the association suggested that a "proper price" be considered, and that allowances be made for the price of other items. The government should stimulate production by what means it had at hand, now that the Japanese methods of coercion had been abolished. Finally, the association recommended a program of incentive goods, allowing farmers to buy expensive, scarce necessities at reasonable prices from the government when they turned in their straw bags.

The various collection programs conducted in South Korea by the American Military Government were characterized by one factor which was similar in all instances. During the rice straw product collection, fertilizer was sometimes used as an inducement. During the rice collections, cotton cloth was used as an incentive, and during the cotton collection, straw bags and other commodities were employed as an aid to collection. It was a case of robbing the right hand for the sake of the left, and illustrated forcibly one basic reason for the prevailing inflation and instability in Korean agriculture---the lack of consumer goods.

On 22 July 1947, the American advisor of the Agricultural Economics Bureau, informed the advisor for the Department of Agriculture that apparently the basic reason for the failure of the rice straw products collection was the price. Current black market prices at that time were 40 to 80 yen for one bag, while farmers could sell the raw material alone for from 35 to 40 yen. Legal top prices for bags at that time, as set by Military Government, were 19 yen for straw bags and 17 yen for the highest grade rope. Although collection goals for 1947-48 had been set at 16,000,000 bags and 34,860,000 pounds of rope, by the end of July 1947, only about 4,300,000 bags had been collected, while no figures were available on the amount of rope gathered. Another possible reason for the poor collections, as put forth by the Agricultural Economics Bureau advisor, was that during 1947 for the first time Korean farmers were allowed to re-thatch their roofs at will, whereas formerly such repair had been controlled by the Japanese government. 289

At a National Economic Board meeting, held on 26 August 1947 the question of straw bags was brought up, and the chief advisor, Department of Agriculture,

reported that South Korea would require a minimum of 20,000,000 bags and 37,350,000 pounds of rope for her 1947-48 needs. The question of utilizing refugee labor in the manufacture of straw products had been broached previously, as had the possibility of using prison labor for the same purpose, but these suggestions were deemed impractical because of the difficulties of transportation of both raw materials to the laborers (or vice versa) and of finished products to buying-selling points in the provinces. The substitution of other fibers for rice straw was mentioned, but due to lack of machinery and necessary parts in the only two existing gunny sacking factories, this possibility too was dismissed.[290]

The principal association having to do with straw products was the Korean Rice Straw Products Association, described by the head of the Cotton and Fiber Section as "a source of worry and supervision from the beginning since their status is hard to determine." Three military government agencies tried to control the nine companies which made up the association. About 10 March 1946 the status of the company was clarified, and by April it was making

delivery of sacks as directed by the Department of Agriculture. Since that time, it has functioned principally to buy and resell straw bags and products which would be used by private individuals, as well as assisting the Korean Agricultural Association in its annual collection and distribution of straw bags to government agencies.[291]

II. Production

B. Industrial Crops

4. Forestry in South Korea

"Korea south of the 38th parallel does not produce enough lumber for its basic needs; it does not produce enough fuelwood for its basic needs. Unless North and South Korea are joined or large imports received, the timber resources of South Korea will decline rapidly in spite of reforestation efforts and controls."[292]

Forest land comprises 73 percent of South Korea's total area, and within the last three years, it is estimated that at least 35 percent of the already dwindling forests has been completely denuded. The stand of available timber has decreased greatly because

of unregulated cutting during past centuries, Japan's wartime overcutting, recent hill stripping by Koreans, and loss of access to the larger forest reserves in North Korea.[293] Though American Military Government has taken what steps it could---inaugurating a ten-year planting program, importing timber from Japan, increasing the number of forest police--at the present irreducible rate of cutting the remaining forest lands in South Korea are rapidly being deforested.[294]

The importance of Korea's forests cannot be over-emphasized. Korea is a mountainous land with more than 74 percent of her entire area occupied by forests which serve not only as a source of timber, firewood and charcoal, but also as a vital check to rain runoff, soil erosion, and floods.[295]

The earliest record of an attempt to regulate forest management came during the reign of King Sunchong (982-997 A.D., Koryu dynasty) when that monarch tried to control the noxious insect "songchoong" (Gastropacha Pini. L.), (pine moth) and since that time "due attention was paid by the government to protect the forest lands."

Pine forests were valued highly. In 1660 King Hyungchong set aside a number of Reserved Forests and levied heavy penalties for cutting within these areas, and in 1664 a national edict proclaimed: "The pine is the king of all trees. They say that the people do not cut it in the proper seasons. From now on, lumbering of pine trees, except the necessary cutting for public uses, shall be strictly prohibited." Provisions in "Codes of the State" (Kyungkook Taichun) protected State Reserve Forest Lands and were known popularly as "sangkeum" (pine prohibition).[296]

From 1789 to 1803 an extensive program of reforestation was carried on in Suwon and the ten adjacent counties, utilizing 5,542,504 seedlings and 10,275 bushels of seed. County magistrates forbade any breaking of land for cultivation on the upper half of a hill in order to forestall soil erosion. Despite these and other regulations, however, corruption of enforcing officials was so prevalent that toward the latter half of the 19th century, forest lands near population centers became almost barren and

treeless. During the seventies and eighties of the last century, more than two-thirds of the forest land was denuded, through lack of foresight among the people, and the devastating attacks of the insect, songchoong, which in 1947 was still an unconquered enemy of Korea's forests.[297]

During the latter days of the Yi rulers, old orders and laws were pigeonholed and "reckless exploitation" went on for many decades, resulting in the denudation of all except certain protected forests, and forests located in remote places. In 1908 a law requiring people to report to the government the forest lands they owned was widely disregarded for fear of new taxes. Consequently, after the 1910 annexation by Japan, most privately owned forests were taken over by the Japanese Government, since the owners had failed to register, and the government thus acquired more than four-fifths of the entire area under forest. New laws provided that unreserved state forest land might be leased to private persons for the purpose of afforestation and ultimately might be transferred permanently to those who showed success

in this work. Japanese and Koreans leased large areas, but because of continued complaints of forest owners who had failed to register their lands, a survey of forest readjustment was initiated in 1917 and completed in 1924. Old owners who had material evidence of their prior ownership were allowed to be "Enkosha" (claimants). Under this new plan of distribution, 8,439,000 acres were "claimed"; 12,673,000 acres were unclaimed; and 16,526,000 acres were privately owned. Any dispute regarding ownership was brought before the Committee on Forest Investigation.[298]

When the Japanese took over in 1910, they found an extensive area of inaccessible forest in the north, which reached into Kangwon province (south of the 38th parallel), while in the other seven provinces of South Korea, forest lands had been exploited until little cover was left on the hills and slopes. Immediately the Japanese embarked upon an aggressive program designed to reforest denuded lands and to control timber cutting in the future.[299]

After 1911 certain forest lands were reserved for state or public uses under the following classifications: those necessary for military and scientific purposes; those necessary for public welfare; those having an area extending over 4,900 acres which were suitable for large business undertakings; and those necessary for some other profitable undertaking.[300]

Classification of the entire forest areas included four general categories: national forests, public forests, temple forests, and private forests. The fourteen national forests were managed each by a headquarters station which divided the work into reforestation, protection, cutting and sawmilling. An increasing number of trees was planted each year until the beginning of the war, when military necessity forced the abandonment of the reforestation program.[301]

The National Forest protection sections, with a force of 235 forest police and 304 assistant policemen aided the Provincial Forest sections in guarding Korea's forests. Both National and Provincial protection sections were responsible for preventing

fire or insect damage, illegal cutting, and for issuing information on their areas.[302] The cutting sections had numerous offices, most of them along the Manchurian boundary and in Kangwon Province. They were responsible for the cutting of trees, the construction of truck roads and railroads, and the building of rafts for moving timber by water.[303]

Planting on private lands was encouraged under the Japanese regime by granting subsidies to the extent of one-half the cost of the seedlings used. These were given by the national government to the provincial governments, which underwrote from 20 to 50 percent of the total cost of the seedlings, with the result that planting stock was obtained by the landowners at a cost ranging from 30 percent of total production cost, to nothing. Starting in 1910 with the modest area of 3,482 hectares bearing 10,647,000 trees, the program expanded rapidly through the years and reached its peak in 1939, when 88,400 hectares of private lands were planted in 270,375,000 trees during one twelve-month period, while the largest area

of national forests planted was 48,846 hectares, with 26,083,000 trees, also in 1939.

Permits were necessary before any cutting took place even on private lands, and certain types of lands were totally exempt from cutting---watershed, public health, scenic, soil erosion, navigation, and fishing forest---except in exceptional instances, although permits were granted to thin these woods. A force of 367 police and 1,248 assistants protected these special areas.[304] Erosion control on private forest lands began in 1920 and by 1930, 134,727 hectares were terraced and planted, financed by the national and provincial governments, as well as private funds.

Reforestation under the Japanese was excellent from a technical standpoint. Their methods were modern and survival percentages were high. Even private land owners were required to reforest their lands after cutting, and when permits were issued for cutting on provincial or national forest lands, it was required that the operator reforest the land immediately after cutting.[305]

After July 1937, however, the Japanese needed huge quantities of lumber and other forest products

for military use. These demands increased tremendously over those of peace time. For example, ten-ton trucks were operated on charcoal fuel and thus the demand for this product was increased several times over. Similarly, there was a greater need for tannin and cork, and as a result the cutting of oak was accelerated. A plant for converting pine-wood oil to gasoline was evolved, creating a further drain on the forests. Funds allotted to the Forestry Bureau, and all its employees, were devoted solely to war work, while reforestation and erosion control projects stopped entirely and the only activity in the forests was cutting. With this exploitation, the forested area decreased rapidly and an average of 150 percent of timber grown each year was cut.[306] This was tantamount to spending interest on one's savings, then dipping into the capital for half again as much as the interest totalled, thus decreasing capital and the resultant interest for coming years.

Forestry Under American Occupation

When the Americans occupied South Korea in September 1945, they found the lumber industry in the

midst of wartime production. A complete picture was not available because the principal timber-producing areas were located in the Russian zone of occupation. All timber south of the 38th parallel either had been cut already or had been earmarked for cutting, even some of the sacred forests which surround the tombs of ancient Korean kings. Timber cutting from a management standpoint had long since been abandoned. Records in the Forestry Bureau showed that the Japanese had been overcutting timber since 1933. Since most of the lumber mills of South Korea had been geared to war effort and the overcutting policy, cessation of the conflict removed the necessity for such largescale operations, thereby throwing these mills into idleness and eventual liquidation. As the war ended, the Koreans swarmed over the timber holdings of their former masters and cut off much of the timber for fuel.[307]

Overlooked in the first hectic days of the American occupation, the Forestry Bureau suspended activities pending official instructions, while most of its Japanese officials abandoned their posts to attend to private affairs. As the Bureau continued

1945, it moved to the Bureau of Agriculture and
309
commerce, leaving behind the Lumbering Section
in the Bureau of Mining and Industry. After a short
sojourn in the Department of Domestic Commerce, the
bureau was finally recognized during the latter part
of October as an activity warranting full bureau
status under the Department of Agriculture and Commerce,
as the Bureau of Forestry.* Navy Lieutenant Commander
Harold D. Paget, not a forestry man, was placed at
the head, and he succeeded in locating a competent
Korean to serve as chief of the department. About
the middle of October 1945, a navy lieutenant, R. J.
Costly, who had training in forestry, was placed in
charge, and for the first time the bureau began
to get its feet on the ground. Lieutenant Costly
reorganized the office and departed on an inspection
field trip of the country, one of the first complete
tours to be made of South Korea since the Americans
occupied the territory, and left in charge still
another navy lieutenant, R. M. Kirk. (All Navy

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* Exact dates for these transfers were unobtainable since no records apparently exist, and approximate dates were supplied by Maj. Hayden B. Whitehouse, Executive Officer for Department of Agriculture, who was head of Forestry at one time.

personnel mentioned in this section were at that time assigned to Military Government.) Lieutenant Kirk discovered that the Central Forest Experiment Station, located five miles from Seoul, had not been brought under Military Government control, and immediately annexed it to the department. A qualified Korean, professor of forestry at the Suwon Agricultural College, agreed to manage the experiment station until the college reopened. When it was found that the experiment station never had been connected with the old Forestry Bureau but had been administered directly under the Governor General, Lieutenant Kirk obtained necessary authority to place the director of the experiment station directly under the Chief of the Forestry Bureau, holding the next lower grade. This was good from an organizational standpoint but resulted in complications later when there arose questions of prestige, salary, and rank. The station was a going concern, and needed little supervision since many of its staff were graduates of Japanese universities, with years of practice in forestry. The projects were found in good condition, but many key records had been destroyed by the Japanese.[310]

On 13 November 1945 Major Hayden B. Whitehouse was assigned as chief of the Forestry Department, assisted by 1st Lt. G. R. Moxness, both of whom were trained in forestry. Their initial activity was aimed at the recovery of several million yen which had been illegally distributed by the Japanese. Korean members of the staff aided in this search, and most of the misappropriated funds were recovered. While these yen notes were being collected, they were stored in desk drawers until the proper procedure for disposal could be determined. "Even the banks didn't take the trouble to count the money bill by bill when it was offered for deposit. If a ¥ 10,000 bundle seemed to be the proper thickness, it was accepted as such." This campaign went on during the last part of November and the first of December 1945.[311]

With the advent of winter, all forest activities except cutting came to a standstill, and the distribution of fuelwood and charcoal was still a major problem, since truck transportation was badly needed in order to move substantial amounts of fuel from the hills to Seoul. Trucks were scarce, and truck owners were reluctant

to make the long hauls necessary because of the shortage of gasoline. Consequently, Seoul obtained most of its fuel supply from the nearby hillsides, and the chief mode of transportation was by ox-cart. As these carts have a maximum radius of only about fifteen miles, the hillsides near Seoul "suffered miserably from indiscriminate cutting." However, the city survived the winter with few reported deaths from cold.[312]

By mid-December 1945 a reasonably rapid courier service had been established from Seoul and the provincial capitals, and the functions of the Forestry Bureau began to assume national proportions. When reports arrived from the provinces, some in Korean, some in English, a few in both languages, it became apparent that Americans could not attempt to run the forestry affairs of South Korea. The voluminous laws, reports, and records were unreadable, and English translations were at a premium. The department had been able to obtain only one interpreter, who also acted as translator. The Korean Chief knew no English, and the Americans knew no Korean. The only practicable solution to the question was to turn the

business over to the Koreans and maintain merely a supervisory control over their activities. Since memorandums had been received from the Military Governor to adopt this practice wherever possible, the die was cast, and the Korean staff, promised cooperation.* The idea proved a good one and many benefits were reaped from its adoption. The Koreans realized it was they who had the job to do and that the Americans would not interfere unless their ideas were ill-conceived or projects were improperly planned. The Korean Chief was able to receive official visitors with the proper air of authority and was free to make decisions. By April 1946 the Korean forestry personnel had proved their ability and loyalty, both to Korea and to the Americans with whom they worked.[313]

One of the first and as yet unsolved problems that beset the American administration was the promiscuous cutting of trees by Koreans, a practice which was rapidly denuding the remaining forest lands south of the 38th parallel. Lieutenant Costly had observed this condition

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*This decision did not occur on a particular date but rather evolved over a period of time.

during his field trip and had instituted negotiations immediately upon his return to increase the forest police force in the provinces. These police had formerly been assigned in adequate numbers, but during the war had been reduced to ineffectiveness. While the Japanese had carried on an energetic reforestation program and had controlled the cutting of timber prior to the war, it was obvious that they had promoted these activities not for the benefit of Korea but to furnish Japan with a larger timber reserve. During the war Korea was drained of her forest resources at a precipitous rate, and the number of forest police fell from 1673 to 1025. Under the Forestry Bureau of the American Military Government, their ranks were restored to the pre-war level by means of subsidies to the provinces (which at that time were unable to pay adequate salaries) since the urgency of the need dictated immediate action.[314]

Concurrent with negotiations to increase the number of forest police was a request that the Lumbering Section of the Dept. of Mining and Industry be transferred back to the Forestry Bureau, its parent organization.

Though this measure encountered little opposition, it required two months for final approval. On 13 February 1946, the Lumbering Section was again made part of the Forestry Bureau, and plans were drawn up for controlling and distributing lumber in South Korea. This was deemed necessary since estimates indicated that only 1,000,000 koku (120 board feet equals 1 koku) could be produced during 1946, while the demand would exceed approximately 19,113,000 board feet. The Transportation Department, Communications Department, and others informed the Forestry Bureau that unless large stocks of ties, telegraph poles, mine props, etc., were made available, their facilities would soon become inoperative. Ordinary civilian needs were becoming acute, and tactical troops were making big demands for their own use and for dependent housing projects. The situation called for control, and a plan was submitted whereby the Korean Timber Company (see p 281, this chapter) became the national agent for lumber and the sole agency for its distribution.[315]

Ordinance Number 33, dated 6 December 1945, stated that all Japanese property would become the property of Military Government, pending final disposal. Since Japanese-owned forest lands comprised 67 percent of the total area of Korea, this was the cue for the Forestry Bureau to draw the greater part of South Korea's forests under government management, a wise step since forest management in South Korea had to come under national supervision if adequate timber resources were to be assured. It was hardly to be expected that private companies would put capital into reforestation projects and then wait twenty years before realizing on their investments.[316]

By April 1946 the Forestry Bureau had eighty million trees in the forest nurseries ready for planting, and plans had been laid for the inauguration of an annual Emancipation Planting Week, to be held in April of each year, in an attempt to reforest denuded lands and to bring the problem of forest conservation before the Korean public. The first Emancipation Planting Week was observed in April 1946 and proved highly successful, as did the second week in 1947. On both occasions,

ceremonies were held in all provinces during which school children, civic organizations, political organizations, and public officials, both Korean and American, participated. At the conclusion of the first Emancipation Planting Week, 899 hectares of National Forest land and 38,633 hectares of private land had been planted, using 2,622,340 trees on the National Forests and 77,219,066 on privately owned lands. The cost to the government amounted to ¥ 7,126,704 in the form of subsidies to the provinces, which in turn spent the money to defray nursery and distribution costs of the trees.[317]

While this was a substantial number of trees put out to aid in reforestation, it was less than the number needed to keep the country's timber resources solvent and far short of the yearly program in effect under the Japanese before 1939, which had reached a pre-war peak of 300,000,000 trees planted during one twelve-month period. However, during the spring of 1946, seeds were planted with the expectation of producing 170,000,000 trees to set out in future reforestation programs and to provide for an enlarged planting program in 1947. A seed collection program was also planned for and carried out in the fall of 1946 which yielded approximately 25,000

bushels of tree seeds, serving as a basis for a future annual program of 550,000,000 trees planted.[318]

In July 1946 a meeting of the fuelwood subsection chiefs of the Provincial Forestry Sections and the fuelwood subsection of the Seoul City Government was held for the purpose of making plans to supply Seoul with fuel for the coming winter. A quota of fuelwood to be shipped from each province (except Kyongsang Namdo and Pukto) was set up and agreed upon. In addition to caring for local needs, Provincial Forestry Sections were to issue sufficient cutting permits through the district chiefs to insure the desired supply and also to issue permits for the export of this wood. City officials named agents at certain concentration points, who in turn purchased from local producers and shipped the wood to Seoul. It was hoped that these shipments of fuelwood, plus those normally received each winter, would be sufficient to supply Seoul for the season. To supplement the fuelwood supply for Pusan, efforts were continued to arrange a barter whereby charcoal or firewood would be furnished from the Island of Tshushima in exchange for fish from Korea.[319]

(Since these negotiations had been carried on mostly by telephone, there are few records of the proposed transaction, and what files do exist are in Tokyo.)

The end of 1946 found the cutting of firewood proceeding vigourously everywhere. In Kangwon Do, which is the best wooded of all the southern provinces, the Forestry Bureau furnished thirty-eight trucks to wood dealers concentrating wood in the Chunchon and Wonju areas, and wood was accumulated in the railroad yards there, but due to difficulties encountered in Chunchon, only three railroad cars of wood were shipped to Seoul from that point. Information on the wood arriving by bullcart and trucks is not available, but there was a heavy traffic. At the end of the year, Seoul, Inchon, Pusan and Taegu were in a doubtful position as to the winter's fuel supply.[320]

Production of railroad ties in South Korea during 1946 was estimated at 700,000 pieces, produced to meet a demand estimated at 1,600,000 pieces. Similarly, 50,000 poles were produced as against a need for 100,000 in order to maintain communication and power lines. A total of 3,000 poles was secured from Japan through the import-export program of the National Economic Board.[321]

Only approximately 9,174,240 cubic feet of lumber were produced in 1946, half of what was required. The logging camp with apparently the greatest output was located near Hosan in Kangwon Do, under control of the Forestry Bureau. With the material hauled out prior to 1946, and that hauled after, an estimated 2,000,000 board feet of logs were taken to the beach at Hosan. These were brought out of the mountains by a narrow gauge railroad and "decked" on the beach for water transportation to mills. In December 1946 an estimated 3,000,000 board feet remained in the hills, most of which had been cut and moved to the railroad tracks. As some of the logs on the beach had been cut four years before and were showing signs of rot, continued efforts were made to obtain water transportation to Inchon and Pusan where there were sawmills and wood using plants. The Bureau of Marine Transportation, MG, arranged for eight trips by LST's, whereby a half million board feet were delivered to the above mentioned ports.[322] These voyages occurred on the following dates: 29 April, 4 May, 18 May, 23 May, 9 June, 15 July, and one in December, 1946, and the most recent on 9 June 1947.

Three locomotives were secured in June 1946 through the import-export program and placed in service on the narrow gauge railroad to assist in bringing logs out of the mountains. Fifty-five trucks were secured in the same program, and of this number it proved possible to put fifty in running condition. Of the fifty, thirty-eight were loaned to contractors to move fuelwood, and twelve were placed with the Provincial Sections to do general hauling. Had it been possible to remove all of the logs from the beach at Hosan, and to bring more from the hills, an increased supply of forest products would have resulted. Nevertheless, even that would not have materially altered the disparity between supply and demand in South Korea.[323]

Foreign exchange activities were carried on at a modest rate by the Forestry Bureau during 1946. In April a request for information about Camellia seed was received from the Oliver Flower Farms at Tyler, Texas. When this concern was informed that such seeds could be collected in Korea, it replied on 18 June, expressing an interest in a considerable quantity but requesting first a small shipment of about 100 pounds, which it

said it was authorized to import. Early in November one suk of the seed (264 pounds) was gathered, and it appeared that 8,000 more pounds could be obtained if the collecting began promptly. The matter of shipment and reimbursement was turned over to the Department of Commerce. Five days later the Forestry Bureau sent a one-pound sample to the Oliver Flower Farms asking that the firm advise the Department of Commerce how much of the seed was wanted and how much it was willing to pay.

On 26 December 1946 a letter was received from the State of New York Conservation Department to the effect that it wanted 900 pounds of larch seed. It was advised that there were 900 pounds available, of the kind desired, but that it had been collected in 1942. It also was told that in all probability 900 pounds of the same seed could be secured from South Korea's 1946 collection program. The Conservation Department replied that it was processing an order through the U. S. Commercial Company, Washington, D.C., for the 1946 seed. During December 1946 another order for pine seed was received through the Korean mails,

from Albert Johnson, a forester located at Waukesha, Wisconsin. He was informed that one of the variaties of pine seed he desired was available, as well as two others not mentioned in his letter. In accordance with the instructions of the Department of Commerce, Mr. Johnson was asked what price he was willing to pay, and his reply was turned over to the Department of Commerce, which was to complete financial arrangements. 324

General Forestry Picture, South Korea

Of the 73 percent (39,897,005 acres) of Korea's total area which is classed as forested, 15,841,106 acres are in the United States zone; however, much of the more desirable species and quality timber is located in the northern part of the country. In 1942 a survey indicated that of the total of 15,841,106 acres of so-called forested lands in South Korea, only 11,662,155 acres were characterized as actually forested, while the remainder, submarginal land, was classified as either irregularly or poorly stocked, non-forest or waste-land. Since 1942, at least 25 percent of the formerly forested areas have passed into irregularly or poorly stocked classifications,

while 15 percent of the latter have regressed into non-forest and waste-land categories. In addition, since 1942 the pressing expansion of population and the need for food have caused 117,113 acres to be burned and cleared for "fire-fields" in South Korea.[325] Fire-fields (Kaden) are areas of ground obtained by burning grasses and bushes in the forest area and planting cereals or potatoes there for a few seasons, then moving to another place when the fertility of the ground has been exhausted. This primitive system is harmful in many respects: the farmers set fire to forests, which often cause great losses; they disturb the virgin soil and leave it broken, so that erosion sets in.[326]

Principal hardwood species in South Korea include oak, walnut, elm, chestnut, sumac, maple, birch, and ash, while among common softwoods are red pine, Korean pine, Korean larch, spruce, black pine, and fir. Softwoods are used generally for firewood, charcoal, pineroot wil, rosin, mine props, railroad sleepers, construction lumber, door trim, framework,

interior decoration, furniture, piling, utility poles, paper, and boat masts. Hardwoods are pressed into service as furniture, railroad sleepers, construction lumber, cork, tannin, charcoal, gun stocks, propellers, railroad ties, veneer, rims and spokes of cart wheels, handlestocks for farm implements, and lacquer.[327]

Most forest land (44 percent) is devoted to the production of firewood, for Korean winters are long and cold, and firewood is of necessity the principal fuel. The current shortage of this product is due in part to lack of transportation, but the chief factor lies in the inescapable fact that South Korea's forests have been so depleted by Japanese overcutting during the war, and Korean overcutting since cessation that she is incapable of balancing growth with the cutting of just enough fuelwood, or commercial timber, to satisfy her own demands.[328]

Korea has twelve national forests, all but two of which are located north of the 38th parallel. Those in the American zone were brought directly under national control and are administered from the capitol,

similar to the arrangement prevalent in the United States. At the present time these two national forests, located near Kang Nung and ChunChon are capably staffed, and handle their own management and financial affairs with little supervision from the national level. Routine reports are submitted and the chiefs make frequent visits to the capitol to iron out problems and discuss policies.[329]

The forests of Korea may be classified under many categories, but except for the national forests, all lands are under the jurisdiction of the respective provincial governors, or the provincial forestry sections. Under the United States Military Government, they are divided into the following: national forests, fixed; national forests, unfixed; royal household forests; temple forests; shrine forests; provincial forests; private forests, (formerly Japanese owned); and private forests, Korean owned.[330]

National forests, fixed, are owned by the government and by law may not be sold to private indi-

viduals. These may be part of a recognized national forest or may be isolated under the protection and management of a provincial forestry section. They may be leased to individuals but cannot be sold. National forests, unfixed, are similar to national forests, fixed, except that they may be sold to private individuals at the discretion of the Chief of the Forestry Bureau, upon recommendation of the Provincial Forestry Section concerned.

Royal household forests belong to the Lee Whan Jig family, descendants of the last line of Korean kings. The Japanese deposed them but respected their royalty and right to ownership of sizable forest areas. It is expected that these forests will be incorporated in the new National Forest program along with the former Japanese-owned forest lands.

Temple forests are the property of Buddhist Temples throughout Korea, which own small amounts of timber land, mostly in the vicinity of sacred cemeteries. The timber is quite large due to centuries of total protection. The Japanese however, cut some of these forests

during the war. The remaining timber cannot be counted as part of the timber reserves of the country because it is not available for use. Shrine forests surround the many Shinto Shrines erected by the Japanese throughout Korea, and they have already been assigned to the Forestry Bureau for consolidation into national forests. Many of the shrines are being destroyed since the Koreans are not sympathetic with the Shinto belief.

Provincial forests come under the ownership of the provinces and are administered by the Provincial Forestry Sections. They correspond to the State Forests in the United States, and in quality are consistently poor as compared with the national forests. Privately owned (formerly Japanese) forests are now vested property under Military Government through the provisions of Ordinance No. 33, and are being incorporated into National Forests or Experiment Stations. Falling in this class are several experimental forests of rather large area, formerly owned by Japanese universities, and forest lands formerly owned by the

Oriental Development Company, Mitsui Company, and Sumitomo Forestry Company, large Japanese firms now administered by Military Government, whose forest holdings have not been turned over to the Forestry Bureau. Private forests (Korean owned) are free of supervisory control except in the case of cutting, when permission must be granted by the provincial governor of the national government.[331]

The Provincial Forestry Section, set up as a staff of the Provincial Governor, handles all matters pertaining to forestry with the exception of those National Forests which are large enough to warrant occupancy by federal personnel. The average forestry section employs about forty technicians and clerks, exclusive of Forest Police who average about 200 per province. Forestry sections are responsible for the administration of provincial forests, national and unfixed, coming within their jurisdiction; carrying out of over-all national policy directives; supervision of the provincial forest (National Forests have supervisors of their own); supervision of provincial tree nurseries; and keeping numerous records. Large

subsidies are received from the national government to finance flood control, reforestation, and the salaries of over half the forestry staff, while the entire forest police program is subsidized by the national government. The relationship between the provincial forestry sections and the Forestry Bureaus, under the Japanese, ranged from centralization to decentralization. At present, under Military Government, decentralization exists to a large extent, each provincial governor being responsible for forestry matters within his province. This system does not allow for the best enforcement of forestry practice as most provinces do not have sufficient trained forestry personnel, and the whims of the respective governors are often reflected in forestry policies, with resultant detriment to the program.[332]

Most provincial forestry sections make use of forestry associations or societies. A provincial forestry society is the left hand of the forestry section so to speak, but is only semi-governmental in nature, although the provincial forestry chief is

usually the president of the society. It is the operating agent of the governor in forestry work, and it engages in reforestation and flood control, gathers seeds, harvests fuelwood, makes charcoal, and manufactures pine wood oil,---all at small profit. Separate books are maintained, yet government funds are often used. During the war all such societies furnished materials to the Japanese Army and Navy on a credit basis. Consequently when Japan surrendered, the forestry societies found themselves heavily in debt, holding accounts receivable which apparently would never be paid. As a result, some societies had to be revived and others liquidated.[333]

Closely connected with reforestation are the forest nurseries, ranging in ownership from national to private, most being privately owned. During the last years of the war, nurserymen were slighted by the busy Japanese government and many either ceased tending the seedling beds or plowed them up entirely and planted them in barley or other foods. Most government nurseries are still intact, however, and about 30 percent of the needed seedlings were available for planting in 1946.

An even greater bottleneck in the reforestation program was the problem of labor. Cheap labor was no longer available, and the necessary stocks of food for isolated planting crews were practically non-obtainable. Fertilizer for nurseries was also non-existent. As many nurseries as possible were brought under government control because of the instability of the supply from private sources. The area to be devoted to these installations was increased substantially after 1946; however, since it is apparent that approximately 33,325 acres allotted for this use are inadequate to produce the seedlings required for a well-rounded reforestation program, further increases are planned for 1948 and the succeeding years, as appropriations and materials became available. In spite of the terrific pressure for food, land in the nurseries must be put back into tree production and additional land obtained, until a total of 550 million seedlings can be produced annually.[334]

Forest fires in previous years destroyed an annual average of ₱ 30,000,000 in timber lands,

and it is not likely that fire damage will be reduced this year, unless because there is much less timber land still extant. Korean forest fire control methods are most primitive. There are few lookout stations, and those that are manned have no means of communication. Villagers are organized into fire fighting groups, but most fires are beyond control when fighters arrive on the scene as detecting methods are pitifully ineffective. There is an unlimited field for improvement in Korean fire prevention, detection, and control.[335]

All the common tree diseases are found in Korea, but one of the main pests is the pine tip moth which takes a 30 percent annual toll in some areas. The experiment stations have reams of data on control measures attempted, even to spraying from an airplane, but to date no practicable control has been devised.[336]

The sawmills of Korea are primitive in some respects and modern in others. A sawmill having electric power and band saws may not have

any planing device, that operation being done by hand. An output of 15,000 board feet is considered a big day's run in the larger mills. The Koreans are ingenious and succeed in making the most of their timber capabilities: utilization is 100 percent, since there is always the fuel shortage to absorb any random scraps. In South Korea there are about 500 mills of handsaw size (25 HP or more), and mills are classed according to horsepower rather than output. Logging methods are primitive judged by American standards, and machinery is practically unknown in any phase of logging, from stump to the mills. Trees are felled in the normal manner with axe and saw and are bunched and skidded by oxen. Most of this skidding is done during the winter months to take advantage of the snow, since sleds, "bummers", wheels or other aids to skidding are not generally in use. Logs are decked at truck roads or railroads until spring, when they are hauled to the mill. Loading of both trucks and railway cars is accomplished by manual labor, with usually two to four or more men lifting or rolling logs into the truck or car bed.

Erosion control work under the supervision of the Bureau of Forestry divides itself naturally into two categories: that work done to prevent too rapid runoff of water from steep slopes; and that work done to control the flow of small streams. 338 By February 1947 some 287,000 hectares of completely denuded land were in need of erosion control, because of extensive timber cutting by Japanese during the war years, and promiscuous cutting by Koreans since their liberation. The rapid runoff from bare slopes resulted in the disappearance of vital streams during dry periods, while during rainy seasons they swelled and became damaging torrents.

In the opinion of Bureau of Forestry officials, meeting in February 1947, erosion control must be expanded rapidly to prevent loss of lands and resources by such streams. If funds were provided for this purpose, it would be possible to hire refugee laborers, thus giving such persons employment while at the same time accomplishing an important task. The heavy rainfall of June 1946 gave flood control work popular support, as it forcibly brought the danger to the people's

attention. Many petitions were received asking for flood control work in 1947 and the Bureau of Forestry accordingly planned to increase its program for this year to encompass 18,000 hectares of land, concentrating on KyongSang Pukto, where 5,000 hectares demanded immediate attention.[339]

In the flood control areas, streams are sually intermittent, running deep and swift during the rainy season, then drying up completely for the rest of the year. It is estimated that the total length of such streams needing control work is 8,000 kilometers. These constitute the only water resource of certain mountainous areas. Soil has been washing down from slopes into the streams year after year, with the result that the stream beds below the mountains have risen in some cases 10 meters above their original level, and have increased as much as 100 meters in width. When heavy rains occur, such streams often change their course and flow through rice paddies, or even villages, covering the rice beds and destroying houses, railroads, bridges, and other valuable property. Boundaries of flood control jurisdiction are fairly legical, and so far the Forestry Bureau flood

control program has consisted mainly of terracing and planting hillside areas in the higher watersheds. In 1946 the Bureau of Forestry spent 42,576,200 yen in such terracing and planting, covering 5,808 hectares of menacing slopes. The rainy season comes during late July and early August, and if heavy downpours occur again in 1947, thousands of acres of farmland will be laid waste by floods and erosion. In the face of the food shortage, this problem assumes formidable proportions since no amount of planting will be of help this season, and Koreans can only hope for light rains for the next few years.[340]

In the realm of research and education, there is a Central Forestry Experiment Station located near East Gate in Seoul, and a branch station in each of the ten provinces, which work loosely together. The central station is supported by the National Government while the others are maintained by their respective provinces. The central station is under the direction of the chief of the National Department of Forestry but those in the provinces are on the same administrative level as the provincial forestry offices.[341] These forest experiment stations at present are conducting work on 35 long-range

experiments, designed either to answer specific questions, or to investigate possibilities of improvement in methods of tree growing (silviculture), use of wood, measuring or appraising growth and yield, and protection from insects and disease. Forestry is taught in conjunction with animal husbandry and agricultural subjects in the Colleges of Agriculture at Suwon and Taegu. A three-year curriculum is offered at both institutions, and although no independent school of forestry exists, it is believed that graduates of these schools will have acquired at least a basic knowledge of forestry. Developing and maintaining a fully trained and efficient Korean forestry organization will take years and is undoubtedly an important part of the occupation program.[342]

By way of making Koreans forest conservation conscious, 10,000 posters, 10,000 arm bands, and 2,500 flags have been distributed advocating the prevention of forest fires, while 3,000 warning signs were posted in 1946 to aid the forest police in their work of protection. The regulations and statutes in regard to

forest lands were printed on these posters so that there might be general familiarity with them and thus violations through ignorance reduced. 343

At the time of the American occupation, several forestry associations and companies existed, which were investigated by Military Government. Largest of these was the Korean Forest Development Company, an organization initiated in 1937 for the avowed purpose of the reforestation of Korea. It sold 400,000 shares of stock, of which 98 percent were purchased by Japanese interests. Capitalized at ¥ 20,000,000, stockholders were guaranteed 5 percent interest on their money. The company had slightly more than 500,000 hectares of forest land under contract, of which 170,000 are south of the 38th parallel. It was to plant and manage the contract areas according to plans laid down by government technicians of the Forestry Section; harvesting was to be done at their direction. At the end of the contract period (1958) forest products on the areas were to belong to the company and could be harvested under the direction of the Forest Section while the land in its reforested condition would still belong to the government. Officers

were appointed by the Governor General and received handsome bonuses; extra heavy bonuses were apparently paid just as the Japanese military were leaving. The average annual operating costs were about ¥ 2,000,000, including the stockholders' 5 percent interest, as against an average annual income of about ¥ 300,000, with the deficit being met through government "[illegible]" appropriations and spending. The Oriental Development Company (now the New Korea Company) owned a sizable block of the stock and took over the financial management of the company after the American occupation, though the program and technical forestry supervision remained unchanged.

The Korea Forest Combined Association was organized about 1915, and its membership included all foresters and forest products companies, who paid dues. Its purported purpose was the "aiding of Korean forestry", and activities along this line were carried on through the publishing of a journal, fostering nurseries, and collecting seed for distribution in Korea and Manchuria. There was a small paid technical and clerical staff, and the chief of the National Bureau of Agriculture

and Commerce was automatically president. With the advent of war, the main role of the company appeared to be the encouragement (possibly even subsidization) of the various forest products such as alcohol, tannin, tartaric acid, rosin, turpentine, etc, but did not include timber, pulp, or fuels.

The Korean Timber Control Company was a wartime monopoly organization set up in 1942 for the purpose of controlling completely the production, distribution, rationing, and prices of lumber so as to better key them into the wartime economy. Most of the production area was in northern Korea, and the majority of its products was exported to Japan and the fighting fronts. Since the cessation of hostilities, the company has been dormant, and with the announcement of General Notice Number II, the legal position of the company became that of any ordinary commercial venture. (This notice, dated 20 October 1945, established a free market in all commodities with the exception of those normally monopolized and controlled by the government, such as tobacco, salt, opium, ginseng, sugar, medicines, and pharmaceuticals.) It had a paid-up capital of ¥ 10,000,000, of which

¥ 20,000 is owned by seven Koreans. The company was heavily in debt, with the only accounts receivable those owed by Japanese military organizations.

The Korean Forestry Society is a recently organized society of about 400 Korean professional foresters and businessmen dealing in Korean forest products. It is an outspoken organization with a strong Korean nationalistic attitude, and has indicated a professional interest in the future of Korean forestry. In Seoul it is a pretty tight union as far as local foresters are concerned, and there has never been an instance of a forester applying for a job who was not a member of the society. 344

The outlook for South Korean forestry this year/is dark. 1947 The estimated demand for railroad ties in South Korea for 1947 is approximately 1,600,000 pieces, while the most that can be produced is 700,000 pieces. Though attempts are being made to import lumber from North Korea and Japan, such sources cannot be depended upon. Power line poles and telephone poles are, of course, vital from a communication and industrial standpoint. The 1947 demand for poles in South Korea is estimated

at 100,000 pieces, while anticipated production is placed at only 50,000. During 1946, on a request from Japan for 50,000 poles, only 3,000 were received. In 1946 lumber production was estimated at approximately 18,351,480 cubic feet but by the last of December only 50 percent of that total had been produced.[345]

The great majority of South Korea's population has done little to improve the forestry situation. Having ignored regulations for centuries and cut trees indiscriminately, regardless of the long-run result, it was hardly to be expected that under the new "liberation" Koreans should suddenly reverse their practices and scrupulously observe these same regulations. Nor did they. Beginning with a Military Government press release of 5 October 1945, and continuing to the present, repeated appeals have been made to Koreans to cease cutting, warning that in effect they were sawing off the limb which bore them. Though the dangers of floods, soil erosion, and timber shortages were presented time and again, illegal deforestation progressed at an unabated rate, while Military Government continued its attempts to stem the tide of denudation with its Emancipation

Planting Week, increasing the number of forest police, and distributing stockpiled coal and timber---all to little effect.[346]

At present, 1947, there is no cutting being carried on officially to afford luxury or plenty for anyone but only to provide for the most essential needs: fuelwood, shelter, ties, telephone poles, etc. This yearly cut of timber, which exceeds by half the amount grown, cannot be reduced without causing suffering, and furthermore, too rigid restrictions on cutting would result in evasion and theft. As a result of this inevitable overcutting, it is estimated that each year 25,000 additional hectares of denuded forest lands are added to the already tremendous amount of waste lands, which are now estimated at 2,500,000 hectares. The United States Military Government launched a ten-year planting program designed to recover 25,000 hectares of waste land each year and to plant 25,000 hectares to replace what was cut during that period. However, the program was not adequately financed, and at best at the completion of this plan, although most of the waste forest lands in South Korea will be recovered with some 350,000,000 young trees, annual growth still will not equal the

amount cut.[347]

Present Situation and Problem

The forestry situation in South Korea is, to say the least, not promising. When the Americans arrived in 1945 they found a country whose forests had been exploited for war. Hills and mountains around the large cities were either denuded or sparsely covered and in an alarmingly advanced state of erosion. Prior to the American occupation, a large percentage of the ties, poles and lumber needed in South Korea originated north of the 38th parallel, as did much of the indispensable fuelwood and coal, with some imports of the last named from Manchuria and Japan. North Korea and Manchuria are now completely cut off, and very little lumber or fuel comes in from Japan. The acute coal shortage has brought about a substitution of fuelwood for coal in many light industries and large dwellings, necessitating a still heavier drain on the forests and resulting in skyrocketing prices for fuelwood in the cities and further denuding of hills.[348]

The reasons, then, for unregulated cutting and exploitation of South Korea's forest lands are many:

shortages of coal, firewood, charcoal, and lumber; loss of the main reservoir of timber resources in the north; inadequate transportation (especially as regards existing stockpiles of coal, firewood, charcoal and lumber in South Korea); inadequate enforcement of forestry laws; psychological effect of release from Japanese restrictions; inflation (reflected in high prices of coal and fuelwood); and lack of confidence in the ability or desire of the present government to control overcutting.[349] Though South Korea's demands for lumber are relatively modest, she still can produce only one-third of the estimated 300,000,000 suk* required for one year. The shortage of firewood and charcoal continues to be a major headache, since four-fifths of the wood south of the 38th parallel is consumed as fuel. Clearly dependent on northern forest resources, especially for logs, South Korea formerly imported 86 percent of her hardwood and softwood supply for northern forests. While it is obvious that if her forest preserves are to be restored, annual cutting cannot be allowed to exceed annual growth, it is also apparent that South Korea cannot produce enough to meet her most essential

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* 1 suk (koku) = 6,371 cu. ft.

requirements. Consequently large imports are the only answer.[350]

The need for food in South Korea is so pressing that all suitable land is used for food crops, leaving only steep slopes and very poor soils to grow trees, yet this otherwise useless land occupies 16 million acres (73 percent) south of the 38th parallel, from which must come the needs of some 20 million people. The so-called forest lands are classed at present, 19 percent as waste, cutover and denuded; 47 percent as forested in trees between one to twenty years of age; 19 percent containing trees from twenty-one to forty years of age; 9 percent growing trees from forty-one through sixty years of age, and the remaining 6 percent as forested in trees over sixty years old. Due to the fact that so much of the area is denuded or poorly stocked, or is stocked with comparatively young trees, the forests are producing far less wood material than they could be made to produce under proper management.[351] The war completely deranged the Japanese protection, planting and erosion control program, and since the coming of the Americans, efforts have been made to reestablish and increase these programs. However, as previously indicated, all attempts to re-

forest South Korea have failed to keep pace with the number of trees still being cut each year.[352]

Though 15 percent of the forest area consists of growing trees approaching maturity, this is true largely because of the inaccessibility of this timber. As a result, the greater portion of the cutting and overcutting is confined to the accessible areas about the few railroads and truck roads. It should be noted that the cutting and harvesting about large centers of population is extremely intensive. Brush, grass, leaves--- everything is collected and removed. More roads and more equipment to move material in from remote locales would help alleviate this situation.[353]

The vicious circle is in full swing. To meet only the barest needs for fuelwood and other products, a heavy cutting back into young growing stock is necessitated. But as the growing stock is depleted, the capacity of the forest to meet the needs of the country will be less and less, and devastation and the expanse of stripped and bare hills will spread. Erosion will increase with its consequent covering by unproductive sediment of vitally needed crop land. According to current Forestry Bureau

technicians, as a partial solution, fertilizer should be furnished to nurseries, and they should be dedicated solely to the production of forest planting stock until production of 550 million trees per year is reached. Every alternate source of fuel and substitute materials for forest products must be found and completely utilized.

In addition, trucks must be made available, and means of transportation to reach mature timber in inaccessible areas should be found so that the inevitable cutting may be spread out and conducted as conservatively as possible. Ever since the American occupation of South Korea, transportation has been one of the biggest detriments to progress in forestry. The two national forests, employing a total of 450 workers, had to operate without any motorized transportation during the first year of liberation. The Forest Police have been practically immobilized for lack of transportation, and this condition still exists in all provinces. The average Korean citizen does not realize the importance of forestry to his country, although the Forestry Bureau has done much to

educate the people in forest conservation. Much education is necessary before voluntary compliance with forest laws can be expected, and the lower schools are being used for this purpose intensively.[354] Other activities carried on by the Military Government to better the forestry situation are importations--meager as yet--from Japan; assigning of an American specialist to each of the Provincial Forestry Sections; increasing coal production and distribution; distributing stock-piled coal and lumber; and tightening of law enforcement regulating the cutting of trees.[355] Further steps suggested by the Forestry Bureau include the following:

1) A greatly increased program of reforestation and erosion control. Three million acres are already waste land or cutover and denuded, while 600,000 additional acres are being cut over each year, much of which must be replanted. The Bureau of Forestry contemplates a planting program of 550 million trees annually for the decade beginning with 1948, if sufficient funds can be made available.

2) Better fire protection and better protection of timber from theft.

3) The building of accessible roads to those few places where mature timber is available for harvesting.

4) An attempt to reverse the present trend toward using wood in lieu of coal in industrial plants, by the resumed use of coal, or fuel oil, which should be imported if necessary.

5) The importation of wood materials, and an extensive educational program to bring the necessity for forest conservation before the people.[356]

III. Experimentation, Education, and Extension

A. Experiment Stations

Introduction: -"The greatest service which can be rendered any country is to add a useful plant to its culture... one service of this kind rendered to a nation is worth more to them than all the victories of the most splendid pages of history." (Thomas Jefferson)[357] Taking this as a premise, and adding the fact that Korea as an overcrowded nation must continue to increase her agricultural yield if she is to become or remain self-sufficient in food stuffs, throws the spotlight on the means for increasing such yield...agricultural research.

In South Korea, work of this nature is conducted by 13 central and branch experiment stations, scattered throughout the provinces. In general, the overall program of these stations aims at: selection and breeding of disease resistant, high yielding crop varieties; conducting research on the latest insecticides, fungicides, and agricultural disinfectants; establishing the most economical means of utilizing commercial fertilizer; instituting a system of agriculture which will decrease or eliminate soil erosion; producing and distributing original seed to the provinces and seed federations; conducting research on livestock diseases, feeds and management; and distributing to the provincial livestock stations improved breeds of swine, sheep, rabbits and poultry. In addition, it is the duty of the experiment stations to conduct fundamental research and compile information which will aid the Korean farmer in the solving of his past, present and future problems.

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According to the director of the experiment stations (October 1946 - November 1947), the most important accomplishment of American Military Government

in the field of agricultural research has been the complete reviewing of all projects conducted by the agricultural experiment stations, and their revision or elimination according to the latest improved methods of experimental design and plot technique. During the winter and spring of 1946-47, both the director and the assistant director of the stations toured the provinces and secured complete reports on projects conducted by the stations. They found "few if any...were properly designed." The importance of this may be illustrated by stating that experiments improperly designed yield fallacious results, and cannot be accepted by scientists as being of any value. In addition, many projects conducted by the stations had already been carried out by the Japanese, or by experiment stations in other countries; the results had been proven and were on record. So far as could be ascertained, no review of South Korea Agricultural Experiment Station projects had been made since the surrender, and many man-hours, and funds had been and were being expended on these useless activities. The American directors recommended changes, revisions, and eliminations, which were included in the spring

projects, and the director stated: "To our knowledge, this is the first time in the history of Korean agricultural research that proper experimental design and plot technique have been given consideration in carrying out [agricultural] research projects. It is felt that this single step is the greatest forward stride taken by Korean agricultural research under USAMGIK, for these methods are recognized in all progressive countries and will give...meaning to research data obtained....If the members of the experiment station staff continue to grasp new ideas as they have this past year, within five to ten years, Korea will be recognized as a nation doing fundamental and practical research on all phases of agriculture."[259]

Experiment Station System

The thirteen agricultural experiment stations of South Korea are valuable to Korean farmers not only because farming families make up from 70 to 75 percent of Korea's total population but because the extent of arable land is exceedingly limited, averaging about 2.7

acres per farm, making it imperative that each farmer obtain maximum production from his small plot. The experiment stations, by conducting research leading to improved plant varieties, cultural methods and practices, and by keeping abreast of similar activities carried on in experiment stations all over the world, aid Korean farmers by relaying such information to him as soon as it becomes available at the stations.

The Japanese Government recognized the need for agricultural research in its exploitation of Korean agriculture, and established 18 experiment stations throughout Korea which were administered directly by the Military Governor, the director of the stations being "Sanban" of Korea, the number three man who ranked next in importance only below the military governor and his deputy.

During the first year of their occupation, in 1906, the Japanese established an Agricultural and Industrial Model Station at Suwon with the purpose of improving and developing the agriculture of Korea. At the time of the formal annexation in 1910, a new set of regulations for the stations was issued by

Imperial Ordinance No. 370, which decreed that the station should undertake and engage in: 1) investigation and experimentation relative to the improvement and development of the agricultural industry; 2) investigation of agricultural products as well as analysis and examination of materials for use in agricultural enterprises; 3) distribution of seeds, seedlings, silkworm eggs, poultry, and livestock; 4) lecturing, giving guidance, and instruction and supplying information on agricultural practices.

As the work of the station expanded, and the need for additional facilities arose, branch and subbranch stations were established. By 1940 the Korean Agricultural Experiment Station system consisted of the central station at Suwon and 17 branches distributed throughout Korea. All were under the direct control of the Japanese and were staffed principally by Japanese technicians, while Korean employees were given little or no voice in policy making, administration, or type of research work conducted by the stations, nor were they allowed an opportunity to become proficient in the skills and knowledge required by technicians at the stations.

After the capitulation of Japan and the entry of United States troops into Korea, all Japanese nationals were ordered repatriated to Japan. In July 1947, the American advisor for the stations (who as an army officer had come in with the first troops and visited the Suwon station) said: "I came to the stations in October 1945 and found that most of the Japanese had gone back to Japan, and that the experimental work was in a very bad condition. There was very little salvaged from the 1945 research program. The Department of Agriculture appointed an American Director... [and] six Japanese were retained for a period of six months, but the American director did not make any use of these men. There has been an attempt to help the Koreans with their research work, but the personnel who have been in this position [director of stations] have had very little background in research work." Since the occupation, the station has had five American directors.

The experiment station administrators and technicians were among those returned to Japan, thus leaving the station completely unstaffed. Consequently Military

Government promoted Korean workers to fill these positions. As observed by the American advisor however, Koreans were not trained for these positions and did not have experience in either the administrative or technical phases of research, with the result that the quality of work performed at the stations declined considerably.

Under the organization of Military Government, the experiment station system was placed under the Bureau of Production in the Department of Agriculture. This step, taken principally for administrative reasons, seemed practical in theory but actually resulted in much dissatisfaction among "face"-conscious Korean employees. Under the Japanese, the director of the experiment stations had been second only to the Governor General and the Vice Governor, while under the United States Military Government, the director was head not of a department, nor of a bureau, but of a section level organization. This drastic demotion resulted in a constant struggle by branch station directors to elevate the stations to their former level, and culminated in May 1947 when a group of branch station directors called personally on the Korean head

of the Department of Agriculture, placing their problem before him, and threatening to resign if the experiment stations were not restored to something approximating their former status. Under the new table of organization, effective in fall of 1947, all experiment, agricultural, forestry, and fisheries stations were raised from section level to that of a bureau, with a temporary cessation of complaints by Korean directors.[360]

Meanwhile, in October 1946 two American agricultural specialists, the first civilian directors, were assigned to the station as the counterparts of the Korean director and assistant director, director being the former Major Ford M. Milam, who had visited the stations in October 1945 and who commented when he returned as a War Department civilian, that: "the overall condition of the station is far better than it was at this time last year."

The Central Agricultural Experiment Station was located at Suwon, Kyonggi Do province, in the west central part of Korea, and occupied 463 acres of land, with 75 acres under cultivation, 101 acres under forest, and 102 acres occupied by the irrigation system. Six of

the eighteen stations operated by the Japanese were north of the 38th parallel, and those remaining in the southern zone were at Suwon, Soso, Mokpo, Iri, Chinju, Taejon, Chongju, Kyongju, ChunChon, Kangnung, Kaipung, Taegu, and Kwangju.

For administrative and operational purposes the Central Station was divided into nine departments, each administered by a department head, while the departments were further separated into sections, each manned by a section chief. The organization of branch stations approximated that of the central station at Suwon.

The nine departments and their sections and functions were as follows:

1) Agricultural Biology Department conducted research on diseases and insects which affected plant crops, and was divided into the Entomology and the Pathology Sections.

2) Agricultural Chemistry Department was composed of four divisions, the Fertilizer; Soil; Farm Chemical; and Foods and Nutrition Sections.

3) Agricultural Engineering Department included the Irrigation and Land Reclamation and the Farm Tools Sections.

4) The Agronomy Department, which was the most important division of the station, conducted investigations on all field crops, including Paddy Field, Upland and Fiber Crop Sections.

5) Livestock Department included livestock, dairy cattle, swine, sheep, poultry, rabbits and native Korean work cattle.

6) Agricultural Economics Department investigated the comparative costs of planting and dealt with crop rotation, cost studies, cooperative farm labor studies, farm labor utilization, cost of farm tools, and rural surveys.

7) The Horticulture Department took in the Orchard and the Vegetable sections.

8) Largest department of the station was Sericulture located near the Suwon Agricultural College, and it included the Silkworm Egg Production, Experimental, Filature, and Mulberry Tree Sections.

The program conducted by the branch stations supplemented the work of the central station by conducting varietal trials and increasing seed stocks of improved strains. General agronomic work was carried out by nine

of the twelve branch stations in South Korea; two conducted research in production and distribution of sheep, and one conducted experiments with cotton.[361]

Experiment Stations After Surrender

Immediately after the American entry into South Korea, September 1945, the director of the Department of Agriculture dispatched 1st Lt. Archie E. Downing on a tour of the central and branch agricultural experiment stations of South Korea, to report on their condition and to make recommendations as to their disposition or continuance.

The central station had been founded at Suwon, 30 miles south of Seoul, in 1906, and since that year the station system had expanded to include 5 branch and 13 provincial experiment stations. In 1944 these were combined into 9 branch stations, at Soso, Kori, Kwangchon, Taiken, Sariwun, Chunchon, and Hesan, with sub-branches. Under the Americans the four sub-branch stations were designated as full branch stations, bringing the total of the central and branch stations in South Korea to 13. Under the Japanese, the stations had been used by the

Japanese to increase production by the distribution of rice seed to the farmers. At the time of Lieutenant Downing's inspection of the Suwon station, he found work at a standstill since all responsible positions had been held by Japanese who had either left the station or who were idle waiting news of their fate. The records, library, equipment, and building had been preserved.

The central station included 70 acres of land at Suwon, and 665 acres at Whasan Farm, about five miles from Suwon, plus 180 buildings. All phases of agriculture--agricultural chemistry, livestock, agronomy--were represented in the station departments, the most important of which Lt. Downing considered Sericulture.

This department alone occupied about 15 acres and 30 buildings, involving the breeding, production and distribution of original eggs. It operated a sericulture school for girls which housed and educated about thirty students during a one year course. Downing reported that the Japanese had neglected sericulture primarily because it offered competition to their own

industry in Japan, and secondarily because their chief interest had been increased production of rice.[362]

Downing stated that the Soso, or Seoul Branch Station, was "the most complete of any of the branch stations in that...livestock, grains, fruit, vegetables and cotton are studied," and that the buildings were adequate for maintenance of the station. The Soso Station had been founded in April 1917 and was located about one mile east of Soso, Kyonggi province. At the time of Downing's visit, all Japanese staff members had left, and Kim Ta' Su, senior Korean worker at the station, was in charge. Mr. Kim had been at the station eight years and had studied four years at the Imperial University in Tokyo, and was later engaged by Military Government as director of the station. There were three sub-branches under the Soso station: Kaypoong, ChunChon and Kangnung. The Kangnung station was small, consisting of 4 staff members, 5 acres of paddy field, and 6 buildings, 3 of which were staff houses. The other two stations were visited and reported upon later by Downing.

Soso station owned 10 and rented 2½ acres of land, paying annual rent of about ¥300. The station

was running in a fairly normal manner, with the main problems being the shortage of livestock feed, and the lack of funds necessary for wages, fuel, feed, and rice. The principal activities in the livestock section had to do with poultry and swine, and there were 1500 hens and pullets, and 300 cocks at the station at the time of Downing's visit. Two electric incubators at the station had produced, in 1944, 80,000 baby chicks for distribution to the provinces. Most of the poultry was of the White Leghorn strain. There were two boars, 15 sows, 11 sheep, 5 ducks, and about 20 rabbits at the station, all in good condition. Downing commented, "I believe the poultry flock is the finest in all of Southern Korea."[363]

The Taejon station had been founded in Kyongju in 1908 and moved to Taejon, ½ mile south of the city, in 1934. The station was fully equipped for working both with grain and livestock, though at the time of Downing's inspection, the livestock population was limited to poultry. There were 3 buildings, for hogs and sheep, not in use at that time. The Japanese manager and his two assistants were still in charge

when Downing arrived. This station conducted more extensive work with poultry than any other station, and at that time maintained 372 spring pullets and cockerels, both White Leghorn and Rhode Island Red. The station owned 2 electric incubators, one with a 2,000-egg, the other a 700-egg capacity. There were several brooder houses and 2 large laying houses, which hatched about 20,000 eggs each spring. The Taejon station occupied 39 acres, 31 of which were owned, the other 8 rented. There were 5 acres for buildings, 17 acres of paddy field. At that time rice, wheat, barley, corn, millet, soybeans, sweet potatoes, and vegetables were produced and studied, while in former years cotton had occupied an important place in the station projects.

Downing reported that the station was both well equipped and well managed, that the staff had worked in the fields for the preceding 20 days in order to harvest the full crop. All stations were suffering from a shortage of labor due to lack of funds with which to pay increased wages. The Taejon organization operated one sub-sub-branch station at Yesan,

consisting of 2 acres owned, 4 acres rented, 4 buildings, and a staff of 5 men and 3 laborers, all used for the production and distribution of seed.[364]

The Chinju Sub-branch Livestock station was a branch of the Taegu station, founded in 1906 and moved to Chinju in 1922. Its primary purpose was the development and breeding of livestock, with emphasis on poultry and swine. The Japanese manager was still at the station at the time of Downing's inspection, though he had turned active management over to a Korean staff member. Downing reported that operations seemed to be running satisfactorily, and that some work had been done on rice, barley, cotton, sweet potatoes and vegetables. The soil was a rich fertile loam, with a resultant good harvest. The station included about 31.75 acres, .75 acres of which were occupied by buildings. There were 12.75 acres of owned dry fields, 10.84 of owned rice land, and 7.72 of rented dry field, with annual rent amounting to ¥ 1,206.[365]

The Taegu station had been established at Taegu in 1935. Its buildings were new and in fairly

good condition. The operation of the station had been interrupted for a time when equipment was stored and Japanese soldiers quartered in the buildings. At the time of Downing's visit, the equipment had not yet been put in proper order, and he suggested a second inspection in December 1945 to ascertain that this had been accomplished.

The Japanese managers had decamped prior to Downing's arrival, in October, and the senior Korean staff member was in charge. This station too suffered from a labor shortage, and lack of funds. The station experimented with rice, barley, cotton, sweet potatoes, soybeans, apples and peaches, and there was some equipment for livestock. It had been planned by the Japanese to put livestock at this station, but this was postponed because of the war and only 8 small hogs, belonging to the Suwon station, were in residence, these "in very poor condition." At Taegu, there were 5 acres for buildings, 12 acres of paddy field, and 13 acres in dry field, including a half acre of apple and peach orchard, totaling about 30 acres in all, 17 owned and 13 rented.

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The Iri Branch station consisted of a main station in Iri and a branch station near Chungju. The Iri station was devoted to the development and production of rice and sweet potato seed, and maintained a weather station. There were green houses and chemical laboratories used for the study of soil. The buildings occupied about 2 acres of land, owned by the central government, and the station rented about 35 acres from local land owners at an annual cost of ¥ 6,000. There had formerly been a second branch station at another location near Iri which in 1944 was incorporated into the main station. This site included 12 acres of land owned by the government, and 38 acres rented at ¥ 7,200 a year, and was devoted principally to the growing of rice and sweet potato seed. There was a complete chemical laboratory at this locale for the study of plant diseases, fertilizer, etc. The Japanese manager of the Iri station and its branch was living at Kwangju, and management had been undertaken by two Korean staff members, one at the Chunju branch station. 367

The Kaipung station, established in 1940, consisted of 1,244 acres of rough mountainous grazing land which had been rented from a Korean farmer for ¥ 3,800

a year. It included 15 buildings; 4 sheep barns, 1 hay barn, 1 office building, 1 veterinary building, 2 feed and storage buildings, 1 garage and storage building, 2 manager and 3 laborer residences. All were in good condition. The staff consisted of a manager, two assistants, and 12 laborers. On August 15, 1945 there had been two Japanese staff men, but on that day one committed hara-kiri and the other left for Japan. The station had been managed by two Korean staff men until 12 October when the Suwon Central Station sent a Mr. Hyung Sung Hai as manager. The Kaipung station operated only for the feeding and production of sheep, and its original stock had been imported from Australia or New Zealand in about 1940, being of the Coridale breed. In fall 1944 a group of ram lambs were acquired which were to have been raised and then distributed to farmers for breeding purposes. At the time of Downing's visit, there were 343 rams 18 months old; four 3-year old ewes, and 4 spring lambs, many of which were sick and all in poor condition. The sheep had been kept in barns or corrals most of the time, and fed a poor quality

of grass, hay, and a high protein mixed concentrate. They appeared infested with worms; many were infected with sleeping sickness, and there was some evidence of foot rot. Since 15 August, 26 had died and 10 to 15 more would succumb shortly. They had been allowed to graze only a short time each day. Downing ordered the Koreans to separate sick and well sheep, and to graze them 8 hours a day on the high mountain lands.[368]

The Mokpo branch station was founded in 1905 for the purpose of developing and promoting the growth of cotton using original seed imported from America. The records and library had been preserved and there was a green house in good condition. In 1943 a new stone office building and 2 stone warehouses had been constructed. In 1944 the Mokpo branch was made a sub-branch of Kwangju Station and was still controlled by that station at the time of Downing's inspection. The Mokpo station produced superior seed which was distributed to nearby farmers who planted a total of 225 acres. The station then purchased the seed grown on these 225 acres at an annual cost of 44,000 yen and distributed it to farmers throughout

the village, province, etc. It was the largest producer of cotton in all Korea. The Japanese manager was still in charge but expressed his desire to return to Japan. 369

The Kwangju branch station was established in 1909 and had dealt mostly with the development of rice and sweet potatoes, though in 1944 the production of cotton had been undertaken. There were office buildings, warehouses, and a chemical laboratory. The station owned 12 acres of dry land, and rented 23 acres of rice land from 6 farmers at an annual cost of 4,600 yen. 12 acres of rice land was owned by the station, and two acres was occupied by buildings. In 1944 when cotton was added to the station agenda, 90 acres were taken over northeast of Kwangju, 80 rented and 10 bought outright. There were three buildings on this land, one warehouse and two residences.

The Kwangju Agriculture station also conducted a provincial agriculture school for engineers, offering a 2-month course with the staff of the station acting as instructors. The Japanese manager was still in

residence at the station, but a Korean staff member had assumed active management.[370]

The Kyongju livestock station was located about 5 miles southeast of Kyongju, and was founded in 1941 for the purpose of promoting the production of sheep. All buildings were new and in good condition at the time of Downing's inspection. The station consisted of 24 acres of owned land. The cultivated land was devoted to the raising of feed, and there were 777 acres of rough grazing land rented at an annual cost of about 3,800 yen. There were 565 head of sheep at the station in good condition: 215 mature ewes, 10 mature rams, 77 rams 18 months old; 63 ewes 18 months old, and 200 spring lambs. The breed was Coridale and was imported from Australia or New Zealand in 1941. The Japanese manager and his assistant had left for Japan, and a Korean staff member had assumed management. At that time the station employed 11 staff members and 11 laborers, all Korean.[371]

The ChunChon station, a branch of the Soso station, was founded in 1909, and owned an office building, weather station, laboratory, green house,

warehouse, and 13 residences. There were 50 acres of owned land, of which 22 were paddy field, the balance being used for dry fields, woods and buildings. The station studied the production of rice, soybeans, cotton, wheat and potatoes. In 1945 the 22 acres of paddy field were used as follows: 5 acres for research, 2.5 acres donated for use by a women's college, 9.5 acres rented to farmers in return for 1/3 of the seed produced, and 5 acres used for the production of seed. Downing noted that, "the soil and climate of this province is not so well adapted to the production of rice."

The station originally had employed 28 staff members, 7 of whom were Japanese. At the time of Downing's inspection, the Japanese had been gone for several weeks and had left a Korean staff member in charge who had formerly been head of the weather station. On 11 October 1945 the province had sent another Korean to the station as manager. During the Russian campaign the office building had been used as a hospital, which disrupted the normal operation of the station. Some station work cattle had been slaughtered, and Downing was told that the Japanese

had ordered this done. The station did "not appear to be operating as it should be" [372] at the time.

In summary, there were 13 central, branch and sub-branch stations in South Korea, as follows:

Founded	Name	Acres	Location	Province	Principal Activities
1906	Suwon Central Station	735	Suwon	KyonggiDo	General
1906	Mokpo Sub-Branch Station	154	Mokpo	Cholla Namdo	Cotton
1907	Chinju Sub-Branch Station	31	Chinju	KyongSang Namdo	Agronomic
1909	Kwangju Branch Station	121	Kwangju	Cholla Namdo	Agronomic
1909	Chonju Sub-Branch Station	45	Chongju	ChungChong Pukto	Agronomic
1909	Taegu Branch Station	210	Taegu	KyongSang Pukto	Agronomic
1910	ChunChon Sub-Branch Station	54	ChunChon	KangWon Do	Rice
1917	Soso (Seoul) Branch Station	90	Soso	KyonggiDo	General
1920	Kangnung Sub-Branch Station	7	Kangnung	KangWon Do	Agronomic
1930	Iri Branch Station	24	Iri	Cholla Pukto	Agronomic
1941	Kyongju Sub-Branch Station	660	Kyongju	KyongSang Pukto	Sheep
1941	Kaipung Sub-Branch Station	1218	Kaipung	KyonggiDo	Sheep

Under Military Government, all stations were classed as branch stations, and in March 1947, the Kaipung and the Kyongju stations, which dealt only with sheep, and the maintenance of which cost half the annual experiment station total budget, were taken from experiment station jurisdiction and placed under the National Livestock Section. Since the

stations concerned devoted themselves only to production and distribution, they strictly speaking did not belong in the research organization.

In summarizing his inspections, Lieutenant Downing reported that every station, with the exception of Kaipung, was well managed, fully equipped and essential, while there were three smaller sub-sub branches which he recommended for elimination; Sepo, Kumje, Yesan. The experiment stations had been founded by the Japanese after 1905, and each station operated a complete office building, chemical laboratory, weather station, green house, library, and other essential buildings including living quarters for the staff and laborers. The staffs had consisted of a manager and his assistant who were invariably Japanese, while the second assistant was usually a Korean. Usually the senior Korean staff member had taken over management by the time of Downing's arrival and was doing as best he could, though these Koreans generally had only middle school agriculture education, plus their years at the station.

In general the branch stations were concerned with either grain and vegetables, or livestock, seldom both,

while at Suwon and to a lesser extent, Soso, all phases of agricultural research were represented. At the grain and vegetable stations there were usually from 30 to 40 acres of dry fields and paddy fields, while the livestock stations had several hundred acres of rough mountain land. The primary purpose of the stations was to conduct research, and to distribute good seed and stock to the farmers.

The system used in such distribution began with the experiment station which obtained or developed a good seed, sent it to branch stations for production, then distributed the seeds to districts, villages and farmers. Farmers were selected on the basis of their capability and in turn they were obligated, though not required, to sell seed to other farmers so that the good seed might find wide distribution.

Downing recommended that Military Government support the experiment station program, and that where possible the ranking Korean at each station be installed as director. These men could be replaced later if better qualified men became available. The organization of the stations when Downing inspected them was:

Central	Branch	Sub-Branch	Sub-Sub-Branch
Suwon	Iri	Chungju	Kumje
		Taejon	Yosan
			Gyumsan
	Seoul (Soso)	ChunChon	Sepo
		Kaipung	
		Kangnung	
	Kwangju	Mokpo	Syubang
	Taegu	Chinju	
		Kyongju	

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2 September 45 - 15 July 46

The next comprehensive record of experiment station activities under American Military Government was contained in 1st Lt. Harold V. Loden's "Report on the Agricultural Experiment Stations of South Korea," 15 July 1946, compiled when Lt. Loden was relieved as director and replaced by Capt. N.Y. Chung. According to Loden, the only existing records for the period 2 September 1945 to 21 November 1945 were the reports just summarized, written by Lt. Downing during his inspection of all experiment station facilities. During the period 31 October - 21 November Capt. Ford M. Milam was director of the stations, but there were

no records for the station covering this period. At some time during that same period, the appointment of Dr. Keh Ung Sang as director was effected, but the exact date was not known. During this period there was considerable unrest and uncertainty among station employees, while very little if any constructive work was carried out due to the lack of interest on the part of the Japanese, and to the fact that actual management of many stations was taken over by Koreans, which prevented the carrying out of previously initiated Japanese planned programs. Much valuable data was lost during this period, or never recorded. Many seeds and crops were lost, being allowed to spoil in the fields, while there was much looting and disorder, and at one branch station the main office building of the station was damaged to such an extent that it could not be used until repaired. Though some instances were found in which both Korean and Japanese employees acted as loyal caretakers, these were the exceptional cases rather than the rule, and one instance was known in which American tactical troops removed from the station all laboratory equipment and other valuable property.

Most of this, however, was recovered. In general, the period from 2 September 1945 through 21 November 1945 was characterized by great disorder and misunderstanding. As a result much valuable material was lost, and the achievements of the agricultural experiment stations for the year 1945 were nil.

During the period 21 November 1945 - 13 May 1946, the stations were headed by two Americans, Major Victor E. Schember and Lt. Comdr. Olive R. Austin. Schember was appointed on 21 November as director of the stations, under the Bureau of Agricultural Production, National Department of Agriculture, and on 30 November he was joined by Commander Austin who was appointed as his assistant. Austin was sent to SCAP early in May 1946, and Major Schember departed for the United States on the 13th of that month. Due to the suddenness of their removal, no detailed report or summary was made for the period during which they were in charge of the stations. However, a complete log of daily activities for the period 21 November 1945 - 22 February 1946 was found in the office residence of

the central station in Suwon, which furnished a complete chronological picture of the problems encountered in the operation of the stations during that time, and offered some clues as to the work accomplished by the stations for that period.

In August 1947, when the Corps Historical Section was compiling material for this account of the experiment stations, it was found that this log, together with the complete record of Capt. N.Y. Chung's directorship at the stations and many other valuable files, had been burned by the Koreans during the transition between Capt. Chung's removal and the assumption of the directorship by Mr. Ford M. Milam, who had returned as a civilian to take the job he held briefly as an army captain. Fortunately, Lt. Loden had copied important excerpts from Austin's and Schember's log and included them in his report, so there is not a complete void in records for this time.

Apparently both Austin and Schember were greatly hampered in their efforts to aid the experiment stations in resuming full operation by a policy of

passive resistance on the part of all station employees, and headed by the director, Dr. Keh, who consistently agreed to all suggestions and promised speedy action but who actually did nothing and concerned himself more with his own business affairs in Seoul, and with black market activities, than with the affairs of the experiment stations until his forced removal in spring 1946. There were no interpreters at the station at this time. Austin and Schember recorded on 24 November: "It appears that members of the station, both staff and laborers, are not interested in their duties and in most cases are doing very little work or none at all." On 28 November: "Major Schember attempted to obtain some general information from Dr. Keh concerning the experimental program of the central station and sub-branches. Dr. Keh has very little knowledge of what any of the stations are doing, including the central station." Difficulties in obtaining and storing fertilizer developed early, and on 8 December 1945: "drove to Inchon to find out about fertilizer and if possible to freeze a portion

thereof for the station's spring needs...impossible to freeze....only method is to buy new, transport to station and store...impossible due to lack of funds." On 10 December: "Attempted to secure advance against funds of current budget...funds not secured." On 12 December: "drew up a letter to each sub-station requesting financial statement, budget estimates and personnel information in detail." On 14 December: "Dr. Keh does not have the faculty of being able to make up his mind and follow through, but is easily swayed by others. He is not only slow at reaching a decision but his decisions are most always temporary."

On 16 December 1945: "Spent the afternoon conferring with Messrs. Takahaski, Funabiki, Kurosawa, Wada and Uchida, the five remaining Japanese who were formerly officials at this station. During the discussion the following pertinent items were obtained. Under Japanese management the station was run by 47 Japanese and 16 Korean staff members. There were 30 Japanese and 90 Korean full time laborers. In addition many temporary laborers were hired as needed in the busy seasons of fall and spring. The work hours were

from 0900 to 1600 in winter and 0700 to 1700 in summer, with an hour for lunch and two 15 minute rest periods. The station has four cows and one bull of pure bred Holstein blood, which they have been crossing with native stock....the introduction of Berkshire strain of hogs has been good....it is their opinion (presumably the Korean or Japanese staff members) that Park Seung Man is the best Korean staff member, and expert on paddy field culture. "But lazy." However this same Park Seung Man was later to cause trouble by heading a Self-Help Committee, consisting of all station employees, who went on strike for better pay, and who were the cause of a station riot during which several people were injured and several more jailed. This occurred in December and is more fully covered in another portion of this chapter, "Major Difficulties."

An observation of the Oriental way of business was entered on 17 December 1945: "through an interpreter from 60th MC company, the following was obtained from employees...Mr. Han, General

Affairs (see this chapter, "Major Difficulties") [says] "all employees are assigned a specific department head and these heads are responsible for giving the instructions....when asked why buildings are in such a mess replied 'he did not have direct orders from Dr. Keh." On 19 December: "made an inspection of the silkworm department..... everything in apple pie order, buildings in good repair and clean....almost everyone working." Austin and Schember had reported to the director of the Department of Agriculture, Lt. Col. Dewitt Jones, their dissatisfaction with Dr. Keh and on 22 December: "Col. Jones arrived at station....told us we must discard the idea of replacing Dr. Keh for his appointment had been made by higher officials." (For full story on Dr. Keh, see this chapter, "Major Difficulties"). On 10 January: "inspected sericulture, everyone at work...all hands paid, all signed the payroll. No trouble whatever." On 16 January:

"worked with Dr. Keh on organizational chart for central station and selection of personnel to become directors of branch and sub-branch stations." 16 January 1946: "made a general inspection of the station. Staff and employees gradually becoming more interested in work...general improvement noted in cleanliness." On 23 January Austin and Schember: "received a petition from station employees and branch station directors requesting Dr. Keh be dismissed." On 31 January: "Major Schember conducted a general inspection of the station and drafted a letter to Dr. Keh setting forth major complaints and requesting corrective action," and on 12 February: "Dr. Keh finally agrees to have staff meetings." On 15 February: "Mr. Hyun (Korean head, Bureau of Agricultural Production) from Seoul arrived bringing Mr. Kim Ho Jik the new assistant director." On 21 February: "general inspection of station shows progress being made in getting the place cleaned up," and on 22 February, the final entry: "made inspection of all departments and grounds...found progress in

cleaning up with much to be done, very little sign of constructive work going on except in insect and livestock departments. None of tne suggestions on the greenhouses has been started...very little started on the pruning of...trees which need it so badly." It is interesting to note that when Mr. Milam came to the stations ad director in October 1946, the greenhouses had been completely stripped of glass, which had been removed in broad daylight and carted away, with no interference by station employees. Also that the hill on station property had been stripped of trees and brush, with a similar lack of interference by station personnel.

Detailed account of station activities did not go past 22 February, and little is known about the details of the station operation, nothing at all about the projects being conducted. Major Schember and Lt. Loden (then assigned to Seoul) made an inspection trip to Taejon, Taegu, Seoul and Chinju branch stations. Dr. Keh was finally removed as director on 19 April 1946 (see"Major Difficulties") for complete story of dismissal) and Kim Ho Jik was appointed acting director, then director.

In summarizing the period during which Austin and Schember headed the stations, Loden says: "the MG officers operated under great handicap and were able to accomplish very little in the way of getting under way a good sound agricultural experimental program; however, through repeated efforts they were able to clear up many major administrative difficulties in order that in the future the desired type of experimental program may be assured," and added that, "With the best efforts all that it is possible to accomplish is at the present time [15 July 1946] to keep the station in operation and safeguard as well as possible the work that is now in progress so that when personnel, etc, are available, a high type of work can be immediately undertaken."[374]

During the period 13 May 1946 to 31 July 1946, 1st Lt. Harold V. Loden was assigned as director of the stations, and he enumerated the major activities of this period as follows:

On 15 May a meeting of all station employees was held; they were "briefed" and informed that the

station facilities were to be kept clean and in good condition. Later a time for regular weekly staff meetings was established so that the departments might coordinate better their activities and so that the director might keep an eye on current projects and activities. Each week, two departments gave complete report on their organization, duties, and functions of their department, with a complete outline of works being carried out. Inspections were made of all departments, including Whasan Farm, at regular intervals.

Loden remarked that "the buildings are in great need of repair", and that the price estimates of such work were so great that it was questionable whether the annual budget would allow such expenditures. He instituted an English class to teach conversation, which met three afternoons a week for one hour and had a regular attendance of about 85 station employees. A complete audit of books was made and several misappropriations of funds discovered which had taken place during Dr. Keh's administration. The girl's sericulture school was found to be on the verge of having to discontinue due to lack

of food for its students, and arrangements were made to secure the necessary rations through civilian supply, 60th MG company. The station was completely reorganized on 1 July 1946 and found to be greatly overstaffed with so-called technicians. Loden reported that for the past year since the termination of the war, several things had been lacking in the experiment station administration: planning in advance, cooperation between departments and individuals, and work; and he commented that before the reorganization on 1 July "there were more people sitting in offices and behind desks giving orders... than there were people to carry out these orders." On 22 June 1946 the last Japanese staff member departed for Japan, after writing and submitting two reports on the experiments carried out in central and branch stations during 1945, and on Korean agriculture in the future. On 3 July 1946, Mr. Kim Ho Jik, acting director, was appointed to the position of director and was described: "Mr. Kim Ho Jik has the confidence of the station staff and employees and it is believed that he is the best qualified man available for this position."

During the June 1946 floods it became evident that the station should have control of some adjoining lands in order to establish an adequate draining system. The lands were under control of the New Korea Company, and the tenants did not maintain the drainage system. Requests were initiated, but by August of the following year, 14 months later, no action had been taken.

All departments were instructed to turn in each week prepared news releases on their activities which might be suitable for publication in Korean papers. The first mention of the actual projects being conducted by the stations was made by Loden when he said; "A careful study of the types of experiments being carried out in the station...shows that there is not any work of a very constructive nature being done. Some experiments look good from the title...but close observation of the techniques used show that the results obtained will have no accuracy. Many experiments are being carried out which should be discontinued due to either not being practicable or else [being a] duplication of work which

has already been done many times elsewhere." It is interesting to note that Loden commented, when recommending that that part of the budget set aside for publications be reserved for later use: "It will be at least 2 or 3 years before results will be available which will be of interest to the Korea farmer" and "It will be at least 10 years before publications for worldwide distribution should be made." In 1947 the station released many announcements to farmers regarding fertilizer, irrigation, and other phases of cultivation, and also in 1947, the Japanese records of all work done by the stations in the past were being translated, and were slated for publication and distribution to experiment stations in other countries.

Loden says: "a program of joint operation between the Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Department has been worked out whereby the station will furnish rabbits for laboratory use. It was also worked out whereby the main station and the Soso branch station could furnish approximately 1,000 eggs per week for laboratory use...during the season in which the station incubators were not operating."

Originally, 402 permanent civil service employees were allocated to the central station but the positions were never filled completely. The revised number required after the 1 July 1946 reorganization of the stations called for only 296, and even this figure was not met. On 15 July 1946 there were 25 vacancies, and only 271 full time employees of the central station, not including the temporary laborers employed during busy seasons.[375]

During the period 15 July 1946 to 4 October 1946, Captain N.Y. Chung was director of the stations. Unfortunately all records for this period were burned by the Koreans while cleaning out Captain Chung's desk when he was replaced by a civilian director, and little is known of the activities of the station during this time.[376]

4 October 1946 - 7 August 1947

On 4 October 1946 Captain N.Y. Chung was relieved as director of the stations by Mr. Ford M. Milam, who as a captain had held the same position briefly a year previous. In Mr. Milam's initial report, he

stated: "The main office building and grounds were in good condition, and the overall condition of the station is far better than it was at this same time last year." With the Korean director, Kim Ho Jik, he "inspected all departments of the station on 7,8 and 10 October," and found "the overall picture is about as good as could be expected under present conditions. There seems to be an honest attempt by all departments, but all of the people are at a great handicap due to the lack of proper training, lack of complete knowledge of past experiments, and not enough experience to grasp the significance of the present work."

For the first time, a complete review was made of actual projects being conducted by the station's nine departments and their sections. The Farm Management Department was collecting data on the cost of rice production under different cultural methods, with the main project being a comparative study of the cost of single transplanting as opposed to double transplanting. The Agricultural Engineering Department did not have an active program under way at that time, and Mr. Milam commented "there is a definite lack of leadership ability,"

concluding that it was advisable to curtail the activities of this department as this could be done at a yen saving "without damaging the station program." The Agricultural Biology Department was conducting studies on the control of the rice borer (Chilo simplex) and also on the storage of sweet potatoes, as well as investigations of various diseases and plant insects. The Agricultural Chemistry Department was carrying out some laboratory work in soil analysis, fertilizer analysis, spray materials, and the analysis of feeds.

The Agronomy Department, described as "the most important department at the station", was divided into sub-sections. The paddy field sub-section was engaged in a number of activities having to do with rice, and Mr. Milam found that the Korean in charge was "very alert and aggressive," had "a complete record of the work and [was] well acquainted with all phases of the...studies." The Upland Sub-section was experimenting with wheat, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, beans, soybeans, and sesame; the Fiber Sub-section with cotton and flax.

The Horticulture Department was working with fruits and vegetables and "the personnel have changed so frequently in this section that it is very difficult to get a clear picture of their program." The Livestock Department had been successful in purchasing enough feed to "take care of the roughage requirements for the present number of livestock," and it was conducting experiments on cattle management, hog feeding, artificial insemination, meat preservation, hybrids, the hot floor method of chick breeding, winter egg production, and other important phases of livestock care and management, but "it is questionable whether these experiments are being carried out in a satisfactory manner."

The Sericulture department was testing moths from which summer eggs had been obtained, and the head of the department was concerned by the shortage of labor. The filature at that time was working on the standardization of the silk fiber. An inspection was made of Whasan Farm, and a partial history obtained of the installation. Until 1925, the farm apparently was under

the control of the Royal Family and was employed for horse breeding. In that same year it was transferred to the Suwon experiment station and was used by the Japanese as a cattle breeding farm until 1942. It was then utilized for a study of cooperative farming and the breeding of native Korean cattle. On the farm, which covered some 665 acres, were three good barns, two warehouses, several usable, some good office buildings, three dwellings, and a fair, good-sized laboratory on the premises. 377

During the week 24-29 March 1947, the American advisor, assistant advisor, and Korean director, after inspecting all branch stations under the experiment station system, reviewed the results of their observations and planned to introduce work during 1947 having to do with the growing of soybeans in rain water paddies when insufficient rain fell to irrigate the rice crop. They also laid plans for a program of green manure crop cultivation for the coming winter. Finding that many experiments being conducted by the central and branch stations were worthless or were duplications of other work already completed or being conducted, they revised,

eliminated, and introduced projects which would utilize the scarce manpower, land, facilities, and funds to best advantage, at the same time explaining to branch station personnel why the inadequate methods used by them in their projects made the results obtained inaccurate and meaningless. 378

On 9,10, and 11 April 1947, the American advisor and three Korean station directors attended a meeting of the Korean Horticultural Society at Onyang, which had met to organize a society composed of technicians, producers and merchants. It was estimated that with all the branch organizations, there would be about 10,000 members of the society, who planned to meet annually to exchange information and technical knowledge. The American advisor commented that in the past Koreans had felt that the function of the experiment stations had been to publish data, then forget about it, and in his introductory speech to the meeting, he pointed out that it was the experiment stations' duty to find solutions to the farmer's problems, and to get the information to the farmer.

On 7 April 1947, the agricultural advisor for the New Korea Company visited the Suwon station and promised funds to the amount of 42,500,000 yen to the stations for the purpose of conducting a training course for New Korea Company and experiment station technicians who were not agricultural graduates. The course was to consist of from 15 to 18 hours instruction weekly for a period of three years. In addition, the stations agreed to conduct a 37-day training course in horticulture for the New Korea Company horticultural technicians.[379]

During the American assistant director's inspection trip of branch stations in April 1947, he commented on the advanced soil erosion which was causing great damage throughout the provinces. "I particularly noticed the extent to which the hillsides had been denuded and the resulting soil erosion. Many rice paddies have been sanded...[until] they are valueless. If the stripping of...mountains is permitted to continue, not only will...erosion completely remove all....soil from the hillsides, but...paddies in the

valleys below will be ruined by sediment...There has been much cutting of timber from the mountains...formerly the top soil was fairly deep and well stabilized, supporting an abundant vegetative growth on the mountains. The rapid removal of this...growth has accelerated the processes of erosion...loose friable top soil is not only washing away but in many steep areas is gradually cleaving and slipping away." On seeing many small logs being floated down the So Young River toward Seoul, he commented: "If these trees could have been permitted to grow until they had reached 14 to 16 inches in diameter, and then systematically harvested, rather than wholesale stripping of the hills, much more lumber could have been realized and the soil of the mountains could have been maintained in a stabilized condition."[380]

On the same subject, the American advisor commented on 19 April 1947: "I was amazed at the damage which has taken place in the area from Seoul to Kaesong during the past year due to soil erosion and destruction of forests and soil cover. I observed this area in late 1945 and early 1946, and I would estimate we are now 25 years behind the condition which existed when Japan surrendered.

The..life blood of Korea (its soil) is being washed away by uncontrolled soil erosion and floods. The economic stability of any nation is based upon the productivity of the soil. If the present rate of devastation is permitted to continue, then Korea will be a poverty stricken nation within five to ten years... If there is one third as much rain in June of this year as there was last year, there will be considerable damage from floods, for there is no soil cover or vegetation to check the run-off in many areas."

While this strictly speaking was not an experiment station problem, the Advisor commented: "There is no point in sending valuable fertilizer to this country to be washed away to the sea by devastating floods and uncontrolled soil erosion. If it were possible to obtain data at this time on the loss /of soil/ in Korea, I have no doubt that the loss of /nitrogen phosphate, potash/ ...eroded...annually would be approximately 100 times the cost of the commercial fertilizer being shipped into this country. It is very true that the rainfall for June 1946 was unusual, but if the forests and ground cover had not been destroyed during the fall and winter of 1945 and 1946, the flood damage would probably have been only one

half as great." In the opinion of the same advisor, "there is much doubt as to whether a soil conservation program could be carried out here along democratic lines as we know them in America. The Korean Government will probably have to enact hard and strict laws dealing with erosion control if it is ever to be a success in this country." Both the American advisors devoted much time, during the training courses later held at the Central Experiment Station, to explaining the seriousness of soil erosion, and to teaching the methods whereby it could be checked.[381]

On 26 April 1947, it was found that the experiment stations had not been receiving the supplemental rations made available to all governmental employees, and a complete list of all personnel, together with the village in which they resided, was submitted to the National Food Administration. In July, 1947 the first rations were received, in the form of bolts of suit cloth, sold at prices far below the current inflationary market figures.[382]

On 17 May of the same year the American and Korean directors inspected the hill area surrounding

the central station at Suwon with a view to using it as grazing land for the station livestock. When this was broached to the head of the livestock department, he "seemed much surprised...it seems that the only idea they have of maintaining livestock is to purchase expensive commercial feed and make no effort to produce feed or forage."[383] Subsequently, the herd of Holstein cows were released daily to forage on the experiment station hillsides, with a marked increase in weight and improvement in general physical condition.

On 24 May 1947, an inspection was made of the Sericulture Department, where the first silk worm eggs had been hatched on 17 May. The department had evolved an economical and efficient method of silk worm feed, using first finely chopped up mulberry leaves and gradually increasing the coarseness to whole leaves. This method was not in common use by Korean farmers at the time, with the result that much feed was wasted and the head of the sericulture department/said steps were being taken to acquaint the farmers with this improved method.[384]

On 19 May 1947 the Biology Department installed lights to be used in the study of night-flying insects, particularly the moth of the rice borer (Chilo simplex). These lights were installed at various locations on the edges of irrigation ditches.

At this time, there were 21 prisoners from the Suwon prison farm, working for various experiment station employees at a cost of ¥ 50 per day, per worker, as compared with the current cost of ¥ 200 a day for transient laborers, in addition to the fact that "prisoners do almost three times the work of ordinary laborers."[385]

On 7 June 1947, the central station orchard was inspected. Of twelve peach trees imported from the United States, (two each of six varieties), one each of four varieties had failed to live after being planted. The head of the horticulture department said the roots of these trees had been damaged before arrival. During this inspection, a number of laborers were observed "bagging" each individual fruit on the trees in the large station orchard. This was necessary due to lack of spraying chemicals, and resulted in the expenditure of much man-power, materials, and the loss of 2/3 of the fruit,

which was removed from the trees since it was impractical to bag all fruit. "If we had sufficient chemicals to carry out recommended spray schedules, it would be possible to produce a much greater quantity of fruit in Korea," the advisor commented.[386]

On 19 July 1947, a meeting was held of all central station department heads and a Publication Committee was set up through which all releases prepared by the departments would clear before leaving the station, and which would handle all outside requests for information.[387]

Major Difficulties

From the beginning of the occupation, the Central and Branch Agricultural Experiment Stations were beset with many difficulties, one of which was lack of cooperation by the Korean director of the national Department of Agriculture, Dr. Lee Hoon Koo.

Immediately following the Japanese surrender, a group of trained Korean agriculturists banded together to form the Agricultural Society, raison d'etre of which was to compile a complete list of competent technical men who could be of service to the United States Military Governor.

While Lee Hoon Koo was a member of this society and was designated one of the two vice-chairman, Yun Tai Chun, professor of Crops at the Suwon Agricultural College, was made chairman. Judging from subsequent actions, Lee Hoon Koo resented this slight, and when Yun Tai Chun was selected by Military Government as director of the agricultural experiment stations, Lee, who had by then been appointed head of the Department of Agriculture, was instrumental in the voiding of Yun's orders of appointment and was influential in effecting the substitution of a friend of Lee's, Dr. Keh Ung Sang.[388]

Dr. Keh proved cooperative when talking with American directors of the stations, Major Victor E. Schember and Lt. Commander Olive R. Austin, but these two soon discovered that Keh's compliance took lip form only, that Keh did not carry out their directions, did not run the station efficiently nor make an effort to do so, and that in addition he was involved in black market activities.[389] Austin and Schember were at first reprimanded by Lt. Col. Dewitt Jones, the American director of the production bureau for not achieving results at the stations, but when the two American directors obtained proof of Keh's

extra-legal activities, Col. Jones accompanied them to the office of Lee Hoon Koo in order to secure Keh's dismissal. Confronted with Austin's and Schember's verbal report and written proof of Keh's incompetence and dishonesty, Lee Hoon Koo still protested the dismissal, and only when the American officers threatened to eject Keh bodily from the station and to bring criminal charges against him, did Lee consent to his removal and Kim Ho Jik's appointment.[390]

Lee's grudge against Yun Tai Chun apparently expanded to include all Suwon Agricultural College graduates, for he consistently refused, despite the extreme scarcity of qualified agricultural personnel, to allow any graduates of the college to be appointed within the national department of agriculture in Seoul. Only exception to this "closed shop" policy was an employee within the Bureau of Forestry who had been on the job before Lee Hoon Koo's appointment as head of the department.[391]

Kim Ho Jik's being installed without Lee's approval, coupled with his being a graduate of the

black-listed college, as well as an outstanding member of the Agricultural Society, apparently prejudiced Lee Hoon Koo against him, for throughout Kim's tenure, Lee Hoon Koo remained uncooperative, and against the advice and recommendations of three successive American directors, plus Kim Ho Jik, refused to allow the dismissal of another of Lee's friends, one Ham Gai Chun, head of the General Affairs Section at the Central Agricultural Experiment Station. In regard to Ham's being retained at the station, Lee Hoon Koo stated: "I think it wise to have an employee at the stations who is antagonistic to the director so that I may obtain an unbiased report of his activities."[392]

Ham was first branded incompetent by 1st Lt. Harold V. Loden, while the lieutenant was director of the experiment stations. He stated: "Ham has no administrative ability...his dismissal is a job that must be done."[393] Ham was ordered to transfer to the Mokpo station as acting director, but after consultation with Lee Hoon Koo, refused to obey. The American and Korean directors then attempted to transfer Ham to the national Department of Agriculture with the Bureau of Fisheries, but Lee Hoon Koo blocked

this action. In spring and summer of 1947, with Ham's full knowledge, two employees in his department misappropriated station funds, and misused station property for their private profit. Ham did nothing to halt these activities, and did not inform Kim Ho Jik of their existence until just before the police stepped in and jailed the two station employees. Ham was then asked to resign, and agreed, but later refused to comply.[394] A letter was then sent by the American Advisor through channels to Lee Hoon Koo, setting forth the reasons why Ham should be dismissed.[395] The following day, Lee Hoon Koo sent three of his auditors to the station to examine the books, and two days later, Kim Ho Jik was called to Seoul to answer a trumped-up charge concerning the acquisition of some light bulbs and sickles, secured through Kim's efforts for the station. It was clearly proved that Kim Ho Jik had acted in the best interests of the station and had not handled any money during the transaction, much less pocketing an illegal profit.[396]

That same week (July 1947) the American advisor, Department of Agriculture, held a consultation with his Korean counterpart, Lee Hoon Koo, after which Lee agreed to Ham's removal, though he insisted that Ham

be allowed to resign so his Korean Civil Service status would be unmarred by a dismissal.

Other vexing problems confronting experiment station advisors were the lack of adequately trained technical personnel, and the low position to which the experiment stations had been delegated in the Military Government table of organization. As previously noted, under the Japanese, the director of the Central and Branch agricultural experiment stations enjoyed considerable autonomy, being entirely independent of the Department of Agriculture. Under the United States Military Government, the stations were assigned to the Department of Agriculture, within the Agricultural Production Bureau, and on a section level, with appropriate ratings for all personnel employed throughout the system. According to the American Advisor, the functions of the extensive experiment station system did not cease with bureau boundaries but, "it is the primary mission of the experiment stations...to coordinate and cooperate with <u>all</u> bureaus of the Department of Agriculture in

obtaining the ultimate goal...the securing and dissemination of relevant information."[397]

With 13 central and branch stations under his jurisdiction, the Korean director directly supervised 618 technicians, plus millions of yen in property, scientific equipment and lands. As the American Advisor put it: "I have had any number of men, well educated in agricultural research, tell me that they could not work for the experiment station because it is just on a section level."[398] Yet being delegated to the level of a section head, he experienced great difficulty in securing and retaining qualified men to staff the stations.

With living costs mounting daily, and with governmental salaries fixed at purely nominal figures, the few qualified agricultural men in South Korea more often than not elected to accept private jobs paying a living wage, rather than work in a subordinate organization where they received neither the money nor the prestige normally attendant upon such positions. When the American advisor brought this problem to the attention of the American and Korean directors of the Department of Agriculture, the Korean head of the Agricultural Production Bureau

commented: "I agree with him...It is a matter of time when it can be realized."[399] A step in the right direction subsequently was taken when the newly revised Department of Agriculture table of organization, effective in the summer of 1947, gave bureau status to the experiment station system.[400]

Another difficult problem was the attitude of the Koreans. It is interesting to note that at the time of liberation, when the first American director visited the Central Agricultural Experiment Station at Suwon, the attitude of the Korean experiment station employees was suspicious and resentful while two years later, in August 1947, this frame of mind had reversed itself and Americans were welcomed, their advice being sought and taken by Koreans at all stations.[401]

On 24 November 1945 a log kept by the American directors at the Suwon station at that time stated: "It appears that members of the station, both staff and laborers, are not interested in their duties, and in most cases are doing very little work or none at all. Dr. Keh's [Korean director] excuse for this condition is that this is more unstable period; employees not fully paid, need

some time to make things stable, perhaps 5 months indeed'." On 30 November it was recorded: "One man trying to live and work with a band of Koreans, none of whom speak English, finds himself in a most trying and difficult situation for more causes than the paramount one of a common means of communication. He is a lone alien among an unfriendly, untrustworthy, scheming peoples who do nothing to help his work, and who thwart his every effort in their own behalf by passive resistance and purposeful misunderstanding." On 10 December: "Koreans showed up for work at their usual 1000," and on 13 December, "Lengthy discussion regarding the ranking of Mr. Park Seung Man..not able to judge his ability as an agronomist, having not seen him do a stroke of work...and find his manner and personality obnoxious...the agronomy rooms are a filthy mess, though no worse than most other departments." On 17 December, "When asked why buildings are in such a mess, /Hem/ replied 'he did not have direct orders from Dr. Keh'...Mr. Park Seung Man...had not put his employees to work due to lack of orders from Dr. Keh."

On 18 December, payday: "The crowd looked indifferent and sullen...as the names were called the

first two or three (high ranking ones) took their envelopes and signed the pay roll. All the rest took the envelopes, read the outside, threw the envelopes onto the table with mutterings and walked back into the crowd without signing. The crowd appeared angry. When we asked Dr. Keh what was the matter he looked frightened and there was much chatter in the room...to our repeated requests he gave no answer." This occurrence was the outcome of agitation by a Self-Help committee, headed by Park Seung Man, who agitated for higher pay. The strike was finally settled without a raise in salary. During the period 24 December 1945 to 10 January 1946 "a riot broke out on station with several people injured. Several people were placed in jail." On 16 January "made a general inspection of the station. Staff and employees gradually becoming more interested in work...general improvement now noted in cleanliness," and on 21 February: "general inspection...shows progress being made in getting the place cleaned up.." The following day..." found progress in cleaning up with much to be done, very little sign of constructive work going on except in insect and livestock departments. None of the suggestions on the green houses has been started...very little started

on the pruning of trees which need it so badly." Loden commented: "it may be said that these men [Austin and Schembey] did all in their power, working under extreme handicap, to keep the station in as good shape as possible."[402]

After Loden's appointment as director, conditions continued to improve and he commented: "Mr. Kim Ho Jik has the confidence of the station staff, and employees and it is believed that he is the best qualified man available for this position."[403] It is noted that the American director in May 1947 commented that the station Korean employees were much more receptive to American advice in 1947 than in 1945 due largely to the influence of Mr. Kim who "had taken the position that Americans were in Korea to help the Korean people," and insisted that his employees cooperate fully with the American advisors. He explained the former lack of cooperation during early days by commenting that the Koreans had not been sure just why Americans were assigned to the station, adding that Dr. Keh had been too immersed in his own activities to pay attention to station welfare and the Americans assigned there.[404]

In July 1946, when Lt. Loden was replaced by Capt. N.Y. Chung as director, the former commented that "there is a general undertone of dislike to any supervision given...there is a general feeling of resentment. A person is made to feel that he is an intruder and had the feeling of being carefully watched at all times as though he were suspected of being a thief..." He further advised his successor that, "the best way to overcome this...is to pay no attention to it and when orders are given expect full compliance...do not ever relax in any detail...The Korean attitude...is summed up..'Korea is now free and independent, therefore I am free and independent, therefore I do not have to take orders from anybody.'..The Koreans take their independence as far as failure to do their work if they do not want to and resent very much any one telling them to do it."[405]

Despite this gloomy description of Loden's relations with Koreans the general attitude was changing gradually toward amiability with Americans. The American director, Ford M. Milam, remarked when he returned to Suwon in September 1946, "The attitude at the...station was exactly the reverse of what I anticipated, being

both cordial and friendly. I could not understand the reason for this welcome...but...it continued." By August 1947 the Koreans had accepted Americans to the extent that during the last part of July they requested the American advisor to secure an American plant pathologist for the station, an unprecedented action and one that augured a continuance of the new policy of cooperation.[406]

B. Agricultural Education: -On 2 November 1945, Capt. Ford M. Milam was assigned to the Department of Education as head of Agricultural Education in South Korea, and at his request an Agricultural Education Training Branch was established in the Department on 20 October 1945. Among his first activities were to review the available Japanese information and to compile data on the number, type and location of agricultural schools in South Korea.

Until April 1945, Korea had two agricultural colleges. The Suwon Agricultural College, established in 1904, was still functioning in 1945 as the center of higher agricultural training in Korea and was reopened by Military Government on 1 October 1945 after a short period of inactivity which came as a result of the current

confusion following the surrender. The other, the Taegu Agricultural College, was opened in 1943 by the Japanese in a former agricultural middle school, and closed in April 1945, because of a shortage of teachers and students.

In January 1946 a group of citizens presented themselves at Capt. Milam's office in Seoul and petitioned to have the Taegu College reopened. The idea was favorably received by the Department of Education, and the captain was ordered to Taegu to make a complete inspection of facilities, equipment, and source of students. He obtained, through the provincial Military Governor of Kyong Sang Pukto, a former Japanese middle school whose buildings could be used as a site for the college. All arrangements for faculty, budget, moving of equipment, student qualifications, and curriculum were worked out during February and March 1946, and the college was opened in Taegu at the end of March, admitting 150 male middle school graduates.

The 1st Infantry Regiment, a contingent of United States troops, had been quartered in this school before permission was secured to utilize it as a college, and Captain Milam had obtained authority from the Military

Governor to use the institution when it was vacated. However, on the day that the equipment was to be moved into the building, the provincial head of the Bureau of Education went to the Korean in charge of moving with the information that since the local equivalent to the American Parent Teachers Association had petitioned him to use the school as a middle school, the Military Government officer could go elsewhere in his search for a college site. Following this announcement, the college students, who had already assembled in Taegu ready to begin classes, went on strike, and there was much confusion and occasional fisticuffs. A group of ten students went to Captain Milam with ten letters, written in their own blood, expressing their eagerness to study for "the new Korea." Captain Milam again went to the Military Governor, reaffirmed his original permission for use of the school, and proceeded successfully with plans to open the college in March.

Suwon Agricultural College:-The Suwon Agricultural College comprised 11 buildings used as dormitories and class rooms; employed 7 professors and 20 assistant professors, furnished living quarters for all 27; accommodated from

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Suwon Agricultural College:-The Suwon Agricultural College comprised 11 buildings used as dormitories and class rooms; employed 7 professors and 20 assistant professors, furnished living quarters for all 27; accommodated from

two to three hundred students each year; offered a three-year course until 1946, when the first four-year students were enrolled; granted degrees in animal husbandry, forestry, agricultural chemistry, agricultural engineering, and general agriculture; offered courses in plant pathology but awarded no degree in this subject. Formerly the college was operated directly under the Department of Education in Seoul, and the director of the Suwon Central Agricultural Experiment Station was also dean of the college, but under American Military Government, a separate dean was appointed, and the station and the college were entirely separated.

In July 1946 the Seoul University was changed to the Seoul National University, including all national public colleges except the Taegu Agricultural College and a few normal colleges. The Suwon College of Agriculture and Forestry became a part of the Seoul National University under this organization. In the fall and winter of 1946 and 1947, students of the Seoul National University, including the Suwon Agricultural College, and most of the middle schools throughout South

Korea, went on a lengthy and costly strike against the Seoul National University system, claiming that the restrictions imposed by the system prevented the individual colleges and their students from enjoying as much freedom and as wide a scope as formerly. This activity was conducted on a national basis, and petitions submitted by the strikers were identically worded throughout the provinces and Cheju-Do, but the Seoul National University remained as set up by USAMGIK Ordinance 102, 22 August 1946.

In South Korea, the Japanese had 68 middle schools devoted exclusively to agriculture; 40 four-year boys schools, 20 one-to-three year boys schools, and eight one-to-three year girls schools. The curriculum in the four-year schools was divided into six parts, or subjects, among which the student chose to major after his first year: general agriculture, animal husbandry, agricultural engineering, forestry, agricultural chemistry, and sericulture. These students were used by the Japanese as minor officials in their government, and the ages of the students were restricted to boys from 12 to 17 years old. The one-to-three year schools were smaller and

concerned entirely with practical agriculture rather than academic and technical study. Girls' schools were also conducted along this practical line and with the same age limits. All boys' schools included physical and military training, sometimes as much as 3 hours a day, and it was the opinion of the Military Government Department of Education that the schools had been utilized by the Japanese as training grounds for government officials and military personnel. The greatest objection to this system was that children born in a certain village were required to attend the school assigned to that village, regardless of their preferences in the matter.

In October 1945, after the setting up of the Agricultural Education Training Branch, in the Department of Education, Captain Milam was instrumental in the establishment of an Agricultural Education Advisory Board, which consisted of 12 Korean members, including the dean of the Suwon Agriculture College, the mayor of Suwon, director of the South Korea experiment stations, head of the national Livestock Section, Korean head of the Agricultural Education Training Branch, several

businessmen who were leaders in agriculture, and two outstanding Korean farmers. The purpose was to meet regularly and discuss problems relating to Agricultural Education in South Korea. Among the activities of the Agricultural Education Training Branch were the revising of the curricula of all schools, eliminating all military and much physical and highly specialized training, adding subjects such as Korean history and grammar, which were prohibited by the Japanese. The one-to-three year middle schools were closed since there were insufficient funds and personnel to adequately maintain them.

On 10 January 1946, the agricultural schools were combined with technical schools under the Vocational Training Branch, placed by the Department of Education in the Bureau of Secondary Schools, and the Agricultural Education Training Branch went out of existence.

The main problems faced by agricultural education in South Korea were: lack of transportation, shortage of qualified teachers, badly needed repair for all school buildings, complete absence of agricultural textbooks, and a shortage of school supplies, laboratory equipment and chemicals. In addition, because of the

billeting of American troops in school buildings, much classroom furniture and equipment had been destroyed.[407]

C. Extension:-Agricultural extension may be defined for our purpose as: the dissemination of useful information to farmers which will enable them to increase their agricultural yields. In South Korea, prior to August 1947, there was no central extension service, and scattered activities along this line were conducted by various military government agencies, which were entirely uncorrelated with each other and which reached only a small fraction of the South Korean farming population. Principal among these agencies were: the Farmer's Weekly, a newspaper published each week; the Korean Agricultural Association, which included all farmers of South Korea; the New Korea Company, which controlled all formerly Japanese owned farms and farming lands; and the Central Agricultural Experiment Station at Suwon.

In August the American Advisor for the South Korea Experiment Stations proposed a plan for a national

extension service, and on 4 August 1947 he was appointed chairman of the committee to investigate the possibility of instituting such a plan and to take steps toward establishing it.

1. Farmer's Weekly:-A constant deterrent to the American Military Government was the difficulty of communicating with many scattered farmers throughout the southern provinces. Few Koreans owned radios. Mail systems were disrupted. Word of mouth communication was at best exaggerated, unreliable and distorted. Yet a means of making known to the farmer important announcements, ordinances and regulations, new and useful farming methods, etc. was vital, and it was in part answered by the appearance on 22 December 1945 of a periodical known as The Farmer's Weekly, whose purpose was "to bring information to the farmers of Korea."

Editor of this paper, which was a four-page, doublespaced, tabloid sized sheet, was Augustus J. Theodore, an army captain, who from its first issue

in December 1945 through June 1947 piloted the paper's progress, with the help of his Korean staff. During his editorship (he was succeeded in June 1947 by Miss Ada Leeke) more than 70 issues of the Weekly aided Military Government by bringing to the farmer's attention such matters as the rice collection; the need for preserving herds of dairy cattle; the activities and personnel of the Interim Legislative Assembly; and all other important local issues; as well as conducting a continuous campaign of agricultural education via weekly articles on such subjects as Animal Husbandry, Poultry Raising, Care of Dairy Cattle, and encouraging the study of Korean by publishing in each edition excerpts from scarce language textbooks which, when saved and combined, formed a complete Korean grammar.

In make-up the paper used page one for "helpfully significant" world items, playing up news articles which pertained to Korea and giving emphasis to all speeches by internationally prominent figures which concerned Korea and her welfare. Page two was devoted generally to one or two news items and many feature articles illustrating the workings of democracy. Page three was

the occupational page. Here appeared all articles such as when to plant and harvest potatoes, how to make good hay and fertilizer, and why a goat instead of a cow is more practical for small farms. A feature of this page was the weekly appearance of Kim Chum Ji, or Grandfather Kim, who each week made a "homey" appeal to the farmer on some specific issue, such as forest conservation, surrendering of rice to Military Government officials, and inordinate slaughtering of work and dairy cattle for meat.

Page four was the family page. Here Korean children and their parents followed the adventures of mythical Korean youngsters who were "Seeking Happiness" (title of comic strip). At the bottom of the page, "The Mischievous Bears", two active little cubs, got into and out of scrapes much like the Katzenjammer kids, and incidentally sneaked in bits of propaganda, as when they observed a Korean chopping down trees during the forest conservation drive. "That man is cutting down a tree, which is bad, so we shall play a trick on him," they agreed, then proceeded with their adventures, the sugar-coated pill having been painlessly administered. Both the story and the comic strip were written and illus-

trated by members of the Korean staff.

During the first weeks of its publication, said Mr. Theodore (who was released from the army in Korea and remained on the job as a civilian), distribution of 800,000 copies of the Weekly was effected by allocating bundles marked for each village to the Provincial Public Information offices, who made further distribution to Gun (county) and Myun (district) heads, who in turn passed the papers out to household heads under their jurisdiction. Due to the 1946-47 paper shortage, only 300,000 copies of the paper were printed, these being mailed directly to individual farmers and given to school children to take home to their parents. In addition to distribution in Korea, copies of the Weekly were sent to the U. S. Department of Agriculture in Washington, D.C., to the Korean Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles, and to various American universities.

The question of illiteracy as a deterrent to the effectiveness of the paper was "pooh-poohed" by Mr. Theodore, who brought out the facts that all Korean men, having little or no night life in the small

villages, gathered and discussed their problems, at the same time passing on what information they had gleaned during the day, including contents of The Farmer's Weekly. Also Koreans had so little reading material that they seized eagerly on any printed matter, reading what they could and going to more learned friends for translations of the remainder. "You give the farmer the paper, and he'll read it," stated Mr. Theodore positively.

The two major campaigns conducted continuously by the Farmer's Weekly aimed at universal woman suffrage, and at election of all representatives of the Interim Legislative Assembly, instead of the 50 percent elected-50 percent appointed system which existed at the time.[408]

2. KAA:-By far the most important agricultural organization in Korea both during the occupation by American troops and for a period long before, was the Korea Agricultural Association, known commonly as the KAA. In addition to bringing timely advice to farmers regarding production and harvesting, KAA also actually delivered to farmers necessary seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, tools,

machinery and other farm supplies at the lowest possible cost. Membership in the organization included practically all farmers in South Korea. Its duties were to extend to all farming sections, through its branch offices in provinces, counties and townships, the services and policies planned by the Department of Agriculture for improving farming conditions and increasing production of foods and fiber. Actually, KAA was the only operating agency of the Department of Agriculture that had direct contact with farmers. Combined value of farm supplies and consumer goods procured and distributed by the Korea Agricultural Association in 1946 was 693,681,396 yen. Its services to farmers were rendered on a non-profit basis, thus making available to them the things they need at lowest possible cost. In many respects the KAA was a cooperative organization, giving farmers of South Korea the buying and selling advantages to be obtained only through the bargaining power of a single association handling a large volume. Following Korea's liberation, KAA underwent a period of reconstruction, and was reorganized from a state of chaos following the defeat of Japan. As a result it was changed from a dictatorial institution,

whose ultimate purpose was to provide more foodstuffs for Japan, into an association "based strictly on democratic principles."

The origin of the KAA dated back to 1906. First called the Korea Central Agricultural Association, it was founded at Suwon with 2,000 members and the original purpose of assisting farmer members and improving their social conditions. During its early years the organization thrived and was held in high esteem by farmers generally. Membership increased and the organization's administrative expenditures were paid out of annual membership fees.

KAA Under Japanese Rule

After the Japanese became dominant in Korea (1910) the KAA ceased to be strictly an organization for the interests of Korean farmers; farmers became dissatisfied with the Japanese management, and membership dwindled. Japanese officials of the association found it extremely difficult to collect membership fees since farmers rebelled against the domineering methods then used. Sharply

decreased membership and lack of funds with which to carry out the association's activities resulted; consequently, the Japanese government put into effect an ordinance requiring farmers to become members of the association and collected their annual fees in the land taxation program. Evidence that Japan forced the KAA to function for Japanese interests exclusively is present in the rules and regulations of Ordinance No. 1, 1926, under which the association was reorganized by the Japanese into a powerful instrument for regimenting farmers. While its purpose in general still was to develop and improve agriculture in Korea, the plan for accomplishing this purpose was carefully designed to increase production of food and fiber for the benefit of the ruling power at the cost of Korean labor. Some of the details of the plan under this regime were: "It shall...embrace the entire area of Korea...In case of war, it shall assist the government to collect agricultural products and settle agricultural labor disputes...In war it shall become absolute controller of agriculture in cooperation with the government."

In the March 10, 1926 issue of the KAA Gazette, its Japanese editor and directing manager, Mr. Adachi

said: "Frankly speaking, this revived KAA under Ord. No. 1 is dictatorial, as can be seen by the selection of staff members who are the chief of civil administration, the province governors, director of Internal Affairs Department, and gun governors. The true aim of the KAA is cooperation and harmony between the government and the farmers. KAA should be an organization to give protection to the happiness and welfare of its members. I feel very sorry because of the dictatorial manner in which KAA is operating, but the present Korean situation forced it to be so administrated."

The Japanese Governor General of Korea appointed the governing body of the Korea Agricultural Association by selecting its president and vice-president. Counsellors were elected by members of the association, but were accepted only upon the approval of the Governor General. Special counsellors, constituting one-third of the common counsellors, were appointed by the Government Administrative Office. Minimum production was a factor limiting membership in the association. A renter who farmed 900 pyung

(1 pyung = 36 square feet) or more, or a land owner who produced at least one or more cases of cocoon worms, were eligible for membership. Members were required to be actually engaged in farming, but if the provincial governor did not approve of certain farmers, their membership could be cancelled by his order. During the Japanese regime, KAA was thus under complete control of the government; it was required to answer to any governmental request and to make regular, complete reports. Since KAA controlled agricultural production completely it was thus entitled to receive government subsidies.

KAA Under American Military Government

During the first year following Korea's liberation, the KAA was gradually reconstructed; many of the good features of its former organization were maintained, such as its educational and training services, and its program for purchasing and distributing farm supplies to farmers on an actual cost basis. A year elapsed before definite plans for a "strictly democratic" organization had been approved and completed. In lieu of the imperialistic control of agriculture under the Japanese rule, the KAA's

set-up gave farmers or Korea a voice in the administration of agricultural affairs through the privilege of selecting their officers by ballot at the township and village levels. It provided a close contact with farmers; facilitated training farmers for community leadership; encouraged improved farming methods; fostered cooperative enterprises for association members; and assisted in solving other problems of Korean rural life.

KAA representatives in the myun and gun (township and county) levels assisted in many phases of the work carried on by the Department of Agriculture, such as rice collection, fertilizer and farm machinery distribution, and dissemination of agricultural information, and were in a position to render service in the collection of data relating to crop and livestock production estimates. Primarily the purpose of KAA under the United States Military Government was to assist in more economical food production by extending educational services to farmers; aiding farmers in securing livestock, farm machinery and necessary farm tools at a minimum of cost; processing and distributing fertilizers obtained locally or from foreign countries, or preparing them for further

processing in KAA mixing plants; encouraging the use of improved seed varieties, and controlling plant diseases and pests through the use of insecticides and fungicides. KAA was active in the purchase and sale of livestock, and assumed control of the Chosen Livestock Company, a Japanese organization which was in charge of livestock breeding and exporting.

Organization of KAA

On the national level, KAA was divided into three departments; General Affairs, Agricultural Enterprises, and Educational and Training. Its management was vested in a staff consisting of president, vice-president, and employees, was organized on the province level, and similarly the association's authority was channeled through the guns and myuns. Through this extensive web of organization, it was made possible for the Department of Agriculture to assist every farmer in South Korea.

The General Affairs Department dealt with supervision of employees and personnel matters, the budget, planning, investigations, statistics, bookkeeping

and accounting, inspection of contracts and goods contracted. Activities of the Agricultural Enterprise Department of the KAA included the purchase and distribution of essential farm items on an actual cost basis plus handling charges, as well as administration of warehouses and fertilizer plants.

To illustrate the manner in which the organization effected great savings to farmers through the bargaining power of handling large volume, the procurement of threshing machines during 1946 may be cited. The price for threshing machines on the open market exceded 3,200 yen; KAA made contracts with factories for a definite number of these machines at a substantially reduced price and delivered them to provinces at an average cost of 2,300 yen per unit, resulting in a savings of 25 percent or more to farmers. Another example of economic benefits was illustrated in the purchase of a large quantity of rice transplanting rope at a net saving of 2,500,000 yen. During the 1946 summer grain collection, KAA delivered to the provinces, under the consumer goods incentive plan, commodities with a total value of ¥ 6,965,423. In addition to these, KAA also purchased and resold at cost

such goods as soap, shoes, matches, underwear, salt, lamps, nails, dust pans, cotton seed, and blankets, with a total value of ₩42,562,301 in 1946 alone.

Fertilizer

The increasing need for fertilizer, concomitant with a limited supply, was a major problem in Korean agriculture. Centuries of double-cropping and intensive farming without adequate fertilization had so depleted the soil of plant nutrition that crop yields decreased even though climatic conditions were favorable for increased returns. During the last quarter of 1946 administrative officials responsible for Korean agriculture "became fertilizer-conscious" for amounts of fertilizer available from other Asiatic countries were far below the requirements of the South Korean farmers. During this period the United States made allocations to Korea of considerable quantities of ammonium nitrate, which, in addition to the ground phosphate rock and potash also allocated to Korea for 1947 crops, increased the value of imported fertilizer to

several billion yen. KAA was officially designated as the sole agency of Military Government for the distribution and sale of commercial fertilizer in South Korea, and the fertilizer section of this agency became one of the chief sub-divisions of the organization. The amount of fertilizer handled by KAA up to November 1946 was a drop in the bucket compared with actual needs; however, during the latter months of 1946, imports from the United States increased tremendously and the organization found itself facing one of the biggest distribution projects of its existence. As of 31 December 1946 Korean ports had received a total of 56,348 tons (metric) of ammonium nitrate and 8,825 tons of potassium sulphate. This fertilizer, chiefly ammonium nitrate, was packed in moisture-proof bags and was shipped by rail and boat to the various provinces according to allocations based on cultivated acreages in the provinces.

At a meeting of the National Economic Board on 20 November 1946, it was announced that farmers would be charged for the fertilizer at prices based on the price of rice. Final figures were: 12 yen per pound for nitrogen plus two large, new straw bags

for each bag of nitrogen bearing fertilizer; 11 yen per pound for potassium sulphate plus two new straw bags for each bag of potash fertilizer; and 10 yen per pound for phosphoric acid plus two new straw bags for each bag of phosphate fertilizer. The sale of this fertilizer at such low prices was made contingent upon the procurement of straw bags in an effort to stimulate the production of bags necessary for handling the 1947 crops. Also, the sale of fertilizer was closely linked with the rice collection program through priorities given farmers to buy fertilizer provided they had turned in their quotas of rice. The approximate value of all ammonium nitrate and potassium sulphate allocated up to the end of the year was 604,014,250 yen. Instructions for the sale and distribution of fertilizer were relayed to gun and myun leaders by province KAA fertilizer chiefs following a two-day meeting at the national headquarters in Seoul. All available methods of transportation, including ships, railroads, motor trucks, ox carts and push carts, were used to transport the product to the farmers.

Farm Tools, Insecticides & Fungicides

The need for farm tools and machinery was general throughout all farming areas of South Korea, and the KAA made it a definite part of its service program to procure and deliver to provinces numerous items in this category.

Lack of information regarding the use and advantage of insecticides and fungicides for controlling diseases and parasites was the chief reason why farmers were slow in utilizing them. Since the reorganization of the KAA, farmers have been informed regarding the different sprays to combat various diseases, and the demand for fungicides and insecticides exceeded the supply during the summer of 1946, with KAA active in purchasing and distributing the available chemicals.

Another important project of the KAA during the growing season of 1946 was the purchase and distribution to farmers at cost of large quantities of vegetable and other seeds, and a total of 5,900 bushels of vegetable and potato seeds were bought and distributed, coming to a total value of ₩ 1,620,093.

Many warehouses, owned by KAA, were operated by provincial and county units, being used for storing grains, seeds, farm tools, fertilizer and chemicals, in addition to serving as collection points for farm products. In total, there were in South Korea 892 KAA warehouses, covering an area of 72,369 pyung of land, (1 pyung = 36 square feet) having a storage capacity of 2,797,398 bags.

Educational and Training Department

In 1946, the KAA Educational and Training Department conducted an agricultural extension service similar to that provided by agricultural colleges in the United States. Educational meetings, lectures, demonstrations and moving pictures were provided to many farming communities in all provinces. Short courses in agriculture were held during 1946, covering many subjects including farm chemicals and their uses in control of plant diseases and pests; fertilizers and their proper application for particular crops;

livestock production and breeding, and farm management. These classes were attended by groups of KAA representatives from provinces, guns and myuns, and were held in centrally located schools and colleges by KAA officials. During 1946 a total of 14,640 Koreans attended 29 lectures, 10 instruction classes, and 8 meetings where moving pictures were shown.

Livestock and crop information was contributed each week to the Farmer's Weekly, including a complete series of articles on poultry, swine, goats, rabbits and animal breeding presented in simple question and answer style. Also weekly radio talks were prepared and given by the head of the Educational and Training Department, and as 1946 drew to a close, 10,000 farmer's handbooks went to press for later distribution.

Farm Life Exhibition

An exhibition of Korean rural industrial arts and farming methods, sponsored and conducted by KAA, was held in the Royal Pavilion behind the Capitol

Building in April 1946, primarily for the purpose of acquainting American military personnel with Korean farm life. Demonstrations of manufacturing methods used in making straw mats, baskets, sandals and bags were among the thirty exhibits, which also included the threshing of rice over a log and by machine; making of straw rope by hand and by machine; hulling rice by wooden machine and foot pounds, and methods of using various farm implements. A total of 42 Korean farmers from Kwangju myun, Kyonggi-do, assisted in this project by setting up a typical farm village where they carried out the demonstrations.

Manure, Potato, Hemp Projects

Other projects conducted by the KAA during 1946 were the Green Manure Competitive Exhibition, and the Potato Contest. These were conducted to stimulate interest in better production and cultivation methods. A total of 10,000 yen was awarded in prizes for the greatest yield of potatoes, the first prize for Irish potato production going to a Kyonggi-do farmer whose

yield per 75 acres was 8,788 pounds. First prize for sweet potato production went to a Kangwon-do farmer whose yield per 300 pyung was 1,755.9 kwan.*

KAA Motor Pool

A motor pool was established by KAA during the latter part of 1946 for the purpose of concentrating vehicles in a protected area where they could be given proper maintenance and servicing. The pool was located near National KAA headquarters, in Seoul and an extensive lot was levelled and an office and supply building erected. Motor trucks in this pool were used for Department of Agriculture activities and for transporting materials which otherwise could not be distributed, while in emergencies, trucks were dispatched to points in South Korea where they were most needed. 409

3. New Korea Company. The New Korea Company operated nearly 600,000 farm units, most of which were under Japanese management prior to 1945. Many of the Korean tenants were capable farmers, but were operating without the close supervision to which they had been accustomed,

* 1 kwan = 8.27 pounds.

and were in need of both expert help and advice. Since it was part of the New Korea Company's duty to aid in obtaining maximum yields from the former Japanese property under its supervision, a program of agricultural extension was necessary which would make available to farmers all useful information which would assist them in securing greater agricultural yields from their farms. There were few American agricultural specialists assigned to the company, and such American personnel as did work therein were forced to limit their work to mainly administrative duties. As in all other phases of Korean occupation, Koreans themselves did not have the training necessary to qualify them for adequate extension work.

The shortage of rice which had existed since the first days of the occupation made it even more imperative that farmers be kept up-to-date on latest methods of cultivation, while by double cropping with small grains after the rice had been harvested, two crops could be gleaned from one field. Widespread ignorance of orchard management was cutting down fruit yields, which could be increased in some cases as much as three or four times simply by wider spacing of trees,

less severe pruning, and less thinning of fruits.

In a report dated 23 May 1947, and entitled "New Korea Company Extension Plans", the New Korea Company military agricultural advisor recommended that about 20 employees of each provincial New Korea Company branch be assigned exclusively to extension work, which would allow about one full-time extension worker to every 5,000 New Korea Company tenants. In order to train these men, the advisor and his assistant at the Central Suwon Agricultural Experiment Station had volunteered to conduct training courses for NKC technicians, utilizing funds provided by the NKC and American agricultural specialists from the station and the National Department of Agriculture. At the termination of these classes, the extension workers would then conduct short courses throughout South Korea for farmers and agricultural workers.

In emphasizing the importance of agricultural extension, the advisor pointed out that Korea is and probably always will be predominantly an agricultural country, and that the only means of increasing agricultural yields significantly will come through a

government sponsored program. "In my opinion, no American expenditure in Korea will have a more lasting effect than a well conducted program of practical education in improvement of agriculture and conservation of its natural resources," he concluded.

In keeping with this proposed plan for extension, the New Korea Company secured and gave to the Central Experiment Station for use in the program the sum of ¥ 2,500,000 ~~yen~~. The first three-day training course under this program was held from 21 to 24 April 1946, for the New Korea Company horticulture technicians; the second on 12 to 14 May, which was devoted to the subject of rice production.[410] The sequel to this beginning was found in a 10 May 1946 MG press release, which announced the opening of an agriculture school near Seoul, staffed by NKC technicians, who would instruct students from the provinces in both rice production, and the raising of vegetables, barley, and other crops.

Hub of Agricultural Extension was the Central Agricultural Experiment Station, which on 11 July 1947 reported that a training course for its

personnel had been instituted on 5 May, offering instruction in English (conversation, reading, grammar and composition), Korean, algebra, trigonometry, chemistry, physics, zoology, geology, botany, and sociology, to which were later added soils, corps, genetics, animal husbandry, agricultural engineering, economics, farm management, food processing, plant breeding, sericulture, and experimental design. Students met from 17 to 19 hours weekly, and the proposed course was to extend for three years. Instructors were obtained from station employees who were university graduates, professors from the Suwon College of Agriculture and Forestry, and American advisors from the national Department of Agriculture in Seoul.[411]

On 17 July 1947 the American advisor for the South Korea Central and Branch Agricultural Experiment Stations submitted a plan for an Agricultural Extension Service to be conducted in South Korea through the coordination of the experiment stations, the agricultural college, and the national Department of Agriculture.

According to this report, there never had been an extension service in Korea as known in the United States, and what few activities did exist were conducted by the KAA, NKC, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, experiment stations, and other agencies who for the most part operated independently. Under the Japanese, the Suwon College of Agriculture and Forestry and the experiment stations had been closely connected, and in order to institute an adequate extension service, the unification of these two institutions was imperative. It was suggested that they work together under a Director of Agricultural Education and Research to be known as DAER. In this way personnel from the college, and the stations, would be available for extension work, as would be qualified personnel from KAA, NKC, and other agricultural agencies. The report recommended that the experiment stations and the agricultural college be unified under DAER; that a competent director of extension be appointed to work under DAER; that maximum use of qualified personnel from KAA, NKC and other government agencies be made; that maximum use of information be made from the

experiment stations, and college; and that funds be made available to DAER for the publication of extension information.

IV. Land

A. Irrigation and Reclamation

One of the most important functions of the USAMGIK Department of Agriculture, was the supervision of activities having to do with land reclamation and irrigation. With a restricted amount of land at her disposal, more than two-thirds of which were covered with forest, Korea, an agricultural nation for the entire four thousand years of her existence, had cultivated her arable land intensively until its soil fertility dropped below that level necessary for the raising of adequate crops. In order to make maximum use of the land available, to reclaim land covered with water, and to irrigate paddy fields, which made up by far the greater proportion of cultivated land in Korea, the Irrigation and Reclamation Section was established in the Department of Agriculture,

Bureau of Agricultural Production.

Organization and Functions:-The Section had as its main duties: the planning, approval, supervision, and inspection of all land irrigation and reclamation projects of areas greater than 297.5 hectares* in South Korea; the investigation and approval for construction of all irrigation and reclamation projects which are handled by provincial governments, and for which government subsidies are granted; the supervision and guidance of the following agencies: Korean Land Development Company, Korean United Water Utilization Association Union, Provincial Branch Agencies of the section, Tidal Land Work, Water Utilization Associations and the Korean Relief Irrigation Union. 412

More specifically it received, investigated and recommended approval or disapproval of applications

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* The figure 297.5 hectares was carried over from Japanese government days, since all existing irrigation projects were established on the basis of this figure. All projects involving land areas less than 297.5 hectares were handled by provincial sections.

submitted by water utilization associations for the construction of irrigation and reclamation projects for areas greater than 297.5 hectares; and surveyed and prepared the necessary engineering plans for construction of the approved projects. Where the construction of large scale works was contemplated, after approval of projects, it submitted plans to the Korean Land Development Company, which was responsible for the engineering details, including specifications, materials, and estimated costs. This completed detailed plan was returned to the Irrigation and Reclamation Section for check and approval and recommended subsidy, and then forwarded to the Korean Land Development Company with the required authorization to begin construction. The section made frequent inspections of construction work on projects to insure required quality of work; audited cost records and allotted proportionate amounts of subsidy as required; made final inspection before accepting the project: assisted the Water Utilization Association in taking over the completed

projects; made frequent inspections of completed irrigation or reclamation projects to insure proper maintenance and operation; investigated requests from Provincial Governments for the construction of projects having areas less than 297.5 hectares and recommended approval when such constructions did not interfere with larger proposed or completed projects. It recommended subsidy allotments for such projects when they were approved; encouraged experimentation and recommended the use of all improved irrigation methods found to be worthwhile; made necessary surveys to maintain accurate records and adequate information needed on the water table and underground water supply of the country; gave advice on engineering technical matters when requested by other sections or sub-sections of the Department of Agriculture; maintained close liaison with other sections to insure close coordination of related works; checked and approved budgets of all relief water utilization associations; and finally checked and approved budgets or all associations of which government subsidy is granted for construction or improvement work.[413]

The Korean Land Development Company was a stock company organized by the Japanese and retained by Military Government for the purpose of constructing large scale irrigation projects in Korea. It made initial detailed plans for construction of a proposed project upon receipt of directions from the Department of Agriculture, then proceeds along lines set forth earlier in this section. The company also let contracts for construction to the lowest bidder and financed projects during their construction by borrowing from banks on short term loans and allocating government subsidies made directly to the company. The subsidy was paid, upon formal written request, at three to four months intervals in amounts proportionate to the percentage of work completed. Upon completion the project was inspected by the Land Reclamation and Irrigation Section and then turned over to the Water Utilization Association, which paid for the cost of construction, over and above the subsidy, through a long-term loan from a bank, negotiated and underwritten by the Korean United Water Utilization Association Union.[414]

The Korean United Water Utilization Association Union was the national organization of the individual water utilization associations. It constructed irrigation projects which were smaller than 297.5 hectares for its member associations, assisted member associations in the operation of projects, took necessary measures to stabilize the finance of members and negotiated necessary loans for operation; promoted culture and welfare of employees of member associations, and handled the repair, improvement and electrification of member projects. Upon request from members, the Union made preliminary surveys, plans, and cost estimates, and submitted them to the Association, thence to the provincial Land Reclamation and Irrigation Sections for approval. It then prepared detailed plans for the work, and submitted them to the Provincial Land Reclamation and Irrigation Sections for authorization, and for determination of a government subsidy. The Union next let contracts for the authorized projects and usually rented the equipment and furnished the materials used in the work. In general, the Union

financed the entire job until its completion, except for the government subsidy. At intervals of three to four months, on formal written request from the association, a portion of the government subsidy, proportionate in amount to the percentage of work completed, was forwarded to the association, and paid to the contractors by the association or to the Union as reimbursement for materials, financing, engineering, or other services rendered. When work was completed, a final inspection was made by the provincial Land Reclamation and Irrigation Sections, and final payment of subsidy was made in the same manner as described above. The Union then arranged for long term loans from a bank for the cost of the work, over and above the government subsidy, and in turn loaned these funds to the association. Arrangements were made for the repayment of this long term loan to be made directly to the bank by the association. The Union in effect acted as underwriter of the debt. In some instances where the associations credit was well established, this procedure was not followed and the association itself borrowed from the bank.[415]

Provincial Irrigation and Reclamation Sections carried on activities similar to those of the National Section, except that they handled projects of areas smaller than 297.5 hectares, and had jurisdiction only within their respective provinces. The functions of the Provincial Korean Water Utilization Association Unions also were similar to those of the national union except that they handled the smaller repair, improvements, construction projects, and electrification work by mutual agreement with the national union, based primarily upon the ability of the provincial union to handle the job. The provincial unions collected yearly assessments from each Water Utilization Association in the province and handled the cooperative purchase of materials and equipment needed by member associations, through the National Union. 416

Tidal Land Projects:-Tidal land work was the reclamation of government-owned, shallow inlet waters along the sea coast. Levees were constructed across the mouth of the inlet or around one or two sides of the area

involved and flood gates were installed. Salt water was released at low tide and was prevented from re-entering at high tide by the flood gates. The area was then converted to crop lands by leaching out the salts, leveling, and by filling-in with good soils. Irrigation facilities were then constructed, and the project was ready to function.

A tidal land project differed from regular land reclamation projects in that the land was government owned and was not released to the person performing the work until the work was completed. Because of this no landowner associations could be formed. To organize a tidal land project, a group of individuals or organizations recognized as a judicial person submitted a request to the Military Government of Korea for a license to begin construction. The Irrigation and Reclamation Section investigated the proposed project, and if it was found to be sound, a license was granted by the provincial governor, a government subsidy was fixed, and a time limit was set for completion of the reclamation work. However, a great majority of the

projects required several extensions of time before the work was finally completed. A license for construction of a tidal land project could be transferred to another individual with the consent of the Military Government of Korea. Upon completion of the project, the license-holder made a written request to be granted title to the land reclaimed. The Irrigation and Reclamation section then examined the project, and if it found the work satisfactorily done, recommended grant of title.

At the time of the Japanese surrender, there were nine tidal land projects under construction. No work was done on these after the surrender, due to their low priority in the section's construction program. In addition, since all were under control of Japanese nationals, no agency was delegated by Military Government to carry on the program.

The Irrigation and Reclamation Section requested that these projects be turned over to the Korean Water Utilization Association Union for management, accounting of funds, completion, and disposition of lands after completion, as directed by the Property Custodian or

other controlling agency of the National Government.[417]

Types of Irrigation Associations:-There were three types of associations: Water Utilization, Relief Irrigation, and Small-Scale Groups. Water Utilization Associations were members of the Korean Water Utilization Association Union and in 1947 they controlled 75 to 80 percent of all irrigated lands in all Korea. They formed the largest associations and were supervised by the National and Provincial Irrigation and Reclamation Sections, being organized in accordance with the Japanese "Ordinance, Rules and Regulations Governing Land Reclamation," dated c/a 1920. Relief Irrigation Associations were bankrupt irrigation associations requiring extensive governmental assistance. There were 35 such associations in Korea, 19 of which lay south of the 38th parallel. Small-Scale groups were made up of projects with areas of 20 to 99 hectares, or 49 to 245 acres. They were supervised by the Gun and Myun of the Provincial Irrigation and Reclamation Sections and controlled 20 to 25 percent of all irrigated lands in Korea.

The Water Utilization Association in general was a body corporate, similar to an Irrigation District in

the United States, organized for the purpose of constructing, operating and maintaining irrigation, drainage and flood control works. The Association was temporarily responsible for other practices of farm guidance which would tend to lend themselves to agricultural improvements as directed by the Military Governor.

Specifically, the Water Utilization Association petitioned the Provincial Governor, requesting the construction of a project, after obtaining signatures of 50 percent of the land owners as well as the consent and signatures of owners representing two-thirds of the area affected by the work. Next, it gave approval for initial plans of construction and directed the Korean Land Development Company or the Korean Water Utilization Association Union, through the Irrigation and Reclamation Section, to proceed with the work. Upon completion of construction the Association formally began functioning as such, operating and maintaining the project and collecting water fees from the land owners to pay off the loans and to defray the costs of operation, maintenance, and administration.[418]

Activities of Irrigation & Reclamation Section

September 1945-August 1946: -Actual details of the preliminary reorganization in September and October 1945 were not known except that the section was first placed under the Forestry and Land Reclamation Bureau and later under the present Bureau of Agricultural Production. On 27 October 1945 the Japanese Chief of the section was removed and Whong Chong Hun was named acting chief, later becoming actual chief. On 1 November Major Emory R. Minnich took over the duties as Military Government Chief of the Section, and on 11 November Capt. Stanley I. Phillippi was assigned to the section as assistant to Major Minnich, in addition to three enlisted men who were assigned respectively on 16 November 1945, 25 March 1946, and 10 April 1946. On 16 March 1946 Major Minnich was promoted to Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Production and Capt. Phillippi replaced him as chief of the section, retaining that position as a civilian following his release from the army in Korea on 15 August 1946.

On assuming his post as chief of the section, Major Minnich effected a complete reorganization, placing responsible Koreans in leading positions formerly held by Japanese, and employing Korean engineers and other personnel to replace dismissed Japanese and to fill other positions vacated during the interim following the surrender. The section was divided into two main subsections, Administration and Engineering, with appropriate divisions in each. In August 1946 efforts were being made to have the section reclassified, in the Department of Agriculture Table of Organization, as a bureau, and in August 1947 this was finally accomplished, the section being incorporated into the Bureau of Engineering and Soil Conservation.[419]

The Korean Irrigation Association Union at the time of the surrender had a total of 144 employees, with Japanese holding all important positions. Except for removal of Japanese personnel, little was done toward reorganization until 8 December 1945 when Major Minnich was appointed chairman and Ju Suk Kyun, vice-chairman. Provincial branches of the Union were

reorganized by provincial governors, and the number of employees in many of the province branches, in August 1946, was being reduced by 80 percent.

In the Relief Irrigation Association Union, all Japanese officials were removed, and the number of employees were reduced from five to two, in addition to the director. The Korean Land Development Company was placed under the jurisdiction of the New Korea Company and its reorganization and subsequent supervision were effected by that agency. In August 1946, plans were underway to dissolve the company and combine its functions and necessary operating personnel with the Land Reclamation and Irrigation Section.

At the time of the surrender, there were 78 irrigation projects south of the 38th parallel over which the National Government exercised direct control and on which some type of construction work was being done. Of this number 27 were new projects on which the work was anywhere from 8 to 95 percent completed. Seven were projects on which flood damage repair was being done. Some 35 were projects on which extensions or improvements were being made, and nine were "Tidal Land" projects.

In addition to these, the provinces were engaged in improvement work on approximately 1800 community projects ranging from 22 to 750 acres in area. All work was completely suspended at the time of the surrender.

Major Minnich ordered resumption of such work as appeared consistent with the beneficial results to be obtained, and in accordance with the overall policy of stimulating production, commerce and industry. Work was resumed almost immediately on a large number of the smaller community projects under provincial supervision, while on the larger national projects, further study was deemed necessary. Teams of Korean engineers and technicians were sent into the field in late November 1945 to make firsthand investigations and surveys of these larger projects. When the field surveys were completed, further studies and plans were made in the office and it was determined to complete the work on 25 of these projects as rapidly as possible, consistent with availability of materials.[420]

As of 25 July 1946 contracts had been let and work had been started on 14 of the 25 approved

"larger" projects. Contracts were held up on others because of lack of materials and transportation. Construction on smaller projects by the provinces and on improvement works being undertaken by the Korean Irrigation Association Union had been started in all parts of Korea.[421]

A budget to cover costs of irrigation work for the fiscal year 1946 was prepared early in November 1945 and funds immediately allotted. Since little construction was accomplished, amount requested proved more than sufficient. The budget as originally presented contemplated an expenditure of 303,000,000 yen but this figure was cut to 211,030,772 yen. Because the original computation was based on prices of labor and materials as of February 1946, the budgetary allowance was found to be insufficient to meet rising costs, and a request for an additional sum of 147,721,540 yen was made and on 30 August 1946 was pending in the Department of Finance. A further sum of 138,760,888 yen was requested for repair of flood damage to projects as a result of the June 1946 floods, and this too was pending in the Department of Finance.

Negotiations had been made for four major loans, three for the Korean Irrigation Association Union in the amounts of ¥10,000,000, ¥30,000,000, and ¥60000,000, and one loan of ¥68,000,000 for the Korean Land Development Company, and these/were under study in the Department of Finance. in August 1947 Arrangements had been made during the period 1 November 1945 to 15 February 1946 to obtain release of all funds of the various agencies concerned with irrigation work which had been frozen by order of the Military Governor.

The Section had been instrumental in recovering from Japanese officials of the Korean Land Development Company approximately 20,000,000 yen out of a total of over 26,000,000 yen misappropriated, and approximately 40,000 yen from the former Japanese chairman of the Korean Water Utilization Association Union, out of a total of approximately 176,000 yen misappropriated. 422

The shortage of materials and equipment was the most serious problem retarding continuance of irrigation work. Requisitions were submitted through the Import-Export Programs 1 and 2 for a total of 39,000 tons of cement, 132 trucks, and additional critical items including tractors, scrapers, lumber and nails. Spot requisitions

were placed for 60 trucks and 10,000 tons of cement. Justifications were prepared in detail but none of the items requested had been received by August 1946.

Meanwhile, all local stocks of materials which could be acquired had been purchased and distributed, and the program of local procurement was continuing. The Korean Irrigation Association Union acted as purchasing and distributing agency for most of these materials, and by August 1946 its purchases comprised approximately 40,000 bags of cement, 300 tons of wire, 5,000 shovels, 3,000 picks, 200 tons reinforcing steel, 5,000 gallons of oil, 30 electric motors from 20 HP to 300 HP, electric wire, nails, tools, straw bags, and many miscellaneous items. In addition, the KIA Union was prepared to purchase all materials which might have been secured through the Import-Export Programs, and to distribute these through the provinces. [423]

In determining work to be accomplished, a study of all contemplated projects was made and priorities for such work set up as follows. First priority was given to repair of flood damage to existing completed projects; second, to completion of extensions and improvements to

existing projects where such work had already been started; third, to completion of new projects which were under construction at the time of surrender; and the fourth, to proposed new projects. It was decided, however, that no new projects requiring critical materials would be undertaken until such time as materials became available.

During the war the Japanese, in order to expedite construction of irrigation works and to increase rice production, had suspended certain provisions in the old Korean irrigation laws and had constructed projects without consent of the landowners. After completion they had forcibly organized associations of the landowners and turned the projects over to them for operation. This procedure was halted, and no work on any project under American Military Government was done except on request of landowners within the project, or of duly organized associations, as required by the old Korean irrigation laws. Where new projects were concerned, associations had to be organized and formal request made through them before any work was begun.

In many cases licenses which had been granted individuals for construction of tidal land projects had been cancelled during the war years because of failure of the licensee to complete the work. Usually failure to do so was caused by inability to get labor and materials because of war conditions. For this reason a policy was established by Irrigation and Reclamation giving the former licensee first priority in re-establishing his license, before granting a license for the project to a new applicant. Where necessary, the section officials acted as arbiters between the old licensee and the new applicant, and three such cases were under consideration in August 1946.[424]

The former policy regarding granting of subsidies had been to permit a higher rate of subsidy to be paid for construction of projects where the project costs at the current high inflationary level were expected to be amortized over a period of years, during which time prices would have returned to a more normal level. In this, each project was considered on its own merit. As of August 1946, the entire subsidy picture, however, was not satisfactory, and further study was instituted on on the subject.

The water fees levied and collected for the 1945 fiscal year which began in April 1945 and extended to April 1946 were far short of being sufficient to carry on the work of the projects through 1946, due to inflationary rise in labor and material costs. Associations were directed to increase the 1946 levy to a figure sufficient to repay any funds borrowed for maintained purposes and to carry the projects through to the next collection period. The average water fee for 1946, set in March of that year, was fixed at approximately 10 times the 1945 rate. If prices did not increase further, the current fees would be sufficient. If prices continued to rise, however, the rates should again be increased.

Prior to the entry of the United States Military Government, associations were delegated the responsibility of managing lands of absentee landlords lying within their respective associations. With the vesting of all former Japanese lands, this function was turned over to the New Korea Company. An effort was made to have that company delegate authority to the associations with respect to lands within the association's area. In some provinces

this was done, and the matter was handled smoothly, while in others the recommendation was not followed. As Japanese nationals left prior to the time of payment of water fees, the New Korea Company as agent for Military Government made water payments as funds became available. 425

Translations were made and copies forwarded to the provinces of four important sections of the regulations involving inland improvement work. Three copies of a complete set of original Japanese maps, were acquired, and the general outline of all irrigation projects in Korea, together with information on dams and similar installations was transposed on two of these. One copy was slated to be sent to the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation and the other retained in the section for use by American personnel. The third set of maps was forwarded to the provinces for use of American personnel there.

On 26 June 1946 there were 1,244 irrigation construction projects proposed for that year, calling for an expenditure of 698,440,000 yen, affecting 277,940 acres, and possibly increasing the rice yield

for 1946 by 3,405,540 bushels. Some 635 projects actually were under way, involving 142,078 acres of land. The completion cost of these projects was estimated at 366,747,341 yen, and it was anticipated that they would increase the rice crop by 2,411,325 bushels.[426]

Period Ending 30 June 1947

On 30 June 1947, it was reported that "progress made in irrigation and land reclamation work [during the past 6 months] exceeded that for any similar period since the Japanese surrender and the advent of Military Government in Korea."[427]

This encouraging increase in activity was due to several factors, chief of which were receipt from the United States of substantial quantities of cement and other urgently needed construction materials; the acquisition of a considerable number of vehicles for transportation of materials and supplies, and the fact that Korean personnel in irrigation work had gained much experience during the previous 22 months, thus making them more valuable to the organization.

Construction work on nineteen of the large scale national projects supervised by the Korean Land Development Company, was "progressing rapidly", with three projects completed except for finishing touches." The work of the Korean Irrigation Union on 10 projects for the same number of member associations had advanced far during the six months, January-June 1947. On the nine proposed tidal land projects turned over to the Union by the Office of Property Custody, plans and specifications had been completed, and arrangements had been made to start work on five by 1 May 1947. However, due to delay in approval of the national budget and in obtaining bank credit, this proposed date had been pushed forward to 15 July. The major portion of damage to works of the various irrigation associations, caused by the floods of June 1946, had been repaired, although complete rehabilitation in the smaller unorganized areas would require another two or three years.

Materials and equipment received from the United States and distributed to all provinces and

irrigation agencies, which accounted largely for the progress of the section's activities, included 428,000 bags of cement, 400 tons of reinforcing steel, 100 tons of dynamite, fuses and detonators, 50 tons of structural steel, 20,000 pairs of workmen's shoes, 105 trucks of varying weights, and 46 trailers. In addition, allocations had been made on a number of cranes, tractors, scrapers, and other items of construction equipment which had not yet been picked up and distributed.

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Arrangements had been made for establishment of both long and short term credits at the Chosun Industrial Bank for the purpose of financing construction costs over and above the government subsidy and for short term maintenance and operating loans to irrigation associations. These credits were made to the Korean Irrigation Association and to the Korean Land Development Company. The budget for the fiscal year 1947 as tentatively fixed required curtailment of plans for resuming work on many projects, including four of the large scale national works.

One problem of major importance was partially disposed of when arrangements were made with the Soviet authorities and Koreans from North of 38° for the repair of the Kuan Reservoir of the Yong Baek Irrigation Project, and for the orderly release of water from the reservoir. The Yong Baek project was the rice bowl of Kyunggi Province and was dependent for the major portion of its water supply on the Kuan Reservoir which lay north of the 38th parallel. The dam was damaged so badly by the floods of 1946 that the entire structure was endangered. As the result of months of effort the arrangements mentioned above were made and the repair works nearly completed by June 1947. Prior to these arrangements, the release of water for irrigation had been entirely irrational, resulting in considerable loss of crops in 1946.[429]

The three main agencies of irrigation at the national level were required to move office locations and in June 1947, were located in the old Chong Lo Tax Building, immediately south of the Monopoly Building in Seoul. This was the third move for the section and for the Korean Land Development Company, and the fourth for the Irrigation Union since the advent of Military Government.

Pursuant to directive from the National Economic Board, recommendations were submitted to it and to the Office of Property Custody calling for disposition of the Korean Land Development Company and for incorporating its assets and personnel into the Korean Irrigation Association. The proposals made had not been acted upon by 30 June 1947, pending further recommendations by the Department of Justice and other agencies concerned.

Another matter which had caused considerable hardship to irrigation associations during the preceding six months had been the order directing that amounts over and above certain figures, due landowners for rice collected in the rice collection program, be held in blocked accounts and released only on approval of the Department of Finance. The mechanics involved prevented irrigation associations from collecting water fees from such owners, and resulted in their defaulting in their own obligations. This order was adjusted by 30 June 1947.

In the fall of 1947 reorganization of the Department of Agriculture, a new Bureau of Soil

Conservation and Engineering was established, which incorporated the Irrigation and Land Reclamation Section with Soil Conservation.[430] In general, the main problems that beset the Irrigation and Reclamation Section were: lack of cement for construction work; inflationary cost of labor and materials; small salaries of government employees; shortage of qualified personnel; delay in obtaining action on matters requiring action by the Department of Finance; shortage of food for laborers on construction projects; high interest rate on bank loans; and the need for motor vehicle repair shops.[431]

B. Tenancy and Rent

In South Korea agriculture was practiced on a very small scale. In 1942 the total crop area was distributed among 2,050,104 farm families with an average of about 1.12 chongbo (2.74 acres) of cultivated area per farm family. The scarcity of new arable land, together with a growing rural population, tended to reduce individual holdings still further. Lee Hoon Koo in his book "Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea" stated: "Land is so scarce that

almost no farmer can cultivate as much land as he wishes to, and yet the acreage of arable land per farm household is declining."

Korea was faced with the problem of many people on little land, and not rich land at that. The income from subsidiary occupations as related to total farm income was of little significance because only a small percentage derived any income from non-agricultural occupations. The amount of land cultivated by the great majority of the farmers was often not large enough to provide the farm with the bare necessities of life. Tenants accounted for nearly half of the total area of arable land. Adding owner-tenants to this group, about 80 out of every 100 Korean farmers were tenants or semi-tenants, a situation arose that had few counterparts elsewhere in the world.

Tenancy in Korea increased rapidly; from 1914 to 1938, the total number of farmers increased 11 percent but the number of tenants increased 66 percent. During the same period the proportion of tenants to the total number of farm households increased from 35 to 53 percent. This development,

combined with the concentration of land in the hands of a few landlords and the terms under which the land was rented out, spelled doom for many Korean farmers.

Next to security for the tenants came the problem of adjusting the population to the land. It goes without saying that population increases could not be absorbed on the farm. Employment prospects in industry were not too encouraging. The increasing number of farmers for the same number of farms promised to continue for years to come if the current biological and economic trends were not altered. Further improvement in the status of tenancy itself offered the most direct and immediate remedy for some of the current evils of the Korean land tenure system.

Military Government's Ordinance No. 9 did much to alleviate the condition of Korean tenant farmers.* The Policy Section of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics made a study of the tenancy problem, with a view to reviewing the ordinance, and setting up a rental policy based on what the tenant could afford to pay, and what the landlord should receive as his investment plus a fair depreciation charge.

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* See following page.

The land problem could be divided into two parts: first, the disposition of former Japanese-owned lands; and second, what treatment should be given to large land holdings of the Korean landlords.[432]

Ordinance 9

According to the American Advisor, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the most effective step taken toward alleviating the problem of tenant farmers in South Korea was, Ordinance 9, "Maximum Tenant Farmers Rents Fixed",[5] October 1945, as supplemented by Department of Agriculture Order No. 2, "Rice Rental Collection by New Korea Company Limited." "A national emergency in Korea is hereby declared to exist by reason of oppressive rents and interest rates payable under existing contracts by tenants of farm lands and the resulting semi-enslavement and a standard of living below the standard which is the object of the Military Government," began the ordinance.

The situation which made possible the aforementioned oppressive rents dated back to pre-Jap annexation days, when most Korean farms were owned and

rented out by absentee landlords, rather than being owned and tilled by the same person. Through the forty years of Japanese domination, at least 14 percent of all Korean farms fell into Japanese hands, and after liberation, these were vested in the government. With landlords demanding from 20 to 90 percent of each annual crop as rent, plus farm agents hired by the landlords requiring an under-the-table share of the profits, farmers after paying rent, "squeeze", and myriad taxes, water fees, and other levies, were left with sometimes less than what they required to support themselves and their families. Though the situation was apparent at the time of the surrender and the occupation by United States troops, and though a land reform program was much discussed, and admitted by all concerned to be a necessity, by August 1947 no acceptable program had been evolved. Meanwhile, Communist propaganda informed prospective buyers of such farm lands as were available, that the new much-touted land reform program was to be made effective at any time, and that under this new entirely hypothetical program, land would be distributed free of charge.

Consequently, land had small selling value and buyers were hesitant before closing a deal.

According to Department of Agriculture statistics, as of 31 December 1945, there were 2,065,477 farm households (farm population divided by 5) in South Korea. Of that number, 284,509 tenants owned over 90 percent of the land they farmed. Some 337,506 owned from 50 to 90 percent of the land farmed. A total of 378,574 owned from 10 to 50 percent of the farmed land, and 1,009,604 farmers owned less than 10 percent of the land they cultivated. Some 55,284 tenants operated "non-cultivated" farms, that is, farms on which no crops were raised but which were devoted to the raising of stock, or silkworms.

Ordinance 9 prohibited the charging of rents which exceeded one-third of the "natural crops, produce and fruits of such land cultivated and tended" by the tenant. Rental agreements which required less than this figure remained in effect, but all contracts calling for more than one-third of the annual crop were declared null and void. It was further provided that landowners could not terminate farm leases until their legal date

of expiration except with just cause which must be substantiated by the District Court under whose jurisdiction the case fell. Though The ordinance further provided that all property owners who were entitled to collect rent should register their lands and the amount of rent required at the proper land registry office within 60 days, submitting a written agreement by the tenant complying with such terms as the landowner claims have been agreed upon. In the case of owners who fail to so register, the ordinance stated that tenants in occupancy should continue under present agreements until the legal termination of such contracts and instead of paying the agreed rent to the landlord, should pay it to the Government of Korea at the "nearest duly constituted agency of the Government for the collection of taxes on such land." Actually this clause was not strictly enforced.

In the event that rent was to be paid "in kind," and instead of paying in produce, the tenant was to pay in a cash equivalent, such rent was not to exceed "a reasonable market price" for the product at the place where the rent was paid, or not to exceed the "then existing lowest bid price of the Government of Korea." In case

of disagreement between tenant and landlord as to the amount of such rent, the farmer delivers not to exceed 1/3 of his total produce to the nearest branch office of the Korean Commodity Company, where it is held to the account of the landowner.

While this ordinance did do away with the demanding of exorbitant rents, it did not get at the fundamental root of the situation...widespread tenancy. That problem was in the hands of the South Korea Interim Legislative Assembly, and by 18 August 1947, that august body showed no signs of arriving at a solution.[433]

C. Fertilizer

Throughout this chapter, frequent mention has been made of the lack of fertilizer, which constituted a major problem in every phase of agriculture with the possible exception of forestry and fisheries.

The soil of Korea in its virgin state was probably deficient in soil nitrogen, since it was developed under a heavy forest cover with heavy summer rainfall conditions unfavorable to the accumulation of

soil nitrogen and generally generating acid soil reactions. Korea's soil was also probably deficient in phosphorous because the parent materials from which it was weathered were low in that element.

The type of agriculture practiced in South Korea (continuous grain production for centuries without intervening sod crops) was unfavorable for the maintenance of soil nitrogen. This continuous cereal cropping consumed the available phosphorus rapidly, leaving the soil less and less productive unless the phosphorus removed by the crops was replaced through the application of phosphoric acid. The soils of South Korea were in 1947 so depleted of plant nutrients that successful production could not be practiced without heavy applications of nitrogen and phosphoric acid.

With respect to potash the case was not so clear. Inherently the soil did not appear to have been so deficient in potassium. Korean farmers for many generations had recognized the productive value of wood and other vegetative ashes as sources of plant nutrients and their annual applications of compost and ashes tended to replace the potassium removed by the

crops. However, this was done at the expense of the vegetative cover and water retention capacity of the soils of the hills and mountain slopes.

The annual practice in South Korea of paring to the roots all grass, weeds, sedges and brush on the hills and mountain slopes as material for compost and ashes only transferred plant nutrients from the soil of the hills and mountains to the soil of the more level lands. This practice was accompanied by much erosion, flood damage, and silting, and it was apparent that this annual manicuring had to be checked if the irrigation works essential to rice production were to be preserved. This meant that in the future Koreans should have much larger quantities of commercial potash then they had heretofore.

The average consumption of fertilizer per planted acre from all sources had been declining since 1943. The consumption of nitrogen from farm supplied sources reached its height in 1944-45 when 41.3 pounds per planted acre were reported to have been consumed under the Japanese program initiated in 1941 fostering the farm production of fertilizer. Farmers under this

plan were paid a subsidy for producing this fertilizer. The accuracy of this year's reports were to be questioned, since it was reported that to secure the subsidy, farmers reported more then was actually produced, and the Japanese were so undermanned at that time that they were unable to maintain adequate checks. Under the American occupation, the subsidy was eliminated and consumption of nitrogen from farm supplied sources fell to only 18.3 pounds per planted acre, while in the years 1934-35 and 1942-43 it had been 32.6 and 30.4 pounds respectively.

Phosphoric acid consumption perplanted acre had always been low in South Korea, averaging only about half of that amount expended on a like amount of farm land in Japan. Fertilizer consumption per planted acre from all sources in all of Korea in 1939 was 59 pounds of nitrogen, 30 of phosphoric acid, and 47 of potash. Comparable figures for Japan for the same year were 110, 61 and 67 respectively, which explained in part why yields in Japan were generally nearly twice those of Korea. Since it was the aim of USAMGIK to raise the level of living of South Koreans, and since the only way this could be done is to raise agricultural production, it

was obvious that South Korea needed large quantities of commercial fertilizer.

Fertilizer was the lifeblood of agriculture in humid climates and particularly in South Korea. The maintenance of normal production levels and possible increases could be achieved only by large imports of nitrogen, phosphoric acid, and potassium oxide, the principal ingredients of fertilizer. South Korea could be made self-sufficient in nitrogen, the most costly ingredient, by the establishment of a nitrogen fixation plant of adequate capacity. South Korea's fertilizer requirements were 136,900 metric tons of 100 percent nitrogen, 516,400 metric tons of superphosphate, and 41,400 metric tons of 100 percent potassium oxide. In determining fertilizer requirements, careful consideration was given to acreage in various crops, plant nutrient needs for profitable production, economic value of the crop, historic fertilizer usage, standard ration of application in Japan, probable consumer acceptance, facilities for transporting and distributing large quantities of fertilizer, and South Korea's economic position with particular reference to her need for agricultural exports to balance imports.[434]

By 25 August 1947, approximately 153,116 metric tons of fertilizer had been received in South Korea through the import program. Of this amount, 132,650 had been shipped to the various provinces, and due to loss enroute, only 110,427 tons had been received and distributed to farmers. In terms of percent, 72 percent of the fertilizer received in South Korea had been shipped to the provinces, and of the amount shipped, 83 percent had been received and distributed to farmers. These shipments included ammonium nitrate, potassium sulphate, ammonium sulphate, and superphospate. 435

Night Soil:-In concluding this section on fertilizer, it is necessary to add a note concerning the use of so-called night soil, human excrement which was transferred periodically from each house and public room, transported in "honey-carts", and applied extensively as fertilizer throughout Korea. Night soil has been used for centuries by the Koreans, and in view of the shortage of land, of fertilizer, and the low economic status of Korean farmers which made it impossible for them to substitute commercial fertilizers, there was no likelihood, or even possibility,

that the use of this compost would be eliminated within the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the American advisor, Bureau of Agricultural Production, Department of Education, stated flatly that discontinuance of use of this compost would mean ruin for Korea as an agricultural country.

The dangers of disease being spread by the use of night soil were actual but could be minimized by correct application and by thorough cooking of all foods. If night soil was poured in around the roots of the plant, there was no possibility of injurious bacteria working its way into the plant, since chemical reactions in the soil and the plant, coupled with exposure to direct sunlight, completely neutralized the dangerous bacteria. Even root foods and plants on which the night soil was applied directly, were safe when thoroughly cooked. Improper use of night soil and consumption of raw or inadequately cooked foods which had come into direct contact with the compost was dangerous, since night soil carries all varieties of intestinal diseases, including typhoid, worms, amoebic dysentery, and other unpleasant if not fatal ailments.

As mentioned previously, it was highly improbable that the use of night soil would ever be discontinued in Korea, since land under cultivation was deficient in nearly all chemicals, including the three most often present in night soil; nitrogen, phosphate, and potash.[436]

V. Conclusion

A. Agriculture in North Korea

Before bringing this chapter to a close, it may be of interest to note briefly what the Soviet authorities in North Korea were doing in agriculture while USAMGIK wrestled with agrarian problems in the American occupied zone. According to a Korean informant who visited the Suwon Central Agricultural Experimtn Station on 7 June 1947 and was there interviewed by Mr. Kim Ho Jik, the Korean Director, agricultural activity under the North Korean People's Committee was the responsibility of the Agriculture and Forestry Department, which was comprised of six bureaus: Production, Forestry, Animal Husbandy, Agricultural

Economics, Fisheries, and Sericulture. Three Soviet advisors were assigned to the department, but no trained agricultural specialists such as were employed in South Korea. The Korean informant, who was described as "trained in technical agriculture", said that "the three Russians did very little in the way of technical aid and advice."

B. Characteristics of South Korean Agriculture,

Two important characteristics of South Korea agriculture emerged. One, that the industry was not in 1947, and probably never had been self-supporting but had been subsidized continually by the Korean Imperial and the Japanese Military Governments, and was in 1947 being aided by subsidies and imports from the United States, brought in by American Military Government.

Two, Korean farmers and all agricultural workers were actually part of effective unions, the highest level of which was the Korean Agricultural Association. Embracing all farmers in South Korea, the society bargained with manufacturers to secure wholesale lots of equipment (plows,

clothes, etc.) at a great saving to farmers; secured loans which were broken down into credit for provincial, county and village branches, which further distributed the funds to individuals; acted as a central selling and intermediary between the millions of farmers and their government. This feature appeared in all phases of agriculture...Sericulture, Horticulture, Cotton and Fiber, Fisheries, Forestry, Livestock. All agricultural industries had peculiar organizations which on a smaller scale performed for them the functions carried on for all farmers by KAA.

C. Stumbling Blocks:-

The United States Army Military Government in Korea was hampered in its agricultural program by stumbling blocks which could neither be avoided nor blamed on any particular person, agency, or country.

The long-standing bitterness of the Koreans toward the Japanese necessitated that all Japanese be repatriated immediately to their homeland, regardless of tne fact that Japanese held almost without exception all the professional, scientific and governmental positions

requiring skill and experience, and of the simultaneous fact that few or no Koreans had been given the opportunity to understudy these positions or to acquire the education and training necessary to equip them for stepping into Japanese-vacated posts. As a result, the best qualified Koreans available were installed, and although their efforts were sincere and aided by American specialists with years of training and experience, the situation remained that the Korean government and its agencies were manned largely by inexperienced personnel. This was particularly detrimental in the fields of science and research.

One army major, advisor for the Department of Agriculture Bureau of Agricultural Economics, stated: "As an overall statement, I do not believe that their /Koreans/ capabilities,..compare favorably with a similar group of Americans," and added "The removal of Japanese agriculturists from control left a huge void to be filled in all key positions." According to the major "In ten years, under favorable conditions and educational opportunities, the bureau could be well staffed with efficient men."[438] The civilian advisor

to the Cotton and Fiber section commented: "Many Koreans need more training and experience with less emphasis on 'face'," and cited as a major problem, "Lack of sufficiently trained personnel,"[439] while the civilian advisor to the Bureau of Agricultural Production stated: "There is a great shortage of trained personnel."[440]

This paucity of experienced Koreans was aggravated by a second factor: low salaries paid by Military Government, in addition to still a third hindrance, Oriental psychology and the maintenance of "face." The American advisor to the Bureau of Agricultural Production put it: "The rate of pay permitted for Korean officials is too small to attract some of the best qualified people in Korea. This is especially true of technicians. Many have left us for private business. Others tell us frankly that they must work where they can make a living. I have been told by many Koreans that they don't believe Americans think much of the Koreans in the government. 'If they did, they would give these employees better pay, special rations, and other special privileges. How can the Americans

expect us to respect these officials if they [do not]? How can they expect us to have respect or take orders from government officials with a lower standard of living than we have?'"[441]

Consequently, many of the few qualified Koreans preferred jobs in private business to positions with the government, and the American sericulture advisor deplored: "...technicians [government]...do not represent the higher skilled silk people in Korea today."[442]

To cite a concrete example, the Korean director of the Central and Branch Agricultural Experiment Stations, Mr. Kim Ho Jik, received approximately four thousand yen a month, on which to support two residences (his home in Seoul and his house in Suwon, where he worked) and a family consisting of a wife and three children. He was constantly offered more lucrative positions in private schools, being well known for his honesty and ability, and was enabled to remain in his government position only through the generosity of his more affluent brother-in-law who each month contributed as much as fifteen thousand yen to Mr. Kim Ho Jik so that he might help Korea during her difficult years.[443]

It is quite probable that other Korean government employees, less fortunate in their choice of relatives, helped make up the deficit between salary and living expenses by indulging in under-the-table transactions, common in the Orient and labeled by Americans as graft. It is also a possibility, pointed out by the American advisor, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, that this lack of trained personnel in the Korean government may result in the American Congress' refusing to donate more of their voters' money to Korea, where it "is not being administered by competent personnel."[444]

Still another serious problem was the difficulty of obtaining supplies. With no export trade, and with imports coming only from America and Japan, many phases of agriculture struggled to keep their heads above water, and some stated, as did the Fisheries Bureau advisor, "Unless materials are forthcoming soon, the industry will cease to function."[445] Actual figures on the amounts of materials requested and those received in Korea were not available; however, statements by American advisors of each bureau in the Department of

Agriculture indicate that although many requisitions were submitted, some as far back as October 1945, of goods, with the exception of food and grain imports, only a negligible amount had arrived. "The Bureau of Agricultural Economics has requisitioned a number of items...the percentage of these requisitions which have been filled is practically negligible," and another American advisor in the same bureau stated: "To date, no supplies have been received."[446] This was 21 months after the occupation of South Korea by American forces. The Bureau of Agricultural Production advisor said: "Many supplies requested...but the percentage [received] is low,"[447] and the Cotton and Fiber Section advisor commented "To date [9 July 1947] none have been received."[448]

In an attempt to ascertain reasons for the arrival of so few supplies requisitioned for Korea, the American advisor for Civilian Supply, Commerce Department, Mr. J.E. Auburn, was interviewed on 17 September 1947. He said: "Of course, each individual item requisitioned presents a different problem, and the reasons for its non-arrival depend on a number of factors peculiar to each case. In general, however, I can say that many

of our difficulties arise from just plain short supply, both in Japan and in the United States."

Manila rope, for instance, urgently needed by the Fisheries Bureau, Department of Agriculture, was unobtainable since there existed in 1946 and 1947 a world-wide shortage of that item. Office supplies, too, were in critical short supply not only in Japan, but even in the United States, and the Civilian Supply advisor admitted that he had no idea when Korea would receive adequate amounts of these essential items.

Other factors contributed to the general shortage of imports for Korea, such as red tape in processing requisitions in Japan and in Washington. Even after requisitions were submitted, said Mr. Auburn, it was necessary for Civilian Supply personnel to follow up with letter and wire inquiries in order to obtain action. He commented that when a representative from the agency concerned went personally to Japan to expedite the procurement of necessary items, the process was speeded up by many times.

When supplies did arrive in Korea, he said, they were sometimes not properly identified, and Civilian

Supply then had to find out who requisitioned them. Sometimes when a number of parts, inter-dependent upon one another for effectiveness, were requisitioned, some arrived while the others did not, making it necessary for Civilian Supply to store the ones received until supplementary parts became available.

"It's a difficult job," Mr. Auburn said in conclusion, "and we [Civilian Supply] are not entirely blameless." However, he added that as a rough estimate, approximately 50 percent of the spot requisitions processed through his office had been filled.

D. Summary and Conclusion

A brief review of the situation in different agricultural industries shows that South Korea was not in 1947 and probably never would be self-supporting in rice and cereals, and USAMGIK had kept the wolf from many grass-roofed homes by the importation of an average 30,000 metric tons of grain a month during the two years of occupation.

In the field of horticulture, orchards were suffering from lack of spraying materials, and from lack

of knowledge on the part of orchard owners, who planted the trees too close together, and pruned too closely. Vegetables and other minor food crops helped pad the deficient South Korean diet, but no accurate figures were kept on the extent of this cultivation.

Livestock had suffered a serious blow following the surrender when Koreans went on a meat-eating spree and slaughtered draft and breeding cattle, as well as meat herds. In April 1946 an ordinance was finally passed limiting this slaughter, but at least one provincial agricultural officer claimed that it would be twenty years before the number of cattle could regain its pre-surrender level.

Fisheries were in a serious condition, and in August 1947, the American advisor stated that if supplies were not forthcoming soon, the entire industry would be paralyzed. Repairs, boats, fishing nets, and other essential equipment had been in critical short supply since before the surrender, and little had been done to alleviate the situation following American occupancy of South Korea.

Sericulture had no outstanding problems, other than the South Korea filatures' apparent inability to make silk of a quality fit for export to other countries.

So little activity had been reported in the field of cotton, fiber and other miscellaneous industrial crops, and there was an acute shortage of cotton cloth in South Korea. Famers by far preferred cotton cloth to silk on all consumer goods inducement programs, but lack of machinery for cotton mills kept production below normal.

The picture in forestry was not too good. Prior to the surrender, the Japanese had stripped many of South Korea's forests with little regard to the eventual effect of such wanton cutting. South Koreans, faced with bitterly cold winters and little fuel, continued stripping hillsides and destroying young trees in an effort to warm their homes and to cook their food. Although an extensive planting program was conducted for one week each April by USAMGIK, half again as much timber was being cut each year as grew in South Korea forests, and unless large imports of fuel were received from other countries, or unless North and South Korea were unified, making available to South Korea the extensive forest tracts of the North, this unequal and eventually disastrous overcutting was bound to continue.

Experiment stations were a bright spot in the generally dark picture of South Korean agriculture, with two American advisors indoctrinating and training unqualified employees for the technical jobs they had to fill. All

projects in the thirteen central and branch stations were reviewed in detail during the winter and spring of 1947, and faulty projects were eliminated. All new projects were designed along lines laid down by agricultural scientists so that the data, when collected, would be accepted by any country of the world. Formerly, Koreans conducted experiments utilizing outdated or inaccurate methods, consequently the results obtained were worthless.

Agricultural education had been combined with vocational education within the Department of Education, and there were one major college, and 68 middle schools devoted entirely to agricultural training. Agricultural extension, long overlooked and conducted only by scattered agencies, with no central supervision or comprehensive program, came to the fore in August 1947, when the Department of Agriculture called for proposed plans for the establishment of a central extension service. This should, he said, utilize the experiment stations, the college at Suwon, and the various extension services of governmental agencies. The plan agreed upon was submitted by Ford M. Milam, American Advisor for the experiment stations, and as chairman of the extension service committee, he and three sub-committees gathered data in August preparatory to submitting a finished plan to the Military Governor for possible establishment under USAMGIK ordinance.

Land tenancy, a headache for many years in Korea, remained an unsolved problem, though USAMGIK Ordinance No. 9 did do away with exorbitant rents which stripped tenant farmers of their crops and often left them with less than was required to support themselves and their families. With only a small percentage of South Korean farmers owning even part of the land they farmed, the need for a land reform program was recognized by nearly all political parties, and the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and Military Government were both working on proposed plans to accomplish this major step.

Irrigation and reclamation, vitally important to South Koreans, who had little arable land in comparison with the farm population, and whose main cultivated crop was rice, reported a great increase in activities for the six months period ending 30 June 1947, largely due to the receipt of long delayed imports of cement, steel, nails, wire, and other materials necessary to the construction of reclamation and irrigation works. Fertilizer continued a serious problem to all farmers, and although thousands of tons of commercial fertilizer were imported from the United States and Japan, the amounts imported were inadequate to fill the demand. Meanwhile, unchecked soil erosion, according to one American advisor in the

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Department of Agriculture, carried away soil containing more than 100 times the amount of fertilizer brought in by the Military Government.

While it was obvious that South Korean agriculture was not making a rapid recovery, most agricultural industries were holding their ground, and only Forestry and Fisheries were seriously concerned as to their future.

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PART III

Chapter VII

Commerce

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Chapter VIII

Finance



PART III

Chapter IX -

Education

PART III

CHAPTER IX

EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
UNDER UNITED STATES OCCUPATION
1945 - 1948

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Preface

When the Occupation of South Korea began in September 1945, the arriving Americans found education in a chaotic condition. Schools had been closed, and with their reopening many changes were obviously necessary, above all the elimination of Japanese influences.

The present work is intended as a recital of the struggle to implant a modern system of education, based on Western standards in the old "Hermit Kingdom" of Korea, and of the difficulties which, at times, made the task seem impossible. This History does not pretend to cover all aspects of education in the period 1945-1948. Rather, it is deliberately restricted to those directly affected by the Occupation. Thus, no attempt has been made to describe the private schools, for they were in comparatively good condition, and were outside the scope of Military Government's jurisdiction. They have been mentioned, of course, where they were involved with Military Government activities.

Since educational activities of the Occupation have been conducted through the Department of Education, the general approach has followed the experiences of that organization. Department of Education functions which are not properly educational have, of course, been omitted. Thus, the work of the Department's Culture and Meteorology bureaus has been laid aside for treatment elsewhere.

Research on education often proved difficult. Much important information was lost in a fire in the National Department of Education early in 1947. Thus, there is quite often a noticeable lapse of official documentary material for the years 1945 and 1946. Much of the data covering that period and the early months of 1948 were gathered through personal interviews with American and Korean personnel in the individual bureaus.

Credit for the spade work in this Chapter should go to earlier Historical Section personnel, who began the collection of material on education in Korea. Special credit is given to Captain J. O. Sargent for his research work on the history of education prior to liberation and to Miss Juanita Wahl, who began the actual organization and writing. The principal research and writing, however, was done by Mr. Dana W. Russell, with some final additions after his departure made by Dr. Lewis W. Bealer. The American advisory staff of the Department of Education cooperated closely and gave unstinted aid in the project.

In the controversial issues involved such as the May Day Incident, opinions and findings were those of the departments and investigators involved, and in no way to be considered the opinion of the Department of the Army or the historians concerned.

EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
UNDER UNITED STATES OCCUPATION, 1945 - 1948

I INTRODUCTION

At the outset of the American occupation of Korea in September 1945, education was given a prominent place in Military Government plans. However, American educational personnel were all but totally ignorant of Korean educational conditions. They could do little without a clear knowledge of pre-liberation teaching policies and were obliged, therefore, to acquaint themselves with the early history of teaching in Korea, with the contributions of the missionaries, and, above all, with the organization of the Japanese whose successors they were.

Immediately upon assumption of control, American personnel foresaw the necessity of revising former procedures; yet, at the same time, extensive use of them was obviously necessary while revision was in progress. Change-over began almost at once, but the transitory stages were laden with difficulties, many of which were still unsolved three years later.

Initially, the billeting of American troops in school edifices served to delay seriously efforts to develop a sound and unified system of education. The bewildered restlessness of student bodies and faculty members during the first two years of the occupation

was likewise a serious disruptive factor, especially when, as often happened, it expressed itself through the medium of strikes. Such transitory problems were settled gradually by 1948, but there were other difficulties which remained troublesome issues by the end of the third year of occupation.

Again and again the educational system was reorganized in the effort to better conditions, but these trial and error methods were not always productive of the desired results. This was especially true of the basic problems that had confronted early American personnel in the Department of Education. Serious shortages in school buildings, teachers, textbooks, laboratory equipment, and other physical necessities of modern education were all-important factors in South Korea after liberation. In mid-1948 these deficiencies were still prominent. Many new schools had been opened and teaching staffs had increased rapidly, but they were far from sufficient in caring for the large number of Korean children for whom there were no teaching facilities. Lack of textbooks, due principally to publishing bottlenecks, was a major barrier to educational advancement. Like so many other problems, the textbook situation was a direct outgrowth of the disorganized economy of South Korea.

II - KOREAN EDUCATION BEFORE 1945

The system of education in the old Kingdom of Korea and under the Japanese exerted strong influence on educational developments after liberation. This was particularly true of that maintained during the Japanese annexation.

Education Under the Kingdom of Korea. Over many centuries, education in Korea was under a marked Chinese influence. Based on Confucianism, its ultimate goal was to create good public servants, a process which began in the "Sohtang" or private common schools located in every village or town. Emphasis was on common knowledge and development of basic skills, especially in reading and writing Chinese ideographs. From the Sohtang, students could progress to district higher schools and eventually to the highest seat of learning, the Central Confucian School in Seoul. Graduates of that institution took civil service examinations, and successful candidates became eligible for lifetime official posts.(1)

Arrival of Christian missionaries in Korea, beginning in 1883, early began to have some effect on the development of education. Shortly thereafter, the Korean government requested the United States to nominate a number of school teachers to be sent to Korea. As a result, three American theological seminary graduates arrived in the summer of 1886. These and subsequent American missionaries entrenched themselves more thoroughly, probably, in the confidence

of Koreans than did their British and continental confreres.[2] Thus, in September 1945, one Korean newspaper, in welcoming the arriving Americans, listed first among Korea's debts to the United States the establishment by American missionaries of the first modern schools and colleges in the country.[3] Because of the difficulties which confronted the educational efforts of the missionaries and other foreign teachers, even the Japanese were obliged to acknowledge that, "They may be said to have been the pioneers of modern education here".[4]

Missionary schools were, however, subjected to much pressure from the Japanese. In 1915, regulations concerning private schools were revised in such a way as to leave little doubt of the Japanese desire that these independent schools should slip quietly into oblivion as their own system became more and more thoroughly organized and widespread. Though the schools were allowed a ten-year period of grace before enforcement of the prohibition against teaching subjects other than those prescribed as a part of the curriculum, the revised regulations were a heavy blow to mission schools. The regulations concerning teachers and textbooks were designed to undermine the future of these institutions. Many which could not in conscience or in practice conform, dropped by the wayside, but not so many as would have been closed had not Baron Saito, the Japanese Governor General, issued a new ordinance in 1922 greatly liberalizing the regulations.[5] In 1917, there were 350 mission

schools in Korea. This number, however, decreased as the Japanese regime expanded its own educational system, until by 1937, only three colleges and thirty-four lower schools established by missionaries survived.(6)

Meanwhile, even before the Japanese Protectorate and Annexation, primary schools for Japanese had been organized. Regular primary education for Japanese children had been established in Pusan in 1877 and spread to Wonsan, Chemulpo (now called Inchon), and Seoul by 1892.(7) This Japanese influence extended to the education of Koreans when in 1894, the Korean Government, following Japanese advice and examples, abolished the old Korean educational system. Although the "Sohtang" continued to function, old district schools and the highest school in Seoul were allowed to lapse while elementary and some higher schools were founded to replace them. Nevertheless, the new system did not produce gratifying results, possibly because of insufficient suitable personnel for teaching and management, and in all probability reached and benefited only a small proportion of the population.(8)

With the establishment of the Protectorate over Korea in 1906, Japanese educational activities were expanded still more. The Japanese Residency General set out to reform the educational system and to extend common education, while, at the same time, it encouraged industrial, normal, and other specialized forms of education.(9) The new institutions and other education improvements

made during the four years of the formal Protectorate were under control of the former Korean Government's Educational Department. Japanese sources claim they gradually gained in popularity and won the confidence of Korean pupils. The public common schools increased from thirteen in 1906 to a full hundred in 1910.

The Japanese Ordinance of 1911. Shortly after the annexation of Korea by Japan, the Imperial Rescript on Education, promulgated in Japan in 1890, was extended to Korea and implemented through the Chosen Educational Ordinance of 23 August 1911.(11) This ordinance and other published regulations governing each type of school in the new system give a reasonably clear indication of Japanese educational methods for the subsequent three decades. Horace H. Underwood, one of the best informed of all Occidentals on Korean educational conditions in the period, summarized it:

> The policy of the government as stated in this ordinance meant to all Koreans three things against which they mentally rebelled. First, separate and different education for Koreans in Korea and Japanese in Korea...; second, the frank and rather bold statement that the chief object of the education offered was the making of loyal citizens of Japan; third, that education in Chosen (Korea) was to be adapted to the backward condition and low mentality of the people.(12)

The 1911 ordinance stressed that the main purpose of education was to produce loyal and good subjects of Japan by giving instructions on the basis of the Imperial Rescript concerning education. It was further to "engender national characteristics and spread the national language (Japanese)".

The ordinance classified education as common, industrial, and special. Common schools were subdivided into elementary common schools, common high schools, and girls' common high schools. Children were eligible, at the age of eight, for admission to the elementary common schools for a four-year course. Graduates from these schools were eligible to continue their general education in high schools, boys for four, girls for three years. Special and industrial education was restricted to boys and girls who had completed a sufficient portion of their general or common education to make vocational, specialized, or advanced training advisable. The educational picture was confused by the existence of the few surviving "Sohtang", Government schools, private schools, girls' schools, and Japanese schools. Actually, however, these followed the same principle in so far as type of education was concerned. "Sohtang" were allowed to continue as primary schools in villages where the governmental system was not adequately prepared to meet the needs of a community. Government schools were those institutions at any level entirely supported by the central government. Private schools were privately financed and fell into two classes: standard, those following the prescribed regulations for schools of any given type, and non-standard, those which did not. Japanese schools were exclusively for Japanese children; girls' schools were for girls beyond the age at which separate classes were considered as providing adequate segregation.(13)

General Characteristics of Annexation Period. Several points about the post-annexation educational system in Korea require some attention. Education was divided into two classes, one concerned with Japanese, the other with Korean education. Although the Imperial Rescript governed both divisions, the provisions of the Ordinance applied only to schools for Koreans. Japanese schools, on their part, maintained as far as possible a direct administrative connection with the Education Office of the Japanese Government in Japan.(14) Since the same ideology controlled both, there could be little difference in results, although the process required more tactful and subtle, yet forceful, indoctrination in Korean schools. Other differences stemmed from the fact that Koreans generally were offered only twelve or less years of education, while the Japanese in Korea were offered sixteen and enjoyed a far higher percentage of schools in proportion to population.(15)

In government schools the principal was usually Korean, but the headmaster was Japanese. To forestall misunderstanding as to the general purposes or methods of this Japanese-supervised education for Koreans, manuals and regulations commonly emphasized "enforcement of education" and the importance of stressing at all levels the "national language and national characteristics". This "enforcement" extended even into the private schools. There, for example, the principal could not engage a teacher without permission of the provincial governor of his locality or discharge one without making a report.(16)

The curriculum placed considerable emphasis on drill and regimentation. At their desks in the classroom children were required to maintain a position of attention; discipline in all school activity was absolute and complete.(17) Individuality in either pupils or teachers was discouraged. Statements of the Japanese themselves are of interest in measuring the general trend in Korean schools which engaged in preparing students not only for higher education but for life itself. Extracts from an "instructive address", given in August 1911 by the Japanese Director of the Educational Bureau to an orientation class for head-teachers, aid in clarifying Japanese aims:

> Due to political evils hitherto in evidence, Koreans are apt to indulge themselves in vain theories and arguments, and to despise industry, and lack the industrial habit. Among other things these traits are especially to be eradicated in view of the present condition of Chosen, so you are required to direct your pupils properly, making yourselves an example, so that you may be able to bring them up to be an industrious and economical people....
>
> The current of a new civilization, sometimes, tends to destroy old yet good customs. Educationalists are well advised to maintain and respect these good customs. In Chosen there are many good customs, such as the warm relations between teachers and students, and the observance of right order and respect by the younger toward the aged, etc. You are advised to make yourselves thoroughly acquainted with the customs of the locality where you are posted.

Speaking to a different class, the same Director stated: "In Chosen the relation between teachers and pupils is of a very intimate kind and the respect shown to the former by the latter is such as is rarely seen in Japan".(18)

Dr. James Fisher wrote that he believed in the sincerity of the Japanese effort to give Koreans a "fuller and richer life" through education. He admitted, however, that there might be "some truth" in the accusation that Japan conducted extensive educational activities in Korea primarily to "further her own imperialistic aims and to train the Koreans into patriotic subjects of Japan".(19)

The attitude of the Korean people toward the education meted out to them by the Government General during the first decade of Japanese control is clearly brought out in "Grievances of the Korean People", publicized during the 1919 independence movement. This document, calling the Japanese scheme of education "incomplete and inefficient", declared "There is a determination to limit the knowledge of our students instead of cultivating our intellects. A poisonous hand is plucking up young trees". Although that may well be an overstatement of conditions, the Japanese administration during this period did prefer to have insufficient schools rather than to allow Koreans to attend those not under close control. Indicative of this philosophy was the number of schools in relation to Korean population statistics, for, between 1910 and 1923, there were only one to six schools for each 100,000 Koreans, in contrast to 79 to 117 schools for each 100,000 Japanese. Educational expenditures show the same disproportionate discrimination.(20)

Regimentation was likewise prominent in textbook requirements. All textbooks were compiled and published by the Government General.(21)

With the exception of works on the Korean language and Chinese classics, these were written in Japanese. One manual required that textbooks for morals be prepared and distributed. Texts on agriculture stipulated that "matter treated must not run counter with the industrial policy of the Government General and arrangements by the provincial offices".(22) The official Manual of Education in Chosen asserted that books should treat of "matters helpful to the promotion of self conception as Japanese", and those "aiming at the promotion of friendship between Japanese and Koreans".(23)

Privately published books were permitted after the annexation. However, such publications had to be censored and approved by the Governor General. Any "found to contain material and words not agreeing with the new order of things", such as the fact of annexation itself, were thus eliminated. March 1914 was set as the terminal date after which no unauthorized books could be used.(24)

Changing conditions in Korea necessitated a revision of texts in 1928, and a temporary textbook "inquiry" committee was formed to discuss plans for such revisions. These deliberations resulted in the preparation of fifty-three new books dealing with such subjects as Ethics, National Language, and Arithmetic.

In April 1937, Japanese control made itself felt in the educational field once more when the "Tyosen Pernicious Books and Papers Temporary Control Act" was put into force. The Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1937-38 explained that this step was

taken "in view of the change of world tendencies and for the maintenance of peace". According to the official Japanese account, the "patriotism and loyalty" of the Korean people after the outbreak of the China incident was such that after 1939, Japanese and Korean children used the same textbooks.

Figures can be misleading unless all circumstances involved are taken into consideration, but the number of textbooks considered necessary to meet the need of Korean schools may illustrate the extensiveness of the Japanese educational effort. Prior to 1919 less than one million textbooks were required in all categories. By 1923, the requirement reached 4,400,000 but fell to 2,500,000 in the subsequent year. It rose after 1930, however, reaching a peak in 1937 of more than thirteen million volumes.(25)

At the time when Korea was annexed and educational regulations were being considered, the Emperior of Japan gave 17,000,000 yen to Korea for relief and for the improvement and spread of education. Two-tenths of the interest from this fund was to be devoted to the promotion of education, particularly common education. With the help of the imperial grant supplemented by provincial funds, 134 new schools were set up throughout Korea before the close of 1911. Nevertheless, there were still insufficient funds to permit compulsory education even at the primary level.(26) Although the imperial grant was of great assistance in furthering the Korean educational program, it naturally could not carry the whole load. Drafts on

the Central Government treasury funds, as well as interest on the grant, served as subsidies for provincial schools supposedly supported primarily by provincial funds. Government schools, of course, were entirely sustained by the Central Government.

The Ordinance of 1922. In February 1922, the Governor General, Baron Saito, issued a new ordinance on education. Although issued in a spirit of liberalism, the new ordinance added regulations concerning normal schools and colleges and apparently increased the extent of the Government General's control over private education. In private schools the prescribed textbooks and qualifications of teachers were made more rigid. However, although this ordinance seemingly exercised closer control over private education than the original one of 1911, it did liberalize the highly restrictive intervening regulations of 1915. Baron Saito was in fact instituting what were, by comparison with regulations of the two previous administrations, a series of liberal reforms. Evidence of liberalism was marked in the removal of the requirement that all subjects be taught in the Japanese language. The Korean language, technical subjects, and the Chinese classics could again be taught in Korean.(27) According to the Governor General, these changes in the new educational ordinance were made in order to raise the standard of primary, commercial, industrial, and professional education "under the basic principle that Japan and Chosen should have one and the same complete institution (in order) that they may enjoy common

prosperity".[28] With minor modifications, this ordinance served until March 1938, when the Educational Ordinance was fundamentally modified to give similar instruction to both Korean and Japanese children with the purpose of "forming them into true and loyal imperial Subjects through their mental and physical training".[29]

III - BEGINNING OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION

At the outset of the occupation, it was realized that the existing meager knowledge of educational problems required inclusion of an educational officer in the first echelon of Military Government personnel sent to Korea from Okinawa. This officer, upon reaching Seoul on 10 September 1945, made immediate plans for the interrogation of Japanese and Korean officials of the Department (or Bureau as it was then called(*)) of Education.(30) From these officials was requested information on the system of education then operative in Korea.

Preliminary Steps. During the first week of occupation, a great number of Korean educators were interviewed concerning such matters as the reopening of schools, which had been closed on 15 August, dismissal of Japanese teaching personnel, obtaining of competent Korean educators, and rehabilitation of the Department of Education. To obtain the advice of Korean educators, a meeting was held on 16 September in which sixteen eminent Koreans participated.

*According to the Annual Report, Tyosen, 1937-38, p. 37, titles of central offices were changed from "department" to "bureau" in 1919. At the outset of the American occupation, the principal units of Military Government were denominated in the same style with the provincial offices being designated "departments". This was changed, however, by USAMGIK Ordinance No. 64, 29 March 1946, which restored the old nomenclature although functions of the offices remained essentially the same. Central offices again became "departments" and their subordinate branches "bureaus". To avoid confusion, the following arbitrary procedure has been adopted: Henceforth in this chapter, the National Department of Education is referred to as "Department" and subordinate branches as "bureaus" regardless of the date of the event discussed. The foregoing handling is for textual matter only.

At this meeting, the educational officer pointed out that Military Government policy was to continue, for the time being, the system established by the Japanese. Changes would be made when deemed appropriate, but not until Military Government had acquainted itself with the existing situation. Moreover, he emphasized, since the Japanese system was so highly centralized, changes would necessarily extend throughout the entire organization.(31) At this same meeting, it was agreed that elementary schools would be reopened on 24 September, and that while the Japanese would eventually have to be removed, they would be tolerated in departmental positions until Koreans were ready to take over.(32) The sixteen Koreans then voted for colleagues they considered qualified to represent each of seven individual fields of education on a Korean Committee on Education.(33) By mid-November, this and another group, the National Committee on Educational Planning, had become firmly entrenched as permanent advisory committee. Both were still functioning in 1948.

Immediately apparent at the beginning of the occupation was the existence of one outstanding problem -- the necessity of reorganization. Very soon, three others manifested themselves: in the question of insufficient school space, the urgent need for textbooks, and the teacher shortage. Satisfactory reorganization was not achieved until over two years later, while the other three major problems, common to all levels of education, were unsolved by

mid-1948. With the occupation of school buildings as troop billets, expansion of the school system was seriously hampered. Although troops were removed from school edifices within six months, the effects of their stay was felt long afterward. Textbook shortages were most acute in 1945 and 1946, but even by 1948 had not been completely overcome. Teacher deficiency was probably the most critical problem facing all school levels, and this was still true in 1948.

Education Reorganization. The National Department of Education was not formally organized until 6 October 1945, although operations were resumed earlier. On that date, seven "divisions" were created within the department: schools, textbooks, standards, planning, culture and welfare, meteorology, and the office of business management. Within the week, however, a new reorganization took place. The seven divisions were reduced to six (now denominated "bureaus"): textbooks, schools, arts and religions, welfare, meteorology, and business management. Four more revisions followed in rapid succession. In accordance with Military Government Ordinance No. 18, the Welfare Bureau was transferred to the Department of Public Health on 27 October. On 16 November, the bureau of business management was made an office, leaving the department with four bureaus. On 19 December 1945, there were created two offices — Liaison and Administration — and nine bureaus. On 21 January 1946, the series of earlier upheavals

culminated in a reorganization upon which the activities of the department were based for almost two years.

Under the new organization, the department comprised the offices of the director, research, special subjects, and administration, and the bureaus of textbooks, elementary schools, secondary schools, higher schools, adult education, culture, and meteorology. The special subjects office was made responsible for musical education, but, at the same time, was so organized that responsibility for additional subjects could be added. By 10 June 1946, further breakdown was under way. The Bureau of Higher Schools, for example, had been subdivided into the sections of normal schools; colleges, medical colleges, and Seoul University.(34)

Later, other minor changes occurred, such as the re-designation of the Bureau of Culture as Bureau of Social Education. While the department was thus divided into "bureaus" and "offices", actually it was operating with its main divisions following the major grades of education, as higher education, secondary, and so on down the line.

As time went on, however, concentration on centralized issues became more and more necessary and the existing organization less and less satisfactory. Therefore, in the fall of 1947, plans were drafted for a thorough-going reorganization which would in effect create a new department. Tentatively approved in October by the Acting Military Governor, Brigadier General Charles G.

Helmick, these plans received the formal sanction of the new Military Governor, Major General William F. Dean, in December and became effective with the new year.(35)

In the new departmental structure, elementary and secondary education were brought under one bureau which was broadened to include five sections: physical health, science and mathematics, social studies, English, and guidance. Through this combination of two previously separate bureaus, it was hoped that elementary and secondary administration would develop a smooth continuity of twelve years instruction instead of the former "six-six" method. The five sections were more concerned with curriculum development. Vocational training was expanded to include specialists in industrial training for skilled and semi-skilled students, while the business administration branch was enlarged and given the task of creating a sound educational fiscal policy which could eventually be adopted. The antiquated research bureau, which had degenerated into being a mere keeper of records, was authorized to train Korean personnel in handling research, tests and measurements, and extensive child statistics in mental and physical growth. Among the more important research studies it conducted in the course of the following year were surveys of middle-school salaries, scholarship needs for economic development, and "Skills and Critical Needs in Economic Development of South Korea".(36)

Two new divisions were added to the department: a bureau

for education of the handicapped and one of provincial liaison officers. The latter's function was to maintain close contact with all provincial bureaus for reporting results and in clarifying national directives and surveys. Other changes included broadening of the Bureau of Textbooks, to which was assigned a specialist on audio-visual aids, formerly lacking in the bureau; addition of an advisor on pre-service training in normal schools and colleges to the Bureau of Teacher Training; and a greatly expanded Bureau of Higher Schools.(*) Administration of education remained much the same, as did the American Language Institute.(37)

Billeting of Troops in Schools. One of the earliest difficulties which educational authorities faced was the use by occupation personnel of school buildings as billets. This began practically with the occupation itself. A directive of the Commanding General on 29 September 1945 prohibited this practice except where permission was granted by the Department of Education or the local government. However, this directive was inadequately circulated, and by 1 November 1945, American troops were well ensconced in a large number of schools.(38)

The Japanese had kept the best Korean institutions running up to the time of liberation. These included the Imperial University, the only institution where students could receive a Bachelor of Arts degree on the level of occidental standards, the missionary colleges, and the better schools. One of the first

orders issued by the occupation authorities was that closing all schools above the primary level. With the closing of the schools the way had been cleared for use of the buildings by troops, although this came as a by-product. The 29th General Hospital moved into Ewha College. Ewha's president, Miss Helen Kim, protested that the college was actually Korean, not Japanese. When the matter was brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff, the college buildings were relinquished.

The 29th thereupon moved into the scientific school of the Imperial University. Subsequently, that school's laboratories were "denuded of their expensive, complicated, and irreplaceable equipment", according to Lieutenant Commander Crofts, who served for a time as President of Seoul University.(39) Dr. Paik Lark Geoun, dean of Law and Literature at the Imperial University prior to liberation, however, was more qualified in his comment. At the outset, the Americans had thought it "a purely Japanese enterprise" and had burned many technical papers, periodicals, and publications, but when they learned the institution was Korean, they were "much more careful". Nevertheless, "much valuable and delicate equipment had been roughly removed and put in adjacent buildings", which were inadequately guarded, and in the long run was "hopelessly lost".(40) The building itself was not harmed.

The Seoul University College of Law and Literature became the billet for the 308th Bomb Wing. There was no strenuous objection to this at first, for many classrooms could be used without detrimental effects on the building as a whole. However, the Bomb Wing took up

quarters in the library with the consequent destruction of that room. Books disappeared or were lost; meanwhile the catalogue itself became so completely disordered that there was no chance of tracking down lost volumes or even discovering whether they had ever existed as part of the library. "A plan for saving treasures and the library might have been worked out if there had been coordination", but unfortunately the 308th moved in very early in the occupation. The Department of Education had not approved this move, but at the time it was barely organized and incapable of actually approving or disapproving such actions by the military. Even the 29 September 1945 directive prohibiting occupation of school buildings as billets was ineffective, mainly because the American director of education was not informed or aware of its existence. This directive was clear and gave the director sufficient power, but he did not see it until fully a month later. By that time the troops were settled in the buildings.(41)

1st Lt. W. S. Biscoe, director of secondary schools in 1945, stated that the destruction in middle schools was "wanton, shameful, and unnecessary". He referred particularly to the Keijo Middle School, which, although a Japanese school, had been built and run by public funds, thus making it primarily Korean rather than Japanese. The Lieutenant visited the school before American troops entered it in October. It was then in "fairly good condition". Returning to the institution after occupation by troops, the Lieutenant found that equipment had been destroyed,

windows broken, and one classroom completely burned out. Lt. Biscoe's Korean counterpart, Mr. Lee Heung Chong, stated that he had actually witnessed the removal of equipment and destruction through carelessness by American troops in the Seoul University Technical School. 1st Lt. Ernest Mead testified as to the destruction wrought in Chongju by soldiers who preceded the Cannon Company of the 17th Infantry in that area. Almost all the laboratory equipment had been destroyed "and school chairs burned as fuel".

The occupation of school buildings was a serious blow to efforts for rehabilitation of education in Korea. The Command itself had endeavored to protect school buildings and the like by the 29 September directive. Unauthorized billeting was a violation of that directive. However, not even the severest critics of the resulting condition have as much as inferred that it was done with knowledge of the directive's existence. Inasmuch as the Director of Education was unaware of it for a full month, the presumption of similar ignorance on the part of troop commanders is not unreasonable.

The losses by destruction and theft were even more lasting in their effects, and American personnel did obviously contribute. There is no indication from any of the complainants, however, that higher echelons of the Command were cognizant of these actions, careless or otherwise, which from their nature were usually committed at the time of initial occupancy.

Koreans on their part were all too frequently willing to raze anything "tainted" by the Japanese. In line with this, they looted and ransacked many school buildings. Amid the sudden burst of feeling accompanying liberation, they not only went on a prolonged spree of effacing marks of Japanese presence, but looted for personal gain as well. As time went on the last motive became the dominant factor and much stored equipment was stolen due to inadequate protection.

At the end of 1945, education officers made a concerted drive to remove all troops from school buildings. This was given impetus by the urgent need for education in Korea. On 10 January 1946, evacuation of troops from schools was begun. On 16 January, the 308th Bomb Wing, most persistent of the occupiers, vacated the six buildings it occupied. Because of the absolute lack of other suitable space, the 29th remained in possession of the science and engineering campus eight miles east of Seoul.(41) The 34th General Hospital, its successor, continued on the campus until the fall of 1948.(*)

The Textbook Situation. In September 1945 when the United States Army Forces entered Korea, they found a people who for forty years had been "Japanized". All native customs had been suppressed. Children who did not take Japanese names had found it difficult to enter school. The native costume had been considered unpatriotic. In the 1930's instruction in the Korean language had been gradually eliminated from the schools until finally it was completely forbidden except for an official newspaper used for notices to the older citizens. Parents

*It was scheduled for deactivation as of 15 October 1948.

who had not insisted that their children speak Japanese were accused of having dangerous thoughts. Scholars who continued to study the Korean language or who taught it had been placed in prison.

Liberation brought a sharp reaction. Everything Japanese was condemned. Japanese textbooks were gathered from the schools and destroyed by burning or thrown into the sea. Paradoxically, a great need and desire for education was felt by all Koreans.

During the first days of occupation, the Department of Education secured the aid of a famous Korean scholar, Choi Hun Pai. Ten days before American troops arrived, Mr. Choi was released from prison where he had spent three years in semi-solitary confinement, been denied paper and pencil, subjected to torture by starvation, and given the notorious "water cure", because, as a professor at Chosen Christian College, he had continued work on a book of Korean grammar after the Japanese had forbidden teaching of the Korean language.

With the acquisition of Mr. Choi's services, the Department embarked upon the considerable task of writing, publishing, and distributing textbooks for all of South Korea. Textbooks in the Korean language were non-existent, while liberated Koreans had destroyed all Japanese books even though these could not readily have been translated into Korean. The new Japanese series had embraced such facts and interpretations as would add to the great glory of the Japanese empire. Geography, for instance, began with the bombing of Pearl Harbor and progressed through the conquests in China and the Philippines. Civics dealt primarily with the subjection of the individual to the Emperor. Indeed, the first story in

the primer told of a farmer who sold his cow and had his son give the money to the police to buy war materials. A few Korean legends and stories were included, but as a rule these were too adult for general purposes. Korea was divided politically and textbook matter had to skirt all controversial questions. The Department of Education finally decided to translate the fables of Aesop and passages from American school books. Even then the familiar story of the three blind men and the elephant was found offensive and had to be stricken from the proposed manuscripts.

The department applied, through channels, to American authorities in Japan for sample copies of American textbooks to use as references, but by the end of November 1946 none had reached Korea. Several American publishers sent sample copies of textbooks, but the time required for ordering and receipt averaged about four months. Assistance was given by personal friends who sent individual copies to acquaintances in the department.

Problems of Textbook Publication. Prior to the Japanese annexation, the Government of Korea had established and maintained a fine printing press; now, however, there was no Korean type. The Korean alphabet consisted of twenty-four letters, but because of the influence of Chinese ideographs, these were combined into over 2,000 characters. Each of these characters had to be carved by hand before typesetting could commence. Consequently, even after manuscripts had been prepared, there ensued long delays while type was prepared.

During this period, Mr. Choi and other eminent Korean scholars obtained by Military Government to assist in the preparation of textbooks, expressed a desire to introduce certain reforms in the language. They believed the language should be presented horizontally, reading from left to right, since such writing was already universal in music, arithmetic, and science formulas. Moreover, writing with modern pencils and pens was facilitated by the horizontal method of presentation. Despite these and other cogent reasons, this innovation met with considerable opposition. Many Koreans favored retention of the Chinese characters; other wished to adopt the Latin alphabet and characters used by the Americans. For a number of weeks a large committee of Koreans met daily before a decision was finally reached whereby the 2,000 Chinese ideographs were done away with, the pure Korean alphabet established, and horizontal writing instituted. The way was cleared for eventual use of typewriters and linotype machines patterned after standard American models.

Scarcity of paper was an ever-constant problem for the textbook section of the Department of Education. As late as 1 September 1947, no adequate arrangements had been made whereby sufficient quantities of paper were available to the bureau. The Japanese had left an enormous stockpile of paper at scattered locations. These stocks had to be ferreted out, then protected from the many political parties which had been formed after liberation. Each

party had its own newspaper through which it advanced party aims. Consequently, paper was valuable to the political groups, and it was considered the patriotic duty of every party member to report the site of any paper stockpile. Not only were the parties eager to seize paper, but they soon absorbed the few trained printers. Subsequently, when Military Government finally obtained paper supplies, it found the government publishing house seriously understaffed and underpaid. Korean politicians offered more highly remunerative positions to printers than the government could afford to pay. Because of this, the government printing plant was never adequately manned even though other difficulties were partially resolved, and only a part of the available printing equipment was utilized.

In November 1945, the first books were completed. Copies were presented to Major General A. V. Arnold, Military Governor, and a representative of the Korean children, while the Department of Education "rolled up its sleeves" to begin mass production. The possibility of distribution being in any way a problem came as a shock.

Under the Japanese, textbooks had been controlled by the state with every dealer approved and licensed by the government. As most booksellers had been Japanese, repatriation reduced their number from over four hundred to thirty. For book dealers outside Seoul, there was little incentive to conduct business. The Department of

Education had assumed that a set price could be established for each textbook allowing the printer and dealer ten per cent profit each with an additional ten per cent for shipping costs. The final price agreed upon by Military Government officials was one yen fifty sen. As the pre-liberation price of books had been about twenty sen, it was felt that the new price constituted an enormous increase. However, inflation and the cost of transportation made book procurement and selling unprofitable for any dealer. Transportation for one hundred books in a truck with a man to guard them was one hundred yen even for a short distance. Therefore, unless the government allowed dealers to set their own price, they could not afford to be interested. Issuance of free textbooks was one solution suggested, but the director of the Department of Education felt that so long as tuition was charged at all schools, free textbooks could not be justified.

Distribution of Textbooks, 1946. Six weeks after the first books had rolled off the presses, none had been distributed. In desperation the department decided to attempt distribution of one copy of each book published to as many Korean teachers as possible, many of whom had been holding classes without benefit of textbooks. To accomplish this mission, Captain Paul Anderson, Department of Education, an enlisted man, and one Korean "who knew about as much about the country as we did" began a pilgrimage in a 2½-ton army truck into the provinces in January 1946. The journey was

hazardous, for at the time most of Korea was covered with snow, roads were unmarked, bridges were washed out or only partially completed, while the country was disrupted by political unrest. Military Government itself was swamped with problems created by the thousands of refugees returning from Japan, abandoned Japanese property, and food and health questions.

The party stayed wherever it could find shelter, in Korean inns, with army units, or in the truck it travelled in. Captain Anderson described the enlisted man who accompanied him as "one of the unnoticed heroes of the occupation", for: "He worked weekends and holidays in order to get this mission finished. He drove over ice-covered mountain roads built only for bull carts, repaired the truck with whatever parts he could discover in the area. A flat tire on a loaded two and one-half ton truck is quite a problem in a country without filling stations or telephones, especially if part of your tools were stolen the night before. We... had as many as eight flat tires on one trip".

In most cases, the little party received cooperation from the troops with whom it stayed. Most welcome aid was that of repair of the worn truck and replacement of missing parts.

During January, February, and March 1946, the party travelled more than five thousand miles and distributed one million books which were to be utilized by 1,700,000 registered students. When not concerned with the actual distribution of books, the Americans busied themselves with the details of arranging shipment of books by train. This involved going through not only American, but devious Korean channels.

Contact was made with many dealers who could obtain books by freight car if Military Government gave them permission to travel. Unfortunately, the new Korean dealers were inexperienced. After getting travel permits, many journeyed to Seoul, bought their books, and only then realized they had no way to transport them to their villages. Trains were overcrowded. It was impossible for a vendor carrying five or six hundred books

to occupy a passenger seat when people were being loaded even on car-tops. Many dealers waited at Seoul Station as long as five days before getting transportation. Their books were stolen occasionally or burned by others for warmth. At one time Captain Anderson's interpreter was forced to arrange for the cremation of a dealer who had come by boat to the mainland, contracted pneumonia, and died at Seoul Station.

Preparation of Further Texts. During the early part of the occupation, the Department of Education obtained the services of a number of former teachers and scholars to act as authors and editors of the new books. A staff of nearly fifty Koreans working solely on writing, translation, or the business aspects of textbooks manufacturing was thus employed. Because of the tremendous textbook shortage, the department aimed at completing a program of writing and publishing eighty-five textbooks within two years. Captain Anderson, who was in charge of translations -- the English employed by Korean translators was sometimes amusing, sometimes puzzling -- attempted to revise the material to meet American standards. He soon decided that if the material met with the approval of the Korean staff, if it interested children, and if it was not contrary to the Army concept of democracy, attempting further improvements was impractical. In book compilation, the editor usually prepared an outline before discussing it with Korean teachers. If it was approved, a copy was written, mimeographed,

and distributed to the teachers. After final revision, it was approved and sent to the printer. As there were only two Americans in the Bureau of Textbooks, neither of whom understood Korean, Captain Anderson said, "I feel the books are Korean, having been planned, written, and approved by them".

Language difficulties continued to arise. Some Japanese, Chinese, and American words, particularly in the fields of science and mathematics, lacked Korean equivalents. Therefore, the foreign word had to be phonetically translated into Korean and thus incorporated into the vocabulary. Before being adopted, such changes had to be approved by many individuals and offices.

Editorial problems sometimes involved political subjects, which had to be handled with great care. The most serious mistake made by the Bureau of Textbooks was that of printing a picture of the Korean flag waving from a pole crowned by a round ball. After many conferences this was changed to a spear, for the ball was considered "Japanese". This revision was achieved by gluing 200,000 small reprints of a spear over the offending staff in already printed textbooks.

Eight books had been completed by June 1946 and more than two million copies distributed. Meanwhile, the paper supply was rapidly disappearing. Korea could produce only about nine per cent of her paper needs. Though the Department of Education applied through channels for shipments of paper, none arrived. Consequently, most of the textbooks were printed on flimsy newsprint paper. This

was done not only because of the scarcity of better quality paper, but because the Department of Education felt that the books would require revision within the next four years. One project involved printing illustrated readers on better quality paper, but since all Korean presses capable of handling such work were turning out paper money, this was indefinitely postponed.(43)

On 7 January 1947, the Department of Education Military Advisor reported to the Military Governor, in regard to the Bureau of Textbooks, "The cumulative effects of two actions are slowly throttling the efforts of this department". The first of these was reallocation to the Department of Public Information of 250 tons of paper requisitioned by the Department of Education with the result that Education actually "received none from import-export". The advisor commented further, "If our requests are to be reallocated to other people when they arrive in Korea, we can see very little point in trying to anticipate our needs and requesting aid in meeting them". The second point was the releasing of textbook presses to government houses for the printing of money. "We did that because after Public Information took our paper, almost any little plant could print up all the paper we have".(44)

If the Bureau of Textbooks was to supply Korean schools with as much as textbook material as the Japanese had furnished during the last two war years, 170,000,000 books would have to be printed during 1947. In 1946, the bureau succeeded in turning out just over six million copies. On 7 January 1947, the advisor estimated

that, at the current rate of production, the bureau could produce approximately one million books during 1947. He reported in January 1947 that when the Americans occupied South Korea they found that 176,000,000 books printed by the Japanese within the preceding two years had been destroyed. American Military Government at first estimated 63,000,000 books would be needed to replace the lost Japanese editions. By January 1947, this figure was reduced to an essential 35,000,000 books. Since there were approximately 2,200,000 elementary and middle school students in South Korea, the printing of 6,000,000 books by Military Government in 1946 gave each student an average of less than three books. However, the large population centers received more than their share of the texts, while some rural schools operated with only a few books in the hands of the teachers. In addition to the books published by the Bureau, more than 250,000 books approved by the bureau had been published by teachers, societies, and other private agencies.

During 1946, the Bureau of Textbooks had been greatly handicapped by complete lack of any printed material in the Korean language. Further drawbacks arose from the lack of capable personnel for writing textbooks willing to work for small Military Government salaries, scarcity of all types of supplies, and difficulties of distribution. As a result of the tours of Captain Anderson and his party in the winter of 1946, contacts had been made with more

than two hundred book dealers. These had gone into business, but they were hindered by the transportation costs, difficulties of travel, and the small amounts of books available at any one time. Moreover, inflation had caused books to rise eight thousand per cent in price.(45)

Achievements of the Bureau of Textbooks. Several months later, on 22 July 1947, the Bureau of Textbooks progress report summarized the achievements of the bureau to that date. More than twenty-seven elementary and five middle school textbooks, five courses of study, and two teachers' guides had been written, published, and distributed. A total of 9,393,246 copies had been printed. There were, in addition, 500,000 Japanese printed books for elementary school home economics and boys' shop work apportioned without cost among the schools. More than twenty-three books of old court records had been translated into Korean as a source material for Korean history. A number of books on social studies, psychology, arithmetic, astronomy, domestic science, and commercial studies were in the press. American textbook centers to be used for reference purposes had been established at the National Library in Seoul, Taejon Normal College, and the Provincial Education Office at Pusan. Some 3,695 American college textbooks had been distributed for reference purposes and classroom use, along with 16,000 American library books, fiction and non-fiction, sent out to schools and provincial educational offices. A committee to

judge Korean textbooks written outside the Department of Education had been established. By 22 July 1947, it had approved nineteen books primarily designed for middle school use.

Another committee, composed of 119 individuals representing universities, newspapers, publishers, government personnel, teachers, and language scholars, organized itself for the purpose of purifying the Korean language. Its first step was to propose adoption into the Korean vocabulary of some 639 Japanese, English, and Chinese words. The Bureau had translated several Japanese, English, and Chinese books into Korean for reference use and had adapted photographs, maps, and illustrations for all books. Private publishers had been assisted by paper allocations, checking of manuscripts, suggesting and securing of books for translations or reference, obtaining of buildings and loans, and supervision of distribution. As a result of this encouragement, a number of charts for Korean history, phonetic pronunciation charts, food charts, childrens' dictionaries, and reference books for the social studies program had been produced privately.(46)

On 18 August 1947, the Bureau of Textbooks advisor, reported to the Department Advisor that although ten million books had been published during the two years of American occupation, at least four million had undoubtedly deteriorated because of inferior paper and materials used in printing them. In addition, many scarce textbooks were idle on dealers' shelves. In August 1947, due to the paper shortage, the government was producing only 100,000

books per month. With an appropriate increase in paper supplies, it was felt that 600,000 books per month could be printed. At the rate of production of 100,000, the Bureau was not keeping pace with books lost each year through wear and tear and was "making no impression on the great basic need". Even with adequate paper, the advisor believed, it would take four years to supply the books needed in South Korea. He stated that "an assured monthly supply of 25,000 reams of textbook paper and 5,000 reams of newsprint for notebooks for the next two years" could meet the basic needs of the bureau.(47)

In November 1947, the advisor of the Bureau of Textbooks left for Washington, D.C., where he reported on Korean textbook conditions to the Civil Affairs Division. He hand-carried with him requisitions for paper supplies. The Korean situation received sympathetic attention in Washington. Paper supplies requested from Korea were to be filled through American Civilian Supply, but in the meantime shipments were promised from China. In May 1948, two shipments totaling 1,000 tons of paper arrived from China, but as yet none had been received direct from the United States. The Chinese shipments, however, furnished enough material to print eight to nine million textbooks.(48)

From 1 November 1947 to 1 April 1948, textbook printing was at a virtual standstill due to paper shortage. Over-all figures show that during that period only 1,861,883 textbooks were printed,

against a total of 11,163,454 between the outset of the Occupation and 1 November 1947. In the week ending 11 March 1948, output reached an all-time low of 7,070 textbooks, against 167,186 in the corresponding week in 1947. Moreover, the 1947 figures themselves were markedly less than those of 1946, for the paper shortage had already hit the textbook bureau early in 1947.

The 1948 rate amounted practically to a stoppage in textbook publishing, and the extremely low production could not even begin to cope with the rapid disintegration of newsprint books. The decline in printing in 1948 was attributable to two factors: the ever-present paper shortage and the 10 May South Korean election. Preparation of ballots and incidental material plus attendant publicity needs in paper sapped potential textbook supplies and resulted in a temporary loss of printing facilities. Consequently, by May 1948, the textbook situation was at its most critical point since the first days of the occupation.

After the election, the two presses assigned the bureau were returned to normal duty. Moreover, in April, a third printing establishment signed a five-year contract with the government to print textbooks. Manuscript preparation was far ahead because of the publishing stoppage, and a great number of texts were on hand ready to be run through presses. With the subsequent arrival of paper supplies from China, the bureau looked forward to highly accelerated textbook production. Unfortunately, with everything set to begin unprecedented activity, South Korean electric power was cut off by the Russians. The Bureau of Textbooks was once more stalemated by circumstances beyond its control.(49)

IV - ELEMENTARY, SECONDARY, AND NORMAL SCHOOL PROGRESS

From an over-all standpoint, the difficulties in modernizing the education system were numerous. The various bureaus were not only faced by problems common to all, but each had troubled issues peculiar to its own functioning. Over-all problems involved chiefly the physical aspects of education such as lack of textbooks, equipment, buildings, and, above all, teachers. Other issues which arose were usually those which pertained directly to the level of education concerned. The lower and middle level schools -- elementary, secondary, and normal -- were far less disorganized than were the higher.

Elementary schools were, perhaps, the easiest level to organize in all education, but they, too, had difficulty in the attempt to modernize curricula. In many instances, city children were facing such hardships as undernourishment, while rural pupils were obliged to give priority to the laboring needs of the agricultural economy of Korea.

The real struggle of Korean education to right itself began in secondary schools. Primary school children could be easily led, but middle-school children were already set in educational patterns based on Japanese ideologies. To overcome this previous

design, the "six-six year" plan was initiated to bring public schooling in Korea up to western levels. The plan considerably upset the middle schools as did curricular changes. However, the new system began functioning in 1946, and by 1947, educational authorities had begun to look into the field of student activities.

Changes in the normal school system were undertaken early in the occupation and emphasis was placed on curricular changes and more intensive training for future elementary teachers. Greatest handicap to normal schools was the low salary scale for teachers. This kept many prospective students out of the teaching profession and caused many of those in training to desert the schools. Accomplishments in normal schooling remained mostly with the national bureau where much material was prepared and distributed to the schools.

Progress in Elementary Schools. Scarcely a week after entry of occupation forces into Korea, the American command directed the reopening of public primary schools on Monday, 24 September 1945. All Korean children between the ages of six and twelve were to be registered. Korean primary school teachers were ordered to register immediately and to hold themselves in readiness to begin work on that date.(50)

On 29 September, Military Government Ordinance No. 6 was promulgated. It prohibited "racial and religious discrimination in the schools of Korea", forbade the teaching of any subject or

observation of any practices "inimical to the interests of Korea", and required that Korean be the language of instruction. However, pending availability of adequate materials in Korea, foreign languages might be used.

When the primary schools of Korea were thus reopened, many problems immediately beset the lower level of education. The Japanese system of elementary education had been established primarily as a means of indoctrinating Korean children into Japanese ideology. Individual thought by them had not been considered important. Consequently, teaching of this age-group was left without the direction of men with education, competence, or intelligence. The Japanese Department of Education had had no independent organization for the primary schools; nor was any personnel specifically responsible for them. Alterations in curricular matter were made by the chief of schools and colleges, while clerical personnel wrote and filed the routine reports in addition to their other duties. American Military Government, believing that capable and experienced elementary educators inside the department would improve the quality of learning, and with an earnest desire to promote compulsory education created a separate bureau for elementary schools.

The promotion of compulsory education was made a direct responsibility of the Bureau of Elementary Schools. General Order No. 4 had begun the compulsory idea with the registration of all

children between the ages of six to twelve. When the National Educational Committee approved a sub-committee compulsory education plan, it was on theory that after 1946, all six-year old children would be required to attend school. The approved program called for continuation of compulsory education with six-year olds of subsequent years until compulsory education reach the sixth grade. During these years a double-shift program would provide for other elementary age children who requested schooling.(51)

The National Educational Committee, however, made little attempt to answer the practical problem created by its approval of compulsory education.(52) By accepting the plan, the committee made itself in many ways responsible for solving the financial, building, and teaching problems involved, although these were innumerable and staggering.(53) Koreans had never had free or compulsory education; nor had there been opportunity for more than at most half of the children of elementary school age to attend school. Consequently, Korea was faced by inadequate teaching personnel and facilities. To accomplish the National Committee's six-year plan, the government would have had to double the number of elementary school buildings, hire ten thousand new teachers annually, and spend almost two billion won per year.(54) Economic instability and lack of materials and trained personnel precluded such steps. The only apparent advantage of the plan and its discussion was that it brought the educational needs of the country to the attention of a large group of influential Korean

educators and citizens.

By November 1947, compulsory education had begun to show faint signs of success because of the continuing increase in enrollment in elementary schools, but the system was still far from adequate for the needs of the country. In an attempt to school all eligible children, warehouses and other types of buildings were pressed into use.(55) Even then there were not enough buildings. The teaching staff had been supplemented by recruitment of new personnel, but these were unsatisfactory, as they could be given very little training. The need for teachers was so great that requirements were necessarily lowered and it became a matter of hiring anyone willing to teach the pupils. Moreover, despite the recruiting program, teaching staffs remained severely undermanned.(56)

The six-year plan was not new to Korea. It had been created originally by the Japanese, but after liberation it became necessary to change the language of instruction from Japanese to Korean. Thus, in December 1946, Japanese language and morals courses were replaced by civics and the Korean language, while tuition was limited to one won a month per student.(57) The language change necessitated new textbooks whose printing became a major problem because of paper and material shortages. This difficulty had not been overcome by November 1947. In changing the curriculum of the elementary schools, Korean educators also

made concerted efforts to abolish the Chinese classics and institute an over-all social studies course which would include geography, social science, and related subjects. This blow at ancient established ideas on Korean education met great opposition. At the end of 1947, no real degree of success had been reached in this enterprise although there was continuing hope that the Chinese classics would eventually be replaced and practical education installed.(58)

Changes in curricular matter and shortages of personnel and material were not the only problems. In the provinces it was found that while farmers were willing to send their six-year old sons to school, they balked at sending those of ten and twelve years, for their services were needed in the fields.(59) Within the schools were added difficulties. In March 1946, a report of malnutrition among the school children was investigated at the Seoul City Education Office. An estimated ten to twenty per cent of the children did not eat lunch; many more lacked sufficient food. It was stated that, "until more food is available to the general public, this condition will continue".(60) In early April a discussion was held at the Seoul City Education Office on feeding undernourished school children.(61) No record of this meeting exists, but it has been asserted that one of its decisions was to allow small loaves of bread to be sold to primary pupils. Because of grain shortages the bread was not of the highest quality,

but it was nourishing nevertheless. Sale of this foodstuff began in the fall of 1946. At the end of 1947 it was still being distributed, students being allowed to buy one or two loaves according to their desires.(62)

Although most of the problems faced in 1945 and 1946 remained unsolved by November 1947, enrollment in elementary schools consistently increased.(*) Under the Japanese, elementary school enrollment in South Korea had been 1,430,000.(63) Late in 1945 there were 3,500,000 children between the six and twelve-year age limit, of whom 1,546,919 were enrolled in school by 15 December.(64) By the end of 1946, this figure had swollen to 2,114,000.(65) A survey of the schools in May 1947 showed the enrollment to be 2,137,634.(66) Meanwhile, the number of teachers increased from 13,782 under the Japanese to 20,724 on 15 December 1945 and 30,519 in May 1947. Schools had increased in number from 3,068 to 3,314 on 15 December 1945. In September 1947 there were 2,243,259 students, 32,199 teachers, and 3.401 schools.(67) According to school attendance figures of 31 May 1947, 24,519 classes daily were conducted in elementary schools. The attendance report for September 1947 listed 38,771 daily classes. Thus, each teacher had an average of sixty-six students in the classroom. Furthermore, it was estimated in April 1947, that sixty per cent of the children of elementary school age were all that could be enrolled under the then existing conditions.(68) With this fact in mind,

* No reliable school statistics are available. Those used in the context are thought to be the most dependable.

the Department of Education set its goal for a seventy per cent enrollment for 1947.[69] In August 1947, the Advisor to the Director stated:

> There are now well over two million children of this group in school as against a million and a half under the Japanese. Unfortunately, there are still at least a million children of this age group not in school. It is the belief of the Director of our Department that with an additional 200,000,000 yen per year he could find schooling for these children and bring universal education to Korea.[70]

Although no official census figures were available in November 1947, estimates based on the September school census indicated the seventy per cent goal had almost been reached. Moreover, the department was assured that the 200,000,000 won which the Director felt was necessary for the upkeep and enlargement of the elementary school system would be granted in the 1948-1949 Korean budget.[71]

Secondary Education. All schools had been closed at the time of Korean liberation, but while primary schools had been re-opened in September 1945 by Ordinance No. 6, those above the elementary level were left out of consideration. A few days later, however, the Department of Education received an instruction from the Military Governor, who had requested permission of the Commanding General, USAFIK, to reopen higher educational institutions on 1 October 1945.[72]

Under the Japanese there had been 275 middle schools with an enrollment of about 80,000 Korean students in addition to Japanese students. Of 3,603 teachers only 833 were Koreans.[73]

By 31 May 1947 there were 385 middle schools with 159,950 Korean students and 6,304 Korean teachers.(74) In September 1947 there were 212,234 students, 7,298 teachers, and 406 schools.(75) In the growth of the middle school enrollment, the same difficulties that prevailed at all levels of education faced the secondary school level. Because of physical deficiencies, admission of students into the schools had to be made on a competitive examination basis.(76) In February 1946, less than fifteen per cent of the middle school age population could be accommodated in schools.(77) In August 1947, the departmental advisor reported:

> We still have one million students for whom schools must be provided — students of whom just under sixteen per cent are now provided for. Korea must, therefore, plan on schools for more than five times as many high school students as she has at present which will mean, even with larger schools, over 1,600 schools and 25,000 to 30,000 teachers.(78)

Military Government made two important administrative changes in the Japanese secondary school organization. In place of a clerical section under a Japanese chief in charge of all schools and colleges, an independent secondary school bureau was created with provision for personnel capable of assuming responsibility for educational policy. The Japanese office of supervisors, which had exercised independent control over all secondary school policy, was eliminated and school inspection and supervision brought under the secondary bureau. After 10 January 1946, all middle schools were administered from that office although the National Department retained jurisdiction over secondary schools. The

Department of Education had among its powers the right to establish, move, or do away with schools, control curricula, appoint public school principals and all teachers of middle school rank, as well as approve appointments of private school principals, and the right to transfer or dismiss all such appointees. It could approve students' qualifications for higher schools, give entrance examinations, examine receipts and expenditures in both private and public middle schools, and approve national subsidies to public institutions. The National Department also approved the school calendar and student uniforms.(79)

Contrary to Japanese policy, Military Government encouraged provincial offices to initiate recommendations for changes in their middle schools. The National Department insisted only on the right to review recommendations before action was taken. More than half of the high school principals were appointed on recommendations of the provincial offices.(80)

Under Japanese rule, the middle school had comprised the five grades from the seventh through the eleventh. During the war, however, this program had been reduced to four years. After liberation, on the recommendation of the National Committee on Educational Planning, the six-year secondary school plan was adopted.(81) The fifth year, or eleventh grade, was to be added to the curriculum in September 1946, and a sixth in 1947.(82) Students who were expected to gradnate in 1946 could either graduate and leave school,

or graduate and take examinations for a two-year preparatory course to be established temporarily in the great schools until such time as the six-year plan was effectively operating. The 1946 graduates were also given the choice of taking examinations for entry into the three colleges which existed in February 1946, and, upon admission into one of them, to complete the three-year courses offered. In 1949 the colleges were to become "great schools" established on the four-year plan. Students in the first to third year in middle schools in February 1946 were to be automatically enrolled in the appropriate years under the new system.(83) This ambitious plan, however, was still unaccomplished by the end of 1947. A few middle schools were running on the six-year basis in 1947 and 1948, but due to lack of facilities and equipment, many secondary schools were unable to install the eleventh and twelfth grades. Eventual success was predicted, but progress was necessarily slow.(84)

Although the majority of the members on the subcommittee on Secondary School Planning had not agreed to this American style six-year high school system, they adjusted their plans to accord with it once the schedule had been accepted. In the new curriculum, students were offered increasing opportunity for elective courses. Committees on vocational and agricultural training obtained approval for new curricula including forestry, sericulture, stock-breeding, fisheries, electrical engineering, textile engineering, commerce, and other fields of education.(85) However, according to the Arndt

Mission findings of 29 June 1947:

> The curriculum of the middle schools for general education, like that of the elementary schools, is highly formalized. There is little provision for relating education to the current problems of the community or of the nation, and just as little provision for giving students first hand experience in vocational fields or practical arts.

The Mission further found no "evidence of a planned guidance program at the secondary school level", even though "the need for such a program is especially urgent in view of the increasing number of pupils who will attend the middle school". This same group reported that as a rule the middle schools followed the Japanese method of separate schools for boys and girls and that the Korean teachers knew only the highly formalized methods of Japanese teaching. "There is little 'give and take' between pupils and teachers". In conclusion, the Arndt Mission reported:

> In the field of secondary education the immediate needs are better trained teachers, more adequate teaching materials a curriculum that makes more provision for technical education directly related to effective social living, and the development of a plan of organization that unifies the administration of these schools at the community level.(86)

In March 1947, a syllabus on National Department rules and regulations for middle schools was drawn up by the National Department of Education. These regulations governed finance, administration, and curricula — including vocational subjects — of middle schools. On 20 March 1947, a committee of twenty-eight Seoul middle school principals undertook to revise and edit the new syllabus. After this was done, it was printed and distributed to all middle schools.(87)

After spending the previous year in the confusion of setting up a secondary school system, in 1947, the bureau began to stabilize itself and to look into student activity fields. In April, a national art contest for South Korean Middle Schools was announced with "Democracy" as its theme. All entries were posters depicting various phases of democracy. Prior to the final judging on 29 June 1947, provincial contests were held and the two students from each province who created the best posters were sent to Seoul to compete in the grand prize contest. These students arrived in Seoul on 28 June for a three-day trip with all expenses paid. Participation was one hundred per cent, with all South Korean Middle Schools sending delegates. Two grand prizes and two second place prizes were awarded for each grade from the seventh to the twelfth. Prizes went also to each of the other students for winning the provincial contests.(88)

Another contest was the National Middle School Music Festival on 10 and 11 May. Fifteen choruses and seven bands from middle schools in South Korea, winners in provincial try-outs the previous month, gathered at Kyung Bok Palace grounds in Seoul. Altogether, approximately two thousand school pupils participated. The National Police Band and the Korean Symphony Orchestra were also present for the occasion.(89)

In March 1947, initial arrangements were drafted to organize a youth training program patterned after the National Defense Train-

ing Program, National Youth Administration, and Civilian Conservation Corps in the United States. Its direction was left to the Vocational Education Section of the Department of Education, and the National Economic Board agreed to finance the project.(90) However, by the end of 1947 this program was not yet in effect, although plans were nearing completion. Early in 1948, an American advisor was selected to head the project.(91)

Normal School Reorganization and Progress. Reorganization of the normal school was begun on 12 February 1946. At that time responsibility for administration, supervision, and control of normal schools was transferred from the Department of Education to the several provincial governments. However, the department itself continued to determine policies and principles of normal school education and teacher training.(92) Curricular changes became the responsibility of the National Committee on Education Planning.(93)

Under the Japanese, all secondary school teachers had been trained in Japan, none in Korea. Elementary school teachers, however, were educated in Korean normal schools, of which there was one to each province. These schools required teachers to begin training in the seventh grade. After satisfactorily completing the number of training years specified by their province, trainees were graduated with teaching diplomas for elementary schools. In some provinces three years training was required, in others four and five years.

The new curriculum, devised in 1946, contemplated that elementary teachers would complete twelve years schooling, thus bringing training up to the equivalent level of high school education in the United States. Secondary school teachers and college instructors were required to complete a "great school" course.(94) In further renovation of the teacher training system, in-service training of teachers, including teacher institutes, and summer and winter schools were established during 1946.(95)

One of the earliest steps taken in structural changes in the Department of Education was the creation of a teacher training section or branch, a unit which had been lacking under the Japanese. This was done on 7 October 1945, but selection of principals and faculty members for normal schools was not completed until the following January. The new principals were usually well educated, but lacked experience in teacher training or other administrative work, since those duties had been formerly performed by Japanese. Clearly, however, it would be difficult to meet teacher needs for several years. Our main reason for this was low salary scale. Many elementary and secondary teachers were forced to accept donations from Parents' Associations in order to live. This was scarcely an inducement to prospective normal school students. In the spring of 1947, the situation was such that "teachers are now leaving the profession about as rapidly as they are being recruited".(96)

The unsatisfactory personnel outlook was brought out in an April 1947 report of the department. The number of Korean teachers had risen "from about 15,000 to 35,000 since liberation". However, "most of these teachers are poorly trained and practically all of those who are trained understand only the old Japanese methods".(97) To combat this situation, teacher training institutes were created in the hope that all teachers could be reached and given additional training.

An August 1947 review of the situation was more encouraging. It noted that Korean teachers had profited greatly from teacher training institutes in Seoul and throughout the country. A marked difference could be seen between the teachers receiving this training and those not having done so. Due to language barriers and a lack of competent interpreters, however, results were oftentimes discouraging. The state of the national economy, low salaries, lack of personnel, both Korean and American, and the unprecedented demand for teachers were solid obstacles to the teacher training program.

Despite the many difficulties facing the bureau, much valuable work had been accomplished. Lectures, outlines, books, and pamphlets had been translated into Korean, while teacher training standards had been established even though the total impress on Korean teachers was much less than it should have been. The American advisor to the Department of Education declared, "The

training of new teachers and the re-training of teachers steeped in Japanese methods are two phases of the same problem. It is the unanimous opinion of Koreans and the advisory staff who have had experience in Korea that far better results could be secured by sending groups of teachers to the United States and to Hawaii for 90-day tours of observation and short-time training."(98)

By the end of 1947, there had been some further gradual progress and improvement in the normal school system. The best summary of conditions on the lower levels was produced by the Arndt Mission report. The Arndt committee found that the average elementary teacher had the equivalent of about ten years of formal education, the average middle school teacher about thirteen years. It pointed out that future teachers must have opportunity "to observe under actual teaching conditions, a demonstration of the best teaching methods and use of instructional aids" and "to engage in practice teaching under supervision".(99)

V. ACHIEVEMENTS IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

In the field of vocational education, progress was indeed slow in the first two years of the occupation. During 1946 little in the way of positive achievement was attained. The following year, however, commercial and agricultural education began to show definite progress, and by 1948 were well established. Technical and home economics schools, though, were even then barely organized.

Vocational Education in General. After liberation, committee on vocational education met and attempted to set up regular vocational institutions. Not until early 1947, however, was any real progress made in this field. Agricultural and commercial schools which had existed in theory in 1946, began to evolve into workable institutions during 1947, but technical and home economics schools were still in a poor state. Home economists in Korea were apparently intensely interested in their vocation, but those that were trained were teachers only and not research or administrative personnel. Korean home economists were determined to establish themselves in every field of endeavor in their vocation, but little achievement was made until 1948.(100)

In South Korea, the Japanese had had sixty-eight middle schools devoted exclusively to agriculture, forty four-year boys' schools, twenty one-to-three-year boys' schools, and eight one-to-three-year girls' schools. The curriculum in the four-year schools was divided into six parts, or subjects, in one of which the students chose to

major after his first year. These were: general agriculture, animal husbandry, agricultural engineering, forestry, agricultural chemistry, and sericulture. The smaller one-to-three year schools concerned themselves entirely with practical agriculture rather than academic and technical study. Girls' schools were also conducted along the practical line. All boys' schools included physical and military training, often as much as three hours per day, and it was the opinion of the Department of Education that the schools had been utilized by the Japanese as training grounds for government officials and military personnel. The greatest objection to this system was that children born in a certain village were required to attend the school assigned to that village, regardless of their preference in the matter.

In October 1945, an Agricultural Education Training Branch was established in the Department of Education, followed by an Agricultural Education Advisory Board. The latter was composed of twelve Koreans prominent in the various fields of agriculture. They met regularly to discuss agricultural education in South Korea. Among the activities of the Agricultural Education Training Branch were those of revising curricula of all schools and eliminating all military and much of the physical and highly specialized training. The one-to-three year middle schools were closed for lack of funds and personnel to maintain them adequately. On 10 January 1946, when agricultural schools were combined with technical schools

under the Vocational Training Branch of the Bureau of Secondary Schools, the Agricultural Education Training Branch went out of existence.

Home Economics Education. Education in home economics was, until the end of 1947, a casual by-product of other educational efforts. No special training was provided for teachers. Early in 1948, however, some important steps were taken. In March, sixty elementary teachers in Seoul attended a three weeks "workshop" in home economics. Several textbooks were in preparation during the year, with plans to use them during 1949, first in Seoul, later in the provinces.

In March 1948, a Korean Home Economics Association was organized by the American advisor. It sponsored a radio program which began in June, and made plans for publishing its own magazine.

By August 1948 home economics teacher training was bolstered by four summer "in-service" training session. These were held at Seoul, Taejon, Pusan, and Chonju.(101)

Commercial Education. Commercial education made steady but nevertheless quite slow improvement, and by the end of 1947 conditions were still unfavorable for effective teaching. As in other branches of education, books were not available, buildings were in disrepair or ill-adapted, and classes too large. Teaching itself was still done mostly by the lecture method. Work was at a standstill in courses which required constant practice to test the actual ability

and knowledge of theory of the student. The greatest needs were addition of subject matter in which commercial teachers had had no prior training, and a change in the approach of teaching practical methods. It was thought that teachers should be trained at the college level in subject matters and methodology.(102) Early in 1948, the Commercial Vocational Education advisor made tentative plans to conduct a series of surveys in the business world to determine the curricular needs of commercial students as required by prospective employers. These surveys would then serve as a basis for revised schedules of work to be accomplished in commercial schools.(103)

Courses in bookkeeping, economics, business arithmetic, business law, and selling were based on the old Japanese system, with little change occuring by 1948. This was primarily due to the lack of textbooks, without which new methods and ideas could not be introduced into the classroom. However, the outlook was definitely brighter. Textbooks for the first, second, and third year bookkeeping courses had been prepared, printed, and distributed by the end of 1947. A translation of an American economics text based on the Korean economic system had been completed but not published. Business terminology in English was compiled in text form and distributed, while typewriting and business statistics text were in the process of preparation. Lecture methods in the classroom in 1947 began to show a gradual breakdown with student participation in classes becoming more evident.(104)

The very heavy demand for bookkeepers, accountants, and the like for placement with vested(*) business enterprises caused so acute a shortage of such personnel that training had to be curtailed. As a result they received education in the theory of their respective subjects but almost no actual practice.(105) Yet, during 1947, there was greater progress in bookkeeping courses than in other phases. This was evidenced in May, when Mr. Lee Eun Tak, student at Kyunggi Boys' Commercial School, won first prize in the Junior Division of the Business Education World's Monthly Bookkeeping Contest. Mr. Lee entered the contest in competition with a thousand other students representing thirteen States in the United States, several Canadian provinces, and Korea.(106) Early in 1948 entries had been accepted for the International Bookkeeping Contest which was to end in March. Seven of South Korea's twenty-four senior middle schools participated in this event.

Because of lack of equipment, no typewriting classes had been held in January 1948. During the winter of 1947-1948, fifteen Korean teachers undergoing special training, gained a speed averaging between twenty and thirty words per minute on English typewriters. These instructors were eventually to form the teaching nucleus of typing schools.(107)

Administration of commercial schools under Military Government remained much the same as it had under the Japanese primarily, for

*The term "vested" refers to former Japanese-owned properties taken over by Military Government. Under Military Government Ordinance No. 33, 6 December 1945, title to these properties vested in the Property Custodian.

the Japanese-trained principals had had little training in modern schooling methods. Japanese administration had divided vocational schools into Japanese, Korean, and Japanese-Korean institutions. In 1944 there had been four Korean, two Japanese and seven Japanese-Korean public schools for boys, one Japanese and one Japanese-Korean public school for girls. Korean graduates of public primary schools were permitted to continue with one or two years of supplementary work in commerce in public middle schools, but relatively few Koreans were allowed to enroll in the combined Japanese-Korean institutions. Private commercial schools consisted of six Korean and one Japanese boys' school and five Korean girls' schools.(108)

As of September 1947, nineteen public and private junior commercial schools had a total enrollment of 3,712 Korean students. Senior commercial middle schools numbered twenty-four with 15,114 students.(109)

In May 1948, a memorandum by the vocational education advisor stressed the urgent need to create incentives leading toward the breakdown of traditional scholarship worship. Recognition of an education that "prepares for the performance of today's activities and operations" could then be created. The advisor suggested that support of business, industry, agriculture, and civic organizations be enlisted and in-service and pre-service teacher educational programs developed. He further recommended sponsoring and promoting leadership lay programs among groups of parents and those interested through citizens' workshops. As a result of these recommendations,

a Bureau of Vocational and Technological Education was created in May. Within it were five sections: agricultural, industrial-technical, business-distributive, girls' and womens' occupations (including home economics), and advancement of technological science. (110)

The Board of Technological Training. Technological training in industry was actually another facet of vocational training. However, on-the-job trainees were provided for under the Technological Training Board. At first, this board held jurisdiction over agricultural projects, but responsibility for such programs was turned over to the Agricultural Improvement Service created late in 1947. From that time, technological and agricultural projects were administered by the individual boards. Because their organization, functions, and problems were similar, discussion had centered on the Technological Training Board. Budgetary provisions for technological training in industry and agriculture included the establishing of a Board of Technological Training. This board, activated on 19 April 1947, comprised two delegates each from the departments of Education, Commerce, and Agriculture, with a full-time, non-voting, paid secretary, comparable to a bureau chief. The board was responsible for administration of appropriations set aside for technological training in industry and agriculture. It was empowered to approve and disapprove projects, allocate funds from the appropriation to carry out approved projects, and prescribe reporting procedures concerning them. Monthly reports were made to the Civil Administrator

setting forth the breakdown on funds allocated during the preceding month.

Since the board was created to handle "on-the-job" training in industry and agriculture, it did not interfere with Department of Education policies. It was entirely separate from National Education and was activated specifically to train large groups of workmen in the field of production and related activities. Because of the tremendous need of skilled workmen in the South Korean industrial field, trainees were to undergo short terms of instruction and curricula kept to the absolute minimum.(111)

Prior to actual establishment of the board, training costs were estimated at 400,000,000 won. Budgetary difficulties, however, caused sharp curtailments. First, the National Economic Board halved the training estimates for the fiscal year 1947-48. At that time, projects submitted to the Technological Training Board by seven departments of the South Korean Interim Government, called for outlays in excess of 700,000,000 won. Actual allocations to the various departmental projects, other than agricultural, for the fiscal year 1947-48 amounted to 93,362,848 won. Departmental budget requests for 1948-49 training projects came to 244,967,500 won. This figure was reduced by the Technological Training Board to 162,600,000 won after due consideration of departmental requests. Actual appropriation cut the allocation to 77,588,820 won.(112)

In August 1947, one project had begun operations in Kyonggi-do,

an extension program in agricultural and fisheries production which started in July. Several other projects of the Department of Agriculture were approved by the Board and inaugurated in September.(113) By the end of 1947, 101 separate training projects had been approved. Fully half of these concerned agriculture.

In December 1947, the Agricultural Improvement Service was created under Ordinance No. 160 (4 December 1947). Agricultural projects were turned over to the Improvement Service, which was to supervise agricultural training, leaving industrial projects to be administered by the Technological Board. Subsequently (January 1948), the enrollment figure of 10,369 trainees controlled by the Technological Board before December 1947 was cut to approximately 5,000.(111) In March 1948, 5,709 trainees in fifty projects were under the Boards jurisdiction.(115)

While some projects were ably presented, preparation and planning in others had been poor. Obtaining adequate teaching staffs often proved difficult, while primary schooling constituted the academic background of many trainees. Some students had had no more than four years of primary education and consequently were incapable of absorbing the more technical courses taught them. Moreover, the physical condition of classrooms was poor. Although some projects did not fare well, others were successful in the attempt to turn out skilled workers. The measure of success often lay with the Korean director and his American advisor, whose ability and interest were

apparent in the results obtained. At the end of February 1948, the greatest difficulties facing the Technological Board were lack of interest by many Korean officials in the departments concerned, planning and execution of training projects, selection of trainees, and poor teaching methods.(116)

As a result of the segregation of agriculture in December 1947, a reorganization of the Board became necessary. This was effectuated by SKIG Executive Order No. 17 (1 April 1948), which increased the Board's membership from six to nine. As reconstituted it included two members each from the departments of Education and Commerce, one each from the National Economic Board and the departments of Transportation and Labor, the Dean of the Engineering College of Seoul National University, and the Director of the Central Research Laboratory. A full-time Korean executive secretary was assigned to administer the program with an American advisor to assist him. The Board was empowered to call upon any South Korean Interim Government agency for information, advice, and assistance in technical matters related to departments or agencies not represented by membership on the Board. Its powers and responsibilities in technological training in Korean industry and related activities remained as before, except for two important additions. These were the authority to assist vocational public schools in establishing proper training facilities with grants-in-aid when the Board deemed it appropriate, and the right to make recommendations in all planning involving training of technological students and technicians abroad.

VI HIGHER EDUCATION

Perhaps the greatest difficulties of all were those encountered in the rehabilitation and development of higher education. More than any others, the students in Korean institutions of higher learning were indoctrinated in the old Japanese ways and methods. While in some respects the net progress during the first three years of the Occupation was noteworthy and laudable, in others it seemed as if little or no positive achievement had been registered. Certainly, many problems were far from overcome despite efforts which were often herculean.

Reorganization of Higher Schools. By the end of February 1946, nineteen approved institutions of higher learning had reopened in South Korea.(117) Fifteen months later (31 May 1947), twenty-four higher schools with an aggregate enrollment of 13,485 students and 1,075 faculty members were in operation.(118) A census of universities and colleges on 30 November 1947 showed an even greater increase. There were then twenty-nine approved universities and colleges with an enrollment of 22,086 students. In addition, the Iri Agricultural College in Cholla Pukto had been formally established but was not yet in operation.(119) Such progress becomes more significant when compared with Japanese figures for higher learning, for under Japanese domination the greatest number of operating colleges at any one time was nineteen, with only 3,039 Korean students and 261 Korean teachers.(120)

Under the Japanese, Korean colleges were handled by a Department for Colleges and the University and conducted three-year courses which included the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteen grades. Medical colleges required an extra year. The one university, Keijo Imperial, required two years of preparatory school or College education for entrance.(121)

The "Great Schools" Plan. In September 1945 when Military Government established the Department of Education, a Colleges Branch was organized and made part of the Bureau of Higher Schools.(122) A plan was then devised to change the system of education, basing it upon western standards.(123) The Department's aim was to raise the standards of all higher schools so that their work might be recognized by institutions outside Korea.(124) The great schools would confer three degrees: Bachelor of Arts to graduates of great schools of four years' training or more; Master of Arts to students who completed one or more years of graduate work, submitted acceptable thesis, and passed all other requirements; Doctorates to those who completed three or more years of graduate work, submitted acceptable theses, and passed all required examinations.(125)

This plan, drawn up by the National Committee on Educational Planning, was approved in June 1946. Thereupon, the Bureau of Higher Education instituted the new system of education, effective 2 September 1946. Higher education was defined as follows:

> a. A great school will be known as an educational institution with a course of instruction of four years or more, which admits graduates from higher middle schools or normal schools,

and those who have passed special qualifying examinations; b. a university will be known as a great school with two or more faculties; c. a college will be known as a great school with one faculty; d. the Department of Education must give final approval on ordinances and regulations for great schools; e. co-education will be optional for great schools, but the Department of Education will designate certain schools to be either for boys or girls; f. courses in Korean language, history, and culture, and the natural sciences, and physical education will be required eventually of all great schools; g. post-graduate schools of one year or more will be established as great schools where there are facilities for graduate study. (126)

It was anticipated that by 1949 all existing colleges would be converted into four-year great schools. Three-year colleges would be done away with as would the two-year preparatory school for the university. The university and the colleges would initiate four-year programs while the middle schools added eleventh and twelfth grades to take up the slack between preparatory school and the university. (127) As in other schools the great school semesters were divided with a Saturday in February, and a second from the first Monday in March to the last Saturday in July. (128) By November 1947 only one school, Seoul National University, had achieved the four-year status, but others were gradually attaining it.

Higher schools in 1945 had been completely disorganized. Repatriation of the Japanese had removed most of the able college and university teachers; inflation had ruined the budget, making it impossible to make repairs, keep teachers, or handle the influx of students; and inability to obtain supplies, especially laboratory equipment, had prevented much necessary and essential education. Almost all higher education had stopped during the winter because

of the fuel shortage. Moreover, loss of teachers to better-paid industries, degeneration of janitorial services, and the still noticeably Japanese influence in the administrative procedures, general organization, curriculum, and objectives had created a black picture of higher learning.(129)

Possible solutions for these problems were set forth in June 1947, when, in reply to the question, "What educational program should be adopted and developed in Korea in the field of higher education?", the advisor to higher education recommended:

> That the Provisional Government be advised to retain and/or secure from abroad a considerable number of foreign advisors and that so far as possible these be given the means and authority to not only advise and teach but to actually carry out such reforms and changes in method as may be approved by the Department of Education; that large but carefully selected groups of mature educators be sent abroad for short term periods of observation; that a plan be prepared and funds provided to send abroad each year a number of graduate students in various branches of study for periods of from one to three years of study... also that in sending educators for observation and students for graduate study where facilities are equal, the candidates shall be given their choice of country and institution; that in view of the shortage of institutions of higher learning a plan be worked out for subsidies to such private colleges and universities as shall meet certain standards and requirements to be determined by the Department of Education, no discrimination to be based on ideology of the institutions so aided; that full provision be made for freedom of thought, speech, and teaching in the institutions of higher learning and for as great a degree of democratic control through the faculties of such institutions as is possible; and that the attention of the Provisional Government be called to the need for change and improvement in the following phases of higher education; modern techniques and methods of administration, management, and finance; improvement of library facilities and more liberal library policies; training of teaching staff on higher education level; translation and preparation of college texts in the Korean language; encouragement of professional societies; extension of University program to the community through varied extension courses and programs; emphasis on special need of Korea for scientific and practical education on higher level rather than merely classical and academic type of education; and reconstruction

and re-equipment of most of the physical plants of higher educational institutions.(130)

Problem of Higher Education. In December 1947 the Advisor on Higher Education made a formal report to his superiors in which he set forth factors which had materially impeded improvement of conditions in higher education. These were brought out specifically in connection with the formation of an Association of Colleges and Universities in Korea (the subject of the report) but were presented as part of the over-all picture. In his opinion, there had been three great obstacles: There was no unity among educators themselves and among the colleges and universities. "With the private colleges suffering still" from Japanese oppression, and the public ones regarded as "government tools" by many Koreans, a cooperative spirit was lacking. "Government agencies, bureaus and men", were unwilling to turn over to the educators themselves the responsibility for setting up standards for higher education, though admittedly there was some justification since college people were not always ready to stand on their own feet. Finally, he contended, it was difficult to get Military Government authorities to grasp "the real democratic significance of a group of educators working out solutions together in such an Association" (as that of Colleges and Universities), and "giving the resolutions and requests of such a body the serious consideration they deserve".

In an attempt to overcome these obstacles, the Advisor to Higher Education first familiarized himself with the barriers to progress in higher education. Innumerable visits were made to colleges, and conferences held with deans, college presidents, professors, teachers, and

administrators in order to achieve true understanding of problems and how they could be solved.

The advisor felt that one solution would be to create a desire among the Korean educators themselves for an Association of Colleges and Universities which would unite the higher schools in an effort to overcome the difficulties they faced separately. At every opportunity during discussion of problems with Korean educators, the value of an Association was stressed to them until they began to realize that such matters as library rehabilitation, book and textbook work, entrance regulations, credit system, graduation requirements, transfer of students to other colleges, and pre-medical curricula could best be promoted by working on them together. With growing interest in a cooperative association, these educators obtained approval of such a project from authorities in the National Department of Education. The Director of Education and the Chief of the Bureau of Higher Education (both of whom were now Koreans) approved plans for the new Association in August 1947. A Higher Education Committee was appointed to work on and draft the framework of a proposed constitution for the Association. College and university presidents and deans were notified that the first meeting was to be held on 28 November 1947. All colleges and universities were invited to participate, but only those approved by the Department of Education could become charter members and vote for the constitution. It is noteworthy that all college and university delegates invited were present at this meeting, the first of its kind in Korea.(131)

A number of pressing problems were reviewed at the first meeting of the Association. Among the more important of these were: the fuel situation and consideration of a two and a half month winter vacation for the next few years; consideration of subsidies to private institutions and comparison of needs and money value of 1937 with those of 1947; inadequacy of teaching staffs; means of combating student unrest; the confusion and lack of organization in libraries; shortage of textbooks; poor attendance records of students; and possibility of forming an inter-library loan association. Discussion of and action on these were placed on the agenda for future meetings of the Association. All in all, there was definite promise of full future cooperation among the educators.(132) The first meeting of the Association of Colleges and Universities was encouraging, but the national department was unwilling to approve any delegation of power or authority to the Association until it had definitely proved itself.(133)

A survey conducted in connection with an expected visit in Korea of an advisory group from the National Academy of Science (United States) in August 1947,(*) brought to light the fact that

* The National Academy of Science Advisory group never arrived in Korea. Instead it ended its tour in Japan and returned to the United States from there. This neglect was received by the Koreans with the bitterness that marked other such occasions, for after great preparations and expectations they had been completely ignored. Their justifiable lament was that "Japan was a conquered nation and Korea a liberated nation". They could not understand why the focus was on Japan and not the rebuilding of Korea especially since Japan had assaulted the United States and Korea had "befriended" her. Cf. Bureau of Higher Education, SKIG, "Visit of Advisory Group, National Academy of Science", 31 July 47.

purely Korean scientific societies had not existed in Korea before the war. Those formerly in operation had been completely dominated by the Japanese, and most Korean scientists did not desire to belong to them. With repatriation of the Japanese, the societies had disintegrated rapidly, while the chaotic conditions within the higher institutions greatly hindered the development of new societies. This was apparently true of all professional groups in Japanese-controlled Korea. By August 1947, however, the Korean Biological Society, the Korean Association of Microbiology, the Korean Dental Association, the Korean Agricultural Association, the Korean Medical Association, the Korean Association of Science, and the English Club had been formed under the influence of the Department of Education, which continued its efforts to organize other associations. Membership, however, included many persons who were not bona fide members of the professions according to American definitions.(134) Moreover, by the end of 1947 most of these organizations were merely on paper, for they held no regular meeting and there were no works or projects accomplished. The Medical Association was the most active group, while the Association of Colleges and Universities gave the greatest promise of future success.(135)

Reorganization of the Department of Education, 1947. In stabilizing its work, the Department of Education was reorganized in the late fall of 1947. The Bureau of Higher Education was

expanded to include specialists in college administration, education extension schools, social science, and engineering, and a consultant librarian. Possibly the most important addition was that of a library consultant, who began setting up a model library in the Department of Education in December 1947. Lack of adequate library facilities had been a serious deficiency in the higher education organization.(136)

Under the new system the subject fields remained much the same, and the Bureau of Higher Education as a whole installed a new system of reporting and accounting for work accomplished and work to be achieved. This change, in November 1947, consisted of a grouping of problems faced by the bureau and their breakdown into the following categories: 1. administration and organization; 2. teacher improvement; 3. finance and budgetary matters; 4. curricula; 5. library and textbooks; 6. equipment, supply, and maintenance; 7. extension, vocational, and short courses; 8. American instruction and lectures; 9. public relations; 10. miscellaneous.(137) It was thus easier for higher education to keep its problems and accomplishments catalogued. One of the most important projects listed was that of finance and budgetary matters, for lack of funds had seriously hampered work in higher education.

Early in the summer of 1947, a report on the financial situation in the Bureau was made by the American Advisor, who had observed conditions over a six-month period and had conferred extensively with

responsible persons in education. In an attempt to obtain a sufficient budget, the report set forth five basic needs. Some of these, as increased salaries and rehabilitation of buildings, were shared with other branches of education. It pointed out, too, that the Bureau of Textbooks had done nothing as yet for higher education, where texts were likewise a great problem. Attention was likewise called to the need for teaching aids such as charts, maps, models, and visual aids, which were completely lacking. Stress was put on the urgent need for laboratory supplies, which had had so little attention that it stood as the foremost curricular need. To these five main categories was added the understaffed condition of the hospitals administered by medical schools and their inadequacy in caring for Korean due to lack of facilities and funds.(138)

Financial Problems. Meanwhile, various financial problems plagued the Department. In a report made in December 1947, the Advisor disapproved requested subsidies from the provincial colleges in an attempt to balance them equitably. Subsidies, he felt, should be handled for the colleges through the Bureau of Higher Education. Under the existing system, provincial colleges received funds direct from the National Department of Finance. In the Bureau's opinion, however, that department was not in position to know actual needs. Instead, colleges should submit detailed budgets through the provincial offices of education and bureaus of finance for appraisal to the National Bureau of Higher Schools for critical

examination. Then they would go to the Department of Finance, where a definitive policy should be laid down before any subsidies were granted.

It was further recommended that teacher salaries be removed from civil service control. Salaries were so far out of line with living costs that although slight raises had been granted in 1947, they were far from sufficient; consequently, there was a consistent degeneration of teacher quality. It was suggested that the department itself establish a salary scale for teachers which would be kept apart from other governmental systems as an aid to teacher improvement. The Advisor then recommended: that the National Colleges be allowed to secure monies by direct appropriation of the Legislature in the manner that state universities are dealt with in the United States; that, because no change had been made in the system whereby student fees and tuition were returned to the national treasury by the end of 1947, national college and university fees and tuition be returned to the institutions in order to encourage them to adopt a more realistic and reasonable tuition and fee system; that some system of college assistantships for needy students be devised whereby students could secure financial aid through employment in laboratories, libraries, or in janitorial and repair service.(139)

In 1947, the Bureau of Higher Education was allotted 252,057,700 won to cover salaries of the Korean staff in the Bureau and in the administration and maintenance of Seoul National University, Pusan Fisheries College, Taegu Agricultural College, and

Taegu Normal College. The approved budget for 1948 was 487,000,000 won. The new budget included responsibility for the Pusan Liberal Arts College, for which there had been no previous allocation, and, for the first time, financial responsibility for nursing education. But by the end of 1947 financial difficulties had become so serious that it was feared some of the colleges of Seoul National University would have to be closed at the beginning of the spring semester in March 1948.(140)

Added to official financial difficulties were those raised by colleges established through private funds. Under the Japanese, government schools had received all government funds and support while enrolling very few Korean students. Moreover, the Japanese did nothing to encourage the private schools, which were practically the only source of education for the Koreans and which enjoyed consequent prestige among the Korean populace. At the end of 1947 the Korean people still looked upon government institutions with suspicion and tended to regard them as tools of the government. Thus, in the two years following liberation, when wealthy Koreans wished to endow educational institutions, they contributed to funds to establish new private schools. This was exemplified at Pusan, where a number of wealthy citizens set up a fund to organize a new liberal arts college in complete disregard of the already established Pusan Liberal Arts College, a government institution which was itself badly in need of financial aid.

This sort of situation was possible in the provinces or cities of Korea where new institutions were granted licenses by the Provincial Education Office concerned, without reference to the National Department. New institutions could therefore function successfully for one or two years; but when their funds began to run low they sought approval and subsidies from the National Department. Consequently, early in 1948 the Adviser of the Bureau of Higher Education drew up a plan whereby such institutions would have to be approved by the National Department before they could open. The project involved working out new standards for approving colleges and having the approval made by leading educators, provincial educational directors, and a committee composed of government officials. After four years of operation these new schools would receive permanent approval and could then be considered for membership in the Association of Colleges and Universities. It was hoped that this or some similar plan would eventually be put into practice and thus eliminate the difficulties arising from the founding of unorthodox private institutions.(141) Besides the involvement created by the establishment of such new schools, however, financial hardships were experienced by private schools already in operation.

In one private school, the Sook Myung Girls' College, financial conditions were chaotic. Originally endowed in 1938 by the Li Household (the former Korean royal family) with income-producing lands north of the 38th parallel, the school suddenly found its

source of revenue cut off by the fall of the "Iron Curtain" in 1945. Funds donated by private citizens were insufficient to keep it running. Consequently, in June 1947, it requested a subsidy from the Li Household to offset its losses. However, because of discrepancies in its financial statements, the Household itself was being audited at that time by the Office of Property Custody, under whose jurisdiction it came. Subsequently, when the Household was disclosed to be on the verge of bankruptcy, the College's request was disapproved.

In the fall of 1947, the College submitted another request that land be granted it for re-sale purposes so that it could improve its deteriorating finances. This, too, was disapproved, for the complications arising from land reform had not yet been solved by the Interim Government. At the end of 1947, the College submitted another equally impractical request for funds, this time to the Department of Education. The administrators evidently felt that because the College catered to an aristocratic class of Koreans, it should be granted a subsidy, but they approached their dilemma unrealistically; and National Education at the end of 1947 was confronted with the financial problems of another private institution.(142)

Report on Accomplishments, August 1947. Although beset with innumerable difficulties, the Bureau of Higher Education found time to set forth some of its accomplishments in a formal report of 18 August 1947. In teaching, it noted, emphasis had been placed on

English, since that language was an essential tool for information published in it. Curricular changes had been emphasized mainly because most of the American personnel had been teaching or advising in specialized subjects. The report cited organization of the School of Veterinary Medicine -- first of its kind in all Korea -- and of the School of Nursing as among main achievements to that time, along with the establishment of a pre-medical program as a basis for better medical education in Korea, promotion and encouragement of teaching and professional societies, and development of a lecture series to aid the teachers of colleges and universities in securing more modern and progressive information. Careful note was taken of the concentration on libraries which had resulted in the modification of Japanese library regulations and the distribution of thousands of books and periodicals. Finally, attention was brought to the herculean task of organizing ten separate colleges into the Seoul National University.(143)

Seoul National University. During the first year of the Occupation, the former Keijo Imperial University, now re-named Seoul National University, was governed by a temporary Board of Regents, appointed by the Military Governor and serving at his pleasure. The Board consisted of the Director, Advisor, Deputy Director, and Deputy Advisor of the Department of Education, and the Chief and Advisor of the Bureau of Higher Schools. This arrangement was regarded as thoroughly transitory pending a thorough shuffle

of university and related facilities, which was actually effectuated at the end of the summer of 1946, with the promulgation of Ordinance No. 102. Powers of the temporary board were essentially the same as later set forth in the new Ordinance.

Military Government Ordinance No. 102, entitled "Establishment of the Seoul National University", had as its purpose, "to provide for and make available to the people of Korea improved facilities for higher education, so that the youth of Korea may take advantage of the benefits and opportunities accuring therefrom, for the betterment of themselves as individuals and the Korean people as a nation in modern society". Under its provisions the old university was merged with the previously independent dental, law, medical, mining, normal, technical, and women's normal colleges in Seoul, and the Suwon Agricultural and Forestry College. Within the new university were nine colleges (Law, Agriculture and Forestry, Commerce, Dentistry, Education, Engineering, Fine Arts, Liberal Arts and Sciences, and Medicine, -- including the School of Nursing and Nursing Education). At its head was a President, appointed by and responsible to a Board of Regents. His powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities and those of the Board were set forth in considerable detail in the Ordinance. In May 1947 some amendments were made to the Ordinance. Basically, these followed closely the general trend in similar institutions in the United States and need not be specifically noted here.(*)

* See, Appendix A, Extracts from USAMGIK Ordinance No. 102, "Establishment of Seoul National University", 22 Aug 46.

The merger met severe opposition, both before and after its actual consummation, which culminated in serious disorders and quasi-rebellion. As these disturbances were part of the larger pattern of school upheavals in the first years of the Occupation, discussion of them is reserved for later consideration.(*) By the end of 1947, however, the uproar attending the reorganization of the University had died away and been forgotten, and the University itself was on a firm foundation.(144)

* See Part XI, "Student Strikes and Other Disturbances", especially Pages 128-132.

VII - SPECIALIZED ADVANCED EDUCATION

Distinct from higher education, yet closely allied with it and handled administratively by the Bureau of Higher Schools, several specialized aspects of advanced education presented problems almost from the beginning of the Occupation. Even among themselves these activities were distinctive, though they shared one feature: Practically all of them were linked with medical activities in a general way, as pre-medical education, nursing training, and veterinary education. Even psychology had a tenuous connection.

Pre-Medical Education. At the outset of the Occupation, perhaps the most acute need of any in the whole educational field was for expanded medical education. These involved not only the medical colleges but pre-medical work as well. Formerly, practically all leading doctors and the staff of the medical schools, except for Severance Medical College were Japanese. Other than a few who had had foreign training, almost all Korean physicians lacked sufficient experience and training to permit them to conduct medical education in Korea. Thus, the medical colleges were faced with an acute shortage of qualified teaching personnel when the country's need for more doctors was greater than ever before. In all South Korea, there were but 3,115 regular physicians, of whom a full third were not medical school graduates.(145)

Before expansion could come, however, reopening of existing

schools was necessary. This was hampered by the same adverse factors as those affecting other branches of education but with the addition of still other, so that in some respects at least, the situation was even more acute than usual. Thus, shortages of essential equipment and supplies, such as gas and water for chemical and biological laboratories were much more serious. Too, relatively more medical buildings were used for billeting of troops. When, at length, these buildings were evacuated, they were still in abominable physical condition. Once troops were removed from school structures and rehabilitation of facilities inaugurated, emphasis was placed upon curricula.

Prior to 1945 the only higher institution requiring students to have pre-medical training was the Keijo Imperial University. These students completed four or five years of middle school work before entering the University Preparatory School; there they were trained for eventual admission into Keijo Medical College. At all other medical colleges, students were admitted directly from middle schools without being required to undergo pre-medical training. If Korean medicine was to be based on modern training, pre-medical curricula had to be carefully organized for all.

One of the earliest steps taken was to transfer pre-medical work from the University preparatory schools to the Liberal Arts and Sciences College. The American pre-medical advisor began his work by concentrating on establishment of a pre-medical program

at Seoul National University. Later, similar efforts were made at other institutions. Investigation showed that installation of such a program in the Arts and Sciences College was agreeable to all personnel affected.

Two primary considerations in this plan were: to use the best in pre-medical education in the American system, and to help Korea devise a pre-medical program appropriate to existing conditions in Korea which would undoubtedly continue for some time. It was decided further that, in view of Korea's urgent need for doctors, a curriculum involving more than two years study would be unwise. Moreover, by shifting pre-medical work to the Liberal Arts College the strain on medical colleges would be relieved, thus giving the medical colleges more time for true medical education. The shift was endorsed by the faculty members affected, the University president, and the American advisory staff. In December 1946, it was formally approved by the Board of Regents.(146)

In early 1947, an intensive survey of pre-medical education revealed that it was impossible to offer the full program of courses due to inadequate facilities and acute shortage of textbooks, and that many courses were not of the best quality. Pre-medical students in 1947 relied almost entirely upon lectures and classroom instruction. To keep students completely occupied in their respective fields, Japanese teaching authorities had devised a schedule which kept them in the classroom every hour of the day.

Consequently, students had carried many more courses than had their American counterparts. In the preparatory schools, eleven courses a week had been considered maximum, although this schedule was almost completely devoid of laboratory work. The pre-medical student under the Japanese had depended entirely upon the lecture method and upon observation without participation in laboratory work. To revamp this system, which existed even after liberation, four steps were necessary if a workable pre-medical schedule was to be established in Korea: modernization of curriculum, employment of sufficient qualified teachers, overhauling of facilities -- especially laboratory -- and acquisition of an adequate supply of textbooks and reference works.(147)

By February 1947, the pre-medical curriculum had been worked out with maximum of seven courses for the first and second years. Subjects approved for the two preparatory years were: chemistry, zoology, English, advanced English, scientific English, German, sociology, psychology, Korean language and literature, mathematics, physics, and physical education. To allow more time for laboratory work by reducing the number of courses to five or six if necessary, it was determined that Korean language and literature, first year mathematics, or second year advanced English could be dropped. For the inclusion of sufficient laboratory work a minimum pre-medical schedule was created and consisted of: chemistry, zoology, English, German sociology, and physical education in the first year, and

chemistry, zoology, physics, German, psychology, and physical education, in the second year.(148)

Not only scientific competence was stressed in this program, however. Thus, in March 1947, the pre-medical supervisor stressed that the qualities of culture, idealism, and broad understanding must also become a part of a physician's background. These, he stated, could best be attained by early training in liberal arts where the student must be introduced into the fields of learning about men and what men have accomplished. Thus, in the fields of language and literature a student might be able to "set up goals of beauty and perfection".(149)

Nursing Education. Prior to 1945, Korean nurses were "hired" to fill the schools and work in hospitals. In general they were but servants, and nursing graduates were licensed under low standards by the provinces. Japanese nurses held all the positions in hospitals and in the teaching field. No public health nursing program for Koreans existed, and midwifery practice was uncontrolled. When Japanese nurses were dropped from the hospitals for repatriation to Japan, teaching activities ceased. Until 1945 directors of nursing were selected from among doctors and the best of the scattered Korean nurses, but the latter were given no authority. After liberation, it was necessary, therefore, for Korean doctors to fill nursing director positions due to the lack of trained nursing personnel.(150) At the end of 1947 this situation was still unchanged.

In education, the nursing department was in great need of personnel, teaching equipment, translations of American textbooks, and postgraduate facilities. The greatest handicap of all, perhaps, was the disregard in which female nurses were held. Woman's secluded position in Korean society, coupled with the fact that few girls remained unmarried, while married women disappeared from public life once they entered their own homes, was the predominant cause for this feeling. Consequently, the female nurse was hardly looked upon with favor. To combat this situation, every possible means of publicity -- posters, speeches, newsreels, press, and radio -- was utilized to dignify the nursing profession. Living standards were raised; efforts were made to obtain scarce uniforms; student nurse allowances were increased; quarters and recreational and mess facilities were improved; and an abridged text on general nursing was prepared and distributed in mimeographed form.

Before 1945, a course in Nursing Theory took the place of all nursing arts courses. This subject was taught by a doctor, usually one hour a week for one year. As nurse instructors were not permitted to follow medical, surgical, and allied subjects in the demonstration room, the student nurse obtained her practical experience in the ward from nurses willing to teach her. In December 1946, only sixteen recognized nursing schools were in operation. These improved two years of full nurses' training with a course of midwifery in the third year. Refresher courses of

two to three months duration were conducted by the Nurses' Affairs Section of the Public Health and Welfare Department to train graduate nurses as instructors and supervisors in public health and midwifery. Too, a Nursing and Midwifery Licensing Board was set up to issue national licenses and hold yearly registration of nurses. The Korean Nurse Practice Act of 1946 set new standards for schools, nurses, and midwives.(151)

At the end of 1947, conditions in nursing education remained much the same as before, with a continuing need for experienced teachers and for textbooks. No complete textbook existed in the Korean language, and the Japanese text in use was outdated. Moreover, the highly technical nature of all such texts made translation difficult and left accuracy open to question.(152) American advisory personnel had hopes that Korean nurses could be sent to the continental United States, Hawaii, China, or the Philippines for one to four years of advanced work, but, as in all other branches of education, lack of funds made this impossible.(153)

Early in the history of Military Government in Korea, nursing education was assigned to the Department of Public Health and Welfare for administration, at a time when the Department of Education was not in a position to accept responsibility. With the addition of an American Nursing advisor to the Education Department, controversy arose. Staff members of both departments visited and advised in the various schools of nursing. Their conflicting

opinions not only caused confusion among school personnel, but created misunderstandings between the departments themselves as to the exact responsibilities, rights, and duties of each in nursing education.(154) These difficulties were resolved in the main at a joint conference between the two departments in July 1947. There, it was agreed that, since nursing education was in theory the responsibility of the Department of Education, that department would assume direction and guidance of nursing education in higher schools associated with medical colleges through an appropriate section which it would create. On its part, the Department of Public Health and Welfare would retain its American advisory personnel in Taegu and Kwangju, but they would devote half their time to education policies.(155)

Further conferences between the two departments resulted in another agreement reached in November 1947. Under this, the Department of Public Health and Welfare was conceded full responsibility and authority to examine, license, and register nurses and midwives; to establish minimum entrance requirements, minimum curricula, and maximum standards of proficiency for all schools of nursing; and to inspect all schools of nursing and their activities to determine which schools met with prescribed standards and could therefore be accredited. Responsibility and authority for the operation of any school of nursing, including financing, supply, supervision, and administrative control, was to remain with the

agency operating the hospital to which the school of nursing was associated. Furthermore, the Department of Public Health and Welfare was to continue supervision of the Taegu and Kwangju Medical Colleges hospital schools of nursing with the understanding that, eventual control would be assumed by the Department of Education when it was prepared to do so. Textbooks and nursing educational material were to be prepared by the two departments jointly, with the Educational Committee of the Korean Nurses' Association acting as co-ordinating agency. Public Health and Welfare further agreed to give full consideration to any recommendations submitted by the Department of Education concerning the composition of the Nurses and Midwives Licensure Board. On its part, the Department of Education appended a statement in which it declared that it would "feel obligated at all times to help with educational activities in which it is qualified, and when it can be of help, in any project and in any School of Nursing where the Department of Public Health and Welfare requests or invites us to do so".(156)

Veterinary Training. Among the aims of the Department of Education was the establishment of veterinary medicine on the professional level. This was greatly needed, for out of 1,776 licensed veterinarians in Korea in 1943, only 251 were graduates of college or university courses. Of the latter 219 were Japanese, who had held all the important positions, and 32 were Koreans. These 32 Koreans were the only true veterinarians practicing among

an estimated two million domestic animals, excluding poultry and pets, in South Korea in the fall of 1947. The rest of the burden fell upon several hundred "veterinarians" with at most only ten or eleven years schooling.(157)

Under the Japanese and until 1946, veterinary medicine was a course taught at agricultural middle schools, wherein eleven years of total education was sufficient for recognition as a graduate veterinarian. The curriculum was quite general in nature, with stress on animal husbandry, agronomy, and other agricultural subjects. In addition, a three-year course of continued veterinary medicine and animal husbandry was offered at Suwon Agricultural College. Graduates of this college had had a total schooling of thirteen to fourteen years. Supplementing these two categories, there was a third, of "limited veterinarians", men with less than middle school training who passed a special examination. These constituted approximately ten per cent of the total.

In 1946 middle school veterinary training was discontinued. For the time being only Suwon Agricultural College was offering courses with a mixed curriculum of veterinary science and animal husbandry. These, it was recommended, should be separated and veterinary education raised to full college rank under Seoul National University. Both proposals were rejected, however, and during the ensuing year veterinary education became "progressively worse", according to a subsequent report by Veterinary Affairs Advisor.

In July 1947, the Board of Regents of Seoul National University agreed to the establishment of a School of Veterinary Medicine. Entrance requirements were then raised to 12 years of prior education, the same as for other university students. The four year veterinary curriculum became similar in professional subjects to the curricula of advanced veterinary colleges elsewhere in the world. Graduates would receive the degree of Bachelor of Veterinary Science and with additional study could obtain that of Master of Veterinary Science and, eventually, the doctorate.(158) By 1950, it was planned, there would be a pre-veterinary college year during which approximately thirty credit hours would be utilized on these subjects.(159)

Veterinary education fell into three categories, formal education, re-education of graduate veterinarians, and an information and education program for the general public. The purpose of this last was to inform the public on the veterinary profession as a whole. In furtherance of it, a regular feature entitled "Animal Health" was included in the magazine Farmer's Weekly. This stressed disease prevention, importance of qualified veterinary diagnosis and treatment as against home treatment, and information of general interest and value to farmers. Press releases and articles were issued at various times to stimulate understanding and cooperation among members of the medical and veterinary professions. Posters and displays were utilized to promote and

publicise veterinary medicine. The purpose behind this re-education of graduate veterinarians was to raise the professional standards of practicing middle school and lower college graduates and put them abreast of recent developments. Short courses during vacation periods at the School of Veterinary Medicine and for field demonstration teams and extension work were scheduled.(160)

In July 1947, the veterinary advisor reported that, "though relatively little of a concrete nature has been accomplished", there had been definitely created an "increased awareness" of veterinary medicine and of the education, capabilities, and responsibilities of the veterinary profession, together with its relation to other professions and occupations.(161) A year later, the Veterinary Affairs Advisor of the Department of Public Health and Welfare reiterated earlier criticisms of the failure to raise the school to college level. In a report submitted to the Chief Advisor, Department of Education, he declared:

> There is a fear in the faculty and student body that the school will be absorbed and moved to another college and be relegated to a minor role as before. It is strongly felt that if veterinary education in Korea is to reach the level of veterinary education in other countries, the school must be raised to college level. This action would give representation on the Board of Regents and Deans' Council, continued advancement in the physical plant and faculty, an opportunity for gradnates to obtain advanced degrees in foreign schools on equal footing with the others, security and a boost in morale to the profession as a whole both in the light of recognition and prestige.

On the credit side, however, was an improvement in enrollment totals. In the school year 1947-48, the School of Veterinary

Medicine had an enrollment of 29 freshmen, 3 sophomores, and 4 juniors. A further 57 were enrolled in a special pre-veterinary course which would permit them to meet the requirement of 12 years of prior education and enter as freshmen the following year. Most of these apparently did qualify, for in September 1948 a 1948-49 enrollment of "approximately 50 freshmen, 40 sophomores, 6 juniors, and 4 seniors" was anticipated. The additional students above freshman grade were graduates of Suwon Agricultural College who had passed the examinations or "otherwise qualified for the particular class".(162)

Psychology Teaching. Prior to 1945, psychology as taught in Korea consisted of a little of each of animal and theoretical psychologies, representing the influence of German psychology through the Japanese. There was no planned curriculum, while courses were mere titles without coordinated content, schedule, or systematic reference. Hardly any course covered the general subject matter, for either the teacher was not fully prepared, or he did not "have time". A field survey in 1946 disclosed this attitude was not only predominant among teachers but also among students, whose instructors taught them approximately a fifth of the subject matter. The students were also handicapped by lack of textbooks or reference materials. From this survey it was deduced that curricula, courses of study, and teaching materials must be developed and textbooks and manuals published. Too, the

Psychology Department at Seoul National University would have to be developed into a demonstration center for all other colleges and universities where new methods in teaching could be learned and psychological knowledge disseminated, and the psychology library in Seoul National University re-organized for the purpose of facilitating the new methods of teaching and learning.(163)

On 26 May 1947, a general plan for setting up a laboratory for tests and measurements was presented to the Director, and Deputy Director and to the Adviser, Deputy Adviser, and other interested American personnel in the Department of Education. Following their favorable reaction, a detailed plan was drafted and presented to the Director and Adviser of the Department of Education in July 1947. This was approved and initial plans were made for the installation of the laboratory. Authorities of the laboratory hoped to make this unit self-supporting under the direction of the Department of Education and desired that it be located near Seoul National University so that the faculty and qualified students could receive benefits from employment, research facilities, and technical training.(164) The objectives of the laboratory were to construct tests of intelligence, personality, and educational achievements, and objective tests and essay examinations of certain types for entrance or transfer students, as well as to disseminate knowledge as to how these tests could be used profitably.(165)

By the end of 1947 the laboratory was functioning successfully

within the framework of existing facilities. Instead of the lecture method used under the Japanese, students themselves performed experiments in the laboratory and recorded their results. The laboratory curricula had been increased to include general sensory processes and learning and efficiency tests, and plans were underway for the institution of placement guidance tests. (166)

VIII - TEACHER INSTITUTES

In all branches of education lack of trained teaching personnel had been the greatest of the many problems facing the Department of Education. This acute shortage became apparent in South Korea soon after the occupation began in 1945. One middle school in Seoul had eight hundred students and only eight teachers. Such conditions existed in all schools on all levels and were the direct result of the stripping of Japanese teachers from the schools for repatriation to Japan and Korean teachers' reluctance to accept ill-paid positions at a time when the cost of living was high and many more remunerative jobs were open.(167)

One of the greatest needs was that of graduate study and additional training for the teachers and educators of Korea. Repatriation of Japanese professors and instructors left vacant fully four-fifths of the teaching positions in public higher educational institutions. These were filled by Koreans who were precipitately promoted from lower ones or employed from the outside. Many of these new teachers occupied important posts in college and university teaching work and yet lacked proper background, training, education, and experience. Administrators without proper qualifications and experience added to the general destruction of higher education.(168)

Teacher training methods were studied with a view to consolidating and shortening courses. However, at the end of 1947, two efforts at teacher institutes had failed, and the situation was still critical. The first of these was the Winter Institute, held during the winter vacation of 1946 and 1947. Its results could "hardly be called successful," according to a report to the Bureau of Higher Education.

> Perhaps this is due primarily to three things: 1. Lack of long and careful planning, 2. lack of interested, willing and cooperative personnel, and 3, the inappropriateness of much material presented at the Institute which did not serve the real needs and desires of those attending. And since none of us fully understand the attitudes of the Korean teachers in this respect, long, detailed, and careful planning with these people regarding the character of such an Institute is positively essential to the interest, cooperation, respect for the Americans participating, and satisfaction with the results. Bad results cannot be undone easily, and seriously impair the efforts many of us are making. For these reasons, such Institutes should not be held until we are assured of their success. Even the time of our Institute, seemed to them an attempt to detract from their Institute, and was rather insulting to them for obvious reasons.(169)

The second form of training offered was a lecture series. Its results were even more unhappy. Early in May 1947, after a conference between American Korean personnel of the Bureau of Higher Schools and Teacher Training, a series of lectures on the general topic of Higher Education in the United States was planned. Lectures were held on successive Saturday afternoons at Seoul National University. At the first lecture (24 May) seventy-five

teachers were present, but only thirty appeared at the second. The decline was then so rapid that by the fifth lecture only four persons were in attendance. The three remaining scheduled sessions were cancelled. Although the subjects were carefully chosen and represented those most often asked about by Korean teachers, it was apparent that teachers were not interested in learning American methods. In preparing the lectures, planning of details had been turned over to Korean personnel in the Department of Education, but some believed that the series might have failed because the Americans had originally proposed the forum. The speakers selected had had considerable experience, held doctoral degrees, and could not be regarded by the Koreans as inexperienced and ill-informed. Yet, despite seemingly careful planning, the lecture-series was unsuccessful.

This failure brought to the fore several questions which had persistently dogged the Department. Did the Koreans want to learn American methods, and were these teachers, largely Japanese-trained, actually anxious to change procedures? Was the attitude of Korean teachers towards institutes and such forms of training so different from that of American teachers that a voluntary plan of attendance was needed from the start? Experience in Korea indicated that Korean college teachers disliked being in the positions of students. Consequently, was it wise to schedule such programs of teacher improvement which cost several hundred thousand dollars

without advance guarantee of attendance? A check of library records in Korean colleges and universities showed a great lack of interest on the part of Korean college teachers in reading. After two years of Military Government, college teachers seldom actively sought information which was related to changing of teaching policies. Thus came the last and most important question: Were the Americans assuming existence of greater interest and desire on the part of the Korean teachers for their self-improvement than really existed? As the Advisor stated, "We could not with assurance answer these questions at present, but we are aware that they must be answered with reasonable accuracy before other lecture-series or institutes devoted to similar purpose should be attempted".(170) By January 1948, little more had been accomplished in higher educational training institutes, although college teachers were apparently beginning to evince more curiosity in the procedures of modern education. This was perhaps an awakening to the advancement of education in the outside world from which they had been so long cut off.

The strange apathy of Korean college teachers was noted by the Arndt Mission, who stated that the faculty members of colleges and universities were graduates of higher institutions in Japan or Korea, but that they had had little graduate work and few had had specific teaching preparation. The Mission pointed out that college teachers would have to have "a thorough preparation in

the subjects they will teach", and that normal college staffs would require complete re-training with instructions "that will be able to demonstrate to them desirable teaching methods".(171)

In July 1947, the Adviser of Higher Education reported that it was "perhaps a reasonable estimate" to say that only "ten to twenty per cent of our college or university teachers are trained for their jobs, by anything like American or even Japanese standards". He continued,

> Yet we have done nothing to improve the situation. We have no functioning graduate school in Korea, where college teachers can be trained, or any group of experts available for it. We need a single channel developed to America from the Bureau of Higher Education to develop the interest of the American Universities in Korea at present into graduate fellowships for many students. We must be in a position to advise many such benevolent foundations in America as the Rockefeller Foundation.(172)

IX - EDUCATION OF KOREANS ABROAD

In August 1947 the Advisor declared that in establishing an efficient educational system in Korea, there must be a "nucleus of teachers who want, understand, and are trained to develop professional and non-professional types of education in the Colleges and Universities". There was a great need for further training of teachers and students in the United States. There they could learn modern methods in all fields of professional endeavor and return to Korea to teach the many future teachers who could never hope to study abroad. "We are neglecting to plan for, tomorrow when we do not send future teachers to America, which is Korea's principal hope of ever being able to teach these things to its own people".(173)

Korean Students in the United States. During the early spring months of 1947, direct contact was made with colleges and universities in America. Through correspondence the question of fellowships for Korean students was brought to the attention of American schools. Many of these higher institutions were willing to accept Korean students, but none of them could pay full costs although they agreed to furnish tuition, tuition and fees, or tuition and other costs excepting travel. The institutions varied in their offers, but the majority agreed to furnish tuition only to students qualified for such benefit. Letters of inquiry to many American medical colleges brought favorable responses. However,

it was necessary for medical students to complete their undergraduate work in Korean schools before they could hope to enter American schools. The vice-president of the University of Hawaii visited Korea to obtain direct information on the situation, and to inform the Korean Department of Education that his university was desirous of aiding the fellowship program. Korea, however, would have to be responsible for travel expenses. But with all these offers and with the increasing awareness in American colleges of Korean needs, Military Government lacked funds for aiding fellowship students in their travel or subsistence during their study. Thus the main stumbling block in the way of sending teachers abroad for study was the absence of an exchange rate between the Korean won and the United States dollar. Lack of a definite fund for travel of such people and for subsistence money while they were in America precluded acceptance of tuition scholarships to American schools when they were offered. The final block was the students' inability to use their own money for such purposes. Only those students who received money in dollars through friends in America were able to take advantage of the offers.(174)

In mid-January 1948, seventy-one male and forty female Koreans were studying in the United States. Only a few of them, all post-graduate students, were really adequate in English. Seventeen were allowed to go only after arrangements had been made for them to study English in America. A majority were aided by private

individuals and organizations who guaranteed their tuition, living, and travelling expenses.(175)

Through arrangements made by the Bureau of Higher Education, Korean delegates were invited to the Fourth International Cancer Research Congress in St. Louis in 1947. Expenses of the president of the Taegu Medical College, one of the representatives selected, were paid by the Danforth Foundation in America. A second delegate, the Dean of the Graduate School, Seoul National University, was taken care of by Mission Board funds. He was likewise enabled to make studies in pathological laboratories for three months before his return to Korea.(176) But even with these representatives and students seeking higher training in the United States, the vast needs of Korea in all fields of education obviously would require a growing stream of students going abroad in future years if there was to be any noticeable benefit or aid from their efforts in establishing a progressive educational system in Korea.

For students going to America under private auspices, the Bureau of Higher Education attempted to set up an advisory board to investigate qualifications and to recommend to American institutions those whom it considered qualified. Because ill-prepared students sponsored under private auspices would create a bad impression in American schools, this board was to act as an advisory service unit for American agencies abroad and Korean agencies

in Korea.[177] In late summer 1947, to further implement the fellowship program, the Advisor to the Bureau of Higher Education recommended that:

> 1. Korean candidates for American fellowships should be chosen months in advance and more emphasis given to preparing them for their life in America and for improving their mastery of English; 2. all agencies of Military Government should be informed about the new Advisory Board and that it stands ready to examine the qualifications of and to approve candidates for graduate study in America; and 3. the South Korean Interim Government should establish a fund for use as a travel and subsistence fund for Korean Graduate Fellows and Scholars approved by the Bureau of Higher Education.[178]

The Board was short-lived, and the Advisor's recommendations went unheeded. It was foredoomed by lack of stabilized connections with American agencies and by the antipathy of the Koreans, who most often were not prepared for study in America, but who were so desirous of obtaining that privilege that they were reluctant to have their qualifications examined. Nothing was done, however, to provide government funds for travel and subsistence. This condition still existed in the spring of 1948.[179]

Program for Fellowships. Up to mid-summer 1947, higher education had had little chance to work out a fellowship program. The only contact made with American societies had been that of the Department of Public Health and Welfare with the Rockefeller Foundation for the furtherance of aiding public health. However, during the summer of 1947, on the occasion of the visit of Dr. Fahs and Dr. Evans of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Bureau of

Higher Education had the opportunity to present to the Foundation representatives the need for teacher improvement in all Korean colleges and universities.(180) In September 1947, Mr. John D. Rockefeller III arrived in Korea to familiarize himself with the situation in Korea. He announced no conclusions, and his survey brought no direct results; however, although his had been purely a reconnaisance tour, arrangements were made with him for reports on the Korean situation to be forwarded to the Rockefeller Foundation for its information.(181)

Correspondence with the International Office of Education was initiated in 1947, and in further attempts to procure fellowships for Koreans, contacts were made with the National Tuberculosis Association, the Commonwealth Fund, the American Medical Association, the Kellogg Foundation, the Martin Foundation, the United Nations, and the American Public Health Association. In Korea itself, the American Civilian Association of Korea was encouraged by the Bureau of Higher Education to devote its charity work to the establishment of a fund making possible the study of Korean students abroad. The Association approved this plan in August 1947, but was handicapped because the project involved giving money to Koreans, which was forbidden by its Constitution.(182) At the beginning of 1948, the granting of Korean fellowships by any of aforementioned American organizations remained in the talking and writing stage.

In August 1947, a Bureau of Higher Education report on "Educational Resources of the United States Available for the Training of Koreans" outlined the four principal types of facilities available for training Koreans: educational institutions in the United States which would award scholarships to Korean students; in-service training in governmental departments in the United States; the International Training Administration for training of foreign students in American industrial plants only; American specialists, available to train Koreans in Korea, who could be attached to universities, industrial organizations, or governmental agencies through American control and expense and who had no other duty assignment.(183) But, it pointed out, before they could make use of these facilities, Koreans had to hurdle two barriers, inadequate grasp of English and lack of monetary exchange. The report then expressed the hope that in time full advantage could be made of these American educational resources to aid Korean education in righting itself and, thus, eventually to help the Korean people in their struggle for a modern democratic society.

Arndt Mission Report. The progress made in higher education in the two and a half years following liberation was achieved under trying conditions. Although much had been accomplished in working out procedures and establishing standards, an incredible amount was yet to be done. This was reflected in the report of the Educational and Informational Survey Mission, commonly called

the "Arndt Mission", which was perhaps the best summary of actual conditions existing within the bureau in 1947. This mission, headed by Dr. C. O. Arndt, professor of education at New York University, was sent to South Korea by the United States Department of State in 1947 to examine the "status of present programs for education" and to review the program for activities during the fiscal year of 1948 as well as to ascertain the most effective uses for proposed grants-in-aid.

During its two months stay in Korea, the Arndt Mission delved deeply into college and university conditions. As a result it concluded, "In many respects, higher education is in a chaotic state. The administrative officers (Korean) are poor; facilities and equipment are wholly inadequate. Marked exceptions are found in some of the private colleges, which are comparatively well-equipped, well-staffed, and well-administered".

To combat this condition, the mission recommended that a group of educational specialists be recruited in the United States and sent to Korea for at least six months. In Korea, it proposed that a training institute be conducted which would provide "intensive short-term courses of training for educational administrative and teachers at all levels". This group would represent the fields of school administration and finance; philosophy and psychology of education; methods of teaching and reading; tests and measurements; the biological, social, and physical sciences;

audio-visual aids; curriculum construction; public administration; industrial arts; vocational teacher-training in agriculture, industrial education, home economics, health and physical education; and library science. In addition to this teaching staff, it was suggested that a director, secretary, and clerical staff for the institute be assigned.(184)

Commenting upon the Arndt Mission report, the Adviser of Higher Education declared that:

> 1. Although the list of subjects covered was good, some of them reflected a misunderstanding of the most vital needs of Korea, such as engineering education; 2. that a group of trained men in any phase of science would be handicapped in teaching advanced work by; a. the complete lack of supplies and equipment of all kinds, and b. the fact that most teachers they would instruct had not had experience in even elementary science laboratory courses and methods as practiced in America and would thus have to be taught first and second year work, and 3. that a six-month period of training would not accomplish enough under the circumstances to make it worthwhile.

After a conference with American-trained Korean educators, the advisor noted further that the Americans were making the mistake of "assuming that Japanese-trained educators are anxious to admit that their educational training and attitudes toward administration and teaching are bad". It was felt, too, that as most of the Korean professors were not trained college teachers and had been promoted rapidly to fill vacancies left by repatriated Japanese, they would not profit from a "few lectures of a re-orientation nature". The advisor ended by pointing out what he considered the "real needs" in Korean higher education — actual participation

in classwork conducted by American teachers to help students understand the American method, courses initiated on a basic level because of the fragmentary background of trainees, and the creation of an actual American College which would also assume the additional function of a graduate level institution in due time.(185)

The result of the Arndt Mission findings, however, was the initiation of plans for a Teacher Training Center "to improve the education program of Korea by training selected teachers and administrators in techniques adapted to the needs of an independent and democratic society". By the first of 1948 construction of buildings for this project had begun and a director had been selected in the United States to head the Institute.(186) The Center was scheduled to open 1 August 1948 with a staff of twenty distinguished educators from America, including specialists on agriculture, technical and vocational education, social studies, teacher training, adult education, and visual educational subjects. Approximately eight hundred Korean teachers were to be chosen by a Board of Selection set up by the National Department of Education to receive training at the Center in eight-week courses covering a period of six months. The Work Shop Plan, successful in American Schools, was to be introduced with films utilized as much as possible.(187)

X - THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE

American fellowships were cited as one of Korean education's major needs, yet had they been freely offered, the majority of Korean students could not have qualified for them due to their inability to speak the English language. Prior to the creation in February 1946 of the Foreign Education Section of the Office of Foreign Affairs, no concerted effort was made to organize and English teaching agency in Korea. Soon after the establishment of the Foreign Education Section, an English language class was begun. This was the forerunner of Military Government's first English Language School for Koreans.

In April, a schedule of classes on four instructional levels was put into effect, "based upon the experience of the State Department, which indicated that many foreign students find language difficulties the main obstruction in preparation for study in American institutions of higher learning".(188)

Korean Education Commission Recommendations. In the summer of 1946, a Korean Education Commission was sent to the United States. Impressed by the importance which educational heads of various institutions in the United States placed on extensive English training for Korean students planning to study in America, the commission on its return, recommended immediate establishment of an English Language Institute in Korea.

In view of this recommendation and because of the immediate necessity of training Korean employees of Military Government in English, the over-all function of the Institute would be the "teaching of the English Language to the Koreans, primarily so that they can prepare themselves for careers in the public service but also to qualify them for professional life". One of its basic aims was to assist students planning to study in the United States to attain at least the average level of English proficiency of freshmen classes in American colleges before they left Korea. An important further aspect was maintenance of a library so that sorely needed technical books would be available to English-speaking Koreans.(189)

On 28 October 1946, on the recommendation of the Foreign Affairs Section, supervision of the school was transferred to the Department of Education.(190) At first it was called "the English Language Institute", but in January 1947 it became the American Language Institute. This name continued in use thereafter.(191)

Development of the American Language Institute. Initially, the Institute was staffed by military personnel with enlisted men serving as teachers and an officer as director. Students were enrolled on a basis of provincial quotas recommended by Military Government Departments. Conversational English was stressed during the six-week courses offered, although a familiarization course in English and American literature at the high

school level was scheduled.(192)

Under the Department of Education, American civilian positions were established for a supervisor and four teachers, while the Office of Korea Civil Service allocated an office-assistant and a janitor. The four levels of instruction were continued, and new students were classified after an interview with the director. Nine-week courses with sixteen classes of ninety minutes each were scheduled. In order to stimulate the attendance of women students, one beginners' class was reserved solely for women. Otherwise, many women would not avail themselves of the educational opportunity offered by the Institute even though they had professional status. As a result of the special class, the registration of women was greatly increased, and the proportion of women to men was soon reduced from a one-eight ration to one-four.(193) Because of this success, the class for women was disbanded at the end of the third term, and, in May 1947, all classes became co-educational. The American Language Institute thus became the only school in South Korea which mixed students freely. The success of this experiment in free co-education was proved by the registration statistics for the October 1947 class, which listed 217 male and 95 female day school students. The ratio had been cut to almost one to two.(194)

In April 1947, the Table of Organization for the Department of Education was drastically cut. Accordingly, it was thought

advisable to close the American Language Institute, which was, more or less, an outside agency. In a resume of the situation, the Director of Education, on 17 April, recommended that the Institute be made a separate agency under the general supervision of the Department of Education with an American supervisor, four American teachers, and a Korean administrative staff to aid the supervisor.(195) On the following day, in a memorandum to the Military Governor, the Chief Advisor to the South Korean Interim Government recommended that the American Language Institute be absorbed by Seoul National University "as a department of English".(196)

This plan disconcerted the Korean students at the Institute, many of whom were of professional status and actively engaged in Military Government work. In a letter to the Director of the Institute, more than two hundred students voiced their strong protest against closing of the school.(197) They likewise formed committees which petitioned the Commanding General, USAFIK, and the Military Governor to retain the Institute for the benefit of Korean students in English. In consequence, the Institute was retained as a separate agency accountable to the Department of Education.(198)

In April 1947, the American teaching staff was increased to five teachers: in May, the Korean administrative staff was set at five. At the end of June 1947, work began on the development of a new orientation section for students going to America. Twelve volunteer teachers, American dependents and War Department

civilians, were engaged for evening extension work. With these staff additions, the Institute was enabled to inaugurate twenty day and twelve evening classes, and thus increase the total enrollment to over five hundred. But the requirements for classes staffed by the regular teachers were necessarily higher than for the evening extension courses.(199)

The class work combined in a single period covered phonetics, grammar, vocabulary, conversation, and syntax. These points were treated functionally. The basic technique was of question-and-answer discussion type. Emphasis was placed on the heard and spoken language, for although the students enrolled had already achieved a fair competence in reading and writing the English language, they were nevertheless extremely weak in hearing and speaking it. This was due mainly to the bad pronunciation acquired from their former Japanese and Korean instructors. Some had had as much as eight years of formal instruction in English, yet could not make themselves understood by an American.

Teaching materials were kept as informal as possible. No text was used at the upper levels, although American magazines, notably Life, and newspapers and mimeographed discussion material were utilized. Material such as the Bill of Rights, slanted to explain and clarify the meaning of Democracy to the students, was also used, as were press releases and various publications put out by Military Government. At the lower levels, I. A. Richard's

Basic English was used, as were visual and auditory aids. The main body of the course material, however, consisted of an introduction to contemporary American culture. The teacher attempted to familiarize the student with phases of American life which he might need to know and about which he had not learned under Japanese instructors.(200)

At the end of the term an individual oral examination was given each student. The test covered in simple sentences, idioms and the correct forms of nouns, verbs, and prepositions; ability to pronounce; answering questions after listening to a conversation between the director and the teacher; and defining typically American collequial expressions.(201) This form of examination was successful and tended to become more standardized through usage.

Since the teachers in the Institute were American and knew no Korean, no translation was involved in the instruction. This direct method of teaching English was supplemented by demonstration. The teachers brought into the classroom such items as spices, celery, cooking utensils, wash cloths, bath towels, cereals, and sewing kits, with which to build a visual and verbal picture of American life and customs. On one occasion, they set an American table with complete dinner service while discussing Western eating habits and manners. Quite often the instructors introduced pictures of famous places in the United States, such as Times Square and the National Capitol. Wedding snapshots were exhibited and

and marriage customs discussed. In this manner Koreans were introduced to life in America and at the same time enabled to pick up the ordinary mode of American speech that would be beneficial to them should they ever need it.(202)

Progress to Mid-1947. By June 1947, teaching materials had been developed and systematized. A complete course of study had been devised, which was used for the first time in an experimental six-weeks term beginning 11 August involving use of flash cards and other visual aids. At the close of the term, it was felt that this course had been so highly successful that its curriculum could be standardized for full usage.(203)

Age distribution in the student body ranged from seventeen to fifty-five years, while the occupational fields represented included civil service employees of Military Government and specialists in the professions of medicine, journalism, welfare, and teaching. Up to January 1948, however, the largest single occupational group studying at the American Language Institute was teachers.(204)

With the exception of personnel salaries, no funds, either Korean or American, were allocated to the American Language Institute in 1946. For the Korean fiscal year beginning 1 April 1947, the Institute was allocated a Korean budget of 229,400 won. As salaries alone totaled 162,000 won, the Institute obviously had to operate on a small financial scale. In September 1947, the Institute's Korean Administrator requested a budget of 713,500 won for the year 1948-49.(205)

In November 1946, branch schools were opened in Pusan and in Cheju-do. These schools were established to prepare students for consideration for scholarship awards in districts distant from Seoul. Both schools were administered in the same fashion as the parent Institute in Seoul, but no official positions were open for teachers. Here again volunteers were recruited to take over the duties of teaching.

In Seoul, evening sessions in the English language began before creation of the Institute. They were carried on under the Korean Civil Service in the Foreign Affairs Section and were staffed with army personnel. When the American Language Institute was organized, evening sessions were not considered at first. But many employees with responsible jobs in the Military Government and medical students hampered by long laboratory periods could not attend day school. The Institute, therefore, initiated night school courses (17 February 1947). These evening classes of the Institute were operated by regular teachers of the Institute while the evening volunteer extension system came under the supervision of the Institute only so far as materials and aid were concerned.

In the summer of 1947, summer institutes for Korean middle school teachers of English were inaugurated at Seoul, Pusan, and Taejon. They were attended by fifty students each, who spent six hours a day for two weeks in learning American pronunciation,

class techniques, and methods of teaching English. The first summer institutes were successful, and plans were made to conduct these classes during both the summer and winter vacation periods.(206)

Confronted with a serious textbooks shortage, the Institute staff improvised and drew up their own subject material for English teaching. During the summer, the staff brought together a textbook which was used for the first time in the fall of 1947 in the Kyonggi Girls' and Kyonggi Boys' Schools. The book was based upon a simplified but practical oral usage, and, after initial testing, was standardized for usage as the basic textbook for English in middle schools. Plans were made to publish these books during the early part of 1948.(207)

Teaching English by Radio. From time to time, radio had been considered as an appropriate medium for teaching English. In December 1946, the Institute broadcast over the local Korean station. The student committee in charge chose as its subject for discussion, "The Status of Women in Korea". The script required the services of four students, led by a moderator, with the rest of the participating class singing Christmas carols at the end of the broadcast. Less successful was an attempt during the summer of 1947, to co-sponsor an English language lesson three evenings a week with the Department of Public Information. The Korean director in charge of the program insisted on using the translation method of teaching, but the Institute did not advocate this method and

felt it could not collaborate with the radio director unless he altered his methods of English teaching.(208)

Included among the long-range plans of the Institute was one to develop a research division which would be responsible for compilation of English language textbooks to be used in Korean schools. This would be followed by the establishment of a library of books in English — especially technical volumes — where Koreans could obtain the information they desired. A language clinic where problems having a physiological basis, as for example, lisping, and corrective techniques for pronunciation difficulties would be considered was also planned. Inclusion of these phases of language study would aid in creating for the Orient an American cultural center, "Where East and West may amicably meet".(209)

XI - STUDENT STRIKES AND OTHER DISTURBANCES

Distinct from educational activities as such in South Korea, but a nonetheless potent factor in influencing the course of the history of Education under the American Occupation was the prevalence of student strikes and comparable disturbances. The attendant turbulence indelibly marked the first two years of the Occupation, and was largely a product of the general unrest which permeated South Korea in the period. During the closing months of 1945, there was a series of outbreaks, which continued into 1946. The most important, however, was the Seoul National University strike, which began late in 1946. The disturbances themselves, however, had their origins in actual and fancied grievances directly connected with education, even though some at least were fomented by political groups for their own purposes, and political implications were nearly always present. The "May Day Incident" of 1947, however, had its roots in political agitation, though its more serious aspects rested on inter-agency frictions.

Background and General Trends. Korean students apparently were eager seekers after knowledge. Having at last flung off the yoke of oppression, students fully reflected the impatience, confusion, and bewilderment that beset their elders. The unsettled times that came in with American troops found students restless and combative. They sought to express their desires, aims, and political alliance

through the medium of striking. In South Korea, strikes among students began shortly after the liberation in September 1945. They were not confined to one school level alone but were widespread throughout middle and higher schools.

Unlike student strikes in the United States, which are usually gestures on behalf of or against a faculty member or a school policy, school strikes in Korea were accepted as major activities in the field of politics and national events. Political school strikes were an established tradition in Korea, as in China, and one nationwide strike in 1929 was still honored in 1947 in national memory as a heroic and patriotic demonstration. In North Korea, where school strikes were virtually the only expression of popular dissatisfaction, disturbances among students had arisen, but these were vigorously suppressed by Soviet authorities. (210)

The long record of student strikes in the various institutions was similar in pattern. They began suddenly, were robust in character, and quite often died as swiftly as they had started. Causes for the disturbances varied from refusal to accept principals or protest over dismissal of certain teachers and acceptance of others, to desire to attain student self-government and demonstrations against such political announcements as the Moscow Decision. The obvious fact was that all strikes were based on political partisanship. A teacher was never one who was simply not a good teacher. He was "pro-Japanese", "Rightist", or "Leftist". Students were divided as

was the faculty. Some were active in Leftist or Rightist organizations while those who remained neutral were easily led by political factions within the student body.

The many rebellions which followed Korean liberation could be used to indict Korean students as emotionally unstable and inclined to radicalism. To some extent this was true. It must be remembered, however, that they lived in an environment of economic insecurity, political excitement, and conflicting creeds and loyalties which required a violent readjustment of values. Most students earnestly desired to study, but many were immature judged by American standards and were, in character, prone to mob behavior. Under Japanese rule, they had developed habits of surreptitiousness, conspiratorial methods, and the use of grapevine channels. Too, students comprised what was probably the most vocal unit in Korea. Certainly it was the one which came into greatest contact with Korean homes and, consequently, the most vulnerable to use by power politicians.

Middle School and College Strikes. In the fall of 1945, a Seoul middle school principal charged that the main source of trouble in the middle schools was the activity of communistically-inclined college and university students who stirred up the youngsters. Led by university students favoring the left wing "People's Republic Party", there existed a student society which reached into the middle schools with the purpose of controlling political partisanship. Such control was felt most in the middle schools following the Moscow

Trusteeship announcement of 29 December 1945, when students took an active part in demonstrations against the decision. In one flare-up, a fifteen-year old Seoul student was seriously injured in a partisan-inspired student raid on communist headquarters. In an effort to halt such riots among middle school students, alarmed military officers in the Department of Education prepared an order which allowed study of various governments but banned indoctrination and student participation in partisan political activities. This order, which became effective in January 1946, gave school officials the power to break strikes. Through it middle school disturbances were finally controlled.

Student upheavals in higher schools were most serious and least easily handled. Minor agitations were frequent and usually swiftly settled. Occasionally a strike was stalemated and both sides dropped the troublesome issues, as in the three-week long Seoul Normal College strike of October 1945. This began with student refusal to accept the appointment of a new principal, and ended in a demand for student self-government to administer the school and to approve faculty appointments and curriculum. The strike was settled by the Department of Education with no concessions to the students and no punishments.

Out of the many short-lived strikes, those of the Kwangju and

Kongju Normal Schools best illustrate the varied causes of student uprisings. In an attempt to force re-admittance of students expelled by Japanese authorities prior to 15 August 1945, Kwangju normal students turned in blank examination papers. On 19 December 1945, the principal expelled all students who had participated. On 25 December, upon advice of the alumni, the students apoligized and were allowed to return to their classes. The Kongju Normal School strike began on 12 December 1945. At the time the principal was in Seoul on business. Four teachers of the school called a meeting of all students and teachers in order to force the resignation of the gymnastic instructor. The principal suppressed the agitation on 18 December, and the teachers who led it resigned.

Although a great many rebellions were of the Kwangju and Kongju type, others were more serious and involved. Conflict between new and old teachers of the Chunchon Normal School broke out on 28 November 1945 and became so intense that it spread to students, parents, and townspeople. The acting principal, who previous to liberation had been a teacher in the school, was charged with extensive cooperation with the Japanese. Many of the opposition had ambitions to make another Korean of their choice principal. The Department of Education heard complaints from both sides and had the Military Government team at Chunchon investigate and report. The Department then appointed still a third Korean as principal. Both the acting principal and his would-be successor resigned, and the school reopened on 20 December 1945.

The Taegu Normal College strike was a chronic affair flaring up at various times from 18 October to 20 December 1945. Two main reasons for it were refusal of students to accept the acting principal and their demand that the college be raised to university status. In the controversy in which students and teachers took sides, part of one school building was destroyed and five teachers and many students injured. The principal resigned, and another was appointed upon recommendation of the Military Governor. Students who led the strike were expelled. The remainder accepted the new principal and the establishment of the school upon a college instead of a university basis.(211)

Seoul National University Strike. Probably the most important, and certainly the most violent, of all student strikes was at the Seoul National University. The controversy commenced with the proposed merger of ten colleges in the Seoul area into one university in accordance with Ordinance No. 102. The proposal met strong opposition from both students and faculty, and became the cause, or at least excuse, for prolonged demonstrations.

Although the formal merger was made in August 1946, actual trouble did not begin until registration for the fall semester in October. On the surface, the strike reflected concern of students over resignations and dismissals of left-wing professors, along with their disapproval of the merger of the several independent colleges within the university. Basically, the strike resulted

from a well-organized Leftist propaganda campaign against anti-Leftist educational authorities, the influence of professors who disliked the merger, and the over-all political unrest and economic dislocation in South Korea. With the closing of several colleges until 3 February 1947, Military Government attempted to make some necessary adjustments. Students were not satisfied with these, and the strike was resumed in February, when it spread to many middle schools as well as technical and normal colleges throughout South Korea, reaching even Cheju-do.

Demands of the strikers included abolition of the Seoul National University plan. When the general outline for the merger was released in July 1946, it had met with cool reception from the press, professors, and students. Representatives of the left wing "Educators' Association" protested the merger to the Military Governor, while the Extreme Rightist press quoted medical students as objecting to consolidation on the ground that Korea needed more medical schools. The Leftist press objected to the merger on grounds that too much control would be vested in the Board of Regents. Shortly before promulgation of the Ordinance, the Extreme Leftist press reported claims of the "Students' Joint Fighting Committee" that ninety per cent of the people were against the merger. Publication of the ordinance brought further press attacks and mass resignation of professors.

On 14 February 1947, a joint conference of the Department of

Education and nine deans of the colleges decided to replace the president of the university and members of the Board of Regents with "capable Koreans" selected by the chiefs of each department of the Military Government subject to approval by the Assembly and the Military Governor. Politicians could not be elected, and the chief of the Department of Education could not join the board. This proposal was assailed by both the Students' Joint Fighting Committee and the Leftist press, who claimed that it violated university autonomy by placing authority in hands of appointees of the officials. On 19 February, the then newly-appointed Civil Administrator, Ahn Chai Hong, promised that the problems of the university would be solved by the Department of Education in accord with the principles of democracy. He stated that the Board of Regents would be "appropriately selected", but students were to return to school on 3 March. The Students' Fighting Committee declared this solution below their expectations, claiming that the Seoul National University Plan itself was undemocratic and should be abolished. Moreover, they expressed their resentment at being ordered unconditionally back to school. On 3 March, the strike was still under way.

On 7 March 1947, recommendations of the Education and Welfare Committee presented to the Interim Legislative Assembly reiterated the previous suggestion that a non-political board of prominent Koreans be established in which the Department of Education would not be represented. Additional provisions included Koreanizing personnel,

raising salaries of professors, and improving university facilities. Left Wing members of the Assembly criticised these new proposals on the ground that there was insufficient teaching personnel to run a consolidated university. Furthermore, they demanded that Education Department heads resign because of the strike. Right Wing members said the strike was due to outside influences. Because of these attacks in the Assembly, the proposals were returned to the Education and Welfare Committee for modification.

Factors behind the University Strike. Reports indicated that much of the opposition to the National University plan emanated first from the professors without regard to political convictions. Faculty members, with few exceptions, objected to the plan because of loyalty to their several alma maters. They believed that the colleges were being jeopardized by "bureaucrats" who were trying to run them. These "bureaucrats" were, evidently, American-trained Koreans in the Department of Education and their appointees in the university. In substance, Korean professors, brought up under Japanese university traditions, resented changes based on American educational practices promulgated under Military Government. The misgivings of the professors became deeper when they were allegedly informed in September that resignations would be required prior to reappointment, which would come only after a stringent re-examination of qualifications. This was regarded by Leftist professors as an attempt to ease them out, and led to mass resignations in protest

against the university plan. These were tendered in the form of signatures on a petition circulated by unnamed organizers. Although about seventy percent of those signing the petition were persuaded to withdraw their signatures, at least one hundred professors and instructors persisted in their protests. These were subsequently discharged from the colleges.

Additional trouble arose from the susceptibility of professors to Leftist propaganda. An estimated ten per cent were "communists". Communists had been the first to come out in defense of many genuine grievances of the professors when no attempt had been made along these lines by either Rightists or Moderates. Professorial resistance to communistic blandishments had been greatly weakened by poor economic conditions, especially since the Democratic People's Front offered them emoluments for writing and lecturing on the side. Too, communistic propaganda found ready listeners when it asserted that, under leadership of the People's Committee, science and culture flourished in the North with professors being well cared for in that region. It was stated, however, that although professors had some reason for dissatisfaction with the Seoul National University plan and with conditions in general, "It is unlikely that many of them would take part in a student strike".

Efforts of the authorities and the legislature to adjust a difficult situation were clearly directed towards meeting the wishes of professors rather than those of students. In March 1947, further

struggles with the faculty were still centered on: opposition to the Seoul National University plan; demand for self-government by professors and students; reinstatement of dismissed professors; demand for the resignation of the heads of the Department of Education.

Faculty members had a number of grievances, some arising from the University plan, some from other causes. They had lost considerable academic autonomy and individual authority when the Board of Regents assumed prerogatives which, under the Japanese, had belonged to the university faculties. Equalization of the status of university professors and the lowly teachers in technical colleges irritated the former, while professors holding preferred positions in smaller independent colleges found their prestige reduced in a large university. Heavy teaching loads incidental to personnel shortage was likewise a strain. Complaint was made, too, of alleged disparity of status with other civil servants. On the economic side were the potent factors of low pay, inadequate housing and transportation, and absence of special rations. Although these were standard charges, the Leftists usually made additional allegations concerning dismissal of Leftist professors and uncertainty of tenure under an allegedly political Board of Regents, lack of academic freedom, failure to consult professors before drafting the Seoul National University plan, and presence of "pro-Japanese reactionaries" in the Department of Education and in various schools who "profiteered" in the university. Thus, the situation of the faculty in the university was complicated

not only by the problems peculiar to that institution but by problems which were common to all Korea.

The part played by students themselves in the strike was open to debate, and the Department of Education felt that the students were led by a small faction of campus "Reds" who did not represent the desires of the majority. Rightists were prone to blame "outside influences", while Leftist politicians flatly denied complicity in the strikes and insisted that they were a genuine mass democratic movement among the students.

University authorities estimated that Extreme Rightists and Extreme Leftist each accounted for from ten to fifteen per cent of student strength, with the balance of the student body normally neutral but easily swayed by mob instincts. The students themselves felt that a far greater proportion of the student body was active politically. Leftists were confident of influencing a majority of the students, while Rightists admitted only that Leftists were better organized and enjoyed the leadership of Leftist instructors. Rightists were split into factions which were insecurely united by the anti-trusteeship movement. One characteristic of the student body was that approximately eight per cent of the eight thousand enrolled students supported themselves by working after school hours. Moreover, because of inflation and impoverishment of the middle classes, this number grew steadily. Despite social and political differences, there existed in the university a spirit of self-protection and unity,

common among subjugated peoples, which made an investigation into the causes of the strike difficult. Most students were imbued with a nationalism "frequent verging on the anti-foreign".

Student complaints were directed at the University plan itself, economic conditions, and inadequacies of the faculty and of university equipment. The longer courses of study envisaged in the reorganization, along with laboratory requirements, recitations, compulsory attendance, and mid-term examinations, called for a greater amount of work than the traditional Japanese plan based on lecture method. Lack of dormitories, special rations, and other offsets to living costs formerly available under the Japanese was a further strong irritant. Shortage of teaching personnel brought elimination of certain subjects and frequent cutting of classes by professors, while some teaching personnel was of obviously low caliber. They felt, too, the lack of textbooks, laboratory equipment, and fuel. To these, Leftist students usually added lack of self-government and police interference in schools.

These last two points were vigorously denied by the Department of Education and by University authorities. General student associations had been formed with the consent of the individual colleges; however, it appeared that these had been taken over by Leftist organizers who subverted them for strike purposes. Charges of police intervention stemmed from two separate occurrences when police had invaded the campus to prevent threatened violence and property destruction. Nevertheless, it was true that police had their own scores to settle

against various student organizations. During February 1947, they arrested fifty or sixty students in their homes. It was felt generally that demands of students for no police interference were an attempt to secure immunity before trouble started.(*)

Korean Public Opinion and the University Strike. Common sentiment among the Korean populace was that insufficient attention had been given to student demands and problems, with the result that students felt both slighted and insulted. Samples of left wing propaganda and editorials indicated that this mood was deliberately exploited by strike leaders.

The major issues of the strike were never specifically settled, and expelled students gradually filtered back to classes when allowed. In August 1947, the Extreme Left newspaper Dok Lib Sinbo reported:

> Almost all the students who took part in the strike in Seoul National University have been allowed to return to their respective colleges. The number of students not allowed to come back follows: Law, 42; Preparatory School, 53; College of Commerce, 466; Fine Arts, 25; Music, 28; Applied Science, 75; Teachers College, 20; Literature and Science, 17; Agriculture, 9. (212)

By the end of 1947 student strikes had ceased to be an active menance to the educational system. With the Seoul National University strike ending with the return of professors and most students to class, there was a gradual termination of school disturbances. After fall enrollment in the various schools in 1947, there were virtually no strikes. The walkouts which did occur from time to time were quickly

* However, for other police activities in schools, see May Day Incident.

settled or died out of their own accord. Students threatened to strike, but the movements lost ground before they were organized and proceeded no further than the talking stage. Student turmoil and confusion had apparently come to an end, but there could be no definite assurance that another series of demonstrations would not break out at any time.(213)

The "May Day Affair" of 1947. Intermingled with student strikes was one disturbance which was basically political in character. Not in itself a strike, the "May Day Affair" stemmed from the 1946 policy of prohibiting middle-school student participation in political rallies. Its greatest significance rather was that it served to underscore friction between the National Department of Education and the City of Seoul Department of Education.

On 11 May 1947, a Korean news release reported, "The girls' schools that expelled the students responsible for mobilizing fellow students for the occasion of celebrating May Day, are asked by the American Advisor to Education, City Hall, to accept a lenient policy, having them come back to school." General A. L. Lerch, Military Governor, in a memorandum to the American Advisor to the National Department of Education, commented upon this release, "If this is true, I wish the 'American Advisor' would stay out of the news".(214)

Early in 1946, orders forbidding students to take part in political gatherings and demonstrations were well publicized over the radio and through press releases.(215) As May Day 1947 approached,

there were increasing rumors that attempts were being made by Leftist political parties to obtain student participation in a May Day rally to be held on Nam San (South Mountain).(216) To forestall May Day activity by students, the National Director of Education telephoned all provinces reiterating the prohibition against student political activity. The Seoul City Director thus received verbal notification that the students might strike on May Day, but he averred later that he did not receive word that students were not to attend the Nam San celebration. Amid the haste to disseminate the new verbal warning, no English version had been prepared and the Seoul American Advisor (Mr. Burton E. Martin) was not notified.(217)

May Day Demonstrators and the Police. On May Day it was estimated that over one thousand students were absent from classes in the Seoul area, and that a great many of those attended the Nam San festival. A small number were arrested by the police and taken to a police station.(218)

On 2 May, the police reported to the Seoul American Advisor, that certain students had been arrested for disorderly conduct and requested permission for those pupils to be held from one week to ten days in a "detention room (not a jail cell)". The Advisor agreed that this could be done as a means of reprimanding the errant students. However, on the same day, the police "without permission of the Chief of Seoul Police or the knowledge of the Seoul City Board of Education entered the schools, and, with the aid of principals

and teachers who revealed the names of absentees on 1 May, rounded up a great number of students and took them to the police station for questioning".(219)

Among those arrested were one hundred fifty girls from the Bai Wha Girls' Middle School who were accused of having joined the Nam San celebration at the request of their ex-principal, a known member of the Communist party. The girls were alleged to have paraded in formation and carried the school banner, thus implying that the school approved the Leftist festival. They themselves denied this charge, stating that they went separately and only because they were curious and wanted to join in the festivities as members of a free, democratic school. They denied that they had any political reason for attending the celebration. Later, eight out of the one hundred fifty charged that the police had separated them from the group and taken them to the police station. After the main group had been questioned, they took the eight upstairs to different rooms, and questioned them in an offensive manner, mistreating them by slapping them on the face and pulling their hair.(220) The police denied these allegations, and in the ensuing investigation, were cleared because of lack of evidence. The investigator stated:

> The charges that the police mistreated several of the girl students apparently has good foundation. The statements of the girls in question are simple and straightforward. However, the police detectives involved all deny this vigorously. Their denial is a natural one and to be expected. However, there are no witnesses who saw any of the girls mistreated and, therefore, it is the question of one person's word against that of another. No evidence was produced or could be found upon which to base a positive opinion.(221)

On 3 May, these eight girls and several other students were permanently expelled from school, and although they pleaded for re-admittance they were not allowed to return. Their deans informed them that to re-admit them would do irreparable harm to the administration of the school. Privately, the deans declared that the students who had been expelled were former trouble-makers and that the May Day incident provided the necessary excuse for releasing them from school.(222)

Friction between National and City Department Advisors. Out of this situation arose a serious dispute between the American Advisor to the Seoul City Department of Education and the Advisor to the National Department, which received an unfortunate amount of publicity. The first positive step in this controversy was an appeal by the City Advisor to the school principals, made through the Korean press. In addition to this appeal, the Advisor prepared a statement which he regarded as highly necessary in clearing up the state of confusion which surrounded the schools. It was issued to all primary and middle school principals in Seoul and became the direct cause of the ensuing military investigation.

In his statement, the Advisor attacked the National Department, for in "not discussing it (student non-participation in Nam San rally) with us, or soliciting our opinion or waiting for it, the National Department made it clear to some members of the Department, but by no means to all, that students who attended May Day festivals should

be dealt with severely. Because some principals are fearful of their positions, and because feeling is rife that National Department gives the impression of holding the whip over many principals and teachers, all principals and a great number of teacher were placed in an awkward position".(223) In the same document, the Advisor categorically declared:

> This department goes on record as saying and believing: a. if such incidents are allowed to occur in Korean schools the danger to students and their education is very great indeed; b. all schools should readmit all students expelled after May Day; c. some principals maintain that a number of these students deserve dismissal. This department backs all principals in their efforts to punish offending students. This is always the case. But in this ticklish crisis, this department feels that; 1. students should not be expelled from schools merely because they were absent from school on 1 May; 2. nor because they can be proven to have attended one of the May Day Festivals (unless they were arrested by the police at one of the festivals and that their misbehavior at festivals can be proven); 3. students who were guilty of crimes before May Day should have been expelled before that time; 4. students whose offenses were for the first time manifested on May Day, should be given severe warning and another chance; 5. that May Day should not be used as the primary measuring rod for the guilt or innocence of students.

The Advisor then took the stand that, "None of us in this Department of Education should use the police to punish those whom we ourselves should punish. This would seem to be a sign of weakness in school discipline and control". Nor, he declared, "should any teacher or principal permit police to enter schools for the purpose of arresting students and no police should at any time enter the schools without permission of this department. This policy is in complete agreement with the Chief of Police, City of Seoul".(224)

The Advisor's statement was not approved in its entirety by the Seoul City Korean Director. In his testimony he stated that he and the American Advisor did not see "eye to eye" on many matters and that the Advisor issued "statements" not in accord with the Director's own ideas.(225) The American Advisor, on his part, testified that the Korean Director never sought his advice and seldom talked to him.(226) Thus, a state of confusion reigned in the City Department of Education which resulted in bewilderment in the city schools among principals and teachers who were at a loss to know whom to please, the Director or Advisor.

The American City Advisor's clarification of policy caused a storm in the National Department. The American Advisor there (Dr. Horace H. Underwood) prepared a letter which, ignoring proper channels of communication, he sent it directly to the City Advisor. In this letter, he wrote, "Allow me to remind you that the Americans in the various departments of government are now ADVISORS and NOT Directors; allow me to further remind you that matters of over-all policy in such matters are decided by the National Department of Education and not on the Provincial level".(227)

Military Government Investigation. By the time these events had taken place, General Lerch had received the Korean press summary and a copy of the "Memorandum to Seoul City Principals and Teachers" from the American City Advisor. The Military Governor then issued a memorandum to the Office of the Special Investigator in which he

stated, "In addition to the evidence of interference by the National Department of Education, Mr. Martin tells me that he has some evidence that some of these girls were taken to the Chung No Police Station and mistreated". The Military Governor ordered, therefore, an investigation and a report with recommendations on "a. alleged interference by National Department of Education with local matters, b. reasons for failure of school principals to back up policies of educational authorities, c. alleged brutality of police".(228) The investigation was made during the period 22 May to 4 June 1947 under the authority of Military Government General Order No. 34, 19 September 1946.(229)

This investigation established that the National Department had issued a directive to the City schools before 1 May 1947, but that it was in verbal form only and not relayed to the American City Advisor. Moreover, the investigation showed, the national advisor's memorandum to Advisor Martin, reprimanding him for his clarification of policy, was not submitted through proper channels. The letter should have gone through the Chief, Civil Affairs Office, under whose jurisdiction the City Advisor came.

It was established, too, that, following the Nam San celebration, the police did enter the schools and order students who participated in the festival to the police station. Although the American City Advisor stated that the police entered the schools without permission, the Chief of Police and the Police Inspector maintained that they had had permission.

XII - TRANSFER TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

With the establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948, the American advisory staff of the Department of Education and the Department of Korean personnel collaborated in plans for formal transfer of functions to the government of the new Republic. Two meetings were held by the newly designated Minister of Education (Dr. An Ho Sang), the outgoing Director of Education (Dr. C. S. Auh), and the seven members of the advisory staff who were to be retained as essential personnel.

Meanwhile, the several advisors (including some who were not remaining) continued activities in their special fields. Most of these were routine. However, in the elementary schools, special stress was put on summer training programs for approximately 7,500 teachers, with gratifying results. "There was an enthusiasm not noticed before in the classrooms and on the campuses". A project for interchange of correspondence between students in a California high school and one of the Korean girls' middle schools was furthered. In the American Language Institute special attention was given to those students seriously contemplating study in the United States within the year. Notable among the activities in higher education was the screening of applicants for scholarships in the United States under an agreement between the United States Government and the Republic of Korea. Details were being worked out in September 1948.

During September, some important gifts from American sources to various Korean university and technical school libraries were delivered through the American advisors to the Department. Among the most noteworthy were a Smithsonian Institution donation of forty boxes of books for Korean universities and a collection of approximately two hundred medical journals to Severance Medical School. The American advisory staff likewise served as intermediary in the preparation and forwarding of photographic prints of 45,000 negatives from the Korean National Archives. This work was under way in September. One set of prints was destined for the Hoover Library at Stanford University, with a duplicate set remaining at the Korean National Archives.

On 13 September 1948, formal transfer of the Department of Education was effected. This terminated 36 months of active American participation in Education in South Korea. The principal mission of the American occupation in this field had been accomplished. However, no over-all statistical and other information was available; consequently, it was not possible for the Chief Advisor to compare and contrast conditions as of the beginning and end of American participation. It was too early, too, to attempt any solid evaluation of the actual achievement made, or to forecast with any degree of accuracy the lasting effects of American participation in and aid to Education in South Korea.(332

APPENDIX A

Extracts From USAMGIK Ordinance No. 102, "Establishment of Seoul National University", 22 August 1946, As Amended By USAMGIK Public Act No. 1, 6 May 1947

SECTION VII.

(a) "Organization

The Board of Regents of Seoul National University is hereby established. It shall consist of the President of Seoul National University (ex officio) and one member appointed by the Military Governor in Korea (but, after the period of military occupation, by the chief executive official of the government) for each of the several colleges, schools and learned faculties constituting the University. Such appointments shall be made upon recommendation of the majority of the directors of the several national departments and offices, subject to confirmation by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. Each of the appointive members of the Board shall be a Korean selected as preeminent in the active practice of the particular profession or calling he is deemed qualified to represent on the Board; provided, however, that no member of the faculty or staff employed by the University and no governmental employee shall at any time be eligible to serve on the Board as an appointive member thereof. The term of office of each appointive member thereof. The term of office of each appointive member shall be six years; provided, however, that one-third of the initial appointments to the Board shall be for a period of two years, one-third for a period of four years, and the remaining one-third for a period of six years; and further provided, that appointments to fill vacancies on the Board shall be made only for the unexpired portion of the term of the vacancy filled; and further provided, that upon creation of new seats on the Board by the establishment of additional colleges and learned faculties, each appointment thereto shall be made in such manner as to carry out the intent of this provision, which is to insure, so far as possible, the rotation of one-third of the total membership of the Board each and every two years. A quorum of the Board shall consist of a majority of the members thereof, and such quorum shall be required for the transaction of all business of the Board. No member of the Board shall at any time during his or her membership engage in any political activity other than the exercise of the right to vote. Members of the Board may be removed for cause at any time by the Military Governor in Korea (but, after the period of military occupation, by the chief executive official of the government)".

* As amended by USAMGIK Public Act No. 1, 6 May 1947

(b) Functions and Duties

(1) To establish overall policy for the government of Seoul National University;

(2) To initiate studies forthwith, and to prepare and submit detailed plans and recommendations on the basis thereof, to the director of the Department of Education, for a permanent location, buildings, campus, dormitories and other facilities, for the combined colleges, schools and learned faculties of Seoul National University, within or in the immediate vicinity of the city limits of the City of Seoul. Necessary land shall thereafter be acquired and taken by condemnation or other suitable proceedings initiated by the Director of the Department of Education in the name of the Government of Korea in the manner required by law;

(3) To tender appointment to any qualified Korean as President of Seoul National University, which, when accepted in writing, shall constitute appointment to office; provided, however, that during the temporary period of military control, the President shall be appointed by the Military Governor of Korea;

(4) To approve the merger of other schools and institutions of learning (public and private), and installations affiliated therewith into Seoul National University and to establish additional colleges, schools, institutions and learned faculties within the University as required, upon consent of the Director of the Department of Education;

(5) To recommend to the Director of the Department of Education classification scales and rates of pay for the President, member of the faculty, and executive and administrative staffs and employees of the University;

(6) To establish scholarships, grants and endowments for needy students in the University, and to establish scholastic and athletic awards;

(7) To establish entrance, matriculation, attendance, graduation and other requirements, including requirements for degrees, diplomas and certificates;

(8) To establish academic standards and scholastic requirements to be administered under the supervision of the President of the University.

(9) To establish detailed regulations for the government of the colleges, schools and learned faculties constituting Seoul National University, and the members thereof;

(10) To prescribe curricula and courses of study required to be pursued by students in attendance at the University;

(11) To accept gifts, endowments, testamentary and other bequests and trusts, grants and donations on behalf of the University; to direct the disposition and investment of the principal and interest thereof in a manner consistent with the optimum realization of the purposes of the University;

(12) To make available funds of the University to the respective colleges, schools and learned faculties of the University for disposition by the respective Deans thereof in accordance with requirements established and supervised by the President, for the furtherance of research, scholarship and learning; including, but not limited to, the granting of fellowships and the publication of professional or learned journals, books, treatises and monographs;

(13) To make recommendations to the Director of the Department of Education regarding proposed leases by or for the University; and to similarly recommend the sale and acquisition of real estate and other property of or for the University; provided, however, that at no time shall any property of the University be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered;

(14) To create scholarships and endowments for students and faculty members admitted to the University from outside of Korea;

(15) To establish tuition rates and other proper charges for those students admitted to the University who are able to defray such expenses;

(16) To establish, operate, maintain and supervise such schools as are necessary for the professional education of teachers in-training in the University;

(17) To establish rules for the conduct and guidance of the Board.

c. Remuneration. The remuneration of appointive members of the Board of Regents of Seoul National University shall be determined by the Military Governor in Korea (but, after the period of military occupation, by the chief executive official of the government). Ex officio members of the Board shall receive no remuneration for such service.

SECTION VIII. Functions and Duties of President of Seoul National University. The President of Seoul National University shall have the following functions and duties:

a. To excute the policies of the Board of Regents of the University;

b. To supervise the administration and operation of the University and the maintenance of its properties;

c. To preside at meetings of the faculty of the University;

d. To appoint the various Deans of the respective colleges, schools and learned faculties of the University, by and with the consent of the Board of Regents;

e. To nominate and pass upon prospective members of the faculty, on his initiative or upon recommendations received from the various Deans of the several colleges, schools and learned faculties of the University, and, by and with the consent of the Board of Regents and subject to requirements of law, to make appointments to the faculty of the University;

f. To appoint and discharge executive and administrative assistants and personnel and clerical and other employees in the University, within budgetary and other limitation established by the Board of Regents, and subject to requirements of law;

g. To suspend, prefer charges against and recommend to the Board of Regents the removal of any member of the faculty; provided, however, that such member of the faculty shall be served notice in writing and shall have opportunity to appear before the Board of Regents and show cause why he should not be removed. The decision of the Board of Regents shall be final in all cases;

h. To preside at commencement and graduation exercises, and to grant degrees and sign diplomas and certificates in accordance with regulations and policies prescribed by the Board of Regents;

i. To prescribe requirements for scholastic and athletic honors and to award such honors, awards, medals and certificates of proficiency or excellence;

j. To suspend or dismiss students from the University for failure in scholarship or for improper conduct;

k. To prescribe detailed regulations, within policies of the Board of Regents, for the operation of the University and for the conduct of faculty students and employees;

l. To prepare and submit periodic and special reports and budgests to the Board of Regents relative to the activities and operation of the University; to prepare and submit to the Board of Trustees the annual report of the University for each year, at the end of the school year;

m. To make recommendations to the Board of Regents, at any time, on his own initiative, relative to any aspect of the operation of the University, or for the furtherance of the objectives of the University;

n. To appoint faculty committees and boards to make continuing or special studies relative to proposed revisions of curricula, courses of study or other matters affecting the University, for submission by him to the Board of Regents with his recommendations.

APPENDIX B

Principal Sources of Information

The present study has been based on a variety of sources. For the pre-liberation period, material is in published form, two books being outstanding (item 1, 2 below). As an over-all presentation of the first ten months of the Occupation, the History of USAMGIK (item 3) has value despite its obvious limitations. For a running account of general events and particularly for student strikes and the like XXIV Corps G-2's Weekly Summary (item 4) is of value.

Several unpublished reports and other compilations have contributed heavily to present History. Some of these have been of value practically throughout; others are most restricted in scope (item 5 to 9 below). The value of this type of material has been all the greater due to the destruction by fire in 1947 of the Department of Education archives, for they have served in many cases as the only surviving sources of certain data.

Owing to this loss by fire, material "in the raw" is sparse. This original correspondence and the like has been almost completely lacking. This, however, has been in a large measure offset through personal interviews with individuals whose long service and key position qualify them as reasonably reliable sources of information. Perhaps as much as 30 per cent of the content of the History relative to the Occupation period itself has derived from interviews, as a perusal of footnotes will indicate.

Some of the more outstanding and typical specific sources are described below.

1. Chosen, Government-General of. Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen (Chosen), 1937-38. Keizyo (i.e. Seoul), December 1938.

This volume is the latest available of a series of reports produced annually with slightly varying titles by the Japanese Government-General of Chosen (Korea), and is probably the best factual and statistical account of the history of Korea under the Japanese. However, since it is a Japanese compilation intended for use by the English-speaking world, it should be used with care.

2. Underwood, Horace H., Modern Education in Korea. New York, 1926.

This work may be regarded as a reasonably reliable source of information on educational conditions in Korea. The author is the second generation of a missionary family established in Korea during the second half of the 19th Century and closely associated with educational activities. He has held, among other posts, the vice-presidency later the presidency of Chosun Christian College (Seoul) and at different time during the Occupation served as Advisor to the Military Governor (Major General A. V. Arnold), Advisor to the first Joint United States-USSR Commission, and Advisor to the Department of Education, South Korea Interim Government. In October 1947 he returned to Chosun Christian College as professor, president emeritus, and advisor to the president. In mid-1947 during his tenure as Advisor, Department of Education, Dr. Underwood prepared three further items, overlapping in nature, intended as orientation material, for which purpose they have quite positive value.

3. United States Army Military Government in Korea, Office of Administration, Statistical Research Division, History of United States Army Military Government in Korea. Period of September 1945-30 June 1946. (Ms. 3 Parts in 4 Vols., Seoul, 1947

This work covers the first ten months of Military Government Activity in Korea and is of special value for the over-all picture presented. Its greatest weakness lies in its lack of documentation.

4. XXIV Corps G-2 Weekly Summary. (S) (Seoul) 1945

This mimeographed weekly review contains up to date data of varying classification. (Its over-all classification is "Secret".). For the present purpose its value is for the running account it gives of week-by-week events in Korea and for specific detail on some developments. Thus, No. 79 (20 March 1947)

5. Report, Lieutenant Paul Anderson, Bureau of Culture, to Advisor. Department of Education, subj: Textbook problems in Korea, November 1946.

Lt. Anderson's report is the best known source of information on the textbook situation in Korea in the first year after Liberation. Though it is his version of his own activities and therefore open to possible criticism, his sincerity and honesty of purpose in personal interviews tend to lend the same qualities to his written reports.

6. Lockard, Major E. N. History of Bureau of Education from 11 September 1945 to 28 February 1946 (mimeographed).

This 41-page work by Major Lockard, at the time Director of the Bureau (later Department) of Education, is the best source of information on the period. Some pre-liberation statistics are given. That the post-liberation statistical data are open to question is no reflection on the compiler, for no information of this nature prior to late 1947 is reliable. At times other source material is at odds with Lockard's work, but it nevertheless stands as a diligent effort written in good faith.

7. Report, Educational and Informational Survey Mission to Korea, to Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, Department of State, and Chief, Civil Affairs Division, Special Staff, War Department 20 June 1947.

This report, usually called "The Arndt Mission Report", is perhaps the best account of Korean education after two years of Military Government. The Mission, headed by Dr. C. O. Arndt, professor of education, New York University, was a joint State and War Department investigative group. Dr. Arndt himself arrived on 9 April 1947 and on 3 June was joined by his colleagues. After extended preliminary orientation by Key American and Korean personnel; "Members visited in Seoul and in villages and towns in several provinces, examined pertinent documents and files, and held conferences with groups and individuals responsible for the various aspect of education and information at national, regional, and local level".

8. Report, Office of Special Investigator to the Commanding General USAMGIK, subj: Report of Special Investigation, 12 June 1947.

This report and its accompanying "exhibits" is basic to the "May Day" 1947 Affair.

FOOTNOTES

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   The form "Tyosen" is in conformity with the Japanese official system of Romanized spelling adopted in 1936. The older, more common form is "Chosen", rendered in Romanized Korean as "Chosun".

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36. Rept. Research and Special Subjects Advisor to Advisor to the Director, Dept of Educ, USAMGIK, Subj: "History and Work of Bureau of Research and Special Subjects", 6 Aug 48.

37. Dept of Educ, "Organization Chart", 1 Jan 48; interview with Mr. Peter Fugina, 30 Jan 48, by D. W. Russell

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39. Ibid., p. 27; interview with Maj. E. N. Lockard, Dir of Bur of Educ, 9 Mar 46; interview with Lt. Cmdr. A. Crofts, USNR, Foreign Affairs Sect., USAMGIK, 21 Jan 46

40. Interview with Dr. Paik Lark-Geoun, Pres., Chosun Christian College, formerly Dean of the College of Law and Literature, Seoul University, 9 Mar 46

41. Interview with Maj. E. N. Lockard, 9 Mar 46

42. "History of USAMGIK", Part II, p. 121

43. The foregoing material on textbooks is derived from Report, Lt. Paul Anderson, Advisor, Bur of Culture, to Advisor, Dept of Educ, subj: "Textbook problems in Korea", 1 Nov 46

44. Memo, Dept of Education to Mil Gov, Subj: "Textbooks", 7 Jan 47

45. Report, Bur of Textbooks to Advisor, Dept of Educ, Subj: "Textbook production and distribution", 4 Jan 47

46. Report, Advisor, Bur of Textbooks, to Advisor, Dept of Educ, Subj: "Progress Report of the Bureau of Textbooks", 22 July 47

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48. No departmental or other reports were made by Mr. (formerly Captain) Paul Anderson, Advisor, Bureau of Textbooks, between his return from Washington, D. C. and his permanent departure for Japan in April 1948. For this reason statistical and other data in this section have been taken from running accounts maintained by Korean personnel of the Bureau of Textbooks and from verbal information provided by the new advisor, Mr. Richard Werth.

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135. Interview with Dr. Edwin L. Miller, Advisor, Bur of Higher Education, 16 Jan 48, by D. W. Russell

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In this memorandum the Advisor indicates that, shortly after transfer, some potentially serious difficulties with the Minister of Education arose from his ultra-nationalistic policies, coupled with a practice of placing political appointees in key positions.

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